Various Charts On Ethic Finals

Overview of Significant Ethical Approaches on how to
“find” Moral Truth:
I. Virtue Ethics
II. Plato
III. Aristotle
IV. Misconceptions Regarding Virtue Ethics
V. John Dewey
VI. Kant
VII. Social Contract Ethics
VIII. Utilitarianism
IX. John Stuart Mill
X. Rule vs. Act Utilitarianism
XI. Act Utilitarianism
XII. Kantian Utilitarianism (R. M. Hare)
XIII. G. E. Moore’s Utilitarianism
XIV. Intuitionism
XV. Ethical Relativism
XVI. Moral Realism
XVII. Care Ethics
XVIII. F. Nietzsche
XIX. David Hume
XX. John Rawls
Welcome to Ethics
Unless your faculties aren’t working
properly, you have an interest in ethics
and the reason why is simple:
Ethics is about what is right and

what is wrong and how can we tell the
difference.
Consider the following questions:
 What does it mean to be moral?
 What are human beings really like: selfish, greedy, noble, or

good?
 Are some people “better” at being good than others? If so, how
and why?
 What does it mean to be good?
 Are there good ways of teaching children to behave morally?
 Does anyone have the right to tell anyone else what is right from
wrong?
 What is human nature?

Consider the following questions:
 Why should I be a good person? What does it mean to be a good
person?
 Is morality about obeying a set of rules or is it about thinking

carefully about consequences?
 When people say “cannibalism is wrong”, do they know it is

wrong or just believe it very strongly?
 Are there certain kinds of acts that are always wrong (e.g.,
torturing children, beating up your mother, lying)?
 Is it okay to ever break a law?
 Is it wrong to enjoy hurting others?
 Are human beings essentially good or essentially wicked?

How do you find
ethical, moral truth? Plato & Kant say the power of
Jainism says ascetic reason
control/suppression of all
feelings. Sir W. D. Ross says intuitions
H. Utilitarians say we discover

Virtue Ethics says in a virtuous
the right act calculating the
character whereby a person is
able to realize the crucial
balance of pleasure over pain
potentialities that constitute
human excellence. It’s focus is Nonobject. say there is no truth
on the person rather than the act.
Care Ethics: Narrative of Social contract theorists say
relationships that extend through ethical principles are made, not
time.
found, constructed by social
groups, and exists for the
Natural/Special Revelation benefit of those groups.
from God
Overview of Ethical Systems: Virtue Ethics:
Rather than focusing on what we ought to do, Virtue ethics offers a distinctive approach
whereby we focus on human character asking the question, “What should I be?” Thus, ethical
life involves envisioning ideals for human life and embodying those ideals in one’s life. Virtues
are ways in which we embody those ideals.
Virtue is an Aristotle says there Plato (c.427-347c): Plato (c. 427-347) is concerned with the quality of
a person’s inner state & he prized beauty,
excellence of are 2 types of virtue: To be virtuous we must
health, harmony, & strength of a soul as the
intellectual virtues: understand what
some sort. virtues we should emulate.
contributes to our
Originally the excellences of the overall good & have Aristotle (384-322): The function of man is
word meant mind (e.g., ability to our desire (appetitive; reason (the good of the thing is when it
workers), spirit performs its function well) which is peculiar
“strength” understand, reason, & (warriors), & reason to him. Thus, the function of man is reason
and referred judge well); (ruler-guardians) and the life that is distinctive of humans is
to as educated properly so the life in accordance with reason. If the
moral virtues: they will aggregate with function of man is reason, then the good
“manliness.” learned by repetition the guidance provided man is the man who reasons well This is the
In Aristotle’s (e.g., practicing by the rational part of life of excellence (eudaimonia; human
ethics (arete) honesty we become the soul (Books 2 & 3 flourishing & well-being).
of Republic). When
is used which honest. To be virtuous G.E.M. Anscombe (1919-2001) argues we can’t
these 3 parts of the soul
is trans. as rely on moral obligation using a non-
requires knowledge, conflict with each other,
religious ethic but we can rely on the Greek
“excellences practice, & consistent it might move us to act
notion of excellence because it is tied to
in ways that go against
of various effort at character well-being & appropriateness to the kind of
the greater good
types.” building. (become incontinent).
things we are.
Philippa Foot (1920-) ethical naturalist, grounds
Aristotle: “Must have knowledge, second he must choose
the virtues in what is good for human
the acts and choose them for their own sakes, & beings; the virtues are beneficial to their
finally his actions must proceed from a firm possessor or to the community; virtues are
valuable because they contribute to it.
character” (1105a).
Basic Framework of Virtue Ethics:
Premise 1: An action is right iff it is what a
virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.
Premise 1a: A virtuous agent is one who acts

virtuously, i.e., one who has and exercises the
virtues.
Premise 2: A virtue is a character trait a human

being needs to flourish or live well.
3 Central Concepts:
 Though there are several modern versions of
virtue ethics, most models have their roots in
ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of
three concepts derived from it:
1. arête (excellence or virtue);

2. phronesis (practical or moral wisdom);
3. eudaimonia (usually translated as human)
flourishing; successful living)
Consider the following quote:
“We are discussing no small matter, but how
we ought to live.”
~ Socrates in Plato’s Republic

Overview of Ethical Systems: Plato (427-347 B.C.)
Plato believed our natural desires are greedy and depraved. Thus, they must
be held in tight check by the powers of reason. He compared the human soul to
a city-state made up of ruler-guardians, guardians, and the peasants/artisans.
Every reality is an archetype of a corresponding eternal form. The goal of life is to
actualize one’s true nature together with one’s many innate potentialities.
4 primary So long as the If reason for The highest good is

integrated individual is a moment the well-ordered
virtues: governed by lets down its whole to which
Wisdom: the power of guard, then each part
corresponds to reason, and the desires contributes
reason; courage: reason is will exert according to its
corresponds to assisted by their power, own capacity. A
the will: courage and seize control, thing in reality is
temperance, will power and lead the good insofar as it
corresponds to (guardians), person to participates in &
desire: justice: the unruly corruption corresponds to the
links individual desires can be and form of the good
to society. suppressed. immorality. (which is the high
point of the forms).
Essential Terms for Plato:
1. teleology: "everything in the universe has a proper function to perform within a harmonious
hierarchy of purposes"
2. reason: the intellectual component of the soul: "calculates, measures and decides"
3. spirit: "structural element of the soul"; this is our passionate side that desires honor, glory,
and respect
4. appetite: the part of the soul that desires things that help us to satisfy our biological and
material desires
5. moral balance: situation in which reason governs the soul guarding against the excesses of
spirit and appetite.
6. class system: In Plato's Republic, a way of dividing individuals into different social groups
based on their talents. There are three classes: philosopher-kings (rulers [reason] ),
auxiliaries (guardians [spirit]) who serve as warriors, and a combination of craftsmen,
artisans, and traders who are driven mostly by appetite.
7. just society: a society that functions harmoniously by allowing each individual to do the
work suited to his/her talents.
8. philosopher kings: rulers in Plato's just society from the Republic
9. guardian class: warriors in Plato's just society from the Republic

Main Points to Know:
 Plato writes dialogues rather than philosophical
treatises. Hence, most of his philosophical
positions are voiced through the character of
Socrates. Even though Socrates was Plato's
actual teacher, the positions and doctrines
traditionally attributed to Socrates are actually
Plato's account of his teacher. Socrates never
wrote anything.
 Plato advances a teleological conception of

morality, "we live the good life insofar as we
perform our distinctively human function well."
 The soul is divided into three parts: appetitive,
spirit, and reason. Each part helps us to fulfill
critical needs, but in Plato's view, only the
rational part of the soul is fit to rule.
 In order to live a virtuous life, it is necessary for

the individual to cultivate balance in his/her soul.
Thus, persons ruled by appetite or spirit
(emotion) are "out of balance" and their actions
are apt to provoke personal or social
disharmony.
 Appetite: In cases where appetite rules (oligarchic and

tyrannical characters fit here) individuals are at the mercy
of the their biological or material whims. Alcohol addiction
fits this profile. Individuals who are addicted to self-
destructive patterns of behavior are apt to feed their
appetites at the expense of other life pursuits. People
can also be ruled by material greed in much the same
way. The key here is that desire is determinative; these
are cravings of the highest degree.
 Spirit: The emotional, passionate side of our

character is centered on the idea of status on a
social level. Ambition, desire for honor and glory,
moral indignation, and cravings for admiration,
all fit under the umbrella of spirit. Love
relationships fit into this category as well. Our
interactions with others provide core experiences
that influence our emotional development.
 Reason: The intellectual, thinking part of the soul
that must weigh options, decide between
alternatives, and "suppress dangerous urges.“
Plato clearly puts reason in control of the soul
because it acts as good counsel seeking
understanding and insight before acting. Rational
individuals possess a strong contemplative
faculty. They think before they act and are
unlikely to take rash action in any given situation.
Know Thyself:
 Plato contends that each one of us performs/does one thing best.
We each have one best skill and it is the development of this skill
that is of paramount importance in creating a harmonious existence.
If we do not have insight into what we do best, the chances of
achieving a balanced soul are likely reduced. Hence the Socratic
imperative, "know thyself."
 Just Society: First ask yourself: is it possible to have a just society?

What would it look like? How would we direct education, the
economy, leisure, and social resources? What is fair?
 Plato wrestles with the idea of justice in his most famous work
entitled, The Republic.
Plato views social justice exactly parallels his notion of
individual justice. There are three parts of the soul and three
corresponding divisions in the social order. The social order is
constructed as follows:
SOUL SOCIETY
Reason Philosopher-King
Spirit Auxiliaries/Guardians
Appetite Craftsmen/Artisans/Traders
Three Elements in the Soul that are distinguished
by their functions, goal, and activities:
 Reason-calculation calculates: calculation is concerned with
the good (i.e., with the best course of action);
 Appetite-Desire desires: Desire is concerned with pleasure;
 Spirit gets spirited: spirit reacts to perceived slights or wrong.
When you revisit these elements in Books 8-8, they no longer

look like faculties (as they did in book 4); they now seem more
like drives. The desiring element is specified as the drive
toward material satisfaction; spirit as the drive to win and to
amount to something; calculation as the drive to discover truth.
Interestingly…
By Book 9 the calculative element has a goal of its own: seeks wisdom.
“Wisdom is a good, of course, arguably the highest good. But this element
seeks wisdom because it is wisdom, not because it is good. It has turned
out to be the philosophical element in the soul. For this reason we should
not be content for the calculative element merely to supervise within us, not
if we want to be happy. Its natural passion is directed at something different
and better than this. Certainly, it is better that this element in each person
should be supervisor than that it should fall under the control of the other
elements of the soul and be reduced to a tool in their service, as described
in Books 8 and 9. But although it is appropriate that the calculative element
should supervise the others (44Ie), this is not what it loves to do. As the
philosophical element in the soul, it takes on the job of ruling the soul with a
reserve comparable in some respects to that with which philosophers take
on the job of ruling the city. Even with the soul, ruling is work….the
philosophical element is divine and immortal, the other elements are mortal
and animal, and only the necessity of incarnation thrusts them together.”
~ Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, “Three-Part Soul” by G. R. F.

Ferrari, pg. 166.
An Ideal City
 Plato attempts to show that on justice is so great a good that it is worth any
sacrifice. He portrays an ideal political community: there we will see justice
writ large, and so we will be better able to find justice in the individual soul.
An ideal city must make radical innovations. It should be ruled by specially
trained philosophers, since their understanding of the Form of the Good will
give them greater insight into everyday affairs. Their education is compared
to that of a prisoner who, having once gazed upon nothing but shadows in
the artificial light of a cave, is released from bondage, leaves the cave,
eventually learns to see the sun, and is thereby equipped to return to the
cave and see the images there for what the are. Everything in the rulers’
lives is designed to promote their allegiance to the community: they are
forbidden private possessions, their sexual lives are regulated by eugenic
considerations, and they are not to know who their children art. Positions of
political power are open to women, since the physical differences between
them and men do not in all cases deprive them of the intellectual or moral
capacities needed for political office. The works of poets are to be carefully
regulated, for the false moral notions of the traditional poets have had a
powerful and deleterious impact on the general public. Philosophical
reflection is to replace popular poetry as the force that guides moral
education.
An Ideal City
 What makes this city ideally just is the
dedication of each of its components to
one task for which it is naturally suited and
specially trained. The rulers are ideally
equipped to rule; the soldiers are best able
to enforce their commands; and the
economic class, composed of farmers,
craftsmen, builders, etc. are content to do
their work and to leave the tasks of making
and enforcing the laws to others.
What makes the soul of person just?
What makes the soul of a human being just is the same

principle: each of its components must properly perform
its own task. The part of us that is capable of
understanding and reasoning is the part that must rule;
the assertive part that makes us capable of anger and
competitive spirit must give our understanding the force
it needs; and our appetites for food and sex must be
trained so that they seek only those objects that reason
approves. It is not enough to educate someone’s
reasons, for unless the emotions and appetites are
properly trained they will overpower it. Just individuals
are those who have fully integrated these elements of
the soul.
What makes the soul of person just?
Just individuals are those who have fully integrated

these elements of the soul. They do not unthinkingly
follow a list of rules; rather, their just treatment of others
flow from their own balanced psychological condition.
And the paradigm of a just person is a philosopher, for
reason rules when it becomes passionately attached to
the most intelligible object there are: the Forms (which
are eternal, changeless, and imperceptible). It emerges
that justice pays because attachment to these supremely
valuable objects is part of what true justice of the soul is.
The worth of our lives depends on the worth of objects to
which we devote ourselves. Those who think that
injustice pays assume that wealth, domination, or the
pleasures of the physical appetite are supremely
valuable; their mistake lies in their limited conception of
what sorts of objects are worth loving.
The Forms:
1. Phaedo is the first dialogue in which Plato decisively posits the
existence of the abstract objects that he often called “Forms” or
“Ideas”-which exist independently of thought (eidos and idea).
2. Forms are eternal, changeless, and incorporeal. Since they are

imperceptible we can come to have knowledge of them only through
thought.
a. Beautiful roses is not Beauty itself.

b. What every rose has in common with every other is that it
bears a certain relationship-called “participation”-to one
and the same thing, the Form of Beauty. Thus, what
makes roses beautiful is the unchanging
Form-beauty.
3. For Plato the Forms are not merely an unusual item to be added to
our list of existing objects. Rather, they are a source of inspiration
and their discovery is a decisive turning point in one’s life.
Example from Symposium: Love.
According to Diotima’s account, those who are in
love are searching for something they do not yet
understand; whether they realize it or not, they
seek the eternal possession of the good, and
they can obtain it only through productive activity
of some sort. Physical love perpetuates the
species and achieves a lower form of
immortality, but a more beautiful kind of offspring
is produced by those who govern cities and
shape the moral characteristics of future
generations.
Example from Symposium: Love.
 Best of all is the kind of love that eventually attaches
itself to the Form of Beauty, since this is the most
beautiful of objects and provides the greatest happiness
to the lover. One develops a love for this Form by
ascending through various stages of emotional
attachment and understanding. Beginning with an
attraction to the beauty of one person’s body, one
gradually develops an appreciation for the beauty
present in all other beautiful bodies; then one’s
recognition of the beauty in people’s souls takes on
increasing strength, and leads to a deeper attachment to
the beauty of customs, laws, and systems of knowledge;
and this process of emotional growth and deepening
insight culminates in the discovery of the eternal and
changeless beauty of Beauty itself.
Aristotle Rejection of Plato:
 Plato’s chief contribution consists in his conception of the

observable world as an imperfect image of a realm of
unobservable and unchanging “Forms,” and his
conception of the best life as one centered on the love of
these divine objects.
 Aristotle rejects Plato’s transcendental Form of the Good

as irrelevant to the affairs of persons, and in general,
had little sympathy with the notion of the absolute good.
Rather, the goal of choice and action is the human good,
namely, living well.
Aristotle Rejection of Plato:
Plato’s general theory of knowledge, i.e., the “theory of forms”
has much in common with the theories of innate ideas. What
is known, at the highest and most general level, is a collection
of objects, with which we have all had direct acquaintance
prior to birth (the “forms” or “ideas”). All of us, therefore,
may have some inkling of general truths; but only those whose
rational capacities are especially well developed-in short,
philosophers-can fully reactivate their memories.
Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory of knowledge. He locates the

source of ethical insight in experience of life itself. Aristotle
argues that we need to know how to act, possess practical
wisdom (have an “eye” for solutions)—and that can only be
developed through a combination of training in the right habits
and direct acquaintance with practical situations.
Aristotle’s Differences with Plato:
 Read in this way, Aristotle is engaged in a project
similar in some respects to the one Plato carried out
in the Republic. One of Plato's central points is that it
is a great advantage to establish a hierarchical
ordering of the elements in one's soul; and he shows
how the traditional virtues can be interpreted to
foster or express the proper relation between reason
and less rational elements of the psyche. Aristotle's
approach is similar: his “function argument” shows in
a general way that our good lies in the dominance of
reason, and the detailed studies of the particular
virtues reveal how each of them involves the right
kind of ordering of the soul.
 Aristotle's goal is to arrive at conclusions similar to
Plato's, but without relying on the Platonic metaphysics
that plays a central role in the argument of the Republic.
He rejects the existence of Plato's forms in general and
the form of the good in particular; and he rejects the idea
that in order to become fully virtuous one must study
mathematics and the sciences, and see all branches of
knowledge as a unified whole. Even though Aristotle's
ethical theory sometimes relies on philosophical
distinctions that are more fully developed in his other
works, he never proposes that students of ethics need to
engage in a specialized study of the natural world, or
mathematics, or eternal and changing objects. His
project is to make ethics an autonomous field, and to
show why a full understanding of what is good does not
require expertise in any other field.
 There is another contrast with Plato that should be
emphasized: In Book II of the Republic, we are told that
the best type of good is one that is desirable both in itself
and for the sake of its results (357d-358a). Plato argues
that justice should be placed in this category, but since it
is generally agreed that it is desirable for its
consequences, he devotes most of his time to
establishing his more controversial point—that justice is
to be sought for its own sake. By contrast, Aristotle
assumes that if A is desirable for the sake of B, then B is
better than A (1094a14-16); therefore, the highest kind of
good must be one that is not desirable for the sake of
anything else.
 To show that A deserves to be our ultimate end, one
must show that all other goods are best thought of as
instruments that promote A in some way or other.
Accordingly, it would not serve Aristotle's purpose to
consider virtuous activity in isolation from all other
goods. He needs to discuss honor, wealth, pleasure, and
friendship in order to show how these goods, properly
understood, can be seen as resources that serve the
higher goal of virtuous activity. He vindicates the
centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in
the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live
a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the
like.
 Virtuous activity makes a life happy not by guaranteeing
happiness in all circumstances, but by serving as the
goal for the sake of which lesser goods are to be
pursued. Aristotle's methodology in ethics therefore pays
more attention than does Plato's to the connections that
normally obtain between virtue and other goods. That is
why he stresses that in this sort of study one must be
satisfied with conclusions that hold only for the most part
(1094b11-22). Poverty, isolation, and dishonor are
normally impediments to the exercise of virtue and
therefore to happiness, although there may be special
circumstances in which they are not. The possibility of
exceptions does not undermine the point that, as a rule,
to live well is to have sufficient resources for the pursuit
of virtue over the course of a lifetime.
1. Difference over what is virtue and vice.
Aristotle differs with Plato’s notion (early dialogues) that

virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice is nothing
more but a lack of knowledge.
The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states

as hexeis is his decisive rejection of that thesis. Aristotle
insists that virtues differ from crafts and all branches of
knowledge for they involve appropriate emotional responses
rather than pure intellectual conditions.
Some Similarities between Plato & Aristotle:
Aristotle sees the human body as complex of soul and body

whereas Plato sees souls temporarily united with bodies (Plato),
they are like other things in the world for they have a “function”
or “activity” which is peculiar to them.
The good life, eudaimonia, will consist in the successful

performance of that function.
Nothing can perform its peculiar function successfully unless it

possess the relevant “arete”, i.e., unless it is good of its kind
(two platonic examples: the only horses that will be able to win
races; the only pruning-knives which can successfully be used
to cut vines-will be good ones).
For both Plato and Aristotle the content of arete depends on

some prior notion of what it is to be human.
What is the function of human beings and what is
the arete which relates to that?
1. Plato’s answers are, respectively,

“governing and the like” (i.e., the
governing of the soul by its union with
the body), and “justice.”
2. “An active life of that which possesses

reason, and the best of the “arete.”
Overview of Ethical Systems:
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.):
Though we are naturally suited to moral goodness,
we don’t automatically develop such inclinations
Your Carefully cultivate moral Ideal of virtue is doing the
habits & goodness by rigorous right thing because you
inclination practice. want to do the right thing:
s develop
you desire to act virtuously.
with
practice; In order to desire to act
what you virtuously you must If you act selfishly then you
sow is carefully and consistently will become a selfish person.
what you practice doing right until it Eventually what feels right
reap. becomes habitual & natural. to you may be very wrong.
With practice & diligence you can develop Thus, choose to be

the habits & inclinations of a virtuous virtuous. Desire +
person. judgment must agree.
Closer Look at Virtue:
 “A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency
to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully
specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait.
It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is
well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say
"goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-
drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a
single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest
actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with
many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional
reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes,
interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is
to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset.
(Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the
basis of a single action)” ~ Stanford Encyclopedia
Why do you want to be happy?
 For Aristotle, the ultimate aim of the best life is eudaimonia. If
someone asks why you want to go to college, buy a car, or get a
divorce, it makes sense to answer that you are doing these things as
part of a long-term plan to achieve happiness. But if someone asks
why you want to be happy, there is no answer because happiness is
not a means to anything further. Happiness is valuable solely for its
own sake. Now, the claim that everything else is valued for the sake
of happiness is somewhat more controversial:
 Mill agrees with Aristotle, but Kant thinks that duty is desirable solely for
its own sake.
 There is much disagreement about what “happiness” is. Some people

think happiness is sensual pleasure; others think it is wealth, honor,
good action, or contemplation.
Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?
What is a virtue?
A virtue is a habit of excellence, a beneficial tendency, a skilled

disposition that enables a person to realize the crucial potentialities
that constitute proper human flourishing (eudaimonia).
What is a habit? A disposition to think, feel, desire, and act in a

certain way without having a tendency to consciously will to do so.
What is a character: The sum-total of one’s habits, tendencies, and

well-being.
Four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, prudence, and justice.

