EXEMPTING

CIRCUMSTANCES This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

Exempting Circumstances
Those grounds which free the offender from criminal
liability but does not relieve him of civil liability, with the
exception of par. 4 where he is relieved of both civil and
criminal liability.

There is a crime but the person who committed the act

is not subjected to criminal liability. Hence, the burden of
proving the existence of an exempting circumstance lies with
the defense.
 Basis of exemption
The basis of the exemption from punishment is based on the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
Exempting circumstance vs. Justifying
circumstance
(1998 and 2004 Bar Exam)
Distinguish clearly but briefly between justifying and exempting
circumstances in criminal law.

SUGGESTED ANSWER
Justifying circumstance affects the act, not the actor; while
exempting circumstance affects the actor, not the act. In justifying
circumstance, there is no criminal and, generally, no civil liability is
incurred; while in exempting circumstance, civil liability is generally
incurred although there is no criminal liability.
I n Justifying Circumstances:
1. The circumstance affects the act, not the actor;
2. The act is done within legal bounds, hence considered as not a crime;
3. Since the act is not a crime, there is no criminal;
4. There being no crime nor criminal, there is no criminal nor civil liability.

Whereas, in an Exempting Circumstances:

1. The circumstance affects the actor, not the act;
2. The act is felonious and hence a crime but the actor acted without
voluntariness;
3. Although there is a crime, there is no criminal because the actor is
regarded only as an instrument of the crime;
4. There being a wrong done but no criminal.
1. Imbecility or Insanity
Basis; Complete absence of intelligence.

Their concepts.

1. Imbecility.
It exist when a person, while of advanced age, has a mental
development comparable to that of the child between 2 and 7 years of
are (Reyes).
 2. Insanity.
It exist when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence or freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties is not enough especially if the offender has not lsot
consciousness of his acts.

Insanity and imbecility, to exempt the actor under par. 1,

must be complete, and they cannot be graduated in degrees of gravity
(Regalado).

Meaning, dili pwede and buan-buang lang, or medyo

buang, or medyo sinto-sinto lang. Dapat absolute insanity and
imbecility jud.
Presumption of sanity vs. In dubio Pro Reo
Principle.

In dubio pro reo principle provides that “when in doubt, rule for
the accused”. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt
is established beyond reasonable doubt ( Intestate Estate of Gonzales
Vda. De Carungcong vs. People and Sato, G.R. No. 181409, February
11, 2010).
 The necessary legal consequence of this is that where a
particular penal law’s is of doubtful application, the court
must rule in favor of the accused. Otherwise stated, “(t)he
rule applies when the court is faced with two possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to
the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule
calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more
lenient to the accused” (supra).
Is this rule absolute?
 People vs. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, July 31,
1991.
Held: Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of
the accused. However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of
insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for
crime, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise
stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288).
Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of
proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451)
.
Additional pronouncement from the case:

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the

presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a
defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily
proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming
the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely,
knowingly, and intelligently.
 People vs. Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., G.R. No. G.R.
No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
Two test of insanity in US Jurisdiction:

(a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence

in committing the [criminal] act," and

(b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation

freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the
test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will.
TESTS OF INSANITY AND THEIR APPLICATION IN PHILIPPINE
JURISDICTION
 Supreme Court went on further “(e)xamination of our case
law has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted
an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of
"freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete
deprivation of intelligence.

In People vs. Puno (G.R. No. L-33211, June 29, 1981), the
Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting
because it does not completely deprive the offender of the
consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e.,
as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-
power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of
his acts.”
 Ayan, these two test of insanity, according to SC,
although well-established in US courthouses, have not find the
same vigor in our jurisdiction, mainly because the we follow
the blanket rule that the test of insanity is absolute. Dapat
baliw ka talaga. Ganyan!

