Strategic Location of Renewable

Generation Based on Grid Reliability

PowerWorld Users’ Group Meeting

November 2-3, 2005
The CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION and DAVIS POWER
CONSULTANTS contributed to the development of this analysis.

2001 South First Street

Champaign, Illinois 61820
+1 (217) 384.6330 Davis Power Consultants
 Strategy
• Identify links between electricity needs in the
future and available renewable resources.
• Optimize development and deployment of
renewables based on their benefits to:
– Electricity system
– Environment
– Local economies
• Develop a research tool that integrates spatial
resource characteristics and planning analysis.

2
 Objectives
• Investigate the extent to which renewable
distributed electricity generation can help
address transmission constraints
• Determine performance characteristics for
generation, transmission and renewable
technology
• Identify locations within system where
sufficient renewable generation can
effectively address transmission problems
3
 Objectives
• We want to determine the impact of large-
scale distributed projects on grid security.
• We need to:
– Identify weak transmission elements and
define metrics that assess system security.
– Find locations where new generation would
enhance the security of the grid.
– Combine maps of beneficial locations with
maps of energy resources.
4
 Methodology
• Simulation
– Power Flow
– Contingency Analysis
• Security Metrics
• Results
– Weak Elements
– Security Indices
– Visualization
5
 Power flow Simulation
• Identify weak elements in the system by
simulating impacts from lost transmission
or capacity (NERC N-1 contingency)
• More importantly, can identify locations in
system where new generation can provide
grid reliability benefits.

6
 Normal Operation Example
100 MW 110 MW

40 Mvar

System does not 33 MW

A
32 MW
80 MW

30 Mvar

Three

have normal One

1.05 pu
MVA

0.9930 pu A

operation thermal
58 MW
57 MW
82% Four

67 MW
MV A

violations
21 MW
1.00 pu
A
A
40 MW 11 MW
20 Mvar
MVA 150 MW
MVA
A 23 MW

21 MW MVA A

67 MW

MVA
11 MW
Two

A
1.04 pu 23 MW

Five
23 MW 66 MW MVA 65 MW

1.01 pu

42 MW
50 MW

A
A 130 MW

40 Mvar

MVA 87%
200 MW
MV A
0 Mvar 23 MW
29 MW 28 MW 43 MW
A

Seven
Six MVA

29 MW A
28 MW 1.04 pu
1.04 pu

MVA 200 MW
280 MW
187 MW 0 Mvar

7
 Contingency Example
100 MW 110 MW
Suppose there is a fault
40 Mva r

55 MW
A

53 MW
and this line is 80 MW

30 Mva r

Then this line gets One

83%

MV A
Thre e
disconnected
1.05 pu 0.9675 pu

overloaded 0 MW
A
0 MW

Four

(is a weak element) 45 MW

A
A 56 MW
MVA

1.00 pu

This is a serious MVA

40 MW

20 Mva r 156%
26 MW

150 MW
A 44 MW

problem for the MV A

MVA
A

58 MW

system
45 MW

95%
25 MW
Tw o MV A

A
1.04 pu 43 MW

Five
30 MW 52 MW MVA 51 MW

1.01 pu

36 MW
50 MW

A A 130 MW

40 Mva r
83%
Planning Solutions: 200 MW
MVA

MV A
0 Mva r 30 MW

New line to bus 3 25 MW A

24 MW 37 MW

OR Six

25 MW
MVA

24 MW
Se ve n

1.04 pu
A

New generation 1.04 pu

MVA 200 MW

at bus 3
280 MW
188 MW 0 Mva r

8
 Contingency Analysis
• Security is determined by the ability of the
system to withstand equipment failure.
• Weak elements are those that present
overloads in the contingency conditions
(congestion).
• Standard approach is to perform a single
(N-1) contingency analysis simulation.
• A ranking method will be demonstrated to
prioritize transmission planning.
9
 Results Organized by
Lines, then Contingencies
Then multiply
by limit to get
the Aggregate
MW
Contingency
Overload
(AMWCO)

