Case Study on Vapor Cloud deflagration & fire

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BLSR OPERATING, LTD.,

Texas, USA

In January 2003

Source :
U.S. C HEMICAL S AFETY AND H AZARD I NVESTIGATION B OARD
 CONTENTS

THE INCIDENT

ABOUT THE UNIT

PRE-INCIDENT SCENARIO

INCIDENT SCENARIO

ANALYSIS

LEARNINGs
The Incident
 The Incident

INCIDENT :

“ FIRE during unloading sediment & water

from trucks into an open pit ”

RESULT :

 Release of hydrocarbon vapour in an E&P facility

 Vapour cloud deflagration & pool fire
 Fire destroyed two vacuum trucks & equipments,
 3 workers succumbed to death & 4 workers seriously injured
The Incident Place

Incident Place
The Unit, Equipment & Process
 The Unit

 BLSR Operating, Ltd. (BLSR), located in Texas

 A waste disposal company operates 24 x 7

INCIDENT Occurred @ a open disposal/unloading pit area

 Vacuum Trucks

 Company was operate Vacuum trucks for unloading basic

sediment & water (BS&W) collected from natural gas well sites

Typical Vacuum Truck

 Generation of BS&W

In Gas well operation,

 Wellhead gas stream flows through separators to remove produced

water & liquid hydrocarbons.
 Water is stored in an aboveground storage tank
 Liquid HC is passed through a heater-treater to break down the
emulsion in above ground tanks
 Resident time provides further separation of liquid from entrained solid.
 BS & W settles to the tank bottom & condensate floats.

Once BS&W level exceeds, the company notifies

the waste hauler to remove it from tank

* Liquid hydrocarbon contains contaminants including

water, paraffin, sand along with hydrocarbon
Pre-Incident Scenario
 Pre-Incident Scenario

Pre-Incident :

 Truck drivers collected BS&W from the storage tanks from two sites
 One truck 46 barrels & other one 50 barrels
 Relied on the truck sight gauges to determine volume of liquid removed from
the storage tanks
 Both trucks arrived within minutes of each other
 Employees were clearing earlier delivery mud
deposits from the pad area by cleaning water

Identifying the hazard class of BS&W & quantity of

liquid to be disposed has to be specified by owner
Sight Gauge
 Pre-Incident Scenario
Pre-Incident :

 Drivers left the engines running & went to shed for paper works
 Two BLSR employees opened valves to drain the truck tanks
 One employee climbed one truck to remove the manway cover bolts

 Suddenly one truck engine started

to race & slowed
 Then violently raced again blowing
thick black smoke from stack
 Loud backfiring was heard & 2nd
truck also started to race violently
 Alerted drivers approached
respective side doors
Incident Scenario
 Incident Scenario

Deflagration occurred

 There was a flash of lightning under a truck.

 Both trucks were completely engulfed by fire along with partial pit
 Intense pool fire producing a large amount of thick black smoke &
very intense heat with 15 feet high was noticed
 Two employees caught in the deflagration were fatally burnt
 Incident Scenario

 Canopy above the unloading pad sustained major heat damage

 Equipment in electrical shed sustained radiant heat damage
Incident Analysis
 Incident Analysis
 Waste water generated at E & P sites include salt water & fresh
water, drilling mud and BS&W – all contains hydrocarbon liquids

 BS & W & other waste liquid are higher density & settle to the
tank bottom, higher tank temp. promotes hydrocarbon separation.

 Significant volumes of waste liquid including potentially

flammable BS&W accumulate when offloading onto the pit

Accumulated BS&W
 Incident Analysis
 No accurate measurement of how much hydrocarbon is
included in the BS&W loaded into the trucks

 The facility consists of a salt water, mud disposal & washout

pad, there are no provision of recovering the crude oil from the
waste liquid that is unloaded on to mud and washout pit
 Incident Analysis

Root Cause:
 BS&W Material safety datasheet (MSDS) was not provided,
unaware of hazard involved in the material to be drained
 Unsafe handling practices, when offloading flammable liquid onto
mud disposal or washout pad
 Truck engines were not equipped with Over speed protection
devices in the intake or exhaust systems
 Backfiring caused by the engine over speed is more likely ignition
source
 Incident Analysis
Key Findings:

Diesel engine over-speed, an indication of flammable vapor presence

Failure to recognize the potential flammability of BS&W
Failure to implement work practices at the well site & at the waste
disposal facility
Failure to recognise potential ignition sources while handling BS&W
Inadequate training to employees
Improper tank labelling would have created awareness among
workers

If a flammable vapor continues to be available through vehicle air intake

system, the engine will continue to run even when the fuel system is OFF
 Learnings !!

 Availability of written procedure on safe handling & safe disposal

of waste liquids
 Availability of job specific Material Safety Datasheet (MSDS) &
Potential flammability hazard
 Availability of job specific emergency procedures
 Review requirement of proper grounding/ earthing (to prevent
static discharge) & elimination of other ignition sources in
hazardous spots
 Reviewing of over speed protection system (intake shut-off valve &
exhaust) in diesel vehicles/engines in case of operating hazardous
locations.
 Conduct & document training of all personnel; addressing
associated potential flammability
THANK YOU