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a) From the standpoint of the educational institution: The freedom of the university
to determine “who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught; and who
may be admitted to study” [Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234].
b) In Capitol Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 493, the closure
of the nursing school was upheld, after due notice to the DECS, when its
teachers and students declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take
examinations. The school may not be forced to reopen at the instance of the
striking students. In University of the Philippines v. Judge Ayson, 176 SCRA 571,
the Court also sustained the closure of the U.P. Baguio High School, on the
ground that U.P. was set up as a tertiary institution and that the High School was
set up only as an incident to its tertiary functions.
c) In Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, the Supreme Court reversed its ruling in
Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7, declaring that the “termination of contract” theory
in Alcuaz can no longer be used as a valid ground to deny readmission or re-
enrolment to students who had led or participated in student mass actions
against the school. The Court held that the students do not shed their
constitutionally- protected rights of free expression at the school gates. Cited
with approval were the rulings in Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359, along
with Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, 135 SCRA 706; Arreza v.
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, 137 SCRA 94; and Guzman v. National
University, 142 SCRA 699. Accordingly, the only valid grounds to deny
readmission of students are academic deficiency and breach of the school’s
reasonable rules of conduct. Be that as it may, in imposing disciplinary sanctions
on students, it was held in Guzman (reiterated in Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong, supra.) that the following minimum
standards of procedural due process must be satisfied: (i) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation against them; (ii)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (iii) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (iv) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (v) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case. Held inapplicable to this case are the rulings in Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 [where the issue
was whether a female lay student had the right to compel a seminary for the
priesthood to admit her for theological studies leading to a degree], and
Tangonan v. Pano, 135 SCRA 245 [where the issue was whether a nursing
student, who was admitted on probation and who failed in her nursing subjects,
may compel her school to readmit her for enrolment],
d) In Tan v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, which involved
a bitter conflict between the administrators of Grace Christian
High School and the parents of some students on matters of
school policy, the Supreme Court said that the “maintenance
of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment
will be seriously imperilled if, under the circumstances of the
case, Grace Christian High School is forced to admit
petitioners’ children and to reintegrate them into the student
body.
g) In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 402, the Supreme Court ruled
that under the U.P. Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is
vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus, which is
composed of the President of the University'of the Philippines and of all
instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant
professor. Consequently, the University Council alone has the right to
protest against any unauthorizedexercise of its power. Petitioners cannot
impugn the directives of the Board of Regents on the ground of academic
freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected.
h) In Cagayan Capitol College v. NLRC, 189 SCRA
658, it was held that while DECS regulations prescribe
a maximum of three years probation period for
teachers, the termination of the three-year period
does not result in the automatic permanent status for
the teacher. It must be conditioned on a showing
that the teacher’s services during the probationary
period was satisfactory in accordance with the
employer's standards. The prerogative of the school
to provide standards for its teachers and to
determine whether or not these standards have
been met is in accordance with academic freedom
and constitutional autonomy which give educational
institutions the right to choose who should teach.
k) In University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3,
2001, the Supreme Court sustained the primacy of
academic freedom over Civil Service rules on AWOL,
stressing that when the UP opted to retain private
petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence,
the University was exercising its freedom to choose who
may teach or who may continue to teach in its faculty.
Even in light of provisions of the Civil Service Law, the
respondent Commission had no authority to dictate to
UP or any institution of higher learning the outright
dismissal of its personnel.
How should the State’s power to regulate educational
institutions be exercised?
Section 4[1], Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State’s power to regulate
educational institutions:
The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions.
As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the
regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.
(Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 265, 288, Dec. 15,
2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan])
Academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in
its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes
in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific
and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency (Section 3[2],
Article XIV, Constitution).
May a university validly revoke a degree or
honor it has conferred to a student after the
graduation of the latter after finding that such
degree or honor was obtained through fraud?
In Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the SC pointed out that academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted to
“institutions of higher learning” which is thus given a “wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students.” If such
institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot
study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer
the honor and distinction of being its graduates.