QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M.

SILVERIO-BUFFE,
FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING
IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 19, 2009

Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees
 SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

 Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials

and employees during their incumbency shall not:

 (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

 These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case
of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions:

 “Why may an incumbent engage in private practice

under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict
or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-
incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently
prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is
the former allowed, who is still occupying the very
public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-
incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a
position of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?”
 The query arose because Atty. Buffe
previously worked as Clerk of Court VI
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 81 of Romblon
 She resigned from her position
effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter
(and within the one-year period of
prohibition mentioned in the above-
quoted provision)
 She engaged in the private practice of
law by appearing as private counsel in
several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon.
Atty. Buffe’s defense:
 Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent
public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does
not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions. In contrast, a public official or employee
who has retired, resigned, or has been separated
from government service like her, is prohibited from
engaging in private practice on any matter before the
office where she used to work, for a period of one (1)
year from the date of her separation from
government employment.
 Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention
of the above prohibition is to remove the
exercise of clout, influence or privity to
insider information, which the incumbent
public employee may use in the private
practice of his profession. However, this
situation did not obtain in her case, since she
had already resigned as Clerk of Court of
RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced
the view that she could engage in the private
practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal
counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict
with her former duties as former Clerk of
Court of that Branch.
Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT)
evaluation:
 The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section
7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of
court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that
provision of law.

 The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits

incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in
the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and
unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on
accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the
Constitution

 The policy thus requires public officials and employees to

devote full time public service so that in case of conflict
between personal and public interest, the latter should take
precedence over the former.
Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon
reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:

 (1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus
Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10,
2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;
 (2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa,
et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;
 (3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor,
on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; and
 (4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps.
Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel
for the defendants.

 Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our of our November 11, 2008
En Banc Resolution and she filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on
February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008
Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81
records. As well, she informed the Court that she had previously taken the
needed judicial remedies in regard to the above query.
ACTION AND RULING
 Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very
same branch she served and immediately after her
resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our
eyes to and that she cannot run away from under the
cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for
declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she
would pursue up to our level.
 We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on
March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared
before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases.
 The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not
deter her in any way and her misgivings about the
fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting
violation she committed.
 Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it

complies with all of the following requirements:

 The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices

law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
 The outside employment can be performed outside of normal
working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the
court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
 That outside employment does not require the practice of
law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services
as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;
 The outside employment does not require or induce the court
personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while
performing officials duties;
 The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or
executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized by
the Supreme Court.
 Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist,
or where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity
of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment. [Emphasis supplied]
 By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as
“unlawful,” Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
 CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

 We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her

lawyer’s oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully
practised law within the prohibited period by appearing
before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:

 CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
COURT RULING:
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty
of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter
her from repeating her transgression and committing other
acts of professional misconduct. This penalty reflects as
well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously the
retired, resigned or separated officers and employees
of the Judiciary should regard and observe the
prohibition against the practice of law with the office
that they used to work with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M.

Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts
of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
ATTY. VICTORIANO S. MURING, JR.,
Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. GATCHO,
Court Attorney V,
NELPA LOTA-CALAYAG,
Executive Assistant V,
and ATTY. EDNA S. PAÑA,
Respondents.

A.M. No. CA-05-19-P

Promulgated:
August 31, 2006
The Issues
 Whether Atty. Gatcho and Calayag
demanded and received P450,000 from
Atty. Paña or her employer to facilitate a
favorable decision in a case before the
office of Court of Appeals Justice Roberto
Barrios.
 Whether Atty. Gatcho and Calayag
demanded P150,000 from Atty. Paña or her
employer, with the representation that
they could facilitate a favorable decision in
a case before the office of Supreme Court
Justice Jose A.R. Melo.
The Court’s Ruling

 Complaint not supported by substantial

evidence

 We have repeatedly held that the

quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt in administrative cases is substantial
evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
 A thorough examination of the records shows that
complainant’s case is founded mainly on statements
uttered by Atty. Paña to complainant and to Atty.
Besonaya. Complainant and Atty. Besonaya had
no personal knowledge of the alleged pay-off.
 Worse, complainant could not even vouch for the
integrity of Atty. Paña’s information, as he was not
certain if Atty. Paña personally dealt with Atty. Gatcho
and Calayag in the alleged transactions
 Testimony of Atty. Pascual and Atty. Besonaya
fail to bolster complainant’s allegations
Atty. Gatcho filed petitions for commission as notary
public while employed as court attorney
 In the course of the hearings, complainant presented copies of
petitions filed by Atty. Gatcho for commission as notary public in
the cities of Mandaluyong and Makati, dated 3 April 2000 and 7
February 2003, respectively. Atty. Gatcho asserts that he filed the
petitions only because he was “planning to engage in private
practice” upon separation from government service. These
petitions do not form part of the records.

 Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department

permits employees of government offices to “engage directly in
any private business, vocation or profession x x x outside office
hours.”However, we declared in an En Banc resolution dated 1
October 1987 that —

 x x x [the memorandum circular] x x x [is] not applicable to

officials or employees of the courts considering the express
prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature of their work which
requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and
responsibility, in order to maintain public confidence in the
Judiciary.
 Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a
government lawyer, he was prohibited from
engaging in notarial practice, or in any form
of private legal practice for that matter.
Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or
good faith, as he did not seek to exculpate
himself by providing an explanation for his
error. Atty. Gatcho’s filing of the petition
for commission, while not an actual
engagement in the practice of law, appears
as a furtive attempt to evade the
prohibition.
Complainant engaged in
unauthorized private practice
 While complainant must have intended to assume the
role of whistle-blower in filing this case, we cannot
disregard complainant’s admission that he appeared
in court as counsel and received P2,000 in appearance
fees when he was employed as court attorney.
Appearing in court on behalf of a party litigant falls
within the scope of the phrase “practice of law.”

 Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in

the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of
profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light
offense punishable by reprimand.
Resignation or removal not a bar
to a finding of administrative liability
 The fact that complainant and Atty. Gatcho are no
longer employed at the Court of Appeals, and claim to
have shifted to private practice, does not preclude the
Court from making a pronouncement as to their
administrative liability for acts committed by them
while in government service
 The complaint in this case was filed on 28 February
2003, before Atty. Gatcho resigned.
 The jurisdiction that the Court acquired at the time of
the filing of the complaint is retained until the case is
finally resolved.
 However, while they deserve a more severe penalty,
like suspension from office, they can only now be
admonished since they are no longer in the service.
Court ruling:
 WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Edna S. Paña guilty of
gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND her from
the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon
finality of this Decision. For engaging in the
unauthorized private practice of law, we ADMONISH
Atty. Victoriano S. Muring, Jr., Court Attorney IV. For
filing a petition for commission as notary public while
employed in the Judiciary, we also ADMONISH Atty.
Manuel T. Gatcho, Court Attorney V. They are
STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.