health care for persons with diverse values living in a pluralistic and multicultural society. In the face of such diversity, where can we find moral action guides when there is confusion or conflict about what ought to be done? Such guidelines would need to be broadly acceptable among the religious and the nonreligious and for persons across many different cultures. Due to the many variables that exist in the context of clinical cases as well as the fact that in health care there are several ethical principles that seem to be applicable in many situations these principles are not considered absolutes, but serve as powerful action guides in clinical medicine. Some of the principles of medical ethics have been in use for centuries. For example, in the 4th century BCE, Hippocrates, a physician- philosopher, directed physicians “to help and do no harm” (Epidemics, 1780). Similarly, considerations of respect for persons and for justice have been present in the development of societies from the earliest times. However, specifically in regard to ethical decisions in medicine, in 1979 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress published the first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, now in its seventh edition (2013), popularizing the use of principlism in efforts to resolve ethical issues in clinical medicine. In that same year, three principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice were identified as guidelines for responsible research using human subjects in the Belmont Report (1979). Thus, in both clinical medicine and in scientific research it is generally held that these principles can be applied, even in unique circumstances, to provide guidance in discovering our moral duties within that situation. (Thomas R. McCormick, D.Min., Senior Lecturer Emeritus, Dept. Bioethics and Humanities, School of Medicine, University of Washington) Intuitively, principles in current usage in health care ethics seem to be of self-evident value and of clear application. For example, the notion that the physician "ought not to harm" any patient is on its face convincing to most people. Or, the idea that the physician should develop a care plan designed to provide the most "benefit" to the patient in terms of other competing alternatives, seems both rational and self-evident. Further, before implementing the medical care plan, it is now commonly accepted that the patient must be given an opportunity to make an informed choice about his or her care. Finally, medical benefits should be dispensed fairly, so that people with similar needs and in similar circumstances will be treated with fairness, an important concept in the light of scarce resources such as solid organs, bone marrow, expensive diagnostics, procedures and medications. The four principles referred to here are non- hierarchical, meaning no one principle routinely “trumps” another. One might argue that we are required to take all of the above principles into account when they are applicable to the clinical case under consideration. Yet, when two or more principles apply, we may find that they are in conflict. For example, consider a patient diagnosed with an acutely infected appendix. Our medical goal should be to provide the greatest benefit to the patient, an indication for immediate surgery. On the other hand, surgery and general anesthesia carry some small degree of risk to an otherwise healthy patient, and we are under an obligation "not to harm" the patient. Our rational calculus holds that the patient is in far greater danger from harm from a ruptured appendix if we do not act, than from the surgical procedure and anesthesia if we proceed quickly to surgery. Further, we are willing to put this working hypothesis to the test of rational discourse, believing that other persons acting on a rational basis will agree. Thus, the weighing and balancing of potential risks and benefits becomes an essential component of the reasoning process in applying the principles. In other words, in the face of no other competing claims, we have a duty to uphold each of these principles (a prima facie duty). However, in the actual situation, we must balance the demands of these principles by determining which carries more weight in the particular case. Moral philosopher, W.D. Ross, claims that prima facie duties are always binding unless they are in conflict with stronger or more stringent duties. A moral person's actual duty is determined by weighing and balancing all competing prima facie duties in any particular case (Frankena, 1973). Since principles are empty of content the application of the principle comes into focus through understanding the unique features and facts that provide the context for the case. Therefore, obtaining the relevant and accurate facts is an essential component of this approach to decision making. Four commonly accepted principles of health care ethics, excerpted from Beauchamp and Childress (2008), include the: 1. Principle of respect for autonomy, 2. Principle of nonmaleficence, 3. Principle of beneficence, and 4. Principle of justice. Any notion of moral decision-making assumes that rational agents are involved in making informed and voluntary decisions. In health care decisions, our respect for the autonomy of the patient would, in common parlance, imply that the patient has the capacity to act intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influences that would mitigate against a free and voluntary act. This principle is the basis for the practice of "informed consent" in the physician/patient transaction regarding health care. Autonomy involves two elements:
1. The capacity to deliberate about a plan of
action 2. One must have the capacity to put one’s plan into action. Autonomy includes the ability to actualize or carry out what one has decided. [Thomas A. Shannon (TS) The principle of autonomy is based on the Principle of Respect for Persons, which holds that individual persons have (the) right to make their own choices and develop their own life plan (Garrett, 28). (See also American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 2, 15.) In a health care setting, the principle of autonomy translates into the principle of informed consent: You shall not treat a patient without the informed consent of the patient or his or her lawful surrogate, except in narrowly defined exceptions. In order to affirm autonomy, every effort must be made to discuss treatment preferences with patients and to document them in the patients’ charts. The patient or surrogate must: • be competent, that is, capable of understanding consequences of the consent and capable of making a free choice. • be free from coercion or undue influence. The health care provider must: • provide and make understandable necessary information for making a free, intelligent treatment decision and must make sure that the patient or surrogate understands the information. The only way to know if the patient understands the information is through reflective conversation with the health care provider. The health care provider must recommend what he or she takes to be the optimal option and is free to persuade, without pressuring, the patient of this option.