Sum each value-100 to

find the Aggregate
Percentage Contingency
Overload (APCO)

10
 Weak Element Visualization
100 MW 110 MW
40 Mvar
80 MW
A
33 MW 32 MW 30 Mvar
Three
One MVA

1.05 pu 0.9930 pu A
57 MW 58 MW
82% Four
67 MW MVA
21 MW
A
1.00 pu
A
40 MW 11 MW
20 Mvar
MVA
MVA
150 MW
A 23 MW

MVA
67 MW 21 MW A

MVA
11 MW
Two

1.04 pu A
23 MW
Five
23 MW 66 MW MVA 65 MW
1.01 pu

50 MW 42 MW

A A 130 MW
40 Mvar
MVA 87%
200 MW
0 Mvar 23 MW
43 MW
MVA
AMWCO
29 MW 28 MW
A

Seven
28
Six MVA

29 MW A
28 MW 1.04 pu
21
1.04 pu
MVA 200 MW
14
280 MW
187 MW 0 Mvar
7
0
11
Determination of Good Locations

Overloaded Line Transfer helps mitigate

in this direction the overload by means
of a counter-flow

Sink

New Source

12
Determination of Good Locations
• Generation could be located to produce
counter-flows that mitigate weak element
contingency overloads.
• The new injection of power requires
decreasing generation somewhere else.
– A good assumption is that generation will be
decreased across the system or each control
area using participation factors.

13
 TLR for Normal Operation
• Need to know how the new generation at a
certain bus will impact the flows in a
transmission element.
→ Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
ΔMWFlow BRANCH jk
TLR BUS i ,BRANCH jk 
ΔMWInjection BUS i
→ Since a TLR is calculated for every bus, the
TLR can be used to rank locations that
would be beneficial for security.
14
 Specify the sink
of the transfer

Specify the weak

transmission element

Sensitivities are
calculated for each bus

15
 TLR for Contingencies
• Need to consider contingencies
• Contingency Transmission Loading Relief
(TLR) Sensitivity is the change in the flow
of a line due to an injection at a bus
assuming a contingency condition.

ΔContMWFlow BRANCH jk ,CONT c

TLR BUS i ,BRANCH jk ,CONT c 
ΔMWInjection BUS i

16
Determination of Good Locations
• Equivalent TLR (ETLR):

ETLR BUS i =  
jk  Overloaded Contingencies that
TLR BUS i ,BRANCH jk ,CONT c

Elements overloaded branch jk

 
v  Contingent
TLR BUS i ,CONTVIOL v
Violations

17
Determination of Good Locations
• Weighted TLR (WTLR) using post-
contingency TLRs:
 CODirCONTVIOL v 
 

N CONTVIOL
WTLR BUS i =   TLR BUS i ,CONTVIOL v

SysAMWCO v  Contingent  MWCO CONTVIOL v 
Violations  

• Weighted TLR (WTLR) using base case

TLRs:
 CODirBRANCH jk 
 

N CONT
WTLR BUS i =   TLR BUS i , BRANCH jk

SysAMWCO jk  Branches  
 AMWCO BRANCH jk 

18
 Weighted TLR (WTLR)
• Complexity: A TLR is computed for each bus, to
mitigate a weak element, under a contingency.
• We want a single “weighted” TLR for each bus.

Contingencies
WTLR
Weak Elements

Buses
Buses

19
 Calculating WTLRs
• The contingency information (severity and
number) of a weak element can be captured by
calculating the Aggregate MW Contingency
Overload (AMWCO).
• This effectively converts the cube to a table.
Contingencies
Weak Elements
Weak Elements

Buses
Buses

20
 Calculating WTLRs
• Need to mitigate the weakest elements first
• Weight the TLR by the weakness of each
element, which is given by the AMWCO.