Piety (reverence to the gods) is sometimes considered a fifth virtue.
On Becoming Agathos & Eudaimon
From Aristotle’s Point of View:
Cited from Michael Boylan, Basic Ethics (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 52.
Step 1: Master the functional requirements within a given type of task or

behavior.
Step 2: Possess the habitual mastery of the functional requirements to an

appropriate degree.
Step 3: Steps 1 & 2: excellence in that task or behavior.
Step 4: Possess habitual excellence in a number of key tasks or behavior.
Step 5: Possess habitual excellence in those tasks or behavior that the

common opinion judges to be the most worthy.
Step 6: Steps 4 & 5 leads to agathos.
Step 7: Possessing Agathos leads to eudaimon.
Thus, on balance, excellent traits in human character generally produce excellent

actions.
What is Virtue:
 Aristotle characterizes virtue as follows:
Virtue, then, is a state of character,

concerned with choice, lying in a mean,
i.e., the mean relative to us, this being
determined by principle, that principle by
which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it (1106b-1107).
 The good for man, then, is activity in accordance with virtue or the highest
virtue. Just like the excellence of an lies in cutting, a thing’s excellence is a
master of how well it performs its characteristic functions or, we might say,
how well it realizes it nature.
 The natural functions of persons reside in their exercise of their natural

cognitive faculties, most importantly, the faculty of reason. So human
happiness consistence in activity in accordance with reason. However,
persons can exercise reason in practical or in purely theoretical matters. The
first suggest that happiness consists in the practical life of moral virtue, the
second that is consists in the life of theoretical activity.
 Most of Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to moral virtues but final book

appears to favor theoretical activity (theoria) as the highest and most choice-
worthy end. It is man’s closest approach to divine activity.
 The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary
desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.
Character:
When Aristotle says that a virtuous person’s virtuous acts
proceed from a firm character, he means to distinguish virtue
from other sorts of character. Consider…
1. The acts of a virtuous person do not arise out of some quirk of
circumstances. Rather, a virtuous person’s acts are typical of
that person because virtue is his/her set of habits of passion,
desire, pleasure, thoughts, & the like. Therefore, he/she is not
out-of-character. In other words, the virtuous person can be
counted on to perform such acts.
Character
3. The acts are not the result of outside pressure or persuasion but
come instead from within the person.
4. The act should not be performed by an effort of will against
temptation. The virtuous person is not conflicted-not pulled
one way be desire and another by duty. He or she is in
harmony with himself or herself. Thus even though the
continent person is reliably good and internally motivated,
his/her act does not “proceed from a firm character.”
Consider the following chart of 6 different types of character:

Aristotle’s Descriptions of the Various Sorts of Characters:
Character Passion/Desires Principles/Choices Choices
Heroically virtuous very right very right very right

Virtuous right right right
Continent wrong right right
Incontinent wrong right wrong
Vicious wrong wrong wrong
Brutish very wrong very wrong very wrong
1. Heroic person possesses supererogatory virtue, acting & feeling even better than ordinary virtuous
people
2. Virtuous person has right passions & desires, makes right choices based on right principles, &
reliably performs right acts.
3. The continent person overcomes temptation by will power. He has wrong passions & desires but
makes right choices & performs right acts.
4. The incontinent: fails to overcome temptation because of weakness of will: he has wrong passions
& desires & makes right choices but performs wrong acts (1150a15).
5. The vicious & brutish characters need no further explanation.
Character:
 Aristotle goes onto characterize virtue
further when he states [1106b-1107]:
Virtue, then is a state of character

concerned with choice, lying in a mean,
i.e., the mean relative to us, this being
determined by a rational principle, that
principle by which the man of practical
wisdom would determine it.
Character:
 A State of Character is a set of:
1. Habits,
2. Passion,
3. Pleasure,
4. Thoughts, &
5. the like.
Thus to say that virtue is a a state of character is to say that a

virtuous person not only reliably performs virtuous acts but also feels
the right passions, desires the right objects, enjoys the right things,
and holds the right beliefs in the each situation.
Consider the following example…

Character:
A courageous person will not only stand firm in
battle but will also feel the right amoun of fear
and confidence and have the right goals. He will
not be thinking, “I can’t run because I am so
terrified that my legs are off-line, and besides if I
stand firm, I may get to appear on CNN.”
Instead, he will be thinking, “The situation is
perilous, but I have a reasonable chance of
surviving if I keep alert, and besides I must stand
firm to keep my city free. It is the brave thing to
do.”
Character:
Is Aristotle demanding an unreasonably high level of perfection from
his virtuous person?
1. Virtue is a matter of degree and Aristotle is sketching a perfect

virtue. He is describing an ideal person so that we can have a
mark at which to aim and a standard for judgment.
2. A person can be reasonably less than ideal and still be a

virtuous person.
The bottom line is that your passions and desires are under your
control. To be sure, you can’t change them quickly or easily, but over
time you can modify your passions and desires. In fact, Aristotle says
that you should use your reason to determine which passions and
desires to have and then go on to develop these passions and desires.
You should cultivate a taste for virtue, just as some people cultivate a
taste for gourmet coffee (1113a-1114b).
Relationship between Virtue and Vice:
Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “hexis” (“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a
tendency or disposition, induced by our habits, to have appropriate feelings
(1105b25-6).
Defective states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis) as well, but they are
tendencies to have inappropriate feelings.
The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states as hexeis is his

decisive rejection of the thesis, found throughout Plato's early dialogues, that virtue
is nothing but a kind of knowledge and vice nothing but a lack of knowledge.
Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the virtues
(and similarly between physical health and eudaimonia), he insists that the virtues
differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve
appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions.
 Every ethical virtue is a condition intermediate between two other

states, one involving excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26-
b28).
1. Virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled

worker knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a
condition intermediate between two extremes.
2. For example, the courageous person, for example, judges that

some dangers are worth facing and others not, and
experiences fear to a degree that is appropriate to his
circumstances. He lies between the coward, who flees every
danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person,
who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or
no fear.
2. Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every

ethical virtue: all are located on a map that places the virtues
between states of excess and deficiency.
3. The mean is to be determined in a way that takes into account

the particular circumstances of the individual (1106a36-b7).
Example: The arithmetic mean between 10 and 2 is 6, and this

is so invariably, whatever is being counted. But the
intermediate point that is chosen by an expert in any of the
crafts will vary from one situation to another. There is no
universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete
should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10
lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I should eat
6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given situation is not a
mechanical or thoughtless procedure, but requires a full and
detailed acquaintance with the circumstances
Virtue
(courage) People
Degree
Vice
(cowardice)
Duration
Vice
(Rashness)
Objects
Occasions
Brutish
A Character Trait is a Virtue IFF it is conducive to eudaimonia
Virtue Excess Deficiency Sphere
Courage Rashness Cowardice Danger

Temperance Self-indulgence Insensibility Sensual pleasure
Liberality Wasteful Stinginess Money
Magnificence Vulgarity Penny pinching Great wealth
Pride Vanity Humility Honor & self-respect
Right Ambition Overly ambitious Lack of ambition Honor
Good temper No emotion Quick-temper Insult
Ready wit Buffoonishness Boorishness Humor
Truthfulness Boastfulness Modesty Self-description
Friendliness Flattery Quarrelsome Social association
Shame Bashfulness Pretense Wrongdoing
Righteous Spite Envy Fortune of others
Justice Greed ? Scarce goods
How does Aristotle Know which Traits are
Virtues?
 It is not by uncritical adoption of values of his
time for Aristotle is quite critical of certain
institutions within society (e.g., slavery) & is
willing to state that certain traits are virtues/vices
even though they have not been previously been
identified as such by his society.
 Aristotle says that a character trait is a virtue IFF

it is conducive to leading the happy life
(eudaimonia).
Relationship between Virtue and
Vice:
 It should be evident that Aristotle's treatment of virtues as mean
states endorses the idea that we should sometimes have strong
feelings—when such feelings are called for by our situation.
Sometimes only a small degree of anger is appropriate; but at other
times, circumstances call for great anger. The right amount is not
some quantity between zero and the highest possible level, but
rather the amount, whatever it happens to be, that is proportionate
to the seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle is committed
to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it
undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always
fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. But it
is possible to be very angry without going to this extreme, and
Aristotle does not intend to deny this.
2 Distinct Theories Regarding the Doctrine
of the Mean:
1st: There is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two
vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency.
2nd: There is the idea that whenever a virtuous person chooses to

perform a virtuous act, he can be described as aiming at an act that is in
some way or other intermediate between alternatives that he rejects. I
Second is more objectionable. A critic might concede that in some cases

virtuous acts can be described in Aristotle's terms. If, for example, one is trying
to decide how much to spend on a wedding present, one is looking for an
amount that is neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many other problems
that confront a virtuous agent are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis. If
one must decide whether to attend a wedding or respect a competing obligation
instead, it would not be illuminating to describe this as a search for a mean
between extremes—unless “aiming at the mean” simply becomes another
phrase for trying to make the right decision. The objection, then, is that Aristotle's
doctrine of the mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical agent does
when he deliberates, is in many cases inapplicable or unilluminating.
Vice:
 A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the virtuous person does after
all aim at a mean, if we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort of
aiming is involved. For example, consider a juror who must determine
whether a defendant is guilty as charged. He does not have before his mind
a quantitative question; he is trying to decide whether the accused
committed the crime, and is not looking for some quantity of action
intermediate between extremes. Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be
described as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct decision, seeks
to express the right degree of concern for all relevant considerations. He
searches for the verdict that results from a deliberative process that is
neither overly credulous or unduly skeptical. Similarly, in facing situations
that arouse anger, a virtuous agent must determine what action (if any) to
take in response to an insult, and although this is not itself a quantitative
question, his attempt to answer it properly requires him to have the right
degree of concern for his standing as a member of the community. He aims
at a mean in the sense that he looks for a response that avoids too much or
too little attention to factors that must be taken into account in making a
wise decision.
Vice:
 Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we ask how Aristotle determines
which emotions are governed by the doctrine of the mean. Consider
someone who loves to wrestle, for example. Is this passion something that
must be felt by every human being at appropriate times and to the right
degree? Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could
still live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we not say the same about
at least some of the emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of the
ethically virtuous agent? Why should we experience anger at all, or fear, or
the degree of concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle commends? These
are precisely the questions that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and
they came to the conclusion that such common emotions as anger and fear
are always inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the contrary, not simply that
these common passions are sometimes appropriate, but that it is essential
that every human being learn how to master them and experience them in
the right way at the right times. A defense of his position would have to
show that the emotions that figure in his account of the virtues are valuable
components of any well-lived human life, when they are experienced
properly. Perhaps such a project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself
does not attempt to do so.
Vice:
 He often says, in the course of his discussion, that when the good person
chooses to act virtuously, he does so for the sake of the “kalon”—a word
that can mean “beautiful,” “noble,” or “fine.” (See for example 1120a23-4.)
This term indicates that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction that is
comparable to the beauty of well-crafted artifacts, including such artifacts as
poetry, music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his discussion of the
mean, when he says that every craft tries to produce a work from which
nothing should be taken away and to which nothing further should be added
(1106b5-14). A craft product, when well designed and produced by a good
craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has such elements as balance,
proportion and harmony—for these are properties that help make it useful.
Similarly, Aristotle holds that a well-executed project that expresses the
ethical virtues will not merely be advantageous but kalon as well—for the
balance it strikes is part of what makes it advantageous. The young person
learning to acquire the virtues must develop a love of doing what is kalon
and a strong aversion to its opposite—the aischron, the shameful and ugly.
Determining what is kalon is difficult (1106b28-33, 1109a24-30, and the
normal human aversion to embracing difficulties helps account for the
scarcity of virtue (1104b10-11).
Vice:
 It should be clear that neither the thesis that virtues lie between
extremes nor the thesis that the good person aims at what is
intermediate is intended as a procedure for making decisions. These
doctrines of the mean help show what is attractive about the virtues,
and they also help systematize our understanding of which qualities
are virtues. Once we see that temperance, courage, and other
generally recognized characteristics are mean states, we are in a
position to generalize and to identify other mean states as virtues,
even though they are not qualities for which we have a name.
Aristotle remarks, for example, that the mean state with respect to
anger has no name in Greek (1125b26-7). Though he is guided to
some degree by distinctions captured by ordinary terms, his
methodology allows him to recognize states for which no names
exist.
Vice:
 So far from offering a decision procedure, Aristotle
insists that this is something that no ethical theory can
do. His theory elucidates the nature of virtue, but what
must be done on any particular occasion by a virtuous
agent depends on the circumstances, and these vary so
much from one occasion to another that there is no
possibility of stating a series of rules, however
complicated, that collectively solve every practical
problem. This feature of ethical theory is not unique;
Aristotle thinks it applies to many crafts, such as
medicine and navigation (1104a7-10). He says that the
virtuous person “sees the truth in each case, being as it
were a standard and measure of them” (1113a32-3); but
this appeal to the good person's vision should not be
taken to mean that he has an inarticulate and
incommunicable insight into the truth.
Vice:
 Aristotle thinks of the good person as someone who is
good at deliberation, and he describes deliberation as a
process of rational inquiry. The intermediate point that
the good person tries to find is “determined by logos
(“reason,” “account”) and in the way that the person of
practical reason would determine it” (1107a1-2). To say
that such a person “sees” what to do is simply a way of
registering the point that the good person's reasoning
does succeed in discovering what is best in each
situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in
the sense that his views should be regarded as
authoritative by other members of the community. A
standard or measure is something that settles disputes;
and because good people are so skilled at discovering
the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought
and heeded.
Vice:
 Although there is no possibility of writing a book of rules, however long, that
will serve as a complete guide to wise decision-making, it would be a
mistake to attribute to Aristotle the opposite position, namely that every
purported rule admits of exceptions, so that even a small rule-book that
applies to a limited number of situations is an impossibility. He makes it
clear that certain emotions (spite, shamelessness, envy) and actions
(adultery, theft, murder) are always wrong, regardless of the circumstances
(1107a8-12). Although he says that the names of these emotions and
actions convey their wrongness, he should not be taken to mean that their
wrongness derives from linguistic usage. He defends the family as a social
institution against the criticisms of Plato (Politics II.3-4), and so when he
says that adultery is always wrong, he is prepared to argue for his point by
explaining why marriage is a valuable custom and why extra-marital
intercourse undermines the relationship between husband and wife. He is
not making the tautological claim that wrongful sexual activity is wrong, but
the more specific and contentious point that marriages ought to be
governed by a rule of strict fidelity. Similarly, when he says that murder and
theft are always wrong, he does not mean that wrongful killing and taking
are wrong, but that the current system of laws regarding these matters
ought to be strictly enforced. So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot
be reduced to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some
rules are inviolable.
Aristotle’s Starting Point
 We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere
intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle
often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that
identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the
good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely
aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting
point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical
reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking
always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting
points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting
points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always
presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve;
and the task of reasoning is determine how that goal is to be accomplished.
(This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for
example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine
what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are
engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental
question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct
premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?
Aristotle’s Starting Point
 Aristotle replies: “Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things
leading to it” (1144a7-8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for
reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a
reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What
he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that
deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the
goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be
occasions when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning
with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often
what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting point—
helping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which
specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good
person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and
emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals
are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may
have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends—the skill Aristotle calls
cleverness (1144a23-8)—but often the ends they seek are worthless. The
cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to
reason—for we are assuming that they are normal in this respect—but in
the training of their passions.
 Nicomachean Ethics was written “not in order to know
what virtue is, but in order to become good.”
 The choices and actions will be free of the conflict &

pain that inevitably accompanies the aktratic and
enkratic agent. This is because the part of the soul that
governs choice and action is so disposed that desire
and right judgment coincide. Thus, acquiring a stable
disposition (hexis) of this sort amounts to acquiring
moral virtue (ethike arete). This disposition is
concerned with choices as would be determined by the
person of practical wisdom (phronesis); these will be
actions lying between extreme alternatives.
In the virtuous person, desire and judgment agree whereby the
choices and actions will be free of the conflict and pain that
inevitably accompany those who are akratic and/or enkratic:
The enkratic:
The akratic:
The enkratic is the
The akratic is the morally strong
morally weak person person who shares
who desires to do the akratic agent’s
other than what he desire to do other
knows ought to be than what he knows
done and acts on this ought to be done, but
desire against his acts in accordance
better judgment. with his better
judgment.
In neither kind of choice are desire and judgment in

Why does desire and judgment
agree for the virtuous?
 The reason why the choices and actions will be
free of the conflict and pain that inevitably
accompanies those of the akratic and enkratic
agent is because the part of their soul that
governs choice and action is so disposed that
desire and judgment coincide. The disposition is
concerned with choices as would be determined
by the person of practical wisdom (phronesis);
these will be actions lying between extreme
alternatives. They will lie in a man-popularly
called the “golden mean”-relative to the talents
and stores of the agent.
Why does desire and judgment
agree for the virtuous?
 Choosing in this way is not easily done. It involves, for
instance, feeling anger or extending generosity at the
right time, toward the right people, in the right way, and
for the right reasons. Intellectual virtues, such as
excellence at mathematics, can be acquired by teaching,
but moral virtues cannot. I may know what ought to be
done and even perform virtuous act without being able to
act virtuously. Nonetheless, because moral virtue is a
disposition concerning choice, deliberate performance of
virtuous acts can, ultimately, instill a disposition to
choose them in harmony and with pleasure, and hence,
to act virtuously.
What does it take to be fully virtuous?
The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desire;
possess practical wisdom (phronesis) which is the knowledge or understanding that
enables its possessor to do just that in any given situation. Most contend that
phronesis comes out of at least two sources:
1. Comes only with the experience of life. The virtuous are mindful of the
consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless,
thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?
2. They have the capacity to recognize some features of a situation as more

important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones.
The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with
their imperfect virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature
of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence
or justice.
These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who
understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly
advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well. In the Aristotelian
"eudaimonist" tradition, this is expressed in the claim that they have a true grasp of
eudaimonia.
What does it take to be fully
virtuous?
1. No struggle against contrary desires.
The fully virtuous do what they should without

a struggle against contrary desires; the
continent have to control a desire or temptation
to do otherwise. But if what makes it hard is an
imperfection in one’s character such (e.g.,
temptation to keep what is not yours or
indifference to those who are hurting), then it is
not.
What does it take to be fully
virtuous?
2. Practical Wisdom:
Practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that

enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do
just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of
what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has
not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are
becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress
the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be
applied correctly without practical wisdom, because correct
application requires situational appreciation — the capacity
to recognize, in any particular situation, those features of it
that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of
practical wisdom. Stated negatively, one can easily fall short
of full virtue is through lacking phronesis — moral or
practical wisdom
Eudaimonia:
 These aspects coalesce in the description
of the practically wise as those who
understand what is truly worthwhile, truly
important, and thereby truly advantageous
in life, who know, in short, how to live well.
In the Aristotelian "eudaimonist" tradition,
this is expressed in the claim that they
have a true grasp of eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia
 The concept of eudaimonia, a key term in ancient Greek moral
philosophy, is central to any modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and
usually employed even by virtue ethicists who deliberately divorce
themselves from Aristotle. It is standardly translated as "happiness" or
"flourishing" and occasionally as "well-being.“ Nevertheless, each
translation has certain disadvantages:
1. Eudaimonia = “flourishing” is that animals and plants can

flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings.
2. Eudaimonia = “happiness” is that connotes something which is

subjectively determined; I can deceive myself into thinking that I
have eudaimonia because I feel happy. In this case,
flourishing is a better translation than happiness.
3. Eudaimonia = living well might be confused with hedonistic

physical pleasures or luxury. But this is not eudaimonia; it is a
wasted life.
Eudaimonia
There is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia, further links
are matters of dispute and generate different moral versions:
1. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is also

needed are external goods (which are a matter of luck). In other
words, the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for
eudaimonia.
2. For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary AND sufficient.
On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a
eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where
"success" of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way)
3. Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the link

between eudaimonia and what gives a character trait the status of
being a virtue.
Given the shared virtue ethical premise that "the good life is the virtuous
life" we have so far three distinguishable views about what makes a
character trait a virtue.
Eudaimonia
There is a conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia,
further links are matters of dispute and generate different
moral versions:
 For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient — what is

also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck.
 For Plato, and the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient.
 Modern versions of virtue ethics disagree further about the

link between eudaimonia and what gives a character trait
the status of being a virtue.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the
virtues:
 His account proceeds through three stages:
1st: Virtues as qualities necessary to achieve the goods internal to

practices;
2nd: Considers virtues as qualities contributing to the good of a whole life;
3rd: Relates the virtues to the pursuit of a good for human beings the
conception of which can only be elaborated and possessed within an
ongoing social tradition (i.e., the goods of particular lives have to be
integrated into the overall patterns of a tradition informed by a quest for
the good and the best).
“Rather it is the case that no human quality is to be accounted a virtue

unless it satisfies the conditions specified at each of the three stages”
(After Virtue, pg. 275). This is important because there are qualities
which are derived from this notion of practice, but which are not virtues,
qualities which survive the tests of the first stage, but fail at the second
or third” (pg. 275).
virtues:
“Why begin with practices: Other moral philosophers after have
begun from a consideration of passions or desires or from the
elucidation of some conception of duty or goodness. In either
case the discussion is all too apt to be governed from then on by
some version of the means-end distinction according to which all
human activities are either conducted as means to already given
or decided ends or are simply worthwhile in themselves or
perhaps both. What this framework omits from view are those
ongoing modes of human activity within which ends have to be
discovered and rediscovered, and means devised to pursue
them; and it thereby obscures the importance of the ways in
which those modes of activity generate new ends and new
conception of ends. The class of practices, defined as I defined
it, is the class of those modes of activities and the shortest
answer…as to why some items are included in that class and
other excluded…is that those items excluded are not such
modes of activity” (pg. 273).
virtues:
“The importance therefore for beginning from practices
is any consideration of the virtues is that the exercise
of the virtues is not only worthwhile for its own sake-it
turns out that you cannot be genuinely courageous or
just or whatever without caring for those virtues for
their own sake-but has further point and purpose, and
indeed that it is in grasping that point and purpose
that we characteristically initially came to value the
virtues. Yet the virtues are not related to the goods
which provide them with further point and purpose in
the way in which a skill is related to the ends that its
successful exercise procures or in the way in which a
skill is related to those objects of our desire that its
successful exercise may enable us to possess.
The Happy Life is the Natural Life:
 Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:
1st:Well-organized life has an ultimate aim.

An ultimate aim is a good that is desirable
solely for its own sake. Eudaimonia is that
ultimate aim because eudaimonia there is
no greater goal; it is valuable solely for its
own sake; it is not a means to another
goal.
The Happy Life is the Natural Life:
 Aristotle characterizes lives in two ways:
2nd The happy life is a life that

appropriately exercises all essential
human abilities. Thus, for Aristotle, the
happy life is the natural life.
But that now leads us to give an account

of Aristotle’s notion of human nature.
Aristotle’s Account of Human Nature:
 Plants are characterized by the abilities to take
nourishment, grow, & reproduce.
 Animals have the abilities of plants plus the

higher-level abilities to desire, move, and sense.
 Humans are rational animals, so humans have

all of the animal abilities plus rationality.
What is Aristotle’s account of rationality?

 Reason has to 2 aspects:
 Practical reason: the ability to do means-

ends reasoning, to work out the best way to
accomplish one’s goals.
 Theoretical reason: the ability to do rule-

case reasoning, to understand things by
subsuming them under general principles.
Higher-level abilities infuse and transform lower-
level abilities. Reproduction in animals is
different from reproduction in plants because
animal reproduction is guided by the abilities of
desire, motion, and sensation. Similarly, human
desires are not simply brute urges. They are
channeled and transformed by reason. And so
on.
Consider the following chart:

People Theoretical Reason
People Practical Reason
Animal Desire, Motion, Sensation
Plant Nourishment, Growth, Reproduction

Type of Life Aim or Goal Abilities Exercised
Life of Enjoyment Sensual Pleasure Desire for sensual pleasure

Money-making life Money Desire for money/material goods
Political Life Honor Desire for honor
Ethical Life Virtuous Activity Practical reason and desire
Contemplative Life Contemplation Theoretical reason
For example: Aristotle rejects life of money-making for he observes that money can’t be the
ultimate of eudaimonia because it is instrumentally valuable; it is desirable only because of
what it can buy (1196a).
Aristotle rejects the political life because honor depends on the bestowers of honor and is
easily lost whereas eudaimonia does not depend on fickle opinions of others and is not easily
lost. Moreover, people can be honored even if they do nothing or little and even if they
suffer great misfortunes, but eudaimonia requires activity and precludes tragedy (1195b).
Tyrannical Life Power Desire for Power

Religious Life Love and Obey God Soul
Creative Life Novelty Imagination
What say ye about these potential candidates?