• Note that legal informed consent, e.g.
signing a waiver, does not meet the moral standards of informed consent. Case 1 In a prima facie sense, we ought always to respect the autonomy of the patient. Such respect is not simply a matter of attitude, but a way of acting so as to recognize and even promote the autonomous actions of the patient. The autonomous person may freely choose values, loyalties or systems of religious belief that limit other freedoms of that person. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses have a belief that it is wrong to accept a blood transfusion. Therefore, in a life-threatening situation where a blood transfusion is required to save the life of the patient, the patient must be so informed. The consequences of refusing a blood transfusion must be made clear to the patient at risk of dying from blood loss. Desiring to "benefit" the patient, the physician may strongly want to provide a blood transfusion, believing it to be a clear "medical benefit." When properly and compassionately informed, the particular patient is then free to choosewhether to accept the blood transfusion in keeping with a strong desire to live, or whether to refuse the blood transfusion in giving a greater priority to his or her religious convictions about the wrongness of blood transfusions, even to the point of accepting death as a predictable outcome. This communication process must be compassionate and respectful of the patient’s unique values, even if they differ from the standard goals of biomedicine. Discussion In analyzing the above case, the physician had a prima facie duty to respect the autonomous choice of the patient, as well as a prima facie duty to avoid harm and to provide a medical benefit. In this case, informed by community practice and the provisions of the law for the free exercise of one's religion, the physician gave greater priority to the respect for patient autonomy than to other duties. However, some ethicists claim that in respecting the patient’s choice not to receive blood, the principle of nonmaleficence also applies and must be interpreted in light of the patient’s belief system about the nature of harms, in this case a spiritual harm. By contrast, in an emergency, if the patient in question happens to be a ten year old child, and the parents refuse permission for a life saving blood transfusion, in the State of Washington and other states as well, there is legal precedence for overriding the parent's wishes by appealing to the Juvenile Court Judge who is authorized by the state to protect the lives of its citizens, particularly minors, until they reach the age of majority and can make such choices independently. Thus, in the case of the vulnerable minor child, the principle of avoiding the harm of death, and the principle of providing a medical benefit that can restore the child to health and life, would be given precedence over the autonomy of the child's parents as surrogate decision makers (McCormick, 2008). The principle of nonmaleficence requires of us that we not intentionally create a harm or injury to the patient, either through acts of commission or omission. In common language, we consider it negligent if one imposes a careless or unreasonable risk of harm upon another. This principle affirms the need for medical competence. It is clear that medical mistakes may occur; however, this principle articulates a fundamental commitment on the part of health care professionals to protect their patients from harm. The following secondary principles come under the principle of non- maleficence: • Do not kill. • Do not cause needless pain. • Do not incapacitate others (Beauchamp and Childress, 194). ⇒ The important point to notice is that each of these principles can be met by doing nothing. U.S. Public Health Service begins study on effects of syphilis › In 1932, the Public Health Service, working with the Tuskegee Institute, began a study of the effects of syphilis on the human body. The 1932 study was called the "Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male." ›The study initially involved 600 black male volunteers – 399 with syphilis, 201 who did not have the disease. ›Government officials recruited African American participants in the study by offering “free medical care” to them. They were also given free meals and burial insurance. ›The men recruited were mostly poor sharecropper's from Macon County, Alabama. (Macon County had a particularly high rate of syphilis cases.) These men had difficult lives, hoeing small plots of land, living in wooden shacks, and picking cotton in the season. There was little wealth in Macon County and a very small chance of seeing a doctor, even though syphilis was more rampant there than anywhere else in the South. The men enrolled in the study were never told they had syphilis. Instead, researchers kept this information from them and told the patients that they were being treated for "bad blood," a local term used to describe several ailments, including syphilis, anemia, and fatigue. In truth, the 399 syphilitic patients did not receive what they signed up for. They were never given the proper treatment needed to cure their syphilis, since the government wanted to study untreated syphilis. The doctors were also interested in whether the disease affected whites and blacks differently. › Each time they visited the doctors, the men thought their condition was being treated and cured. Instead however, the “medicine” provided to them was fake and contained no medicinal properties. The doctors and nurses were not there to cure, but to observe the progress of untreated syphilis. ›Although originally projected to last 6 months, the study actually went on for 40 years, the entire time the participants assuming they were being treated. Instead, the government was purposely letting their disease progress for the study. Patients who are untreated sometimes develop no symptoms, and sometimes spontaneously recover; but they can also suffer greatly. Rashes, skin growths, liver deformity, heart damage, paralysis, insanity, and death are all possible outcomes of the untreated disease. Penicillin came into use in 1947, which could cure syphilis. Had penicillin been administered to the syphilitic men in the study, many would have lead longer and more comfortable lives. However, the government did not treat them. ›To ensure that the men would show up for a painful and potentially dangerous spinal tap, the doctors misled them with a letter full of promotional hype: “Last Chance for Special Free Treatment.” The fact that autopsies would eventually be required was also concealed. (It was from the autopsies that the government would get their final data.) ›The experiment continued in spite of the