After the Cold War

The Post-Cold War World, main trends:

--Unprecedented expansion of capitalism
--Formation of the global capitalist class, which has
absorbed former communist elites
--Unprecedented rise of US global influence
--Ideological dominance of neoliberalism
--Lack of major ideological alternatives to the new status-
quo
--Logic of the market vs. logic of democracy
--Steady buildup of tensions and conflicts: from relative
peace to a global war mode
--Discovery of climate change: new stage in the growth of
eco-consciousness
--The global economic crisis
The Post-Cold War World:
3 periods
 First Period,1991-2000: Triumph of the West
 Russia’s transition crisis

 The Unipolar Moment: US hegemony at its peak

 The Western expansion

 Formation of the global neoliberal regime

 Second Period, 2001-2008: US Hegemony Tested
 The Islamist challenge and the Bush response

 Development of a multipolar system

 Russia’s resurgence

 Relative decline of US hegemony

 Third Period, 2008-
 The global economic crisis

 Gorbama and the American perestroika

 The rise of China as a global power

 Europe: from integration to fragmentation?

 Reset in Russia’s relations with the West

2 international perspectives on Soviet foreign policy

USSR AS A PROBLEM
an empire dominating Eurasian Heartland
a global subversive force undermining capitalism
USSR AS A SOLUTION
a key ally against Hitler
a source of help to developing countries (support of
national liberation movements, economic assistance)
a counterbalance to the US
Contraction of Russian power
NATO enlargement, 1949-2004
Main changes in Russia’s international role following the end
of the Cold War:
1. Reduction of the main parametres of Russia’s power
 Territorial losses
 Economic depression
 The military crisis
 Ideological neutralization
 after being a key part of the Global Left for most of the 20th
century, Russia joined the Global (neoliberal) Right
2. Russian society was opened to the impact of global forces
with minimal regulation by the state
3. Political affiliation with the West
4. Reluctant acceptance of US hegemony
 Post-Soviet Russia was no longer a problem for the West in
the Cold War sense:
 Russia’s abandonment of its Soviet mode became a key
enabling factor for the formation of the global neoliberal
regime
 RUSSIA AS A “NORMAL COUNTRY”: capitalist,
cautious, status quo, pragmatic, with limited ambitions,
seeking friends everywhere, wary of making enemies
RUSSIA AS A PROBLEM AFTER THE COLD WAR
 The transition crisis: dangerous side-effects of reforms:
The nuclear dimension
Possibility of a totalitarian backlash
Potential for civil war
Tensions with new neighbours, attempts to maintain a
sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space
 Russia as a US client: no longer counterbalancing the US
(not a problem for the US, but a problem for many other
states) – or:
 Russia as a member of coalitions to counterbalance US
hegemony (a problem for the US)
The dominant American perspective:
 Help Russia become a “normal” country

 Prevent Russia from acting as a counterbalance

 Control Russia’ behaviour to keep it congruent with US

interests
 Expand US influence into the post-Soviet space

Perspectives outside the US:

 Many countries would like Russia to play the role of a non-
hostile, but relatively independent, actor in international
politics
 Most Russians have the same perspective
 The economy
 GDP, PPP - $2.11 trln. (No.8 in the world)
 Canada – $1.28
 GDP per capita - $15,100
 Canada - $38,200
 Real growth rate – 5.6% in 2008, -7.9 in 2009, 2.7% in 2010
 Canada – 0.5 in 2008, -2.5% in 2009, 0.3% in 2010
 US National Intelligence Council forecast for the year 2025,
unveiled in October 2008, described Russia as
 one of four rising centers of international power: “In terms
of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global
wealth and economic power now under way — roughly
from West to East — is without precedent in modern history
. . . . No other countries are projected to rise to the level of
China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their
individual global clout. . . . Growth projections for Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will
collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by
2040-2050.”
 “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”. Washington: National
Intelligence Council, November 2008 -
http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html , pp. vi, vii
 In the 2000s, Russian state capacity has been partially
repaired
 Putinism has consolidated Russian capitalism, protected it
from internal challenges, and returned Russia to the rank
of major international actors
 But huge problems remain unsolved, while new problems
have been created
 The Russian economy needs major modernization to be
competitive
 The new Russian state is in many ways dysfunctional and
needs major reforms to meet Russia’s challenges
 The Russian society is deeply split by social inequality
 Continued resurgence requires new policies and reforms
The structure of Russia’s exports: 93% raw materials
Russia’s military power
 Mid-1980s – defence spending accounted for 15-17% of

Soviet GDP
 Massive cuts following dissolution of USSR in 1991

 Steady rise since 2000 – by 15-25% a year

 In 2006, a new state armaments program, which will span

2007-2015, was adopted
 Price tag: 4.9 trillion rubles (US$186 billion).

 63% is to be allocated for the procurement of modern

weapons and equipment
 27% towards defense research and development.

 2009 – defence spending accounts for 2.5% of Russia’s

GDP
 normal level for a Western country
Topol-M, Russia’s new mobile ICBM
A Tu-95 over the Arctic
Russian infantry in Georgia, August 2008
A Russian warship in the Caribbean
Russia is buying a Mistral amphibious assault ship from France
 NATO – Russia military balance
 Total armed forces personnel 3:1
 Military aircraft 10:1
 Tanks 3:1
 Artillery 2:1
 Naval ships 2:1
 Submarines 3:1
 Aircraft carriers 19:1
 How real is this picture?
 Partly
Comparing 1917 and 1991:
 The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution,
the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a
result of the civil war
 The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast
themselves as leaders of independent nation-states –
 or of units of the Russian Federation

 A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet

exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for
themselves after communism
 Transition to capitalism would enable most of them to
maintain and even enhance their power and privilege
 Having dissolved the empire, the new elites have been
engaged in competition and cooperation between
themselves to:
 secure their control,

 reform their political-economic systems,

 find new places in the regional and global orders

THIS STRUGGLE OVER THE IMPERIAL SPOILS IS THE

ESSENCE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN EURASIA
 Some of them stick together (RF, CIS, GUUAM)
 Others go their own separate ways, look for new
partnerships
 Meanwhile, many other states are exploring opportunities to
expand their influence in Eurasia
Two basic imperatives of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy:

the imperative of systemic transformation into a

capitalist-type society (the market imperative) and
the realities of her historic-geographic position as
Eurasia’s core state (the geopolitical imperative).
The 2 imperatives may interact in a number of ways.
 They can be mutually reinforcing, making it possible to
achieve significant foreign policy gains.

 They can be mutually exclusive, forcing Russia’s leaders to

make hard choices between them, which makes policy
setbacks likely.

 They can be managed through tradeoffs, which requires

great political skills, significant and diverse power
resources, and effective institutions.
 Choices and balances between market and geopolitical
considerations in Russia’s international behaviour.
 If the market imperative is considered decisive:
 Russia can be expected to try to market its geopolitical assets
– that is, to achieve economic gains through a skillful use of its
unique geopolitical position.
 If the geopolitical imperative becomes uppermost:
 Russia may adopt mercantilist stances and use market
interactions with other countries to achieve maximum possible
geopolitical gains.
 Different forces within Russia favor different market-
geopolitical balances.
Russian elite interests
The oligarchy – the upper crust of the new capitalist class,
product of the post-communist transformation
Most important sources of wealth: oil, gas and arms
Dependent on the West, primarily the US
Dependent on the Russian state, wants to rationalize it
Needs traditional foreign policy assets of the USSR
Assertive in the political sphere
Seeks economic opportunities worldwide
Intertwined with state bureaucracy
 The bureaucrats
The “enforcers” (siloviki) – military and security elites
Determined to get upper hand over the oligarchs, get
their property
Institutionally and traditionally suspicious of the West
Interested in a restoration of a stronger and more
authoritarian Russian state, but on a capitalist basis
Federal civilian bureaucracy
Interested in whatever protects and increases their
power
Regional bureaucracies, regional foreign policy interests
 The national bourgeoisie
Well below the ranks of the oligarchy
Gets little from the West
Feels dominated by the oligarchs
Is nationalist and protectionist
 The politicians
1990s: liberals, communists, nationalists, “United
Russia” – becoming the ruling party under Putin
The Westernizer-Eurasianist divide – and synthesis
 Russian threat perceptions
 Security – internal and external
 Control of resources
 Russia’s defence capability
 Technological lag behind the West
 Negative demography
Globescan poll of Russians, April 2009 http://surveys.globescan.com/bbc_russia09/
Russia’s foreign policy compass
 West - US, EU, NATO

 East – China, India, Japan

 South - the Muslim world

 North - the Arctic

 The dominant trends in Russian foreign policy thinking
 Relations with the West are top priority
 No desire to confront the West
 Recognition of Western concerns
 But also:
 Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence
 Claim for “special interests” in the post-Soviet space
 Multivector foreign policy – active engagement with other
international actors
 Pragmatism
 Primacy of trade and investment issues
 Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to
problems