Are these a means to and ultimate goal? Or are your goals too
short-sighted?
Can you think of any other potential candidates?
Ethical life & Virtuous activity & practical reason & moral
money-making life money virtue & desire for money
Ethical life & virtuous activity & practical reason & moral
religious life love & obey God & soul.
Ethical life & virtuous activity & practical reason & moral
contemplative life contemplation virtue & theoretical reason.
1. Combination of ethical and money-making lives does not exercise all essential human abilities.
Moreover, there are times when you must choose between profitable and moral paths.
2. Combination of ethical and religious seems most promising. But people like Kierkegaard
argue that conflicts arise between virtuous activity and obeying God (Abraham ordered to kill
Isaac). I personally disagree with this because of the commandment to love God with your
mind, to meditate upon Him, etc. (Psalm 19).
3. Ethical and contemplative combination exercises all essential human abilities according to
Aristotelians (Book X; 1177a-1179 suggest that he thinks contemplative life is supreme &
ethical life is secondarily).
Overview of Ethical Systems: Care Ethics:
Rather than the starting point being rationally derived universal
principles, ethics starts in caring relationships. Care ethics is the
narrative of relationships that extend through time.
If your Feelings are Sometimes Feelings must be schooled,

morals are the foundation developed, and examined
are feelings
motivated and motivation before we use them as the basis
must be of moral behavior; shaping the
by for ethical
subjected to right sorts of feelings is a
impersonal behavior.
rational difficult, demanding process.
rules rather They are not
than saying “If it scrutiny; not
It is different than “Ethics of
personal feels good, do any feeling justice” (masculine) which views
affection, it.” Feelings will do (e.g., moral dilemmas as “math problems
then you are are not be racial for humans”, self-contained
morally followed prejudice). problems in moral logic; world is
impaired. blindly. composed of individuals; self is
defined through individualism.
The world is comprised of relationships, viewing the moral world as a network. Self is
defined through connection. Morality and responsibility involves restoring
community wherever it is broken (e.g., loneliness).
Virtue Ethics: What kind of person should I be?
Way to memorize: Vast Lacks Self-centered well-being imprecise luck.
 Criticisms:
 Vast differences on what constitutes a virtue. Different people, culture, &

societies have vast opinions on what constitutes a virtue.
 Lacks clarity in resolving moral conflicts.
 Self-centered because its primary concern is the agent’s own character.
 Well-being is a master-value & all other things are valuable only to the
extent the can contribute it.
 Imprecise: It fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we

should behave.
 Leaves us hostage to luck: Some will attain moral maturity and others
will not.
Problems with Aristotelian Ethics by
virtue-care ethicists.
 Aristotelian ethics seems unable to address, much less
resolve, certain crucial issues of contemporary moral
philosophy. For example, there is no commitment to
generalized humanitarianism.
 Recent ethics have been very much concerned with whether

making (large) personal sacrifices for the greater good of needy,
but distant others is morally obligatory or merely supererogatory,
but because Aristotle never specifically defends the idea of
general concern for the well-being of others and because he
leaves no room, in addition, for supererogatory degrees of moral
excellence, his philosophy appears to be largely irrelevant to this
important issue.
Meta-ethical Problem:
Another problem for virtue ethics (which is also shared by
utilitarianism and deontology) is "the justification problem."
 Deontology: There is the question of how to justify its claims that

certain moral rules are the correct ones.
 Utilitarianism: how to justify its claim that the only thing that really
matters morally is consequences for happiness or well-being.
 Virtue ethics the problem concerns the question of which character

traits are the virtues.
Misconceptions about Virtue Ethics by
Rosalind Hursthouse:
1. Virtue Ethics does not have a peculiar weakness
or problem in virtue of the fact that it involves the
concept of eudaimonia. While eudaimonia is hard
to grasp, it is no more obscure than the concepts
of rationality and happiness. While virtue theory
has never been dismissed on the grounds of
comparative obscurity of this central concept, it
has a problem with this which deontology and
utilitarianism in no way share. This is false
because the concepts “rationality” and
“happiness” are rich and difficult concepts (e.g.,
Mill’s introduction of the higher and lower
pleasures in view of what constitutes happiness).
2. Virtue ethics is not trivially circular; it does
not specify action in terms of virtuous agent
& then immediately specify the virtuous
agent in terms of right action. Rather, it
specifies her in terms of the virtues, and
then specifies these, not merely as
dispositions to right action, but as the
character traits (which are dispositions to
feel & react as well as act in certain ways)
required for eudaimonia.
3. It does answer the question, “What should I
do?” as well as the question “What sort of
person should I be?” In other words, it is
not, as one of the catchphrases has it,
concerned only with Being and not with
Doing).
4. Virtue Theory generates rules/principle for every
virtue generates a positive instruction (e.g., act
justly, kindly, courageously, honesty, etc) & every
vice a prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly, like a
coward, dishonestly). So, one does not need to
imagine what some ideal exemplar would do in
order to know what should do in a given situation.
Rather, the agent may ask, ‘If I were to do such
and such now, would I be acting justly or unjustly
(or neither), kindly or unkindly [and so on].’
5. Virtue ethics is not committed to any sort of reductionism
which involves defining all our moral concepts in terms of
the virtuous agent. Rather, Virtue ethics relies on a lot of
very significant moral concepts (e.g., charity/benevolence
is the virtue whose concern is the good of others; good is
related to the concept of evil or harm, & they are both
related to the concepts of the worthwhile, the
advantageous, & the pleasant). If one has the the wrong
conception of what is worthwhile, advantageous, &
pleasant, then one shall have the wrong conception of
what is good for, & harmful to, myself & others, & , even
with the best will in the world, still lack the virtue of charity,
which involves getting all this right.
6. Virtue ethics is said to subject to the threat of moral skepticism, pluralism, or
cultural relativism. This is too a problem for both utilitarianism & deontologists,
esp. in view 2 their second premises.
For example:
“Rule deontologists know that they want to get “don’t kill’, ‘keep promises’,
‘cherish your children’, and so on as the rules that meet their specification,
whatever it may be. They also know that any of these can be disputed, that some
philosophers may claim, of any one of them, that it is reasonable to reject it, and
that at least people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture which
rejected it. Similarly, the virtue theorists know that they want to get justice,
charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the character traits needed for eudaimonia;
and they also know that any of these can be disrupted, that some philosopher will
say of any one of them that it is reasonable to reject it as a virtue, and that there
is said to be, for each character trait-some culture that has thus rejected it.”
She goes on to say, “Each theory has to stick out its neck and say, in some
cases, ‘This person/these people/ other cultures (or would be) in error,’ and find
some grounds for saying this.
6. Virtue ethics is said to subject to the threat of moral skepticism, pluralism, or
cultural relativism. This is too a problem for both utilitarianism & deontologists,
esp. in view 2 their second premises.
For example:
“Rule deontologists know that they want to get “don’t kill’, ‘keep promises’,
‘cherish your children’, and so on as the rules that meet their specification,
whatever it may be. They also know that any of these can be disputed, that some
philosophers may claim, of any one of them, that it is reasonable to reject it, and
that at least people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture which
rejected it. Similarly, the virtue theorists know that they want to get justice,
charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the character traits needed for eudaimonia;
and they also know that any of these can be disrupted, that some philosopher will
say of any one of them that it is reasonable to reject it as a virtue, and that there
is said to be, for each character trait-some culture that has thus rejected it.”
She goes on to say, “Each theory has to stick out its neck and say, in some
cases, ‘This person/these people/ other cultures (or would be) in error,’ and find
some grounds for saying this.
7. There is the rejection that virtue ethics has un-resolvable conflict built into
it. ‘It is common knowledge,’ it is said, ‘that the requirements of the
virtues can conflict; charity may prompt me to end the frightful suffering of
the person in my care by killing him, but justice bids me to stay my hand.
To tell my brother that his wife is being unfaithful to him would be honest
and loyal, but it would be kinder to keep quiet about it. So which should I
do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.’ So which
should I do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say.”
In other words, virtue ethics does not always answer the question, ‘What
should I do?”
While this is a problem for virtue ethics, it is not a peculiar problem; it is

also found deontology (e.g., preserve life can yield contrary instructions in
a particular case.
8. VE (most major criticism) is that it can’t get
us anywhere in real moral issues because it
is bound to be all assertion & no argument:
the best it can come up with in the way of
action-guiding rules are the ones that rely on
virtue/vice concepts.
Consider this criticism more fully:
Consider the following…
“ Virtue theory can’t get us anywhere in real moral issues bcause it’s
bound to be all assertion and no argument. You admit that the best
it can come up with in this way of action-guiding rules are the one
that rely on the virtue and vice concepts, such as ‘act charitably’,
‘don’t act cruelly’, and so on; and, as if that weren’t bad enough, you
admit that these virtue concepts, such as charity, presuppose
concepts such as the good, and the worthwhile, and so on. But that
means that any virtue theorist who writes about real moral issues
must rely on her audience’s agreeing with her application of all these
concepts, and hence accepting all the premisses in which those
applications are enshrined. But some other virtue theorist might
take different premisses about these matters, and come up with very
different conclusions, and within the terms of the theory, there is no
way to distinguish between the two. While there is agreement,
virtue theory can repeat conventional wisdom, preserve the status
quo, but it can’t get us anywhere in the way that a normative ethical
theory is supposed to, namely, by providing rational grounds for
acceptance of its practical conclusions” (ibid., 223).
Hursthouse admits:
 When a virtue ethicist discusses real moral issues:
1. One has to assert that “certain actions are honest, dishonest, or
neither; charitable, uncharitable, or neither.”
2. One has to admit that it is often very a very difficult matter to

decide; rules are not always easy to apply.
“But this counts as a criticism of the theory only if we assume,

as a condition of adequacy, that any adequate action-guiding
theory must make the difficult business of knowing what to do if
one is to act well easy, that is must provide clear guidance
about what ought not to be done which any reasonably clever
adolescent could follow if she chose. But such a condition of
adequacy is implausible” (ibid., 223-4).
Consider the following…
“Acting rightly is difficult, and does call for much moral
wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy, which
virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an
explanation of a truth expressed by Aristotle, namely,
that moral knowledge-unlike mathematical knowledge-
cannot be acquired merely by attending lectures and is
not characteristically to be found in people too young to
have had much experience of life. There are youthful
mathematical geniuses, but rarely, if ever, youthful moral
geniuses, and this shows us something significant about
the sort of knowledge that moral knowledge is. Virtue
ethics builds this in straight off precisely by couching its
rules in terms whose application may indeed call for the
most delicate and sensitive judgment.”
Consider this issue:
 Someone hesitating over whether to reveal a hurtful
truth, for example, thinking it would be kind but dishonest
or unjust to lie, may need to realize, with respect to these
particular circumstances, not that kindness is more (or
less) important than honesty or justice, and not that
honesty or justice sometimes requires one to act
unkindly or cruelly, but that one does people no kindness
by concealing this sort of truth from them, hurtful as it
may be. This is the type of thing (I use it only as an
example) that people with moral wisdom know about,
involving the correct application of kind, and that people
with such wisdom find difficult.”
What about virtue theorist’s reliance on
concepts such as that of the worthwhile?
 If such reliance on ‘worthwhile” is to count as a fault in
VE, what condition of adequacy is implicitly in play?
Well, it must be that any good normative theory should
provide answers to questions about real moral issues
whose truth is in no way determined by truths about what
is worthwhile, or what really matters in human life. Now
although people are initially inclined to reject out of hand
the claim that the practical conclusions of a normative
moral theory have to be based on premises about what
is truly worthwhile, the alternative, once it is made
explicit, may look even more acceptable. Consider what
the condition of adequacy entails (ibid., 225).
“Consider what the condition of adequacy entails. If
truths about what is worthwhile (or truly good, or
serious, or about what matters in human life) do not
have to be appealed to in order to answer questions
about real moral issues, then I might sensibly seek
guidance about what I ought to do from someone who
had declared in advance that she knew nothing about
such matters, or from someone who said that,
although she had opinions about them, these were
quite likely to be wrong but that this did not matter,
because they would play no determining role in the
advice she gave me” (pg. 225).
She goes on to say…

I should emphasize that we are talking about real
moral issues and real guidance; I want to know
whether I should have an abortion, take my mother off
life-support machine, leave academic life, and become
a doctor in the Third World, give up my job with the
firm that that is using animals in its experiments, tell
my father he has cancer. Would I go to someone who
says she has no views about what is worthwhile in
life? Or to someone who says that, as a matter of
fact, she tends to think that the only thing that matters
is having a good time, but has a normative theory that
is consistent both with this view and with my own
rather more puritanical one, which will yield the
guidance I need?”
Her response to such thinking…
This criticism manifests a failure to understand
what an adequate normative theory is. They
drastically underestimate the variety of ways in
which virtue/vice concepts and others, such as
that of the worthwhile, figure in the discussion.
In fact, any normative theory which any clever
adolescent can apply, or which reaches practical
conclusions that are in no way determined by
premises about what is truly worthwhile, serious,
and so on, is guaranteed to be an inadequate
theory.
Virtue Ethics is not reductionistic:
 “The character traits that virtue theory
emphasizes are not simply dispositional to
intentional actions, but a seamless
disposition to certain actions and
passions, thoughts and reactions” (pg.
230).
 “…virtue theory has a sort of built-in
indexicality.”
Consider the following comparison by MacIntyre:
 Aristotle's assumption that man is as-he-happens-to-be and that this

is distinct from man-as-he-should-be. The Enlightenment, on the
other hand, offers no metaphysical framework whatsoever in place
of teleology.
 Aristotle's claim that rules are based on virtues, which are derived
from an understanding of the telos. The Enlightenment reversed this
and predicated virtues on an understanding of subjective (but
purported to be universal) principles.
 Aristotle's assertion that virtue and morality are integral parts of

society, as an understanding of the telos must be social and not
individual. In the Enlightenment, however, societies lost their moral
authority and the individual became the fundamental interpreter of
moral questions.
John Dewey’s Ethics
Primary experience is everyday experience as it is found, present and given;
He beings with moral experience as it is lived. Theories and beliefs are in our
Lives. Experience is always our starting point (middle and end point) for we
cannot get beyond it) The choice is not between starting in our outside
Experience but between ways of proceeding within it.
Therefore, there are no hard
or neutral givens.
Dewey was skeptical of any theory that (1)
Dewey’s starting The pre-theoretical
(i.e., primary claimed that our primary experience is
point in philosophical
experience) is the more determined (or conditioned) by one single
inquiry that led him primitive level because cohesive factor such as one’s historical period,
to provide one of the it encompasses the culture, race, class, or biological make up. These
most devastating and theoretical and because
are all reductionistic and, as such, non-empirical
systematic critiques it encompasses the
theoretical and because theories overlook the complexity and
of modern moral
it is where things are heterogeneity of factors and interactions that are
philosophy, and a
present in their brute the conditions for human experience. We do not
radically new and direct qualitative experience ourselves as inside (or as trapped in)
account of moral givenness and our subjectivity, language, or anything else. The
experience. thereness. We need to
begin & end
notion, for example, that one’s culture or social
For Dewey, then, experientially guided class solely determines moral experience is itself a
experience is “a inquiries on this level. theory, rather than we experience when we have
starting point and Thus, there is no reason moral experiences.
terminal point, as to think that everything
setting problems and is experienced as moral
in our everyday lives is
as testing proposed
determined by a theory.
solutions.”
Overview of Ethical Systems: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804):
. To act morally you must be motivated exclusively
by rational commitment to the universal moral law or the categorical
Imperative: “Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only,
that you can will at the same time be a universal law.”
Right actions flow out of right principles
Do the act that To act To act Second form of

is motivated morally morally categorical
by the sincere requires the requires the imperative:
belief that rational power of
“Act in such a
what you are power to the will to
way that you
doing is the recognize rise above
always treat
right thing not absolute all natural
humans not
merely for moral laws feelings and
merely as a
you, but for that inclinations.
means to an end
anybody transcend This raises
but also as an
seeking to act our natural us above
end.”
properly in world. our natural
any situation. world.
Deontological Framework:
 An action is right if and only if (iff) it is in accordance with a
moral rule or principle.
 This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between

the concepts of right and action and moral rule, and gives
one no guidance until one knows what a moral rule is.
 So, the next thing the theory needs is a premise about that: A moral rule
is one that would have been historically:
A. Theistic:
1. Given to us by God;
2. Is required by Natural Law (theistic connection);
B. Secular (though can still be connected to God):

1. Is laid on us by reason.
2. Is required by rationality;
3. Would command universal acceptance;
4. Would be the object of choice of all rational beings.
 Therefore, the links between right action,
moral rule, and rationality based upon
moral rule + given by God or required by
natural or laid on us by reason or required
by rationality or would command universal
rational acceptance or would by the object
of choice of all rational being—are all
essential aspects to any deontological
framework.
Basic Terms to Know:
1. Deontological Ethics: "rule or duty-based morality;
...emphasizes right action over good consequences“
2. a priori: "not in any way derived from experience or dependent

upon it"; concepts derived a priori are universal rules that
determine, in advance, the conditions for knowledge in a
particular domain
3. maxim: rule of conduct;
4. Hypothetical imperative: an action that is good only as a means

to something else;
5. Categorical imperative: an action that is good in itself and

conforms to reason; categorical imperatives act as universal rules
governing a situation regardless of circumstance
Summary:
 Thus, Kantian ethics states an action is right iff it
is in accord with the Categorical Imperative (the
supreme principle of morality). Right actions
flow from right principles.
 From using our capacity to reason Kant believes

the Categorical Imperative can be formulated in
at least three ways; they are all equivalent with
the first formulation being the basis. Though
they bring out various aspects of the moral law,
they cannot tell us more than what the first
formula does.
Categorical Imperative:
 The CI does not depend on a logically prior condition though it
assumes the predisposition that one wishes to be rational and will
follow what rationally determined duty dictates (in contrast to
hypothetical imperatives which means that the consequent depends
upon the antecedent: If p, then q). Thus, morality is a function of
human reason. Human reason is governed by Logic. Q.E.D., to be
irrational is to be inhuman. To be sure, there are perfect and
imperfect duties. Actions are characterized as perfect because they
follow directly from an application of the universalization of the
Categorical Imperative in contrast to imperfect duties that follow
from CI only after considering other factors (e.g., seeking our own
happiness). An imperfect duty is just as strong in its action guiding
force as a perfect duty. Thus, their point of origin highlights their
differences.
Three Formulations of the
Categorical Imperative:
 First formulation: “Act in conformity with the maxim and the maxim
only, that you can will at the same time a universal law.” This means
that what I consider doing, it must be something that I can will or
accept that all do (universal); it is replacing individual preferences
with purely universal terms.
 Second formulation: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity,

whether in your own person or in that of another, always an end and
never as a means only.” In essence, every person has intrinsic
value and that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action.
 Third formulation: “Therefore, every rational being must act as if he

were though his maxim always a legislating member in the universal
kingdom of ends.” In other words, we have to will what is consistent
with the operations of the kingdom as a whole. In sum, all people
should consider themselves as both members and heads
Major Points to Consider:
1. What gives an act moral worth is our motives because we
can’t necessarily control the consequences of our act or/and
things do not always turn out as we want. He calls this
motive “the good will.” Therefore, we are responsible for
our motives to do good or bad, and thus it is for this that we
are held morally accountable.
2. What is the right motive is acting out of a will to do the right

thing; only an act motivated by this concern for the moral
law is right.
Consider the following Shopkeeper illustration:

3. Kant’s Shopkeeper illustration: A shopkeeper charges her customers a fair
price and charges the same to all. But what is the shopkeeper’s motive?
A. If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is that it serves her own
best interest, then this motive is not praiseworthy.
B. If the shopkeeper’s motive for charging a fair price is because she is

sympathetic toward her customers, then this motive is still not praiseworthy.
C. If the shopkeeper’s motive is to do the right thing because it is the right

thing, then her motive is indeed praiseworthy. Only doing that which is
morally right is praiseworthy.
We do not always know when our acts are motivated by self-interest,

inclination or pure respect for morality. Also, we often act from mixed
motives. However, we are certain that the motive is pure when we do what
is right regardless how we feel or/and the consequences.
4. In order for our action to have moral worth we must not
only act out of a right motivation but we must also do
what is right.
Right Motive Right Act
The motive and the act must be morally right!

We must not only act of duty (have the right motive) but also
“according to duty” or as “duty requires” (do what is right).
5. How we are to know what the right thing to do is to test our
motives and actions against the categorical imperative. If our
motive and acts meets the criteria of the categorical imperative
we are obligated to do it. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE:
“Oughts” that tell us what we
ought to do no matter what,
under all conditions, and are
Right Motive universally binding
(categorical imperative).
1st form of Categorical

Imperative:
“Act only on that maxim

which can will as a
universal law.”
This means that what I consider
Right Act doing, it must be something that I
can will or accept that all do
(universal).
According the first formula:
According to the first formula: the agent
must be willing to eliminate all individual
reference from the maxim of her action.
The most significant exclusion from the
maxim is oneself. Therefore, in order to
pass the test of the categorical imperative
in the first formulation, one must be
prepared to go on willing even if it contains
no reference to oneself.
6. Thus, whatever I consider doing, it must be something that I can
will or accept all do.
A law by its very nature has a degree of universality. Act only on

that maxim which you can will as a universal law.
Maxim: is a description of the action that I will put to the test.
7. How do I know what I can and cannot will as a universal practice?
As a rational being I can only will what is non-contradictory

8. First Two Forms of the Categorical Imperative:
1st form of Categorical 2nd form of Categorical

Imperative: Imperative:
“Act only on that maxim “Always treat
which can will as a humanity, whether in
universal law.” your own person or that
of another, never simply
This means that what I consider
as a means but always
doing, it must be something that
I can will or accept that all do at the same time as an
(universal); it is replacing end.”
individual preferences with
purely universal terms. This means that every person has
intrinsic value & that humanity
is a limit or constraint on our
action.
1st Categorical Imperative:
 1st Categorical Imperative is a decision procedure for
moral reasoning. 4 Steps:
1. Formulate a maxim that enshrines your reasoning

for acting as you propose.
2. Recast maxim as universal law of nature governing

all rational agents-all people will act upon.
3. Consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in

a world governed by this law of nature.
4. Ask whether you would or could rationally will to act

on this maxim in such a world.
9. Second Form of the Categorical Imperatives:
Explains how we ought to

treat ourselves. 2nd Categorical
Imperative:
Treat ourselves & other as “Always treat
ends rather than merely as humanity, whether in
means. your own person or
that of another, never
simply as a means but
The moral conclusions always at the same
should be the same whether time as an end.”
we use the 1st or 2nd form of This means that every person
has intrinsic value & that
the categorical imperative. humanity is a limit or
constraint in our action.
10. Third Formulation of the Categorical
Imperative: Hypothetical Kingdom of Ends
Key Points:
“All maxims as 1. Think of ourselves as members of a society of beings
proceeding from whose permissible ends are to be respected.
our own law- 2. Test our maxims by asking, whether, supposing the
maxims were natural laws, there would be a society
making ought to of that kind. In other words, we are obligated to act
only by maxims which would harmonize a possible
harmonize with a kingdom of ends.
possible kingdom of 3. We have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that
create incoherent or impossible states of natural
ends as a kingdom affairs when we attempt to universalize them;
of nature." We have an imperfect duty not to act by maxims that
promote unstable or greatly undesirable states of
Grounding for the affairs.
“Kant seems to assume that those who apply the categorical
Metaphysics of imperative to their maxims will come out with answers that
agree when the maxims tested are alike.” J.B. Schneewind,
Morals, 4:436/104. “Autonomy, Obligation, & Virtue,” pg. 338.
Third Categorical Imperative introduces a
social dimension to Kantian Morality
The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the
maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible
kingdom of ends” (4:439).
It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions
to the maxims of a legislator of laws (ii) that this lawgiver lays down
universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that
those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members
equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence
must be treated always as an end in itself.
The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral
obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a
community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in
legislating these principles for their community.
Summary of first three categorical
imperatives:
 The Categorical Imperative requires that I act
only on maxims that I can will as universal law.
 The categorical imperative is supposed to give us a

test for maxims.
 Maxim is the is “subjective principle of an action.”

