PEG Bible Sanitized Version v2

Robert’s secular PEG Bible
October xx, yyyy
DRAFT
This information is confidential and was prepared by Bain & Company solely for the use of our client; it is not to be relied on by any xrd party without Bain's prior written consent
Building PEG decks is like playing with LEGOs
VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

UPDATE UPDATE FINAL UPDATE
Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus
Approach / ‘Math slide’ / Analytical framework
Deck and section summaries
Keystone Section frameworks

slides What we like / Our concerns
What we would do as owners
Next steps
Give an Company overview
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
Few examples
analysis of common Maps
well (and slides/analyses
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
This information is confidential and was prepared by Bain & Company solely for the use of our client; it is not to be relied on by any xrd party without Bain's prior written consent HOU 170912 - PEG Bible sanit ... ion v2 2
Use this one.
Disclaimer Don’t forget to

replace the client
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• This material and the analysis contained herein (the “Report”) was prepared by Bain &
Company (“Bain”) over a limited time period solely for the use of EQT (“Client”) and is
not to be disclosed in whole or in part to any third party without Bain’s explicit prior
written permission. In the event Bain does grant permission for the Report to be
disclosed to a third party, Bain will not permit the third party to rely on the Report.
• Bain has not independently verified this information and makes no representation or
warranty, express or implied, that such information is accurate or complete. Projected
data and conclusions contained herein are based (unless sourced otherwise) on the
information described above and Bain’s best judgment and should not be construed as
definitive forecasts. Bain does not have any duty to update or supplement any
information in the Report.
• No responsibility or liability whatsoever is accepted by any person including Bain &

Company, Inc. or its affiliates and their respective officers, employees or agents for any
errors or omissions in this Report, save insofar as Bain may expressly agree in writing.
• This Report does not constitute (i) an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any
securities or assets or (ii) a recommendation by Bain to purchase or sell any securities
or assets. Each potential participant in the financing of any investment discussed
herein should make their own independent assessment of the investment.
• This Report is not complete without an accompanying oral discussion and presentation
by Bain.

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Phase x: Meeting roadmap
PRELIMINARY
Week of x/xx Week of x/x Week of x/x
M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F
Verbal update: Phase x update

x/x x/xx
• Review high-level approach to analysis • Determine impact of key trends on

of Deck’s addressable market chassis billing days and required
and competitive positioning chassis fleet size (as drivers of revenue
and returns)
• Share emerging insights on marine
market and competitive landscape • Develop outlook for marine chassis
industry pricing/margins
- Drivers of market size and growth
- Shift in chassis supply model • Deepen understanding of Deck relative
- Impact of chassis efficiency improvements geographic, industry, and customer
on required fleet size exposure and potential impact on Deck
- Customer purchasing behavior
• Share perspective on Deck competitive
- Competitive landscape positioning today and through yyyy
• Summarize preliminary findings from • Integrate findings into preliminary Deck

primary research revenue and return outlook
Meeting roadmap
Week of x/x Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx
M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F
Verbal ‘Week x’ update: Verbal update x Final readout:

Kick-off
update x x/xx x/xx (assumes green light) x/xx (assumes green light)
• Review updates to US
• Discuss Porcupine • Share progress • Review accelerated • Share preliminary
work to date update upside opportunity
perspective US findings on stability
• Share existing • Discuss summary finished lubricants of Canadian • Review assessment of
Bain work on US of current share upside operations and Canadian market and
finished lubricants perspective on US
market finished lubricant
- Size of volumes at emerging views on operations
play for Porcupine base and white oil
opportunity • Review exposure to
• Review workplan based on churn and
and align on • Review sampling
markets other products (base
likelihood to receive
scheduling of ‘what we heard’ trial and white oils)
during accelerated - Market growth
US finished • Share preliminary
outlook, supply
lubricant primary view of US market growth and capacity
discussions growth outlook and additions
• Share analytical margin stability
framing of project • Discuss implications
scope and sample for Porcupine
of context- strategy moving
oriented Porcupine forward
internal data cuts
Meeting roadmap
Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx
Kick-off: Working session: Final readout:

x/xx x/xx x/xx
• Discuss market drivers • Discuss emerging • Review final assessment

and analytic process findings on market • Discuss implications for
• Discuss XXX’s work to sizing, segmentation, key XXX strategy moving
date on the market drivers and competitive forward
positioning
• Review workplan,
calendar and timeline • Determine priority sub-
segments for deeper
• Note: XXX to provide analysis
detailed commentary on
feedback received from • XXX to provide update on
market participants and current M&A
target customers opportunities
Meeting roadmap
PRELIMINARY
Week of xx/x Week of xx/x Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx
M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F
Progress update: Interim update: Final update:

xx/xx xx/xx xx/x
• Provide update on progress • Provide preliminary readout • Review Hurricane portfolio by

from primary research, market segment, highlighting
• Review summary of Hurricane including Hurricane market exposure to specific trends,
portfolio and participation by position and customer customer, and competitor
market segment feedback positioning
• Share high-level perspective • Review and discuss analysis
• Share integrated perspective
on Hurricane end markets, of Hurricane end markets,
on outlook for Hurricane end
with focus on Oil & Gas with focus on macro trends
markets
(historic growth; growth and growth opportunities in
drivers and key trends) each market segment - Critical market drivers
- Communication: 3G, 3G, and - Scenario analysis testing
• Share preliminary findings wireline sensitivity to macro trends and
from primary research, - O&G: Midstream infrastructure Hurricane performance
including emerging insights on buildout across US, Canada, - Range of Hurricane revenue
Hurricane competitive position and Mexico growth forecasts by segment
- Stability and range of potential
• Align on critical market upsides across Electric T&D • Provide perspective on key
drivers and scenarios to test and Power Gen revenue risks and opportunities
Meeting roadmap
PRELIMINARY
Week of x/xx Week of xx/x Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx
Management meeting

xx/x xx/xx xx/xx
• Review deal thesis and high- • Share insights derived from • Summarize Jura’s addressable
level approach to analysis of analysis of Jura’s business market, highlighting outlook
Jura’s addressable market across a range of scenarios
• Identify core market drivers
and competitive positioning
and suggested refinements
• Provide overview of Jura’s to ATK model assumptions • Define key purchase criteria
service lines, revenues, etc. and implications for Jura’s
• Assess sustainability of Jura’s
competitive positioning
• Summarize preliminary addressable market, including
findings from primary research perspectives on:
- OPEX vs. CAPEX exposure • Quantify potential upside
• Share preliminary driver trees - Likelihood of deferrals related to share gain efforts
for focus service lines: - % tied to sanctioned activity (e.g. in AUS, from BH/HAL)
- Cranes & Lifting - Pricing trends
- Hydraulics • Define competitive landscape • Share outlook on PPU capital
- Process, Pipeline & Umbilicals by service line and region intensity/returns going forward
- Industrial Services
• Provide POV on the value of
• Outline and agree macro the Tier x.x model and of an
scenarios to be tested integrated solution
Meeting roadmap
Week of x/x Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx
M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F M T W T F
Kick-off: Interim update: Verbal check-in Final readout:

x/x x/xx x/xx – x/xx x/xx
• To be scheduled based • Review final
• Understand current • Share brief progress
on PE Co.t/Bain assessment of
PE Co. views on asset update
availability construction materials
and key questions for • Discuss analytical market
Bain team • Share verbal update
framing of project
on new learnings • Discuss relevant
• Discuss Tie work scope
updates to previous
completed to date by • Discuss any shifts in
• Review summary of assessment
PE Co. team priorities
current perspectives
• Share summary
• Align on general on NA construction
implications for Tie
scheduling plan materials market
asset opportunity
- Market growth outlook
and segment exposure
- Stability of core
connectors business
(risks and upsides)
- Market structure and
Tie competitive
positioning
- Highly preliminary
view on strategic
options
Meeting roadmap
Week of xx/x Week of xx/xx Week of x/x

Holiday
break

xx/xx xx/xx x/xx
• Review high-level approach to • Identify core market drivers • Summarize Wildfire’s

analysis of Wildfire’s and share overview of historic addressable market in NA and
addressable market performance internationally, highlighting
and competitive positioning • Share preliminary outlook across a range of
assessment of size and scenarios
• Share emerging insights on stability of Wildfire’s • Define key metrics and strategic
ESP market and competitive addressable market, with imperatives for top- and
landscape focus on Permian/Mid-Con: bottom-line success in
- Drivers of market size and - Drilling activity by type penetrating ESP market
growth
- ESP usage, segmented by
- Market segmentation customer type
• Define key purchase criteria
- Customer purchasing behavior - Pricing trends
and implications for Wildfire’s
competitive positioning
- Competitive landscape • Define competitive landscape
and highlight strategic • Summarize pricing trends and
• Summarize preliminary strengths and weaknesses associated margin implications
findings from primary research • Quantify Wildfire potential to
• Provide POV on the potential
for Wildfire to differentiate on win share from established
service and win share players
Meeting roadmap
Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx Week of xx/xx Week of xx/x Week of xx/x
Progress update: Interim update: Integrated readout:

xx/xx xx/x xx/xx
• Provide update on • Share preliminary view on • Provide full readout on

progress ‘base case’ Peach revenue primary research
opportunity
• Share updated POV on
• Discuss preliminary deal - Addressable market size, by
industry and geography spotting services business
thesis
- Assessment of market - Market growth forecasts
growth drivers (e.g., - ‘Base case’ Peach revenue
• Share high-level approach spotting adoption, - Scenario analysis testing
to analyzing Peach outsourcing penetration) sensitivity to
revenue growth - Market pricing trends macroeconomic trends,
competitive dynamics, and
• Share preliminary findings • Share Peach competitive Peach performance
from primary, including positioning in spotting

• Share assessment of
emerging insights on services measured
Peach growth potential
spotting market growth against key purchase
from shuttling and VAL
and Peach position criteria
services
• Share emerging view on • Provide perspective on key
shuttling and VAL service risks
opportunities

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Sources to date – as of x/xx/xx
PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

• EVP, Chassis Co* • National Accounts • Morgan Stanley • Barclays Research
Director, SSL • Stephens and • IHS
• EVP, Chassis Co*
• VP, Terminal Company • US BEA
• Manager, Terminal
Operator • Deutsche Bank
Operator • World Bank
• Sales Manager, SSL* • American Association • Transportation Research
• VP, SSL*
• VP Sales, Trucking Co of Port Authorities Forum
• BD Manager, Port
• World Trade • TRAC annual reports
Authority • Intermodal Manager,
Organization
SSL • Federal Motor Carrier
• Yard Manager, • Marketline
Terminal Operator • Operations Manager, Safety Administration
SSL • Clarkson Research (FMCSA)
• CEO, Regional (CRSL) • Ocean Carrier Equipment
Trucking Co • Regional Director,
• HSBC Management Association
SSL
• VP Marketing, • Journal of Commerce (OCEMA)
Chassis Co • Director of • National Cooperative
Operations, SSL • Maersk annual reports
• Regional Director, Freight Research Program
• IANA
Chassis Co • Regional Manager, (NCFRP)
SSL • Research in
• Senior VP, Chassis • Port Technology
Transportation and
Co* • Port Operations International
Business Management
Manager, SSL
*Spoke with expert multiple times
INTERNAL DATA
• Project Deck – CIM (Oct yyyy) • Project Deck – January presentation
• Project Deck – Data room
Sources to date – as of October xx, yyyy

• VP of LNG Marketing, O&G multinational • Company websites, • Energy Information
• VP of Global LNG Operations, O&G multinational filings, and analyst Administration
• Executive, O&G consultancy reports, e.g.: • Wood Mackenzie
• SVP of Assets and Infrastructure, UK natural gas co - Sovereign • Department of Energy
• Executive VP, LNG consultancy - GAIL
• Oil & Gas Journal
• Chief Executive Assistant to CMD, Indian natural gas co - Sumitomo
• Natural Gas Intelligence
• President of USA Marketing and Trading, Russian NG co - Tokyo Gas
• International Gas Union
• Director of LNG, O&G multinational - Kansai
• VP of Projects, O&G multinational • Oil Price
- Pacific Summit Energy
• Chief Executive Assistant, Indian natural gas co • Business Standard
- Cheniere
• Executive Director, Indian natural gas co
- Freeport LNG • Interfax Global Energy
• Deputy Director, international LNG procurement co • Marcellus Drilling News
- Cameron LNG
• Chairman and Managing Director, O&G multinational • Reuters
• RBC Capital Markets
• CEO, international power generation co
• Credit Suisse • BP Statistical Review of
• Head of Strategy, Indian energy co World Energy
• CEO, Indian energy trader • Barclays
• Worley Parsons
• Senior Mgr. of Int’l Gas Sourcing, Indian natural gas co • Morgan Stanley
• Trademap
• MD and Chief Mentor, Indian power trading co • Wells Fargo
• CEO, small U.S. LNG co • International Group of
• RBN Energy Liquefied Natural Gas
• Head of LNG Optimization, Middle East LNG co
• IHS Global Insights Importers
• President, U.S. natural gas liquefaction co
• Capital IQ • ICIS - Reed Business
• Head Term Business, Middle East LNG co
• Rystad Energy Information
• Marketing Director of Short-Term Trading, Middle East LNG co
• Jefferies • International Energy
• LNG Business Integration Manager, O&G multinational
Agency
• CEO and President, LNG co • Platts
• OPEC
• Director of Commercial LNG, LNG trader • Bloomberg
• Vice President of LNG, O&G multinational • Pareto Securities AS
• Thomson Reuters
• Dep. Manager, LNG (Int’l Gas Sourcing), Indian natural gas co • ABN AMRO
• Economic Intelligence Unit
• Advisor, FAI (Fertilizer Association of India)
Sources to date – as of xx/xx/xx
PRELIMINARY

• Customers (xx) • Competitors (xx) • Rystad
- VP Pipeline, IOC - CEO, Mechanical Handling Provider • EIA
- VP, EPC - CFO, Mechanical Handling Provider • Platts
- Senior Global Supply Chain Manager, IOC - VP Pipeline, Chemical and Water • Quandl
- Rig Manager, Drilling Company (x) Treatment, PIPS Provider
• Infield
- Operations/Maintenance Advisor, Natural - VP Business Development, PIPS Provider
Gas Production Company - Director of Financial Planning & Analysis, • Oil & Gas UK
- Director, Global Supply Chain, IOC PIPS Provider • Global LNG Info
- Procurement and Supply Chain Specialist, - Global Business Advisor, OFS Provider • U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory
IOC - Lead Contract Support Engineer, Commission
- Operations Director, EPC Mechanical Handling Provider • Bloomberg
- Quality Manager, IOC - Business Development Manager,
• S&P Capital IQ
- Manager of Maintenance, Refinery Mechanical Handling Company
- Global Business Development Manager, • Financial Times, WSJ
Company
- Procurement Manager, EPC OFS Provider • BofA Merrill Lynch
- Procurement Manager, NOC - Senior Business Manager, Mechanical
- Compliance Engineer, EPC
Handling Provider INTERNAL DATA
- Commercial Director, Mechanical
- Specialist Engineer, EPC
Handling Provider • Project Jura data room
- Operations Manager, Offshore Drilling
- Consultant Lifting Engineer, Mechanical • Project Jura ATK Vendor Due
Company
Handling Company Diligence (August yyyy)
- Rig Construction Advisor, IOC
- VP Hydraulic Group, Hydraulic Products
• Project Jura Information
Provider
Memorandum (August yyyy)
• Industry experts (x) - Regional Director, Mechanical Handling
• Project Jura – Growth Strategy
- President, Procurement Consulting Firm Provider
(October yyyy)
• Project Jura – Company
Overview (October yyyy)
• Project Jura – Global Trading
Plan (September yyyy)
• Project Jura – Operating Model
(September yyyy)
Sources to date – as of xx/xx/yyyy
PRELIMINARY

• Oil & Gas (xx) • Communications (xx) • Rystad Energy U-Cube • Dealwatch
- CEO, Construction Co - SVP Corporate Ops, EPC Firm
- Director of Business Dev., - Regional Director, Comm Co
• Oil and Gas Journal • Company financials
Midstream Co - Exec. Chairman, EPC Firm • US Energy Information • Investor presentations
- Director, Midstream Co - VP Construction & Engineering, Administration
- Sr. Construction Specialist, Comm Co
• The Brattle Group
Midstream Co - Managing Partner, Comm
• IHS • Edison Energy Institute
- Project Manager, Midstream Co Consulting Co • INGAA
- Project Coordinator, EPC Firm - Senior Project Manager, Comm
• Harris Williams & Co
- Production Manager, Co • RBN • Ovum
Midstream Co - CEO, EPC Firm • Cheniere
- Senior Manager, Canada - CTO, Comm Co • IDC
Assets, Midstream Co - VP Technical Ops, Comm Co • Goldman Sachs • Gartner
- Project Manager, Construction - Executive VP Network, Comm • Morgan Stanley • SNL Energy
Co Co
- Field Operator, Canada E&P Co - Regional Director, Comm Co • Credit Suisse • US Department of Energy
- SVP Commercial Support,
Midstream Co
- Executive Director of Sales, • Bank of Montreal • Bloomberg
Comm Co
- Director of Commercial - Vice President, Comm Co • Bank of Canada • CohnReznick
Relations, EPC Firm
- Project Manager, Comm Co • Tudor Pickering Holt & Co.
- Director Business • American Wind Energy
Development, EPC Firm • Robert W. Baird & Co. Association
- Director of Engineering, • Electric T&D (xx)
Midstream Co - SVP, EPC Co • US Federal Reserve • Oppenheimer
- Director of Operations, - Senior Installation Manager, • Canadian Association of • UMTS Forum
Midstream Co Utility Co Petroleum Producers • CDG
- Director of Comm. Relations, - VP Development, Utility Co
EPC Co - Senior Project Manager, EPC • North Dakota Pipeline Authority • 3GPP
Co
• Texas Railroad Comm. • FCC
- VP Transmission, Utility Co
• Power Generation (x) • Dealogic
- President, Utility Co
- VP Distribution, Utility Co • Universal Service Administrative
- VP, Utility Co • Cisco Virtual Networking Index Company
- Director, Clean Energy Co
- SVP, Utility Co
- Project Manager, Wind Farm • USTelecom Analysis • Deloitte
- Senior Purchasing Agent, EPC
- CEO, Wind Consulting Firm
Firm • Akamai
- Director of Bus. Development,
- Contracts Manager, Utility Co
Renewables EPC Co
- Production Lead, Utility Co
INTERNAL DATA
• Project Matador Discussion • Hurricane earnings call
Materials (Oct. yyyy) transcripts
• Hurricane Corporate
Presentation (Sep. yyyy)
Primary and secondary sources used as of June xxth
yyyy
Primary research (N=x,xxx) Secondary research
Survey • ‘Rock’ company information • Publications of other market participants

(N=x,xxx) - ‘Rock’ Management presentation - Bundesverband Musikindustrie, Music industry
- ‘Rock’ Online shop awareness survey (yyyy) report (yyyy)
• UK consumer survey: xxx respondents
- ‘Rock’ Customer segmentation survey (yyyy) - Canadian Association for the Advancement of
• German consumer survey: xxx respondents Music and the Arts, Music market report (yyyy)
- GfK, German textile market report (yyyy)
- Capital IQ, Company financials
- GfK, Event market in Germany, study (yyyy)
- defacto research, German fashion retail NPS data
Expert/Warm Calls (N=xx) - GfK, German Merchandise study (yyyy) - Deloitte, Online fashion retail penetration data
• ‘Rock’ fact book - Destatis, consumer spending data
• Former CEO, Merchandise licensor • Director, US music apparel retailer - Information memorandum
- Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB), margin data
- Deutsche Industriebank AG (IKB),
• Founder, Online apparel retailer • Former GM, Merchandise licensor • Databases & publicly available information German fashion retail report (yyyy)
• Former SVP, Merchandise licensor • BD Director, Online apparel retailer - Company websites - efestival.co.uk, UK festival data
- eventspion.de, Germany festival data
• Former Brand Manager, Online • Former CEO, European retailer - Alexa.com, website traffic data
- Forrester research, European online penetration
apparel retailer - British Phonographic Industry, music record data
• Director, Online apparel retailer - Gesamtverbad Textil & Mode, fashion market data
• Former CFO, US music apparel - Bundesverband Musikindustrie (BVMI), - GfK, consumer confidence
retailer music record sales data - GfK, Textile industry reports
- Bundesverband der Veranstaltungswirtschaft - Licensing Industry Merchandisers’ Association
(BDV), festival attendance data - Mintel, E-Commerce in GER report (July yyyy)
- Mintel, Clothing Retailing UK report (Oct. yyyy)
Customer intercepts (N=xx) - Euromonitor, apparel and footwear in Germany
report (June yyyy) - Mintel, Footwear Retailing UK report, (July yyyy)
- Euromonitor, apparel and footwear in UK report - Mintel, Online fashion retail penetration data
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig (April yyyy) - National Association of Music Merchants (NAMM),
Global report (yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Euromonitor, European apparel & footwear
market data - Statista, E-Commerce report (yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Textilwirtschaft, Fashion retailer revenue data
- Euromonitor, European fashion retailer revenues
- UK music, Measuring music report (yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Facebook, consumer interest data - Verdict, Clothing & footwear retailer ranking
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Google Trends, consumer interest data
• Market reports
- Hypestat.com, website traffic data
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - German Trade & Invest, E-Commerce report
- OneSource, Company financials (yyyy/yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Socialbakers.com, consumer interest data - Statista, Textile & clothing fabrication report
(yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Statista, various data
- Statista, Textile & clothing retail report (yyyy)
• Customer # x, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig • Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig - Twitter, consumer interest data - Statista, Music industry report (yyyy)
• Research institutes - UK music, National music economy report
• Customer # xx, ‘Rock’ store Leipzig
- Centre for Retail Research, Online retailing report
- University of Bamberg, fashion retail NPS data
Leveraged Bain IP
Sources

• Customers (N=xx) • Competitors (N=x) • EH&S Services: US Market Size and • Vendor Guide for Environmental,
- HSE Supervisor, Mining Co - Chief Strategy Forecast yyyy-yyyy (Verdantix) Health and Safety Systems, yyyy
- Director EH&S, Chemical Co Officer, EH&S Co (Gartner)
• EH&S Software: Global Market
- GM EH&S, O&G Co - Key Account Forecast yyyy-yyyy (Verdantix) • Capital IQ
Manager, EH&S Co
- HES Support Service Supervisor, O&G • EH&S Technology Services: Global • Heikkinen Energy Advisors
Co - Director of
Business Market Forecast yyyy-yyyy • yyyy EHS and Sustainability Software
- HSE Manager, O&G Co Development, (Verdantix) Buyers Guide (NAEM)
- VP/Director EH&S, Manufacturing Co EH&S Co
• Global EH&S Survey yyyy: EH&S • Planning for a Sustainable Future
- EH&S Manager, Manufacturing Co - VP of EH&S Software Brands (Verdantix)
Solutions, EH&S Ideas that Will Shape EHS&S
- Senior EH&S Counsel, O&G Co
Co • Green Quadrant EH&S Software Management in the Year to Come
- Corporate EH&S Safety Manager, O&G yyyy (Global) (Verdantix) (NAEM)
Co - Regional Director
EH&S Co • What the Oil Price Decline Means for • Benchmarking Corporate EHS
- Global EH&S Manager, Utility Co
- Manager Health & EH&S Software Spending Management Information Systems
- Director of Environmental Services,
Safety Practice, (Verdantix) Funding and Implementation Trends
Refinery Co
EH&S Co (NAEM)
- Global EH&S Training Manager, • Global Survey yyyy: EH&S Brands
- National VP, EH&S
Chemical Co (Verdantix) • Global Insight WIS
Co
- Head of Procurement, O&G Co • Green Quadrant EH&S Software • US Department of Energy
• Industry Experts (Verdantix)
- QHSE Manager, Government Agency • Oil & Gas Journal (& Financial
(N=x)
- Strategy Managing Direct, Utility Co • EH&S Market Landscape, yyyy Journal)
- CEO, EH&S
- Director HSE Systems, Auto Co Consulting Co (Gartner) • Rystad
- Global Head Health Safety Security, - Corporate EH&S • Magic Quadrant for Environmental,
Mining Co • Energy Information Administration
Safety Manager, Health and Safety Management
- Global Safety Director, Manufacturing Co O&G Co Systems (Gartner) • International Energy Agency
- EH&S Supervisor, Healthcare Co • EY • IHS
- Senior Director Global Engineering, • World Oil
Healthcare Co
• Douglas-Westwood
• Market Realist • Oliver Wyman
- Senior VP, Power Co
- EH&S Manager, Healthcare Co • Google Finance • Resilience
• Pioneer Natural Resources xx-K • Tortoise Capital Advisors
• Fuelfix
INTERNAL DATA • Petrie Partners
• Vanguard Natural Resources xx-K
• Cenergize
• Project Diamondback – CIM (Nov yyyy) • Goldman Sachs • WSJ
• USA Today • Barron’s
• Project Diamondback – Mgmt. Presentation (yyyy)
• Forbes • Houston Energy Insider
Primary research is focused on key business areas,
roles, and regions PRELIMINARY
PRIMARY INTERVIEWS COVERAGE EXAMPLE COMPANIES
Competitors
Company logos
MHS
Competitors
PIPS
Customers
Interviews completed to date: xx
Primary and secondary sources to date (x/xx)
MARKET PARTICIPANT
MARKET PARTICIPANT MARKET PARTICIPANT COMPETITOR SURVEY (N =
INTERVIEWS (N= XX) CUSTOMER SURVEY (N = XX) XX)
• Director of Bus. Development, Const. Supply Co
• Former Chief Executive, Const. Supply Co
• Former Chief Executive, Const. Supply Co
• Manager, Const. Supply Co
• Manager, Const. Supply Co
Suppliers
• Software Engineer, Const. Supply Co

