Breaker Fail Protection

Considerations

GRID
Technical Institute

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transmitted by any means, copied, reproduced or modified without the prior
written consent of Alstom Grid Technical Institute. All rights reserved.
 Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - Agenda

Aims and Objectives Page 4

Types of Backup Protection Page 7

Typical Schemes Page 14

Single Phase Considerations Page 39

Non-conventional Techniques Page 44

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 2

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Aims & Objectives

Dependability

• Duplicate:
− Protective Relays
− Trip Coils
− DC Supplies
− Instrument Transformers

• Not Duplicated:
− Circuit Breakers
• Operating Mechanism
• Hydraulic Systems
• Pneumatic Systems

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 3

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Aims & Objectives

• Objective:
− To Clear the Fault with:
• Minimal time delay
• Minimum disruption to the Power System

• Two forms of Backup Protection:

− Remote Backup
− Local Backup

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 4

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - Agenda

Aims and Objectives  Page 4

Types of Backup Protection Page 7

Typical Schemes Page 14

Single Phase Considerations Page 39

Non-conventional Techniques Page 44

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 5

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Remote Backup Protection

Z3A

Z2A

Z1A

A B C

21A 21B

Advantages Disadvantages
• Not affected by local • Slow
station conditions • Sensitivity
• Contributes to both relay • Limited Discrimination
and CB failure protection
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 6
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Remote Backup Protection

Sensitivity Issue – Affect of Fault Infeeds

B A B A

R1 R2 R1 I1 I2 R2
I1 I2

I3
21 21

V
V
I
I

Fault
Point Fault Effective
Point Fault
Point

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 7

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
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 Remote Backup Protection

Discrimination Issue – Widespread Disruption

~

~
~

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 8

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

Why ?

• Advantages
− Faster
− Improved sensitivity
− Minimises network disruption
• Disadvantages
− May be affected by local conditions
− Accidental Operations (“finger trouble”)
• Security
− No unwanted operations
• Dependability
− Guaranteed to operate when required
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 9
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

What is it?

• Two types of Local Backup can be considered

− Relay Backup
• Provision of duplicated main protection schemes
− Breaker Backup
• Cannot duplicate the circuit breakers (usually)
• Can duplicate trip coils
− Still common physical mechanism failures still possible
• Breaker Failure Protection
− Used to backtrip fault infeeds in case of local break failure
− Only initiated when tripping has occurred
− Sometimes called “Stuck Breaker Protection” or “Backtripping
Protection”
− Trip Circuit Supervision should be considered as part of the local
backup
Breaker Fail Protection facility
Considerations - P 10
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

Duplicate Protection Schemes

VT

CT
AUX. DC CT
SUPPLY

MAIN 1 MAIN 2
PROTECTION PROTECTION

TRIP CIRCUIT
TCS1 SUPERVISION TCS2

RELAYS

TC TC
1 TRIP COILS 2

CIRCUIT
BREAKER
CIRCUIT BREAKER
MECHANISM
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 11
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

Duplicate Protection Additional Dependability

Cct A Trip Supply Cct B Trip Supply

+ - + -
M1 M1
A TC1A B TC1B
M1 M1
A B M2
A TC2A
M2A M2B

M2B
TC2B

Circuit Circuit
A B

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 12

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

Duplicate Protection Schemes

VT

CT
AUX. DC CT
SUPPLY

MAIN 1 MAIN 2
PROTECTION PROTECTION

TCS1 TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION RELAYS TCS2

CB Fail
Protection
Scheme
TC TC
1 TRIP COILS 2

CIRCUIT Backtrip &

BREAKER Intertrip other
CIRCUIT BREAKER
MECHANISM infeeds
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 13
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Local Backup Protection

Backtripping and Intertripping

If Breaker A fails to clear the fault,
− Circuit Breakers B, C, D and
E must be simultaneously
tripped to clear the fault
D E locally
− Remote end Circuit Breaker
Trip should be directly tripped
B A C
to prevent the fault being
fed (if it hasn’t already been
MAIN
PROTECTION opened)
− Consider Health & Safety!!