Maclaim mo lang daw siya as a mitigating circumstance

under par. 9 of Art. 13, RPC, i.e., as an illness.
People vs. Formigones, Phil. 658 (1950).
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there
be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that
the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should
absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because
mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86
Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
 Occurrence of insanity/imbecility and the effects
thereof
Time when the accused suffer insanity Effect on the proceeding/ criminal liability.
At the time of the commission of the Exempt from criminal liability (Art. 12, par. 1, RPC)
crime
During the arraignment The court may order the suspension of the arraignment (Section 11, Rule 116,
Rules of Court)
During the trial The court may order continuance (suspension) of the criminal action. (Section
3[f], Rule 119, in relation to Section 4, Rule 119, Rules of Court).

Note: In case the issue of insanity has not been touched upon during the trial,
the court may reopen the proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice (Section
24, Rule 119, Rules of Court)

Note: Section 9 of Rule 120, Rules of Court states that nothing in this Rule
(Rule 120) shall affect any existing provisions in the laws governing
suspension of sentence, probation, or parole.
After judgment Execution of judgment is suspended, the accused is committed to a hospital.
Note: The period of confinement of the accused as an insane person in the
mental hospital/institution is counted for the purpose of the prescription of
the penalty
Instances where mental condition of the accused
was considered by the Supreme Court as “insane.”
Dementia Praecox or Schizophrenia
Dementia Praecox is a form of psychosis where homicidal attack
is common, because of delusions that he is being interfered with
sexually or that his property is being taken. During such period of
excitement, such person has no control of his acts. (People vs.
Bonoan, G.R. No. L-45130, February 17, 1937).
Instances where mental condition of the accused
was considered by the Supreme Court as “insane.”
Epilepsy/Epileptic fit.
Epilepsy is not insanity from the medical point of view. But from
the point of view law, that is precisely the concept of insanity. He
cannot distinguish what is right and what is wrong, because the
condition of the mind is not the same. It is important to note
however, that the epileptic, to become exempt from liability, must
have committed the crime at the very moment that he was under the
influence of an epileptic fit. Otherwise, even if he is an epileptic, he is
not exempt from liability if he did not commit the crime during an
epileptic attack (People vs. Mancao and Aguilar, G.R. No. L-26361,
January 20, 1927).
Instances where mental condition of the accused
was considered by the Supreme Court as “insane.”
Somnambulism/Sleepwalking
A person suffering from somnambulism while committing acts
punishable under the law are not personally liable. A somnambulist
is covered by the term “insanity” because at the time he committed
the crime, he lacked intelligence (People vs. Taneo,. 58 Phil. 251)
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY NOT PROPER WHERE THE
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTIING THE CRIME ARE DIFFICULT OF
CONSUMMATION OR COMPLETION.
People vs. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15,
2000.While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he has acted during a lucid interval, the
presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every man is sane.1âwphi1 Anyone
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it. 3He
must show that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime
charged. As held in People v. Bañez, "the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
Based on this standard, we find that accused-appellant failed to discharge this
burden. A careful review of the records show the following circumstances which militate
against accused-appellant’s claim of insanity:
As to the first incident of rape, it is established that accused-appellant closed the
door upon entering his house, apparently so that he would not be seen with Maricon.
Then, he got a knife from the kitchen and pointed it at the child. When he heard his
mother get into the house, he stopped having intercourse with Maricon, hid the knife
under the bed and told the child not to report the incident to anyone, otherwise, he
would kill her.
People vs. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15,
2000.
As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant kept
threatening Maricon as he forced himself on her while they were in
the house of Antonia Adovera.
By the totality of his acts, accused-appellant showed that he
was fully conscious of what he was doing.
People vs. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15,
2000.
The bare testimony of accused-appellant’s father that accused-
appellant suffered some mental illness during childhood and that
both his maternal aunt and his brother had been previously confined
at the National Mental Hospital is inadequate to prove that accused-
appellant was completely deprived of reason when he raped Maricon.
Neither do the psychological report and the result of the psychiatric
examination indubitably establish that accused-appellant was insane
immediately before or at the time of the commission of the crime.
People vs. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15,
2000.
The psychiatric examination showed that accused-appellant was
found suffering from schizophrenia. When such mental illness completely
deprives the offender of the consciousness of his acts, then it shall be an
exempting circumstance. It may also be considered mitigating under Art.
13(a) of the Revised Penal Code if it diminishes the exercise of his will
power. In this case, however, the defense failed to conclusively establish
that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia or any mental
illness that could diminish his will power at the time immediately preceding
or during the commission of the crime. Acts penalized by law are always
presumed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person
acted unconsciously in order to relieve him of liability, unless his insanity
is conclusively proved. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance of insanity in favor of accused-
appellant.
See also the case of People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L-
33211.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY
(UNDER R.A. 9344)
Who are covered by the exemption under R.A.
9344?
Who are covered by the exemption under R.A.
9344?
In general, the law covers all those who are considered as “child”. A
child under Sec. 4(e) of R.A. 9344 is defined as “refers to a person
under the age of eighteen (18) years”.

However, in criminal proceedings, particularly in the realm of criminal

responsibility, the exemption is limited to those “child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability.”
Who are covered by the exemption under R.A.
9344?
As a legal consequence, the qualification provided under the old rule
(Art. 12, par. 2 and 3, before the enactment of R.A. 9344), is rendered
simplified. Those children 15 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is considered exempt (absolute exemption),
subject to the condition that the said child will undergo intervention
process as contemplated under Secs. 20 and 21 of R.A. 9344.
How to raise minority?
In this jurisdiction, we follow the principle “El incumbet que
decit, non que negat”, as such, he who alleges must prove, not he who
was accused. Hence, in case what is being raised is minority of the
victim, it is the prosecution which has the burden of proving the
minority of the victim (People vs. Albalate, G.R. No. 174480, 18
December 2009, Del Castillo Case).
On the other hand, if the minority is being raised by the accused
as am exempting circumstance (or mitigating circumstance in case of
diversion), then the said accused must prove the same (People vs.
Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002.)
How to prove minority of the victim (either
mitigating or exempting circumstance).
The age of the victim must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself (Meaning, the proof required
is proof beyond reasonable doubt.)
The guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, are:
a. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party;

b. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age;

c. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
(1) If the victim alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

(2) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;
(3) If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old .
 d. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document or the
testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused;

e. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him

f. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
(People vs. Asis, G.R. No. 179935, April 19, 2010, Del Castillo case. Note,
same with People vs. Pruna na guidelines ito which became the basis of the rule
provided in the Rules on Examination of Child Witness. Ahright?)
 Minority as an exempting Circumstance, as
amended by R.A. 9344.
Pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 12, RPC have been amended by Sec 6 of R.A.
9344. As such, the said provision of the amendatory laws provides:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15)

years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance
with existing laws.
Absolute Exemption under R.A. 9344
A. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
 This group of children in conflict with the law is considered
exempt, regardless of the existence or absence of discernment during
the commission of the crime. The only consequence of their overt
criminal acts is that they would be subject to intervention under
Section 20, in relation to Section 21 of R.A. 9344.
Intervention
Intervention (Sec. 21, RA 9344)
It is a series of activities which are desired to address the issues
that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take the form of an
individualized treatment program which may include counseling. Skills
training, education, and other activities that will enhance his/her
psychological. Emotional, and psycho-social well-being. (it is akin to an
exempting circumstance).
This is available to children 15 years old or less at the time of the
commission of the crime or although over 15 but below 18 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime, the child acted without
discernment.
Qualified Exemption under R.A. 9344.
On the other, children in conflict with the law who are “above fifteen
(15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age” are also exempt
from criminal liability subject to the rule that the element of
discernment is absent at the time of the commission of the crime.

If the element of “discernment” is present, then this group of

offenders would not be absolved form the consequences of their act
or series of acts constituting a crime. But they are entitled to a
privileged mitigating circumstance under par. 2 of Art. 68 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Discernment
Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the
commission of the offense to understand the differences between right
and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act (Sec. 4(j), A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC ).

Simply put, it is the capacity to determine what is right and wrong.

 How to determine the presence of
discernment?
When there is conspiracy between the perpetrators of the crime (Jose
vs. People, G.R. No 162052, January 13, 2005)

When there is evident premeditation (People vs. Doquena, G.R.

46539)

Note: It is the submission of the author/lecturer that in cases where

the crime committed is difficult to commit, it is but proper to presume that
there is discernment, given that the age of the accused, during the time of
the commission of the crime is within the age bracket of above 15 and those
below 18 but above 15. Crimes which are difficult to commit may include
Rape (Llave vs. People), robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, multiple
counts of murder, among others.
Diversion (Sec. 23 to 37, in relation to Sec. 38, RA 9344)
It is an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of
his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or educational background
without resorting to formal court proceedings. (It is akin to mitigating
circumstance).
This process governs when the child is over 15 but below 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime and the child acted with discernment
where:
1. The imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years of imprisonment.
The Punong Barangay or law enforcement officer shall conduct mediation, family
conferencing and conciliation. Here, there is no court proceedings involved;
2. Where the imposable penalty exceeds six (6) years of imprisonment,
diversion measures may be resorted to only by the courts. (Sec. 23, R.A. 9344)
 So under Second paragraph of Section 23, R.A. 9344, the court
will determine whether or not diversion is proper for the child in conflict
with the law. If the court agrees to a diversion, then the child will undergo
diversion program. After the duration of the diversion program, the court
will determine whether or not the child in conflict with the law complied
with the conditions of the said program. If the child complied, he will be
released (note that the diversion here is in the form of a mitigating
circumstance). If the court finds that the child did not change his ways, the
criminal proceedings against the child will continue. The court may acquit or
convict the child (See Section 40, R.A. 9344). If the ruling is for acquittal, on
the ground that the child is not the author of the crime, the diversion
program previously applied to the child will be revoked, as if there is no
diversion at all that happened (Reason: the child is not criminal!). Since the
child is not criminal, there is no legal basis at all for the diversion measure
(again, this is due to the fact that diversion is a form of mitigating
circumstance). On the other hand, if the ruling is for the conviction of the
child, and if he is still a minor at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt,
Art. 68, second par. of RPC will find application.
 If the court does not agree with diversion under item no. 2, just the
same, the criminal proceeding will continue, and the determination of
criminal liability will be established. This is the process contemplated under
second par., of Art. 68, RPC. After finding of guilt of the accused, he will be
under suspended sentence under Section 38 of RA 9344 and will await until
he reaches the age of full responsibility. However, the determination of civil
liability will continue and it will be executed accordingly. The years he spent
under suspended sentence will be charged against his remaining years of
personal penalty (See. Section 41, R.A. 9344) (What I am saying is that,
there is no diversion in cases where the court will not agree to the same.
This has what happened to Franklin Agacer whose case, we will discuss
later.)
Note: From the above definitions, minority may either be an
exempting circumstance, or a mitigating circumstance, depending on
whether or not diversion is proper in a particular case.
 “Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen
years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and
his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to
the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

-xxx-

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age

the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period.”
 People vs. Agacer
G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013.
FACTS: Respondents were convicted for the crime of murder of
one Cesario Agacer. They filed this MR before the SC alleging that there
is no evidence of conspiracy and that no treachery can be imputed
against them since a heated argument preceded the killing. And even if
they are guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
should have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer
(Franklin) who was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the
incident, having been born on December 21, 1981. OSG was required
to comment on the issue of minority but did not oppose it the same
being duly supported by a copy of Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth
secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) Document
Management Division.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of Franklin’s
minority should be appreciated.
 HELD: Yes, the rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was
not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented.
Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on
December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the offender is a minor over
15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed on the accused but always in the proper period.
 Note: This not a diversion in favor of Franklin Agacer, since the RTC did not allow
for diversion here, considering the gravity and seriousness of the offense. This is a
mitigated penalty under Art. 68, par. 2 RPC and as amended by Section 6 of RA 9344 by
reason of the minority of the offender who acted with discernment. And is there
discernment here? You apply Jose vs. People that we explained above. There is
discernment, and in fact, automatic yan kasi upon determination of conspiracy,
discernment automatically lies against the minor accused. There was conspiracy between
Franklin and the other conspirators here. Basta, matic lagi na na may discernment. See, if
the edad is above 15 but below 18 tapos may conspiracy or evident premeditation or if
the crime is too difficult to commit like rape, then there is discernment.
On the other hand, IF the child is below 15, automatic, under Section 6(b) of R.A.
9344, there is no issue of discernment because the exemption here is absolute! Kahit may
evident premeditation, treachery, conspiracy or even if the crime is too difficult to commit,
and as such, requires intensive planning (like robbery with force upon things!!), wala paring
discernment diyan! Automatic nga, by way of legal fiat, EXEMPT sila agad, wala na’ng
maraming sabi! However, as to civil liabilities, the same will continue and the court will
determine whether or not the child in conflict with the law must be held civilly liable.
1998 Bar Exam

John, an eight-year old boy, is fond of watching the television

program "Zeo Rangers." One evening while he was engrossed
watching his favorite television show, Petra, a maid changed the
channel to enable her to watch "Home Along the Riles." This enraged
John who got his father's revolver, and without warning, shot Petra at
the back of her head causing her instantaneous death. Is John
criminally liable? [2%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, John is not criminally liable for killing Petra because he is
only 8 years old when he committed the killing. A minor below nine
(9) years old is absolutely exempt from criminal liability although not
from civil liability. (Art. 12, par. 2, RPC).
 1998 Bar Exam question
While they were standing in line awaiting their vaccination at the
school clinic, Pomping repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his
11 years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate in Grade 5 at the
Sampaloc Elementary School. Irritated, the accused, Katreena turned
around and swung at Pomping with a ballpen. The top of the ball pen
hit the right eye of Pomping which bled profusely. Realizing what she
had caused. Katreena immediately helped Pomping. When
investigated, she freely admitted to the school principal that she was
responsible for the injury to Pomping's eye. Is Katreena liable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, Katreena is not criminally liable although she is civilly liable.
Being a minor less than fifteen (15) years old although over nine (9)
years of age, she is generally exempt from criminal liability. The
exception is where the prosecution proved that the act was
committed with discernment. The burden is upon the prosecution to
prove that the accused acted with discernment.
Par. 4, Accident without fault or intention of
causing it.
The basis of this exemption from criminal liability is that there is lack
of negligence and intent.
Concept of accident
It is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond
the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.

(Meaning, the concept of accident in this discussion is similar to the

concept in civil law.)
Elements of this exempting circumstance
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
(People vs. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004).
The act must be without fault!
The act contemplated here must be without fault. Because if it is
with fault, then the said act will be considered as culpable felony.
Meaning, the fault here of the actor will become the cause of the
injury, as such, categorically speaking, it cannot be considered as
accident. Dibaaaahhhhh?
Par. 5, A person who acts under the
compulsion of irresistible force.
The basis of this exemption is the complete absence of freedom
(remember our discussion on voluntariness as element of felony
under Art. 3? Heto na yon! This is the consequence of incomplete
element of voluntariness. Nawala yong freedom!).
Elements of this exempting circumstance
1. A person acted under the compulsion by means of physical force;
2. That the physical force must be irresistible;
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
Physical force
The physical force here must not be imaginary, speculative, and in indirect.

In one case, the appellant (Moreno) is a prisoner serving a sentence in the

San Ramon Penal Colony Farm, situated in the City of Zamboanga during the
Japanese occupation. Moreno was released from prison and then he became the
captain of semi-military squad. Later, the groupd headed by Moreno proceeded
to the house of one Paciano de los santos, took her two daughters and
apprehended Paciano. The next day, he beheaded Paciano. When the Japanese
occupation was over, Moreno was put on trial for the acts he committed. His
defense is that there was irresistible force against his person as he was ordered
by the latter to eradicate Paciano under the pain of being tortured if he fail to do
so. Captain Sasaki, however, was not present during the time of the commission
of the acts against the person of Paciano and his two daughters.
Held
The fear contemplated under the exempting circumstance must not
be imaginary and speculative. It must be present, apparent, and direct. In
the present case, the claim of irresistible force cannot be sustained
considering the circumstances of the present case.
It is plain that there was no compulsion of an irresistible force that
compelled the defendant to kill the victim against his will; nor was there
any threat of such a serious character and imminence as to create in the
mind of the defendant an uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil
or injury would be inflicted upon him if he did not comply with the alleged
order to kill the deceased. The only part of the defendant's testimony
relating to a sort of a threat is the following: "As they insisted and I
informed them that I could not do it, then Captain Susuki told me: You have
to comply with the order, he had to come along with them, is not such a
threat as contemplated by said provision of the Revised Penal Code;
especially, taking into consideration that the defendant himself declared
that the captain told him "that they could not be present (at the execution
of the deceased) because they had to return that same day to Zamboanga.
Persons liable under this circumstance.
The person who used the force or created the fear is criminally
and primarily civilly liable, but the accused who performed the act
involuntarily and under duress is still secondarily civilly liable (See Art.
101, pars. 1, 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code).
 “Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
subject to the following rules:”
xxx.
Par. 6. Uncontrollable Fear.
The basis of this exemption is also complete absence of
freedom.
Elements of this exempting circumstance.
1. The existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2. That the fear must be real and imminent; and
3. The fear of an injury is greater that or at least equal to that
committed.
Concept of Duress
Duress as a valid exempting circumstance/defense should be based
on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s limb and should not
be speculative, fanciful, or remote. The compulsion must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for wscape or
self-defense in equal combat (People vs. Baldogo, G.R. No. 128106-
07, Jan. 24, 2003). Persons liable under this circumstance.
Irresistible force vs. Uncontrollable fear
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

As to the manner it is employed

Offender uses violence or physical force to compel Offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling
another person to commit a crime. another to commit a crime.

As to whom the same is employed

Must have been made to operate directly upon the May be generated by a threatened act directed to a
person of the accused. third person other than the actor (ex. His wife, child,
parent, etc.).

As to the act feared

The injury feared may be of a lesser degree than the The evil feared must be greater or at least equal to the
damage caused by the accused. damage caused to avoid it.
Par. 7, Insuperable cause
The basis of this exemption is the absence of intent on the part
of the actor.
Concept of insuperable cause.
• It is some motive which has lawfully, morally, or physically prevented
a person to do what the law commands.
Elements of this exempting circumstance
1. That an act (or omission/inaction) is required by law to be done;

2. That a person fails to perform such act;

3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or
insuperable cause.
U.S. vs. Vecentillo, G.R. 6982, March 18, 1911.
The municipal president detained the offended party for three
days (diba? possible liabilities under Arts. 124 and 125, RPC for
arbitrary detention and delay in delivery to the nearest judicial
authority, respectively) because to take him to the nearest justice of
the peace required a journey for three days by boat as there was no
other means of transportation. The distance which required a
journey for three days was considered insuperable cause.
People vs. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186,
September 30, 1936.
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar,
the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to the thicket about
four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go
for that purpose. A few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and
placed her in her bed.
People vs. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186,
September 30, 1936.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
had happened to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy.
Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances,
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and
help him and the appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo leaves
to stop the hemhorrage which had come upon the appellant.
Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body
of newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar
of it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant’s
house. Upon being askes whether the babywhich was shown to her
was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
People vs. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186,
September 30, 1936.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the
circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a
child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and
extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor
the fourth and the seventh exempting circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her
child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that… under such circumstances,
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code in her favor.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime
but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.

They may be in the form of exempting circumstance or justifying

circumstance
Some of absolutory causes.
1. Spontaneous desistance (Art. 6) in cases of attempted stage in the
commission of an offense;
2. Slight or less serious physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances (See Art. 247, RPC);
3. Attempted or frustrated light felonies, not constituting crime
against person or property (Art. 7, RPC);
4. Instigation (In drug related cases);
5. Marriage of the offender and the offended party in cases of
seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape (Art. 344, RPC);
6. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability by reason or
relationship (Art. 20 and in light felonies;
7. Adultery and concubinage if the offended party shall consented or
pardoned the offenders (Art. 344, RPC);
8. Persons exempt from criminal liability for theft, swindling, and
malicious mischief (Art. 332, RPC);
9. Trespass to dwelling when the purpose of entering another’s
dwelling against the latter’s will is to prevent some serious harm to
himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, or for the
purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, or when
entering cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses, while the same
are open (Art. 280, par.)
10. Mistake of fact Doctrine (Ah Chong Doctrine).
-Human ang Exempting Circ!-