• EVP, Const. Supply Co
• Sales Manager, Const. Supply Co
• Sales Director, Const. Supply Co
• National Account Manager, Const. Supply Co
• Account Manager, Const. Supply Co
• President, Distributor
• Acct. Manager, Distributor
• National Director of Sales, Distributor
• VP of Sales, Distributor
• VP of Purchasing, Distributor COMPANIES REPRESENTED
• VP of Manufacturing, Distributor (NON-EXHAUSTIVE) SELECT SECONDARY
• CEO, Truss Manufacturer
Distributors/Purchasers
• Purchasing Manager, Distributor Government entities

• Purchasing Director, Distributor • Bureau of Labor Statistics
• US Census Bureau
• Senior Buyer, Distributor
• Construction Director, Homebuilder Company logos • U.S. Geological Survey
Industry/company publications
• Regional President, Homebuilder • Tie website, annual reports, SEC filings,
• Purchasing Manager, Homebuilder earnings calls
• Purchasing Manager, Homebuilder • Barclays
• Purchasing Manager, Homebuilder • Wells Fargo
• National Purchasing, Homebuilder • JP Morgan
• Procurement Director, Homebuilder • Bloomberg
• VP of Business Optimization, Homebuilder • Capital IQ
• VP of Purchasing, Homebuilder • Freedonia
• IHS Economics
• Senior VP, Homebuilder
• Moody’s
• Senior Purchasing Manager, Homebuilder • Dodge Construction
• VP Purchasing, Big-box Co • National Association of Home Builders
• Merchandising Manager, Big-box Co • RBC Equity Research
• Store Manager, Big-box Co • Wright Investors’ Service
• ProSales
Primary research – Interviews with
IP managers in Benelux and FR (n = xx)
Blade core
operations Large MNCs Medium Corporates Small Players
Blade non-core
operations Intnat’l Benelux France Benelux France Benelux France
Strategic
Strategic advice, x x x x x
Trademarks
search, opposition &

litigation
Administrative
Filing, extensions, x x x xx x
renewals, recordals,
watching...
Administrative
Filing, extensions, x x x x x x
validation,
Patents
annuities...
Strategic
Drafting, exam, x x x x x x
opposition & litigation
Note: Total # of responses from IP managers: N=xx in Benelux; N= xx in France; responses over multiple segments will be double-counted

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Summary of progress and next steps
PROGRESS TO DATE NEXT STEPS

• Initiated primary research • Continue interviews with distributors,
- Focused initial interviews on US distributor customers, competitors, and market experts
market share gain strategy
- x distributors, x competitors, and x customers • Finalize assessment of US distributor-
interviewed by EOD x/xx focused share growth strategy, quantifying
- xx additional scheduled interviews through end potential upside opportunity
of next week; robust pipeline remains - Leverage mix of interviews, survey responses,
and secondary data
• Developed and submitted survey to relevant
US distributors (data to be received on • Refine market sizing, growth, price, margin
rolling basis starting today) outlooks for US market
• Drafted preliminary second survey focused • As agreed: Develop Canada market

on US end-customers assessment (size, growth by segment) and
view of competitive landscape & positioning
• Completed review of available Porcupine
internal data; analysis in progress; • As agreed: Launch second wave of surveys
requested additional key data focused on US end-customers as well as
targeted Canada industrial customers
• Gathered relevant secondary data for US;

• As agreed: Develop preliminary outlooks for
identified market size, reviewed value chain
base oils and white oil
trends, product mix and industry segments
Progress update: key questions and activities
Business definition and growth Customer and competitor market Strategic alternatives for
outlook for Tie business segments dynamics and outlook non-core businesses
 What key end markets does Tie play in?  Who are the key customers and end  To what extent are Tie’s businesses
What is Tie’s revenue and profit for each users? Who are the decision-makers at in ‘one market’? What levels of cost
key end market? each type of end user? and customer sharing exist between
businesses?
 What are the main distribution channels
 What are the market dynamics for each  What should Tie do with non-core
and key purchasing criteria? How have
key end market? businesses (e.g., divest, JV , etc.)?
they changed over time, and how will
they shift in the future?
 What are historic growth trends?  For businesses Tie should divest is a
 How have prices changed historically, and realistic exit path available?
how are they expected to evolve?
 What are the underlying growth drivers  How integrated are Tie’s SG&A
for the key end markets? What is the operations between different product
 What share of Tie’s SKUs drive the
outlook for each of the growth drivers? offerings?
majority of profit within the business?
 In order to grow the business, what
 What competitive advantages and barriers  What is the threat of new entrants or low- would Tie need to do? Is acquisition
to entry does Tie have? cost competitors/imports? the only growth path?
 What are key risks and opportunities in  What products are protected by patents  How should Tie approach
each key end market? and intellectual property? international markets?
 Who would be interested in buying

the entire business?
Key questions and activities
Positioning of Porcupine’s Stability of supply and

Opportunity to win share in US
finished lubricants in demand trends in base
finished lubricants market
Canadian market and white oil
• What is the growth and margin outlook for US finished lubricants? • What is the demand outlook • What is the outlook for
• How are branded lubricants players changing their US distribution for the Company’s key global demand for base oils
model? (e.g. To what extent are they continuing to consolidate finished lubricants by end and white oil? (e.g. outlook
spend? What levers are they employing to affect this change?) market and product type? for demand drivers, trends
• How is supply of relevant in substitution)
• Would distributors and customers be open to picking up other
brands/suppliers? product types and key inputs • What is the outlook for
changing in Canada? global base and white oil
• What characteristics do distributors and customers looking for in
supply? (e.g. supply,
Key questions
a supplier? • How well positioned is the

business in Canada? (e.g. utilization, and capacity
• How much opportunity could be in play based on natural churn outlook)
competitive landscape,
and distributor consolidation? (e.g. What portion of volume could
historic market share,
be in play? What share of wallet would distributors look to move
resonance of value
towards a new supplier?)
proposition, expected share
• What is the likely incumbent response to a new entrant? gain)
• What is the potential upside opportunity for Porcupine in the US?
(e.g. How well positioned is Porcupine to win and what portion of
distributor base willing to pick up a new supplier? What does this
imply about the size of the prize?)
• What capital program, capability development, and GTM strategy
are required to capture this upside?
• Conduct a focused number of conversations with market • Model market demand outlook • Provide overview on base
Key activities
participants, distributors and customers • Conduct a targeted survey of and white oil markets and
• Survey a number of distributors and end customers data and industrial customers in Canada drivers
compare with Bain experience to understand impact of local RMS on • Develop a view on future
• Develop a general survey to outlook on end market
profitability
test customer perceptions demand
• Model potential size of opportunity and highlight the potential
• Compare feedback to Company • Develop a view on future
investments required to achieve (primarily qualitative)
data and develop outlook for base and white oil capacity
share gain additionsand utilization
Key questions and activities
Customer stability (focus on Oil & Gas) EH&S market drivers and
Competitive landscape in EH&S
and views on Diamondback growth
• What are the main product/solution groups Stability: • How big is the market for EH&S
in EH&S software? Which are most • What is the basis on which customers use and pay software? What are secondary
important in Oil & Gas, Chemicals? for Diamondback’s software? Is it, for example, indications of historical growth
- Operational risk, environmental performance,
largely a head office function or distributed in the in the space?
hazardous materials management, MRO, etc.
field? How much is it linked to the level of activity • What are the underlying drivers
• Who are the key providers of EH&S (e.g. # exploration sites in Oil & Gas)? of use (e.g. regulation) and are
software and how do their offerings map to they accelerating?
the product/solution groups? What industry • Given this, how much could a change in the number
vertical biases do they have? of locations / level of activity in Oil & Gas customers • Based on industry interviews,
Key questions
- Broad ERP players, particularly SAP

affect Diamondback? what is the estimated
penetration headroom?
- Niche EH&S players: Diamondback, Enablon, • How stable are Diamondback’s Oil & Gas customers,
Verisk, Intelex, CMO, Enviance, etc. given the oil price decline? What is the risk of • Based on conversations with
• How do the features and functionality of bankruptcy or significant operational pull back? customers, how much growth
Diamondback’s solutions compare to those • Are other customers likely to benefit and expand if may be generated from further
of key competitors? Which are effectively the oil price remains lower (e.g. Chemicals penetration of products/
point solutions for part of a customer org. customers)? solutions?
vs. being ‘full suite’? • How much have prices
Customer perceptions of Diamondback:
• Does SAP’s incumbency in ERP at a increased historically (based on
• Who are the decision makers for, and users of, company data and indications
customer give it an advantage in EH&S?
EH&S software? How do they select a vendor? from customers)? How sensitive
• Which competitors have options for (a)
• What are their perceptions of Diamondback vs. key are customers to future price
hosted solutions (vs. on-prem.), (b)
competitors? What are it’s strengths / weaknesses? increases?
subscription payment (vs. license +
maintenance)? • How sticky is the EH&S software broadly, and
Diamondback in particular? Why do customers
switch from / to Diamondback?
• Assess product/solution set and • Establish basis of EH&S use by customers through • Evaluate secondary sources on
Activities
deployment flexibility of key competitors by interviews market size / dynamics by

solution (operational risk, environmental, • Assess financial position of key Oil & Gas customers solution
product stewardship) through interviews • Use customer interviews to
with industry executives and customers • Carry out interviews with customer decision makers
inform headroom for growth
and users, as well as specialist advisors
• Leverage secondary research and vendor
assessments

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Deal Thesis: Project Fortress
FOR DISCUSSION
SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS AGREEMENT

• Goods consumption in key prime label end-markets has shown stable x-x%
Market historic growth & recession resistance; outlook suggests trend continuing
development • Demand for label conversion expected to grow in line with end-market
consumption, although trends to drive minor tailwinds & headwinds
Fortress competes in a stable
market with steady x-x% growth; • Despite shift in packager spend mix toward Shrink Sleeve & Pressure Sensitive,
majority of growth to derive from Cut & Stack to remain robust segment though medium-term
Shrink Sleeve & Pressure • Market pricing is stable due to underlying stability of customer segments willing to
Sensitive, but Cut & Stack pay up for quality, service & capacity; as a result, capacity oversupply in Cut &
remains stable to up Stack is unlikely to meaningfully erode prices
• Fortress is viewed by customers as a differentiated market leader (particularly in
C&S) with a record of quality, consistency, and tech. range Existing yes,
new
Competitive • Fortress’ leading position in Cut & Stack will drive share growth with existing and
customers no
new customers as they shift spend toward Shrink Sleeve & Pressure Sensitive
position & organic
• Fortress is well-positioned to exploit trends in customer value proposition (e.g.,
growth path more SKUs, digital print, shorter runs, shorter lead time, longer payment terms)
Fortress is a market leader in a • Shifting customer needs will not meaningfully erode margins by increasing
space where customers value converter capital spend profiles
differentiated quality; Fortress
• Fortress margins in Cut & Stack are xx%+ above market; customers are aware of
positioned to gain share while
the premium and willing to pay for differential quality & scale
sustaining price and margin
• Fortress is top-quartile in cost position across label classes and has record of
reducing in-label cost over time with plant & footprint optimization
Inorganic • Fortress has track record of entering and expanding positions via acquisition;
growth path leading Cut & Stack position is key enabler of inorganic growth in other segments TBC
Fortress has a track record of
successful inorganic growth and • There are attractive acquisitions that could improve Fortress product mix, product
acquisition landscape is favorable differentiation (outside Cut & Stack), and footprint strength TBC
to continued success
Deal Thesis: Project Regate
FOR DISCUSSION PRELIMINARY
SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS AGREEMENT
• Demand for frac valve coating replacement will continue to outgrow underlying
onshore drilling and completions activities as well-intensities increase (e.g.,
proppant loads)
Market development
• Regate’s non-frac valve business is more leveraged to the installed well base
Regate’s focus markets are well- than to # of new wells drilled, providing insulation from drilling downturn
positioned to outperform underlying
• Coating demand will face only moderate near-term dislocation driven by
market growth through the near-
inventory drawdown and cannibalization of unutilized frac/drilling equipment
term downturn and into recovery
• Regate focuses on ‘premium’ markets for high pressure/temperature/wear
applications, providing insulation from Asian imports and price deterioration
• Regate supports stable, top-tier OEMs that will continue to increase proportion
of coating services outsourced due to lower cost and faster turnarounds
Competitive position • Regate offers a superior value proposition to competition, particularly in frac
valves, (no-seal coating, service versatility, API certification, fast turnaround),
Regate’s business is supported which will allow Regate to grow share with existing and new customers
by a continued outsourcing tailwind,
• Customers will remain relatively insensitive to pricing of Regate’s services—
a differentiated & defensible
particularly in frac and offshore applications—due unwillingness to compromise
value proposition, and it can grow
on quality and the relatively low share of spend dedicated to these services
top-tier customer base into higher-
growth regions • Focused investment in commercial resources and capabilities could accelerate
growth in non-core regions (e.g., Bakken, Marcellus), particularly by expanding
share of wallet with existing customers
• Regate can protect and potentially improve margins by investing in machinery
Growth and facilities to increase tailoring of service offerings and to improve
operational efficiency
opportunities
• Regate is well-positioned to expand service offerings to other O&G equipment
Growth opportunities provide (e.g., ball valves, plungers) that can meet or exceed current margins
moderate upside, but are not critical
• Regate’s differentiated machining capabilities and equipment footprint provide
to making the deal economics work
portfolio synergies for Oerlikon across NA non-O&G business (e.g., automotive)
Deal Thesis: Project Hurricane
SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS WHAT WE’RE LEARNING

• Increased wireless network capacity needs, coupled with new
• ITH margins at risk due to cross-training of AT&T employees to
gigabit rollouts, will support recovery of Communications
perform services in-house; AT&T CapEx likely to recover and stabilize
segment
Hurricane can rebound
• There is a meaningful near-term growth opportunity in long-
from yyyy performance • Near-term long-haul opportunity confirmed and reinforced by recent
haul pipeline construction (e.g., Dakota Access Pipeline),
and achieve yyyy wins with ETC; Hurricane growth outlook positive through yyyy
which is relatively insulated from current market downturn
revenues of ~$xB+
• Recent decline of Electrical T&D business driven by ‘one-off’
• Hurricane viewed as a quality provider and is expected to recover on
events (e.g., weather, accounting probe); looking ahead, base
continued strong transmission spend (due to regulatory tailwinds)
business is stable, with opportunity for share gain
• While Wireless and Wireline market growth likely to continue,

• Continued deployment of 3G LTE wireless by AT&T, Sprint,
supported by growing consumer demand for data and speed, trend
and others, coupled with ramp-up in fiber expansion, will
towards small-cell deployment and aerial fiber may dampen demand
support moderate growth for Hurricane over next x-x years
for Hurricane construction services
Beyond yyyy rebound,
there is a clear path to • While install-to-home business likely to decline as demand for
• Key Hurricane customers (AT&T/DTV) plan to decrease outsourcing;
satellite TV plateaus, new products (e.g., home
Hurricane revenue security/automation) provide additional growth upside
new products are increasingly well suited for self-installation
growth of ~x% p.a.
through yyyy, with • Long-haul likely to offset decline in smaller pipes through at least ‘xx;
xx% YoY NA decline forecast thereafter; Oil sand site CapEx to
sustained EBITDA • Over next x years, market headwinds do not significantly contract at x-x% YoY if oil price remains <$xx, but xx%+ growth
margins of ~x-xx% impair base business in US and Canada; Hurricane is plausible otherwise, tempered by regulatory risk
positioned to win significant volume of midstream
infrastructure expansion to and in Mexico • Well-positioned to win in ~$xxxM/yr US-to-Mexico mkt to ’xx/’xx, and
~xB/year intra-Mexico mkt, but intra-Mexico work carries significant
risks and duration of demand for build-out uncertain
• Fiber expansion required to enable x gigabit speeds,

combined with potential for 3G rollout, will significantly • Fiber expansion expected to continue due to continually increasing
increase spending and activity past yyyy; Hurricane well data demands; increased wireless CapEx from 3G roll-out likely
positioned to participate in build-out
Hurricane can create a • Integrated Oil & Gas capabilities can be deployed across • Long-haul capabilities not directly transferable to more complex major
platform to craft a range of complex project and ongoing maintenance work, projects (e.g., LNG)
supported by success with recent large projects in US and • Maintenance performed primarily by small-scale regional players;
compelling growth
Mexico requires local presence
story extending
beyond yyyy • yyyy+ wind likely to become cost competitive with other forms of
• Hurricane can win new Power Gen and Industrial generation, driving x-xx% p.a. growth in capacity and higher demand
opportunities (e.g., renewables) to offset risk that wind PTC for O&M services as the installed base ages
(Production Tax Credit) will not be extended • Hurricane not currently well positioned to play in other power
generation markets beyond wind
Deal Thesis: Project Jura
PRELIMINARY
SUMMARY PROOF POINTS AGREEMENT
• Jura’s current revenue streams are supported • Majority of Jura’s revenue is derived from OPEX-related
x primarily by OPEX critical to the production spend on existing production infrastructure
and operation phases of the oilfield lifecycle, • Maintenance services provided by Jura support recurring,
and cannot be easily deferred despite oil & mission-critical needs and, as a result, represent stable *
gas price volatility revenue streams unlikely to be deferred
• Level of outsourcing of Jura services

x expected to remain stable or trend up, and
• Customers are not signaling an intent to change the way
they purchase relevant services (e.g., moving in-house)
prices for similar services will remain
constant across a range of market scenarios • Price is expected to hold roughly steady
• Jura performs well against customer’s key purchase criteria

and has a strong reputation in relevant markets
• Customers value the Tier x.x business model and ability to
bundle services
x• Jura is well positioned to expand market share
in existing markets through offering a • Existing relationship with Bechtel can be leveraged to
differentiated value proposition (e.g., strong translate current capex into opex-related spend in Australia
service record, Tier x.x model), and to build a • Anti-trust concerns and competitive disruptions caused by
scale presence in new geographies (e.g., US BH/HAL merger will create ‘white space’ in market
onshore)
• Jura can leverage its capabilities and relationships to enter
new geographies (e.g., US onshore, Asia)
• There is an attractive pipeline of M&A opportunities which
could further accelerate growth
• Returns on Jura’s asset base will not be meaningfully

affected by a drop in asset utilization and/or price
• Degree of capital intensity of the PPU compression
x business can be managed across a range of • PPU equipment can be re-purposed and re-located to
business scenarios manage capital intensity of the business
• Customers will continue to reimburse for PPU equipment
modifications
*Jura PPU business disproportionately dependent on CAPEX
PE Co. investment thesis and key questions
PE Co. Investment Thesis Key questions for diligence

1. How stable are Blade’s current core markets (Trademark
• Blade is able to grow topline from ~€XXM to ~€XXM
and Patents in Benelux and France)?
by yyyy by increasing share in its core segments medium
1. Key volume drivers and price pressure in market
size corporate customers in Benelux and France
2. Customer stickiness and sophistication of sales approach /
• The relevant Trademark and Patent markets are relatively dormant nature of the market
flat and have limited downside risk (sticky customers, 3. Ability from tech enabled players to play in Blade’s segments
volume growth off-setting price pressure, sleepy market)
2. How defensible / stable is Blade’s current position in its
• Blade enjoys a strong, defensible and differentiated core segments?
position in its core segments 1. Current share and performance in core segments
- Leading market position with high RMS 2. Ability to differentiate / performance on KPC by segment
- Strong customer feedback with industry leading NPS and (account mgmt, IT/portal, ..); NPS vs industry
differentiated performance on key purchasing criteria
3. Recent volume growth on new filings vs market
- Captures at least fair share of new inflow
• Opportunity to grow share of wallet with existing 3. What is Blade’s ability to grow share of wallet with
accounts with commercial focus and investing in IT current customers in its core segments?
- Actively manage base by limiting churn and optimizing price 1. Current share of wallet across segments (IP volume, current
coverage across products)
- Increase share of wallet by capturing larger share of portfolio with
large accounts and drive penetration of all services 2. Opportunity to increase share of wallet by leveraging key
differentiator's and increased commercial focus
• Potential to increase customer acquisition rate by 3. Ability to increase pricing
investing in sales force
- Grow share in existing core: New customers in existing segments 4. How likely is it for Blade to accelerate customer
- Expand into near adjacencies: Cross-sell patents (existing acquisition rate?
industries), Admin services for law firms 1. Current market share / whitespace across segments
- Over time, pursue further adjacencies: Move into new 2. Opportunity to increase market share by leveraging key
geographies; Patents in new industries differentiator's and increased commercial focus
• Required capabilities can be developed 3. Opportunity to cross sell Patents from Trademark relationships
- Increase commercial focus and professionalize account mgmt 4. Customer churn and customers willing to switch if sold to
- Invest in easyIP to develop competitive IT solution 5. Time for training sales force / for relationships to mature
- Attract key talent and build organization to support growth

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Summary of analytical approach
x Volume X Price
Market revenue drivers
Number of Co’s
Share of Co’s Per customer Spend per
requiring X outsourcing X module penetration
solutions module
How many solutions/ What share of How many modules does a customer What is the market price
modules are required? companies use xP? need on average? per unit of volume?
• Regulatory • Regulatory Initial purchase Ongoing support • Pricing model (license

environment environment • Regulatory • Number of physical vs. subscription)
environment locations • Customer volume
• Industry growth • Customer size
(industry growth • License to operate • Product/data complexity
• OE focus considerations • New module vs. support
and consolidation) • Number of modules
• Exec. accountability • Maturity of • Number of users
• Need complexity
• Industry footprint customer funct.
• Exposure to price
complexity
Industry dynamics (e.g., O&G downturn) concessions
x Ability to
Stability of existing Ability to win X
DB competitive
further penetrate
customer base new customers
existing customers • Diamondback ability to
position
price above or below

Performance against key purchasing criteria
market
Relationship stickiness GTM capability
Customer NPS
Large customer exposure Maturation of cust. function
O&G counterparty risk Global v. local purchasing
Diamondback revenue and returns
Summary of approach for core marine chassis
lease/rental growth analysis PRELIMINARY
x
A B Volume C
Marine container
X Billed chassis days per
x Price
(revenue drivers)
Market size
trade flows marine container trade flow

• End-product consumption (e.g., • Proximity of warehouses to terminals • Balance of demand and cost
CPG) • Time to deliver (e.g., road congestion delays) to supply nat’l fleet
- Fleet cost
• Secular trend to containerization • Lumpiness of cargo flow (e.g., shift to mega-ships, - Labor/land cost by geo
• US import/export balance seasonal consumer demand )
• Market mix of day-rate and
• Mix of container sizes • Evolution of port operating models term contracts
- Wheeled vs. grounded
• Evolution of regional flow mix
x
• Economics of ownership • Number of chassis required • US chassis fleet utilization
returns
Market
across potential owners: per ‘billed chassis day’

drivers)
(ROC
- Leasing companies - Pooling models (potential trend

- Ocean carriers towards pool of pools)
- Trucking companies • Natural chassis fleet attrition
- Terminals
x
• Deck relative scale • Relationships with potential • Relative size of customer • Deck price premium
position
utilization)
SSL’s likely to divest chassis base (i.e., large vs. small (discount), if any
(cost &
• Exposure to wheeled vs.
x
Deck
grounded ports • Deck cost position trucking co’s)
• Mix of day-rate and term - Contract conditions stipulating • Industry and customer
union labor usage exposure within specific ports
contracts - Fleet age vs. market
x
Deck revenues & returns
• Deck revenue/profit growth, split by volume vs. margin growth
• Growth scenarios based on macroeconomics trends, competitive dynamics, and Deck performance
Summary of analytical approach PRELIMINARY
Analysis of Jura addressable market
CAPEX OPEX
• By service line
• # of assets to be installed • Capex spend by project + • Installed base of assets • Avg. annual spend/asset
• By geography
• Average spend/asset • Asset utilization intensity • Rate of outsourcing
informs…
x x Stability of
x x
Sustainability Share expansion in PPU capital
of existing business addressable market current and new geographies intensity
• Core market drivers A Tier x.x model • Typical contract structure

Jura historic performance
and project duration
• Organic vs. inorganic • Risk customers are changing • Competitive landscape and Jura position as Tier x.x player
growth service purchase decisions • Customer purchase criteria • Degree of customization
• Expansion of key customer (e.g., bring in-house) required and ability to
accounts repurpose equipment
B Australia
• Historical trends and recent
• Sensitivity to volatility • Asset utilization and returns
shifts in pricing dynamics • Ability to leverage Bechtel relationship to capture more OPEX-
across range of scenarios
related spend
Jura relative exposure • Expected pricing pressure • Expected evolution of
linked to contract renewals
• Revenue derived from: C HAL/BHI merger contract terms, especially
as related to capex
• Region • Addressable market size • Customer response to implications of merger
• Offshore vs. onshore and growth across range of • Outlook for returns, split by
• Jura’s ability to win with current HAL/BHI customers
• Criticality of maintenance macro scenarios to yyyy RORA and ROCE
services provided;
D US onshore
exposure to maintenance
deferrals (regulatory vs. • Ability to extend current capabilities to take share in US
elective) Onshore PPU & IS
Jura growth forecast and capital requirements