Henderson Act (1943), a public health law requiring testing and treatment for venereal disease, and in spite of the World Health Organization's Declaration of Helsinki (1964), which specified that “informed consent” was needed for experiments involving human beings. By the time the study was exposed in 1972, 28 men had died of syphilis, 100 others were dead of related complications, at least 40 wives had been infected and 19 children had contracted the disease at birth. The study becomes public The story finally broke in the Washington Star on July 25, 1972, in an article by Jean Heller of the Associated Press. Her source was Peter Buxtun, a former PHS venereal disease interviewer and one of the few whistle blowers over the years. ›When the experiment was brought to the attention of the media in 1972, news anchor Harry Reasoner described it as an experiment that “used human beings as laboratory animals in a long and inefficient study of how long it takes syphilis to kill someone.” Many began to compare Tuskegee to the appalling experiments performed by Nazi doctors on their Jewish victims during World War II. ›The PHS, however, remained unrepentant, claiming the men had been “volunteers” and “were always happy to see the doctors,” and an Alabama state health officer who had been involved claimed “somebody is trying to make a mountain out of a molehill.” ›Under the glare of publicity, the government ended their experiment, and for the first time provided the men with effective medical treatment for syphilis. The end of the study After the Tuskegee study became public, it caused a public outcry that led the Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs to appoint an Ad Hoc Advisory Panel to review the study. ›The panel had nine members from the fields of medicine, law, religion, labor, education, health administration, and public affairs. ›The panel found that the men had agreed freely to be examined and treated. However, there was no evidence that researchers had informed them of the study or its real purpose. In fact, the men had been misled and had not been given all the facts required to provide informed consent. ›The men were never given adequate treatment for their disease. Even when penicillin became the drug of choice for syphilis in 1947, researchers did not offer it to the subjects. The advisory panel found nothing to show that subjects were ever given the choice of quitting the study, even when this new, highly effective treatment became widely used. The advisory panel concluded that the Tuskegee Study was "ethically unjustified"--the knowledge gained was sparse when compared with the risks the study posed for its subjects. ›In October 1972, the panel advised stopping the study at once. . A month later, the Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs announced the end of the Tuskegee Study. ›In "Tuskegee's" wake, major changes in federal rules governing medical research were established, including written informed consent and the creation of institutional review boards to oversee human subject research. ›The study also created another legacy--it became the metaphor for the distrust of scientific research, the risks of government provision of medical care, and the exploitation of poor patients. Reparations In the summer of 1973, a class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of the study participants and their families. Fred Gray, a lawyer who had previously defended Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, was the lead attorney. In 1974, a $10 million out-of-court settlement was reached. (This resulted in only around $37,000 for survivors.) ›As part of the settlement, the U.S. government promised to give lifetime medical benefits and burial services to all living participants. The Tuskegee Health Benefit Program (THBP) was established to provide these services. ›In 1975, wives, widows and offspring were added to the program. ›In 1995, the program was expanded to include health as well as medical benefits. It wasn’t until May, 1997 that the US government acknowledged its wrong doing during the experiments when President Bill Clinton issued a formal apology. ›The last study participant died in January 2004. The last widow receiving benefits died in January 2009. As of 2009, there were 15 offspring receiving medical and health benefits. Case 2 In the course of caring for patients, there are situations in which some type of harm seems inevitable, and we are usually morally bound to choose the lesser of the two evils, although the lesser of evils may be determined by the circumstances. For example, most would be willing to experience some pain if the procedure in question would prolong life. However, in other cases, such as the case of a patient dying of painful intestinal carcinoma, the patient might choose to forego CPR in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest, or the patient might choose to forego life- sustaining technology such as dialysis or a respirator. The reason for such a choice is based on the belief of the patient that prolonged living with a painful and debilitating condition is worse than death, a greater harm. It is also important to note in this case that this determination was made by the patient, who alone is the authority on the interpretation of the "greater" or "lesser" harm for the self. Discussion There is another category of cases that is confusing since a single action may have two effects, one that is considered a good effect, the other a bad effect. How does our duty to the principle of nonmaleficence direct us in such cases? The formal name for the principle governing this category of cases is usually called the principle of double effect. A typical example might be the question as to how to best treat a pregnant woman newly diagnosed with cancer of the uterus. The usual treatment, removal of the uterus is considered a life saving treatment. However, this procedure would result in the death of the fetus. What action is morally allowable, or, what is our duty? It is argued in this case that the woman has the right to self-defense, and the action of the hysterectomy is aimed at defending and preserving her life. The foreseeable unintended consequence (though undesired) is the death of the fetus. 1. The nature of the act. The action itself must not be intrinsically wrong; it must be a good or at least morally neutral act. 2. The agent’s intention. The agent intends only the good effect, not the bad effect, even though it is foreseen. 3. The distinction between means and effects. The bad effect must not be the means of the good effect, 4. Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good effect must outweigh the evil that is permitted, in other words, the bad effect.