Weak Elements WTLR

Buses Buses

21
 Meaning of the WTLR
• A WTLR of 0.5 at a bus means that 1MW of new
generation injected at the specific bus is likely to
reduce 0.5 MW of overload in transmission
elements during contingencies.
• Thus, if we inject new generation at high impact
buses, re-dispatch the system, and rerun the
contingencies, the overloads will decrease.
• Note that the units of the WTLR are:
[MW Contingency Overload]
[MW Installed]

22
 Large Case Example
• Project for the California Energy
Commission (CEC).
– Needed to simulate N-1 contingencies (about
6,000 for California)
– Simulation developed for 2003, 2005, 2007
and 2017 summer peak cases.
– In 2003, there were 170 violating
contingencies, 255 contingency violations, and
146 weak elements.
23
 Process Overview

Test Power
Identify Evaluate
Injections
Weak Locations
at Select
Elements (WTLR)
Locations

GIS Overlay
D EL N O RTE

SISKIYO U

MO D O C

H UM BO LD T
SH ASTA

LASSEN

TRIM ITY

TEH AM A

PLUM AS

GLEN N
BUTTE
M EN D O CH IN O

SIERRA

LAKE
CO LUSA YUBA

N EVAD A

SUTTER

PLACER

YO N O
SO N O M A

Power
N APA

EL D O RAD O

SACRAM EN TO

ALPIN E
SO LAN O
AM AD O R

M ARIN
CALAVERAS

SAN JO AQ UIN

CO N TRA CO STA

TO ULUM N E

ALAM ED A
MO N O

STAN ISLAUS

SAN M ATEO
PWR 1
PWR 1
PWR 1

M ARIPO SA

SAN TA CRUZ
SAN TA CLARA

Flow Cases
M ERCED

M AD ERA

IN YO

SAN BEN ITO

FRESN O

M O N TERREY TULARE

KIN GS

SAN LUIS O BISPO

KERN

SAN TA BARBARA

VEN TURA
SAN BERN ARD IN O

LO S AN GELES

O RAN GE

RIVERSID E

SAN D IEGO

IM PERIAL

24
Result: Weak Element Distribution
400

APCO 2003 2005 2007

350
Both number and weakness of
300 elements increase with time

250

200

150

100

50
# Weak Elements
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

25
Identification of Weak Elements
2007 2017

The spatial
distribution of
weak elements
seems to
follow an
identifiable
pattern.

