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Windows (IOW’s)
IPEIA Conference
February 2, 2006
Banff, Alberta
John Reynolds
Steamboat Springs, CO, USA
Recently retired from
Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.
Outline for this Presentation
• The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI)
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative
• Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)
• Integrity Operating Windows (IOW)
• Standard and Critical IOW’s
• Integration of IOW’s into the 10 PSI’s
• Training of Operators on IOW’s
• The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid
2
Ten Process Safety Initiatives
(PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000
• Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation
process
• Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring process
• Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge
transfer
• Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process
• Investigations – 3 Levels up to RCA
• Protective Instrument Systems (IPF – “SIL”)
• Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
• Causal Learning
• Audits and Assessments
3
• Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
Process Safety Initiative
•
Metrics
Each of the 10 PSI’s were required to have four
main metrics to track implementation progress (10
X 4 = 40 metrics total)
• For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked:
- Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s) completed
- Numbers of process units with RBI completed
- Numbers of process units with all IOW’s implemented
- Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOW’s
• But there was only one bottom line metric for the
aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives –>
numbers of process safety incidents per
year
4
Results of the Process Safety Initiatives
YTD Totals
1999 2000 2001
Numbers of 2002 2003 2004
25 23
Process Safety 20
20 19
Incidents
in last 6 years –
15
15
A real success 10 9
story 5 3
5
Primary Aspects of the
Pressure Equipment Integrity
• (PEI)Integrity
Identify all necessary Initiative
Operating Windows
(IOW’s)
• Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering -
Maintenance - Inspection) in each operating area to
create and manage CCD’s and IOW’s
• Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s), which
document all process IOW’s
• Train operators on the CCD and IOW’s
• Implement IOW’s and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
• Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR®)
to monitor progress of the PEI Initiative 6
PEI PSI ESP
Pyramid RBI
CCD’s & IOW’s
OEMI Teams
101 Essential Elements
7
Corrosion Control Documents –
•
Contents
Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment
degradation
• Description of the process unit and process conditions
• Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and
degradation mechanisms, as well as normal operation
• Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram
(modified PFD showing construction materials)
• Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g.
overhead system, slurry system, reflux system, etc.
• All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and
history of problem areas
• Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms
• Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc.
• Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes,
construction materials changes, etc.
• Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s) 8
Corrosion Control Documents –
Construction
• Unit specific CCD’s completed by an OEMI
team which includes:
- Site corrosion engineer/specialist
- Unit process engineer
- Unit inspector
- One or more experienced unit operations representatives
- Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer)
• Final document represents an agreement
between the OEMI Team involved and clearly
benefits by the synergistic interaction of all team
members
9
Establishing Integrity Operating
• Historical operating,Windows
maintenance & inspection
records
• Design data; lab data; operating data
• Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules
• Process chemistry and engineering knowledge
• Reactive chemistry knowledge
• Recommended practices (industry and company)
• Process and corrosion modeling tools
• Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy
dose)
Operating
Operating
Window
Window
11
Integrity Operating Windows –
Examples
• Typically fall into 2 categories:
• Physical
- Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design,
operating, partial pressures, dew points, dry points, heating and
cooling rates, delta P, etc.
- Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on
Alky contactor motors, slurry content, hydrogen flux, vibration
limits, corrosivity probes, etc.
• Chemical
- pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in
crude, NH4HS content, NH3 content, TAN, acid strength, amine
strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels,
oxygen content, etc.
12
IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen
• Service
Mechanical design window Temperature
set by the design code e.g. Mechanical Design Limits
ASME
• IOW set by material limit for EOR Process Temp IOW
high temperature hydrogen
attack in API RP 941
• SOR process temperature SOR Process Temp
13
Integrity Operating Windows –
Typical Numbers per Operating Unit
(before & after an intensive review)
16
Definition: Standard Level
A limit that, if exceeded over a defined
period of time, could cause one of the
following to eventually occur:
17
Standard Level Examples
• REAC NH4HS Concentration
- Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping
• Heater Tube Skin Temperature
- Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.
• Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature
- Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to
fractionator internals or potential loss of containment.
• pH of Crude Tower Overhead
- Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to
corrosion of tubing and piping and potential loss of containment.
• Desalter Outlet Salt Content
- Sustained operation above standard level could lead to corrosion
and potential loss of containment
18
Integrity Operating Windows –
• Successes
In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous
project had installed the wrong construction materials –
immediate inspection revealed significant HTHA damage
• An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process
engineer and said that “we actually operate much hotter
than you think because we use the by-pass” – immediate
inspection revealed significant localized damage
• A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH4HS
in the REAC system of an HCU – immediate inspection
revealed a previously-missed localized spot of significant
corrosion
• An IOW was set on NH4HS concentration at another
refinery, which then began to take routine lab samples –
soon thereafter discovered the concentration was too high
and took steps to increase wash water and adjust feedstock
19
Operator Training on CCD’s and
IOW’s
• Level 1
- Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative
- SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training
• Level 2
- Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents
- What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use them
• Level 3
- Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific CCD
- Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them
- What can happen if the IOW is exceeded
20
PEI PSI ESP
Pyramid RBI
CCD’s & IOW’s
OEMI TEAMS
101 Essential Elements
21
Implementing Risk-Based Inspection
• Another major part of (RBI)
our pressure equipment
integrity process safety initiative
• We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI
(S-RBI), as well as the more quantitative API RBI,
both successfully for different needs at different
sites
• But RBI will not be covered today – a topic for
another day, if you like
• Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be
it risk-based, condition-based, or time-based
may not be fully reliable without effective
identification and implementation of integrity
operating windows (IOW’s) 22
Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s &
RBI
Feedback
Confidence in plant integrity
Creating the CCD:
Type of degradation RBI planning:
Method of inspection
Location of degradation
Where to inspect
Susceptibility to degradation
Degradation rates Frequency of
inspection
IOW limits:
Safety Incidents 20 19
20
in last 6 years in 15
15
Shell (US) Refining
Operations – Facts, 10 9