Fault
This is the responsibility of the
Intertri
CB Fail protection scheme
p
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 14
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - Agenda

Aims and Objectives  Page 4

Types of Backup Protection  Page 7

Typical Schemes Page 17

Single Phase Considerations Page 39

Non-conventional Techniques Page 44

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 15

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical Schemes

Simplest Scheme – No Current Check

Prot
+ - Op. Backtrip
Main
TC1 Protectio
1
CB Time n Reset Error In Safety
Main Time
TC2 (Arc Timer Margin
2
Out) (Max)

2 Setting Of
Timer
Disadvantages of this simple
scheme
86 − Long total fault clearance
times due to long timer
Trip Adjacent setting
Circuits & Intertrip − Security of scheme
− Risk of initiation during
testing causing widespread
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 16 system disruption
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical Schemes

Simple Scheme – Use of CB Auxiliary Contact

Prot
+ - Op. Backtrip
Main
1 TC1
CB Time Error In Safety
Main
TC2 (Arc Timer Margin
2
Out)

52a 2 Setting Of
Timer
Advantage of this scheme is that we
don’t need to consider the main
protection reset time so fault clearance
time is much reduced
86
Disadvantages of this simple scheme
Trip Adjacent − Security of scheme
Circuits & Intertrip − Risk of initiation during testing
causing widespread system
disruption

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 17

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical Schemes

Simple Scheme – Use of CB Auxiliary Contact

Prot
+ - Op. Backtrip
Main
1 TC1
CB Time Safety
Main
TC2 (Arc Margin
2
Out)

52a 2 Setting Of
Timer
Additional improvement by
including the CB auxiliary contact
in the back tripping path
− Removes timer overshoot
86

− Increased security of
Trip Adjacent tripping
Circuits & Intertrip
But, consider is it rational or
proper to consider the breaker
status in a CB failure protection
scheme?
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 18
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical Schemes

Simple Scheme – Use of BF Current Detector

Prot
+ - Op. Backtrip
Main
1 TC1 50BF
CB Time Reset Safety
Main
TC2 (Arc Time Margin
2
Out)

50BF 2 Setting Of
Timer
Advantages of this scheme are:
− 50BF designed for fast reset so
improved total fault clearance
times
86 − Security enhanced by two elements
being required to operate for timer
initiation
Trip Adjacent
Disadvantages of this scheme
Circuits & Intertrip
− 50BF must be set greater than
maximum load current (if security
is to be maintained)
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 19
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
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is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

• Sensitive
• Secure
• Dependable
• Fast
• Selective
• Minimise Additional Cabling

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 20

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
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is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Sensitivity

• Minimum Plant Conditions

• Fault Position
• “Operation Factor” (or what’s instantaneous!)
• Relay Drop Off / Pick Up Ratio
• Generator Circuits
• Large Inductive Circuits

We NEED to achieve a setting of less than full load current

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 21
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Switching Large Inductive Loads – CB Resistor Current

For Large Inductive Loads special
circuit breakers are applied,
LARGE
utilising dual breakers:
INDUCTIVE − Main CB contacts opens
LOAD first
− The resistor is used to
reduce the switching
IR overvoltages
− The “auxiliary” CB opens 1
or 2 cycles later
− BF current detector should
NOT remain operated for
the resistor current IR, but
− The minimum fault level
MUST take priority (in
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 22 which case the timer setting
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
would need to allow for
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Current Settings below Full Load Current

If the Breaker Fail Current check is
MAI B.F. to be set below full load, it must
N
only be switched into service when
- required:
+
B/F
− Inhibited during normal
conditions
For static type relays:
2
− Control application of
auxiliary power to the 50BF
86 relay
For numerical relays:
− Software control
− Exact operation depends
upon relay
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 23
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical UK Current Settings

Applies to transmission levels (400/275kV)

• In general, 20% (minimum IF of 55%)
• Generator Circuits, 5%
• Inductive Loads, 80% (20% if IF<180%)

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 24

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Breaker Fail Timer settings

Theoretically, in order to set the BF timer we should consider:

• CB Trip Time
− Main contact seperation time (Arc Out)
− Or Resistor contact seperation time
• Current Detector
− Operation time, and
− Reset time
• Main Protection
− Reset time
• Discriminating (Safety) Margin
• Maximum permitted fault clearance times

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 25

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Timer Setting Example

Simple Scheme – Current Check before Timer

Main Arc
+ - Fault Fault
Prot Out
On Safety Cleared
Main
1 TC1 Margin
Main A C D
2 TC2
(40) (50) (10) (50)
50B (5)
F
B (10) (50)
BF BF 86
Timer
2 Init Reset OP
Starte
d
•Breaker Fail Timer setting:
86
− A+C+D-B = 105msecs
Trip Adjacent •Total Fault Clearance time (of CB
Circuits & Intertrip
Fail)
− 210msecs
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 26
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
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 Timer Setting Example

Alternative Arrangement – Timer before Current Check

Main Arc
Fault
Prot Out
+ - On Safety Fault
Main Margin Cleared
1 TC1
A D
Main
2 TC2 (40) (50) (50)
(5)
2
B (10) (50)
Timer BF BF 86
50B Starte Init Op. OP
F d
•Breaker Fail Timer setting:
− A+D-B = 95msecs
86
•Total Fault Clearance time (of CB Fail)
− 200msecs
Trip Adjacent
•Considerations
Circuits & Intertrip versus Current Check first
− No Fast Reset on 50BF
− 2 stage schemes more difficult to
implement
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 27
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical 2 stage scheme

