Curse or Blessing:

Local Elites in
Decentralized Natural
Resource Management
Kulbhushan Balooni
Jens Friis Lund (University of Copenhagen)
Chetan Kumar (University of Cambridge)
Makoto Inoue (University of Tokyo)
Decentralized Natural Resource Management

 Joint Forest Management

 Around 100,000 Joint Forest Management Committees managing around
28% of forest area
 Forests – source of livelihood for 200 million people
 Watershed Development
 Water User Groups – Desert Development Program, Drought Prone Area
Program, Integrated Wasteland Development Program
 Changing Mode of Forest Management in India:
Focus on decentralized forest governance

 Indian Forest Policy of 1988 (people’s participation)

 Arabari experiment in West Bengal in 1970s
 Joint/Participatory/Decentralized Forest Management
 NGO initiatives through out the country
Scattered & Modest Successes
 Despite changes in policy & rhetoric, only scattered & modest
successes (e.g., Campbell et al. 2001; Blaikie 2006; Manor 2004; Lund & Treue 2008; Ribot et
al. 2006)

 Inability of communities to sustain decentralized programs –

high dependence of communities on external support &
resources
 Sustainability of new institutions?
 e.g., Tree Growers’ Cooperative Societies (discussed in previous
session)
Factors shaping local-level outcomes

 Studies within new institutional economics have focused on

how characteristics* of forest resources system, users, and
institutional arrangements may explain why some setting
are more conducive to local collective management than
others (Agrawal 2007)
 *e.g., forest size, forest utilization patterns, group size and
heterogeneity, and trust among the group

 Improving our understanding of how resources can be

governed better
Factors shaping local-level outcomes

 Another body of recent literature focuses on relations

between communities & various State actors
(e.g., Benjamin 2008; Lund & Treue 2008; Ribot 2004)

 Role of powerful State in nurturing fragile local initiatives &

recognition of local communities as legitimate natural resources
managers
 Concern: Central governments choosing local institutions
that further their control over resource management
 “Recentralization while decentralizing” as Ribot, Agrawal &
Larson (2006) call
Factors shaping local-level
outcomes
 Generally recent studies show how processes of local
participation in forest management can be construed as
a continuous power struggle that unfolds in numerous
ways and forums between external actors and internal
community fractions over the processes and outcome of
forest management
(Benjamin 2008; Lund & Treue 2008; Nightingale 2002; Perez-Cirera & Lovett 2006;
Ribot 2004)
Elites shaping local-level outcomes

 In relation to elites, a tendency for studies to focus

on the curse of elites – the risk of elite capture or
appropriation of benefits by local elites
(e.g., Dhakal & Masuda 2009; Iversen et al. 2006; Lund & Treue, 2008; Oyono 2004)

 How better to explain local-level outcomes in the

context of local elites?
Focus of this Study

 How the local elites play an instrumental role – either with

positive or negative consequences – in shaping struggles
for power over processes and outcomes of decentralized
forest governance (DFG) interventions?
Study of Joint Forest Management implemented in Shiwalik hills
in the State of Haryana in Northern India
Shiwalik Hills
Hill Resource Management Societies in Shiwaliks
Water conservation before forest management
Integrated watershed development
program in 1975 in Shiwalik hills to
check soil erosion in degraded
commons
Participatory approach to water
& forest management
 Implementing agency: Forest
Department
Financial backing: Ford
Foundation
Community facilitator: The
Energy Research Institute/TERI

HRMS – Governance structure

Earlier emphasis on Later tree General Body
rainwater harvesting plantation too Executive Committee –
structures to enhance President, Secretary, Treasurer
irrigation of cultivated land & Others

One of the earliest decentralization initiatives in India now

integrated with the Joint Forest Management Program
No Question Mark on Environmental Sustainability
(Forest & Water Conservation)
 Valuable Tree & Grass species
Khair - Acacia catechu – Yields condiment (katha)
Shisham – Dalbergia sissoo - Gives precious timber
Fiber Grass – Eulaliopsis binata – Used by paper industry & by locals for making ropes

Compelling incentives for Communities & State for a stake

Research Method
Case Study of two villages

 Sahyogpur (in Hindi ‘Sahyog’ means collaboration)

 High degree of internal cooperation & good relations with external
actors
 Sangharshpur (‘Sangharsh’ means competition or conflict)
 Opposite state of affairs

 Interviews with executives of new village institutions, forest

department & NGO officials, key individuals/leaders
 Focus on poorer sections: benefits from resources, patron-client relationship, main
source of information about intra-elite cooperation, competition & conflicts

 Data
 Elections held for executive committees of new village institutions & panchayat
 Landholdings of past & present executives
 Case Study Villages: Sahyogpur & Sangharshpur
Resources
Common history of Water harvesting dams
resource use,
Forests: Sahyogpur (342 ha);
degradation & later Sangharshpur (362 ha)
initiatives to rehabilitate
Sangharshpur comparatively
starting in 1990 better off than Sahyogpur

 Definition of local elite

 Mostly Gujjars (Other Backward Class) identified with agriculture & cattle
rearing in Northern India
 Traditional Indian caste hierarchy not a determining factor in defining
local elite
 Around 25% households landless
 Main criterion: Wealth based on ownership of cultivable land
 Patron-Client Relationship between landless & landholding
households has feudal traits
 New village institutions
Relative success in institutionalizing
Hill Resource Management Societies resulted in
increased developmental funds

An autonomous society of
villagers registered under
Besides, Hill Resource Management Society Societies Act, 1860

Village Development Committee –

Soil & moisture conservation
Department of Agriculture – World Bank
Village Resource Management Society in
Sahyogpur – Village woodlot on commons & self-
help groups - Forest Department – European Union Committees instituted by
Village Forest Committee in Sangharshpur – government agencies in
Improvement of socio-economic conditions of people consultation with local people
by forming self-help groups –
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Benefit Sharing Arrangement
Motivation for the power struggle over processes &
outcomes of Joint Forest Management (JFM)

 JFM brought both new restrictions & privileges

 Dry wood, fencing material, limited bamboos & poles free of cost

 Fodder grass – Access to HRMS/Society on an annual payment basis

 Fiber Grass – Given on annual lease basis through open auction

 If Society fails to bid then auctioned away to private contractor (mostly)
 Net Income divided between Forest Department (25%) & Society (75%)

 Timber – Net Income divided between Forest Department (70%) &

Society (30%)
Society or Village Development Fund
 30% - ‘Plough back funds’ for developing village JFM area
 Jointly held by Forest Department & Society
 10% - ‘Welfare fund’ to support JFM in the region
 Managed by Forest Department

 Rest for village development & community welfare

 Operated by Treasurer & two other executive members
 Buying communal utensils, common gas stove, improvements of minor
roads, schools, community halls
 Few procedures guiding benefit sharing within community
Benefit Sharing Arrangement
Dam Water: Most valuable environmental service produced

 Rotational water distribution

 Managed by a private contractor who is overseen by Society executives
 Compelling reason for elites to run for office in Society

 Introduction of Tradable Water Shares – NGO

 State JFM Policy suggests equal entitlement to all members
 Implemented for few years – Poor could sell their share
 Outspoken resistance among elites eventually led to a reversal
of the system
 Poor feared that it threatened to erode very patron-client
system fundamental to their livelihoods
 Sahyogpur
Intra-elite Cooperation
Profiles of executives in village institutions, 1990–2007
Village institution - Number
Legal requirement
Total elected for
Executives Number of executives elected at least
of executives elected at once as per landholding size in ha
representation
elections
of landless &
least once
Landless 0.1 to 2 ha > 2 ha
women (21%) (local
- Facilitated by NGO elites)
- Token participation
Hill Resource 10 104 80 14 45 21
Management Society
Village Development 1 11 11 2 7 2
Committee - Elected elites support their
Village Resource people
1 (clan &13those attached
13 3 7 3
Management Committee
to their households) as
Village panchayat 5 35 32 9 18 5
candidates for executive
All village institutions members
17 163 107* 23 61 23
*Executives elected to more than one institution are counted only once to
obtain the number of executives elected at least once to any institution
Sahyogpur
Domination of local elites
“Landholdings of premier executive members
of the new village institutions, 1990–2007”
Landholding President Secretary Treasurer Total
 Landless 4 2 0 6
 0.1 to 2 ha 3 5 4 12
 > 2 ha (elites) 5 5 8 18
 Total 12 12 12 36

30 positions held by landholders & 18 by local elites

 Sahyogpur: Intra-elite Cooperation
Six local elites dominating the premier positions in
the new village institutions, 1990–2007
Local elite Hill Resource Management Society Village Devel. Village Reso.
Committeei Management
Committeei
President Secretary Treasurer
Bhishma 1990, 1998, 2001 2001
(President)