26
 Good Locations
D EL N O RTE

SISKIYO U

MO D O C

H UM BO LD T
SH ASTA

LASSEN

TRIM ITY

 New generation at M EN D O CH IN O
GLEN N
TEH AM A

BUTTE
PLUM AS

green locations will LAKE

CO LUSA

SUTTER
YUBA

N EVAD A
SIERRA

PLACER

tend to reduce the

YO N O
SO N O M A

N APA

EL D O RAD O

SACRAM EN TO

ALPIN E
SO LAN O

AM AD O R

M ARIN
CALAVERAS

overloads.
SAN JO AQ UIN

CO N TRA CO STA

TO ULUM N E

ALAM ED A
MO N O

STAN ISLAUS

 New generation at red-

SAN M ATEO

PWR 1
PWR 1

PWR 1

M ARIPO SA

SAN TA CRUZ
SAN TA CLARA

M ERCED

M AD ERA

IN YO

SAN BEN ITO

yellow locations will M O N TERREY

FRESN O

TULARE

tend to increase the

KIN GS

SAN LUIS O BISPO

overloads. SAN TA BARBARA

KERN

 Note that higher

VEN TURA
SAN BERN ARD IN O

LO S AN GELES

imports would worsen O RAN GE

RIVERSID E

system security. SAN D IEGO

IM PERIAL

27
 Local WTLR Visualization
EBM UD GRY
D O M TAR

FIBRJCT1

EST PRTL

LKWD _JCT LAKEWD -M

UCB JCT1

WN D M STR

LKWD BART
FIBRJCT2
FIBREBRD

FIBRBJCT
LK_REACT FLO WIN D 2
UCB SUB LAKEWD -C
STATIN D
M O RAGA

O AKLN D 23
RO SSM O O R
STATIN L

M O RSTA11 M RAGA 2M
RO SSTAP1

CONTRA COSTA
CLARM N T
D UBLIN
M O RSTA21
O AK C115
STATIN X

RO SSTAP2
M O RSTA31 M RAGA 3M

M O RSTA41

EM BRCD RD

M O RAGA

M RAGA 1M
EM BRCD RE

ALAM ED CT
M ARITIM E

CARTWRT

N _LVM O RE

JEN N Y

D ELTAPM P

SL BART SN LN D RO TASSAJAR
H J H EIN Z
JV EN TER
STATIN J

D M TAR_SL

ED ESTAP1
ED ES

ED S GRN T

LEPRIN O

TRACY JC

TRAM AX11
TCY M P2
O WN BRKWY

O WEN STAP
TRACY
TRACY

SAN RAM O N
TCY M P1
KSSN -JC2
TES SUB
TRCY PM P

LLN L
UAL CO GN

UAL TAP
D ALY CTY
TES JCT LLN LAB TCH RT_T2
TCH RT_T1

TCH RTJCT
CV BART
D LY CTYP
SFIA

ELLS GTY
M T ED EN TEICH ERT
LLN L TAP

GRAN T
CASTRO VL

SFIA-M A

VIN EYD _D TESLA D

VIN EYARD ALTM M D W

SERRM N TE TESLA JB

LS PSTAS

O WEN STP1
TESLA E
EASTSH RE
SAN PIT11
O I GLASS

TESLA

SAN M AR11 O WEN STP2

SAN PAULA
E. SH O RE SFWY_TP1 GWFTRACY

TESLA
M ILLBRAE SAN M ATEO

SH AWRO AD
SFWY_TP2 SAFEWAY
AEC_TP1
TESTAB12 AEC_300
TESLA C
CRYO GEN

AEC_TP2
AEC_JCT

ALAMEDA
SAN M ATEO
SAN M AR12

TH . E. D V.
TESLA JA
BURLN GM E
JV BART
M ARTIN C

M ARTIN C

EST GRN D
SM ATEO 3M

BAYSH O R2

BAY M D WS

AD CC

BAYSH O R1 JARVIS
BELM O N T
LARKIN D
LARKIN F

FREM N T
LARKIN E
D UM BARTN

H N TRS PT

BAIR
CRTEZ
M O CCASIN

N UM I JCT

N UM I TAP

RAVEN SWD H ILM AR

N EWARK F
M ISSO N

PO TRERO
SH RED JCT O AKD LTID

N EWARK E
RAVEN SWD

N EWARK D
N EWN EW11
TUO LUM N

PIN EER
N WRK 2 M

JEFFERSN
KIFER

LS N WK12 N O RTH ERN

SH RED D ER AGN EW J

N UM M I
CLY LN G2
N EWARK D LS N WK11

SCO TT

N WK D IST LS N WK13

AGN EW
N EWARK E
LO N ESTAR
S. L. A. C.