The principle of an action is that prescription from
which the action follows.
 If the maxim meets the test, the action that follows

from it has moral worth; if the maxim does not meet it,
the action does not have moral worth.
 1st Categorical Imperative requires
willingness to continue to the subscription
to the maxim of an action even if all
individual or singular reference is excluded
from it. Eliminating individual or singular
reference requires eliminating reference to
me. In other words, think of replacing
individual references with purely universal
terms.
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end.”
Rather than thinking that humanity is the goal or proper end of our
action, he presupposes that humanity is a limit or constraint on our action.
This kind of constraint can be seen mostly clearly by tracing the connection
with the first formula, the Formula of Universal Law. Remember, the agent must be
willing to eliminate all individual reference from the maxim of her action. The most
significant exclusion here is that of herself. Therefore, be prepared go on willing the
maxim even if it contains no reference to herself.
The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of an action
must be such that any other free and rational person can adopt it. Treating humanity
as an end in itself is, for Kant, respecting our capacity for free and rational choice; in
his term, it is respecting our autonomy. I am constrained, according to this first
formula, by the consideration that is wrong, other things being equal, to impede the
agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a means is to ignore the
other as a center of agency. The clearest cases here are those of coercion and
The constraint that the second formula imposes is that the maxim of
an action must be such that any other free and rational person can
adopt it. Treating humanity as an end in itself is, for Kant, respecting
our capacity for free and rational choice; in his term, it is respecting
our autonomy. I am constrained, according to this first formula, by
the consideration that is wrong, other things being equal, to impede
the agency of others. To treat another human being as merely a means
is to ignore the other as a center of agency. The clearest cases here are
those of coercion and deception.
For example: If I take the hand of one of my students in my

class and with it I strike the neighbouring student’s face, I have
bypassed the first student’s agency. I have treated her merely as
a means, as though she were merely an organic hitting
implement. The same is true when I deceive somebody, because
if I conceal the nature of the situation, I impede her ability to
make a free and rational choice for that situation.
What is the connection between the
categorical imperative is the following:
 If I cannot will maxim X as universal law, then I am acting
for reasons that it is not possible for everyone to share.
But to act toward people on the basis of reasons they
cannot possibly share is to use them, to treat them as a
mere means to my goals. In fact, all people should
consider themselves both members and heads because we
have a perfect duty not to act in maxims that create
incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs for it will
lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.
See, the truly autonomous will is not subject to any
particular interest. Kant’s idea here is that one should not
treat others in ways they couldn’t rationally assent to.
10. Perfect and Imperfect Duties:
Perfect Duties: Imperfect Duties:

Perfect duties are Are those duties that don’t whole
absolutes & heartily conform to the
necessary; they categorical imperative.
conform to the e.g., If I were an egoist and concerned
only about myself, no one could accuse
categorical imperative.
me of using other people; I would
simply leave them alone. But this
eg., We can and should
attitude & practice is inconsistent with
absolutely refrain from
the duty to treat others as persons. As
making false or lying
persons, they also have interests and
promises.
plans, and to recognize this I must at
least sometimes and in some ways seek
to promote their ends and goals.
The following are 4 examples
famously used by Kant.
1st example: Suicide
“Whenever continuing to live will bring
more pain than pleasure, I shall
commit suicide out of self-love.”
1. Suicide can’t be a universal law for one can’t will that

would be universal will.
2. Remember, suicide would be morally right if and only

if the person who is thinking about suicide can
consistently will that suicide be a universal law.
1st Example: Suicide:
 A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of
life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask
himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take
his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could
become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: 'From self-love I
adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is
likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.' It is asked then simply
whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal
law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which
it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose
special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would
contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature;
hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature
and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme
principle of all duty." (Quoted from the Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysic of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott)
2nd example: Lying & Not Keeping Promise:
“Whenever I need money, then I shall borrow

the money and promise to repay, even
though I know I will not repay.”
1. Lying and not keeping promise can’t be a universal law for one
can’t will that would be universal will.
2. Remember, lying and not repaying would be morally right if and

only if the person who is thinking about lying and not keeping
promise can consistently will that lying and not keeping promise
be a universal law.
3rd Example: Developing One’s Habits
 "A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture
might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in
comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather
than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural
capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his
natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees
also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could
indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South
Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their
lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species-
in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be
a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural
instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties
be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all
sorts of possible purposes." (Quoted from the Fundamental Principles
of the Metaphysic of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott)
3rd example: Developing One’s
Habits
“When I’m comfortable as I am, I shall let all my
talents rust.”
1. Everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed.
2. If everyone necessarily wills that some of his or her talents be developed,

then no one can consistently will that his non-use of talents to be a
universal law.
3. Non-use of talents is morally right if and only if the agent thinking about
non-use of talents can consistently will that non-use of talents be a
universal law. (The Categorical Imperative)
4. Therefore, allowing one’s talents to rust is morally wrong.

4th Example: Helping Others.
 A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend
with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What concern
is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can
make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do
not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in
distress!' Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law,
the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a
state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care
occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when
he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although
it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with
that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the
universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would
contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would
have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law
of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope
of the aid he desires." (From the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic
of Morals, as translated by T.K. Abbott)
4th example: Helping Others:
“When I am flourishing and others are in distress, I shall
give nothing to charity.”
 Everyone necessarily wills that he or she be helped in desperate
circumstances.
2. If everyone necessarily wills this, then no one can consistently will that
non-help be a universal law.
3. Not helping others is morally right if and only if the agent thinking
about not helping others can consistently will that not helping others be
a universal law. (The Categorical Imperative)
4. Therefore, not helping others is not morally right.

11. Advantages of Kant’s Moral Theory:
Fairness, Consistency, and morally equal treatment of all

people for they are intrinsically valuable.
Emphasizes the Law of Non-contradiction; we would not

will anything that is not rational.
Emphasizes doing what is morally right (it is our duty).
It is universally binding and Impartial for in order for an action to

Be morally permissible, we should be able to will it for all.
12. Criticisms against Deontological Ethics:
Duty centered ethics stressing obedience to rules,
as opposed to result-centered or utilitarian ethics.
1. No clear way to resolve moral duties when they come into conflict with each
other.
2. Deontological ethics are consequential moral systems in disguise enshrined

in customs and law have been known to give the best consequences.
3. Do not readily allow for gray areas because they are based on absolutes.
4. Which duties qualify given time or location: Are old duties still valid?
5. Human welfare and misery: Some principles may result in a clash with what
is best for human welfare & prescribe actions which cause human misery.
6. Rule worship: The refusal to break a generously beneficial rule in those

areas in which it is not most beneficial is rule worship.
7. Exclusive focus on “rationality” ignores our relations to & with other human
beings.
There is no clear way to deal with moral conflicts
consider the following:
a. Killer comes to the door: If a killer comes to the door and ask
for a friend of yours inside whom he intends to kill, you must
tell the truth (illustration by Kant).
But there is only one exceptionless rule in Kant’s philosophy and that is given
in the categorical imperative: We are never permitted to do what we cannot
will as a universal law or what violates the requirement to treat persons as
persons.
Kant may not give us adequate help in deciding what to do when moral
conflicts are involved because in the above example, both to tell the truth and
preserve life are moral obligations.
Regarding Impartiality & Rationality:
b. Kant’s moral philosophy is its belief in impartiality; in order for

an action to be rally permissible, we should be able to will it for
all.
However, persons do differ in significant ways (gender, race, age, and

talents). In what way does morality require that everyone be treated equally
and in what does it perhaps require that different person be treated
differently (e.g., gender).
c. Kant’s stress on rationality may be considered to be too male-

oriented, too Westernized. It is subject to the continental
critique of structure (Foucault).
Kant’s View of Virtue/Vice
 Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being's will in
fulfilling his duty” (6:405) and vice as principled immorality. (6:390)
This definition appears to put Kant's views on virtue at odds with
classical views such as Aristotle's in several important respects.
 First, Kant's account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty

already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits
as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant
takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of
moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a
good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought
to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct
based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on
that basis defines virtue as the trait of acting according to these
principles.
 Second, virtue is for Kant a strength of will, and hence
does not arise as the result of instilling a ‘second nature’
by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act
and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but
a disposition of one's will, not a disposition of emotions,
feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature
that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the
disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior
that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human
nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what
Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz.,
continence or self-control.
 Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral
principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral
law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what
he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean
between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed,
assumes that virtue differs from vice only in terms of
degree rather than in terms of the different principles
each involves. (6:404, 432) But prodigality and avarice,
for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose
enough with one's means. They differ in that the prodigal
acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole
intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious act on the
principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of
possessing them.
 Fourth, in classical views the distinction between
moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly
significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of
the soul , but one finds classical theorists
treating wit and friendliness along side courage
and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be
a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary
between non-moral and moral virtues could not
be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a
remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed,
much of Anthropology is given over to
discussing the nature and sources of a variety of
character traits, both moral and non-moral.
 Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since
it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in
them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a
constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses.
Morality is ‘duty’ for human beings because it is possible (and we
recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run
counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be
trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually
requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that
morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not
change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have
run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict
with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that
makes duty a constraint, and hence virtue essentially a trait
concerned with constraint.
 Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant's system in other
respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing
a good will. (6: 408) That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus
be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary
interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one's duty from
duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own
sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the
lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared
to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind
of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious
conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in
Religion. Kant here describes the natural human condition as one in which no
decisive priority is given to the demands of morality over happiness. Until one
achieves a permanent change in the will's orientation in this respect, a revolution in
which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one's pursuits, all
of one's actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless,
no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will
must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one's will to put this
revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant's considered view is that a good will
is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is
one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.
Overview of Ethical Systems: Social Contract Ethics:
Ethical principles are made, not found. Ethics are constructed by social group, and
exists for the benefit of those groups: 2 Types: Contractarianism & Contractualism:
Both models People cooperate State of Nature:
stress Contractarianism: morality is a set
when they forgo Hobbes says we need
reciprocity and of social practices that self-
the pursuit of their strong social contract
mutual interestedly rational actors can
own independent because our natural
consent. interests & follow “adopt” in their common interests
tendencies are “every
rules or roles, the man for himself.”
(you are born into this model).
Morality is
collective following Underlying motive is rational self-
modeled on a Rousseau says we are
kind of of which promotes interest. Thomas Hobbes:
basically good; it is pity
agreement or everyone’s for ourselves & others
contract. interests better that holds us in check Contractualism: Morality
than would have consists of principles that
Hobbes: Would been done by Locke believes we have
John S. Mill: relatively peaceful &
mediate relations of mutual
you prefer everyone pursuing
social contract gentle state of nature: respect between free and equal
Cultural, her own interests persons. Underlying motive is
or state of independently. Rawls has different S.P.:
intellectual, & mutual respect between
nature? Original position & veil
spiritual of ignorance. equals: Rousseau, Kant, and
pleasures are Rawls.
of greater
The Collective Action Problem is where the
values than John Locke insists on preserving the
collective pursuit of self-interest leads to an
mere physical individual rights of citizens against the
outcome that is worse for each person
pain or his or her respective desires and
pursuing
temptation of social rulers to become tyrants.
pleasure. interests.
Overview of Ethical Systems: Utilitarianism:
A theory of moral reasoning within teleological ethics or consequentialism
that looks to the principle of utility, i.e., the degree to which an act is helpful
or harmful in order to determine the rightness or wrongness of an act.
R.M. Hare’s 2-level J.J. C. Smart: Negative Utilitarianism by K.

J. Bentham: utilitarianism: The Popper in The Open Society & Its
Only 2 logic of moral Preference Enemies (1945): Promote the least
terms & facts
intrinsic Utilitarianism: amount evil or harm; prevent the
about human
values: nature & Maximize the greatest amount of harm for the
achievements greatest number:
“Good is condition) leads to
whatever
a 2 level version of people’s
whereby both rule
brings the & act priorities; it is Motive Utilitarianism (Robert
John S. Mill: for each
greatest utilitarianism are Adams): Inculcate motives
Cultural,
happiness to bridged: intuitive person to within ourselves that will be
level (simple,
intellectual,
the greatest & decide what generally useful across the
general rules) &
number.”
spiritual critical level (act counts as being spectrum of the situations we
pleasures are utilitarianism. happy. are likely to encounter.
of greater
John S. Mill: Though still hedonistic
values than Mill argues that cultural, Ideal Utilitarianism by G.E. Moore: The
utilitarianism
mere physicaland spiritual pleasures are of rightness or wrongness of acts is determined
intellectual,
pain values
greater or than just mere physical plain
by their actual consequences; our duty:
pleasure. or pleasure. produce the best possible consequences.
A Closer look at Consequentialism:
Classic utilitarianism is a complex

combination of many distinct claims,
including the following claims about the
moral rightness of acts (even though it
reduces all morally relevant factors to
consequences):
Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be
defined and whether it can be measured in the
way utilitarians requires:
1. Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends

only on consequences (not circumstances, the intrinsic
nature of the act, or anything that happens before the act).
2. Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right

depends only on the actual consequences (not foreseen,
foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences).
3. Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right

depends only on the consequences of that act itself (not
consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice
that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on).
Issues of Formulation: How utility is to be defined and whether
it can be measured in the way utilitarians requires:
4. Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the

value of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the
consequences).
5. Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the

pleasures and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other goods,
such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on).
6. Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which

consequences are best (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement
over the status quo).
7. Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some

function of the values of parts of those consequences (as opposed to
rankings of whole worlds or sets of consequences).
8. Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the total net

good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per
person).
8. Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the

consequences for all people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the
individual agent, present people, or any other limited group).
9. Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one

person matter just as much as similar benefits to any other person (= all
who count count equally).
10. Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others

does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the
perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer).
These claims could be clarified, supplemented, and subdivided further.

What matters here is just that these claims are logically independent, so a
moral theorist could consistently accept some of them without accepting
others. Yet classic utilitarians accepted them all. That fact makes classic
utilitarianism a more complex theory than it might appear at first sight.
It also makes classic utilitarianism subject to attack from many angles.

Persistent opponents posed plenty of problems for classic utilitarianism.
Each objection led some utilitarians to give up some of the original claims
of classic utilitarianism. By dropping one or more of those claims,
descendants of utilitarianism can construct a wide variety of moral
theories. Advocates of these theories often call them consequentialism
rather than utilitarianism so that their theories will not be subject to
refutation by association with the classic utilitarian theory.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873): Hedonistic Utilitarianism:
Greatest Happiness Principle: “Acts are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness
(intended pleasure), wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (pain and privation of
pleasure). Cultural, intellectual, & spiritual pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure,
because the former would be valued more highly by competent judges than the latter. A competent
judge, according to Mill, is anyone who has experienced both the lower pleasures and the higher.
Pleasures differ from Qualitative differences Mill was an advocate of rule

Mill reaffirmed each other qualitatively
though as well as quantitatively,
easily recognizable utilitarianism: you obey those
whereas quantitative
developed the a “higher” pleasure differences are
rules which experience has shown
hedonistic being intrinsically better difficult to determine. will produce the greatest happiness
theory of than a “lower”
pleasure.” He also differed with of the greatest number. When you
Bentham from
“It is better to be a Bentham by denying always know what people will do
strict hedonistic human being dissatisfied that human
path by saying you get predictability and security.
than a fool satisfied.” motivation implies
that some kinds Bentham treats all forms egoism. Even though We ought to choose the action which
John S. Mill:
of pleasure, of happiness as equal: we are by nature looks most likely to produce most
whatever their “a pushpin is as good as pleasure-seekers, we
happiness. In order to do so we should
opera.” Some desires can be trained through
Cultural,
quantity, are
are primitive: others the proper development of usually be guided by those general rules
intrinsically &
intellectual, result of experience, our feelings to find which have been formulated as a result of
superior to training, self-discipline, pleasure in the the long experience of men in society:
spiritual
others. & special associations. pleasure of others.
pleasures are The beliefs that have come down are the
. rules of morality for the multitude, and
of greater or the philosopher, until he has succeeded
The only justification society has in interfering with the
values than
liberty of action of an individual is self-protection; in finding better.”
mere physical
People should be allowed to think & do whatever they A rule is valid only because it passes the
pain
like. or
Mill was worried about the “tyranny of the utilitarian test: and it is difficult to
pleasure.majority” in his Essay On Liberty. believe
John Stuart Mill:
Essential Terms:
1. higher pleasures: "pleasures of the intellect, ...relating to our feelings

and imagination"; also those relating to our moral values.
2. lower pleasures: bodily and physical pleasures
3. inferior type: persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the lower

pleasures (88-89)
4. superior type: persons who find enjoyment by indulging in the higher

pleasures
5. altruism: personal sacrifice; "putting other's interests before one's

own"
6. incommensurable: (in this case) two things that are incomparable

because they are essentially different. Mill uses this word to describe
the comparison of pleasure and pain.
John Stuart Mill:
10. Although Mill was heavily influenced by Bentham, there are two
specific points of the latter's utilitarian theory that are rejected in Mill's
version:
 Mill did not regard all pleasures equally. He made a distinction between
higher and lower pleasures.
 Mill rejects Bentham's hedonic calculus because he believes that
pleasures and pains are incommensurable.
11. Higher pleasures are such because they:

 offer a sense of human dignity,
 offer greater permanency, safety, and un-costliness, and
 challenge us to develop our intellectual capabilities.
12 The only persons qualified to judge the relative merit of

pleasures are those acquainted with the higher pleasures. Mill inserts
this qualification so that his ethics can overcome the charge the it is
an ethics for pigs and because he argues that anyone who is
acquainted with both types or pleasures will certainly affirm the
superiority of the higher type.
Egoism vs. Altruistic Utilitarianism:
 Enlightened self-interest is rejected in favor of consider
the greatest happiness of all concerned.
 Persons responsible for making ethical decisions should

do so from a disinterested, benevolent perspective.
 The value of personal sacrifice or altruism takes center

stage over that of psychological egoism.
 If one can see that personal interests are bound up with

communal interests, then the conflict between ego and
community will be minimized.
Other Points on Mills:
13. Human Suffering: Mill argues that "we have ... a moral duty to prevent or to
reduce to human suffering.“
 Selfishness and a want of mental cultivation are the greatest causes of

unhappiness.
 Individuals who have not taken the time to develop their intellectual capabilities are
unlikely to share the view that the improvement of the human condition is of
paramount importance.
 On Democracy:
 Although he favored democracy, Mill sees the possibility for domination of the
minority by the majority under a strict system of "mob rule.“
 Accordingly, Mill argues that safeguards be put in place to protect the interests and
viewpoints of minorities in the political process. Note that the term minority is not
meant to denote racial minorities, but rather all types of political and social
minorities that do not share majority/mainstream views.
Utilitarianism vs. Deontological Ethics:
Utilitarian Ethics: Deontological Ethics:

1. Consequential Outcomes- 1. One universal law for each
Based. situation.
2. Case-by-Case. 2. All times, all places, & all people.
3. Hypothetical Imperative. 3. Categorical Imperative (Maxim-rule)
4. Happiness (Greatest 4. Duty, Obligation, & Good will.
Happiness Principle)
G. E. Moore’s Ethics
George Edward Moore (1873-1958) was an English philosopher who spearheaded the
attack on idealism and was a major supporter of realism in all its forms. In sum, he
appealed to and offered a defense of common sense, arguing that any view which opposed
common sense was either factually false or self-contradictory. In his major work in ethics,
Principia Ethics (1903), Moore maintained that the central problem in ethics is ‘What is
good?-meaning by this, not what things are good, but how “good” is to be defined.
Regarding how 1st Argument: 2nd Argument: Why is this naturalistic fallacy?
Because good is a non-natural property.
good is to be To identify good with Suppose good were But even it were a natural one, there
defined, Moore some other object definable. Then the would still be a fallacy: Definist fallacy.
result would be even The Definist fallacy is attempting to
contends that (i.e., to define good) worse that that of define good by any means. This
there can be only is to commit the reducing ethical argument is often known as the open
one answer: good naturalistic fallacy. propositions to non- question argument because whatever
To commit this ethical propositions- purported definition of good anyone
is good or good is
fallacy is to reduce ethical propositions offers, it would always be an open
indefinable; would be tautologies! question whatever satisfies the
ethical propositions
For example, define definition really is good.
Thus, good to either good as pleasure.
denotes a “unique, psychological Then suppose you
simple object of propositions or maintain that pleasure In last portion of book Moore discusses
reportive definitions is good. All you would what sorts of things are the greatest
thought” that is as to how people use be asserting is that goods which we are acquainted. He
indefinable and words. pleasure is pleasure, a argues for the view that they are
tautology. personal affection and aesthetic
un-analyzable.
enjoyments.
Moore’s Threefold Contribution:
1. “Good” is the name of a simple indefinable, non-natural property.
2. Moore takes it that to call an action right is simply to say that of

the available alternative actions is the one which does or did as a
matter of fact produce the most good. Moore is a utilitarian:
every action is to be evaluated solely by its consequences, as
compared with the consequences of alternative possible courses
of action. No action is ever right or wrong as such. Anything
whatsoever may under certain circumstances be permitted.
 Propositions declaring this or that to be good are what Moore called

“intuitions”; they are incapable of proof or disproof and indeed no
evidence or reasoning can be adduced in their favor or disfavor.
2. Moore takes it that to call an action right is
simply to say that of the available alternative
actions is the one which does or did as a
matter of fact produce the most good. Moore
is a utilitarian: every action is to be evaluated
solely by its consequences, as compared with
the consequences of alternative possible
courses of action. No action is ever right or
wrong as such. Anything whatsoever may
under certain circumstances be permitted.
3. In the sixth and final chapter of Principia
Ethica, that “‘personal affections and aesthetic
enjoyments include all the greatest, and by far
the greatest goods we can imagine…’ This is
the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral
Philosophy.’ The achievement of friendship
and the contemplation of what is beautiful in
nature or in art certainly almost the sole and
perhaps the sole justifiable ends of all human
action.” MacIntyre, After Virtue, 15.
Critique by MacIntyre:
1. All three central positions are logically independent of

each other. There is no breach in consistency if one
were to affirm any one of the three and deny the other
two.
2. “…the first part of what Moore says is plainly false and
the second and third parts are at the very least highly
contentious” (pg. 16).
3. The fallout: An impoverished concept of the “good”

which contributed to rise of “emotivism.”
Overview of Ethical Systems: Act vs Rule Utilitarianism:
1. Rule Utilitarianism states we ought to consider the consequences of the act performed
as a general practice: What if everyone did that? What results would be this were a
general practice?
2. Act utilitarianism states we ought to consider the consequences of each act separately.
The consequences of the act under consideration determine what one ought to do.
They are alike in Act Utilitarians Rule Utilitarians Best Proof offered for
requiring us to can claim that can claim that Utilitarianism is experience
acts are similar to
produce the ought to Just as the only way in which
one another and
greatest amount consider only we know that something is
so can be thought
what will or is visible is its being seen, and the
of happiness or of as practices.
only way we can show that
pleasure for the likely to happen, Since we should
something is audible is if it can
greatest number not what would make the same
be heard, so, also, the only proof
judgment in
of people happen if we that we have that something is
similar cases, we
acted in certain desirable is its being desired.
They differ in should judge this
ways but is not Because we desire happiness, we
act by comparing
what they thus know it is desirable or
going to happen it with results of
good. In fact, happiness is the
believe we ought the actions of
because we are only thing we desire for its own
to consider in everyone in
not going to act. sake. All else we dire because
estimating the similar situations.
we believe it will lead to
consequences. happiness. J.S. Mill
Act-Utilitarian Framework:
 Act-utilitarian model begins with a premise that provides
a specification of right action:
An action is right iff it promotes the best

consequences.
 It thereby forges the link between the concepts of “right

action” and “consequences.”
The best consequences are those in which

happiness is maximized.
Act-Utilitarianism vs. Rule-Utilitarianism
 Act-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action

is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself.
 Rule-utilitarianism is the view that rightness or wrongness of an action

is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of
a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.
 Individual action are evaluated, in theory, not just in practice, by whether

actions conform to a justified moral rule, and the utilitarian standard is
applied only to general rules.
 Some rule utilitarians hold that actions are right provided that are
permitted by rules the general acceptance of which would maximize utility
in the agent’s society, and wrong only if they would be prohibited by such
rules.
 There are a number of forms of rule utilitarianism.