• Jura growth forecast across range of outcomes for • Capital investment required to enable growth
share gain and success of organic growth initiatives (including both PPU-related infrastructure and M&A)
Summary of approach for Fortress prime labels
growth analysis
x
Prime label converter spend outlook X in label pricing
Converter volume per Spend mix % change in
End-market
X X
(revenue drivers)
A B C D
Market size
consumption end-mkt consump. unit by label type like-for-like pricing

• Consumption trends • Label size per container • Container class mix • Supplier fragmentation
by end-market (i.e., • Container size per unit • CPG marketing strat. • CPG customer mix by size
beverages, spirits, volume goods • CPG label investment
etc.) • Relative cost of label
• Mix of container types technologies • SKU run-length
(e.g., bottle vs. can) • Supplier cost curve &
• Emerging label tech capacity utilization
-
x
Fortress sales X Fortress price Fortress cost
Fortress position
Inorganic Premium (discount) Cost position

Organic growth path
premium drivers)
growth path by technology by technology

(Share and
• Market perception of Fortress • Attractiveness of • Value proposition • Relative scale

• Differentiation of Fortress value potential differentiation (e.g., • Position and movement
proposition (e.g., quality, reliability, acquisitions quality, reliability, ‘one along experience curve
‘one stop shop’) - Target growth rates stop shop’) • Exposure to over/under
- Mix of end-market
• Customer sourcing/share of wallet • Customer willingness to utilized technology
exposure of
strategy Fortress and target pay a premium capacity
• Switching costs and strategy co’s • SKU run-length
x
Fortress revenues & returns
• Fortress revenue/profit growth, split by volume vs. margin growth

• Growth scenarios based on macroeconomics trends, competitive dynamics, inorganic/organic growth paths and Fortress performance
Summary of approach for Peach growth analysis
PRELIMINARY
x
performance
• Current portfolio by • Share of wallet with • New customer • Revenue from cross-
+
selling (e.g.,
historic
industry and geography existing customers acquisition

Peach
shuttling)
• Geographic expansion • Account growth over
time
…compared against….
x
Volume
Market opportunity
(revenue drivers)
A B C D
Truck loads X Spotting services
required X Outsourcing rate x Price
• Consumption of end • Operational complexity • Economics (i.e., • Labor cost by geography

products (e.g., CPG) (e.g., trailer movements relative to inhouse, • Equipment cost
• Trailer transportation within yard) xPL)
• Adoption of drop & hook • Union dynamics
x
• Market landscape, • Relationship stickiness • Frequency of switching • Peach price premium
competitive
positioning
x
including xPLs, contract (e.g., costs, contract (discount)
Peach
• Purchasing approach
carriage) (e.g., local, national) length)
• Performance against • NPS
KPCs
Peach revenue by type
• Peach revenue growth, split by market volume vs. price growth; share gain from new vs. existing customers
• Growth scenarios based on macroeconomics trends, competitive dynamics, and Peach performance
Analytical framework:
Market and Tie outlook
x
Volume of relevant
Price & margin
construction supplies
Key drivers Considers… Value Key drivers Considers… Value
Activity
• # Res new starts

% ∆ in
Construction volume • # Res remodels
projects
• # Non-res new starts
• Price of steel Current
Price
• Shift away from current
Product
∆ in mix of Input costs • Accounts for ‘sticky’ decreases profit

building supplies due to
mix
Substitution products vs. ‘fluid’ increases ($/unit)

Market outlook
preference change or new

sold
products
• Shift to pre-fabricated
construction (e.g., pre-fab ∆ in
trusses, EWP, shearwalls) connectors
Modularization
needed per
• Rate of shift and related project
impact on product intensity
• Pop. shift to southern, urban,

Intensity
single/multi-family ∆ in
• Shift towards more direct
Demographic connectors
• Add’l/different supplies distribution as lumber dealers
Margin
shifts needed per
needed per shifted population Distribution channel become increasingly utilized X%
project
unit mix sales channel margin ∆
• Software salesforce governs
• National code requirement access to channel
changes ∆ in
Construction
connectors
regulatory • Regional code requirement
needed per
environment changes
project
• Non-code regulatory shifts
x
Share upside/risk Ability to command price/margin premium
Tie outlook
• Relative importance of key purchasing criteria and Tie performance against them • Customer service and salesforce drive commanding brand loyalty
• Competitive differentiators (e.g. customer service) impact on brand strength • Software sales impact to gaining influence with customers
Magnitude of switching costs and stickiness of customer relationships
• Tie’s exposure to higher-margin distribution channels
• Headroom available for winning new customers and growing share of wallet
• Exposure to regional markets with more stringent building code requirements and • Potential Tie scale advantages in input costs and raw materials purchasing
differing product types/mix • Ability to realize savings from SKU rationalization and “value engineering”
- Regional demographic growth rates quantify impact

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Executive summary
PRELIMINARY
• Hurricane is a collection of specialty construction businesses in North America, participating across four major industries:
communications (~xx% revenue), midstream O&G (xx% revenue), electricity transmission and distribution (xx% revenue), and
wind power generation (xx% revenue)
• Preliminary market analysis suggests Hurricane has grown with or above underlying markets over last x years, though
historic growth rates vary significantly by industry:
- Communications grew at ~x% CAGR organically (~x% inorganic), outpacing AT&T CapEx growth of x% ’xx-xx, driven primarily by share-of-wallet growth with
AT&T and DirecTV, and accelerated by new customer development (e.g., Sprint, Google)
- O&G grew at ~xx% CAGR organically (~xx% inorganic), at pace with overall market growth (xx% p.a.), driven primarily by US shale production boom
- Transmission growth of xx% p.a. ’xx-xx outpaced rapid overall & served market growth (xx% p.a.), driven by acquisitions (e.g., EC Source) and exposure to
high-growth regions (South and Midwest)
- Wind power generation grew organically at ~x% CAGR, largely in line with cyclical growth and falloff of sector capital spend driven by PTC regulation
• Customers consider Hurricane a high-quality, second-tier national E&C firm

- Hurricane is viewed positively across industries, but is not highly differentiated from key competitors (e.g., Quanta, Primoris, Wilbros)
- Hurricane has the scale and geographic footprint to deliver on large, engineering-light projects that third-tier regional players are unequipped to handle, but is
less focused on FEED services and major, complex projects than first-tier players like Bechtel and Fluor
• Customers across Communications and Oil & Gas (major projects) rarely switch EPC providers; Hurricane growth outlook is
largely dependent on buildout and upgrade cycles of its underlying markets and largest customers, with most significant
potential for upside in new, emerging markets (e.g., midstream infrastructure in Mexico)
• Revenue and margins associated with Install-to-Home business exposed to a series of risks, as DirecTV subscribers plateau, less
installation and maintenance is performed on site, and AT&T cross-trains employees to perform in-house services across products
• While Wireless and Wireline markets will continue moderate growth driven by growing consumer demand for data at faster speeds,
addressable market for Hurricane faces several headwinds over next x years
- AT&T CapEx budget divided across Wireless and Wireline, as well as expansion in Mexico and investment in DirecTV
- Growing use of micro-cells to increase Wireless capacity and aerial fiber to accelerate Wireline coverage at lower cost likely to dampen demand for outsourced
construction services historically provided by Hurricane
• Hurricane’s core US and Canada O&G markets expected to decline as midstream infrastructure ‘catches up’ with
production growth; construction of long-haul pipelines will likely continue next x-x years, then drop off sharply, whereas G&P
buildout will also slow, but has higher variability, driven by oil price and the impacts of well productivity/infrastructure maturity
- Deregulation in Mexico provides meaningful upside opportunity, but is likely not sizeable enough to counteract declines in US & Canada markets, and majority
of opportunity may not extend far beyond ~yyyy
- Achieving Hurricane forecasts would require several large project wins per year with major midstream players not currently customers (e.g.,
Spectra, Williams, Kinder Morgan)
Executive summary
Preliminary analysis is generally supportive of key elements of the Tie investment thesis:
a very strong core connectors business, varying (generally weak) market positions across
non-core product segments, and clear tactical and strategic improvement opportunities.
• Tie is a collection of tangentially related construction materials businesses, with a history

of inorganic expansion outside of the company’s core US connectors business
• The company is the clear leader within the US connectors market, where it has a history of
leveraging its leading brand and quality products to maintain significant market share. Recent
customer losses are not believed to be indicative of a weakened future outlook for Tie.
• Outside of general macroeconomic volatility, the outlook for connectors as a critical

manufacturing component is stable. On average, usage per “unit” of construction is likely to
increase, while threat of substitution is low.
• Tie’s non-core products have limited integration and provide minimal benefit to the
connectors business. Management has generally expanded in to markets where they have weak
competitive positions and likely limited profitability.
• Strategic alternatives for non-core products may be limited, given weak competitive
positions in either very consolidated or very fragmented markets. (To be refined)
• Initial perspectives would indicate multiple potential opportunities for margin improvement.
Executive summary PRELIMINARY
• Peach is an independent player in the US spotting services market, with yyyyE revenue of $xxxM and robust
organic growth of xx% p.a. since yyyy
- Focused in Southeast, with ~xx% of revenue from CPG, Food & Bev, Pulp & Paper, and Retail industries
- ~xx% of growth since yyyy driven by adding incremental revenue with existing customers, with recent success cross-selling
shuttling and other VAL services (~$xxM growth since yyyy)
• Outsourced trailer spotting market likely to grow at ~x% p.a. through yyyy
- Trucking demand growing at ~x%, driven by domestic consumption. Limited exposure to economic cycles due to essential nature
of spotting and mix of end industry volumes
- Spotting outsourcing cycle is well underway but with significant headroom (~x% outsourced today); adoption should add xxx basis
points of growth through yyyy, slowing to xxx basis points from yyyy-yyyy
- Pricing will grow with inflation, contributing xxx% nominal topline growth (excluding fuel) due to trucking wage inflation
• Customers do not view spotting as a significant service decision, and are willing to pay a premium for quality
- Spotting comprises a relatively small component of total transportation spend (~xx%), while having a high cost of failure. Both
yard managers and corporate decision-makers value quality and safety; xPL customers cite reputation risk as a key consideration
- Value proposition highest for outsourcing is strongest for medium and large yards (x+ spotters), given dollars at risk/upside and
great need for driver consistency
• Peach is well positioned relative to smaller, pure-play spotting firms, with limited risk of increased
competitive threat from integrated logistics companies
- Peach enjoys sustainable competitive advantages relative to smaller players: ‘sticky’ customer relationships and a high portion
of satisfied customers, strong local footprint in many areas, competitive IT solutions, and somewhat advantaged economics
- Customers frequently outsource spotting as part of a larger logistics contract; while asset-light xPLs may be attractive
partners for Peach, asset-heavy firms are unlikely to sub-contract or to increase presence in spotting market
• Going forward, Peach could grow at ~xx% p.a. through yyyy, supported by increased adoption of xrd party
spotting and continued service cross-selling
Executive summary
• Outlook for Fortress depends primarily on the strength of its existing customer relationships, the stability
and growth profile of customer spend, and the ability to deliver on inorganic growth
• Customer relationships are highly sticky with a focus on product quality and on-time (but flexible) delivery
more so than price (which represents only x% of CPG COGS)
- Despite consistent RFP cadence—every x-x years—customers rarely switch and when they do drivers are typically product
&/or service issues; most customers (particularly large co’s) willing to pay a premium (xx%+) for quality provider
• Initial feedback from customers on Fortress is broadly favorable: strong marks on quality & consistency
across label types & key customers, as well as an open willingness to pay a premium for quality; deep
existing customer relationships in one label offer advantage as same customer expands label participation
• Customers assess performance of converters (and purchase) on a label-specific basis; favorable perception
in one label does not provide advantage in another
• US prime label converter market was ~$xxB in yyyy and is expected to grow at ~x% p.a. to yyyy, largely
driven by consumption growth in end-markets; Fortress outlook (at flat share) in line with market as
overweighting to declining Cut & Stack offset by overweighting to growth in Shrink Sleeve
- Market spend in C&S expect to be ~flat (slightly down), as two forces offset: (x) C&S declining ~x% p.a. as a share of label
spend in preference of pressure sensitive & shrink sleeve (likely somewhat slower in a recession); but (x) end-market
consumption is growing; outside C&S total spend up between x% p.a. Shift away from C&S accelerates market growth ~.x%
p.a. given price differentials between label classes
- Consistent history and forecast of price compression (x% yearly) across label types as customers expect cost efficiency
gains to be passed on; this creates an imperative to consistently drive out cost to maintain margins; least pressure on Cut &
Stack as it is mature market with stable competitive set
• Market is recession-resistant as end-market consumption more tied to demographics than GDP with the
exception of paints & coatings (due to construction exposure)
• Stickiness of customer relationships constrains organic growth potential beyond expansion of existing
customer spend; typical growth path is to acquire and retain competitors’ customer bases
Executive summary PRELIMINARY
• Global ESP market has less direct exposure to drilling activity than OFS overall, because it is driven primarily by the replacement
Market outlook
cycle of the existing installed base of conventional wells

- There is a key inflection point for NA ESP demand at oil prices of ~$xx-$xx/bbl; below this price range the economics for replacing ESPs on conventional wells
erode from ~xx%+ of wells economic to ~xx-xx% of wells economic
- A price rebound following a sustained downturn would drive a meaningful demand ‘snap back’ over a few years as shut-in wells are refitted with ESPs
- International ESP demand is more predictable than that in NA, as it is driven (today) almost entirely by conventional wells with replacement economics robust
to very low oil prices, although uncertainties related to government policy and civil unrest may impact demand in select markets
• Over the past decade, demand for ESPs has grown at ~xx% YoY, although ESP share of the global artificial lift market fell from
~xx% to xx%, primarily losing share to rod pumps
- This is due primarily to tight oil increasing its share of drilling activity, as unconventional wells typically use ESPs only in the first year, followed by rod pumps
- This trend is likely to continue in both NA and international markets as tight oil activity continues to gain share in activity, barring a technological innovation
further improving ESP performance on low flow wells or a major surge in refracs
• In NA, Wildfire strategy is well-aligned with customer desires, but faces headwinds due to down market and prior Summit success
- ESP customers seek to optimize total cost of ownership, with product reliability and service quality having the largest impact; Wildfire strategy considered
Competitive
feasible and well-aligned to customer priorities

landscape
- North American ESP market is highly concentrated, with BHI and GE controlling a combined ~xx% of NA market; smaller ESP providers also present in each
basin (e.g., X, Y , Z in Permian), with differentiation based on low cost and high-touch service
- Competitors are increasingly cutting prices (~X-Y% in Permian from yyyy highs) and improving service to retain share in down market, and established
players are committed to preventing new entrants from taking key customer accounts following Summit’s success
• Internationally, Wildfire success will depend on reliability record and key relationships; most attractive markets in LATAM & ME
- Internationally, customers are generally larger (significant NOC presence), demand track record of reliability, and place more importance on relationships;
market share can increase/decrease more rapidly than NA due to customer concentration
- Wildfire highest potential in LATAM and ME; countries characterized by attractive ESP markets (e.g., large existing fleet of ESPs, positive outlook for future
activity) and an ability for Wildfire to win (e.g., friendly regulatory environment, fragmented competitive landscape vs. heavily-entrenched incumbents)
• Over next xx-xx months, Wildfire likely to face significant challenges winning share from established players at attractive
economics, given competitors’ cost advantages due to scale and strong incentives to protect share in anticipation of oil price
Implications
for Wildfire
rebound and associated increase in ESP demand

• Wildfire growth strategy should anticipate near-term challenges, and target growth across several key ‘levers’: organic growth in
customer Segments II/III, accelerated growth through small scale acquisitions, medium-term growth into Segment I, and
targeted investment in international opportunities
• Wildfire financial outlook varies substantially across a range of plausible market scenarios
- Despite downturn, achieving ~xx% of management forecast by yyyy (~$xxxM revenue and ~$xxM EBITDA) appears plausible but would require rapid,
sustained market recovery, exceptional company performance, and ~$XXM in growth capital outlay
- In a ‘bear’ market in which prices remain <$xx/bbl through yyyy, Wildfire is likely to struggle to achieve greater than ~$xxM in EBITDA (~xx% of profit pool
for global ESP market)
Emerging insights around Diamondback opportunity Week x
• EH&S software market grew at ~xx% since yyyy and is forecast by secondary
sources to continue double digit growth (xx%) to yyyy with strong performance
across industries
• Looking ahead, primary industry growth tailwind is spend within the existing
customer base, as most companies within an industry use an outsourced EH&S
provider (e.g., O&G has an ~xx% total adoption rate and ~xxx% for large Co’s)
• SMBs will drive outsized share of growth going forward; Diamondback’s core is
among large customers (xx% revenue from Co’s >$xB)
- SMBs are significantly less penetrated in their ‘module penetration’ paths
- Module addition is getting easier for SMBs due to an increasing number of SaaS offerings that
require less expertise and have a lower entry-level cost
• Lower oil prices are unlikely to cause significant cutting of existing module
programs, but will likely reduce purchase of new modules and drive price pressure
• Diamondback is viewed by the market as a top tier provider with a strong,

broad set of offerings across industries, with some concerns around new product
implementation and system integration
• Diamondback’s recent market underperformance spanned end-markets, and

was the result of implementation programs ending and fewer new customer
additions (versus lost customers)
Summary of emerging insights Interim
• US marine container flows have historically grown at a x-xX GDP due to trends towards ‘containerization’ and
manufacturing offshoring; looking ahead, growth from these factors expected to slow, with multiple of ~x.x-xX
GDP in yyyy
• Demand for outsourced chassis leasing/rental has grown significantly since yyyy, as ocean carriers divested
chassis and disengaged from chassis management in order to cut costs through improved efficiency and avoid
‘roadability’ regulation liability
• US trade flows are relatively stable between regions; Deck’s geographic exposure is in line with overall US port
container flows (xx% of revenue from Top x ports), and is expected to remain so
- There are sufficient excess, out-of-service, chassis available to be refurbished to support moderate trade flow shifts
- Although chassis move within port systems and regions, it is typically uneconomic to relocate chassis over long distances
• Three largest chassis leasing companies account for ~xx% of US marine chassis market, and have very limited
differentiation across cost, customer base, and quality of service; Deck market share relatively stable, as
competitors have little incentive to compete on price
- Leasing companies’ EBITDA margins rapidly declined from ~xx% to ~xx% several years ago as SSLs completed divestitures and prices
fell to level that disincentivized customer insourcing
- Today, stable competitive dynamics are supported by high barriers to entry (i.e., national scale, size of chassis fleet, long-term contracts,
high cost of liability insurance )
- Existing leasing companies share disincentive to compete on price, potentially provoking a ‘race to the bottom’ diluting existing margins
• Key driver of Deck’s market volume is ‘billed chassis days’ (or ‘revenue loads’), which has grown slightly above the
~x% growth in underlying container flows; however, outlook to yyyy is uncertain, as the shift toward ‘on dock’ rail
loading may offset upside from increased highway congestion or growing distances to distribution centers
• Margin/chassis is expected to grow based on a mix shift towards higher-margin short-term contracts, while
margins across classes of contracts (i.e., long-term lease vs. day-rate) expected to remain stable
- Previous recessions resulted in limited pricing pressure due to high share of fixed rate, long-term contracts with SSLs; while the business
model has moved toward shorter-term contracts, relative margin stability is expected even in a downturn
• Across major terminals, there are more chassis than needed; pooling efficiency improvements are expected to
outpace chassis volume growth to yyyy and initial work suggests no material inflection in capital intensity
Executive summary
Blade is able to grow topline from ~€xxM to ~€xxM by yyyy by increasing share of wallet with customers and
accelerating new customer acquisitions with medium size corporate customers in BNL and France;
realizing this opportunity requires investments in add’l sales people, commercial focus and IT
• Blade core segments (TM & Patent for Medium Sized customers in BNL and FR) stable with limited downside risk
- Blade core market stable with volume growth generally linked to GDP, off-set by pricing pressure (which is limited in Blade core segments: pricing
generally flat for medium sized customers and ~-x-x% p.a. for larger customers)
- Customer relationships are sticky (average churn ~xx% p.a.); market generally seen as dormant with limited sophistication in sales approach
- Tech disrupted players mainly focus on admin services for large/ international MNCs (players (larger tickets, higher price sensitivity due to
involvement procurement; no requirement for strategic services as done in house) where experienced price decline is stronger (~x% p.a.)
• Blade shows leading position in core segments; but struggled to keep pace with the market
- Strong RMS in core segments (RMS in TM ~x.x in BNL, ~x.x in FR (#x))
- Blade shows high NPS in TM (x vs -xx% for industry) and performs at par on key purchasing criteria (quality & expertise and int’l presence);
except for IT and Price on Admin services (large gap vs tech enabled companies)
- Recently, Blade underperformed market on new TM filings in BLX, FR, and OHIM (-x% Blade growth vs. x-x% market)
• Opportunity to drive growth with existing customers to reverse negative historic revenue trend to overall flat
- Blade experienced historic revenue decline (€xxM in ‘xx to €xxM in ’xx): churn (-€xxM), price pressure (-€xM), off-set by customer wins (+€xxM)
- Opportunity to increase share of wallet with existing customers by increased commercial focus and investments in IT
‣ Limit churn (€xM): Limit churn with tier II customers from xx% to x% p.a. (experienced with top-xx)
‣ Manage price pressure (€xM): Benefit from position with less price sensitive medium sized customers; implement value based pricing
‣ Increase SoW: (€x.xM): Aggressively capture SOW with top TM customers (achieve xxx% portfolio share in nearly all top customers); and
drive penetration of watching from xx% to xxx% of filing customers (other services mainly sold in bundle already)
• Aggressively drive growth from new customers by investing in additional sales people
- Whitespace exist for Blade to win new customers, however significant investment required (customers sticky even if aggressively sold to, required
time to onboard & train sales force, x year to get IT on par)
- Base case assumes ~xx-xx additional sales force which are likely to drive ~€xx-xxM revenue upside by yyyy (total investment ~€xM)
• Further opportunity to drive growth from near adjacencies & M&A
- Blade has further opportunity to expand into near adjacencies:
‣ Leveraging existing TM relationships to drive cross-sell in patents (Pharma, Digital Communications, Transport) likely to be very challenging
(Negligible upside included in base case)
‣ Provide admin services for small law firms (~€xM upside)
- Over time, pursue further adjacencies (e.g. move into new geographies, build position in patents in new industries); revenue upside not assessed
- In addition to organic growth, Blade can pursue inorganic growth by bolting on other firms in attractive market segments
Emerging perspective on US lubricant share upside
• US finished lubricant market is stable with ~x.x B gallons in volume p.a.; ~flat demand outlook to yyyy as continued
efficiency gains in auto/commercial offset activity growth
• Finished lubricant market weighted to branded products (~xx%+ Commercial, ~xx%+ Industrial and ~xx% Consumer
Automotive, to be refined with survey data); private label share growing, primarily due to desire for low-cost option in
“installed base” automotive segment; however, profitability outlook in private label is under pressure as OEMs seek to
capture more of profit pool
Key market context • Supplier-distributor relationships are very sticky, but more so in branded than private label
- Branded product relationships highly sticky due to risk-averse customer base; more sophisticated buyers in industrial and commercial segments
prioritize technical specs over brand per se; when changing suppliers, shifts typically occur between Tier x providers (i.e., Exxon, Chevron, etc.)
- Private label products are more prone to churn to prevent “price creep”; contracts often bid out every x-x yrs
• Growth in private label and distributor consolidation/M&A is causing ‘Tier x’ suppliers to push for brand alignment from
distributors to maintain supplier power; Exxon is leading the charge
• Between normal churn and distributor consolidation, total distributor volume churn of ~xx% p.a. expected over next x-x
years (to be refined with survey)
Organic/ • Natural churn in private label offers modest opportunity for share gain based on price (and to an extent quality); regional
position of suppliers is critical cost lever due to freight cost and creates natural catchment areas for facilities
natural • Branded product share opportunity limited in ordinary churn circumstances due to high degree of relationship stickiness
churn and preference among most customers for well known ‘Tier x’ products
Push for brand • Tier x suppliers are pushing for branded product alignment from distributors; Exxon accounts for
vast majority of this push
alignment • Some distributors are unwilling to ‘align’, typically when volumes are small or not tied to national
(driving contract accounts; when customers switch, most choose other leading US branded supplier(s) (and often
cancellation) shift volumes to existing suppliers)
Growth Three
opp. trends • Some suppliers are forcing smallest distributors to sub-job as a means to ensure product
Sub-jobbing of availability from distributors with limited or inconsistent supply
disrupting small distributors • Resulting reduced margin is driving sub-jobbers to seek opportunities to move supply contracts;
distributor however, securing new supply contracts is difficult as as their volume and service radius is small
base • Lubricant distributor market continues to consolidate, but pace has slowed significantly
• Distributors view consolidation as a path to gain leverage via volume growth and brand
Consolidation of
diversification (i.e., avoidance of brand alignment)
distributor base
• Distributor M&A is unlikely to result in meaningful supplier churn as distributors are making
strategic consolidation decisions in conjunction with existing, major, branded suppliers
• Most promising share gain strategy founded on achieving scale and building fulfillment systems in lower margin private
label segment (~xx% of market) and potentially taking branded share in industrial segments, winning on price and
Implications for •
comparable quality in ‘ordinary churn’ environment
Volumes at play due to disruptions to distributor model are limited and focused on branded products
share gain strategy -
-
Contract cancelation due to supplier brand alignment strategies not likely to open meaningful volumes to non-Tier x branded supplier
Sub-jobbing likely creates opportunity for share gain, though with small tail of distributors spread across broad geographic range
- Distributor base M&A/consolidation unlikely to result in meaningful supplier churn
• Opportunity for share gain is broadly bounded by regional catchment of facilities given need for cost parity
Updated view of market evolution Section
PRELIMINARY
x A
• Deck, TRAC, and Flexi-Van make up xx% of U.S. chassis market; little competitive differentiation among
top three leasing companies supports stable margins industry-wide
- Majority of cost-base is maintenance and repair with limited differentiation between players; remaining costs driven by scale
Market share will (e.g., SG&A) or historical purchase price from SSLs (e.g., Depreciation)
- Competitors offer near-identical pricing (within x-x%) with only marginal differences in non-price purchase criteria (e.g.
be fairly stable in equipment, service); trend towards pooling continues to reduce competitive intensity on equipment technology and service
chassis oligopoly - Customer base is shifting towards highly fragmented motor carriers with broad end-market exposure
with limited B
• High barriers to entry prevent new entrants or insourcing from disrupting current oligopoly
- Need for significant regional scale, long-term contracts, and flexibility make insourcing unattractive for all but largest MC/BCOs
differentiation…
C
• As a result, market share of top three leasing companies has remained static with no major shifts expected
- Current market share largely driven by historical asset acquisitions from SSLs
- No disruptive technologies or major competitive actions expected in the near-term
x A
• U.S. container flows expected to grow at x-x% p.a. in “Continued economic expansion” case, x-x% p.a. in
“Downside” case
- Container flows primarily driven by GDP (trade as a share of GDP, and “containerization” as a share of trade)
… So container - Trade expected to continue taking share of GDP (~x% p.a. increase from yyyy-xx); and “containerization” trend expected to
volumes and moderate, but still grow (~x.x% p.a. increase from yyyy-xx)
geographic B
• Each container move requires ~x-x chassis days; outlook for future demand dependent on several factors
- Trends toward increased road congestion and DCs moving further inland increases chassis days/container move
exposure will - However, trend towards rail reduces chassis days/container move; timing and magnitude of rail roll-out uncertain
largely drive C
• Deck is highly exposed to port traffic rather than in-land chassis usage (xx% ports, xx% inland)
Deck revenues… - Deck unlikely to shift away from a port-centric model; top x ports drive xx% of Deck port revenues making port-specific
dynamics important
- Deck is well-positioned across geographies; secondary ports (e.g. Savannah, Charleston, Houston) expected to see strongest
chassis demand growth; LA/LB and Philadelphia expected to see weakest chassis demand growth
x A
• Market expects pricing and margins to remain resilient in the event of a recession
- Previous recessions experienced limited pricing pressure due to long-term contracts; future recessions expected to
experience similar price stability due to lack of end-customer price sensitivity
… And three key B
• The continued shift towards day rate contracts under merchant haulage will improve margins
uncertainties - Contract type heavily influences returns; on a per day basis, day-rates are ~x.xx more profitable than long-term lease rates
will drive - As customer base shifts, high margin day-rate contracts are likely to represent a larger share of revenues
Deck returns C
• Number of chassis to remain relatively constant in next x-x years as utilization improvements absorb
increase in chassis day demand
- Historically, asset utilization was tight and leasing companies wanted to buy as many chassis as possible
- Today, there is excess chassis capacity due to improved efficiency; limited incentive to continue purchase of SSL assets
Customers and competitors:
Reinforces Tie’s core
No change to Tie’s core
Connector summary Undermines Tie’s core
IMPACT CONFID-
ON TIE ENCE
• Tie controls a leading portion of the connector market at ~xx% market share; USP, the next largest
player, has ~xx% market share
Tie controls leading • Recently, Tie lost several key customer relationships after USP was acquired by MiTek in yyyy
share in connector
• Going forward, share expected to remain relatively stable due to (x) Tie still maintaining a strong
market; likely to
position amongst specifiers, and (x) other major accounts unlikely at risk of shifting
maintain share - Additionally, USP has worse cost position vs. Tie and has little remaining headroom to cut price further, leading them to
despite recent losses recently signal price increases to its customers
- In downside case, USP becomes a more widely accepted ‘major’ brand and captures some additional specifier share
- In upside case, Tie still unlikely to regain all business lost to USP, but potential to win back the DR Horton and Lowe’s accounts
• Connectors are a relatively commoditized product; price competitiveness is table stakes, but
Share
KPCs are stable and manufacturers are still able to compete on product quality, innovation, and brand recognition
price is table stakes; • Within a xx-xx% price range, price is rarely the deciding factor in selecting a connector manufacturer
most products - Manufacturers tend to be most comparable in price on fully commoditized products
are relatively - End-users (homebuilders) can also get discounts in the form of rebate programs offered by manufacturers
commoditized, but • Due to size, Tie and USP have scale advantage in raw materials costs over competitors
quality still matters - However, neither has a significant steel purchasing advantage over the other; USP relatively small compared to Tie but still
able to get competitive steel prices based on MiTek’s steel volumes
• Distributors (manufacturer customer) rarely switch due to the cost of accumulated inventory, the
Customers are sticky; number of products to be replaced, and the need to retrain human capital
switching relatively
• Homebuilders (distributor customer) are slightly more likely to switch because decisions made by
uncommon
more price-sensitive procurement functions, but switching over small price changes is uncommon
• Lumber yards tend to be lower volume but higher margin channels than home centers or one- or two-
Tie more exposed to step distributors; ~xx% of Tie sales are direct to lumber yards, as compared to ~xx% for USP
higher margin direct - Tie has exclusive relationships with x of the top x lumber dealers
channels; expected - More direct selling garners additional ~x-xx% of gross margin; Tie has larger footprint and has been more successful in
moving away from two-step distributors, which are going out of business
shift away from x-
step improves margin • Two-step distributors expected to keep losing share as manufacturers move towards higher margin
Margin
one-step and direct channels
Tie represents • Among customers, Tie is consistently recognized for its strong reputation, full suite of high quality
connector industry products, and customer service (xx%); USP competitive on price but has more limited offerings (-x%)
standard; leads on • Tie able to command price premium of ~x-x% due to brand recognition
brand reputation and - Tie is leading innovator in connectors and gets ~xx-xx% price premium on new products (although new products are relatively
customer service small share and premium only tends to last x-xx months as competitors ‘catch up’)

