The Phillips Disaster refers to a devastating series of explosions

and fire on October 23, 1989 near the Houston Ship Channel in
Pasadena, Texas, USA, causing death of 23 employees and 314
injured – 185 Phillips 66 employees and 129 contract employees.
The Houston Chemical Complex (HCC) facility had
905 company employees and approximately 600
daily contract employees, who were engaged
primarily in regular maintenance activities and new
plant construction.
The facility produced approximately 15,000 million pounds
per year of high-density polyethylene (HDPE)
Isolation valves were closed & compressed air hoses
that actuated them physically disconnected as a
safety measure

The air connections for opening and closing this

valve were identical, and had been improperly
reversed when last re-connected

The valve would have been open when the switch in

the control room was in the "valve closed" position

The valve was opened when it was expected to stay

closed

Passed the reactor content which more than 85,000

pounds (39 t) of highly flammable gases was
released into air
 • An explosion occurred as a result of a massive gas released from reactor 6.
• More than 85,000 lbm (38, 560 kg) or 99% of the reactor contents were released almost
1:00 – 1:05
instantaneously.
pm

• The gas mixture reached a still-unidentified ignition source and exploded with the force
of 2.4 tons (2, 177 kg) of TNT.
1:07– 1:08 • This initial explosion threw debris for about six miles and, according to seismographic
pm data from Rice University, registered between 3 and 4 on the Richter scale.

• A pair of secondary explosions occurred when two 20,000 gallon (75, 700 L) isobutane
1:15 – storage tanks exploded.
1:20pm

• Another polyethylene reactor failed catastrophically and explode.

1:30 – 1:50
pm

There may have been as many as six more explosions in all.

The fire was brought under control within about 10 hours as a result of the
combined efforts of fire brigades from other nearby companies, local fire
departments, and the Phillips 66 foam trucks and fire brigade.
 The slurry of HDPE The concentration
and catalyst of polymer
particles products n the
The polymer circulates through slurry is 25% by It can also be
particles are the loop at a weight controlled by the
suspended in an velocity between 5 addition of
inert hydrocarbon – 12 m/s hydrogen into the
Ethylene, a-olefin co- reactor
monomer, inert
Slurry The polymer solvent and catalyst
polymerization chains grow components are The molecular
takes place at a outwards and continuously charged weight is again
temperature below inwards, causing into the reactor at controlled by the
135°C the granule to 450 psig temperature of
expand catalyst
progressively preparation
The catalyst and
The polymer is
the inert solvent The active sites on concentrated n The conversion of
are introduced into the catalyst are settling legs to ethylene to
the loop reactor equally accessible about 60% by polyethylene is
where ethylene to the monomer weight slurry and very high (95% -
and a-olefin are throughout the continuously 98%), eliminating
circulating particle removed ethylene recovery

The inert solvent is

used to dissipate A cooling jacket is
heat as the also used to The solvent is The polymer is
reaction is highly dissipate heat recovered by hot dried and
exothermic flashing pelletized
Spontaneous Chain Transfer:

Cr – CH2 – CH2 – polymer -> Cr – H + CH2 = CH – polymer

This is the principal chain-transfer for the Phillips process with the use of a chromium
catalyst. Its importance increases rapidly with increasing temperature and it provides
easy means of controlling molecular weight.

Chain Transfer with Hydrogen:

Cr – polymer + H2 -> Cr – H + polymer - H

HDPE created is more

crystalline

Advantages Create
More more
economical
of Phillips durable
process products

Conversion rate is very high

 BASIC CAUSES
PERSONAL FACTOR
Site procedures laid down
details that air hoses to valves
were to be disconnected prior
to maintenance work was not
carried out
It was likely that individuals in
certain parts of the plant were
unable to hear the siren
The air hoses to the valve had
been cross-connected so that
the air supply that should have
closed the valve actually
opened it
JOB FACTOR MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATION
FACTOR
Ventilation intakes of buildings An effective permit to work
close to or downwind of the (PTW) for both company
process plant were not arranged employees and contractors was
to prevent the intake of gas in not enforced by the company
the event of release
The intended control centre was Both the company and industry
damaged beyond use and safety required isolation by
telephone communications means of double-block system
were disrupted or the use of blind flange.
However, at a plant level a
procedure had been adopted
which did not comply with this
The location of the control The site held a large inventory
room, separation distances of flammable materials under
between plant and escape high pressure yet it has no fixed
routes (particularly for gas detection system
administrative staff) were
criticised
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
 Reactor Settling Leg

Demco Valve
Based on OSHA’s findings there are few weakness in the
Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex production
plants:

Inadequate lockout system

Inadequate fire protection

Inappropriate evacuation routes for

employees

Inaudible emergency alarm siren

Unutilised of the process hazard analysis

Hot works permit were not issued for

vehicle entry
 23 employees who were
within 250 ft of the point
where the gas was initially
released were killed while
314 people were injured.

Capital losses were

initially estimated at over
$715 million. Business
disruption losses were
nearly as great, $700
million.

CIMA Chairperson, L.
Douglas Miller, and Safety
and Security Director for
the Phillips plant, R.A.
Wiederstein, were aware
of the fuels involved in the
fire and knew there was
no toxic problem with the
smoke being emitted.
 SITE PLAN OF PASADENA
PHILLIPS PLANT AREA
 CONCLUSION
Having a comprehensive pre-emergency plan is of great value

The use of a field command post along with a central command post
made possible well-coordinated response management in a major
emergency

Accessibility for inspections allows responding fire departments to

have full knowledge of contents and possible dangers involved

The separate staging area under the command of the central post
was very helpful for the quick response of apparatus, equipment,
triage, and as a rest and relief area

Automated sprinkler protection systems should have main control

valves and connections below ground level if possible

An efficient, successful suppression operation can inadvertently

leave possible post-fire hazards from leftover pockets of unburned
fuel
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Dekker, Inc: New York

Yates, J. (1989). U.S. Fire Administration/Technil Report Series: Phillips Petroleum Chemical Plant
Explosion and Fire

MacDonald, D. (2004). Practical Hazops, Trips and Alarms. Newnes Elsevier: Netherlands, pg 23

Tweeddale, M. (2003). Managing Risk and Reliability of Process Plants. Gulf Professional Publishing:
USA

Lees, F. P., 2005, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd Edition, Butterworth
Heinemann, Burlington, USA

High Density Polyethylene. n.d. Retreived March 16, 2015.

http://wwwcourses.sens.buffalo.edu/ce435/Polyethylene/CE435Kevin.htm

Klutz, T. (1993). Lessons from Disaster: How Organizations have no Memory and Accidents. Institution
of Chemical Engineers: Warwickshire, UK. Pg 9 – 10

Hyatt, N. (2003). Guidelines for Process Hazard Analysis, Hazard identification and Risk. Dyadem
Press: Ontario, Canada. Pg 11

Bethea, R. M. n.d. Phillips 66: Fire and Explosion. Texas Tech University