There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism

according to whether one construes “rule” as “actual
rule (S. E. Toumlin)” or “possible rule (Kant).”
On using Kant as possible rule we would do the

following: “Act only on that maxim through which you
can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law” as “Act only on that maxim which you as
a humane and benevolent person would like to see
established as a universal law.”
Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by

J.C.C. Smart via David Lyons:
1st: Rule-Utilitarianism collapses into act- utilitarianism:
“Suppose that an exception to a rule R produces the

best possible consequences. Then this is the evidence
that the rule R should be modified so as to allow this
exception. Thus we get a new rule of the form ‘do R
except in circumstances of the sort C’. That is,
whatever would lead the act-utilitarian to break a rule
would lead the Kantian rule-utilitarian to modify the rule.
Thus, an adequate rule-utilitarianism would be
extensionally equivalent to act-utilitarianism.
Two arguments are offered against rule-utilitarianism by J.C.C. Smart via David
Lyons:
2nd Argument: Lyons is interested in “threshold effects”:
A difficulty for rule-utilitarianism is on rules like “do not walk on the grass” or “do
not fail to vote at an election” or “do not fail to vote at an election.”
In these cases it seems that it is beneficial if some people, though not too many,
to break the rule (pg. 11).
Lyon points out that we can distinguish the act of doing something (e.g., walking
on the grass) after some largish number n other people have done it from the
action of doing it when few or no people have done it (pg. 11).
When these circumstances are written into the rule, Lyons holds that the rule will
come to enjoin the same circumstances as would the act-utilitarian principle (pg.
11).
 Smart thinks that an adequate rule-utilitarianism is not only

extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian principle but it would
consist of one rule only: the act-utilitarian rule: “Maximize
probable benefit” (pp. 11-12).
 This is because any rule which can be formulated must be able

to deal with an indefinite number of unforeseen types of
contingency (pg. 12).
 No rule, short of the act-utilitarian one, can therefore be safely

regarded as extensionally equivalent to the act-utilitarian
principle unless it is that very principle itself (pg. 12).
 Thus, act-utilitarianism must become “one-rule” rule-

utilitarianism which is identical to act-utilitarianism (pg. 12).
R. M. Hare’s Two Level Utilitarian Model:
 Two-level utilitarianism or Kantian Utilitarianism is an attempt to accommodate

deontological intuitions (Kantian universalizability) within the framework of
utilitarianism by synthesizing both act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.
 In summary, a person's moral decisions should be based on a set of 'intuitive'

moral rules (derived from the logical feature of moral knowledge, common
preferences of humanity, etc) except in certain rare situations (e.g., prima facie
principles conflict, unusual cases) where it is more appropriate to engage in a
'critical' level of act utilitarianism.
 Act utilitarianism states that in all cases the morally right action is the one
which produces the most pleasure.
 rule utilitarianism states that the morally right action is the one that is in
accordance with a moral rule whose general observance would create the
most happiness.
 In terms of two-level utilitarianism, act utilitarianism can be likened to the

'critical' level of moral thinking, and rule utilitarianism to the 'intuitive' level.
Basic Argument:
1. The logic of moral terms like "ought”
a. Moral judgments are by their nature universalizable (they are

more than simple imperatives, they commit one to making the
same ought judgment in all circumstances that share the
same universal features; moral thinking is a rational pursuit).
2. Facts about human nature and commonly held human

preferences (human condition):
a. Human basic preferences tend to be uniform

b. Humans vary on their ability to think critically and act on what
they determine to be moral principles.
3. Warrants a two-level version of utilitarianism.

Regarding the Intuitive Level (Kantian/Rule):
The Intuitive Level is composed of prima facie principles or rules derived from the
logical features of moral language (universalizable ought claims) and general facts
& commonly held moral preferences. They are also informed by 2nd level
principles. Thus, a morally right action is an accordance with a moral rule whose
general observance would create the most happiness. Prima facie principles are
beneficial when there isn't time for critical thinking, or when one can't trust one's
critical thinking.
The Intuitive These rules are generated by the logical

The Intuitive features of moral language; they are by
level is also
level also nature universalizable. This means that
informed by moral judgments are more than simple
involves
Critical Level imperatives for they commit one to
general facts
when it comes to making the same ought judgment in all
& preferences
unusual cases, circumstances that share the same
commonly
etc (rule universal features (e.g., let no one
held by _________ at least, under such and such
utilitarianism).
humanity. experience).
Three Kinds of Intuitive Principles:
 According to Dr. Gary Varner, a proponent
of this view, notes:
 Common Morality
 Professional Ethics
 Personal Morality
Three Kinds of Intuitive Level
Principles:
Common Morality emerges when members of society face similar problems.
This is expected because of the universal features of the human condition as
evidenced in the common moralities of various cultures at different times and
places.
Professional Ethics emerge because of the similar kinds of situations repeatedly

certain roles experience; agreements on basic standards of conduct take place.
Personal Morality. Dr. Varner writes, “And insofar as individuals differ in their
abilities to reason critically under various circumstances, critical thinking will
lead different individuals to train themselves to adhere to different sets of
intuitive level rules, including "metaprinciples" for deciding when to engage in
critical thinking and when to stick unquestioningly to one's intuitive level
principles.”
Regarding the Critical Level (Act Utilitarian):
When you encounter (1) an unusual situation, (2) determine that two prima facie
rules contradict each other, (3) or where the normal rules would specify a course of
action that is clearly not the most beneficial, changing one’s mode of moral
thinking to the critical act utilitarian level is necessary (utility needs to be
maximized).
Act utilitarianism is a necessary compliment to rule utilitarianism because in

some cases an individual might pursue a course of action that would obviously
not maximize utility. Conversely, act utilitarianism is criticized for not allowing
for a 'human element' in its calculations, i.e. it is sometimes too difficult (or
impossible) for an ordinary person with imperfect knowledge to calculate the
action of maximal utility
Description of Model:
Each person shares the traits of the following to limited and varying extents at different times:
Prole:
Archangel:
1. Only uses critical moral 1. Human weaknesses to an extreme
thinking; no intuitive principles degree.
are needed.
2. Superhuman, god-like powers 2. Must rely upon intuitions and
of knowledge, thought, and no sound prima facie principles all
human weaknesses. of the time.
3. Unbiased, ideal observer who 3. Incapable of critical thought.

can immediately scan all
potential consequences of all
4. The set of intuitive moral rules
possible actions in order to
must be simple, general, easy to
frame a universal principle memorize, and use.
form which it could decide an
appropriate action for the
situation.
Objections against 2-Level
Utilitarianism
Apart from the criticisms that are commonly made of utilitarianism:
 Undermines an agent's commitment to act in accordance with his

moral principles for he knows that his everyday set of moral rules
is merely a guideline (less guilt for breaking an intuitive
principles).
 It is problematic for one's thinking in the way the two-level account

requires — to simultaneously think like a utilitarian and act in a
non-utilitarian way.
 Weakness of Will: Problems arise when we try to keep critical

thinking separate from intuitive (acting against one’s own
judgment).
How do we know what intuitive principle or
prima facie rules to follow?
According to Dr. Gary Varner:
1. Ideally: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would use

to choose such principles for people like us.
2. In practice: Default setting is an acceptance of common morality
and professional ethic which we fine-tune in order to arrive at a
distinctive personal morality.
How do we decide when to override an intuitive principle:
1. Ideality: Engage in critical thinking which an archangel would do.

2. Practice: Only override when the aggregate harm to be prevented
by doing so is both clear and great and the situation is the kind in
which you can really trust your critical thinking.
Advantages of Two-Level
Utilitarianism
 It is an integrated model which attempts to bypass objections to act
and rule utilitarianism by borrowing the best features of both theories
and combining them, and as a way of solving the problem of what to do
when moral rules conflict.
 It accounts for "the non-consequentialist (or deontological) feel" of the

principles of common morality.
 It relies on linguistic intuitions (intuitions about the logic of the moral

terms) rather than intuitive moral judgments. Reason is not just
random, subjective, or emotional.
 It is compatible with consequentialism because it occurs at critical level

and is the source of those “guides” at the lower level.
A. Advantages of Utilitarianism: BCPB:
1. Banishes mystery from moral decision-making; questions become

engineering problems.
2. Clear practical method of resolving moral conflicts.
3. Pleasure and pain are in fact considerations even if one

can’t capture it.
4. Benefits in view of being incorporated into public policy (inner-city

school vs. new turf in football stadium).
Arguments for Consequentialism:
1. Most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to

make the world better when we can. The question then is only
whether any moral constraints or moral options need to be added to
the basic consequentialist factor in moral reasoning. (Kagan 1989,
1998)
2. Even if every possible objection is refuted, we might have no reason

to reject consequentialism (but still no reason to accept it).
3. Attacks opponents. If the only plausible options in moral theory lie

on a certain list (say, Kantianism, contractarianism, virtue theory,
pluralistic intuitionism, and consequentialism), then
consequentialists can argue for their own theory by criticizing the
others. This disjunctive syllogism or process of elimination will be
only as strong as the objections to the alternatives, and the
argument fails if even one competitor survives. Moreover, the
argument assumes that the original list is complete. It is hard to see
how that assumption could be justified.
4. Consequentialism also might be supported by an inference to the

best explanation of our moral intuitions. This argument might
surprise those who think of consequentialism as counterintuitive, but
in fact consequentialists can explain many moral intutions that
trouble deontological theories. Moderate deontologists, for example,
often judge that it is morally wrong to kill one person to save five but
not morally wrong to kill one person to save a million. They never
specify the line between what is morally wrong and what is not
morally wrong, and it is hard to imagine any non-arbitrary way for
deontologists to justify a cutoff point. In contrast, consequentialists
can simply say that the line belongs wherever the benefits outweigh
the costs (including any bad side effects). If consequentialists can
better explain more common moral intuitions, then consequentialism
might have more explanatory coherence overall, despite being
counterintuitive in some cases. (Compare Sidgwick 1907, Book IV,
Chap. III.) And even if act consequentialists cannot argue in this
way, it still might work for rule consequentialists (such as Hooker
2000).
5. Consequentialists also might be supported by deductive arguments from

abstract moral intuitions. Sidgwick (1907, Book III, Chap. XIII) seemed to
think that the principle of utility follows from very general principles of
rationality and universalizability.
6. Other consequentialists are more skeptical about moral intuitions, so they

seek foundations outside morality, either in non-normative facts or in non-
moral norms. Mill (1861) is infamous for his “proof” of the principle of utility
from empirical observations about what we desire (cf. Sayre-McCord 2001).
In contrast, Hare (1963, 1981) tries to derive his version of utilitarianism
from substantively neutral accounts of morality, of moral language, and of
rationality.
7. Yet another argument for a kind of consequentialism is contractarian.

Harsanyi (1977, 1978) argues that all informed, rational people whose
impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society
would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and
extends Harsanyi's argument.
8. Even if none of these arguments proves consequentialism, there still might

be no adequate reason to deny consequentialism. We might have no
reason either to deny consequentialism or to assert it. Consequentialism
could then remain a live option even if it is not proven.
B. Objections to Utilitarianism:
1. Moral Problem: Utilitarianism lacks any moral component since it is an

engineering problem of calculations (e.g., Anscombe).
2. Consequential Problem: Utilitarianism can’t determine the full range of

consequences.
3. Quantification Problem: Just how much “good” outweighs” evil?
4. Justification of evil Problem. Outrageous and horrific acts can be justified

(Dostoevsky’s argument in Karamazov Brothers (1879-1880).
5. Moore’s Naturalistic Fallacy: Moral goodness cannot be adequately defined by

some natural property (G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica). He argues we must have
a tacit understanding of moral goodness (though he is consequential). Ross
(1877-1971) argues the same.
6. Explanation Problem: Unable to explain what is wrong with a

wrong action (obliging stranger who cooks himself in an oven).
7. Kantian-Inclination Problem: People naturally choose a Kantian-

type principle or consequentialism.
8. Psychologically False: (e.g., Pleasure Machine).
9. Individual Rights Problem. Fails to acknowledge intrinsic value of

individual rights.
10. Too demanding Problem: Utilitarians demand too much in every

action having the best consequences (e.g., going to the movies).
11. Utilitarians are divided on what should be calculated:
a. Jeremy Bentham’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism: pleasure vs. pain from Bentham

as the only 2 intrinsic values: “good is whatever brings the greatest happiness
to the great number.”
Ross states: Pleasure is not the only thing we recognize as being intrinsically
good; we recognize other things such as a good character & an intelligent
understanding of the world as having intrinsic value.
b. Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism: Cultural, intellectual & spiritual pleasures

are of greater value than mere physical pleasure.
c. JJ.C. Smart: Maximize the achievements of people’s priorities; it is for each

person to decide what counts as being happy.
d. Karl Popper’s Negative Utilitarianism: We are to promote the least amount of

evil or harm, or try to prevent the greatest amount of harm for the greatest
number (1945 The Open Society & Its Enemies).
f. Act Utilitarianism: Consider each act separately.
g. Rule Utilitarianism: Consider the consequences of acts performed as a general

practice.
h. Motive Utilitarianism by Robert Adams who advocates that we inculcate

motives within ourselves that will be generally useful across the spectrum of
the situations we are likely to encounter.
i. R.M. Hare’s 2 Level Utilitarianism whereby he bridges both act and rule
utilitarianism.
j. Preference Utilitarianism: defines the good to be maximized as the

fulfillment of person’s preferences.
k. Ideal Utilitarianism: Good is not identified with pleasure. Rather, goodness

is discovered by intuitionism; the rightness or wrongness of acts is determined
by their actual consequences; our duty is to produce the best possible
consequences even though we cannot always predict what the consequences
of our acts will be.
Ross states: Productivity of maximum good is not what makes all actions
right.
Counter-Intuitive Objection by Bernard Williams
 Bernard Williams argues that all versions of Utilitarianism

involve a counter-intuitive view of (a) responsibility for
acts (b) the virtue of integrity.
 Suppose Pedro will shoot 20 innocent people unless Jim agrees

to shoot 1. Utilitarianism says that Jim should shoot 1. If he does
not, then he is responsible for the deaths of 19 people he could
have saved. But Williams says that (a) if Jim declines to shoot,
then it is obviously Pedro rather than Jim who is responsible for
the 20 deaths. Moreover, b) if Jim is the sort of person for whom
shooting would be absolutely abhorrent, incompatible with his
deepest commitments, then a moral theory requires him to shoot
must be wrong.
Reply to Utilitarian Objection:
A Utilitarian might reply to Williams as follows: (a) if Jim

does not shoot, then both he and Pedro are fully
responsible for the 20 deaths. There is no “Law of
Conservation of Responsibility.” (Pedro is also
responsible for setting up the situation, of course.).
Moreover, (b) there is nothing sacred about integrity. It is
perfectly possible for a person to build a life around
morally flawed ideals that should be violated in certain
situations. Huck Fin was committed to the institution of
slavery, for example. Nevertheless, he had a moral duty
to help his enslaved friend escape. Jim may be
committed to the ideal of never taking human life, but
that commitment does not absolve him from killing, when
killing is morally required. His ideal, though hardly as
bad as slavery, is morally flawed. Jim is too squeamish.
Overview of Ethical Systems: W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism (1877-1971):
We directly, intuitively, immediately, objectively, & undeniably moral truths. 7
Prima facie duties are in fact duties which include fidelity, gratitude, reparations,
non-injury, beneficence (generosity), self-improvement, & justice.
They are What do you do Prima facie duties are 4 Central Views at the center of
moral, conditional
different from when these moral
guidelines which can Ross’s Intuitionism:
feelings when principles or truths
be overridden, 1. Moral Realism (metaphysics): it is built
come into conflict? trumped by other
you It is often difficult to
into our everyday ethical discourse &
duties; they are not thought.
experience be sure what the rules without
them; the exceptions. 2. Non-Natural Properties (metaphysics):
stronger duty is.
Transparency argument (we use term
truths of Nevertheless that We apprehend P.F. “good” without defining it) & open
intuitions is uncertainty doesn’t duties the same way argument (infinite regress on def. of good);
infect the general we apprehend it is this worldly (non-natural moral).
self-evident.
principles. mathematics.
They are 3. Irreducible pluralism about the right and
Therefore, I carefully There is no ranking of good (normative theory).
objective facts consider which duty priority with P.F.
which are 4. Moral propositions are self evident
is more “weighty”; it duties but some are
(epistemological); we have a priori
applicability more incumbent than
will then become knowledge (no special faculty).
others.
dependent. obvious.
Prima facie duties are different than Proper Duties.

Proper duties are duties we should perform in the particular situation or choice. You are obligated to do it; you
are bound to it. Rightness is not derived from the value of motive form which it is done. Rightness is not
wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one’s action. Rightness is determined by a plurality of
self-evident prima facie duties. In fact, rightness & goodness are simple non-natural properties.
W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism:
1. Ross, who combines aspects of Aristotle and Kant against
utilitarianism, contends for the following:
A. We have an intuitive knowledge of the rightness and wrongness

of acts.
B. Unlike Kantianism, Ross contends that this intuitive knowledge
doesn't consist of a set of moral absolutes that can not be
overridden.
C. Rather, our moral principles present us with prima facie duties
(conditional duties). While these duties' value is not upon
circumstances, their applicability is so dependent.
D. There is no special intuitive faculty. Our sense is highly fallible
but it is the only guide we have to duty.
E. His moral theory is pluralistic (several duties may make it
right; there is no master-value).
F. We have at least seven prima facie duties: fidelity, gratitude,
reparations, non-injury, generosity, justice, and self-
improvement.
W.D. Ross’ Intuitionism
 Objections:
 The prima facie list is unsystematic & follows no logical principle.
 Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations are in a
particular situation in contrast to both Kant and Mills who do.
 List of prima facie duties is without justification: how can we be sure it is

accurate?
 Clearly people have different intuitions about moral issues.
 How can we decide which intuitions to trust?
 Ross says in our immediate experience we don’t think about consequences, we

think about our binding duty (e.g., love for a friend). Hare says that is good
thing that you don’t think about this.
Overview of Ethical Systems: Ethical Relativism:
Ethical values and beliefs are relative to the various individuals or societies
that hold them; there is no objective right and wrong. Thus, morality is
simply a matter of subjective opinion.
INDIVIDUAL OR CULTURAL 3 Reasons used to support ethical

There is no PERSONAL RELATIVISM: relativism:
general RELATIVISM: Ethical values
agreement Ethical judgments 1. Diversity of Moral Views: The
& beliefs are
vary from
about what existence of moral diversity
simply the society to
is right and among people & cultures;
expressions of the society; the basis
wrong; there moral outlook & for moral 2. Moral Uncertainty: the great
can be no attitudes of judgments lies in difficult we in knowing what is
individual these social or morally right or wrong.
agreement believers. In
regarding cultural values;
essence, I have my 3. Situational Differences: The
there are no
morality. ethical views & you situations and life world of
have yours; neither trans-cultural
different people vary so much
are right or wrong. values.
it is difficult to believe that the
same things that would be right
1. Reject moral relativism because we don’t have basis moral for one would be right for
disagreements (lying) (but disagreements about facts; did he lie?). another. Thus, it seems
2. People can disagree about what is the right thing to do & yet believe that unlikely that any moral theory
there is a right thing to do (e.g., be a good steward of environment; Co2
emissions harm or don’t harm? We have different conclusions). can apply in a universal
3. Because we are uncertain about answer does not prove that it lacks an manner.
answer.
Overview of Ethical Systems: Moral Realism:
Moral Realism is the view that there are real objective moral facts/truths: Reason (Plato;
Kant) that can be known special intuitive powers (Moore), by revelation from God (Aquinas),
or by careful scientific investigation of moral lives and beliefs of variety of people and culture.
4 Types of Moral Cont. philosophical realism insist that

Realism: G.E. Moore Dispositional
objective moral facts are possible, & it
claims that we Ethical Realism: may be possible to discover them; it is a
1. Natural/ can intuit
Special Morality is complicated study. Rather than looking
revelation moral through intuition, pure reflective
evident in a
from God; qualities such reasoning, finding real moral facts will
relational require diligent research, including
as goodness in
2. Pure matter: careful inquiry into the moral lives &
reflective people or acts
beliefs of variety of people & cultures.
reason; though we A certain fit
Research will yield evidence of real
can’t observe between actions moral facts (maybe not). But in order
3. Intuitionism
it through the and situations or to decide we must do the empirical
4. Contemporary senses (e.g., actions and our research & investigate in order to see
Moral taste, touch innate how moral facts are to be established
philosophy.
taste, or sight) sensibilities. To be sure, It is less certain of itself.
While they are not sure that there are
objective moral facts, the insist that
Two reasons offered by B. Waller why moral truths have not yet been
disproved; Following Kuhn, it can
contemporary moral realism may fail: (1) A legitimately be one of competing
better theory comes along; (2) Lack of moral theories; let the facts determine the
answer. We may eventually develop
consensus. consensus. Advocate: Michael Smith.
Friedrich Nietzsche
 “Nietzche’s interprets his thoughts on morality as
what he calls “a morality for moralists” (KSA 11,
34 [194]).
“…the power of Nietzsche’s position depends upon

the truth of one central thesis: that all rational
vindications of morality manifestly fail and that
therefore belief in the tenets of morality need to
be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations
which conceal the fundamentally non-rational
phenomena of the will.” ~ Alasdair MacIntyre,
After Virtue, 117.
F. Nietzsche (1844-1900): Life simply is the will to power:
Campaign against morality. Greatly troubled by the decline of individuality, the hypocrisy of traditional European
morality that has oppressed the unfettered spirit of humanity, proclaims that true morality is that which conforms to
nature and condemns as bad whatever is contrary to it. Nature is essentially the will to power; it is brutal, cruel,
frightful, tragic, and beautiful. We must say yes to life as it actually is. The moral person lives “lives dangerously” by
increasing its mastery. Morality is located in nature-process; it is empirical, what we will, not metaphysical.
Genealogy of Morals Morality is not “located” in forms; it does not have a starting
The essence of the Our natural desire
questions the value of point (no origins) but is a nature- process; it is earthly as
individual is the is to dominate and opposed to spiritual; it is empirical, not metaphysical. Moral
morality.
will-the will to reshape the world terms become vacuous. In his typology of morals there are 2
power (Dionysus Self-deception is a to fit our own types: master morality & slave morality: Moral codes have
represents frenzied particularly destructive preferences & to originated “either among a ruling group whose consciousness
& passionate); characteristic of Western of their difference from the ruled group was accomp. by
asset our personal
reason (Apollo culture. delight or among the ruled, the slaves. Noble proclaimed
represents order &
strength to the good out of self-affirmation; evil is the slave’s primary
Moral phenomena does fullest degree concept. Both types “can have each other.” Every morality is
reason) is to
facilitate by not exist; there is only a possible. Struggle, against nature & reason (but not an object.)
moral interpretation of through which
organizing
phenomena. But once individuals achieve
efficiently the Regarding asceticism: We could go so far as to say that
freed, realize a degree of power
conditions of we are the "inward-looking animal," and that this inward
independence is only for
action. The height commensurate w/ looking has only been generated by a constant struggle
the strong.
of Greek civ. their abilities is the against ourselves and our own nature. The greatest
blending of both. The greatest power is basic fact of human triumph is to delight in and affirm this self-torture and
We are under found in those who can existence. struggle, to see it as a willful act of creation, whereby
Apollo & are in control their passions & we free ourselves of our instincts and our evolutionary
need of Dionysus. use them creatively. past, and fully create ourselves. The will is the will to
truth.
There are only verbs; The bird is the will; “their knowing is creating”; "There is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective ’knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ’concept’ of this thing, our ’objectivity,’ be.“ Absolute truth
means that a certain interpretation has become suspiciously compelling (Third Essay of Genealogy of Morals)..
Summary from Stanford Encyclopedia:
 Nietzsche's moral philosophy is primarily critical in orientation: he attacks

morality both for its commitment to untenable descriptive (metaphysical and
empirical) claims about human agency, as well as for the deleterious impact
of its distinctive norms and values on the flourishing of the highest types of
human beings (Nietzsche's “higher men”). His positive ethical views are
best understood as combining (i) a kind of consequentialist perfectionism as
Nietzsche's implicit theory of the good, with (ii) a conception of human
perfection involving both formal and substantive elements. Because
Nietzsche, however, is an anti-realist about morality, he takes neither his
positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have
any special epistemic status, a fact which helps explain his rhetoric and the
circumspect character of his “esoteric” moralizing. Although Nietzsche's
illiberal attitudes (for example, about human equality) are apparent, there
are no grounds for ascribing to him a political philosophy, since he has no
systematic (or even partly systematic) views about the nature of state and
society. As an esoteric moralist, Nietzsche aims at freeing higher human
beings from their false consciousness about morality (their false belief that
this morality is good for them), not at a transformation of society at large.
Nietzsche’s Starting Point:
 In his preface to his Genealogy of Morals, his “a
priori” starting point is to have a “suspicious interest
in morality.” He is interested in the following
questions:
“Under what conditions did man devise these value

judgments good and evil? And what value do they
themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or
furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of
distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of
life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the
plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty,
future? (Genealogy of Morals, preface, 3).”
What does he mean by
“Genealogy?”
 On one hand, it points to the investigation and
the evolution of a phenomenon: it describes the
successive forms the phenomenon adopts, and
it is especially interested in the most significant
changes or displacements in such an evolution.
 On the other hand, Genealogy points to the

investigation of the psychological, sociological,
and physiological conditions, functions, and
effects of such an evolution.
Outline of Genealogy: Using the genealogical method he examines the
constitutive understanding of the two foundations of morality:
1. good/evil and good/bad in GM 1.
2. Guilt/bad conscience in GM 2.
3. The Ascetic ideal in GM 3.
“The genealogist knows that life is will to power; this

enables him to acknowledge the plurality while at the
same time “collecting” it in terms of universal structures”
(e.g., “the ascetic ideal” in GM III), and it provides him
with a criterion by which he can evaluate what he finds;
with this criterion he can evlauate the traditional (moral)
criterion” (pg. 391 of “Nietzsche and Ethics”).
Central Points:
1. His call for a radical reconsideration of
everything from life and the world and human
existence and knowledge to value and
morality:
a. The “de-deification of nature;”

b. The “translation of values,”
c. The tracing of the “genealogy of moral”
and their critique;
d. The elaboration of “naturalistic”
accounts of knowledge, value, morality,
and our entire “spiritual nature.”
Central Points:
2. He insisted upon the interpretive character of
all human thought; he insisted on the need for
a revaluation of all received values, and for
attention to the problems of nature, status, and
standards of value and evaluation.
3. One form of the inquiry he took to be of great

utility in connection with both of these tasks is
genealogical inquiry into conditions under
which various modes of interpretation and
evaluation have arisen.
Central Points:
4. He emphasizes the perspectival character of all thinking and the
merely provisional character of all knowing, rejecting the idea of
the very possibility of absolute knowledge transcending all
perspectives. However, because he also rejected the idea that
things (and values) have absolute existence “in themselves” apart
from the relations which he supposes their reality to consist, he
held that, if viewed in the multiplicity of perspectives from which
various of these relations come to light, they admit of a significant
measure of comprehension. This perspectivism thus does not
exclude the possibility of any sort of knowledge deserving of the
name, but rather indicates how it is to be conceived and achieved.
His kind of philosophy, which he characterizes as “cheerful
science” proceeds by way of a variety of such “perspectival”
approaches to the various matters with which he deals.
Central Points:
5 Thus for Nietzsche there is no truth in the sense of

correspondence of anything we might think or say to
“being,” and indeed no “true world of being” to which it
may even be imagined to fail to correspond; no
“knowledge” conceived in terms of any such truth and
reality; and, no further, no knowledge at all-even of our
selves and the world of which we are a part-that is
absolute, non-perspectival, and certain. But that is not
the end of the matter. There are, e.g., ways of thinking
that may be more or less well warranted in relation to
differing sorts of interest and practice, not only within
the context of social life but also in our dealing with our
envisioning world.
Key Elements to Know:
1. The essence of the individual is the will-the will to power.
2. Transvaluation of values: Reverse the self-deception of

Judeo-Christian religion & Greek Rationalism by
implementing a moral revolution that presents a corrected
table of virtues for the free spirits, the aristocracy of free
spirits (not the common herd who are too weak):
a. Humility is replaced with pride;

b. Sympathy is replaced with contempt;
c. Love your neighbor is replaced with no more than
tolerance.
3. He exhorts the aristocracy of free spirits to prepare for the

highest stage in human development: the Superman.
Superman symbolizes the unfettered spirit, reveling in his

magnificent strength and his own worth. Although human nature
in its present condition may be regarded as the highest form of
existence, our dominance over nature is still precarious:
“Man is something to be surpassed.”

4. The conception of evolution is fundamental aspect of his system. However,
his interpretation of it departs from the Darwinian hypothesis.
Darwin’s evolution is conceived as passive and mechanical adaptation to the

environment, but Nietzsche finds the true meaning of evolution in an
aggressive will to power to dominate the environment:
“The strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expression in a
miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War, a Will to Power, a
Will to Overpower.”
There is in evolution no progress toward a goal: each thing in the universe

manifests a ceaseless, blind striving for power, shifting back and forth
between success and failure in the competition for master.
5. Good is whatever conforms to nature and he condemns as bad

whatever is contrary to it.
Affirming the values which enhance the will to power: Saying

yes to life as it actually is, constitutes true morality.
6. All ethical theories which conceal the hard facts of existence and
teach the repression of the will to power are insidious. Thus, he
believes that Judeo-Christian thought and rationalism of
traditional philosophy have had a debilitating influence of
Christianity by holding up the ideal of a human being as a
rational animal and suppression of our desires.
7. Nietzsche uses the Greek gods, Dionysus and Apollo to

dramatize the relationship between the will and reason.
Dionysus, the frenzied and passionate, is revered as the symbol
of the undisciplined will to power. Apollo, representing
rationality and order, must be the instrument by which the will to
power can increase its mastery.
With the Apollonian element supporting rather than suppressing

the Dionysian, humans can defy God and dominate the universe:
The moral person “lives dangerously.”
8. The distinction of moral values have either originated in a ruling
case, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled-or
among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts.
a. Master-morality creates the values than honor himself.

Therefore, when he helps the unfortunate, but not out of pity,
but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance
of power.
b. Slave-morality: Te slave has an unfavorable eye for the

virtue of the power, suspicious, and skeptical. Thus, those
qualities which they generate (helping hand, warm heart,
patience, diligence, humility, friendliness, etc) are the most
useful qualities: it is a morality of utility.
9. There will always be “weak” types.
10. The worry is that nihilism or “pity” will prevent those who are
strong from keeping their strength; that the weak are infecting
the strong (e.g., democracy levels precludes the possibility of an
over-rising man from rising).
11. Man is a kind of type; the over-man is a type; man is a bridge to

the overman. The type we are. But I don’t know if I would read
it as personified.
12. The weak can triumph but that doesn’t make them strong (e.g.,
his view of Christians).
13. Two stories of conscience: The relationship between the creditor and the debtor. If the
debtor doesn’t pay back the debts, the creditor will punish him. But on the other hand,
there is this attachment to “norms” which is through “cruelty” which we are made to
remember how we ought to behave;
14. Being in debt is being guilty and you should be made to suffer and so the origin of
cruelty there is an element of pleasure the debtor takes; there is pleasure in being cruel.
15. Pleasure is involved in receiving the cruelty.
16. Bad conscience emerges as a result of urbanization; the hostility and joy in attacking.
17. In this moment that our instincts turn upon ourselves we are at war; we level
ourselves.
18. The weak cannot actualize them.
20. We can overcome our nature which gives us the capacity that we can become strong or
we can become inward, and thus, weak.
21. The aesthetic ideals: poverty, chastity, and humility;
22. The aesthetic ideals give an explanation for our suffering. This is where our
sin comes in. We can be used in great service but he is concerned with the
aesthetic ideals for Christians; for them they are ends in themselves. For
Christians Aesthetic ideals have come to absolute. First claim he makes is
that the aesthetic ideals show us something of the human will. We need
meaning ultimately and aesthetic ideals and the needs that give rise to them,
show us that we need meaning (this is in the last section of the genealogy; the
aesthetic ideals that we need a human goal; he turns to the aesthetic priest,
who re-directs the blame (what is the cause of your suffering? It is your own
fault for being bad says the priest). So, the story he tells of the aesthetic ideals
is fascinating. The aesthetic ideals de-value life: this life is worth doesn’t
matter; only this life does. But how did this come to be? How has this view
of sin become widespread? Well, the aesthetic ideals grew out of a need to
preserve life.
23. The aesthetic ideals in the end de-value life…they help us overcome and give
meaning.
24. In the twilight of the idols, it is a profound moment in the decadence of
Greece whereby Socrates to comes to the scene. These ideals, Christians,
who de-value life gives us a reason (you are sinful). He is both appalled and
marveled by it.
25. Sin is not falsifiable; it has tremendous explanatory power.
26. Who can I blame, though a weak disposition itself, says it is your fault-says
the aesthetic priest.
27. Suffering makes you stronger (for Anselm you are paying off that debt).
28. BOTTOM LINE: WE CREATE MEANING FOR OURSELVES!
29. The strong person doesn’t resent, so there is no forgiveness.
30. The strong says yes (the eternal return); When Zurathrusta; Absolute
affirmation of the will; it is an existential compartment; the aesthetic priest
wishes to be elsewhere and Nietzsche affirms life as it is.
Significant Points by Paul J.M. Van Tongeren on
Nietzsche & Ethics
1. One of the most radical critics of morality &

ethics in history of philosophy.
2. There is an unmistakable moral pathos in his

philosophy, criticism of morality, & ethics:
Nietzsche himself interprets his thoughts on
morality as what he calls “a morality for
moralists.” Thus, the critique of morality as
well as the morality of his critique are of utmost
importance for a correct understanding of his
whole philosophy.
Nietzsche & Ethics
3. The moral distinctions of “good” and “evil” also lie, according to
Nietzsche, at the heart of religious principles, metaphysical categories,
and aesthetic appreciation.
4. But, in Nietzsche’s critique of those cultural domains morality has an

important role to play: the Christian God has been undermined by the
morality of truthfulness that unmasked the belief in God a s lie, and the
same morality of truthfulness plays an important role in the criticism of
science, philosophy, and art.
5. Nietzsche himself can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is
inspired and molded by the morality he criticizes.
6. Nietzsche can’t escape this criticism since his own critique is inspired and
molded by the morality he criticizes.
7. Therefore, Nietzsche resembles all those he criticizes, continually holding

them up to an ideal of health and fitness that has an unmistakable moral
tone. His own thought is certainly not exception to the rule he formulates
in Beyond Good and Evil:
Nietzsche & Ethics
“Gradually it has become clear to me that

every great philosophy so far has been:
namely the personal confession of its
author and a kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir; also that the moral
(or immoral) intentions in every philosophy
constituted the real germ of life from which
the whole plant has grown (BGE 6).”
Nietzsche & Ethics
8. What is the genealogy? The genealogy is

the method of his critique. Nietzsche, in
sum, argues in favor of the study of the
following:
a. The origination of moral categories;

b. The functioning of moral categories;
c. The critical evaluation of those categories.
Nietzsche & Ethics
Three crucial elements of his genealogical

method:
(1) History of origin and evolution;

(2) Analysis of function and effectiveness;
(3) Critical evaluation.
Consider MacIntyre’s Critique:
Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the
Enlightenment, is “at once absurd and dangerous fantasy,”…it is
worth noting how even that construction began from a genuine
insight” (pg. 113-14).
In the Gay Science (section 335) Nietzsche mocks the notion of

basing morality on inner moral sentiments, on conscience, the
Kantian categorical imperative, universalizability. In five swift
paragraphs he disposes the Enlightenment project to discover
rational foundations for an objective morality and of the confidence
of the everyday moral agent in post-Enlightenment culture that his
moral practice and utterance are in good order. The underlying
argument is: “If there is nothing to morality but expressions of will,
my morality can only be what my will creates. There can no place
for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. I must myself now bring into existence ‘new
tables of what is good.’ ‘We, however, want to become those we
are-human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give
themselves laws, who create themselves.’ (pg. 266).”
MacIntyre continues:
“The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of the

eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion; so, Nietzsche resolves, let
will replace reason and let us make ourselves into autonomous
moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the will, and act of
the will that by its quality may remind us of that archaic aristocratic
self-assertiveness which preceded what Nietzsche took to be the
disaster of slave-morality and which by its effectiveness may be the
prophetic precursor of a new era. The problem then is how to
construct in an entirely original way, how to invent a new table of
what is good and a law, problem which arises for each individual.
This problem would constitute the core of a Nietzschean moral
philosophy. For it is in his relentlessly serious pursuit of the
problem, not in his frivolous solutions that Nietzsche’s greatness
lies, the greatness that makes him the moral philosopher if the only
alternatives to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy turn out be those
formulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their
successors.”
 MacIntyre opposes Nietzsche's return to the aristocratic ethics of Homeric
Greece with the teleological approach to ethics pioneered by Aristotle.
Nietzsche’s critique of Enlightenment moral theory does not work against a
teleological ethics. For MacIntyre,
1. "Nietzsche replaces the fictions of the Enlightenment individualism, of

which he is so contemptuous, with a set of individualist fictions of his
own.
2. Nietzsche’s übermensch, his solution to the lies of the Enlightenment,

exposes the failure of the Enlightenment's epistemological project and
of its search for a subjective yet universal morality.
3. Nietzsche neglects the role of society in the formation and

understanding of tradition and morality, and "Nietzsche’s great man
cannot enter into relationships meditated by appeal to shared
standards or virtues or goods; he is his own only moral authority and
his relationships to others have to be exercises of that authority... it
will be to condemn oneself to that moral solipsism which constitutes
Nietzschean greatness.“
4. The attractiveness of Nietzsche’s position lay in its apparent
honesty (pg. 258).”
5. “Since moreover the language of morality is burdened with

pseudo-concepts such as those of utility and of natural rights, it
appeared that Nietzsche’s resoluteness alone would rescue us
from entanglements by such concepts; but it is now clear that the
price to be paid for this liberation is entanglement in another set of
mistakes. The concept of the Nietzschean ‘great man’ is also a
pseudo-concept, although not always perhaps-unhappily-what I
earlier called a fiction. It represents individualism’s final attempt
to escape from its own consequences. And the Nietzschean
stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from an alternative to
the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather
one more representative moment in its internal unfolding. And we
may therefore expect liberal individualist societies to breed ‘great
men’ from time to time. Alas!” (pg. 258-9).
He continues:
“So it was right to see Nietzsche as in some

sense the ultimate antagonist of the
Aristotelian tradition. But it now turns out to be
the case that in the end the Nietzschean
stance is only one more facet of that very
moral culture of which Nietzsche took himself
to be an implacable critic. It is therefore after
all the case that the crucial moral opposition is
between liberal individualism in some version
or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some
version or other” (pg. 259).
6. “The differences between the two run very
deep. They extend beyond ethics and morality
to the understanding of human action, so that
rival conceptions of the social sciences, of their
limits and possibilities, are intimately bound up
with the antagonistic confrontation of these two
alternative ways of viewing the human
world….Andit will now, I hope, be clear that in
the chapters dealing with th the topics I was
merely summing up the arguments against the
social embodiments of liberal individualism, but
also laying the basis for arguments in favor of
an alternative way of envisaging both the
social sciences and society, one which the
Aristotelian tradition
A Brief Critique:
 First, his moral relativism cannot stand against the logical strength of moral
absolutism.
 His basic arguments are self-defeating (in view of his belief in perspectivalism).
 There is strong evidence for God’s existence.
 Ramifications of Nietzsche’s ideas have had horrific consequences in 20th

Century history.
 Rather than promoting the welfare of others, he promotes selfishness,

harshness, and suspicion.
 He promotes hatred, bigotry, and discrimination of others.
 His radical empiricism is also unwarranted.
 His view isn’t livable (as he himself demonstrated in his own life).
 His views are counter-intuitive.

The Scottish Philosopher
David Hume (1711-1776):
An Introduction into
Hume’s view of Ethics:
If you want truth look to science or mathematics; ethics
is ultimately based on our feelings; Natural moral
sentiments is where moral decision-making is
grounded.
Consider the following quote…
“Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the

destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of my finger.”
~ A Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A. Selby-

Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave

of the passions, and can never pretend to
any other office to serve and obey
them.”
~ A Treatise on Human Reason, edited by L.A. Selby-

Rigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 416.
Consider the following quote:
“Take any action allowed to be vicious: willful
murder, for instance. Examine it in all its lights and
see if you can find that matter of fact, or real
existence, which you call vice…. You never can find
it, till you turn your affection into your own breast,
and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises
in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact;
but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in
your self, not in the object. So that which you
pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you
mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your
nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame
from the contemplation of it.”
~ A Treatise of Human Nature, Everyman’s
Library (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1956) 2:177.
“When we run over libraries, persuaded of these

principles what havoc must we make? If we take in
our hand any volume-of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance-let us ask, Does it contain
any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or
number? No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain
nothing but sophistry [literalism] and illusion.”
~ Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,

12.3.173.
I. Major Tenets:
(1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but

rather is the “slave of the passions.” In other words,
reason alone cannot motivate to action; the impulse
to act itself must come from moral sentiments.
(2) Morals are not derived from reason; they are
derived from the experience of people.
(3) Morals are generated from moral sentiments:
feelings of approbation (approval, esteem, praise) &
disapprobation (disapproval, blame) felt by
spectators who consider a character trait or
I. Major Tenets:
(4) While some virtues and vices are natural,

others, including justice, are artificial.
(5) Since the human psychological makeup of
man is similar, moral judgments will tend to
be similar.
(6) Since morals will tend to be similar,
moralities may be conceived in terms of
“social utility”
I. Major Tenets:
(7) Hume’s ethics comes out of the worldview of
empiricism: only matters of fact are those
discernible by the senses.
(8) Moral facts do not exist; rules of morality are not
derived from reason.
(9) Vice and virtue are perceptions in the mind and
that is all that is needed to regulate moral behavior.
(10) Moral distinctions are constituted by their
pleasantness & usefulness (he did not synthesize
how the relate to each other).
II. Overview of Significant Points:
1. Primacy of feelings over reason as a guide to ethics;
2. Human was profoundly influenced by Newtonian
scientific revolution;
3. Empirical science nor science can offer us ethical truths;
only genuine knowledge comes from pure mathematics or
empirical science. It is not because reason is flawed, but
because basic ethical preferences are generated from
feelings passions;
4. Factual knowledge arises exclusively from the data
supplied by the senses and is extended in usefulness by
means of inferences based on a belief in cause-and-effect
relations.
II. Overview:
5. Feelings cannot provide an objective foundation for
ethics; In fact, feelings are not subject to reason.
6. Hume attacks the idea of a necessary “metaphysical”

connection between cause and effect.
7. The basis of moral assertion is sourced in feelings of

approval (pleasure) or disapproval (pain or
uneasiness).
8. Hume is a compatibilist regarding free-will and

Newtonian determinism (he is a strict empiricist).
II. Overview:
9. Hume agrees with the moral sense theorists such as
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (moral sense) and Butler
(conscience) that all requirements to pursue goodness
and avoid evil as consequent upon human nature, which
is so structured that a particular feature of our
consciousness (whether moral sense or conscience)
evaluates the rest.
10.Because we are the kinds of creatures we are, with the

dispositions for pain and pleasure, the kinds of familial
and friendly interdependence that make up our life
together, and our approvals and disapprovals of these,
Hume believes we can escape radical relativism,
generate natural and artificial virtues are socially
agreeable.
II. Overview:
11. This view of moral grounding in “moral

sense”, “emotions,” or “passional nature” is
contrary to rationalists like Locke, Hobbes, and
Clarke, who believed that good and evil were
discovered by reason.
12. Locke, Hobbes, and Clarke believed, in some

moods, that moral standards or requirements are
requirements of reason.
II. Overview:
13. Hume takes an intermediate view regarding

whether morality is conventional (Hobbes)
or natural (Locke). Hume thinks natural
impulses of humanity and dispositions to
approve cannot entirely account for our
virtue of justice; a correct analysis of that
requires the thesis that mankind, an
“inventive species,” has cooperatively
constructed rules of property and promise.
II. Overview:
14.Hume disagrees with Hobbes regarding the

following:
a. Necessary psychological Egoism;

b. Necessary violent view of a state of
nature whereby without an organized
state “all is in a war against all”
II. Overview:
15. Hume disagrees with Locke (and Rawls) about the idea of
humanity being involved in a highly cooperative domain of
law-governing citizens for the following reasons:
a It is a hypothetical condition in which we would

care for our friends and cooperate with
them;
b. Self-interest and preference for friends over

strangers would make any wider cooperation
impossible.
One of the central themes of Hume’s political philosophy is

that we are both fundamentally loving and selfish.
II. Overview:
16. Turning from reason to sentiment Hume believes that has
avoided radical relativism or mere subjectivism.
a. Since people have the same psychological makeup, their
moral responses will be similar.
b. If provided the same data, people will tend to respond
similarly. That does mean that all people will agree about
the moral worth of an action.
c. Ethical disagreements generally stem not from differences
in our “passional” nature or feelings but from (a)
misunderstandings regarding circumstantial evidence or
from (b) incomplete analyses.
II. Overview:
17. Study of individual assessments reveal that

“socially useful acts are approved while those
which are socially detrimental are disapproved.
18. Since we judge acts generally by their conformity

to social utility (rather than by immediate, personal
preferences), impartiality will tend to prevail in
moral judgments.
II. Overview:
19. Conjoined events do not prove they are causally connected

any more than there is a causal connection between the
“rooster crowing” and the “sun rising.” All one can do is
extrapolate based on oft-repeated occurrences. He does not
deny the principle of causality; he denies the basis on
which some people try to prove causality.
20. All objections of human inquiry are relations of ideas

(mathematics; definitions) or matters of fact (everything
known through one or more of the senses).
II. Overview:
21. Laws of nature are habits formed in our

minds on what has occurred in the past and
the expectation of similar experiences will
occur in the future.
III. The Nature of Moral Judgment:
3 Textual Interpretations:
1. Non-propositional View: a moral evaluation does not express any

proposition or state any fact. Either it gives vent to a feeling, or it is
itself a feeling. (A more refined form of this interpretation allows
that moral evaluations have some propositional content, but claims
that for Hume their essential feature, as evaluations, is non-
propositional).
2.Description of the Feelings of the Spectator:

Hume is describing the feelings of the spectator, or
the feelings a spectator would have were she to
contemplate the trait or action from the common
point of view.
3. Dispositional interpretation: Evaluated trait or

action is so constituted as to cause feelings of
approval or disapproval in a (suitably
characterized) spectator. On the dispositional view,
in saying some trait is good we attribute to the trait
the dispositional property of being such as to elicit
approval.
IV. Moral Sentiments:
1. Moral sentiments are emotions which possess unique

phenomenological quality, and special set of causes.
2. Moral Sentiments are caused by contemplating the person or

action.
3. Moral sentiments tend to be clarified or brought into

focus by social utility which is a common moral sentiments
or similar responses (collectively).
Moral sentiments are the sort of pleasure & uneasiness which are
associated with 4 passions:
1. Pride;
2. humility;
3. Love;
4. Hatred.
Some argue that pleasure and pain cause these 4 passions others
believe these 4 passions make up the pleasure or pain.
Thus, when we feel moral approval we tend to love or esteem, and

when we approve a trait of our own we are proud of it.
Because we share a similar psychological makeup, thus share

common moral sentiments, we are able to generate or invent artificial
virtues because we find them to be pleasant and not painful (e.g.,):
1. Justice with respect to property,

2. Allegiance to government,
3. The laws of nations,
4. Modesty, and
5. Good manners), which (Hume argues) are inventions c
contrived solely for the interest of society.
V. Kant vs. Hume
1. Similarity: Hume and Kant recognized the difference between
pure reason (understanding) from practical reason (work of the
will). In other words, they both recognized an important
difference between judgments of facts and judgments of value.
2. Difference: Kant was a rationalist in his conception of morals;

Hume was an empiricist. A rationalist derives principles of
morality from metaphysical assumptions. Stated differently,
Kant grounds his morality in rationalism and Hume on natural
moral sentiments.
3. Difference: According to Kant, no matter how unpleasant the

command makes you feel, you are obligated to fulfill it
according to Kant.
VI. Kant vs. Bentham and Mill on “utility”
Jeremy Bentham argued that the standard of goodness in the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
persons is intrinsically valuable.
1. While Hume and Bentham agree that happiness is good,
Hume does not admit that it is the only thing that is good.
Human beings are complex organisms, and their total
welfare includes more than the satisfaction of the one
need for happiness.
2. Mill recognizes the cultural, intellectual, and spiritual
pleasures are of greater value than mere physical pleasure.
While Hume will agree that we are complex humans, he
would reject Mill’s finite godism and would reject his
utilitarianism because he grounds morality not in utility but
in moral sentiments which all humans share.
VII. Hume on Justice:
1. The purposes of justice can be realized only by adapting

the methods that are used to the particular situation that is
involved.
a. Justice is a relative virtue in contrast to a deontological
version of justice, one that is not influenced by the
situational setting.
b. He believes our human understanding of justice does
vary from one time to another and that the application
of the principles of justice will vary with the
circumstances under which they are applied.
“As justice evidently tends to promote public
utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of
justice is either derived from our reflecting on that
tendency, or like hunger, thirst, and other appetites,
resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring,
and other passions, arises from a simple original
instinct in the human breast, which nature has
implanted for like salutary purposes.”
~ An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,
(Chicago: Open Court, 1966), 35.
2. Justice is “dynamic”:
a. Justice is expressed in laws and customs which are

generated when the need arises for them.
b. The nature of justice varies in view of situational

setting (illust. Sexual morality may vary depending
upon setting).
3. In view of his appendix on justice in An Enquiry

Concerning the Principles of Morals that there are
certain principles which may be recognized that
can advance justice:
A. Avoid giving special privileges to some but not others;
B. Take into account the long-range interests of others rather than
immediate satisfactions; personal and immediate needs may need to
be sacrificed in order to achieve the well-being of society.
C. Seek to meet the needs of society as a whole.
4. On Distributive Justice:
 Justice exists for meeting the needs of society;
 Justice will be stated in general rules of conduct but particular
situations and other factors may arise whereby the needs and
meeting those needs will mean change (e.g., war).
 Distributing justice is quite impossible to meet every need.
 Justice is for the purpose of distributing goods in an equitable
manner; there is no exact formula for doing this that will meet the
needs of every situations that comes about.
 Neither extreme wealth or poverty are in the best interests of
others.
 Believes in a moderate view of property rights.
 Justice is a relative virtue; nothing remains constant about the
nature of justice.
VIII. Hume on Altruism and Selfishness:
1. Altruism and selfishness are not necessarily opposed to one

another.
2. We possess a humanitarian sentiment which naturally
approves of what is beneficial and useful to society.
3. Since we share a common morality derived from our nature,
principles of morality are not derived from self-love alone.
4. What gains the admiration and respect of others is by acting upon
the pleasing moral sentiments that fellow-humans share; this is
virtuous and meritorious.
 Human nature includes both selfish and unselfish sentiments.
 Human nature is selfish to some extent.
 Human nature also has the capacity to act beyond one’s selfishness.
 We can feel the pain of others and their misfortune.
 Selfishness can over shadow good intentions but does necessarily have to.
IX. In Summary:
“About Hume's ethics: we have a moral sentiment or feeling of
approval or disapproval (approbation or disapprobation) about actions
that we find pleasing or agreeable. We find actions agreeable (and thus
approve of them) not because of the utility of such actions but because
we ‘naturally’ have an inclination to approve of what we are attracted
to. In thinking about the pleasures or pains of other people, we (along
with all other normal human beings) are attracted to what arouses in us
natural sentiments of humanity and benevolence. Such sentiments are
not derived from self-love but from a sense of identifying with other
human beings. That sense of fellow-feeling, not the perception of the
utility of actions, is the basis on which we feel moral obligation. Of
course, promoting social utility is in our own self-interest, but acting
for the sake of promoting our own self-interest is not a good enough
reason for acting in a moral way” ~ Dr. Steve Daniel
X. Advantages:
1. Some will appreciate the fact that it removes

“metaphysical mysteries” from realm of ethics because it
grounds morality in moral sentiments which all humans
share.
2. Pleasure and pain are important considerations in ethical
judgments.
3. It attempts to balance both selfishness and altruism.
4. It seems to avoid pure egoism, utilitarianism, and radical
relativism.
XI: Objections Raised against Hume:
1. Hume reduces ethics to a matter of taste (e.g., A.J. Ayer & C.L.
Stevenson), relativism, and subjectivism.
 Hume replies: since people have the same psychological makeup, moral
responses will be comparable. To be sure, this doesn’t mean everyone will
agree about but if provided the same data, they will generally tend to
respond similarly:
a. Common Nature
b. Same Data;
= Similar response.
Ethical differences stem not from differences in our “feelings or “passional”

nature but from misunderstandings about the actual circumstances
surrounding a given act or from incomplete analyses of the consequences
accruing from the act.
XI. Objections:
2. Those who embrace “objectivist feelings” will reject
Hume’s account of subjectivist feelings. Some believe
feelings can be a source of objective truths of ethics.
Consider Blaise Pascal’s famous statement:
“The heart has its reasons that the reason know not”
For those who embrace objective feelings they would
argue that while feelings may not be an infallible guide
to ethics, feelings are not distractions on the path to
ethical truth. Rather, feelings can be a source of ethical
insight.
Do you agree? Can ethical feelings be objectively true or are they
more like tastes?
XI. Objections:
3. Moral sentiments cannot provide an adequate basis for moral
obligations (e.g., justice).
Hume’s response: It is obligatory, for example, to be just…but the

reason we adopt the concept of justice and guide our actions in
conformity to it is because it comes from the moral sentiments we
all share.
 Hume doesn’t deny a specific instance of injustice could be more beneficial

to society than its corresponding instance of justice in some odd case, but by
conforming ourselves to the moral sentiments of justice, humanity can be
served.
Response: Still justice is not absolute, fixed upon absolutes; it is sourced in

moral sentiments that can change (justice becomes somewhat relative even
if it is not radical relativism).
XI. Objections:
4. Borrowing the notion of social utility to find a way to maintain
social order is using reason. Social utility is powerful enough to
incite action to actually do the good.
 Hume would respond by saying that the source of utility is not

reason but “moral sentiment” that we naturally share; we
identify with other beings on that sense of “fellow feelings”.
Thus, it is not from “social utility” but moral sentiments that
ground our morality. Secondly, reasons of social utility is not
powerful enough to incite action; it is the “moral sentiments”
of feelings of approval or disapproval that motivates action, not
the perception of social utility.
5. Hume’s skepticism is self-defeating because he did not suspend

moral judgments regarding God, miracles, and metaphysics.
XI. Objections:
6. Metaphysical problem: According to Hume, meaningful
propositions are empirical. But this is self-defeating, for the
statement that “only analytic or empirical propositions are
meaningful” is not itself an analytic statement. If one allows that
such statements are meaningful, then why cannot metaphysical
statements be meaningful? Stated differently, to say there is no
metaphysics is itself a metaphysical statement, namely that you
know that metaphysics doesn’t exist.
7. Causality can be experienced internally. I am the cause of this

sentence I am typing, and I experience that fact. Everyone
experiences their own thoughts and actions.
XI. Objections:
8. Fundamentally to explain what is wrong with a wrong
action because it is solely based on human experience.
Reason only reveals matters of fact.
a. Good in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or

moral sentiments.
b. Evil in the moral sense of the term is reduced to feelings or
moral sentiments.
1. Hume’s response is that there is no other way to judge morality.

Moreover, we are naturally constituted in such a way that there
is present in us a “sense of humanity” which always approves
of that which promotes human welfare and is useful in society
because we all share it.
XI. Objections:
9. Hume is subject to the postmodern critique that are our

“emotions” are not a product of “moral sentiments”.
Rather, we are morally scripted by our sub-culture.
How does Hume know that our moral sentiments are
natural and not socially inscribed values?
10. Doesn’t the idea that we all share a “similar constitution

of moral sentiments” beg the question that we are
“designed” by God (e.g., Thomas Reid)?
An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals
An Introduction/Overview:
Overview of Enquiry:
An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals (1751) is
broken down into 9 Units of thought:
1. Of the Great Principle of Morals

2. Of Benevolence
3. Of Justice
4. Of Political Society
5. Why Utility Pleases
6. Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves
7. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves
8. Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others
9. Conclusion
What is the aim of book?
Thesis Statement: Moral sense makes the ultimate
distinction between vice & virtue; both moral
sense and reason play a role in the formation of
moral judgments. The basis of virtue lies in its
utility (usefulness), fulfilling two requirements for
moral sentiments: (1) It is useful to ourselves
(agreeable) or (2) to others. Therefore, the
purpose of this book is the contributions moral
sense and reason make in our moral judgments.
What is the aim of book?
Complimentary Statement: Reason is important

because we make moral judgments about what is
useful to us or to others; it plays the role of an
advisor, not decision-maker. In other words,
reason does not motivate us to action. Rather, the
capacity of sympathy (moral sentiments), which is
rooted in our human constitution, motivate us to
act or ignore those judgments.
Central Points to Hume’s Ethics:
Hume’s list of virtues are:
 Qualities useful (pleasurable) to others: benevolence,

justice, fidelity.
 Qualities useful to their possessor: discretion,
industry, frugality, strength of mind, good sense.
 Qualities agreeable (immediately pleasurable) to their
possessor: cheerfulness, magnanimity, courage,
tranquility.
 Qualities agreeable to others: politeness, modesty,
decency.
Hume’s Distinction between
artificial & natural virtues:
Artificial virtues depend on social structures and
include the following:
a. Justice and fidelity to promises;

b. Allegiance;
c. Chastity and modesty;
d. Duties of sovereign states to keep
treaties, to respect boundaries, to protect
ambassadors, and to otherwise subject
themselves to the law of nations.
Artificial virtues may vary from society to society.

Hume’s Distinction between artificial & natural virtues:
Natural virtues, originate in human nature, thus tend to be

more universal:
Compassion Prudence Temperance Generosity

Gratitude Friendship Fidelity Charity
Beneficence Clemency Cleanliness Decorum
Temperance Frugality Pride Modesty
Good Sense Wit Humor Articulateness
Perseverance Patience Good nature
Sensitivity to poetry Self-assertiveness
Elusive quality that makes a person lovely or valuable
Involuntary virtues (e.g., good sense)

voluntary virtues (e.g., ambition)
Related to purpose are three
questions (chapter 1):
 (1) Is morality derived from reason or sentiment?
 (2) What is the process whereby we obtain knowledge of

moral judgments: chain of arguments and induction or by
some internal sense?
 (3) Are moral judgments the same for every rational

intelligent person? In his pursuit for the origins of
morality he presupposes an anti-supernatural claim, thus
dismissing any theological metaphysical perspectives of
this matter and advances a utilitarian model.
Chapters 2-5:
In chapters 2-5 Hume surveys three kinds of

conduct that are virtuous; they are virtuous
because they are useful:
Benevolence;
Justice;
Political Society.
Chapter 2: On Benevolence:
 “On benevolence,” “nothing can bestow

more merit on any human creature than
the sentiment of benevolence in an
eminent degree; and that a part, at least,
of its merit arises from its tendency to
promote the interests of our species, and
bestow happiness on human society”
(2.2.14).
Chapter 3: On Justice:
 “On Justice”, Hume writes, “public utility is

the sole origin of justice, and that reflections
on the beneficial consequence of this virtue are
the sole foundation of its merit” (3.1.15). This
particular virtue is the considerable source of
merit ascribed to “humanity, benevolence,
friendship, public spirit, and other social
virtues of that stamp [justice]” (3.2. 38).
Chapter 4: Of Political Society:
 “Of Political Society,” the fundamental value

of the duty of allegiance is the “advantage,
which it procures to so society, by preserving
peace and order among mankind” (4. 39). He
concludes that “common interest and utility
begets infallibly a standard of right and wrong
among the parties concerned” (4. 45).
Chapters 5-7
 Chapter 5: Why utility pleases is because we are social
beings.
 Chapter 6: Qualities that are USEFUL to us

INDIVIDUALLY include happiness, joy, triumph,
prosperity, honesty, fidelity, truth, temperance, patience,
perseverance, sobriety, and physical fitness.
 In chapter 7 what is immediately AGREEABLE to

OURSELVES include pleasure accompanied with
temperance and decency; greatness of mind, character,
philosophical tranquility or magnanimous predisposition,
benevolence, and bravery.
Chapter 8: Of Qualities Immediately
Agreeable to Others:
 What is immediately agreeable to others: wit, politeness,
modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality which one
possesses which we characterizes as good manners and
character.
 How one determines those qualities is whether they have a

beneficial, useful, extensive, and positive influence; not
only will they harmonize with the moral sensibilities of
others and ourselves, but will produce pleasure personally
and socially.
 To be sure, no quality is absolutely either blamable or

praiseworthy; it is all according to its degree and
coherence (6.1. 68). But for those that produce public
affection, they must be pursued (e.g., self-love vs.
community-centered) (5.1. 48-49).
Chapter 9: Conclusion:
 Reason does not cause our actions.
 Our actions are caused by a combination of utility and

sentiment whereby reason is embedded in the passions,
desires, habits, and sentiments of mind. In other words,
morality cannot be separated from psychology.
 There is no such thing as good and evil outside of human

sentiments.
 What promotes happiness among our fellow humans “is

good” and what tends to their misery “is evil”; we do not
need to go any further in our reflection or deliberation on
these matters.
 What is virtuous is useful.

Chapter 9: Conclusion:
 Hume writes:
“What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish

these sentiments, dependent on humanity, from
those connected with any other passion , or to
satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals,
not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my
approbation, by touching my humanity, procures
also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the
same principle in them; but what serves my
avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me
alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of
the rest of mankind. There is no circumstance of
conduct in any man, provided it has a beneficial
tendency that is not agreeable to my humanity…”
(9.1.112-13).
Central Ideas:
1. Moral sentiment is where moral decision-making
is grounded.
2. Sympathy is the capacity to be moved or affected

by the happiness & suffering of others-to be
pleased when others prosper and distressed when
others suffer.
3. The inclination for this capacity is experienced to

be a principle of human nature (V.17).
Central Ideas:
4. Sympathy is not a virtue but the source of moral
approval.
5. When we ascribe moral praise or blame, the praise or

blame derives from an attitude of sympathy.
6. Sympathy, if not universal, is a feature for any normal

human being.
7. Hume attempts to describe and explain how we do in fact

make moral judgments; he does not tell us how we ought
to make them. In other words, he is concerned with
judgments about personal qualities rather than
judgments about actions.
8. Three Stages of Judgments:
First Stage: Sympathy induces us to take into account the
happiness and suffering others and ourselves.
Second Stage: General standards correct the operation of

sympathy so that we attach the same moral importance to
the happiness or suffering of anyone, ourselves, or others,
close to us or remote to us.
Third stage: In some cases we need to take into account

not merely the utility or particular acts, but the usefulness
to society of a whole system of general rules and
conventions.
8. Three Stages of Judgments:
 Each of these three is a move from a limited to a
more generalized standpoint.
 Together they challenge the Platonic-Aristotelian

view that one’s moral assessments are
necessarily made from the standpoint of a
concern for one’s own well-being.
9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:
“When a man dominates another his enemy, his rival, his
antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the
language of self-love, and to express sentiments peculiar to
himself and arising form his particular circumstances and
situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of
vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another
language, and expresses sentiments in which he expects all
his audience are to concur with him. He must therefore,
depart, from his private and particular situation and must
choose a point of view common to him with others; he must
move some universal principle of the human frame (IX.6).”
9. Significant Quotes on Sympathy:
“This universal principle is the sentiment of humanity or
sympathy. And though this affection of humanity may not
generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet,
being common to all men, it can alone be the formulation
of morals or of any general system of blame or praise
(Ibid).”
10. Similarities:
Hume agrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:
A. Moral judgments are primarily about virtues and vices.

We praise people insofar as they exhibit virtues and
blame then insofar as they exhibit vices. Only
secondarily are our moral judgments concerned with
specific actions. We praise or blame others because they
reveal morally admirable qualities in the agent.
B. Virtues would not be virtues unless possession of them

were in some sense an advantage. In fact, Hume, an
action is only virtuous if it proceeds from a virtuous
motive. So if an action lacks a virtuous motive, that
action is not virtuous even if it is the same type of action
as a genuinely virtuous action.
11. Differences:
Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle on the following:
A. Differences emerges when we look at what Hume

counts as virtues.
1. For Hume, what makes various qualities

“virtues” is that they are useful or
agreeable with, either to the possessor or
to others.
2. For Hume, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle,

thinks that not only qualities useful or agreeable
to their possessor, but also qualities useful or
agreeable to others, are regarded virtues.
11. Differences:
Hume contends that virtues may be immediately pleasing, in
which case he describes the qualities as “agreeable”; or may
be an indirect advantage-i.e., possession of such qualities may
help to promote states of affairs which in their turn are
pleasurable, and these are these are the qualities which Hume
describes as ‘useful.’ He parts company from Plato and
Aristotle, however, in that he thinks that not only qualities are
useful or agreeable to their possessor, but also qualities useful
or agreeable to others, are regarded as virtues
11. Differences:
B. Benevolence also marks a decisive shift from the standpoint of
the Greeks.
1. Hume states that ‘the epithets [labels] sociable, good-

natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly,
generous, beneficent, or their equivalents…
universally express the highest merit which human
nature is capable of attaining (II.1).’
2. Benevolence is a quality the exercise of which

promotes the happiness or well-being of people in
general, and because, through sympathy, we take
pleasure in this general happiness or well-being, we
are led to admire the quality which promotes it.
11. Differences:
3. Since Hume disagrees with Plato and Aristotle’s
metaphysics and believes these virtues are sourced in
man’s constitution we understand why he would
regard benevolence the highest merit.
4. In fact, Hume’s notion of sympathy sets him apart from

the egoistic perspective of Plato and Aristotle though he
does abandon his reliance on sympathy and revert to
self-love in part II of Enquiry’s conclusion.
11. Differences:
B. Hobbes:
1. Hume rejects Hobbes harsh egoistic depiction of human

psychology and strong authoritarianism and states
(Hume) that we are not wholly self-seeking; we can take
immediate pleasure in the flourishing of others.
2. Virtue of justice develops out of the self-regulation of

our desire for possessions, in an implicit denial of
Hobbes’ view that there can be no justice without
external regulations by a stronger ruler. Life in a secular
world need not be grim; it can be both enjoyable and
free.
An Introduction to John Rawls
John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice:
Cambridge: Harvard, 1971)
&
The Law of Peoples
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1999),
a book that extends
distributive justice to a global
context.
Lived from 1921-2002,
Dr. Rawls was professor at
Harvard University, author of
such as works as A Theory of
Justice, Justice as Fairness,
and Lectures on the History of
Moral Philosophy.
Summary of Rawls Contribution
A. American political philosopher who made a tremendous
impact in Anglo-American political philosophy in a series
of articles that culminated in A Theory of Justice.
B. Rawls opposed utilitarianism with its exclusive concern

with aggregate happiness. Rather, Rawls argues that the
fundamental or essential political value is individual rights
or “justice as fairness.”
C. The most reasonable principle of justice are those everyone

would accept and agree to from a fair position.
D. A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is impartially

situated as equals (the original position) and a certain
degree of rationality (a certain conception of the good we
want to realize and that it requires a certain set of primary
goods (all purpose or good needs) to realize a fair
agreement) and is situated by a hypothetical veil of
ignorance ( no extra bargain powers).
E. The veil of ignorance demands that people set aside their

knowledge of their particular differences, including
knowledge of philosophical, religious & social positions,
conception of values, and wealth.
1. Let’s say two parties are disputing the future arrangement
of a set of primary goods—income, for example. In what
Rawls terms the “original position,” both parties as equals,
know the benefits and disadvantages that will flow from a
particular distribution of those goods: that a worker will
achieve a particular wage, a manager a certain salary, a
stakeholder a certain return on investment, and so on. But
a veil of ignorance exists for the parties. Neither party in
the original position knows their specific place in that
future arrangement, they come as equals (original position),
setting aside their particular differences (veil of ignorance).
Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an

arrangement that maximizes the benefits to all.
2. Stated differently, for fairness, you want to ignore your own
personal circumstances when you come to the discussion table.
3. Theoretically we use the “veil of ignorance” to convey the idea

that if you don’t know your own personal situation, you are
forced to create laws that can be universally applied. By having
this “blind” point of view, you are not motivated by personal or
national self-interests, inclinations, desires, etc. All that remains
is reason.
4. Why? Each person as a rational being wills to enjoy the primary

social goods and primary natural goods. Social primary goods
include rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and
wealth are social goods. Primary natural goods include health,
vigor, intelligence, & imagination. These goods are desirable for
any rational plan of life. Our rationality is flexible in that we are
willing to give some of these liberties up to help those who are in
need or less fortunate.
F. Rawls proceeds by arguing for a “social contract” as
articulated in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.
G. Said differently, the ultimate basis of society is a set of tacit

agreements. The question then becomes, what conditions
will satisfy all parties.
H. In the hypothetical original position everyone would reject

utilitarianism & intuitionist views. Rather, everyone would
unanimously accept justice as fairness.
I. Justice as fairness consists of two principles:
1st Principle: Certain liberties are basic and are to be

equally provided to all: Freedom of conscience, freedom
of thought, freedom of association, equal political thought,
freedom and integrity of the person, and the liberties that
maintain the rule of law.
They are basic because they are necessary to exercise one’s

“moral powers.”
.
1. They are basic liberties because they are necessary to
exercise one’s “moral powers.” The two moral powers
are:
a. The capacity to be rational, to have a rational
conception of one’s good.
b. The capacity for a sense of justice, to

understand, apply, and act from requirements
of justice.
Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that

maximizes the benefits to all.
1. They are basic liberties because they are necessary to
exercise one’s “moral powers.” The two moral powers
are:
a. The capacity to be rational, to have a rational
conception of one’s good.
b. The capacity for a sense of justice, to

understand, apply, and act from requirements
of justice.
Reason should prevail to bring the parties to agree to an arrangement that

maximizes the benefits to all.
2nd Principle is the difference principle:
The difference principle regulates permissible differences

in rights, powers, & privileges. It defines the limits of
inequalities in income, positions, powers, and wealth that
may exist in a just society.
The difference principles asserts that social positions are to

be open to all to compete for on terms of fair equality of
opportunity. Inequalities in income, social powers, and
wealth are permissible only if they maximally benefit the
least advantaged class in society.
2. Therefore, the difference principle contends
that a just economic system distributes income
and wealth so as to make the class of least
advantaged persons better off than they would be under
any alternative economic system.
3. To be sure, this principle is to be consistent with the

“priority” of the first principle which requires that equal
basic liberties cannot be traded for other benefits.
4. A basic liberty can be limited only for the sake of

maintaining other basic liberties.
J. Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:
1st: Certain liberties are basic and equally provided to all;

2nd: Difference principle which regulates permissible differences in
rights, powers, and privileges;
a. A just society maximizes the worth to the least

advantaged for the basic liberties shared by all (Theory,
pg. 205).
b. Priority of basic liberty implies a liberal egalitarian society

in which each person is ensured adequate resources to effectively
exercise her basic liberties and become independent and self-
governing
J. Take Rawls’ conception of justice together:
c. Thus, a just society is governed by a liberal-democratic

constitution that protects the basic liberties and provides
citizens with equally effective rights to participate in
electoral processes and influence legislation.
d. Economically, a just society incorporates a modified

market system that extensively distributes income and
wealth-either a property-owning democracy with
widespread ownership of means of production, or liberal
socialism.
K. In sum, Rawls general conception of Justice:
 All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity,

income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are
to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored. (303)
 This flows from Kant’s categorical imperative,