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
The teams assessed four key questions
x x x
How likely are GAIL and
What is the nature of What are the plausible courses
Sumitomo/Tokyo Gas to seek
Sovereign’s of action for Sovereign’s
modification of the
contracts? counterparties?
Sovereign contracts?
How does Sovereign Have Sovereign’s counterparties

Are India and Japan (and Sovereign’s repudiated or renegotiated
participate along the
counterparties particularly) seeking to contracts in the past? What can we
LNG value chain across
reduce the volume of LNG contracted learn from past behavior?
supply, liquefaction and
or just lower the cost of supply?
transport?
How likely are counterparties to
unilaterally repudiate contracts?
Which contracts are at risk (supply,
What are the How competitive is Sovereign/US
liquefaction, transport)?
obligations and key brownfield LNG versus its
terms of Sovereign and counterparty’s existing supply stack and
How much value can be extracted
its counterparties? competing sources of available supply?
from renegotiation? Can the
contracts be made competitive and
thus does it make sense reopen?
What other contracts
Does India/GAIL or
have GAIL and Are there economically viable
Japan/Sumitomo/Tokyo Gas value
Sumitomo/Tokyo Gas options for the counterparties within
the US as a strategic supplier
secured (e.g., long-term the constraints of the existing
of LNG, irrespective of price?
gas supply contracts)? contracts (e.g., swaps, resale)?
x
What are the high level implications for an investment in Sovereign?
What is the likelihood of the What are the high level

possible courses of action? implications of each course of action?
Agenda
x x x x
Industry Industry & Tie connectors Tie non-core
volume Tie margin market share business
outlook stability stability outlook
A • High exposure
A • Prices
A • Tie lost
A • Tie has poor
to macro fluctuate ~xx% share share in all
construction
Price with steel
Competitor after MiTek Share segments
Construc- cycles; dynamics input prices; behavior bought USP position except lateral
tion weighted manuf- and cut systems
activity toward acturers prices
residential B change price B • Tie bests
B • Perf. varies
outlook to maintain Perf.
Perf. against USP across across
Cost margins against segment; high
customer important
B • Product
dynamics
• No sourcing priorities customer customer in fasteners,
intensity advantages buying priorities poor in ICS
drivers C • Drivers of C criteria
C • Perf. varies
Product support Tie ~xx% • Most major across
intensity moderate connectors Views of key accounts Historic
margin segment; high
tailwinds remain loyal
margin premium in customers perf. in fasteners,
connectors to Tie poor in ICS
premium
intact
x
Tie strategic and tactical options
Relationship of non-core segments to core connectors

Strategic Exit options
(reinforcing, necessary, degree of integration)
Tactical Short-term upside Revenue/price

Long-termimprovement
upside
Key questions
x x x
How does Who are the
How big is the
unconventional in- participants and
market today and
field processing how do they
how is it evolving ?
work? interact?
What are required production What are the key drivers of What is the landscape of buyers
equipment (i.e. battery) and spend on processing equipment and sellers from the wellhead
services by resource type? and services? to basin export?
How do resource-specific What is the current market size How does behavior and
characteristics impact battery and relative profitability for preference vary across customer
configuration? unconventional in-field processing segments? What are key
equipment and services? customer pain points?
How do operator-specific How will the demand for What competitors provide
strategies impact battery equipment and services production equipment and
configurations and equipment change going forward? services?
placement?
x
What does this mean for XXX?
Which customers will be most How does XXX’s M&A pipeline

What are the implications for
responsive to the XXX value compare to
XXX’s strategy?
proposition? strategic goals?
Agenda
x x x
Field-processing Customer and
Market size
requirements & provider
and outlook
configurations landscape
A • Impact A Growth
• Addressable A • Vary primarily
equipment market is according to
Resource forecast ~$x-x.xxB customer size,
and capacity
characteristics requirements • Growth Customer which
across basins B Well outlook priorities influences
capabilities and
& sub-basins varies from
completions ~x-x% strategic focus
B • Impact through
degree of C Pricing yyyy, driven
processing dynamics
by plausible B • Range of
centralization macro provider types
Operator scenarios offer equipment
(i.e.,
strategies Provider
aggregated D ‘Spend
and market-
offerings
and services;
vs. specific none offer fully
distributed)
intensity’ trends ‘integrated’
per well solutions
x
Implications for XXX strategy
Preliminary view on ‘where to play’ Insights for M&A planning
Discussion of strategic implications & next steps
Agenda
x x
What is the high level outlook for
What share of annual churn is
US market growth, margins, and
Porcupine positioned to target?
product mix?
A A
What are the key drivers of growth? What share of US finished lubricant
What is the expected net impact of volumes is addressable by
efficiency gains and demand growth Porcupine (i.e., Group II and III-
on the outlook? derived products)?
B B
What volumes are at play via natural
What is the outlook for finished
churn? How does it differ by branded
lubricant pricing and margins?
and private label volumes?
C C
What volumes are at play based on
How will the mix of private label and
disruptions to the distributor
branded shift over the next x-x years?
model?
Five competitive factors will influence attractiveness
of Diamondback investment
FACTORS KEY QUESTIONS WHAT WE’RE HEARING
x • KPCs: What do customers consider when “DB’s functionality is up to my
selecting an EH&S provider? standards…you can configure their products
KPCs & but they’re not so complicated that people
• DB Performance: How well do
NPS Diamondback's products perform relative to can’t understand them.”
competitors? GM EH&S, O&G Co
x “Subscription-based pricing is the way
• Service model: How are service models the market is moving…even the big ones
Shift to SaaS shifting, and how well positioned is DB to are seeing the benefits.”
compete going forward?
Direct of Business Development, EH&S Co
x • New customer penetration: How well “DB’s story sells well at the executive
Go-to- positioned is the Diamondback sale team to level…but not at the business unit
market penetrate new customers? level. They don’t have the technology to
compete against Enablon at that level.”
capabilities • Existing customer penetration: What are
Diamondback’s ‘upsell’ capabilities? Chief Strategy Officer, EH&S Co
x Central vs. • Decision makers: Where are EH&S “Where decisions on EH&S providers are made
software purchasing decisions made within varies by company, but there is a trend to
local the customer organization (i.e. local or centralization and standardization.”
purchasing centralized buyers)? VP/Director of EH&S, Manufacturing Co
x • Counterparty risk: How exposed is

Diamondback to small, ‘higher-risk’ Oil & “We are excited about the M&A environment in
Oil & Gas Gas customers? O&G. We have a good platform and service
customer so we’re viewing it as an opportunity to
• Distressed acquisitions: How will win new business.”
outlook increased oil & gas M&A activity impact Chief Strategy Officer, EH&S Co
Diamondback’s legacy accounts?
Source: Interviews with customers, competitors, and industry experts
‘What you would have to believe’ for asset-heavy
players to become a significant competitive threat
PRELIMINARY
LEVEL OF
ASSERTION DESCRIPTION CONCERN
x • Most asset-heavy players have the capabilities to provide
spotting, and significant overlap with their customer base
Synergies exist between
spotting and other asset-heavy • Cost sharing with existing offerings is more limited;
business lines spotting requires unique equipment, and is typically a
distinct skill set and value proposition for drivers
x
• Spotting makes up a “negligible” percentage of overall
Spotting offers a highly asset-heavy revenue (<x%)
attractive revenue opportunity,
with attractive returns • Spotting returns are variable, but typically in line with those
of other business lines
x
• Spotting services are not a key factor of consideration for
Most customers prefer to customers when choosing an asset-heavy logistics company
consolidate spend with single
outsourced logistics providers • There is not significant differentiation between spotting
quality among asset-heavy players
x
Major asset-heavy players view • Decision-makers for asset-heavy players have not chosen
spotting as a key strategic focus to focus on spotting as a strategic priority
x
Market is concentrated such
• The market is highly fragmented across players, mitigating
that a handful of players could
the risk to Peach if larger players make a move into the
meaningfully reduce growth
spotting space
opportunity for Peach
Looking ahead, Jura portfolio will be influenced by a
wide range of uncertain variables PRELIMINARY
LAST X YEARS NEXT X YEARS IMPLICATIONS FOR JURA

• Strong demand growth • High degree of • Large portion of business (~xx%)
x (+xMB/D from ’xx-xx) uncertainty around supports ‘mission-critical’ OPEX
drove oil prices into long-term pricing (oil services, making business
~$xx-xxx/BBL range, plus gas imports) and comparatively well insulated from
incentivizing investment resulting drilling activity market volatility
Macro O&G in supply across range • Dramatic near-term • However, operator cost cutting
scenarios of sources slowdown in activity; pressures prices, and deferral of
• Lack of low-cost gas low service utilization ‘optional’ maintenance may depress
supply for Asian/ rates leads to pricing activity volumes and associated
European markets drops service needs
• High global crude prices • Significant contraction • While PPU services required to
x and Asian/European gas in major project complete buildout of committed LNG
prices supported approvals (e.g., xx%+ facilities, LNG project work should
Large approval of major reduction in upstream be considered ‘one-off’ opportunity
infrastructure and CAPEX, deferral of • Equipment utilization likely to
project drilling investments incremental LNG FIDs), decline across PPU industry as large
environment (e.g., LNG export/import as production levels and projects both offshore and onshore are
terminals, midstream, infrastructure to completed and AUS/US LNG market
deepwater drilling) support market declines by ~xx% from ’xx-xx
landscape ‘catches up’
to operator needs
x • Relatively ‘sleepy’ MHS • Merger of BHI/HAL will • Opportunity for Jura to continue to win
industry saw limited create significant share with ‘Tier x.x’ offering in MHS
change; Jura disrupted disruption in PPU markets, though North Sea likely
Competitive North Sea market market, creating close to full potential
opportunity for Jura and
landscape • BHI/HAL market
others to win business
• Opportunity for share gain in PPU
leaders in PPU, with (x-x% additional share through yyyy),
Jura and others winning from customers looking but market price pressures and limited
occasional contracts with for lower costs ability to differentiate on service likely
low prices • All competitors will to compress margins and returns
increase focus on costs
Preliminary assessment suggests prime label
Tailwind
Neutral
market to have low impact tailwinds Headwind
LAST XX NEXT X RECESSION

YEARS YEARS IMPACT COMMENTS
A • Packaged food consumption market is expected to grow between x-x%, as convenience of
Food purchase of packaged foods drives higher growth for snack foods than staple foods
• A shift in trend for more “natural” products has turned the attention to smaller providers
consumption
End-market
• Industry expected to grow at x-x% mainly driven by consumption increase of bottled

Beverage water, and switch from carbonated to performance drinks and RTD
• Spirits growth is expected to continue growing between x-x% following the growth trend
Spirits since yyyy, mainly driven by premiumization of the category with higher price points for
luxury drinks
Paints & • Paint and coatings market expected to continue growing at x-x%; however this end
Coatings market is more exposed to recession due to construction exposure
B Converter volume
• (TBC) Label size per package, package size per unit of volume goods, and mix of
per end-market packaging types can change the amount of label required for certain products; initial
consumption unit assessment suggests trend toward flexible packaging is the major market risk
C • Cut & Stack market relatively slowly declining over the last ten years as products
Spend mix by label Technology
migrated to more favorable pressure sensitive labels; trend expected to continue with
Cut & stack growth close to ~ -x% p.a. as share of market continues to dilute
• Certain end markets likely to remain loyal to C&S, such as glass beverages and paint due
to cost benefits and limited waste
• Roll-fed outlook likely to remain ~flat, driven by demand from major beverage CPGs that
Roll-fed utilize for cost effectiveness and application speed
• Shrink sleeve is expected to grow at ~x% per year driven by xxx degree printing area,
Shrink increased functionality, and high quality imaging for a wide variety of packaging types
sleeve • Overall CPG marketing trend to diversify shelf appeal aiding in Shrink sleeve growth due
to a variety of advantages over other labeling and package decoration types
• Pressure sensitive maintains leading market share for prime labels, experiencing steady
Pressure growth for the last xx years as products migrated away from C&S due to improved
sensitive aesthetics, ease of application, and shrinking cost differential; growth is expected to
continue at ~x%, given already high penetration limits
D • Moderate price pressure expected seen historically and expected to continue across label
Price
Price classes (- x-x% total every x-x years) as customers expect efficiencies to be passed on
?
trajectory • Lease price pressure in C&S as it is a mature market with a stable, concentrated
competitive set
Preliminary assessment suggests chassis market
Tailwind
Neutral
largely to experience tailwinds to yyyy Headwind
LAST XX NEXT X IMPACT AS OF FEB X - TO BE REFINED PRELIMINARY

YEARS YEARS POTENTIAL COMMENTS
x • Imports/exports forecasted to steadily increase
• Slow, steady increase of containerized trade as a share of
imports/exports (growing above trade volumes)
Container • Mix of container sizes relatively fixed; meaningful shift towards
flow larger containers is limited by US road weight regulations and
existing infrastructure
• Trade flow shifts (e.g. trade imbalances, Panama expansion) may
have effect on port mix; but Deck fairly diversified
Market size
• Inland mega distribution centers continue to drive lengthy

Chassis chassis moves
days
• Road congestion expected to continue increasing transit times
• Price structure per chassis day moving away from ‘cost-plus-
plus-plus’ to a ‘cost-plus’ model over time
Further
• Potential for price upside based on replacement high replacement
Price evaluation
cost as chassis fleet ages
required
• Increasing share of day-rate contracts, which are higher priced
and more profitable; some risk of shift by MC/BCO’s to longer-term
• SSLs appear likely to continue divestiture of chassis fleets
Insource vs.
outsource • However, there is some potential that scaled motor carriers and
x cargo owners will begin to in-house chassis
• Despite utilization benefit from pooling, ‘required fleet’ of chassis
increased, soaking up slack in supply
Market returns
Number of Further - Much of the pooling benefit has already been realized
evaluation
chassis required
- Shift to more ‘pool of pools’ could further improve utilization, but the model is
only suitable in certain locations
required
• Major ports have already shifted to grounded (vs. wheeled);
limited room for further adoption
• Annual cost per chassis increasing, but price likely to follow
Cost - Labor costs going up
- Aging fleet increasing annual M&R per chassis
Emerging insights from customer research
• Customer label choice driven primarily by scale of customer and complexity of label needs
• Across segments, quality and price are critical criteria; Large CPGs spike on lead time, small
Purchasing CPGs on price; CPGs focused on complex products spike modestly on technical requirements
behaviors • Customer relationships highly ‘sticky’ despite RFPs every x-x years, due to switching cost/time
Customer • As CPGs shift label spend, key to winning business is to have leading share of wallet with CPG;
feedback favorable market reputation in one label type does not provide leverage to win in different label
• Fortress has favorable market reputation versus global players and key C&S competitors
Fortress
• However, strong negative feedback from lost customer (i.e., Clorox) raises concern
performance
• Fortress shows market-leading average share of wallet across survey respondents
• Label converters fall into three categories: (x) large global or national; (x) mid-sized/multi-
regional; ( x) regional ‘mom & pops’; large players tend to offer near full range of labels & mkts
Competitive • Regional scale drives returns via lower cost/ability to reinvest, leverage with suppliers
dynamics
• Limited interest among commercial printers to break into the prime labels as it is a different
Competitive business and requires significant capital
landscape • Fortress commands leading C&S margins due to mix of cost position & scale (which drives
Fortress price & pricing power); leadership position defensible as it is unattractive for a competitor to invest
heavily to compete with Fortress in a slow/negative growth space
cost position
• No consensus as to the low cost provider(s), but Fortress ranks favorably across label types
• Core C&S business expected to remain stable given customer stickiness, generally favorable
market perception of Fortress, and stable competitive structure
• Despite stickiness and favorable market perception, key risk to base business is loss of key
Core C&S accounts given degree of concentration among top customers; needs to be tested further
Implications
• Growth outlook limited given declining market, customer stickiness and likelihood of price war if
for Fortress Fortress aggressively targets share expansion
growth & • Given leading SOW positions with many customers, Fortress has opportunity to leverage
margins relationships to win with existing customers as they shift spend from C&S to other label types
Non-core • However, leadership position in C&S does not appear provide a meaningful growth platform to
labels win in other label types with new customers; growth beyond C&S likely to require M&A focus
• Given price pressure, success will require cost-focus in a space where Fortress is not a leader
Segment overview: Oil & gas midstream EPC
PRELIMINARY
x NA midstream industry macro themes

A HURRICANE B PAST MARKET C D FUTURE MARKET E
TODAY PERFORMANCE KEY MARKET DRIVERS EXPECTATIONS HURRICANE OUTLOOK
x
• Peak revenue of • Overall US midstream • Long-haul CapEx spend • Short-term: Buoyed by • Short-term: Recent project
~$xB in ‘xx off by CapEx grew ~xx% driven primarily by shifts in ‘catch-up’ activity, average wins and well-positioned
~xx% in ’xx p.a. from ’xx to ’xx supply-demand balance; annual CapEx ’xx-’xx likely customer base suggests
pipelines
US large
• xx%+ of revenue • US Non-G&P transport secondary driver is end- flat compared to ’xx-’xx, maintenance of existing
focused on new- CapEx grew ~xx% market differentials though declining YoY revenue feasible, on average,
build, not p.a. from ’xx-’xx • Large intrastate pipes driven • Long-term: ’xx-’xx, annual through yyyy
maintenance by YoY production growth spend to decline xx-xx% from • Long-term: Market headwinds
• Long-haul best assessed recent levels assuming no of xx-xx% decline suggest
across several years as YoY major prod. growth beyond difficulty maintaining revenue
known shale ’xx-’xx
x CapEx lumpy
• xx% p.a. growth • Overall US midstream • Onshore G&P CapEx spend is • Short-term: Due to pricing • Short-term: Market
US gathering
& processing
since yyyy, xx% CapEx grew ~xx% driven primarily by new- pressures and ‘catch-up’, headwinds of xx-xx% decline
via acquisition of p.a. from ’xx to ’xx onshore wells put online CapEx spend to decline xx- suggest revenue maintenance
Bottom line • US onshore G&P (incented by pricing xx% on avg. to ~yyyy as unlikely thru yyyy
• Both G&P Co’s CapEx grew ~xx+% environment and position on fewer new wells put online • Long-term: Cyclical decline in
based in Texas p.a. ’xx-’xx driven by supply curve) • Long-term: Annual G&P G&P spend suggests revenue
density of G&P • Secondary drivers: per well spend likely to further decline to continue decline into yyyy
necessary to support G&P intensity, age/maturity xx-xx% from yyyy levels thru barring major drilling surge
shale of existing infrastructure yyyy within/beyond shale
x
• Revenue declines • Crude production has • Oil sands production relative • Short-term: Long-haul highly • Short-term: Near-term long-
in yyyy after grown ~x% p.a. over to takeaway capacity speculative once three haul opportunity could
(oil sands)
Canada
significant growth the past decade • Construction of new oil sands current projects finished; oil provide upside but short-lived
through yyyy • Growth in in-situ projects and facility sands site CapEx ~flat (x pipes) and site mkt flat
• Revenue mix to be production has expansions • Long-term: Takeaway • Long-term: Likely contraction
further vetted outpaced mining • US & Canadian regulatory capacity likely sufficient to in long-haul due to lacking
approval of oil sands support production and site demand and site CapEx
infrastructure CapEx remains ~flat business stagnant
x • <x% yyyyA rev. • Minimal energy • Recent Mexico energy • Short-term: $x.x-x.xB mkt • Short-term: opportunity likely
(pipelines)
• Announced two investment given high regulation reform for US-to-Mexico NG pipeline worth $xxx-xxxM in annual
Mexico
contracts to date level of regulation and • Lack of domestic natural gas buildout; additional $x.x-x.xB revenue between yyyy-yyyy
(xxx+ miles) discouragement of transmission or distribution from intra-Mexico • Long-term: Significant
foreign investment network • Long-term: Significant variability given demand and
variability given demand and regulatory fluctuations
regulatory fluctuations
We tested two avenues to win share through
lubricants distribution channels
x B x C
Consolidation of
Natural churn
distributor spend
Criteria Volume at play Criteria Volume at play
Brand Volume churned
xx M gal
Volume churned annually
annually
xx M gal alignment
Private Volumes where
distributor is willing to xx M gal
label Volumes outside
catchment area
xx M gal switch to new provider
Volumes where
Addressable annual
churn volume
xx M gal M&A distributor is willing to
switch to non-IOC
xx M gal
brand
Addressable annual
churn volume
x M gal
Criteria Volume at play
Volume churned Criteria Volume at play
annually
xx M gal
Volume annually
Volumes Specialty churned
xx M gal
where
Branded Porcupine
industrial
Sub-
xx M gal Volumes outside
unlikely
to win Other
jobbing catchment area xx M gal
(as it is PL)
trial
Addressable annual Addressable annual

x M gal churn volume
x M gal
churn volume
Note: Actual Porcupine addressable market ~xx M gal; difference from summing values on slide due to rounding
Summary of emerging insights
PRELIMINARY
x x x x Power Gen./
Communication Oil & Gas Electric T&D
Industrial
• Wireless infrastructure will • NA Midstream EPC is a cyclical • Recent transmission regulations • Non-hydro renewables
continue to expand due to business either approaching or (e.g., EPA Clean Power Act) contribute ~x% of global
increasing capacity demands & at the peak of a major boom have supported increase in energy generation, but xx-
new technology; supply factors - Large pipe build-out more transmission spend xx% of recent electricity
Market insights
(e.g., shift to micro cell) impact predictable than G&P, and expected capacity additions in US
to decline substantially in ~x yrs • Large and small projects have
demand for Hurricane services sourced from wind
- G&P more variable given sensitivity very different margin
to oil price, but downward trending implications for EPC firms; • Over past xx years, wind EPC
• Wireline has promising outlook due to well productivity gains and yyyy was an unusually business followed boom-and-
and significant runway for less G&P intensity
“small-project” year bust cycles driven by PTC
continued fiber adoption; new • Oil sands to see uptick in long-
• Customers value providers who extension and expiration, as
entrants forcing increased haul capacity build out over x-x
can provide end-to-end subsidies drove economics
investment from Telcos years (but only x pipelines);
solutions (e.g., engineering) • By yyyy, onshore and
cessation of new sands facilities
• Future demand for for install-to- and flat-lining expansion spend • Distribution is a low-margin offshore wind may be
home contracts less certain, as business and is best suited for competitive with hard coal
• Mexico buildout likely to include and combined cycle gas
service providers balance in- small, regional, players
import pipes and domestic driving significant investment
house vs. out-sourced build-out, but moderately sized
• In wireless, Hurricane’s size and • US midstream business expected • Price will increase in importance • Hurricane expected to grow
scale create strong position, but when awarding transmission wind business in line with
Implications for Hurricane
to face significant headwinds

uncertain future spend of main through yyyy (and further into contracts (due to FERC yyyy) market (xx% p.a.) through
customer (AT&T) creates risk yyyy), barring a major surge in • Hurricane should focus on yyyy, but PTC expiration
• In wireline, highest growth will onshore production above and winning large projects in order driving uncertainty to ~yyyy
come from new entrants (e.g., beyond known shale reserves to protect and expand margins • US positioned to follow global
Google); Hurricane growth (and likely requiring new geo’s) wind down supply cost curve,
• Limited upside opportunity in
largely dependent on gaining • Canada business exposed to distribution due to intense price leading to potential cost-
share outside of AT&T opportunity in long-haul ‘catch competition from local competitiveness by ~yyyy
• In install-to-home, Hurricane up’ buildout to ~yyyy/xx, but ‘mom-and-pops’ • If subsidy-free cost-
business at-risk due to limited opportunity thereafter and competitiveness is achieved,
saturation of DTV and Digital Life production facility CapEx flat market could expand xx%
and threat of in-house services • Mexico opportunity is real and p.a. to yyyy, but total upside
substituting out-sourced Hurricane is well-positioned limited by several factors
contractors (perhaps best) to win among key • Potential opportunity in O&M
competitors market as installed base
expands and ages
Focus of today’s discussion
Communication: Segment overview
PRELIMINARY
A HURRICANE B PAST MARKET C KEY MARKET D FUTURE MARKET E HURRICANE

TODAY PERFORMANCE DRIVERS EXPECTATIONS OUTLOOK
x • ~xx% of total
revenue
• DirectTV
subscribers grew
• AT&T, DirecTV
merger poses
• Trends towards consumer self-install
products could limit growth
• DirecTV expected to lower out-
sourcing levels and utilize U-
Install-to-home
• ~xx% of total from xx.x to xxM uncertainty to opportunities for Hurricane’s existing verse techs
margin ’xx-xx standing Hurricane specialties • DirecTV spend expected to
• Hurricane revenues agreements • Need for maintenance providers is plateau as consumers move
• Highly
dependent on flat and margins • Service providers decreasing as technology increases in toward cord-cutting
DirecTV down since yyyy on prefer to utilize in- reliability
relationship falling subscribers house employees
x • ~xx% of total • Rapid growth of • Subscribers grew • Strong growth in wireless data • Underlying market forecast x%
revenue network coverage x% CAGR ’xx-xx expected to continue (xx% CAGR ’xx- CAGR to ’xx with AT&T
• ~xx% of total and capacity across • Wireless data usage xx in mobile traffic) growing above market
margin all carriers grew at xxx% CAGR • Currently rolling-out 3G; 3G roll-out • Hurricane expected to
• CapEx increase (’xx-xx) expected to begin ~yyyy with maintain share with
Wireless
• Strong
relationship from $xx to xxB • TelCo’s focused on accompanying CapEx ramp key customers
with AT&T, (’xx-xx) during 3G increasing ‘capacity’ • Regulations (e.g., Connect America
good macro- roll-out through increased Fund) provide subsidies for building in
cell track use of micro-cells rural areas
record
x • ~x% of total • FTTH deployments • Wireline data usage • Consumer data consumption will • Underlying market forecast x%
revenue grew xx% ’xx-xx in grew at xx% CAGR continue increase, driven by video CAGR to ’xx with Google
• ~x% margin US (bringing total (’xx-’xx) and wireless traffic growing slightly above market
to xxM HHs)
Wireline
(investing for • Verizon largely • TelCo’s and CableCo’s upgrading “last • Hurricane expected to
future • Recently, TelCo complete; AT&T mile” to fiber (over coax or twisted maintain share with
growth) CapEx flat while upgrading in select pair copper) key customers
Cable CapEx markets • Limited risk of abrupt end to fiber roll-
growing at xx% • Aerial fiber reduces out; forecast to reach ~xx%+ of HHs
CAGR ‘xx-xx construction by yyyy
requirements
We assessed Hurricane’s current portfolio against key
dimensions that drive performance relative to market
PRELIMINARY
KEY QUESTION CURRENT STATUS
x • Hurricane’s revenues are diversified between project classes, esp. laterals,
What is Hurricane’s mix G&P, and Canada
Project class
of project classes (i.e. • Hurricane has shown ability to flex project-class mix over time to adapt to
long-haul vs. G&P)? changing market conditions
x
• Hurricane has increasingly supported small and medium-sized projects (<$xxxM)
What is Hurricane’s mix
of contract sizes? • Hurricane has history of only x+ major project win/year, and open bids for
contracts >xxxM are largely with non-current customers
x
• Hurricane’s revenues are diversified between geographic regions, esp. Canada,
To what geographies
Geos
Texas, and the East Coast; upcoming Mexico revenues will further diversify
is Hurricane’s portfolio
• Activity in Canada and Texas expected to decline, but Hurricane exposure to
leveraged?
East Coast is valuable given upcoming natural gas plant build out
x
What is Hurricane’s • Hurricane increasingly leveraged to small to mid-sized midstream players; less
customer mix across to large players well-positioned to weather downturn and grow in downward market
Customer
project classes? • Lack of clear customer continuity as mix shifts significantly year-to-year
x
How is Hurricane • Hurricane performs well across KPCs (and even compared to some ‘tier x’
viewed by its players) but is not particularly differentiated
customers against key • Hurricane not a particularly low-cost player, which would allow share gain in a
KPC’s? heightened competitive environment
Summary of insights on key topics
PRELIMINARY
TOPIC SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS

• Customers across MHS and PPU industries are seeking to reduce costs ~xx% through cutting both volume
and price, with North Sea prices under more significant pressure than GoM (xx-xx% vs. <xx%)
x• Pricing trends across • Capital-intensive PPU services seeing greater price declines (xx-xx%) than labor-intensive MHS
services •
maintenance services (x-xx%) due to competitors’ desire to utilize existing equipment
Interviews confirm Jura historically priced aggressively to win business; recent declines in market prices
have brought them in line with Jura, raising questions about Jura’s ability to continue winning business
• While BH/HAL combined represent ~xx-xx% of the global PPU market, PPU services are not core offerings
for either company (<x% of combined revenue)
• Ability to win PPU • Significant divestitures of BH/HAL’s PPU businesses are unlikely, but customers report a strong interest in
x share from BH/HAL seeking alternative service providers to BH/HAL, particularly price sensitive EPCs and NOCs
• Jura could increase yyyy revenues by $xx-xxM, as customers seek new service providers (concern that the
merger will lead to higher prices and compromised customer service)
• While majority of existing business driven by ‘mission critical’ maintenance work, regional services market
• Stability of spend and tied to stable ongoing production unlikely to expand over next x years
x ability to expand in • Jura has ~xx% market share in MHS; limited ‘headroom’ from growth relative to Sparrows (~xx%), which
still leads on technical capabilities
‘core’ offshore Europe • Potential for moderate share gain in PPU due to disruption caused by BH/HAL, from ~xx% share to yyyy to
~xx% by yyyy
• LNG project work unlikely to extend past yyyy; market for services will contract as pre-commissioning
• Opportunity in projects transition to ongoing maintenance
x
Australia for LNG OPEX • Limited opportunity for Jura to expand share in the Australian market, as oversupply of equipment likely to
fuel aggressive pricing
• Jura well positioned to win US LNG pre-commissioning work by leveraging AUS track record
x• Opportunity in US • Market for US onshore transmission pipeline maintenance is growing, but Jura poorly positioned in win work
PPU market •
within fragmented regional market; Jura more competitive within subsegment of large, high tech projects
Jura considered a top offshore PPU provider in GoM; well positioned to benefit from market consolidation
• PPU returns on capital typically low (top of cycle before recent price cuts ~x-xx% for brownfield
maintenance; ~xx-xx% for offshore maintenance) due to a number of intrinsic factors: significant upfront
x• PPU capital intensity capital requirements, little technological differentiation, competition for talent, and competitive price
environment
and returns on capital • Many providers do not offer PPU; when they do, strategy is often to accept lower returns in order to protect
other business lines and bundle to maintain customer relationship through asset lifecycle
• While PPU assets are relatively fungible, levers to improve returns on capital are limited
NEW SLIDE
Lower landed cost and pricing premium drive Tie’s

~xx% margin advantage over USP in connectors
x C Industry margin stability | Tie margin premium
x
• Direct to lumber yard, and one-
DIRECTIONAL step distributor sales produce the
highest revenue on like-for-like
By channel, price highest for products
- Additional cost of sales and logistics
direct-to-lumber yard sales; are covered by additional margin
x
dynamics steady as Tie’s mix capture
shifts towards lumber yards; Tie • Tie’s channel mix pushes xx%
Lower footprint aligned to deliver on through “high-margin” channels in
x landed more-direct sales model contrast to USPs xx%
cost - Tie’s broader manufacturing and
distribution footprint allows for efficient
distribution to lumber-yards and
smaller one-steppers
x
‘Race to the Tie’s investment in automation • Expanded manufacturing footprint,
bottom’ is
has materially reduced and investment in automated
unlikely as
production costs, adding manufacturing equipment
Tie has lower
~x%p.p. of GM decreased total cost to serve
cost position
than USP x
x Commoditized products • Tie holds a rNPS of +xx over USP
~xx% of revenue allowing for premium pricing even
on largely commoditized product
- Promoters cite service and quality as
Tie’s brand reputation and primary reasons behind loyalty
customer affinity earns an • Based on a small sample of
additional x-xx% price premium popular SKUs, Tie pricing at home
over USP on like-for-like centers sits ~x-xx% above USP on
products like-for-like product offering
Pricing
x
x premium
Specialized products • Tie’s extensive patent library and
~xx% of revenue R&D investments protect the most
specialized products; USP
IP creates >xxx% price commonly seen as a “fast
premiums on specialized follower”
products and is key to • Comparison of extra revenue from
maintaining share leadership; R&D and IP protection vs. required
brings significant R&D costs cost is not available for estimate
Source: Customer and competitor interviews

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Our perspective on this investment
WHAT WE LIKE OUR CONCERNS

• Highly stable base of recurring revenues • A continued high rate of market growth is
from modules in place at existing customers, predicated on a strong underlying economy
which gives downside protection
• Market supported by two penetration • The market will likely be nearing saturation of
tailwinds, that provide growth upside: existing modules over the next five years,
which means:
- Additional modules per customer
- Further penetration of companies - May be limited upside for the next buyer
- New avenues of growth must be identified & exploited
• Potential for meaningful pricing upside on
recurring maintenance & services, based on
very high customer stickiness • Since yyyy, Diamondback has failed to grow
in a rapidly growing industry
• Customers view Diamondback as a ‘Tier x’ - Diamondback appears to be underinvesting in
provider, based on the breadth & quality of product improvement compared to key competitors
offerings; existing customers are satisfied Enablon and Intelex, inhibiting it’s positioning in
‘bake-offs’
• SAP not viewed as a focused competitor ‣ SaaS solution and back-end product
integration capabilities are behind those of
• Diamondback’s customer base is made up of competitors and will require investment
large companies, who see EH&S software as - Diamondback’s salesforce appears to be missing
mission critical; despite focus on O&G sector, opportunities with both new and existing customers
counterparty risk appears limited
• Diamondback is not well set up to win in the
• Over time, companies are shifting to a more
faster-growing SMB segment
centralized purchasing model (particularly
SMBs) which favors EH&S players with broad - Lack of sales focus
offerings, like Diamondback and Enablon - Customer preference for off-premise hosted solutions
Peach faces range of attractive opportunities, tempered
by a few key risks
FOR DISCUSSION
WHAT WE LIKE OUR REMAINING CONCERNS

• Substantial remaining market headroom • Uncertainty regarding pace of outsourcing
supporting continued growth across range of adoption across existing customer base,
geographies and industries; Peach well coupled with relative lack of historic focus on
positioned to gain share winning new customers
• Highly fragmented competitive landscape • Increasing outsourcing penetration,

further enabling share gain and mitigating particularly from pure play start ups, could
potential risks associated with actions of erode margins in select local geographies
larger players and/or customer relationships
• Consistently strong customer feedback • Large customers who view logistics as

inspires confidence in ability to maintain ‘mission critical’ (e.g., Amazon) could move
share in growing market spotting in house to cut costs and
integrate with proprietary systems
• Opportunity to build partnerships with
asset-light xPL(s) looking for reliable partner • No clear evidence of returns to scale at
with national scale regional or customer level
• Relative resilience through economic
cycles due to stability of end user demand Important to get management perspective on what
(e.g., CPG, Food & Bev) and spotting services drives margin variation across sites; consider
testing through additional analysis of local markets
and site-level financials
Our perspective on this investment
PRELIMINARY

• Relatively stable market; limited exposure to • Given replacement cycle and contract terms create
drilling activity relative to other OFS segments, with lag between decline in production and demand for
key volume driver being EPS replacement cycle ESPs, current market downturn likely to persist
within installed base of conventional wells through yyyy-xx even in event of oil price rebound
• Attractive market growth outlook over next x+ • Challenging market environment placing downward
years, given ESP demand will increase with oil pressure on prices (~xx% in NA) and making it
prices as conventional wells come back online and more difficult to differentiate on service, as
unconventional drilling activity increases; in event of established players improve service levels, given low
prolonged market downturn, there isn’t another utilization and increased focus on ESP margins
‘shoe to drop’ from a volume perspective
• Established NA and international players, particularly
• Customer base is open to switching providers, BHI and GE, are highly focused on ESP given its
particularly for differentiated service that a new relative stability and margin contribution to portfolio
entrant such as Wildfire could provide; sophisticated as drilling-related services have dropped off; strong
technology and ability to bundle ESPs with other commitment to defending market share through
products are not critical purchasing criteria aggressive pricing and improved service
• Consistent market feedback that ESPs themselves • For a new entrant like Wildfire, combination of cost
are a fairly commoditized product sourced disadvantage due to scale and willingness of
through Chinese providers, with limited scale competitors to price aggressively given current
advantages in procurement market conditions suggests Wildfire will face
significant challenges achieving threshold scale
• Strong management team with proven track with sustainable economics over next xx-xx
record and relevant relationships in key regions months
Preliminary perspectives on asset
FOR DISCUSSION

• Fortress participates in a stable, growing • Shift to flexible packaging may accelerate,
market that is largely recession-resistant creating downside risk to overall label spend
(particularly C&S and RF)
• Strong history of M&A-driven growth and
consolidation
• Fortress core C&S business will continue to
• Fortress has regional scale positions which lose share of spend within label classes
drive leadership economics, enabling
continued reinvestment to reinforce
advantage • Relatively concentrated customer base
creates exposure to specific product lines
• Fortress scale in C&S is market-leading and (e.g., Nestle water vs. beverage in general)
offers meaningful cost advantage, providing
stability to competitive environment
• Opportunities for organic share gain appear
• Customer relationships are sticky; initial limited and ‘one stop shop’ does not appear
customer feedback on Fortress largely to provide competitive advantage
positive
• Relatively small price differentials (<x%)
• Pace of spend shift away from C&S relatively
cause certain customers to switch providers;
slow, and likely slower in a recession
critical to unpack further
• Fortress’ high wallet share with customers
will likely enable a shift with existing • Consistent price pressure creates imperative
customers away from C&S toward PS & SS to improve landed cost to maintain margins

• Strong historic revenue growth (~xx% ’xx-’xx) • Install-to-home represents ~xx% of EBITDA
and EBITDA margins (~x-xx%), generally gat or margins; high risk of revenue and margin erosion as
above underlying markets across business segments DirecTV subscribers plateau, more services
performed remotely, and less requirement for
outsourcing following AT&T merger and equipment
• Strong relationship and capabilities supporting advancement
AT&T/DirecTV CapEx spend across Wireless,
Wireline, and Install-To-Home • In Communications, portfolio concentration with
AT&T limits ability to fully benefit from
Wireless/Wireline buildout, as AT&T divides
• Significant presence in geographies differentially limited CapEx dollars across categories; market
exposed to near/medium-term O&G growth participants highlight difficulty of ‘breaking in’ to
(e.g., Texas, Southwest, Mexico), with particularly new players’ spend programs
strong competitive position and ability to participate
in major projects expanding Mexican • O&G portfolio has historically been focused on
midstream infrastructure small/mid-sized G&P and lateral projects across
North America; market facing steep decline
~yyyy-xx as infrastructure ‘catches up’ to
• Strong customer feedback regarding reliability and production
project management expertise
• Achieving YoY forecasts would require
delivering significant O&G projects each year
($x-xB p.a.), suggesting share gain and shift in
commercial and execution capabilities that would be
difficult to achieve

• Very strong historic revenue and EBIT • Consistent market feedback that in current
growth (~xx% CAGR ’xx-’xx) market environment, prices for like-for-like
services falling xx+%
• ~xx% of revenues support ‘mandatory’ OPEX
services for producing assets, providing relative
top line stability despite macro • Ability to manage returns on capital if
uncertainties equipment utilization falls, particularly in
asset-heavy PPU business units
• Management team has proven capability to - Contraction of LNG market opportunity following
enter new market segments and geographies completion of pre-commissioning project work
both organically and through M&A
• In ‘core’ cranes market in Europe, gaining • Remaining ‘headroom’ for Jura share gain in
share from Sparrows (#x) on organic basis European MHS markets
- Customers value ‘Tier x.x’ position; integrated - Requires further market analysis
offering and low cost position strong fit with end-
of-lifecycle assets in North Sea
- Perceived as being at or near Sparrows in terms of • Ability to execute ambitious growth strategy
technical capabilities requiring success in markets with limited
customer or capability overlap relative to current
• Headroom for growth in markets with existing core business (e.g., US onshore)
presence (e.g., Australia, US onshore); BH/HAL
merger creates ‘white space’ in market for
smaller players to gain additional share
- Continuing to pressure-test feasibility of management
forecasts
Emerging perspective on upside opportunity
• $xx-xxM in EBITDA upside requires

capture and retention of ~ xx% of
• Meaningful volumes ‘at play’ for volume at play for x+ years
Porcupine given combination of natural • Capturing upside likely requires price
and disruptive churn—on paper enough concessions, which could trigger a
to achieve $xx-$xxM incremental competitive response
EBITDA • Significant investment in sales
overhead and fulfillment likely
required
• US finished lubricant supplier prices

• Downward margin pressure is likely
remained stable through the
given expectation of continued low oil
oil price downturn; margins are at an
prices and a potential recession
almost unprecedented high
• US economy is increasingly likely to

• Market demand is highly stable and
enter into a recession; demand
slowly trending upward; continued low
impact is likely sizeable given key
oil prices is an accelerator to demand
activity drivers (miles driven, industrial
levers
productivity)
UPDATED SLIDE
Potential owners’ perspective
WHAT WE LIKE KEY CONSIDERATIONS
• Clear market leader within core US connectors • Significant exposure to US residential and non-
market: significant market share, leading customer residential construction cycles
advocacy, beneficial cost position, ability to create a
premium with a generally commoditized industry
• Fairly commoditized core product with limited
structural barriers to entry
• Stable overall connectors market, with positive
penetration trends and limited threat of • While recent losses appear to be one-time events,
obsolescence or substitution likely limited ability for organic share gain
within core connectors market
• Attractive gross margin profile and ability to • Historical track record of sub-optimal
maintain cash flows through historical recessions investments (acquisitions and internal product
development)
• Strategic opportunity to rethink product

portfolio and overall investment strategy • Execution risk: tactical improvements have
customer risk, and are generally enabled by
strategic refocus on core connectors business
• Potential for margin improvement through re-
setting SG&A and R&D at appropriate levels • Strategic buyers would likely need to come
from beyond current competitive set, given
market shares and competitive dynamics in Tie’s
• Potential attractive asset for a financial buyer end markets
Our preliminary perspective on this investment

• Marine container flows are expected to continue to • Container volumes are exposed to ~xx-xx% downside
grow at a multiple of US GDP risk peak-to-trough during cyclical global economic
downturns
• ~xx% of Deck revenue is tied to regional growth
around major ports, which is stable and expected • Recent growth in chassis days/container may flatten,
to outgrow the US average and could potentially fall, as terminals increase the use
of ‘on dock’ loading to decongest ports and lower cost
• Deck’s fragmented customer base is diversified
across trade goods, therefore mirroring regional • Some retreat to lower-margin, longer term contracts is
consumption growth expected as the ‘new’ customer base increases
purchasing sophistication
• Limited threat of disruption to the competitive
landscape by insourcing, emergence of a new
• Narrow set of mechanisms to improve performance
competitor, or technology
within Deck’s core business (e.g., some pricing and
• Market concentration across three largest chassis utilization optimization); would need to push to more
leasing companies supports strong, stable distant adjacencies to drive upside
margins, given customers have little incentive to
insource at current prices, and competitors • Meaningful geographic expansion (e.g., Brazil) appears
unlikely to compete on price unlikely given structural differences with markets
outside of the US
• Higher margin day-rate contracts expected to grow
from xx% to xx% of revenue as customer base • Uncertain exit strategy given questions regarding value
shifts to motor carriers/cargo owners proposition to buyer and growth story post-holding
period (i.e., limited potential for competitive
• No material inflection in capital intensity, given differentiation, share gain, or geographic expansion)
excess chassis inventory
Initial findings on Rock
What we like… What concerns us…

• Underlying market is growing and is reinforced by • There does not seem to be significant latent demand as
macro tailwinds as consumers become more comfortable customer needs are generally met (although it is difficult
with buying apparel online to assess the impulse nature of the demand)
• The sales in the core Music market are generally - ~xx% of those surveyed say their assortment needs are not met
predictable - ~xx of those surveyed say their accessibility needs are not met
- xx% of sales from iconic bands are relatively stable
- Remaining xx% are stable due to portfolio effect
• Amazon is best placed to meet increasing demand
• There is value in Rock’s brand
- Established brand which has enabled the fast growth of its own - Amazon has leading NPS in the segment
apparel labels - Rock is driving new business to Amazon with the marketplace
- See as more than a retailer by creating effective community (€xxxk YTD inyyyy)
elements ‣ Rock is unable to collect full customer info from Amazon
‣ High social media engagement marketplace
‣ YouTube channel
• Core customers are not alienated by adding
• Majority of sales (xx-xx%) are not exclusive products
Entertainment apparel
- >xx% shop across music and entertainment
• Rock is well positioned to grow • Difficult to unlock growth through international expansion
- ~xx% market share in core German market - UK ecommerce market has the highest level of sophistication
‣ Second to Amazon
- Many target countries have sophisticated online markets
- Expertise in online sales
‣ Industry leading page views per visit, time on site and ‣ Expectations on multiple shipping options, possible next
day delivery, free shipping, and free returns
number of direct
- Positioned to capture growth in gaming apparel
‣ High traffic acquisition costs, high cost to build awareness
‣ Top referring site is a gaming community site - Lack of community presence or history in growth markets

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
What we would do as owners FOR DISCUSSION
• Link capital to PPU and rental jobs to track regional and project-
level ROCE
• Prioritize BH/HAL markets given existing Jura assets, including

relationships, and ability to drive regional scale
• Identify niche opportunities within PPU market to drive sustainably

accretive returns
• Opportunistically acquire required equipment below book value
• Develop a plan to maximize value of existing MHS relationships;

upgrade technical capabilities and cross-sell more value-added
services
• Leverage customer relationships and growing technical expertise to

further expand MHS outside Europe; differentiate more on service,
less on price
What we would do as investors
PRELIMINARY
• Hire a small, focused team that is scalable with fungible talent should prices
rebound sustainably
• Quickly establish ‘proof of concept’ with financially robust Segment II/III

customers to confirm product quality and refine service model
• Target attractive sub-plays within the Permian/Mid-Con to achieve scale and

build efficient, differentiated service model
• Test Segment I customers’ willingness and preconditions to award

contracts to Wildfire by leveraging relationships to gain trial and discuss terms
with key decision-makers
• Consider small acquisitions in focus regions where cost can be managed near-
term, with capability to scale
• Continue to evaluate potential for strategic partnerships in international

markets (e.g., Middle East, Colombia)
Wildfire success requires achieving scale with attractive

economics, in context of market downturn and uncertain rebound
FOR DISCUSSION
• Professionalize sales and marketing functions, to both rationalize

pricing and expand share of wallet with existing large, high
potential customers
• Strategically expand geographic reach, building local density in

attractive subregions
• Pursue partnership(s) with asset-light xPLs looking for a reliable

spotting provider with national scale
• Explore opportunity to build geographic density through acquisition of

smaller ‘mom and pop’ pure plays
• Continue to leverage relationships with existing customers to cross-

sell shuttling services; offer additional value-added services
opportunistically

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Next steps
FOR DISCUSSION
• Analyze market pricing and margin trends across segments
• Continue interviews with AT&T, DirecTV, and other major TelCo’s to

refine view of capital spending plans, stability of EPC relationships
• Deepen understanding of potential to win major O&G projects

- Customer buying behavior and key purchasing criteria
- Hurricane’s competitive position and customer relationships by region (e.g.,
reasons for prior contract wins/losses)
- Relative size and shape of current/potential customer project backlogs and
forecast capital spend
• Assess potential upside to laterals business based on geographic

exposure to Texas and east-coast natural gas power gen build-out
• Develop range of scenarios for Hurricane segments and refine ‘what

you have to believe’ to achieve forecasts
Proposed next steps
CUSTOMER &
MARKET OUTLOOK COMPETITOR LANDSCAPE
• Quantify potential shift in packaging types, • Further coverage of feedback from top
especially trend toward ‘flexible’ packages customers on Fortress performance
• Assess impact of customer size on the rate of
shift away from C&S and implications for • Deepen assessment of price point at which
Fortress customer base customers typically switch providers and
• Deepen perspective on recession implications differences by end-market & customer size
for market and Fortress growth outlook
- Potential tailwind for consumption of low cost - Upon provider change, tendency to shift
products that require less complex label types + wholesale or share of wallet
slowed migration away from C&S
- Potential headwind in consumption of paint &
• Develop perspective on historic and go-
coatings
forward margins by label type based on
• Analyze impact of new label technologies
cost-out versus price pressure (industry and
(e.g., ‘in mold’) beyond expectation from
Fortress-specific)
market analysts (which show limited growth)
• Understand cost and price change correlation
and identify where margin increase comes • Map Fortress potential paths to gain above-
from market growth (focus on inorganic)
• Evaluate potential impact of increase/
decrease for the top xx customers and
determine particular exposures
Integrate findings into Fortress revenue and return outlook
Potential next steps
Deepen understanding Analyze potential to

Assess GAIL’s
of GAIL’s ability to facilitate solutions
propensity to arbitrate
offload US volumes for GAIL
• Investigate propensity for • Determine GAIL’s ability to • Possibility for Sovereign to

arbitration by GAIL and offload volumes across remarket GAIL’s gas
similarly situated potential end-markets via (partially or fully) as a sign
companies against US swapping, reselling, or of good faith and
counterparties with US marketing cooperation
choice-of-law provisions - Detailed cost- • Possibility to support GAIL
competitiveness (landed otherwise
- Whether GAIL fully
arbitrates or if GAIL uses cost) by demand center
arbitration as a negotiation - Demand center market
tactic sizing (long-term, short-
term, spot)
- Historic arbitration
outcomes - Competitive positioning of
GAIL to make the market
- GAIL internal capabilities to
market volumes itself
Key questions & next steps: competitive landscape
PRELIMINARY
NEXT STEPS KEY QUESTIONS
• How does Deck perform on key customer purchase
criteria? Is Deck able to command a price premium?
• How does Deck’s cost position compare to IEP
Assess Deck competitive competitors, motor carriers, and BCOs?
positioning today and - How will this cost position evolve as Deck has to invest in
through yyyy replacement chassis?
- How is this cost position impacted by Deck’s relative scale?
• How strong are Deck’s relationships with SSLs? Is Deck
likely to benefit from future chassis divestitures?
• What is the volume outlook for key Deck ports, given
Deepen understanding of changing trade flows?
Deck relative geographic,
• Which end-industries is Deck exposed to? How stable is
industry, and customer the outlook for these industries?
exposure and potential
impact on Deck • Which end-customers is Deck exposed to? Is there risk of
switching to competitors or substituting to in-house?
Integrate findings into preliminary Deck revenue and return outlook

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Porcupine sales are concentrated in US & Canada, and
are primarily direct
Source: Project Porcupine data room; Bain analysis

Porcupine participates in group II and III lubricants;
US volumes weighted toward low margin base oils
PORCUPINE EXCLUSIVELY PROVIDES PORCUPINE US VOLUMES WEIGHTED

GROUP II AND III LUBRICANTS HEAVILY TOWARD BASE OILS
Mgmt forecasts x%p.a. EBITDA growth, from both
revenue (x%p.a.) and margin (x%p.p.) improvement
Contracting market, volatile commodity markets, and Management forecasts depend on minimal growth in
economic stagnation prompted xx% EBITDA commodity prices, expansion in China, and continued
contraction over ’xx-’xx pricing power over distribution partners
Management forecast
Margin growth in ’xx can be credited

largely to commodity pricing collapse,
and weakening of the CAD
Source: Porcupine Management Presentation
Management forecasts Fortress to grow ~x% p.a. to
yyyy via market uplift, share, and new customers
PRELIMINARY KEY GROWTH
ASSUMPTIONS
xx% x%
• US prime label market expected
to grow at x.x% CAGR according
to Freedonia
• xx% of gross sales come from

customers purchasing multiple
labels; capture total revenue
opportunity of $xxxM with top xx
customers
Acquisition
Core Label and

Sleeve Co
• Management implements sales
Fetter and AC
acquisitions and marketing tools (SalesForce)
Label acquisitions
to increase customer base in
existing end markets
• Fortress successfully enters new

x% x%
end markets (e.g., craft beer and
-xx% x% nutraceuticals) that align with
Fortress core capabilities
xx% xx%
x% x%
Note: Roll-fed included in SS; CAGR include acquisitions on ‘xx and ‘xx
Source: CIM; Fortress data room
UPDATED SLIDE
Today Tie sells thousands of products across six major

categories
Wood/Steel products Concrete products
A B C D E F
Exemplary products
Share of revenue ~xx% ~x% ~x% ~x% ~x% ~x%
Gross Margin % xx-xx% xx-xx% xx-xx% xx-xx% xx-xx% xx-xx%
Retail Distributors
Distributors Direct sales
Channel
Lumber dealers
OEM
Residential xx% xx% xx% xx% x% x%

End Markets
Home
Improvement
xx% xx% x% x% x% x%
Commercial xx% xx% xx% xx% xx% x%
Industrial x% x% x% x% xx% xxx%

Source: Company website; Tie annual reports; Bain analysis
Peach’s management forecasts continued strong
revenue growth of xx% YoY
PRELIMINARY
Source: Management presentation

Management forecasts Deck to grow ~xx% p.a. to
yyyy via mixture of fleet, price, and utilization uplift
PRELIMINARY KEY GROWTH
ASSUMPTIONS
• Marine chassis demand will grow
Management at ~x% YoY from ‘xx-xx
forecasts
• REZ-x domestic intermodal will
grow at ~xx% YoY from ’xx-xx
• SSLs will divest ~xxk chassis in

the next x-x years, of which
Deck will win ~xx%
• Marine pool utilization will

increase to xx% using REZ-x’s
technology and increased density
• Deck will grow inorganically by

acquiring x,xxx used marine
chassis per year from SSL
divestitures (average price of
‘xx- ‘xxP
$x,xxx per used chassis)
xx%
• Deck will grow organically
through ~x,xxx leased newbuild
xx% marine chassis and ~x,xxx
leased newbuild domestic chassis
xx%
Source: CIM; Deck data room

Diamondback revenue is derived from a broad array
of pricing models, solutions and industries
x PRELIMINARY
xx
xX + Ad-hoc
Recurring
Two customers
combine for
>xx% revenues
Source: Project Diamondback data room; Bain analysis

In recent years, Diamondback failed to grow in line
with the underlying market
Diamondback not
growing with market for Management forecasts
last x years ‘hockey stick’ recovery
Unknown EBITDA for

yyyy-yyyy
Source: Project Diamondback data room; Diamondback annual reports

Deck owns and/or manages ~xxxk chassis across a
variety of participation models PRELIMINARY
DECK BOTH OWNS AND MANAGES DECK OWNS ~XX% OF MARINE

~XX% OF ITS FLEET; DOES NOT OWN BUT CHASSIS AND HAS ~XX% ACTIVE
MANAGES ~XX% OF ITS FLEET FLEET UTILIZATION
Chassis
managed
Chassis
owned
Co-op/grey
Neutral pool Non-pool
pool
• Deck manages • Third party • IEPs provide
own pool, leases manages, all long term lease
to SSLs IEPs provide of chassis, no
Note: MSC model is a combination of neutral pooling and net leasing
chassis pooling
Source: CIM; Deck data room
Hurricane margins vary significantly across segments
PRELIMINARY
Hurricane ’xx revenue, by business segment
Legend: Comm. Oil & Gas Electric T&D Power
Source: Macquarie Capital CIM; Bain analysis


Disclaimer
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front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
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analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Wireless & Wireline: Emerging insights
(x of x) PRELIMINARY
x
EMERGING
INSIGHTS DESCRIPTION WHAT WE’VE HEARD
End-user demand for • Growth in number of wireless subscribers
“If you look at the demand for wireless data, it's insatiable.
wireless data expected to moderate (x% CAGR ’xx-xx)…
People want more and more data.”
expected to continue • …But data per device expected to continue
strong growth -Snr. Vice President, EPC Firm
exponential growth (xx% CAGR ’xx-xx)
• Shift of driver from “coverage” (new areas) to “We’re not having to build to support as many new cities as
“capacity” (additional data in existing areas) much as we are to make our capacity better in the cities
increasing use of micro-cells we’re already in. Most of that is being done with small-
Market players • Small cells expected to contribute ~xx% of cells.”
focusing on base-station CapEx by yyyy, up from ~xx% -Fmr. Snr. Project Manager, Telco
increasing ‘capacity’ today
through increased “AT&T got really excited about an entirely small-cell
use of micro-cells • LTE-Advanced and other technology expected network, but when it didn’t work on a small scale, the
to increase capacity per cell whole press release quietly went away. It’ll have to be a
mixed approach.”
• AT&T attempted aggressive micro-cell
expansion, but has since pulled back -Fmr. VP E&C, Telco
• Consumer demand for increased bandwidth “If we had kept our fiber business, it’d be our best product
will continue due to increased data usage per line because of Google Fiber. Expect them to drive that
device and number of devices business for years.”
Fiber buildout is
• Fiber currently available in ~xx% of HHs; -Fmr. CEO, EPC Firm
happening quickly,
expected to reach additional xx-xx% by yyyy
with significant “Google realized the incumbents were never going to build
runway for • Unlike Telco’s, Google is uninterested in infrastructure to support the speeds they wanted, so they
continued adoption building a business; focused on disrupting forced their hand by becoming a competitor. And it’s
broadband by entering low-cost cities with working very well.”
slower internet (rolling-out x additional cities,
with x potential future additions) -Director of E&C, Telco
Positive fiber market • Costs to connect declining as providers adopt “There’s some really interesting R&D going on around the
outlook tempered by innovative processes (for example, micro- FTTH installations; be on the lookout for companies that are
headwinds for trenching and fewer truck rolls) shortening the time and construction impact required to
Hurricane-specific • Aerial fiber increasingly chosen over buried, bring entire neighborhoods online.”
wireline services with reduced Hurricane opportunity -Director of E&C, Telco
Emerging insights from primary research:
US share upside opportunity (x of x)
INSIGHT DETAIL WHAT WE ARE HEARING
• Lubricant customers, especially in commercial and industrial, are
intelligent buyers that conduct extensive testing and analysis to “In most circumstance the distributor dos not have the
Purchasing decisions are
Normal market churn
ensure product effectiveness; distributors generally have some decision rights to select which brand a customer purchases.
generally made by difficulty pushing products on customers Additionally, customers have contractual rights to agree
customers with some with any brand before switching happens”
• Certain circumstances exist where distributors maintain decision-
input from distributor rights to procure on behalf of their customers (e.g., limited supply Ind. Lubricant Distributor Consultant
options or private labels)
• Private label: Underpenetrated suppliers able to compete for

More opportunity in volumes on price and volumes otherwise given to leading brands in “When sourcing for a private label supplier, distributors are
private label than sub-markets with low brand appreciation (DIFM auto, etc.) looking for the lowest price that meets the required
branded for • Branded: Stickiness of relationships and IOC brand strength are specifications, and they will often have multiple suppliers
underpenetrated difficult forces to overcome within most markets for and change suppliers if someone offers a lower bid”
lubricant supplier underpenetrated brands; some opportunities exist with niche Founder, Medium Distributor
applications in industrial to win based on quality/price alone
• Supplier-led: IOC supplier brand exclusivity push forcing distributors

Finished lubricant to consolidate volumes or accept contract cancellations “Overall churn in the market place has been fairly constant
distributor base is under • Customer-led: Suppliers are assigning large distributors to “sub-job” over the years, but recently all of the consolidation and
pressure from three when small distributors cannot handle volume load or service req’s IOC supplier pressure has turned the distributor market on
its head”
angles • Distributor-led: Distributors are buying small jobbers with similar
suppliers; customer accounts are folded into portfolio EVP of Distribution, Large Distributor
• IOC suppliers continually pushing to fully-align distributors with as

Suppliers are pushing for “ExxonMobil has been the most forceful supplier when it
Disruption overview
few brands as possible in order to forcibly reduce competition and

greater branded product provide market stability comes to brand alignment. They are requiring distributors
alignment from to sole source lubricants with the understanding that their
• Exxon has been most aggressive supplier trying to protect brand
national accounts provide ample outlets for volumes/fees”
distributors alignment during the consolidation trend through requiring sole-
(particularly Exxon) sourcing; Shell and Chevron only offering incentives to raise President & Founder, Industry Advisor
Brand-alignment
distributor SoW
“Mobil is giving big geographic areas to some distributors
• ExxonMobil exclusivity creating somewhat transformational shift in
Some distributors are and in return expecting them to discontinue their
supplier landscape as portion of distributors look to replace brands
unwilling to ‘align’ relationships with other suppliers and move to full
in portfolio if they chose to remain flexible with sourcing
(typically when volumes alignment. They’ve cleared the deck for x main
• Distributor decision to ‘align’ or not driven by “game-theory” distributors to cover the Northeast and I know of at least
are small share of total or
involving supplier share of wallet, number of national accounts, and two that were discontinued by Mobil.”
not tied to nat’l accounts) availability of comparable products CSO, Large Distributor
Alignment has raised churn rates, allowing sophisticated suppliers to “When the distributor is switching supplier due to market
•
Majority of customers pressure, they aren’t switching from Exxon to a tier II; they
take advantage of share gain opportunity in a mature, stable market
that switch are likely to are switching to Chevron or Shell to maintain competitive
• Majority of share shifting is between leading branded suppliers (i.e., positioning”
choose other leading
intra-IOC brands), which can be more easily be marketed to
branded suppliers
customer base
EVP of Distribution, Large Distributor
Source: Industry participant interviews; Bain analysis
Emerging insights: Market opportunity
PRELIMINARY
Outsourced spotting market: ~x-xx% nominal growth p.a. through yyyy

EST.
DRIVER GROWTH RATIONALE WHAT WE’VE HEARD
A • Truck loads shipped highly correlated with “No [truck] population growth and stagnant freight rates
industrial production (Rx=.xx), growing at ~x% in a period of economics expansion gets to the key
• Largest Peach industries stable, with minor differentiator of demand this cycle: massive productivity
Truck loads x.x-x.x% cyclicality; performance of largest Peach growth… However, as utilization rates are already at high
customers at/above respective industries levels, the rate of productivity growth is expected to slow
through the forecast horizon.”
yyyy NA Commercial Vehicle Outlook
B • Mix shift to larger facilities increases the overall “There’s some room for more drop and hook, but it’s
Spotting complexity of spotting incremental. The driver shortage could help drive it a
services x-x.x%
• Incremental adoption of drop and hook
little bit because carriers are more likely to charge and
required enforce detention fees.”
provides minimal uplift
President, Trucking Research Firm
• Yard management (including trailer spotting) is “Outsourcing is going to increase, especially in the
C earlier in the outsourcing adoption cycle than medium and large facilities. There’ll be more success
other outsourced logistics services stories with yard spotting outsourcing and xPL
• Outsourcing varies significantly by yard size, outsourcing in general.”
with strongest outsourcing value proposition CEO/COO, Food distribution Co.
Outsourcing for medium and large facilities
x.x-x.x%
adoption rate • Significant headroom remains in medium and
“I think companies are going to continue to focus on the
large facilities, supporting annual growth of
core competency, which will continue to have an impact
x.x-x.x% p.a. through yyyy
spotting companies.“
• Outsourcing growth will slow following yyyy Manufacturing Manager, Beer Co.
(~x-x% p.a.) as facilities reach ‘full potential’
D • Pricing growth is primarily inflationary, tracking “The driver shortage will impact OTR driving, but the
driver wage inflation and has not been spotting jobs that stay in the distribution center are easy
materially impacted by OTR driver wage to fill. Costs will follow driver wage inflation at x.x-x%.”
Price x-x.x% pressures or economic cycles Director of Operations, xPL Co.
• Pricing somewhat protected by significant
incumbency bias in existing contracts
Emerging insights from primary research (x/x)
INSIGHT DETAIL WHAT WE ARE HEARING

x • Rasgas was the first contract GAIL (through Petronet) went after because the
spread between the contract and market price was very large (~xxx%). In “Rasgas negotiation was prompted by our
GAIL renegotiated addition, they felt issues with the indexing methodology gave them just cause long term customers refusing to buy from
contracts historically, • The current negotiations with Gazprom are aimed at mitigating a potential GAIL & others…it became an economic
primarily because of oversupply situation (again at a higher than market price) imperative for our buyers since the spot
pricing – it is likely to do • The government has been very active (especially in the case of Rasgas) given the market was xx% lower”
so again strong political, economic and cultural ties between the two countries International Procurement Deputy Director,
• Given the current spread between the contract and market prices for Cove Point Large Indian NG provider
Plausible courses of action (India focus)
(even with Henry Hub , it is likely GAIL will attempt to revisit this contract
• Sovereign is likely to be lower down in the pecking order of potential "GAIL will want to renegotiate but
renegotiations, given a lower price point and later initiation of deliveries than likelihood of it working out is very low
Gazprom as US government is not going to help
However, the impact on
• Even if a renegotiation were to happen, the first port of call is likely to be gas [as with the Qatari state-owned
Sovereign is likely to be
supplier, followed by the transporter – liquefaction isn’t viewed as a dynamically- supplier]…GAIL might have to take up the
more muted than in these priced service, tied to gas price penalty if it comes to that or sell the gas at
other situations loss”
• Finally, industry participants in India universally acknowledge American firms are
more protected. They have better contract management/legal capabilities and the Former Head of the Chairman’s Office, Large
Indian government is much less inclined/able to exert pressure on these entities Indian NG provider
• In a number of deflationary commodity environments, Indian public sector “I disagree with any statement that says
In the event the Indian India does not observe the rule of law –
undertakings (PSUs) have maintained contractual integrity e.g. rig payments
government forces the during the yyyy-xx oil price shock there have been no examples of
issue, experience from unilateral nationalization-type actions
• However, in a number of other sectors with significant public-private partnership
other sectors suggests (e.g. roads, solar, thermal, wind power), the public bodies have pushed back on
in this country in decades. We viewed the
Sovereign will have renegotiations with Rasgas as a way to fix
pricing or payment obligations
recourse, but could take an egregiously flawed agreement – and they
• In the vast majority of these cases, the private partner has ended up winning clearly agreed”
time and litigation compensation, but this has often been a lengthy process Former Chairman, O&G multinational
• There are limited examples of Japanese multi-nationals choosing to completely “My initial take would be “don’t worry”
renege or walk-away from contracts unless the customer is under significant
Japanese buyer unlikely financial pressure. Sovereign’s customer
• Additionally, in the case of Sovereign’s customers, they are multi-nationals with
to walk-away given does not strike me as a likely situation.
trade partners across the world; their first concern would be upholding their public
potential brand name image and brand name for their customers and trading partners
Additionally, they will think they have a
damage brand name to protect as a trading
• Only a significant financial pressure is likely to drive walking-away, and company.”
Sovereign’s Japanese customer does not appear to be in this situation Executive, O&G consultant
• Work within the bounds of the contract to resell or swap volumes

There are four plausible • Come back to Sovereign and attempt to renegotiate the contract
actions that Sovereign
• Choose to delay payment and attempt to renegotiate terms in arbitration
counterparties could take
• Renege and walk away and choose to pay the penalty or not (highly unlikely)
Source: Industry participant interviews; Bain analysis
Power Generation: Emerging insights (x/x)
PRELIMINARY
EMERGING
INSIGHTS DESCRIPTION WHAT WE’VE HEARD
“There is just a physical limit on viable sites. There is a finite
• Wind power is never expected to exceed ~xx% of number of places where there is wind good enough and where
Even if wind power
power generation supply
generation reaches or it’s not prohibitively expensive to connect to the grid. Not
• Daily intermittent production limits capacity for wind
exceeds cost parity with to mention the wildlife implications. Areas around the Great
to support electricity demands
other sources (including Lakes have enormous potential, but you can’t build because
• Onshore growth constrained by noise ordinances,
gas), there is a natural aesthetic pollution, wildlife safety concerns
there are a lot of bald eagles around and inevitably a few
limit to wind power will get caught in the turbines”
• High up-front transmission line installation cost act
penetration as barrier to major regional build-outs
-Project Manager, Wind Developer Co.
As the installed base • Wind farm operators purchase maintenance

agreements from the EPC providers x-x years post “Maintenance is about xx% of the cost of any wind farm. As
grows, there is an installation the wind farms already constructed age, there will be a huge
opportunity for EPCs to demand for maintenance and repair services”
• By yyyy, up to ~xx% of EPC revenue could be
capture share in higher generated by O&M agreements, and xx%+ of profit
margin O&M services • O&M services commands xx-xx% margins, x-xx -Director of Construction,
business higher than the margin for construction Wind Developer Co.
“Normally we see margins for EPC companies around x-xx%,

Wind installation
but that’s been dropping. At the end of yyyy, in the super
margins expand and • Uncertain demand for wind farms (due to PTC)
competitive environment right before the legislation ran out,
contract meaningfully as results in margin fluctuation driven by quick ramp-
ups and ramp-downs in demand companies were taking margins less than half of normal just to
PTC-driven investment
lock in work”
cycles spike up and • yyyy margins of x-xx% declined to x-x% recently
down; currently facing and will continue downward until PTC extended
-Director of Business Development,
downward pressure
Hurricane Subsidiary
• Offshore wind is currently ~xX as expensive as “Offshore is xxx more expensive than anything onshore right
Offshore wind energy is onshore, and is expected to remain uncompetitive to now. The price will come down but when you do anything
not a viable means of yyyy+ offshore it is just more costly. Long term, offshore will not
power generation in the • Offshore production has not yet moved meaningfully become price competitive for the next xx-xx years, until
US today, and will not be down the experience curve, and is largely contingent
major developments outside the US
then people will be buying offshore production for diversity
cost competitive for xx+ reasons or carbon credit benefits ”
years • No offshore projects online in the United States and
only a handful under development
-CEO, Wind Industry Association Co.
Emerging insights (x of x)
PRELIMINARY
INSIGHT WHAT WE’RE HEARING

x• Yard operations are becoming more “I took our three facilities, condensed them into one, then hired a
complex, driven by supply chain xrd party to handle the new facility’s trailer spotting.”
consolidation (e.g., larger facilities) Logistics Manager, Retail Co
and adoption of drop and hook
programs “There’s more drop and hook and it’s very difficult to get trailer
capacity in the position you need in time.”
COO, Logistics Co
x• Value proposition for outsourced “What we were doing was so time-sensitive that you couldn’t have
spotting services is particularly well a hiccup… There is so much potential for a never-ending domino
suited to more complex effect if one truck doesn’t show up somewhere in time.”
operations (e.g., need to staff Director of Transportation,
multiple shifts, less navigable yards)…
Retail Co
“If I needed x-x shifts per day, I would need to outsource”
Director of Transportation,
Retail Co
x• …and in certain niche markets “Sometimes, like in December, we exceed the capacity that JB
- Highly seasonal Hunt and Swift can offer us and we need other parties for
- Multiple xPL/truck company facilities trucking and spotting”
- Difficult labor markets (e.g., labor
shortages, strong unions)
SVP, Retail Co
“We have xx different xPL carriers so we need a neutral party
like Peach to handle everyone’s trailers”
VP, Paper Co
“Unions will resist outsourcing, but it’s worth the fight. We also
use outsourcing in California where it’s hard to get good
employees”
VP, xPL Co
Source: Interviews with customers, xPLs, logistics companies, industry consultants and competitors.

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Peach revenue growth expected to be ~x-xx% p.a.
through yyyy
PRELIMINARY
Peach revenue growth yyyy-yyyy, given continued economic recovery and outsourcing adoption
Total yyyy revenue:

Spotting + Shuttling
+ VAL = ~$xxxM
Spotting: xx-xx%
Shuttling and
VAL: x-xx%
Market growth Share gain
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ACT Research, ATA, Armstrong and
Associates, Peach management presentation, interviews with customers, competitors, and industry experts; Bain analysis
The vast majority of Blade’s growth will need to come
through new customer acquisitions
PRELIMINARY
CLOSE
GROWTH IN CURRENT CORE ADJACENCIES
TMs PTs
Revenues
Gains
Losses
xx
Dependent
on level of
investments
Net impact: -€xM

~x% p.a.
x x x x x x x
Upside case: ~xM ~xM ~x-xM ~xM ~xxM ~xM
Very hard
to achieve

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Across many served markets, Hurricane likely to face
increasing headwinds over next x years and beyond
PRELIMINARY HURRICANE MARKET GROWTH TRENDS
% YYYY % YYYY LAST X NEXT X
REVENUE EBITDA YEARS YEARS YYYY+ COMMENTS
• Industry trends towards less labor-intensive

Communications
Install-to-home xx xx installations and maintenance, in-house

labor, and consumer-installed solutions
• FTTX rollouts continue; future growth

Wireline x x.x dependent on rural area growth or fiber
replacement beginning
• 3G roll-out nearly complete, but capacity

Wireless xx xx additions will continue in targeted areas; 3G
rollout likely in yyyy-xx timeframe
Long-haul and • Major up-cycle to support shale boom

xx xx nearing or at its peak, and likely to ramp
laterals down to significantly lower levels by yyyy
G&P • Shale drove ~xx% p.a. growth ’xx-’xx;

Oil & Gas
x xx headwinds gaining due to oil pricing

infrastructure pressure, well productivity & basin maturity
• Current upcycle supporting oil sands to see

Canada xx xx flattening near-term and decline thereafter,
barring major price and regulatory shift
Mexico/
?
• Deregulation creates significant import pipe
x.x x.x opportunity near-term; broader domestic
International build-out potential sizeable but uncertain
• Need for new projects will flatten as current

Transmission xx xx transmission projects are completed to meet
Electric
congestion and renewable integration needs

T&D
• Steady, but lower growth will continue,

Distribution x x.x supported by replacement CapEx and grid
modernization investments
Power
• Wind power generation historically reliant on

Power Gen &
?
Gen
government tax credits; expected to increase

x x
Industrial in cost competitiveness by yyyy, but limited
by low cost natural gas and intermittency
Source: Macquarie Capital; customer and expert interviews; Bain analysis

US market growth outlook:
Commercial driver has the largest impact at ~x%p.a.
x A YYYY OUTLOOK &
DEMAND EFFICIENCY HEADWIND IMPACT
% of
Last xY xY Outlook Headwind Impact ’xx-’xx CAGR Impact
Market
• Increase in fuel
Passenger Miles
efficiency standards
Passenger
~xx% • Further mix shift

’xx-’xx CAGR: ’xx-’xx CAGR:
towards more efficient Impact on ~(x%)
synthetics ’xx-’xx CAGR:
x.x% x.x%
• Development of engine ~(x.x%)
monitoring systems
Commercial
Commercial
• Increase in drain
Vehicle
intervals due to:

Miles
~xx% improved engines and ~x%

’xx-’xx CAGR: ’xx-’xx CAGR: mix shift away from Impact on
’xx-’xx CAGR:
x.x% x.x% mono-grade lubricants
~(x.x %)
Industrial Prod.
Industrial
• Improved fluid
management practices
~xx% ~x%
’xx-’xx CAGR: ’xx-’xx CAGR: • Rising demand for Impact on
synthetics ’xx-’xx CAGR:
x.x% x.x%
~(x%)
Overall ~x.x% ~(x.x%) ~x%
To date, analysis does not reflect potential for recession scenario

Source: US DOT; IHS; market participant interviews
Deck ports face unique combinations of headwinds
and tailwinds PRELIMINARY
xC
Chassis
Port # of containers x days/container
Resulting chassis demand outlook
National average Regional Structural Shift to Average Outlook
Below natl. avg. GDP- flows on-dock & route compared
Description
driven (e.g., Pan. short-haul times/ to national
Above natl. avg. flows Canal) rail lengths average
• Plan to expand on-dock rail to all xx

LA/
terminals; Panama canal may drive
Long Beach traffic to east coast
• Existing capacity for megaships;

Savannah close proximity to population centers
• Upgrading infrastructure for

Increasing Deck exposure
NY/NJ megaships but plan to increase on-

dock rail by xx% through new project
• ‘Secondary’ port, stable economically

Seattle/
but working to expand on-dock rail;
Tacoma unlikely to experience major shifts
• ‘Secondary’ port, stable

Oakland economically; unlikely to experience
major shifts
• May benefit from Panama canal

Charleston expansion
• High growth projections for trade

Houston flows and demand; some examination
of on-dock rail projects
• Low growth outlook; ‘tertiary’ port,

Philadelphia unlikely to see significant increase in
trade flows
Source: Port annual presentations; Woods & Poole; JOC; customer and competitor interviews; Bain analysis

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Within Cranes & Lifting, Jura leads on price and
responsiveness but lags Sparrows on technology
PRELIMINARY
Jura Sparrows OEMs OFS providers Small players
NOV, Liebherr, Seatrax Wood Group, Aker IKM, Alatas
Current share in
~xx% ~xx% ~x% ~x% ~xx%
Europe
Performance against key purchase criteria
Price • Well positioned: • Moderately • Poorly positioned: • Poorly positioned: • Well positioned:
Known for pricing positioned: Higher Charges a premium Customers sacrifice Low cost provider
lower to win price than Jura; this for parts and service price for (minimal overhead,
Increasingly business; low price has lost them some convenience of less R&D)
has won Jura some contracts historically bundling; Overhead
important during
major contracts costs of larger
downturn; Some company plus
operators so risk
Importance to typical Jura customers
subcontracting costs
resistant that price is lead to higher prices
almost a non-issue
• Well positioned: • Well positioned: • Poorly positioned: • Poorly positioned: • Moderately

Responsiveness High level of service Focus on improved Few techs dedicated Little to no crane positioned: Local
and responsiveness service, to aftermarket services in house; presence, easy to
to operator needs responsiveness and service; unlikely to need time to access, but limited
Most important for part of core value availability after have labor available organize capacity due to
ad-hoc work; Critical proposition being challenged by for quick turnaround subcontracting smaller staff
for drilling and Jura
marine customers
Technical • Moderately • Market leader: Still • Well positioned: • Poorly positioned: • Poorly positioned:
capabilities positioned: Has known as the best in Considered the Outsource most Less R&D, little
gained significant the business for ultimate authority cranes & lifting ability to retain
ground in technical engineering and on technical needs- limited in- talent
Less critical for capabilities but still complex questions, both due house expertise
lagging Sparrows refurbishment to in-house mostly around lifting
Operations and
projects; xx+ years expertise and engineering
Maintenance work; of expertise operator liability
More critical for concerns Local players dominant
projects and major in Norwegian market
upgrades due to labor restrictions
and Statoil preference
Source: Customer and competitor interviews for local providers
Within PPU, Jura performs well on price but lags
BH/HAL on technical capabilities PRELIMINARY
Halliburton/ Regional Players Const. Companies

Jura
Baker Hughes (IKM) (Technip, Subsea x)
Current share in
~xx% ~xx% ~xx% ~xx%
Europe
Performance against key purchase criteria
• Well positioned: Jura • Poorly positioned: • Market leader: Able to • Moderately positioned:
pricing is always very Consistently the most offer the lowest price, but Increasingly bundling
Price competitive, but expensive due to largely focused on pipeline pre-
sometimes undercut on corporate overhead and smaller jobs commissioning work with
Increasingly important smaller projects by the highly sophisticated pipeline installations for a
during the downturn medium scale, regional offerings competitive price
players with less
Importance to typical Jura customers
overhead
Capacity • Well positioned: • Market Leader: Global • Poorly positioned: • Moderately positioned:
Substantial capacity to footprint supports Smaller players are often Excess capacity in today’s
take on multiple projects extensive personnel and constrained by limited market as construction
Critical because of the
across PPS equipment capacity capacity slows down; however,
high cost of delay large overhead prevents
offshore; for major CAPEX them for taking smaller
projects, PPU is often the PPU jobs.
last step before cash flow
• Moderately positioned: • Market leader: Best-in- • Moderately positioned: • Well positioned: Highly
Capabilities are sufficient class equipment and Capabilities are sufficient; competent pipeline
Technical Capabilities and improving, but not personnel; can execute sweet spot is smaller specialists, but PPU work
considered cutting edge; even in the most complex projects (e.g. tiebacks), hasn’t been a historical
More valued in pipelines; better positioned on environments; most not interested in focus; re-entering this
umbilical work is relatively Umbilicals than Pipeline valued for Pipeline investing in building best- market as demand for
commoditized due to lower technical (rather than Umbilical) in-class technical offering EPC services has declined
requirements work due to higher
technical needs
Responsiveness/ • Well positioned: Quick • Poorly positioned: • Market leader: Able to • Moderately positioned:
to respond and act on Highly bureaucratic able to mobilize quickly When there is a frame
Customer Service
customer needs; companies; slow to when capacity exists; agreement in place,
described as ‘easy to talk mobilize. Less inclined to interested in working with customer relationships
Well coordinated service to’ due to smaller size develop new approaches, customers to develop are typically well
function to ensure quality unlikely to “go the extra new and innovative managed and coordinated
and timely delivery mile” approaches

As a result, Jura positioning and ability to win varies
across regions and business lines PRELIMINARY
Europe Australia Americas

• Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with
Jura core: Initial Jura offering and Jura core: Onshore, majority of Jura core: Recent DOFSI
considered a ‘core’ business; long- business is hydraulics and driven by acquisition not considered strong by
standing customer relationships success in PIPS onshore; offshore, some customers; bundled offering
limited presence and relationships difficult to coordinate with
• KPC alignment with Jura core:
MHS Low-cost culture fits well with end- • KPC alignment with Jura core:
decentralized purchasing
of-lifecycle North Sea assets; Onshore hydraulics successfully • KPC alignment with Jura core:
bundled offering works well with bundled with PIPS services relationship-driven market rather
corporate-level decision makers and than low-cost market like North
fleet-wide purchasing Sea; few established customer
relationships, especially in offshore
• Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with
Jura core: Little overlap in Jura core: Successful acquisition of Jura core: Increased LNG
customer base with MHS and Valve-Tech Engineering (yyyy) and construction could drive demand
offshore PIPS core; Limited market Vicon Services (yyyy) from previous EPC customers (e.g.,
Onshore
size and growth (only xx% of PPU Bechtel); limited experience with
• KPC alignment with Jura core:
work in the EU today is onshore) midstream services and customers
Success with bundling diversified
• KPC alignment with Jura core: service offerings (i.e. facilities pre- • KPC alignment with Jura core:
Low cost culture aligns with Jura commissioning work and other Little to no portfolio of midstream
offering Industrial services) clients today in a relationship-
driven market; recruiting
experienced local mgmt team
PIPS • Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with • Service needs alignment with
Jura core: Core business, Jura core: Limited MHS presence Jura core: Perceived as viable
management team has deep roots to “get in the door” with offshore alternative to HAL/BHI in deep
in this market clients water, well positioned to benefit
Offshore
from HAL/BHI merger

• KPC alignment with Jura core: • KPC alignment with Jura core:
Ability to use MHS strength to Deep expertise in offshore PPU • KPC alignment with Jura core:
cross-sell to same purchase work across geographies; Low-cost Growing local presence today, with
decision-makers; Prevalence of and bundled offerings fits well with demonstrated ability to win share;
fleet-wide procurement strategies high labor cost environment and continued success will depend on
increases demand for bundled highly planned, large offshore ability to grow and build local
services projects relationships
Jura position: Strong Moderate Unproven

Source: Customer and competitor interview; Bain Analysis; ATK VDD
Pricing pressure varies by segment;
less intense for Medium sized Corporate customers
MAJORITY OF BLADE REVENUES HAS

LIMITED EXPOSURE TO PRICE PRESSURE OBSERVATIONS
• Pricing pressure largely driven by competitive

intensity
- Most intense pricing pressure is found at the intersection of
Patents, Admin, and MNC, which is due to the increased
competitive intensity (large market with commoditized product)
and the overall pricing sensitivity (likely involvement of
procurement in provider selections)
• Blade core segments relatively insulated from acute

pricing pressures found in other segments
- Blade overweight in the least price sensitive Medium
segment (xx-xx% of revenue vs. xx-xx% each in Large MNCs
and Small players)
‣ Mediums least price sensitive due to the value placed on
the full integrated value proposition and the rarity of
procurement being involved in provider selection
- xx% of Blade’s revenue in Strategic activities which require
more sophisticated understanding of the market and relevant
laws, insulating these revenues from pricing pressures
- Trademark Administrative work (xx% of Blade’s
revenue) under less pricing pressure than Patent side
which has significantly more competition from tech-enabled
scale players (simplicity to automate, overall larger size of
market, annual nature of recurring fees)
NEW SLIDE
Across segments, margins see moderate tailwinds in

base case, mild headwinds in recession case
x Industry margin stability
yyyy-xx yyyy forecast

Base case Recession case
∆ in margin Rationale
∆ in margin ∆ in margin
• New entrants (USP) have squeezed
margins across industry as prices are
more competitive
Connectors -x% x% x%
USP price
• Margin pressure from competitors fully
competition drove absorbed; channel shift to one-step
a few points of distribution may drive margin lift
margin out of
connectors • Commoditized product with flat,
transparent pricing structure
Fasteners x% x% x%
• Small potential for margin expansion due
to price ‘stickiness’ as steel prices rise
• Highly engineered products customized
per order; allows price increases in real
Lateral time as steel prices fluctuate
x% x% x%
systems
• Product price ‘stickiness’ allows for
margin expansion as steel prices rise
• Industry leaders (MiTek) have keep
prices constant to lock new entrants (Tie)
Integrated out of market
x% x% -x%
systems • Margin compression possible if steel
prices increase too much to be passed
along to purchasers
• Stable competitor and channel mix, lower
Concrete exposure to steel indicates flat margins
x% x% -x%
products • Potential for margin compression with
new entrants/consolidation
Source: Customer and competitor interviews; Market participant competitor survey (n=xx); customer and competitor interviews
Detail on international prioritization
DIRECTIONAL
x
Market attractiveness Ability to win
Country Replacement Evolution of Regulatory Customer Competitor
# of ESP wells
dynamics installed base openness fragmentation fragmentation
Colombia
Latin America
Venezuela
Ecuador
Argentina
Brazil
Chad
Kuwait
Iraq
Middle East
UAE
Yemen
Oman
Libya
Egypt
Indonesia
Pacific
Asia
Thailand
Australia
Well positioned Poorly positioned

Source: Customer & competitor interviews; Bain analysis
In target regions, BHI known for reliability but high
price; smaller players focus on service PRELIMINARY
x
A B C D PLAYERS
• Significant geographic • Significant geographic • Continuing to expand • Very few locations

Local presence supporting presence supporting footprint within target • Focused on specific
Presence customers with the largest customers with the largest basins operating areas within the
Pump shops and ESP programs ESP programs basin
service personnel
near operating area
• Longest track record of • Consistent performance • Relatively new entrant still • Variable; depending on age
Reliability service in the ESP market with a company focus on collecting reliability data and size of player
Data to support a engineering
strong track record
• Very experienced in every • Customers make trade off • Tend to focus on pumps in
of pump US onshore basin between volume of data vs more benign operating
‘quality’ of data environments
Total cost of ownership
Importance of criteria
performance
• Service highly dependent on • Large variability in • Business model based on • Hyper-regionalized model
Service quality size of ESP program customer’s service high touch service offering supports service and speedy
Well coordinated to
• Small customers struggle to • Good service provider in • Differentiate based on response times
ensure quality
design and timely get attention Texas/Permian basin response times and
delivery, installation • Heavily bureaucratic relationships
and support
structure
Initial • Consistently the most • Competitive • Entered market with low- • Low priced pumps
expensive provider cost product
Purchase Price • Generally regarded as • Often provide refurbished
One component of • Sometimes too expensive to ‘middle of the pack’ • Continue to offer high ESPs; less focus on new
TCO; increasingly be considered by smaller quality products at low end equipment
important during operators prices
downturn
• Largest portfolio of ESP • Leverages GE technology • Upfront investment in • Lower quality technology
Equip/ Tech offerings expertise and reputation premium pump designs • Minimal add-on
Range of equipment • Solution for even most • But limited changes in ESP • Struggled early with engineering; pumps are ‘fit
that can perform difficult environments technology to date sourcing issues and for purpose’
across environments equipment failures • Limited portfolio of pumps
Market leader Well positioned Moderately positioned Poorly positioned

Source: Customer and competitor interviews, CIM
Majority of Blade revenues has limited exposure
to price pressure in the market
x
Slight price decrease €XM = Blade revenue yyyy; (X%) = share of Blade revenues; X% = pricing pressure
Very slight price decrease
Large MNCs Med. Corporates Small Players
Approximately flat prices
NL / NL / NL / Blade revenues by price
Slight price increase Intnat’l France France France
Benelux Benelux Benelux pressure exposure
Blade core
Strategic €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM

Strategic advice, (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%)
Trademarks
search, opposition
& litigation ~x% ~x% ~x% ~x-x% ~x-x% ~x-x% ~x-x%
Administrative €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €xx.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM

Filing, extensions, (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (xx.x%) (xx.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%)
renewals,
recordals, ~-x% ~-x% ~-x% ~x% ~x% ~x-x% ~x-x%
watching...
Administrative €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM

Filing, extensions, (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%)
validation,
Patents
annuities... ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~x% ~x%
Strategic €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM €x.xM

Drafting, exam, (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%) (x.x%)
opposition &
litigation ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~-x - -x% ~x% ~x% ~x-x% ~x-x%
Note: Includes Blade % of revenue (yyyy data); totals ~xx% of revenue;

Price development not corrected for inflation No Blade revenues at risk
Source: Industry interviews; Blade customer data (xx.xx.xx) Given identified price pressure per segment and current Blade position

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Chassis demand may rise at ports in high growth
areas due to consumer demand
xC
PRELIMINARY
GDP GROWTH FORECASTS DIFFER CHASSIS USE TYPICALLY INCREASES
SIGNIFICANTLY BY STATE ALONG WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH
“As regions experience sustained GDP

growth, and thus increased
yyyy-yyyy Projected GDP Growth Top x Deck port
consumer spending, BCOs will re-
Seattle/
Tacoma
route or increase shipments to the
area to meet that demand without high
NY/ intermodal rail costs.”
NJ
Director, Chassis Leasing Co
Philadelphia
Oakland
Charleston
LA/ “A vast majority of the goods consumers
Long Savannah
Beach
Houston
purchase today come from Asia, which
means that as we see an increase in
regional GDP or consumer spending,
Below Average Above
container and chassis volumes in
that area increase as well.”
Senior VP, Chassis Leasing Co
Source: Woods & Poole; customer and competitor interviews

UPDATED SLIDE
Given national footprints, geographic exposure felt on

‘average’ basis
x B Industry volume outlook | Product intensity
TIE AND USP HAVE NATIONAL …INSULATING AGAINST

MANUF. AND DIST. FOOTPRINTS… REGIONAL MARKETS TRENDS
“I don’t think there’s a difference between the supplies

used in Florida and California…building a wood
frame building is a pretty standard process.”
President of Homebuilding Operations, National
Building Co.
“Footprint matters to these companies because it

determines the channel they sell through—
stronger regional networks allow for more direct
sales; USP is opening new distribution centers
aggressively across the country to match larger
competitors.”
Director of Sales, National Building Supply Co.
“Having facilities in a region is important, but once a

Legend company ‘plants their flag’, they have a broad reach.
USP distribution center USP manufacturing plant It does not require a large amount of facilities
to access that regional market.”
Tie distribution center Tie manufacturing plant
Director of Bus. Dev., Const. Supply Co.
Google’s Fiber rollout is accelerating Wireline
investments from AT&T and Verizon PRELIMINARY
x x D
AT&T OFFERS GIGAPOWER IN AT&T LOWERS THE PRICE OF

PLANNED GOOGLE FIBER CITIES GIGAPOWER AFTER GOOGLE ENTERS
Google Fiber and GigaPower AT&T introduced

Google Fiber city GigaPower in all
U-verse states Google Fiber cities
inside U-verse
states
AS OF AUGUST yyyy
Source: Google Fiber, AT&T Annual reports

Be mindful of the x,xxx mile shipping radius for core
equipment
x XXX PROPOSED
PLATFORM ACQUISITIONS INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
Platform x: Build from LEED/Colorado • Strong coverage of DJ and
Mid Con basins with leading
Williston provider
• Provides potential entry point
DJ- Niobrara
Utica
A for ‘core’ acreage positions in
Mississippian
Marcellus Bakken
Cana Woodford Arkoma Woodford • Would be challenged to shift
Granite Wash
Fayetteville
coverage to Eagle Ford and
Permian
Ardmore Woodford parts of Permian
Barnett Haynesville
Eagle Ford • Strong coverage of Mid

Con, Permian, Eagle Ford
Platform x: Build from SFI/Texas
Williston
• Likely requires separate
B regional footprints to
Utica
economically serve
DJ- Niobrara
Bakken/DJ and NE
Marcellus
Mississippian
Cana Woodford Arkoma Woodford

Fayetteville
Granite Wash
Ardmore Woodford
Permian
Haynesville
Comm. product radius (~xxxmi)
Barnett
Eagle Ford Core product radius (~yyyymi)
Source: Baker Hughes

Economics restrict focus to xxx-mile radius: ~xx% of
US passenger, commercial and industrial markets
x B Natural churn: Private label Branded
~XX% OF GDP AND

PORCUPINE CATCHMENT RADIUS POPULATION ADDRESSABLE
• Passenger: Passenger mileage is dispersed with population, xx.x% of US
State % of GDP % of Population
population lives within catchment area
• Commercial and Industrial: Based on industrial business, both production Connecticut x.x% x.x%
and transport; xx.x% of US GDP generated within catchment area Illinois x.x% x.x%
Indiana x.x% x.x%
Kentucky x.x% x.x%
Maine x.x% x.x%
Maryland x.x% x.x%
Massachusetts x.x% x.x%
Michigan x.x% x.x%
New Hampshire x.x% x.x%
New Jersey x.x% x.x%
New York x.x% x.x%
Ohio x.x% x.x%
Pennsylvania x.x% x.x%
Rhode Island x.x% x.x%
Vermont x.x% x.x%
Virginia x.x% x.x%
West Virginia x.x% x.x%
Wisconsin x.x% x.x%
Increased shipping radius to Total xx.x% xx.x%
account for lower transport costs
(due to barging optionality) for
non time-sensitive deliveries C&I PVL
Note: States with >xx% of the population within the xxx mile radius were included in the analysis
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data; US Census Bureau

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
Penetration headroom from ‘first time outsourcing’
focused on small and medium companies…
END-MARKET OUTSOURCING PENETRATION TO BE
DRIVEN BY SMALL AND MEDIUM COMPANIES WHAT WE’RE HEARING
Large = $xxB+ rev.
Medium = $x-$xxB rev.
“We are where we want to be as an
Small = <$xB rev. industry in terms of outsourcing.
Oil and gas is a mature industry
and all the companies suffer from
the same rules and regulations.”
HES Support Services Supervisor,
O&G Co
“I think for the large companies,

pretty much everyone that has
some type of need (which is all
of us), is using a xrd party EHS
provider. These aren’t new
problems, so the industry is pretty
mature.”
HSE Manager, O&G Co
“The large utilities and oil & gas

are pretty heavily saturated.
Chemicals too, since they were
some of the earliest adopters.”
VP of EH&S Solutions, EH&S Co
Oil & Gas Natural Chemicals Healthcare/ Utilities Industrials/

Resources Pharma Manuf.