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 207)
The ordinary meaning of this principle is that health care providers have a duty to be of benefit to the patient, as well as to take positive steps to prevent and to remove harm from the patient. These duties are viewed as rational and self-evident and are widely accepted as the proper goals of medicine. This principle is at the very heart of health care implying that a suffering supplicant (the patient) can enter into a relationship with one whom society has licensed as competent to provide medical care, trusting that the physician’s chief objective is to help. The goal of providing benefit can be applied both to individual patients, and to the good of society as a whole. For example, the good health of a particular patient is an appropriate goal of medicine, and the prevention of disease through research and the employment of vaccines is the same goal expanded to the population at large. It is sometimes held that nonmaleficence is a constant duty, that is, one ought never to harm another individual, whereas beneficence is a limited duty. A physician has a duty to seek the benefit of any or all of her patients, however, a physician may also choose whom to admit into his or her practice, and does not have a strict duty to benefit patients not acknowledged in the panel. This duty becomes complex if two patients appeal for treatment at the same moment. Some criteria of urgency of need might be used, or some principle of first come first served, to decide who should be helped at the moment. The following are secondary principles falling under the principle of beneficence:
• Prevent the infliction of needless pain.
• Prevent killing. • Prevent incapacitating others. In a particular instance, for example, of standing by and watching a person who is undergoing a procedure done by an assistant, I might satisfy the principle of non maleficence by not causing needless pain, but violate the principle of beneficence by not preventing pain. Case 3 One clear example exists in health care where the principle of beneficence is given priority over the principle of respect for patient autonomy. This example comes from Emergency Medicine. When the patient is incapacitated by the grave nature of accident or illness, we presume that the reasonable person would want to be treated aggressively, and we rush to provide beneficent intervention by stemming the bleeding, mending the broken or suturing the wounded. Discussion In this culture, when the physician acts from a benevolent spirit in providing beneficent treatment that in the physician's opinion is in the best interests of the patient, without consulting the patient, or by overriding the patient's wishes, it is considered to be "paternalistic." The most clear cut case of justified paternalism is seen in the treatment of suicidal patients who are a clear and present danger to themselves. Here, the duty of beneficence requires that the physician intervene on behalf of saving the patient's life or placing the patient in a protective environment, in the belief that the patient is compromised and cannot act in his own best interest at the moment. As always, the facts of the case are extremely important in order to make a judgment that the autonomy of the patient is compromised. The duty of beneficence claims that we have a duty to help others further their interests when we can do this without risk to ourselves. The duty of beneficence argues that we have a positive obligation to regard the welfare of others, to be of assistance to others as they attempt to fulfill their plans. The duty of beneficence is based on a sense of fair play. It basically suggests that because we have received benefits from others, because we have been helped along the way, we have an obligation to return the same favor to others. Beneficence is a way of ensuring reciprocity in our relations and of passing along to others the goods we have received in the past. The duty of beneficence is not without limit. The limit is harm to one’s self. Beauchamp and Childress have identified a process which one can use to evaluate the risk of harm to determine our obligation.
1. First, the individual we are to help is at risk
of significant loss or danger. 2. Second, I can perform an act directly relevant to preventing this loss or damage. 3. Third, my act is likely to prevent this damage or loss. 4. The benefits the individual receives as a consequence of my actions (a)outweighs harms to self and (b) present minimal risk to self. Justice in health care is usually defined as a form of fairness, or as Aristotle once said, "giving to each that which is his due." This implies the fair distribution of goods in society and requires that we look at the role of entitlement. The question of distributive justice also seems to hinge on the fact that some goods and services are in short supply, there is not enough to go around, thus some fair means of allocating scarce resources must be determined. It is generally held that persons who are equals should qualify for equal treatment. The formal principle of justice requires that a health care practitioners and society in general treat equal cases equally. For example, two patients with the same medical need ought not be treated differently (Beauchamp and Childress, 329). A variety of factors as criteria for distributive justice, includes the following: 1. To each person an equal share 2. To each person according to need 3. To each person according to effort 4. To each person according to contribution 5. To each person according to merit 6. To each person according to free-market exchanges (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 330)