Start Verifier or 2-stage (re-trip & backtrip) Scheme

+ -

Main 1
•Advantages of 2-stage approach
TC

SV
1 − With lack of use, circuit breakers
Main 2
will become “sticky”
TC
2
− Start verifier, “re-strikes” the trip
coil and may overcome the initial
reluctance of the CB to open
50BF
− First stage may be time-delayed
(if preferred) but will extend
50BF overall fault clearance
SV

52a
•Disadvantages
− Breaker fail timer setting must be
Timer
set longer and overall fault
clearance time is longer
86

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 28

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Typical 2 stage scheme

Start Verifier or 2-stage (re-trip & backtrip) Scheme

Fault Main SV SV Arc Fault
On Prot Init. Op. Out Cleared
Safety
Margin
E
A D
(40) (5) (10) (50) (10) (50)
(10) (50)
B
C
BF Timer BF 86
Init. Started RESET OP.
Timer Setting
=A+C+D=110msec

Total BF Clearance Time = 225msec

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 29

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Security & Dependability

• Security
− Duplication with Series connections
− For example, duplicate current detectors & timers
− “AND” logic: 2 out of 2
• Dependability
− Duplication with Parallel connections
− “OR” logic: 1 out of 2
− Cater for single contingency failure

These may often be contradictory requirements so consider

the scheme carefully
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 30
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Security & Dependability

+ Main -
Prot
50BF 50BF

T1B T1A
86
T2B T2A

Unit DC
Supply No 1 T1
+ A
-
T1
B
Unit DC
Supply No 2 T2
+ A
-
T2
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 31 B
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Selectivity & Cabling

•Breaker fail scheme needs to:-
BF BF − Intertrip remote infeed
BF
− Backtrip all local feeds
•Problems:
− Cabling cost
− Cabling complexity for all but
the simplest schemes
• Easy to make an error

•It may be acceptable to integrate the

backtripping into the local busbar
protection

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 32

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Desirable Features

Selectivity & Cabling – Double Bus Systems

MI(A) MI(B)
50BF(A)
TC
RI(A) RI(B) B
MI(A) MI(B) MI(C)

MI(A) MI(C)

RI(A) RI(B) RI(C) TC

RI(A) RI(C) C

etc.

•As can be seen, lots of auxiliary

contacts will be required for a
50 50 50 segregated “backtrip” system
BF
BF BF
− Is it more secure?
Cct A Cct B Cct C
•Do we duplicate the breaker fail
protection scheme to increase
dependability & security?
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 33
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Practical Scheme Examples
Single Busbar Scheme
A B C
BB
D
BB
CH
50 50 50
+ BF(A) BF(B) BF(C)

50BF 50BF 50
(A) (B) BF(C)
50BF 50BF 50BF
T T T
(A)-1 (B)-1 (C)-1

BB BB BB
TR TR
TR
(B) INT
(C) B.B.
(A) INT
(B)
INT Protection
(A)
(C) Buswires

50BFT 50BFT 50BF

(A)-2 (B)-2 T
(C)-2

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 34

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Practical Scheme Examples
Main & Reserve Bar Scheme
Main Bar
MI MI
Reserve RI RI
Bar A B MI RI
BB
M
MI MI

BB RI
R RI C
BB
BF BF
CH BF
(B) (C)
(A)
+ 50BF
50BF 50BF
(A) (B) (C)
50BFT
50BFT 50BFT
(C)
(A) (B)
MTR RTR
RI MI

M RI INT RI INT
M
(A) (B)
I I
BB BB MT RT
TR(A) TR(B) R R

50BFT 50BF 50BF

(A) T(B) T
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 35
- (C)
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Practical Scheme Examples
Existing 275kV Breaker Fail Scheme
Supply 1
+ -
Main
TC1
1
TR BF1 BF2
T1A

T1B

Main
BF1
2
BF2
Supply 2
+
TC2
TR T2A

Alarm T2B
Supply+ T

B.F.
+ Defective
T1A M R CH T1B 29L
TR
29M T2B 52’a
T2A
’
29R

B.B. Prot Trip

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 36 INT
Buswires
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - Agenda

Aims and Objectives  Page 4

Types of Backup Protection  Page 7

Typical Schemes  Page 17

Single Phase Considerations Page 39

Non-conventional Techniques Page 44

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 37

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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Single Phase Considerations

Standard 3 phase CB Failure Scheme

Main Main
Arc Fault
Fault Prot Prot
Out Cleared
Op
+ Main - On Reset
Safety
Prot Margi
A 50BF
A E C
n
D
ABC
B (40) (50) (40) (10) (50)
(5) (10) (50)
C
B
Timer
BFABC Timer BFBC 86
Init. Start BFA OP
Reset
Reset

