Facts: Facet purchased some merchandise from IWA and paid thru to the PNB account of IWA. The transfer was delayed due to an error. Unaware that IWA had already received the money, Mantrust transferred another payment to different bank. Thus, Mantrust asked IWA to return the second payment but the latter refused to do so. IWA contended that the second transfer was negligence on the part of Mantrust. Issue:
Whether or not IWA was unjustly enriched
because of the erroneous second transfer? Ruling: There was a mistake, not negligence, in the second remittance.
Art. 2154 of the Civil Code provides that: If
something received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. PUYAT & SONS VS CITY OF MANILA GR NO. L-17447 April 30, 1963 Facts: Puyat and Sons paid their tax to the City Treasurer of Manila not knowing that they are exempt from such, pursuant to an ordinance.
After learning about the ordinance, Puyat
asked for refund of the tax.
However, the City Treasurer denied the
requested refund. Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is obliged to
refund the amount which the plaintiff paid Ruling: Yes. Puyat is exempted from paying the tax, hence it was clearly an error or mistake which makes it fall under Art.2154 of solutio indebiti.
The obligation to refund the tax arises.
CINCO VS CANONOY GR NO. L-33171 May 31, 1979 Facts: Cinco filed a complaint against the driver and the operator of a jeepney because of a vehicular accident.
Subsequently, Cinco filed a criminal case
against the driver.
Private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit. Issue:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action Ruling: Yes. The nature and character of Cinco’s action was quasi-delictual.
Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
provides that: In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. NAPOCOR VS CA GR NO. L-124378 March 8, 2005 Facts: Petitioner built and operated the Agus Regulation Dam and maintains a normal maximum level of water. In 1976, respondents fishponds and other improvements were washed away when the water level of the lake escalated. Respondents filed an action for damages, alleging that the negligence and inexperience of NPC’s employees were the proximate cause of damage. NPC denied the allegation and refused to compensate the respondents. Issue:
Whether or not NPC is liable for damages
Ruling: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is proper in this case. In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC. JIMENEZ VS CITY OF MANILA GR NO. L-71049 May 29, 1987 Facts: Petitioner bought went to Sta. Ana Public Market which was flooded by dirty water. Consequently, petitioner stepped on an uncovered drainage opening causing a 4- inch rusty nail to penetrate his leg, fell sick and was unable to supervise his business for long time. He sued the City of Manila and the administrator of the market. Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila are jointly and
solidarily liable with the administrator Ruling: Yes. The negligence of the city is the proximate cause of the injury. Asiatec and the City are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable. Art. 2189 of the Civil Code provides that: Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, and other public works under their control or supervision. SANCHEZ VS RIGOS GR NO. L-25494 June 4, 1972 Facts: Rigos executed an “Option to purchase” stipulating that he will sell his parcel of land to Sanchez within 2 years from the stipulated date. Within 2 years, Sanchez deposited the sum of money for the purchase of the said parcel of land but Rigos refused to sell his land. Rigos contended that the contract was unilateral promise to sell and the same being unsupported by any valuable consideration by force of the Civil Code, therefore it is null and void. Issue:
Whether or not there was a contract to buy and
sell between the parties or only a unilateral promise to sell? Ruling: The instrument executed is not a "contract to buy and sell," but merely granted plaintiff an "option" to buy. Rigor can withdraw his offer anytime he want. However, pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.