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Chapter 16
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Imperfect Competition
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Imperfect Competition
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Types of Imperfectly
Competitive Markets
Oligopoly
Only a few sellers, each offering a
similar or identical product to the
others.
Monopolistic Competition
Many firms selling products that are
similar but not identical.
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The Four Types of Market Structure
Number of Firms?
Many
firms
One Type of Products?
firm Few
firms Differentiated Identical
products products
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Markets With Only a
Few Sellers
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Characteristics of an Oligopoly
Market
Few sellers offering similar or identical
products
Interdependent firms
Best off cooperating and acting like a
monopolist by producing a small
quantity of output and charging a price
above marginal cost
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A Duopoly Example
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A Duopoly Example: Demand
Schedule for Water
Quantity Price Total Revenue
0 $120 $ 0
10 110 1,100
20 100 2,000
30 90 2,700
40 80 3,200
50 70 3,500
60 60 3,600
70 50 3,500
80 40 3,200
90 30 2,700
100 20 2,000
110 10 1,100
120 0 0
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A Duopoly Example: Price and
Quantity Supplied
The price of water in a perfectly competitive
market would be driven to where the marginal
cost is zero:
P = MC = $0
Q = 120 gallons
The price and quantity in a monopoly market
would be where total profit is maximized:
P = $60
Q = 60 gallons
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A Duopoly Example: Price and
Quantity Supplied
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Competition, Monopolies, and
Cartels
The duopolists may agree on a
monopoly outcome.
Collusion
The two firms may agree on the
quantity to produce and the price to
charge.
Cartel
The two firms may join together and act in
unison.
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Competition, Monopolies, and
Cartels
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The Equilibrium for an Oligopoly
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The Equilibrium for an Oligopoly
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The Equilibrium for an Oligopoly
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Summary of Equilibrium for an
Oligopoly
Possible outcome if oligopoly firms
pursue their own self-interests:
Joint output is greater than the monopoly
quantity but less than the competitive
industry quantity.
Market prices are lower than monopoly
price but greater than competitive price.
Total profits are less than the monopoly
profit.
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A Duopoly Example: Demand
Schedule for Water
Quantity Price Total Revenue
0 $120 $ 0
10 110 1,100
20 100 2,000
30 90 2,700
40 80 3,200
50 70 3,500
60 60 3,600
70 50 3,500
80 40 3,200
90 30 2,700
100 20 2,000
110 10 1,100
120 0 0
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How the Size of an Oligopoly
Affects the Market Outcome
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How the Size of an Oligopoly
Affects the Market Outcome
As the number of sellers in an oligopoly
grows larger, an oligopolistic market looks
more and more like a competitive market.
The price approaches marginal cost, and the
quantity produced approaches the socially
efficient level.
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Game Theory and the
Economics of Cooperation
Game theory is the study of how people
behave in strategic situations.
Strategic decisions are those in which
each person, in deciding what actions to
take, must consider how others might
respond to that action.
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Game Theory and the
Economics of Cooperation
Because the number of firms in an
oligopolistic market is small, each firm
must act strategically.
Each firm knows that its profit depends
not only on how much it produced but
also on how much the other firms
produce.
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma
The prisoners’ dilemma provides
insight into the difficulty in
maintaining cooperation.
Often people (firms) fail to cooperate
with one another even when cooperation
would make them better off.
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Bonnie’s Decision
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Cooperation is difficult to
maintain, because cooperation is
not in the best interest of the
individual player.
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Oligopolies as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Iraq’s Decision
High Production Low Production
Iraq gets Iraq gets
High $40 billion $30 billion
Production Iran gets Iran gets
Iran’s $40 billion $60 billion
Decision
Iraq gets Iraq gets
Low $60 billion $50 billion
Production Iran gets Iran gets
$30 billion $50 billion
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Oligopolies as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma
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An Arms-Race Game
Decision of the United States (U.S.)
Arm Disarm
U.S. at risk
U.S. at risk
Arm and weak
Decision USSR safe
of the USSR
and
Soviet at risk
powerful
Union
(USSR) U.S. safe and
U.S. safe
powerful
Disarm USSR at
USSR
risk and
safe
weak
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An Advertising Game
Marlboro’s Decision
Advertise Don’t Advertise
Marlboro gets Marlboro
$3 billion gets $2
Advertise billion profit
profit
Camel gets Camel gets
$3 billion $5 billion
Camel’s profit profit
Decision
Marlboro gets
Marlboro gets
$5 billion
$4 billion
Don’t profit
Camel gets profit
Camel gets
Advertise $2 billion $4 billion
profit profit
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A Common-Resources Game
Exxon’s Decision
Drill Two Wells Drill One Well
Exxon gets Exxon gets
$4 million $3 million
Drill Two profit
profit
Wells Arco gets Arco gets
$4 million $6 million
Arco’s profit profit
Decision
Exxon gets
Exxon gets $5
$6 million
million profit
Drill One profit
Arco gets Arco gets
Well $3 million $5 million
profit profit
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Why People Sometimes
Cooperate
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Jack and Jill’s Oligopoly Game
Jack’s Decision
Sell 40 gallons Sell 30 gallons
Jack gets Jack gets
$1,600 profit $1,500 profit
Sell 40
gallons
Jill gets Jill gets
Jill’s $1,600 profit $2,000 profit
Decision
Jack gets
Jack gets
$2,000 profit
$1,800 profit
Sell 30
gallons Jill gets Jill gets
$1,500 profit $1,800 profit
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Public Policy Toward
Oligopolies
Cooperation among oligopolists is
undesirable from the standpoint of
society as a whole because it leads to
production that is too low and prices
that are too high.
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Restraint of Trade and the
Antitrust Laws
Antitrust laws make it illegal to restrain
trade or attempt to monopolize a market.
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Clayton Act of 1914
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Controversies over Antitrust
Policy
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Resale Price Maintenance
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Predatory Pricing
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Tying
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Summary
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Summary
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Summary
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Graphical
Review
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The Four Types of Market Structure
Number of Firms?
Many
firms
One Type of Products?
firm Few
firms Differentiated Identical
products products
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Bonnie’s Decision
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Oligopolies as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Iraq’s Decision
High Production Low Production
Iraq gets Iraq gets
High $40 billion $30 billion
Production Iran gets Iran gets
Iran’s $40 billion $60 billion
Decision
Iraq gets Iraq gets
Low $60 billion $50 billion
Production Iran gets Iran gets
$30 billion $50 billion
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An Arms-Race Game
Decision of the United States (U.S.)
Arm Disarm
U.S. at risk
U.S. at risk
Arm and weak
Decision USSR safe
of the USSR
and
Soviet at risk
powerful
Union
(USSR) U.S. safe and
U.S. safe
powerful
Disarm USSR at
USSR
risk and
safe
weak
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An Advertising Game
Marlboro’s Decision
Advertise Don’t Advertise
Marlboro gets Marlboro
$3 billion gets $2
Advertise billion profit
profit
Camel gets Camel gets
$3 billion $5 billion
Camel’s profit profit
Decision
Marlboro gets
Marlboro gets
$5 billion
$4 billion
Don’t profit
Camel gets profit
Camel gets
Advertise $2 billion $4 billion
profit profit
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A Common-Resources Game
Exxon’s Decision
Drill Two Wells Drill One Well
Exxon gets Exxon gets
$4 million $3 million
Drill Two profit
profit
Wells Arco gets Arco gets
$4 million $6 million
Arco’s profit profit
Decision
Exxon gets
Exxon gets $5
$6 million
million profit
Drill One profit
Arco gets Arco gets
Well $3 million $5 million
profit profit
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Jack and Jill’s Oligopoly Game
Jack’s Decision
Sell 40 gallons Sell 30 gallons
Jack gets Jack gets
$1,600 profit $1,500 profit
Sell 40
gallons
Jill gets Jill gets
Jill’s $1,600 profit $2,000 profit
Decision
Jack gets
Jack gets
$2,000 profit
$1,800 profit
Sell 30
gallons Jill gets Jill gets
$1,500 profit $1,800 profit
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