•Breaker Fail Timer setting:

86 − A+E+C+D-B = 145msecs
Trip Adjacent
•Total Fault Clearance time (of CB Fail)
Circuits & Intertrip − 250msecs
•With Common BF initiation during single
phase trpis, load current will prevent fast
reset of the CB Fail current check device
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 38
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Single Phase Considerations

Alternative 3 phase CB Failure Scheme

Main Main
Arc Fault
Prot
+ - Fault
On Op
Out Prot
Reset
Cleared
Main Safety
A
Prot Timer Margi
n
B A C D
(40) (50) (40) (50)
C (5) (10) (50)
50BF B
ABC
Timer BFABC BFABC 86
Start Init. Op OP

A •Breaker Fail Timer setting:

86 − A+C+D-B = 135msecs
B
Trip Adjacent •Total Fault Clearance time (of CB Fail)
C Circuits & Intertrip
− 240msecs
•With Common BF initiation during single
phase trpis, load current will prevent fast
reset of the CB Fail current check device
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 39
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only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Single Phase Considerations

Single Phase control of current check devices required

Main
+ Mai - Arc Fault
n Fault Prot
Out Cleared
A
Prot
BF
On Op
(A) Safety
Margi
B BF
n
(B) A C D
C BF (40) (50) (10) (50)
(C) (5) (10) (50)
B
Time
r BFA Timer BFA 86
Init. Start Reset OP

•Breaker Fail Timer setting:

− A+C+D-B = 105msecs
86
•Total Fault Clearance time (of CB Fail)
− 210msecs
•Phase segregated control of CB fail current
check relay required to remove main
protection reset time from setting
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 40 consideration
© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Single Phase Considerations

2-stage, Single Phase Control using a Modern 3 Phase Relay

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 41

© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - Agenda

Aims and Objectives  Page 4

Types of Backup Protection  Page 7

Typical Schemes  Page 17

Single Phase Considerations  Page 39

Non-conventional Techniques Page 44

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 42

© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Non-Conventional Techniques

• Traditional CB Fail protection schemes utilise overcurrent

technology
− Control inputs to “energise” the detection unit under
appropriate conditions only i.e during a fault. This permits:
• Low current thresholds – good sensitivity & speed
• Allow for good thermal withstand
− Need to be designed correctly to ensure:
• Fast energisation
• Fast resetting and very close to pick-up setting
− Can suffer extended reset times during fast fault clearance due
to a decaying DC current in the secondary circuit.
• Modern relays can achieve the same goals using different methods:
− Software control prevent operation except during fault situation,
negating traditional issues associated with low current settings
& thermal capacity
− Use of undercurrent type elements, or sampling relies on fast
operation, not resetting
− Can account for or filter the DC currents preventing fast
“resetting” on traditional overcurrent based technologies
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 43
© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Non-Conventional Techniques

Decaying DC Current after Fast Fault Clearance

•At fault clearance, the flux within the core
will still be at some value but this suggests
that there is a magnetising current
E A
•Since the primary circuit is open, this
magnetising current can only be present in
the secondary circuit but it is not a
sustainable state
C D •The CT will attempt to reach a stable state
with no magnetising current
•The transition from the point on the flux
curve to the point with no magnetising
F current (CT remenance) will cause a
B decaying DC component on the secondary
circuit
•Due to low current settings, this may be
enough to prevent resetting of overcurrent
elements (or operation of undercurrent
elements)

Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 44

© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Non-Conventional Techniques

“Sampling Method” of Current Check in CB Fail Schemes

The algorithm looks for successive positive going and negative

going excursions above a “positive” and “negative” current
threshold. If they are both above the current threshold and of
oposite sign, current flow is still present i.e the CB has not opened.
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 45
© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Non-Conventional Techniques

“Sampling Method” of Current Check in CB Fail Schemes

In this case, the breaker fail timer is completed but the current
check still indicates that the CB is closed. Therefore, a CB Fail
condition is given.
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 46
© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 Non-Conventional Techniques

“Sampling Method” of Current Check in CB Fail Schemes

In this case, the breaker fail timer is completed and the current
check indicates that the CB is open, even in the presence of the
decaying DC component due to the CB opening.
Breaker Fail Protection Considerations - P 47
© ALSTOM 2010. All rights reserved. Information contained in this document is provided without liability for information purposes
only and is subject to change without notice. No representation or warranty is given or to be implied as to the completeness of
information or fitness for any particular purpose. Reproduction, use or disclosure to third parties, without express written authority,
is strictly prohibited.
 GRID
Technical Institute

This document is the exclusive property of Alstom Grid and shall not be
transmitted by any means, copied, reproduced or modified without the prior
written consent of Alstom Grid Technical Institute. All rights reserved.