“Desire to treat one another not as means only but as
ends in themselves.” People are be treated as ends in
themselves because of their capacity for moral
choice.
L. In conclusion, if we accept Rawls’ tenets of the
following:
Original Position: A fair agreement is one whereby everyone is
impartially situated as equals; this is a justice of fairness. If I want to justify
policy to other people, then I have to adopt a perspective that forces me to adopt
the good of others. It is a powerful heuristic device. It is offering respect to
others (intuitive principle).
Veil of Ignorance: people set aside their knowledge of their particular

differences, preferences, abilities, and position (including knowledge of
philosophical, religious & social positions, conception of values, and wealth). It
is offering respect to others (intuitive principle).
Difference Principle: a just economic system distributes income and

wealth so as to make the class of least advantaged persons better off than they
would be under any alternative economic system.
We have a foundational, universal, systematic method

for judging the moral actions of a society (s)
Rawls vs. Plato:
Why Rawls is different than Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.)?
Plato raises an interesting question:
“What advantage is there in being just?
1. In presenting an ideal state as articulated in The Republic, Plato
contends that on occasion, the leaders must manipulate some citizens
through the social device of a “Noble Lie” in order to achieve a well-
ordered state.
2. Rawls contends that no individual, of his or her own volition, will

agree to a social principle which reduces him or her to mere means.
Rather, contract must be such that if they were made public, everyone
would continue to support them. In Plato’s case, publicity would surely
work toward the disaffection of those being lied to. Indeed, this would
be the case even if individuals acknowledged their inferior abilities.
Rawls vs. Hobbes:
Why Rawls is different than Hobbes (1588-1679)?
1. Hobbes insists that we agree to subordinate ourselves completely to

an absolute sovereign power because of our self-serving desire for
security. But even if we subordinate ourselves to a sovereign power and
achieve a measure of security, we, more than likely, wouldn’t remain
bound by the agreements made. Ex. On a Hobbesian account if a
citizen in a secure environment desires to steal, is confident that he can
avoid detection, there is no reason in theory or practice for him to feel
morally constrained from acting on that desire.
If there is no fear, there is no obligation!
2. Rawls believes that basic social agreements must be such that they are
acceptable in perpetuity, i.e., contracts are not conditional upon on the
happenstance of one’s position in a society at a given time.
Rawls vs. Hume:
Why Rawls is different than Hume?
1. Hume states, “There is a maxim very current in the world, which few
politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the
practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for
princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private
persons.” Treatise pg. 597.
While morality may extend to princes, it does not have the same force as
that of private persons.
2. Hume believes that neither justice or injustice is in the state of nature
because justice and injustice are conventional. Questions of justice arise
exclusively in connection with social rules, adopted in the expectation of
mutual benefit, & observed in expectation of mutual conformity.
3. Rawls would respond by saying that contracts need to made in such a

way that it bears equality & responsibility on both prince and pauper.
Rawls vs. Marx:
Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):
1. Marx contends that only in a classless society, where all people become
workers, where the means of production are socially owned, can all
participate equally in making the decisions that shape their lives. Only
socialism allows us to have “an association , in which the free
development of each is the condition for the free development of all”
(The Communist Manifesto, 491).
“In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class
antagonisms, we shall have an association , which the free development
of each is the condition for the free development of all” (pg. 491). In
other words, a society without class conflict will permit all people to
freely develop their human powers. Human freedom is the self-
actualization as conscious, human beings. Moreover, he argues, “Human
emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has
absorbed into himself the abstract citizen” (pg. 46).
Rawls vs. Marx:
Why Rawls is different than Marx (1818-1883):
2. For one, Rawls would respond by contending for

“reasonable” pluralism because classes will not escape
fundamental conflicts of interests among various groups; we
have to be realistic. Moreover, inequality in economic
resources is permitted, but only as long as it benefits the
least advantaged. Secondly, we must protect the equal
liberties of citizenship: political liberty, freedom of speech
and speech; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person along with the right to have personal
property; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure is a right
for all. Marxism removes these essential freedoms as
demonstrated in the oppression of people as clearly evident
in history.
Rawls vs. Nozick:
Why Rawls is different than Robert Nozick (1938-2002):
The individual takes precedence over the state. In fact:
1. Nozick calls for a minimal view of state (libertarianism)

because people far-reaching intrinsic human rights, which
includes the rights of ownership, entitlement, private
property; people are not burdened distributive justice and
legislation. Rather, they have entitlements and will pay for
services of protection. If we follow Rawls, we lose certain
freedoms, and entitlements; it also curtails creativity and
productivity.
2. Rawls would respond by contending for distributive justice

that is end-goal and patterned; Nozick’s view of justice lacks
fairness (fair opportunity of equality).
II. Basic Argument of Laws of Peoples:
A. First, this book consists of two parts:
1. The essay “The Idea of Reason

Revisited,” first published in
1997.
2. A revised essay “The Law of
Peoples” first published in
1993.
I. Basic Argument
B. The Idea of Public Revisited offers a
detailed account of how a modern
constitutional democracy, based on a liberal
political conception, could (ideal) and would
(real) viewed as legitimate by reasonable
citizens who on religious, philosophical, or
moral grounds do not themselves accept a
liberal comprehensive doctrine.
I. Basic Argument
C. In essence, Rawls conceives the “Law of People” as being a “particular
conception of rights and justice that applies to the principles and norms
of international law and practice.
D. “Society of Peoples” means “all those people who follow the ideals and
principles of the Law of people in their mutual relations. These peoples
have their own internal governments, which may be constitutional liberal
democratic or non-liberal but decent governments.
E. Rawls rejects the difference people on global level.
F. He has a deeper view of pluralism; he doesn’t want to impose
“liberalism” upon other countries. It is about the principle of toleration
seriously (respecting others); there is a much deeper level of pluralism
on the international society that is required.
1. There is diversity among liberal societies and illiberal societies.
2. Recognize the autonomy of societies as I do for individuals; I don’t have to
enforce
E. 5 Types of Societies
Non-liberal societies
Honor human rights but whose basic institutions
denied meaningful meet certain conditions
participation in political of political right &
decision-making Reasonable justice (e.g., just law;
Liberal Peoples participation in politics)
Well-ordered
peoples
Benevolent
Decent Peoples
Absolutisms
Types of
Societies
Not well-
Conditions of ordered
societies whose peoples
historical, social, Non-compliance:
and economic they refuse to
Not well-
circumstances ordered comply with a
Societies
make their peoples reasonable Law
achieving a well- burdened
Outlaw states of People (e.g.,
ordered regime by unfavorable war advances
difficult if not Conditions national
impossible interests).
“The aim of the Laws of Peoples would be fully achieved when all societies have been able to
establish either a liberal or a decent regime, however unlikely that may be (pg.5).” pp. 3-5.
I. Basic Argument: Political
liberalism or “realistic utopia”
F. Rawls presupposes a series of actions based upon rational
principles, developing the ideas of justice and public reason
to argue that a reasonable Law of Peoples based upon the
tenets of political liberalism is both possible and realistic.
Several features mark this argument.
1. Rawls conceives of governments as an outgrowth of the

need of citizens to act, to express their common and
moral nature (23).
2. Governments are thus a means, not an end; the basic unit
to be considered, then, is the people—and thus the Law
of Peoples, not the Laws of States.
3. Democracy seems to be the most practicable means of
government for achieving the ends of justice (though it may
not the only means of governance that might work).
a. Hierarchical societies may also achieve the ends of

justice. Some argue that Rawls' work is particularly
relevant at this point in dealing with problems in the
countries of Middle East and Asia” (via) decent
consultation hierarchy" to achieve similar ends to those
of the liberal democratic state.
b. The approach helps us move beyond the icily reified

conflict recorded in Samuel Huntington's “clashes of
culture."
4. The fundamental division is not between
democratic and non-democratic peoples
or liberal and non-liberal, but decent and
non-decent or outlaw peoples. Decent
peoples allow toleration and subscribe
to eight principles:
5. Liberal peoples allow autonomy and on-
intervention and subscribe to eight principles
and hope to show their acceptability to illiberal
peoples (this is the full list of guiding
principled for international ethics):
a. Peoples are free and independent, and
their freedom and independence are to be
respected by other peoples.
b. Peoples are to observe treaties and
undertakings.
c. Peoples are equal and are parties to the
agreements that bind them.
d. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
e. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right

to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.
f. Peoples are to honor human rights.
g. Peoples are to observe certain specified

restrictions in the conduct of war.
h. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living

under unfavorable conditions that prevent their
having a just or decent political and social
regime. (37)
I. Basic Argument
6. Description of a decent society:
a. Not aggressive
b. Engages in war only in self-defense.
c. Common good idea of justice that assigns human rights to all its
members.
d. Includes a decent consultation hierarchy which protects these and
other rights and ensures that all groups in society are decently
represented by elected bodies in the system of consultation
e. Fair, reasonable, & sincere judicial system.
f. Laws grounded by force are grounds for rebellion and rebellion.
g. A slavery cannot belong to a decent society.
I. Basic Argument
7. Rawls's methodology thus places peoples behind a suitable veil
of ignorance, and inquires about what principles could be
developed to guide the interactions between them. The analysis
proceeds in three stages:
 The first develops the appropriate content of the veil of ignorance in

this context, and discusses what principles could be developed between
liberal peoples for their mutual interaction.
 The second extends the analysis to illiberal peoples, and tries to show
the acceptability of the principles to illiberal peoples as well.
Illiberal are states that do not respect freedom and equality but are not
expansionist and offer some sort of legal system that is able to impose
moral duties on its citizens (benevolent absolutisms; societies burdened
by unfavorable conditions).
 The final stage extends these principles of ideal theory to such non-
ideal contexts as partial compliance and unfavorable conditions (other
burdened and benevolent peoples but we must condemn outlaw states).
I. Basic Argument
Liberal or illiberal—which are able to take
responsibility of their collective political life, maintain
minimally decent political institutions, and have
acceptable moral relations with outside nations have an
obligation moral to assist all societies become a well-
ordered society. Such a duty is based upon the notion of
the international community as itself a well-ordered
society of well-ordered societies, in which each state is
enjoined to respect and tolerate the different methods of
governance of each other state.
I. Basic Argument”
8. Rawls international ethics is a weaker form of his
domestic ethics. Consider the following:
a. Method: Respect the circumstances of the world as

they currently are. As a result, the original position
must be set up in such a way that illiberal states can
accept as well.
b. Those countries who violate human rights, free

speech, and coercive legal structures are entitled to
full and equal participation in the original position
because respect is a simple consequence of the liberal
respect for autonomy and tolerance of diversity.
c. Primary rights are rights of states to independence

and non-intervention.
I. Basic Argument”
d. Distributive Justice is inapplicable on the international level for it is
unfair for wealthy nations to foot the bill for another nation’s lack of
effective and productive political structure and decision-making.
e. Difference principle is only applied domestically not internationally. In

fact, Rawls see no need to equalize resources across borders and no
moral reason to repair the gap between wealthy and impoverished
nations as being morally problematic. There are two reasons why
difference principle can’t be implemented:
1. Too controversial to be agreed upon internationally.

2. It can’t be grounded by illiberal and liberal societies
f. Rawls international proposal is similar to the domestic model in the

sense that it rest on a contractual agreement by members in original
position (a morally defensive position or situation of choice).
Duty of Assistance for Burdened Societies:
G. First Guideline for Duty of Assistance is by means of a just (real)

savings principle is to establish (reasonably) a just basic institution for a
free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and
to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its
citizens. Savings account may stop once just or decent basic institutions
are established. Great wealth is not necessary to establish a just or
decent institutions. How much is needed will depend on a society’s
particular history as well as on its conception of justice.
H. Second guideline: Consultation: dispensing funds will not suffice to

rectify basic political and social injustices: emphasis on human rights
may work to change ineffective regimes and the conduct of callous
rulers against their people (distribution of food; treatment of women).
I. Third guideline: Target of assistance: To help them manage their own

affairs reasonably and rationality whereby freedom and equality are
achieved by self-determination.
J. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:
1st reason for reducing inequalities within a domestic society is to relieve the
suffering and hardships of the poor.
A. Yet this does not require that all person be equal in wealth. In itself;
B. It doesn’t matter how great the gap between the rich and poor may
be. What matters are the consequences. For example:
1. In a liberal domestic society that gap cannot be wider
than the criterion of reciprocity allows.
2. Why? In order that the least advantaged, as agreed
upon, have sufficient all-purpose means to make
intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and to
lead reasonable and worthwhile lives.
a. When that situation exists, there is no further need to

narrow the gap.
“Similarly, in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty of
assistance is satisfied and all people have a working liberal or decent
government, there is again no reason to narrow the gap between the
average wealth of different peoples.”
Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:
2nd reason for narrowing the gap between rich & poor within a domestic
society is that such a gap often leads to the following:
A. Some citizens being stigmatized;

B. Some citizens treated as inferiors;
Stigmatization and inferior treatment is unjust.
Therefore, in a liberal or decent society, conventions that establish ranks to
be recognized socially in view of admiration or esteem, must be guarded
against, for they may unjustly wound the self-respect of those not so
organized.
“The same would be true of the basic structure of the Society of Peoples
should citizens in one country feel inferior to the citizens of another
because of its greater riches, provided that those feelings are justified. Yet
when the duty of assistance is fulfilled, and each people has its own liberal
or decent governments, these feelings are unjustified. For then each
people adjusts the significance and importance of the wealth of its own
society for itself. If it is not satisfied, it can continue to increase savings,
or, if that is not feasible, borrow from other members of the Society of
Peoples” (pg. 114).
Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:
3rd Reason for considering the inequalities among peoples concerns the
important role of fairness in the political processes of the basic structure of
the Society of Peoples.
A. Domestically, the concern is evident in securing the fairness of

elections and of political opportunity…the background social
conditions are such that each citizens, regardless of class or origin,
should have the same chance of attaining a favored social position,
given the same talents and willingness to try. Policies for achieving
this fair equality of opportunity include for example, securing fair
education for all and eliminating unjust discrimination.
B. Fairness also plays an important role in the political processes of the

basic structure of the Society of Peoples, analogous, to, though not
the same as, its role in the domestic case.
H. Three Concerns Regarding Inequality:
Basic fairness:
1. Given by being represented equally in the original position with
its veil of ignorance.
2. Representatives of peoples will want to preserve the independence
of their own society and its equality in relation to others.
3. Working of organizations and loose confederation of peoples,
inequalities are designed to serve the many ends that people share.
4. The larger and smaller peoples will be ready to make larger and
smaller returns.
5. Parties will formulate guidelines for setting up cooperative
organizations, and will agree to standards of fairness for trade as well
as to certain provisions for mutual assistance.
6. Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified distributive
effects, these have to be corrected in the basic structure of the
Society of Peoples.
II. Criticisms:
1. Don’t we have a moral reason to repair the gap between
wealthy and impoverished nations?
~ If so, how without violating human rights?
2. How do we enforce cooperation when violations occur?

~ But at what lengths we will go to “punish” or execute
judgments upon “states” which are made up of people-
groups (s)?
3. The problem of tolerating inequalities.
4. Less powerful set of principles than his domestic view.
5. Respecting states is not the same as respecting people

because states can hold coercive power over people.
Toleration commits us to accepting certain problems
(e.g., oppression of women’s rights).
I. Basic Argument
C. “The Idea of Public Revisited” offers an
account of how a modern constitutional
democracy, based on a liberal political
conception, could and would viewed as
legitimate by reasonable citizens who on
religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do
not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive
doctrine.
I. Basic Argument
D. We must support and strengthen hope by developing a workable,
reasonable conception of political right & justice & apply to the relations of
peoples. To accomplish this Rawls argues that we must follow Kant’s
leading and begin from the political conception of a reasonably just
constitutional democracy and proceed to extend that conception outward to
the Society of liberal and decent peoples (pp. 22-23). A constitutional
democratic govt. is one that is effectively under the political and electoral
control, it answers to and protects their fundamental interests as specified in
a written or unwritten constitution, and in its interpretation. We also take
into account that the Laws of people starts with the need for common
sympathies, no matter what their source may be, and a certain moral
character whereby rational conduct, fair terms, and cooperation
Criticisms of Rawls:
Seyla Benhabib & Jurgen Habermas:
Post-Colonial Critique
A. Post-colonial Critique:
1. Distrust of reason as a Western
Construct (situatedness) by S. Benhabib.
2. An appeal to a “Kantian Universal of
Rationality to extend Colonial or patriarchial societies
(discourse) by J. Habermas.
B. Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise.
C. Problems of reconciliation between liberty and equality.

Benhabib’s Criticisms of Rawls:
1. Seyla Benhabib, a critical
theorist/feminist ethicist has the
problem of situatedness:
“The problem is that the Kantian presuppositions
also guiding the Rawlsian theory are so weighty
that the equivalence of all selves qua rational
agents dominates and stifles any serious
acknowledgment of difference, alterity, and of the
standpoint of the ‘concrete other’” (167).
In other words, the self is always a situated self, and that it
makes no sense in pretending to abstract it.
Jurgen Habermas
2. Habermas’ problem is discourse: Habermas feels that it

is “unnecessary to resort to Rawls’s fictitious original
position with its ‘veil of ignorance’” (198) because the free
play of “practical discourse” i.e., “unforced force of the
better argument,” will better fulfill the function of creating a
model of, what Benhabib terms, a “free public reason” or
resolve the contradictions of multiple perspectives in, again
her terms, “the foray of public contestation” (12).
Response to Post-Colonial Continental Critiques:
Rawls would respond post-colonial
situationalists, that his system embraces
“reasonable pluralism.” In fact, they should
appreciate this approach because it puts forth
procedural means to conceive of, if not to
achieve, a "reasonable pluralism" among
peoples.
“Bentham Utilitarianism in Disguise”
3. In view of Rawls second principle that inequality is

permissible to the extent that it serves everyone’s
advantage:
“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are

both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage, consistent with
the just saving principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”
Isn’t this just rendition of Bentham’s utilitarianism that advocated “the

greatest happiness for the greatest number.”
Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate justification of equal liberty

in society is not that a mere means to an end; the principle of equal
liberty is logically prior to the difference principle. Remember, Rawls
adopts Kant’s categorical imperative, “desire to treat one another not as
means only but as ends in themselves.”
Rawls response is categorical: The ultimate

justification of equal liberty in society is not
that a mere means to an end; the principle of
equal liberty is logically prior to the
difference principle.
Rawls states:
“Each person possesses an inviolability founded on

justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override…. Therefore … the rights secured
by justice are not subject to political bargaining or
to the calculus of social interests.” Theory of
Justice, pg. 4.
4. Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they
are applicable on an international level by exchanging
individuality to nations.
1. Rawls principles do not reconcile liberty and equality:
a. Don’t the social and economic inequalities

permitted by the second principle of justice
(difference principle) subvert the political
equality of the first principle? (e.g., won’t the
poorest citizens lack the economic means to
exercise these rights fully?).
b. Even if you could guarantee equal liberty and

equal opportunity, would this insure equal dignity
for all?
c. Sacrifice individual liberty in the pursuit of

social equality by sharing the successes of the
greatest to those who are less fortunate.
d. The difference principle require a stance of

“affirmative action” which commits reverse
discrimination.
4. Consider these domestic criticisms of Rawls and see if they
are applicable on an international level by exchanging
individuality to nations.
e. If the distribution of natural talent is to be seen as

a common asset exploited for the good of all, then
doesn’t that go against Kant’s categorical
imperative, “desire to treat one another not as
means only but as ends in themselves.”
f. If the distribution of natural talent is to be seen as

a common asset exploited for the good of all, then
doesn’t that dehumanize a person by taking away
the independent nature of that person and by
treating that person as a tool for the use of others?
Will not the poorest nations lack the economic means to exercise
the rights of liberty and opportunity fully?
If a nation’s success in depends largely on character of

nation, nurture, resources, some will never have an equal
success in life.
Rawlsian response:
1. While absolute equality of opportunity is impossible under

his principles, we must stress the importance of equality of
opportunity in allowing the poor nations to improve their
conditions.
Concluding Summary:
Rawls, extends his social contract to the “Society of

People” and laws out the general principles that can and
should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies
as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one
another.”
1. All citizens must equal in their basic liberties (liberties)
2. All must have equal opportunities to develop their talents
and abilities (opportunities).
3. Liberties and opportunities should secure equality and
respect for all.
4. Inequality in economic resources is permitted, but only as
long as it benefits the least advantaged.
Bibliography:
Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self: Gender,
Community and Postmodernism in
Contemporary Ethics. New York:
Routledge, 1992.
Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness

and Communicative Action. Trans. Christian
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990.
Genealogy:
“The key intellectual opposition of our age, such critics will
declare, is that between liberal individualism and some
version of Marxism or neo-Marxism. The most
intellectually compelling exponents of this point of view
are likely to be those who trace a genealogy of ideas
from Kant and Hegel through Marx and claim that by
means of Marxism the notion of human autonomy can be
rescued from its original individualist formulations and
restored within the context of an appeal to a possible
form of community in which alienation has been
overcome, false consciousness abolished, and the
values of equality and fraternity realized” (pg. 261).l
Genealogy:
“The first is that the claim of Marxism to a morally distinctive standpoint is
undermined by Marxism’s own moral history. In all those crises in which
Marxists have had to take explicit moral stances [e.g., Khruschev’s
repudiation of Stalin and Hungarian revolt in 1956]…Marxists have always
fallen into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism.
Nor is this surprising. Secreted within Marxism from the outset is a certain
radical individualism. In the first chapter of Capital when Marx characterizes
what it will be like when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man
none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations’ what he pictures is ‘a
community of free individuals’ who have all freely agreed to their common
ownership of the means of production and to various norms of production
and distribution. This free individual is described by Marx as a socialized
Robinson Crusoe; but on what basis he enters into his free association with
others Marx does not tell us. At this key point in Marxism there is a lacuna
which no later Marxist has adequately supplied. It is unsurprising that
abstract moral principle and utility have in fact been the principles of
association which Marxists have appealed to, and that in their practice
Marxists have exemplified precisely the kind of moral attitude which the
condemn in others as ideological.”

Various Charts On Ethic Finals

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Various Charts On Ethic Finals

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Overview of Significant Ethical Approaches on how to

“find” Moral Truth:

Ethics is about what is right and

 What are human beings really like: selfish, greedy, noble, or

 What does it mean to be good?

 Are there good ways of teaching children to behave morally?

 What is human nature?

 Is morality about obeying a set of rules or is it about thinking

 When people say “cannibalism is wrong”, do they know it is

 Is it okay to ever break a law?

 Is it wrong to enjoy hurting others?

 Are human beings essentially good or essentially wicked?

H. Utilitarians say we discover

Premise 1a: A virtuous agent is one who acts

Premise 2: A virtue is a character trait a human

1. arête (excellence or virtue);

~ Socrates in Plato’s Republic

4 primary So long as the If reason for The highest good is

8. philosopher kings: rulers in Plato's just society from the Republic

9. guardian class: warriors in Plato's just society from the Republic

 Plato advances a teleological conception of

 In order to live a virtuous life, it is necessary for

 Appetite: In cases where appetite rules (oligarchic and

 Spirit: The emotional, passionate side of our

 Just Society: First ask yourself: is it possible to have a just society?

 Appetite-Desire desires: Desire is concerned with pleasure;

 Spirit gets spirited: spirit reacts to perceived slights or wrong.

When you revisit these elements in Books 8-8, they no longer

~ Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, “Three-Part Soul” by G. R. F.

What makes the soul of a human being just is the same

Just individuals are those who have fully integrated

2. Forms are eternal, changeless, and incorporeal. Since they are

a. Beautiful roses is not Beauty itself.

 Plato’s chief contribution consists in his conception of the

 Aristotle rejects Plato’s transcendental Form of the Good

Aristotle rejects Plato’s theory of knowledge. He locates the

Aristotle differs with Plato’s notion (early dialogues) that

The significance of Aristotle's characterization of these states

Aristotle sees the human body as complex of soul and body

The good life, eudaimonia, will consist in the successful

Nothing can perform its peculiar function successfully unless it

For both Plato and Aristotle the content of arete depends on

1. Plato’s answers are, respectively,

2. “An active life of that which possesses

With practice & diligence you can develop Thus, choose to be

 There is much disagreement about what “happiness” is. Some people

A virtue is a habit of excellence, a beneficial tendency, a skilled

What is a habit? A disposition to think, feel, desire, and act in a

What is a character: The sum-total of one’s habits, tendencies, and

Four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, prudence, and justice.

Step 1: Master the functional requirements within a given type of task or

Step 2: Possess the habitual mastery of the functional requirements to an

Step 3: Steps 1 & 2: excellence in that task or behavior.

Step 4: Possess habitual excellence in a number of key tasks or behavior.

Step 5: Possess habitual excellence in those tasks or behavior that the

Step 6: Steps 4 & 5 leads to agathos.

Step 7: Possessing Agathos leads to eudaimon.

Thus, on balance, excellent traits in human character generally produce excellent

Virtue, then, is a state of character,

 The natural functions of persons reside in their exercise of their natural

 Most of Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to moral virtues but final book

Consider the following chart of 6 different types of character: