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Titanic’s Supply Chain Disaster

Case Overview
What Problems Titanic Sank, Hits Iceberg
When Date April 14, 1912
Time 11:40 PM Ship Struck Iceberg 2:20 AM Ship Under Water
Differences Maiden Voyage, Late Spring, Iceberg Warning
Where Business Location Whitestar Line UK, Passenger Ship 1 of 3
Geographical Location North Atlantic Shipping Lane, 41°46’ N - 50° 14’ W
Physical Location Right-side of Hull Front compartment 1-6
Process Location Route from Southampton, England to New York City
Impact Safety Loss of 1500+ Live, 700+ Rescued
Business Liabilities, Business Loss ($ 16 .5mn)
Vessel Loss of Entire Ship ($ 7. 5mn)
Frequency First Time Loss of Ship

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General Characteristics
• Class and type: Olympic-class ocean liner
• Tonnage: 46,328 GRT
• Displacement: 52,310 tons
• Length: 882 ft 6 in (269.0 m)
• Beam: 92 ft 0 in (28.0 m)
• Height: 175 ft (53.3 m) (Keel to top of funnels)
• Draught: 34 ft 7 in (10.5 m)
• Depth: 64 ft 6 in (19.7 m)
• Decks: 9 (A - G)
• Effect: 46,000 HP
• Propulsion: Two 3-blade wing propellers and
one 4-blade centre propeller
• Speed: Cruising: 21 kn (39 km/h; 24 mph)
• Max: 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph)[8]
• Capacity: Passengers: 2,435, crew: 892

• Notes: Lifeboats: 20 for 1,178 people

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High Luxury, Magnamity, Telegraphic Facility, Grand Staircase, Very Satisfied
Reach before time, Gym, Swimming Pool, Dining Saloon for 3rd
class, Library, Ballroom
Performs Very Poorly

Performs Very Well

Actual Performance

Customer Satisfaction
NOT AVAILABLE – Safety, Lifeboats, Product Design, Binoculars, Disaster
Management, Risk Management

Very Unsatisfied
Design Flaws

Material, Bulkheads
Material Flaws
Modern steel, was struck with a large • Rivets
force, the sample bent without breaking
into pieces; Titanic material was
extremely brittle; it broke in two pieces
with little deformation.

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Longitudinal bulkhead was
avoided to fit in the grand
Double Hull only used in the base
and not in the sides

Only Transverse bulkheads were used not Longitudinal.

Aesthetically Height above waterline 10 ft. instead of 30 ft. Doors were
pleasing, doors cut in here to better serve passengers.
replaced the
watertight doors
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Human Flaws

Hubris Effect, Halo Effect & Big Sky Theory

Organizational Behavior
• Exemplary safe record of Captain Smith,
gave him self over confidence
• Charismatic personality and Halo Effect
• Hubris Effect
• Big Sky Theory
• Sycophantic attitude of other crew
members in command Bruce Ismay

• No one either upstream to Captain Smith

or downstream questioned his judgement
Captain Smith

Other Captains
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New Findings
• Photo before the Titanic left - 9 metre black
• Exact area where the iceberg struck
• Journalist Senan Malony (Researching Titanic
disaster for 30 years) - FIRE in the ship’s hull,
burnt unnoticed for 3 weeks at 1000 degrees.
• Metallurgy experts – Fire would had reduced
strength of steel by 75% making it brittle
• Started even before it departed Belfast for
• Management knew about the fire but didn’t
cancel the trip as it would had meant bankruptcy
for ship owners as tickets were sold out.
• Titanic WAS NOT sunk by Iceberg BUT by Fire
• Source:
Disaster Management
• 20 lifeboats onboard only to make the
deck more aesthetically pleasing
• No Safety Drills conducted with
• Full Capacity of boats not Utilized
• Crew not trained and used white flares

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Rescue efforts
• 50 Miles to the North-
• Approx. 20 miles to the east from Titanic
north • Reached the scene 3
• Ignored Flare signals from hours after the sinking
• By the time the Californian
reached the scene, the
Titanic had sunk and there
were just bodies floating in
the water

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Brittle No passengers /
Iceberg Warnings Telegraph Speed Crew Drills
Material Conducted

Product Design & Testing

Single Hull
Prevailing Maritime
10 ft. Height Not seen as a safety
21 warnings Ignored Practices - Ships Ran 22 Knots
Bulkheads At Full Speed

Only Transverse
Only a one day trial
Lifeboats Crow nest

Safety Features Crew Training

No Binoculars Keys Lost

1906 – March, 1912 Fire in Coal Room Before Iceberg Spotted

After Iceberg Spotted American

Those involved followed standard
practice the disaster was an act of
Ship reversed & Turned

After Iceberg Spotted Smith followed long-standing

practice that had not previously

been shown to be unsafe
During trial it took 3.15 min
to stop
other skilled men would have
done the same
Third-class passengers
Passengers not informed Californian’s Captain / Crew
largely left to fend for
seriousness of situation Response
themselves Ships were seen as largely
extremely high speed following
Disaster Management & unsinkable
numerous ice warnings, "what
Rescue was a mistake
Lifeboats not used as per Captain waited some time
capacity before giving loading order. Lifeboats were intended only to
transfer passengers to nearby
rescue vessels Aftermath
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Completely Maybe Lessons Learnt
Preventable Preventable - Aftermath
Iceberg Warnings 1948 Convention on Safety of
Orderly movement could have Life at Sea
saved many more lives.
Reduction in speed / change in
course Iceberg Patrols

Material of Rivets
Delay in instructions and
Telegraph as a safety feature
Number of Lifeboats as per assessment
original design
Modification in Ship Design
Great Easterm & Arizona Design
SOP’s should have been devised
by captain Role of Government in safety
Fire in the Coal Room Regulations / Monitoring

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Expensive Lessons - How much did we Learn?

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Illusion of perfectness of
dependability for cost, Regarding Information or
Design(Unsinkable SCM) –
speed or grandeur. Not Bad News and need for its
Worst Case scenario has to
learning from others flow across the chain
be broad enough

Decisions based on Rational

analysis of the risks rather
Robust Operational Disaster Recovery Plan and
than relying only on past
Processes and Standards Training
experience, assumptions or

Group I
Abhinav Kumar 30NMP01
Dhruba Jyoti Das 30NMP22
Mehul Kukreti 30NMP27
Pawan Kumar 30NMP33
Piyush Kumar 30NMP34
Simran Kaur Kalsi 30NMP42
Umang Rastogi 30NMP46
Varun Kambojh 30NMP96