8/1/2018 AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Security Considerations
AODV :

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 INTRODUCTION

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 MANET

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Malicious Attacks in MANET

 AODV

 AODV: Route Discovery Process

 Security Based Enhancements on AODV

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 MANET

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 Dynamic network

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Mobile devices connected together by wireless link

 Frequently changing Network topology

 Multi-hop network

 Each node has to play two roles

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MALICIOUS ATTACKS IN MANET

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1) Eavesdropping

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

2) Spoofing
3) Control packet modification
4) Denial of service
a) Black Hole Attack
b) Gray Hole Attack
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 AODV

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 Reactive packet routing protocol

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Consists of four message sets:
1. Route request (RREQ)
2. Route reply (RREP)
3. Route error (RERR)
4. for link status monitoring (HELLO)
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 ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ)

The fields in RREQ are:

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

 Source address

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Source sequence no
 Broadcast ID (Request ID)
 Destination address
 Destination sequence no
 Hop count

 The pair < source address, broadcast ID >

uniquely identifies a RREQ.
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 ROUTE REPLY (RREP)

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The fields in RREP are:

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS



 Source address
 Destination address
 Destination sequence no
 Hop count
 Route lifetime

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 SEQUENCE NUMBER

 Serves as time stamps

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 Ensures freshness of the route

 Increments with new messages from the node

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Higher the sequence number, fresher the route

 Sequence number is higher --> existing route is

more up-to-date

THE WAY OF ATTACK

 The malicious nodes causing Grayhole and
Blackhole attack will always attempt to make its
sequence number higher than that of any other
nodes. 8
AODV ROUTE DISCOVERY PROCESS

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Source
F
S RREQ RREQ

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RREQ
RREP RREQ
B C
RREP
RREQ
RREQ RREP
D Destination
A
RREQ
E

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 ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ)

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 To discover a route to the destination
 Utilizes the broadcast behavior of nodes

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 Intermediate nodes use it to update their routing
tables
 Contains the most recent sequence number for
the destination
 Valid destination must have a sequence number
as great as that contained in the RREQ
 Intermediate node drops redundant RREQ

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S ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ)
D?

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AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
D?
D?
D?

D?
D? D?

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D
 ROUTE REPLY (RREP)

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Destination node uncast a RREP back to the source

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
route.
 A node generates a RREP if:

a) It is itself the destination.

b) It has an active route to the destination.
 As the RREP propagates back to the source node,
intermediate nodes update their routing tables.

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 8/1/2018 AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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D
S
ROUTE REPLY (RREP)

S
S
S
 RERR MESSAGES

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 This message is broadcast for broken links
 Generated directly by a node or passed on when

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

received from another node

HELLO MESSAGES
 Hello Message = RREP with TTL = 1
 This message is used for broadcasting connectivity
information.
 A node should use Hello messages only if it is part
of an active route. 14
 SECURITY BASED ENHANCEMENTS
ON AODV

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AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
I. Enhance Route Discovery for AODV (ERDA)

II. Using Digital Signature and Hash Chain

III. Reliable AODV (R- AODV)

IV. Modified Reliable AODV (MR- AODV)

V. Using RSA key exchange and Encryption

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 ENHANCE ROUTE DISCOVERY FOR
AODV (ERDA)

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 Minimum modification to existing AODV algorithm.

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 There are three new elements:
 rrep_table to store incoming RREP packet
 mali_list to keep the detected malicious nodes identity
 rt_upd, parameter to control the routing table update
 This parameter can receive either true or false value.

 Two parts:
 Securing routing table update
 Detecting and isolating malicious node
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 SECURING ROUTING TABLE UPDATE

 Step 01: RREQ message is sent out by S to D.

 Step 02: All neighbouring nodes will respond to node S.

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 Step 03: RREPs received by node S are stored in rrep_tab table.
//network is under Black hole attack and M be the malicious node with a

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

high sequence number.//
 Step 04: The routing table of S is updated with the information
from M.
 Step 05: rt_upd parameter value will continue as ‘true’.
//destination sequence number of A is smaller than the one in the routing
table.//
 Step 06: The routing table of S is updated with the information
from A.
 Step 07: former route entry is overwritten by the later one.
 Step 08: the rt_upd parameter value is then set to false.
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 Step 09: function call: "detecting malicious node".
 DETECTING AND ISOLATING MALICIOUS NODE

 Step 01: Routing table updation will be continued until rt_upd

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parameter = ‘false’.
 Step 02: if rt_upd parameter = ‘false’, then the information in

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

the rrep_tab table will be analysed using the heuristic
method.
 Step 03: Node with high destination sequence number will be
isolated as a malicious node.
 Step 04: The identity of those suspected nodes will be kept in
mali_list.
 Step 05: rrep_tab table will be flushed after the process.
(Memory Management)
 Step 06: The rt_upd parameter value again is set back to
‘true’. 19
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 USING DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND HASH
CHAIN

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DIGITAL SIGNATURES

To authenticate the non-modifiable fields of the

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS


messages.
 Authentication is performed in an end-to-end
manner.
 Steps:
 Normal AODV route discovery mechanism.
 This RREP will be sent with a RREP Signature
Extension.
 When a node receives a RREP, it first verifies the
signature before creating or updating a route to that 21

host.
HASH CHAINS
 To secure the hop count information (The only modifiable
information in the messages).