…as is penetration of new module sales among
existing customer base
Company Performance # modules
Segment Compliance Operational risk
Size Improvement added
~% of modules xx% xx% xx% Growth Rec.
Small
x x
O&G Medium x .x
Large x x
Small x x
Chemicals Medium x .x
Large x x
Small
x x
Industrials/
Medium x .x
manufacturing
Large x .x
Small x
x
Natural
resources
Medium x x
Large x .x
Small .x
x
Healthcare/
Pharma
Medium x .x
Large x .x
Small x x
Utilities Medium x x
Large x x
Large = $xxB+ rev.

Medium = $x-$xxB rev. Today Recession case yyyy Growth case yyyy
Small = <$xB rev.


Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
NEW SLIDE
Customer purchasing criteria and Tie performance vary

across segments; Tie only differentiates in fasteners
x B Non-core business outlook | Customer priorities
SEGMENT TIE PERFORMANCE AGAINST CUSTOMER BUYING CRITERIA TIE DIFFERENTIATION

Width of bar indicates importance of criteria to customers
Fasteners
Differentiated
(for fasteners bundled
with connectors)
Lateral syst.
Minimally
differentiated
ICS
Lagging
Concrete
Not
differentiated
Note: Additional detail found in appendix

Source: Market participant customer survey Tie outperforms competitors Tie on par with competitors Tie underperforms competitors
Distributors and homebuilders value different criteria; NEW SLIDE
Tie performs best in all important categories; lags on

price
x B Connectors share stability | Customer priorities
“When considering and evaluating different connector products and manufacturers,

how important are each of the following criteria?”
x = Not important, x = Highest importance”
Distributors Homebuilders KEY INSIGHTS

• Tie position is
strong across all
top criteria,
particularly quality,
availability, and
xxx% of USP
service
customers rank
price as x or x
Large perception
• Tie slightly less
gap exists between well-positioned
Tie and USP on
most valued criteria with
homebuilders
- They are more
price-sensitive and
less brand-sensitive
than distributors
- Tie tends to under-
perform on pricing
Note: “Homebuilder” survey respondents includes general contractors but largely consists of homebuilders; due to Tamlyn’s small size, N is particularly low
Source: Market participant customer survey (n= xx)
CPGs focused on complex products have a slight
preference for technical ability and service
Please rank each of the following purchasing criteria in their order of
importance when selecting a converter
INSIGHTS
x
x
product customers
Higher complexity
• Quality/consistency and
x low price are important
across customer complexity
x
x • Complex product buyers care
more about technical ability
and service
• Simple product buyers care
more about relationship and
short lead times
x
x
product customers
Lower complexity
• The “one-stop shop” is low

x priority across customers
Note: Higher complexity = >xx% PS and SS label usage; lower complexity = xx% or less PS and SS label usage
Source: Bain prime label customer survey
Three key trends impacting customer requirements;
no clear risk to Fortress ability to deliver
FORTRESS
ABILITY
PERCENT OF CUSTOMERS WHO IDENTIFY THE TREND TO DELIVER COMMENTARY
• Driven by increasing fluctuation in
customer demand, improvements
in technology; Fortress known for
quick TATs and on time delivery
• Considered table stakes as long as

presses and raw materials to
accommodate newer products
• Table stakes, however, Fortress’

combination printing technology
addresses this need at economical
pricing
• Growth space, limited use

currently due to price premium;
Fortress undifferentiated from
competition
• Increased utility to price sensitive

customers; Fortress well-
positioned with design division
• Extended terms to be compared

with associated price premium;
Fortress size alleviates pressure on
working capital
• Reduction in write-offs due excess

production; Fortress VMI able to
optimize EOQs
No indication that trends require significant

structural changes to capital spend profiles
Source: Bain prime label customer survey; Industry participant interviews
When choosing ESP providers in North America,
customers seek to optimize total cost of ownership
x
PRELIMINARY
Safety/HSE record “The first two things our service providers absolutely have to have is a top-notch safety
Table stakes record and a local presence in or near my operating area. Without these two
Local presence things, you can’t get in the door.”
Chief Procurement Officer, Independent E&P
“At the end of the day, the selection should come down to reliability data…
decision makers look for the provider that can ensure that performance and run time
Reliability of the ESP are good. It’s all about minimizing operating costs.”
Manager of Global Well Operations, IOC
Total cost of ownership
“There are three components to great service: first, the collaboration between the
operator and pump engineers to identify the optimal equipment, second is on-
time delivery and installation of the correct equipment, and last is the post-
installation support.”
Importance of criteria
Service Production Manager, Independent E&P

Quality “Even in today's environment, price isn't becoming more important than
reliability. It could cost me more in the actual rig up/rig down than the actual pump.
When I factor in delayed production on top of that, that’s a big cost.”
Purchase Production Manager, Independent E&P
criteria
“Recently, I’ve seen ESP customers put more emphasis on price, but I’m not sure
Initial that it will last. You really have to understand the economics of the pump, and cutting
Purchase corners will cost you eventually.”
Price Senior Reservoir Engineering Advisor, Independent E&P
“There are some proprietary components, but the physical product is pretty
commoditized. As a result, it’s possible for other ESP companies to refurbish a SLB
pump.”
SVP & General Manager, Independent E&P
Equipment
“The down-hole equipment is pretty similar across companies, particularly in
Technology
benign operating environments. A lot of times, it’s even sourced from the same
Chinese manufacturers.”
Drilling Engineer, Independent E&P
Fortress viewed more favorably than global players
and C&S competitors (Smyth, Hammer)
On a scale of x-xx, how likely are you to recommend [company] to a friend or colleague?
Fortress Company logos
Source: Bain prime label customer survey

Disclaimer
Basic up
Roadmap
front stuff
Sources
Summary of progress
Bring it
Deal thesis
into focus

Next steps
early taste
Emerging insights
Waterfalls
Growth drivers
Do the Heat maps
analysis
Maps
well (and
pretty) Penetration
KPCs
NPS
UPDATED SLIDE
Tie has highest NPS® amongst its peers in connectors

Net Promoter Score (NPS)® “How likely are you to recommend [Company] to a friend or colleague?”
= % Promoters –
x = “Not at all likely”; xx = “Extremely likely”
% Detractors
Extremely
likely
xx
Promoter
x
x
Passive
x
x Detractor
x
Extremely
unlikely
Source: Market participant customer survey

NEW SLIDE
Tie NPS highest in fasteners, lowest in integrated

components systems
x B Non-core business outlook | Customer priorities
“How likely are you to recommend [Company] to a friend or colleague?”

x = “Not at all likely”; xx = “Extremely likely”
INTEGRATED
FASTENERS LATERAL SYSTEMS COMPONENT SYSTEMS CONCRETE

Across distributors and homebuilders, Tie is NEW SLIDE
recognized for quality products and customer service;

few detractors
DISTRIBUTORS HOMEBUILDERS
PROMOTER FEEDBACK PROMOTER FEEDBACK

“Great products, cutting edge R&D, “Tie continues to be the choice /
and smart, helpful people when brand that is most asked for by
we are looking for answers.” the professionals. They continue
to make a quality product at a
“Product quality, extensive product good value. Very good fill rate
offering, strong service, support and very few returns due to
team.” defective product.”
“Excellent quality and service.” “Quick lead times and the ability
to get multiple products.”
NEUTRAL FEEDBACK
NEUTRAL FEEDBACK
“Wide breadth of products.”
“They have a very broad and
diverse line that you can trust. ” “Successful use in the past and
positive experience with their
“They are the leader in the field; support group.”
they have excellent technical /
sales support, good and
DETRACTOR FEEDBACK
descriptive catalogs.”
“Product reliability.”
“Product quality.”
“Best at full service supply, training,
engineering and problem solving.”
Does not seem like

true detractor based
Note: “Homebuilder” survey respondents includes general contractors but largely consists of homebuilders on feedback
Deck appears to fit the profile of an True False
Leaning true Leaning false
infrastructure investment
PRELIMINARY
KEY CRITERIA EARLY FINDINGS

Capital intensive • Large established asset base (marine chassis market replacement value of $xB+)
with high barriers
to entry • Significant resources required to build scale and establish a national network
Limited • Three players collectively own over xx% of marine chassis (TRAC: xx%,
competition (e.g., Flexi-Van: xx%, Deck: xx%); even greater concentration on east and west coasts
local monopolies) • SSLs own additional xx% and are actively divesting to market leaders
• Marine containerization remains a global trend, although growth rates have slowed in
recent years
Inelastic demand
for services • Major trends support increases in chassis days billed (e.g., stable distance to DCs,
increased road congestion); outlook for rentals to be vetted (potential for substitution
by motor carriers to ownership model)
• Over xx% of Deck yyyyE revenue is from contracts expiring in yyyy or later
Long duration
contracts • Shift away from long-term supply agreements with SSLs and towards day-rate
contracts (without guarantees)
• Consistent revenues driven by low churn from SSLs
Long, stable and
predictable cash • Operating expenses are largely variable (maintenance/service)
flows • Capex spend (newbuilds, fleet acquisitions) is predictable and somewhat flexible
• Fundamental demand driver (container volumes) impacted by GDP and share of GDP
Low sensitivity to devoted to trade
swings in
economy • Significant exposure to global recessions; xx-xx% decline in container trade
volumes ’xx-xx
Several years of debate on Net Neutrality culminated
with new FCC policy in June PRELIMINARY
x x D
New Regulation on Net Neutrality

• No blocking of sites and OTT services
• No paid prioritization that discriminates
• FCC reclassifies Internet • U.S. Court of Appeals vacates between websites’/services’ data
access as Title I Net Neutrality portion of Open
Information Service, Internet Order in Verizon v. FCC • No throttling of users’ bandwidth
relaxing common carrier • Open Internet Order restrictions • Increased disclosure of network
regulations found beyond FCC’s purview information, to monitor compliance
• No clear restrictions under Title I
regarding net neutrality • Net Neutrality regulation derived from
• Court sides with FCC’s power to authority granted or intended in Title II;
practices regulate prices within section
xxx of ’xx Telecom Act
internet providers appealing on
grounds that Net Neutrality is outside
FCC’s authority
yyyy yyyy Jan. yyyy Nov. yyyy Feb. yyyy June yyyy
• FCC issues Open Internet • Pres. Obama recommends • FCC reclassifies broadband as Title
Order that bans ISPs from FCC impose Net II in Open Internet Order yyyy, or
preventing access to Neutrality by re-classifying ‘Net Neutrality’ regulation
websites, years after broadband internet as Title - Applies common carrier status to
broadband
Comcast blocked BitTorrent II ‘telecom. service’, not
- Forbears portion of Title II
uploads Title I ‘information regulations including rate regulation,
• No regulations on service’ consistent with House’ Jan. ’xx draft
discussion bill
charging websites
differentially for access
Source: FCC; industry participant interviews
Key modeling assumptions (yyyy) PRELIMINARY
‘Trouble Then ‘Return to Old

‘New Normal’
Key levers Recovery’ Paradigm’
• MHS and PPU return almost to
• MHS market prices down x-x% • MHS market prices down x-x%
’xx highs
from ’xx, varying by geography from ‘xx geographies
- MHS prices down x% from
Pricing trends • PPU market prices down x-xx% • PPU market prices down x-x% ’xx highs
- PPU prices down x% from
across services from ’xx, varying by geography from ’xx, varying by geography
’xx highs
• Jura feels xx% of reduction • Jura feels xx% of reduction
• Jura feels xx% of reduction
impact impact
impact
• Jura gains x-x% share across
Ability to win PPU • Jura gains x%+ share in North • Jura gains x-x% share in North
geographies except Australia,
share from BH/HAL Sea and GOM, elsewhere x-x% Sea and GOM, elsewhere x-x%
where share down x%
Stability of spend
• MHS and hydraulics share • MHS and hydraulics share
and ability to down x%
• MHS and hydraulics share flat
grows x%
expand in ‘core’ • PPU share grows x%
• PPU share maintained • PPU share grows x%
offshore Europe
Opportunity in • xx.x% capture of Australian

• xx.x% capture of Australian
• x% capture of Australian OPEX market (convert current
Australia for LNG OPEX market
OPEX market (convert current
CAPEX projects and win x
OPEX CAPEX projects into OPEX)
additional train)
• US LNG CAPEX market size £x • US LNG CAPEX market size £x • US LNG CAPEX market size £x
in yyyy as currently committed in yyyy as currently committed in yyyy as currently committed
Opportunity in facilities finish pre-comm; xx% facilities finish pre-comm; xx% facilities finish pre-comm; xx%
US PPU market capture of maintenance market capture of maintenance market capture of maintenance market
• .x% capture of onshore oil & • x% capture of onshore oil & • x.x% capture of onshore oil &
gas transmission market gas transmission market gas transmission market
• Jura share flat across most • Jura gains share in many (but • Jura gains share in line with
Other growth regions and business lines; not all) regions and business management forecasts in many
assumptions select business lines concede lines, but more moderate (but not all) regions and
share to competitors growth than mgmt forecasts business lines
Source: Jura internal data; AT Kearney VDD; Simmons CIM; Bain analysis
Utilizing two scenarios (WF and GS), key assumptions
flex across reasonable sensitivity bounds
B
Wells Fargo Goldman Sachs
• Based off of IHS well count forecasts • Based off GS proprietary build-up of global projects database and global
supply/demand model
• Most representative of “industry consensus” view
• Key assumptions: • Most bullish view of NA activity outlook among leading xrd party sources
- Moderate WTI price appreciation and slow recovery in US production/rig • Key assumptions:
count signals challenging environment for US unconventional - Minimal WTI price appreciation (even downward trend past ‘xx) combined
development; likely that US unconventional is “marginal barrel” that with booming US production/rig counts signals competitive shift for NA
balances market unconventional production economics relative to other sources of supply
- Scenario potentially assumes OPEC growth, pricing recovery in OFSE, low- - Shift likely aided by continuously competitive OFSE market, unconventional
to-moderate NA unconventional productivity improvements, and low global D&C innovation, and operational efficiencies amongst independent E&Ps
product demand
US ONSHORE OIL &

WTI PRICE US ONSHORE PRODUCTION LIQUIDS RIG COUNT
Note: WF: ’xx-’xx rig/well count extrapolated using ’xx production efficiencies and ’xx price and production levels extrapolated from ’xx-’xx growth; GS: ’xx-’xx rig/well count
extrapolated using ’xx production efficiencies
Source: Wells Fargo; Goldman Sachs
Preliminary US onshore unconventional well outlook
expected to grow at ~xx%-xx% p.a. from ’xx-’xx
B
WELLS FARGO: XX% GROWTH EXPECTED GOLDMAN SACHS: ~X% MORE BULLISH
PER YEAR TO YYYY FROM ’XX LOWS ON US ONSHORE WELL ACTIVITY BY YYYY
-xx% xx% -xx% xx%
Note: yyyy and yyyy GS/WF well counts extrapolated based on latest available well productivity and YoY US production growth rates; WF “Other Mid Con” includes Mississippian,
Granite Wash, and Fayetteville; GS “Other Mid Con” includes Arkoma Woodford, Mississippian, Granite Wash, Fayetteville; GS “Bakken” is synonymous with Williston well counts
Source: Bain Analysis; Goldman Sachs; Wells Fargo
Key activity outlook sensitivities are US onshore
production and well productivity
B
WELLS FARGO CASE
• Well productivity is determined by the amount of
Change in well productivity hydrocarbons expected to flow out of a well over the life
of the asset
-xx% -x% x% x% x% x% xx%
• US unconventional has been uniquely productive over
the last x-x years; benefiting from improvements in
Well productivity
drilling and completion technology and methodology
-xxx (x%) (x%) (xx%) (xx%) (xx%) (xx%) (xx%)
• As more “productive” wells come online, fewer wells are
needed to generate the same amount of production
• Looking to yyyy, future well productivity is uncertain as
Change in yyyy “new” production (Mbpd)
-xxx x% (x%) (x%) (x%) (x%) (xx%) (xx%) commodity prices recover, which may result in US
operators expanding from core acreage, utilizing less
efficient equipment and labor pools, and change how
they approach D&C activity
-xxx x% x% (x%) (x%) (x%) (x%) (xx%) • Therefore, the future of US drilling activity is relatively
variable, creating uncertainty for OFSE businesses (like
Tri Point) that depend on new well activity to drive their
yyyy business
+x xx% x% x% Well (x%) (x%) (xx%)
Count • NA onshore production makes a substantial portion of
global O&G supply, and is subject to market forces
“New” production levels

• US unconventional production is currently considered the
+xxx xx% x% x% x% x% (x%) (x%) “marginal” barrel as some portion of supply is
economical at current prices (>$xx/bbl) and some is not
• Future growth of US production to yyyy will be
determined based on the industry’s ability to continue
+xxx xx% xx% x% x% x% x% (x%) deflating its cost structure relative to other sources of
supply
• Therefore, it is important for industries dependent on US
production growth (and by default new well activity) to
+xxx xx% xx% xx% xx% x% x% x% understand how a changing “call” on US production will
effect their own market outlook
Note: Middle cell (+xMbpd and x% well productivity) represents yyyy estimated “new” production needed to come on-line by scenario
Source: Bain analysis; Wells Fargo; Goldman Sachs
Plausible scenarios for market and competitive PRELIMINARY
landscape meaningfully impact Wildfire outlook
YYYY: ‘HOME RUN’ CASE YYYY: ‘DOWNSIDE’ CASE

Revenue: $xxxM+ EBITDA: $xxM+ Revenue: <$xxxM EBITDA: <$xxM
• Oil prices recover and stabilize above $xx+ • Oil prices remain <$xx through yyyy and <$xx
by EOY yyyy as global liquids demand increases, through yyyy on stagnant or downward trending
driven by accelerated GDP growth in developing global demand
countries
• NA ESP demand is flat to down YoY through
• NA demand grows ~xx%+ YoY from ’xx-’xx yyyy, as new drilling and replacements stall;
on unconventional resurgence; international international demand falls ~x% on civil
demand grows x%+ YoY in focus markets on unrest in select countries and/or further OPEC
moderate activity uptick curtailment
• Pricing further deteriorates and remains
• Pricing recovers as ESP demand rebounds and
suppressed through yyyy as competitors compete
excess capacity is absorbed
fiercely to protect share
• In NA, Wildfire captures xx%+ share of • In NA, Wildfire captures <x% share of
Segments II/III and x-xx% of Segment I Segments II/III and <x% of Segment I,
as competition refocuses on D&C and several struggling to gain scale (even at marginal
small acquisitions provide inventory and economics) with competitors refocused on
accelerated market share service; acquisitions are unattractive
• Internationally, Wildfire captures xx%+ • Internationally, Wildfire captures <x%
share in focus markets by leveraging share in focus markets due to weaker than
relationships to gain trial in ~x new market per expected relationships and entrenched players
year and capture share from entrenched willing to compromise margins to defend market
competition share
Wildfire success varies according to both company
performance and market conditions PRELIMINARY
BULL BASE BEAR

Revenue exceeds $xxxM Revenue approaches $xxxM Revenue less than $xxxM
on strong market growth on sluggish market growth on down NA market;
and share gains and competitive NA aggressive int’l focus
• Aggressively look to gain share • Selectively look to gain share in • Deprioritize soft NA market
in NA to benefit from the rapid best-positioned NA basins to where competitors refocus on
recovery; these efforts are ensure defensive positioning service and slash prices to
aided by a growing ESP market during market recovery retain share
and a broader OFS recovery
(which distracts larger • Gain share with Segment II & • Gain small share with Segment
competitors) III primarily through organic II & III exclusively through
growth, potentially acquiring a organic growth, avoiding
• Gain share with Segment II & unattractive acquisitions tied to
few mom-and-pop players with
III through a combination of poorly positioned E&P’s
well-positioned customers
organic and non-organic growth
• Gain trial with a few Segment I
• Gain trial with Segment I, build • Gain trial with a few Segment I
customers and potentially
a reputation for reliability, and players, and by limiting
convert one or two customers
convert a few Segment I reliability issues convert one or
by yyyy
customers two customers by yyyy
• Aggressively look to gain share
• Initially deprioritize int’l, then • Split initial focus between NA internationally due to market
selectively enter one country and int’l due to NA softness; resilience; enter two countries
per year from yyyy+ enter one country per year from in yyyy and one country per
yyyy year from yyyy+
• Scale up to reach industry norm
margins by yyyy
• Industry pricing and margins • Industry pricing and margins
• Industry pricing and margins recover over time, but not all deteriorate further and remain
recover to yyyy levels the way to yyyy levels suppressed to yyyy
UK apparel is forecasted to continue to grow with
slight population increase and inflation of x-x% p.a.
PRELIMINARY
POPULATION X SPEND PER CAPITA = RETAIL SALES
Forecast Forecast Forecast
Note: yyyy value estimated based on yyyy-yyyy CAGR; Spend and market size given at constant exchange rate in nominal values
Source: Euromonitor
On a per capita basis, popular global music acts
produce similar levels of fans in Germany and the UK
PRELIMINARY
# OF FACEBOOK LIKES PER X,XXX FACEBOOK USERS
logos
Growth rate %* x xx x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x -x -x x x x
Heavy Metal Rock Classic Rock Pop
*Growth rate is the number of net likes in the previous month, annualized over a one year period, divided by current size of fan base
Source: Socialbakers.com; Statista.com

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October xx, yyyy

VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

Deck and section summaries

Keystone Section frameworks

Disclaimer Don’t forget to

• No responsibility or liability whatsoever is accepted by any person including Bain &

VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

Deck and section summaries

Keystone Section frameworks

Week of x/xx Week of x/x Week of x/x

Verbal update: Phase x update

• Review high-level approach to analysis • Determine impact of key trends on

• Summarize preliminary findings from • Integrate findings into preliminary Deck

Week of x/x Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx

Verbal ‘Week x’ update: Verbal update x Final readout:

Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx

Kick-off: Working session: Final readout:

• Discuss market drivers • Discuss emerging • Review final assessment

Progress update: Interim update: Final update:

• Provide update on progress • Provide preliminary readout • Review Hurricane portfolio by

Progress update: Interim update: Final update:

Week of x/x Week of x/xx Week of x/xx Week of x/xx

Kick-off: Interim update: Verbal check-in Final readout:

Week of xx/x Week of xx/xx Week of x/x

Progress update: Interim update: Final update:

• Review high-level approach to • Identify core market drivers • Summarize Wildfire’s

Progress update: Interim update: Integrated readout:

• Provide update on • Share preliminary view on • Provide full readout on

from primary, including positioning in spotting

VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

Deck and section summaries

Keystone Section frameworks

PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

*Spoke with expert multiple times

PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

Primary research (N=x,xxx) Secondary research

Survey • ‘Rock’ company information • Publications of other market participants

PRIMARY RESEARCH (N=xx) SECONDARY SOURCES

PRIMARY INTERVIEWS COVERAGE EXAMPLE COMPANIES

Interviews completed to date: xx

• Software Engineer, Const. Supply Co

• Purchasing Manager, Distributor Government entities

search, opposition &

VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

Deck and section summaries

Keystone Section frameworks

PROGRESS TO DATE NEXT STEPS

• Drafted preliminary second survey focused • As agreed: Develop Canada market

• Gathered relevant secondary data for US;

 Who would be interested in buying

Positioning of Porcupine’s Stability of supply and

a supplier? • How well positioned is the

- Broad ERP players, particularly SAP

deployment flexibility of key competitors by interviews market size / dynamics by

VERBAL / PROGRESS INTERIM / WEEK X

Deck and section summaries

Keystone Section frameworks

SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS AGREEMENT

SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS AGREEMENT

SUMMARY KEY PROOF POINTS WHAT WE’RE LEARNING