PERSONS AND

FAMILY
RELATIONS LAW
CASE REPORTING
 Systems Factors
Corporation
vs. NLRC,
346 SCRA 149 (2000)
FACTS:
• Systems Factors Corporation is a corporation engaged in the
business of installing electrical system in buildings and
infrastructure projects wherein it employs electricians, engineers
and other personnel.
• Private respondents Ronaldo Lazaga and Luis Singson were
employed by petitioner corporation as electricians in one of its
projects.
• Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of backwages, service incentive fees,
premium pay, separation pay and other allowances.
FACTS:
• The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering petitioners to
reinstate private respondents to their former positions and to pay
them backwages.
• On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA-decision.
• Petitioners allegedly received the NLRC judgment on August 10,
1999 and a motion for reconsideration thereto was filed on
August 20, 1999. On November 25, 1999, petitioners received the
NLRC-Resolution dated November 11, 1999 denying their motion
for reconsideration.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for

certiorari and motion for
reconsideration filed was out of time.
RULING:
• No. Petition for certiorari was filed within the allotted time which
is sixty-day period and was reckoned from receipt of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration should be
deemed applicable.
• Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception
of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes.
 Agujetas vs.
Court of Appeals,
261 SCRA 17 (1996)
FACTS:
• Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of
Davao Oriental
assail the decision of the public respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding
them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning
elected candidate.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 7166 repeals
Section 231 of the Omnibus
Election Code, saying that winners
should be proclaimed by the Board
of Canvassers.
RULING:
• No, since R.A. 7166 neither
expressly or impliedly repeals
Section 231 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
De Agbayani vs.
PNB
38 SCRA 429
FACTS:
• Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from
defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944.
• As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the
amount of P1,294.00.
• Defendant then instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for
the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
FACTS:
• Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on
August 10, 1959, his main allegation being that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having
elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944.
• He sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made
permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its
answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
 ISSUE:

•Whether or not EO 32 and RA

342 unconstitutional ?
RULING:
• Art. 7 of the Civil Code declares that , " When the Courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern."
• At the time of the issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945
and of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a factual
justification for the moratorium.
• The Philippines was confronted with an emergency of
impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the
Japanese military forces in 1945.
RULING:
• Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures,
radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some
semblance of normalcy could be restored and an improvement in her
economy noted.
• No wonder then that the suspension of enforcement of payment of
the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and
then by legislation.
• The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention
that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting
as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
RULING:
• WHEREFORE, the decision is reversed and the suit of plaintiff
filed August 10, 1959 dismissed.
 Ting vs.
Velez-Ting
582 SCRA 694
FACTS:
• Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting wed on July 26, 1975.
• On October 21, 1993, respondent filed a petition before the RTC
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Carmen’s basis of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted
of the following manifestations: (a) alcoholism; (b) violent
nature; (c) his compulsive gambling habit; and (d) Benjamin’s
irresponsibility and immaturity.
• Petitioner denied all these allegations. On January 28, 1998, RTC
declared their marriage null and void.
FACTS:
• Petitioner appealed to Courts of Appeal then on October 19,
2000, CA reversed the trial’s court ruling.
• Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
Molina Case guidelines should not be applied to this case since
the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997.
• She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare
decisis, Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
FACTS:
• In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
• On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. On
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision reversing its
first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.
• A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by the
petitioner, but the same was denied by the CA in its December
13, 2004 Resolution.
 ISSUE:
• 1. Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused
to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
• 2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
• 3. Whether or not the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
RULING:
• 1. No, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
no longer new.
• 2. No. Case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own attendant facts, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
RULING:
• 3. No. Evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychological unfit to discharge the duties expected
of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered
from such psychological incapacity as the date of marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari in GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERESED
and SET ASIDE.
Floresca vs. Philex
Mining Corporation
G.R. No. 30642
April 30, 1985
FACTS:
• Several miners who while working at the copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine.
• Allegedly, Philex was in violation of government rules
and regulations for negligently and deliberately failing to
take the required precautions for the protection of the
lives of its men working underground.
FACTS:
• The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits
pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission.
• They also petitioned to the regular court and sued the
said company for additional damages. Philex invoked
that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners
have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
 ISSUE:
• Whether or not Floresca et al can claim
benefits and at the same time sue Philex?
RULING:
• Under the law, petitioner could only do either one.
If they filed for benefits under the WCA before the
WCC, then they will be prohibited from proceeding
with a civil case before the regular court.
• On the contrary, if they sued before the civil court
(Article 9 of the civil code) then they would also be
prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA.
RULING:
• The SC ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this
deficiency due to ignorance of the fact.
• The court also ruled that the dismissal of the case in the
lower court be reversed and case is remanded for further
proceedings.
• However, if in case the petitioner won in the lower court,
whatever award may be granted, the amount given to
them under the WCA should be deducted.
MENDIOLA VS.
COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
• In 1987, Ms. Norma S. Nora convince Rogelio Mendiola
to enter a joint venture with her for the export of prawns.
As proposed by Ms. Nora, they were to secure financing
from private respondent Philippine National Bank.
• The credit line was to be secured by collaterals
consisting of real estate properties of the petitioner,
particulalry two (2) parcels of land, situated in Marikina.
FACTS:
• In 1988, Mendiola signed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Ms. Norma to mortgage his aforementioned
properties to PNB in order to secure the obligations of the
joint venture with the said bank of up to 5 Million pesos.
• The planned joint venture became a failure even before it
could take off the ground. But, in the meantime, Ms. Norma,
on the strength of the Special Power of Attorney issued her
favor, obtained loans from PNB in the amount of P 8,101,
440.62 for the account of petitioner and securred by the parcels
of land hereinabove described.
FACTS:
• 1988, Mendiola belatedly revoked the special
power of attorney in favor of Ms. Nora and
requested PNB to release his properties from
mortgage. Petitioner was notified that PNB and
initiated foreclose proceedings against the
properties of the petitioner.
• 1989, Mendiola filed injunction case against PNB,
PND moved to dismiss.
 ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the
petition?
Whether or not res judicita has already se
in the case?
RULING:
• YES
• NO.
• The instant petition has now become moot and
academic because the first case, which is an
application for injunction filed by the petitioner
against private respondent PNB to prevent the
latter from foreclosing his real properties.
Norma A. Del Socorro
vs. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
• Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland.
• They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem.
• Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
• Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines.
FACTS:
• According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and
her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.
• Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.
• The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the accused, he being an alien.
 ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation
to support his minor child under
Philippine law?
RULING:
• Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
• This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to
support Norma’s son altogether.
• In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.
RULING:
• In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.
• While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
• It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child.
• Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-
Somera
174 SCRA 652
FACTS:
• Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Federal Republic of Germany.
• They haD a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
• Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany
before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983.
FACTS:
• The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
• The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to the petitioner.
• On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
 ISSUE:
Whether private respondent can prosecute
petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife
as decree of divorce was already issued.
RULING:
• The law specifically provided that in prosecution for
adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else.
• Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
so far as he is concerned.
RULING:
• Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
• Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987.
• They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However,
an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha
on May 18, 1989.
FACTS:
• On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was
solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.
Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
• As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
• Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in
November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
 ISSUE:
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by
Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner
and absolved him of bigamy.
RULING:
• The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by
the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the
Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.
• However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the
former presented a divorce decree.
• The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible
to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where
it will be used.
 Roehr vs.
Rodriguez
G.R. No. 14280, June 30, 2003
404 SCRA 495
FACTS:
• Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Germany.
• Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were
born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
• Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang
filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
FACTS:
• Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from
the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese.
Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
• Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
FACTS:
• Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose
of determining the issues of custody of children
and the distribution of the properties between her
and Wolfgang.
• Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous
order for the purpose of tackling the issues of
support and custody of their children.
 ISSUE:
1. W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting
a partial motion for reconsideration.
2. W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when
she assumed and retained jurisdiction as
regards child custody and support.
RULING:
1. YES. A judge can order a partial reconsideration
of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the
case at bar.
2. YES. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained
by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof,
e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.