ZAN KER ZN KER J2

AM ES BS1 AM ES J1B
SLACTAP2
FM C
CLY LN D G

AM ES J1A AM ES BS2
N O RTECH
ZN KER J1
AM ES D ST
SLACTAP1 FM C JCT

D IXO N LD
M ILPITAS
M O FT. FLD
PLO ALTO
M FT. FD J

LCKH D J2

WTLR
LCKH D J1
M T VIEW

SAN MATEO
M ABURY J

WH ISM AN
M O N TAGUE
LO CKH D 2

M ABURY
TRIM BLE

LO CKH D 1 LAWREN CE

AM D JCT

WAUKESH A
SJ B E SN ELP11

A. M . D

APP M AT
w aksha j
PH LPS_JT
LS ESTRS
PH ILLIPS SJ B F
ELPT_SJ1

EL ELP11
LS ESTRS

STELLIN G

ELPT_SJ2
SN JSE A
BRITTN
M O N TAVIS EL PATIO

WO LFE

M CKEE
IBM -BALY

M N TA VSA IBM -H RRS

IBM -CTLE

STO N E

SWIFT

ED N VL J3 ED N VL J1
M ARKH AM M ARKH M J2

STO N E J

SARATO GA
IBM -H R J
ED EN VALE

M ARKH M J
BAILY J1 BAILY J2

PIERCY

VASO N A
BAILY J3

EVRGRN J EVRGRN 1 GEN ELEC

GILRO Y

EVRM TC21
M TCALF D

EVRGRN 2
M TCALF E
CAL M EC

H ICKS

M TCEVR11
M ETCALF

CYTE PM P

M ETCALF
CM P EVRS

M ETLS 11

M ETLS 12

M ETLS 13

28
Eastern Interconnection

WTLR
1.50

0.75

0.00

–0.75

–1.50
29
 Towards a Locational Value
• Determination of locations where new
generation would enhance security needs to
be combined with availability and
economics of energy resources.
• Valuation requires monetizing the security
benefits.

30
 Towards a Locational Value
• GIS spatial analysis techniques are needed
to determine feasible generation
alternatives for each location in a large-
scale system.

ci  $
MW
  cost of least-cost alternative gij
 Based on existing energy potential and
technology, a least-cost alternative can be
determined for each location.
31
 Towards a Locational Value
• Units of WTLR are [AMWCO/MW installed].
• The security cost/benefit can be obtained as
follows:
– Assume WTLR is negative: Injection reduces the
AMWCO
ci  $

si   
$ MW
AMWCO
WTLRi  MW 
AMWCO

Valuei  MW
$
  
benefits k
Bi , k  C
cos ts k
i,k  si

32
 Security-Penetration Curves
• Once a set of proposed sites is defined, the
effect of simultaneous distributed injections
with different levels of penetration can be
simulated using security-penetration
curves.
• The effectiveness of the solution is affected
for large injections due to:
– Local transfer capability of the grid
– Reversed flows

33
 Security-Penetration Curves
SysAMWCO in 2005
12,000

10,000

8,000 69
500
6,000 115
230

4,000

2,000

0
0 650 1300 2000 New Generation

34
 Policy Analysis
• A fundamental goal of integrated electricity
systems is to ensure dependable supply to
customers.
• This goal cannot be achieved if the system
consistently exhibits overloaded elements and
congestion.
• System AMWCO can be utilized to:
– Evaluate system security for different seasons/years
– Design policy goals regarding security
• Can use security-penetration curves

35
 Policy Analysis
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
14000
Indicates the effect of new generation
Approx. -3.5 MWCO/MW Installed
NewGen
12000 Indicates how much generation
AMWCO
is needed to maintain the current
level of reliability.
10000 Approx. 500MW every two years
(at strategic locations)
8000

6000

4000

2000

0
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
36
 Policy Analysis
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
AMWCO
14000 2007 2005 2003
14000

12000 Generation needed to maintain

12000
the current level of reliability.
10000 10000

8000 8000
7300
6000
6000
4000
4000
2000
Generation needed in the next two
2000 years (2005) to solve the problems
by 02017. Approx. 950MW
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
0 New Generation
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
37
 Integrated Model
Power Flow Energy
Model WTLR Calculation Resources

Contingency Analysis Spatial Rep. of Maps of Energy Potential

New Generation
Weak Element GIS Spatial Overlay
Ranking
Security Security-
List of Proposed Sites
Indices Penetration
Curves
Generation
Transmission
Expansion
Expansion

Transmission Energy
Policy Policy

38