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 End to end kind of technique cannot be applied to modifiable
information.
Mechanisms:

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

1) During the generation of RREQ or a RREP message:

 Generates a random number (seed).

 Hopcount_Limit = TTL

 H_field = seed

 H_function = h

 T_Hash = h(seed) _Hopcount_Limit times

2) When a node receives a RREQ or a RREP message:

 T_Hash = h(H_field ) _Hopcount_Limit times

3) Before rebroadcasting a RREQ or forwarding a RREP:

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 H_field = h(H_field)
 RELIABLE AODV (R- AODV)

 A Malicious_ node_list is added to the RREQ packet

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field to notify other nodes.
 Add a flag called Do_not_consider to RREP to mark a

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

malicious node.
 State of a node can be expressed by:
 number of sent out RREQs
 number of received RREPs
 routing table sequence number.
 We use these three parameters to calculate a Peak
value.
 The Peak value is the maximum possible value of the
sequence number that any RREP can have in the 23
current state.
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R-AODV STEPS:
 RREP with sequence number > Peak value will be marked
as Do_not_consider.

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 The node sending that RREP is marked as a malicious
node.

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

 RREP is then sending to the source node via reverse path.
 Each node getting this RREP updates route entry for the
malicious node.
 The source node rebroadcasts RREQ along with a list of
malicious nodes.

DISADVANTAGE:
 If attacker generates destination sequence number which is
less than or equal to PEAK value, the node is not detected 25
as a malicious node.
 MODIFIED RELIABLE AODV (MR- AODV)

 MR AODV is a modified version of R-AODV.

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 In MR-AODV when a node detects a malicious node, it

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updates the routing table with malicious node entry and
discards the RREP.
 It is neither forwarded on the reverse path nor requires a
DO_NOT_CONSIDER flag.
 Thus, all RREPs reaching to the source node will be sent by
genuine nodes only.
 The RREP indicating shortest fresher path will be chosen
for data transmission by the source node.
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 The functionaliy of node broadcasting RREQ.

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 The functionality of node receiving the broadcasted RREQ.
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 The functionality of node receiving RREP.
ADVANTAGE OF MR – AODV OVER R – AODV

MR-AODV attempts to reduce routing overhead by not

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
forwarding RREP after detection of misbehavior.

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

DISADVANTAGE:

 If attacker generates destination sequence number which is

less than or equal to PEAK value, the node is not detected
as a malicious node.

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USING RSA KEY EXCHANGE AND ENCRYPTION

 It uses R-AODV.

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 The nodes are arranged in spanning tree topology.
 The spanning tree maintains security associations only

AODV: SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

with neighbouring nodes.
 The Neighbourhood Key method, in which each node
shares secret key only with the authenticated
neighbours in the adhoc network, is used.
 This avoids group re-keying.
 Whenever there is a change in the set of authenticated
neighbours, a node must compute a new key and send
this new key to all its authenticated neighbours.
 After the key exchange, the message is encrypted twice,
by using neighbourhood key and message specific key. 32
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CONSTRUCTION OF SPANNING TREE
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RSA KEY EXCHANGE
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ENCRYPTION OF MESSAGE
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DECRYPTION OF MESSAGE
 CONCLUSION

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 The Grayhole and Blackhole attacks are considered
as the most dangerous attacks towards adhoc
network.

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 Detection and the isolation of malicious nodes are
the major goals of security based enhancements.
 Need for a new enhancement.

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 REFERENCES

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1) Sisily, S and S. Sreedhar, (2013). “An Efficient AODV Protocol and
Encryption Mechanism for Security Issues in Adhoc Networks”,
International Conference on Microelectronics,

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Communication and Renewable Energy.
2) Sony, S. J. and S. D. Nayak, (2013). “Enhancing Security Features &
Performance of AODV Protocol under Attack for MANET”,
International Conference on Intelligent Systems and Signal
Processing, pp. 325-328.
3) Jalil, K. A., Z. Ahmad and J. L. A. Manan, (2011). “Securing Routing
Table Update in AODV Routing Protocol”, IEEE Conference on
Open Systems, pp. 116-121.
4) Jhaveri, R. H., (2013). “MR-AODV: A Solution to Mitigate Blackhole
and Grayhole Attacks in AODV Based MANETs”, Third
International Conference on Advanced Computing &
Communication Technologies, pp. 254-260.
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