 Largest
Yudhishtir 1990of all elected
landholding (4.45 ha) 1997, 2007
local elites 2002
(President)
Bhim Good leadership & interpersonal
2004, 2005 1995 skills
(only
 Society prospered – an award of excellence
landless) by Government
Arjun  Sahyogpur recommended for visits 2000, 2004 Forest Department officials
by senior
Nakul 1998 2001
 Good personal rapport with NGO and Forest Department
(Treasurer)Officials
 More
Sahadev or less chosen as ‘spokesperson’/‘showcase
2005 leader’ of JFM2002
in region
(Treasurer)
 Emerging as a local leader
iElection held only once Six prominent elites together held 17 of 36 positions
Sahyogpur
Outcomes of Intra-elite cooperation

 Instated rules for relatively effective forest management &

utilization
 Penalty for illegal forest product harvesting

 Successfully overcame external interventions

 Pilferage of valuable khair trees by timber mafia
 Approached Principal Chief Conservator of Forests
 Daring enough to bypass lower level police & forest officers
 Indication of the strength of local leadership – Bhisma
 Sahyogpur
Local elites strongly asserted their viewpoints on forest management

“In the past villagers used to steal from forests and the forest department
too” – Bhishma spoke at an assembly of senior state officials & politicians
Sahyogpur
Questioning the legitimacy of State to control timber harvesting

 Profits from fiber grass dwindling

 Higher extraction costs, declining price – diminishing demand from
paper mills
 Increased focus on potential benefits from timber
 People (mostly elites) demanding timber harvesting

 A natural resistance from State

 Maintain control over revenues from timber, raising concerns
 Local political elements would capture timber earnings
 Politicization would jeopardize stability of the Society
Sangharshpur
Intra-elite Competition and Conflicts

 Limited data on profiles of Society executives

 Analysis of electoral history of Society to reveal roles of local elites

 Since 1990 all presidents local elites except 1998

 1990–1995: Society performed well

 1996: Beginning of Forest Department domination

 Forest Department decided to lease fiber grass in open auction –
capture rent
 Two competing families vied to control Society
 Community divided over allegiance to these local elites
 Forest officers supported those elites who would collaborate with them
 Sangharshpur
Outcomes of Intra-elite Competition & Conflicts
 2003: Beginning of Forest Department’s de jure control
 2003 Election could not be held – Lack of consensus to elect president
 Incumbent President (embezzled Society funds) opposed by another elite
 Forest Department & NGO intervened without success

 An opportunity for Forest Department to reverse decentralization

 “If Society as a whole fails to comply with any of the conditions laid down
[in JFM agreement between government & Society], despite at least two
warnings in writing by the Forest Officer, the Officer shall be entitled to
terminate agreement with the Society after due enquiry” (Government of Haryana 1998)
Sangharshpur
Institutional breakdown

 Tremendous impact on resource management &

utilization
 Forest Department auctioned fiber grass & dam water to a
contractor
 Income went to State treasury rather than the Society fund
 Local elites appropriated benefits by bribing contractor
 Sangharshpur
Institutional breakdown

 2004: Revival of Society by efforts of panchayat & NGO

 A young elite ‘Umeed Kumar’ took the lead & elected new Society president

 Paid US$5500 to Forest Department to obtain lease rights to fiber grass &
dam water

 2007 Election: Failure of community to reach consensus

 Issue: Umeed Kumar wanted to continue as president

 Finally Forest Department took over control of forest

 No efforts to confront Forest Department
Discussion
 Diverse outcomes of similar institutional reforms in
relatively similar neighboring communities
 Need to look beyond institutional reforms to explain outcomes

 Two major differences between communities

 Difference in intensity of cooperation or conflict internally in
communities appears to have been instrumental in shaping
the directions of events
 Ability of key people – elites – to manage external actors
 Drawing upon them when needed to advance local priorities
 Fending them off when seeking to avoid unwanted interference
Discussion
Network Theory on Social Capital

 Bonding & Bridging social capital (Woolcock & Narayan 2000)

 Bonding is relations of reciprocity within the community that secure
a minimum subsistence livelihood
 Poor are characterized by more of social bonding
 High level of bridging social capital in Sahyogpur

 Bridging is relations to more resourceful external actors

 Elites are characterized by more of bridging social capital
 Low levels of bonding and bridging social capital in Sangharshpur
Conclusions
 Draws attention to the importance of looking beyond
elite capture to analyze conflict and cooperation
among local elites and how they in turn influence the
sustainability of local institutions

 Under circumstances where elites are likely to be

dominating the political arena, their role and interests
may need to be considered to ensure that the
concept of Joint Forest Management takes roots at
the local level
“In all societies – from societies that are very
meagrely developed and have barely attained
the dawnings of civilisation, down to the most
advanced and powerful societies – two classes
of people appear – a class that rules and a class
that is ruled.”

Gaetano Mosca (1939, p. 50)

(The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill)