ABATMENT

Under the Penal Code a person becomes liable as an abettor if he instigates another to commit a crime, or engages in a
conspiracy with another to commit a crime and some act is done in furtherance of such conspiracy or if he intentionally aids
another in order to facilitate the commission of a crime.

The term 'abet' in general usage means to assist, advance, aid, conduce, help and promote. The word 'abet' has been defined as
meaning to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to procure, or to counsel; to countenance; to encourage; induce, or assist,
to encourage or to set another one to commit.

The term 'abatement' in criminal law indicates that there is a distinction between the person abetting the commission of an
offence (or abettor) and the actual perpetrator of the offence or the principal offence or the principal offender.

Chapter V of the IPC on 'Abatement' provides for the law covering the responsibility of all those considered in law to have
abetted the commission of offence. The chapter on abatement contains 15 sections.
 Section 107 which defines abatement generally speaks of three kinds of abatement, viz., abatement by instigation, abatement by
conspiracy and abatement by aid.

 Section 108 explains as to when an abatement of an offence takes place, and

 S. 108-A provides for the case of abatements-in India of an offence committed in a foreign country.

 Section 109 prescribes the punishment for the offence of abatement when the offence abetted is committed, while

 S. 110 prescribes the punishment for abatement where the person abetted commits the act with a different intention or
knowledge from that of the abettor.

 Section 111 provides for cases of abatement resulting in a different offence but which is a probable consequence thereof.

 Section 112 provides for cumulative punishment in cases covered by S. 111.

 Section 113 which is supplementary to S. 111 provides for punishment in cases where the act abetted causes a different effect
from that intended by the abettor.

 Section 114 provides for cases where the abettor is present at the time of the offence, and makes him liable for the main offence
and not merely as an abettor.

 Sections 115 and 116 prescribe for the punishment in cases where the offence abetted is not committed.
 Section 117 deals with abatement of offences by the public generally or large groups of persons.
 Section 118 prescribes the penalty for concealing the existence of a design in another to commit a grave offence.
Sections 119 and 120 provide for punishment in the case of public servants and others respectively for concealment of a design in
another person to commit the offence not covered by S. 118.

According to S. 107, IPC, a person abets the doing of a thing when he:
1) Instigates a person to commit an offence; or
2) Engages with one or more persons in a conspiracy to commit an offence; or
3) Intentionally aids a person by any act or illegal omission to commit an offence or illegally omits the doing of an act which
would prevent the commission of the offence.
An act done under criminal intimidation cannot constitute an abatement. Thus, where money was obtained by extortion, by way of
bribe, the person who gave the money would not be an abettor of the offence of taking bribe. But the offence of abatement will not
require any kind of mens rea where the provision relating to the substantive offence itself makes no reference to mens rea and
abatement of the offence is coupled together with the main offence itself in the same provision. It was held by the Orissa High
Court that the giver of a bribe would be an abettor even if he gave it in response to a demand accompanied by threats. This view
cannot be considered good law.
There can be no criminal intention or mens rea on the part of the given in such a case as held in Dulpat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan (AIR 1969 SC 17).

PRINCIPLE BEHAVIOR FORMING ABATEMENT:

Article 126 of the IPC determines behaviours which can constitute abatement in a crime. This Article provides that "the following
persons are abetters:
a. Anyone who persuaded, threatened, bribed, or incited others to commit a crime or a conspiracy or a deceit or abuse of power
b. Anyone who provided tools for committing a crime or offer the criminal the way to commit a crime.
c. Anyone who facilitated crime. ”
According to Article 126 of the IPC, instances of abatement:
Persuasion: “To persuade someone in any manner, including describing, explaining and or drawing the image of a crime to
persuade someone committing a criminal act is considered an instance of abatement”.
Threatening: “This means that a person is forced to commit a crime by means of threat to property, prestige and fear of death. As
mentioned in the discussion of compulsion, threat is a clear example of spiritual force. But its fulfilment needs several conditions,
including those that threat have traditionally be considered as a threat. It is worth mentioning that “the mere fear of someone or
something is not considered a threat, but the agent fear must be originated from intimidating act and be effective”.
Allure: "Allure means to actuate greed and avaricious demands and motivate a sense of favor-seeking. The lure is a special kind of
persuasion. The difference is that the main incentive of the perpetrator of a crime is purely financial and material. For instance, to
give him an amount of money or promised to give him money and or also promised to propose the project contract before the
crime is committed. While in persuasion the means through which the offender is motivated may be financial and non-financial”.
Incitement: "inciting literally means to move out, move and also means pushing and inciting others to come. Incitement to crime
means getting others to commit a crime for any pretext, whether the property, pledges or deception or by encouraging, promoting
and in general strengthening the will of the crime such as stimulating a sense of hatred and revenge”.
Necessity of Unity of Intent between the Abetter and the Accomplice:
It should be noted that the philosophy of Article 126 of the IPC Amendment is to put an end to the important legal issues about
complicity in the crime. In fact, in some cases, a person may even knowing of the other criminal intent, provides them with the
criminal tool but the offender commits another crime.
For example, a person may be provided with a key to a house for stealing, but the perpetrator commits the murder rather than
theft, and not only did steal anything, but committed other crimes such as murder and destruction. In this context that the issue
raised whether the person who has provided the perpetrator with the tools is only the abetter in the same crime for which tools had
been provided or they are abatement in the other committed crimes, as well.
ABATEMENT BY INSTIGATION :
The word 'instigate' literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite, or encourage to do an act and a person is said to
instigate another when he actively suggests or stimulates him to the act by any means, or language, direct or indirect, whether it
take the form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement or a willful misrepresentation or willful concealment
of a material fact. It is not necessary that express words should be used to indicate what should be done by the person to whom the
directions are given. While there has to be a reasonable certainty in regard to the meaning of the words used in order to decide
whether there was incitement, it is not necessary in law to prove the actual words used. Advice amounts to instigation only when
intended to actively suggest or stimulate the commission of an offence. Mere acquiescence does not amount to instigation. Thus
the word denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea,
therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of
the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea required to constitute instigation as they are uttered in a fit of anger and
emotional state.
In Queen v. Mohit the persons who followed a woman preparing herself to be a sati on the pyre of her husband and chanted, Rama,
Rama were held guilty of abatement by instigation to lead that woman to commit suicide. Their approval of the woman's act by
participation in the procession gave encouragement to the lady to commit suicide. A person may incite another by threats or
pressure as well as by persuasion. Incitement may be by expression or implication.
For the purpose of the first two clauses of the S. 107, it is immaterial whether the person instigated commits the offence or not or
the persons conspiring together actually carry out the object of the conspiracy or the act abetted must be committed. The offence of
abatement is a separate and distinct offence.
The word ‘instigate’ has been interpreted in the case of Sanju v. State of M.P One might argue that the actus reus and the mens
reus do not merge to a single person, therefore, abetment to do a thing should not be an offence. In abetment by instigation, there
has to be some active involvement of the abettor towards the preparatory phase of the crime.
This is broadly considered as the actus reus in the crime of abetment, combined with the intention of getting something done or
illegally omitted would constitute a complete criminal offence.
However, there needs to be sufficient proof that the individual has willfully influenced and coerced the individual to commit a
crime but at the same time, it is not necessary for the person abetted to have the same guilty intention or knowledge. The person
abetted can totally have a different set of intention and knowledge, still, the offence is committed because the preparatory phase is
being dealt with in isolation to the execution phase.
The entire liability of the abettor is decided within the first two stages of the crime. Now even if the execution gets a different
result, the crime has been committed. Advice amounts to instigation only when intended to actively suggest or stimulate the
commission of an offence. Mere acquiescence does not amount to instigation. Presence of mens rea is a necessary concomitant of
instigation.
Lord Kenyon in the case of Higgins said that, “a mere intent to commit evil is not indictable, without an act done; but is there not
an act done, when it is charged that the defendant solicited another to commit a felony? The solicitation is an act sufficient to
constitute an overt act of high treason.”

Commission of the offence is not necessary for the first two clauses of Section 107
It is immaterial whether the person instigated goes ahead to commit the crime or a group conspiring together executes the object of
the conspiracy. Abetment as an offence is complete in itself a distinct.[18] When the alleged abettor has instigated another or
engaged with another in a conspiracy to commit an offence. It is not necessary for the offence of abetment that the act abetted must
be committed.
Mere verbal permission or silent assent would not constitute instigation
If A tells B that he intends to loot a bank C, B says do as you like, A succeeds in looting the bank C, here B cannot be said to have
instigated.
Willful misrepresentation or Concealment is sufficient to constitute abetment
A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z, B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z,
wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the
apprehension of C.
In Protima Dutta v. State of WB a charge under S. 306 read with S. 34, IPC was laid against the mother-in-law of the deceased
and her husband of having abetted the commission of suicide by instigating and inciting her. The evidence revealed many
circumstances which showed that the mother in-law suggested to the deceased by conduct, language direct or indirect expressions
to commit suicide. Although, it did not amount to express solicitation, but her cruel conduct towards the deceased over the months
made the deceased suffer mentally. Therefore, the series of conduct amounting to actively suggesting or stimulating the deceased
to commit suicide, it was held, clearly amounted to instigation. Where one person instigates another to the commission of an
offence by means of a letter sent through the post, the offence of abatement by instigation is completed as soon as the contents of
such letter become known to the addressee. If the letter never reaches him the act is only an attempt to abet. In the context of bride-
burning and dowry related deaths, S. 306 which provides for abatement of suicide, is often pressed into service.
A plethora of cases exists on this aspect. Iqbal Singh's case was referred to and relied upon by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Ram Kumar v. State Of MP, which considered the case of suicide committed by a woman who was married for twenty years
during which her husband continuously treated her cruelly and demanded divorce. The husband had been convicted by the trial
court for abetting the suicide under S. 306, IPC and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1000. The high
court held that while asking for divorce by itself cannot be called provocation to commit suicide, it is the cruelty and the overall
atmosphere created by cruelties precedent and antecedent of such demands of divorce, which are material and which had the effect
of leading the deceased person to take poison to end her life.
In Ram Kumar v. State of HP , the Supreme Court considered the case of a constable who dragged a young newly married 19-
year-old girl and her husband from the latter's brother's house. In the police station, the head constable took the girl to a room,
repeatedly beat her and committed rape on her, while the other constable kept watch in outside holding the hapless husband, who
was helplessly hearing the frantic screams of his wife. The Supreme Court held that the constable by his conduct had abetted rape
and therefore, did not merit acquittal.

ABATEMENT BY CONSPIRACY:
A person is said to abet the commission of an offence by conspiracy, if he enters into an agreement with one or more persons to do
a legal act by illegal means, or to do an illegal act, and some act is done in pursuance thereof. A conspiracy to do a thing is a
combination of two or more persons with a common design of doing a specific thing. It has been held that where a criminal
conspiracy amounts to an abatement under S. 107, it is unnecessary to invoke the provisions of Ss. 120-A and 120-B, as the Code
has made a specific provision for the punishment of such a conspiracy.
Abatement of conspiracy consist when two or more person engage in a conspiracy for doing a thing which is illegal thing or act or
illegal omission.
Thus in order to constituted abatement by conspiracy following conditions must be there:
1. A conspiracy between two or more person.
2. An act or illegal omission may take place of that conspiracy.

Conspiracy means an agreement between two or more persons:

• To do an illegal act or
• To do an act which is not illegal by illegal means.

Thus clause II of section 107 of IPC, is a mere combination of person or agreement is not enough , an act or illegal omission must
also take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and the act or illegal omission must also be in order to the doing of the thing agreed
upon between them. But for an offence u/s 120A a mere agreement is enough, if the agreement is to commit an offence.
Clause 2 has to be read together with Explanation 5 of section 108, which provides that it is not necessary to the commission of the
offence of abatement by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commit it.
It would be sufficient if a person engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.
The sections 120A and 107 of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the offences of conspiracy have clearly stated the difference
between the two. The case of Noor Mohammad Momin v. State of Maharashtra shows the difference between criminal
conspiracy and abetment to conspiracy. Criminal conspiracy has a wider jurisdiction than abetment by a conspiracy. An individual
is guilty of conspiracy with the mere agreement between a group of people to commit an offence.

In Saju v. State of Kerala, a young woman, Jameela, was found killed. At the time of her death, the deceased was in advance stage
of pregnancy. Upon trial the two accused were found guilty of the offences punishable under Ss. 120-B and 302 besides S. 109 of
the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Sessions Court, both the accused persons filed appeal before the High
Court, which was dismissed. The apex court held that there is no direct evidence either regarding abatement or the criminal
conspiracy attributable to the appellant. Both the offences are held to be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Hence, the
appellant could not have been convicted and sentenced with the aid of S. 120-B or S. 109 IPC.
ABATEMENT BY AID :
A person abets the doing of a thing who intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. It would be clear
if we read clause 3 ofs107 with explanation 2, that a person cannot be held guilty of aiding the doing of an act when the act has not
been done at all. Mere intention to facilitate, is not sufficient to constitute abatement, unless the act which it is intended to facilitate
actually take place.
Illustration- A servant keeps open the gate of his master's house, so that thieves may come, and thieves do not come. But the
servant intended and informed thieves the door is open and they can come, he would be held liable for abatement.
Mere giving of aid- A mere giving of help is not amount of abatement, until the person who provides the aid does not know that an
offence was being committed or constituted.
Illustration-
A wanted to kill B, he perused C to call B, C calls B and B is murdered, here C provide the aid, but he did not know that A wanted
to kill B. So he would not be held liable for abatement.
Mere presence does not amount to aiding-
Mere presence at the commission of an office done not amount to intentional aid, unless it was intended to have that effect., and
the present aware that an offence is about to be committed an office, or he actively support or present hold some position,
authority, or rank in committing the offence.
Aid by illegal omission-
When law impose a duty on someone and he intentionally for adding some one in an illegal, failed to discharge his duty he shall be
liable for abatement. A person is said to abet the commission of an offence, if he intentionally renders assistance or gives aid by
doing an act or omitting to do an act.
There must be some active conduct on the part of the abettor and the act must be accomplished in pursuance thereof. Aid may be
given both by an act of commission as well as by an act of illegal omission.
For instance, if a police officer knowing that certain persons were likely to be tortured for the purposes of extorting confession,
keeps himself away from the place, he is liable for abatement to the offence of extortion by an act of omission.
a) The act or omission which constitutes the aid must have been done intentionally;
b) The aid must have been given either prior to or at the time of the commission of the offence abetted.

Merely being present at the crime scene does not amount to aiding:
Unless the intention was to have an effect by being present or the person was aware that an offence is about to be committed or he
actively supports or holds some position, rank in committing of the offence.
ABETTOR:
It is not necessary to make the abettor liable that the crime abetted should be committed or the effect desired should be produced.
However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Fagunanath v. The State in the case of abatement by intentional aid, unless the
person who is abetted is found guilty of the offence charged the abettor cannot be punished. Explanation 2 to S. 107 of the Penal
Code provides: "whoever either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act and thereby facilitates the commission thereof is said to aid the doing of that act.“
Section 108 IPC defines abettor as a person who abets:
i. the commission of an offence, or
ii. the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable of committing an offence in law.
ABATEMENT OF OFFENCES OUTSIDE INDIA:
Section 108A was added in the Penal Code in 1898 with a view to overrule a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Queen Empress v. Ganapatrao Ramachandra, in which it was held that the abatement in India by an Indian citizen of an offence
committed in a foreign country was not punishable under the Code. The section states that a person would be guilty of an
abatement, if he abets the commission of an act outside India, which if done in India, would constitute an offence. Sections 109 to
120 prescribe certain rules as to punishment for different kinds of abatement. Sections 109 and 110 prescribe punishment of
abatement, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abatement.
CASES UNDER SECTION 109:
In Jai Narayan Mishra v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court considered the case of an accused who was accused of instigating
others belonging to the Mishra community to attack members of the Tiwari family of village Bareja in Chapra district. The trial
court had originally acquitted all the accused. On appeal by the state government, the Patna High Court convicted them for
offences under Ss. 147, 148, 323, 324, 326 and 307 read with S. 109 IPC.
However, when the Supreme Court examined the evidence, it found that the witness while tendering evidence during trial had
stated that the accused had instigated others to kill him, in the statement made by him recorded as dying declaration, he had stated
that the accused had only instigated others to 'assault the rascal'. This, the court felt, warranted a substitution of conviction from S.
307 to S. 324 read with S. 109 IPC.
The sentence of two years imposed by the high court was, however, not disturbed, as it was felt appropriate for the offence
committed.
In Harabailu Kariappa v. State of Karnataka, there was a dispute between the deceased Kushalappa and two other persons over
cutting of trees from the forest land near the land of the accused, which resulted in the murder of the deceased.
However, the court held that while the evidence proved clearly the direct role of the accused and there was no evidence to prove
that the offence committed by him was with the abatement. Hence, the person charged with abatement was acquitted.
However, the Supreme Court in Mahendra Rai v Mithilesh Rai, it set aside the judgment of the Patna High Court acquitting the
first accused and second accused of murdering a 12-year-old boy as there was discrepancy in timings in preparation of the inquest
report and the absence of names of the assailants in the same. After reassessing the evidence, the Supreme Court observed that the
high court was in error on coming to a finding of innocence, as the facts established clearly that while the second accused held the
boy who was sleeping in a cot under a mango tree in an orchard near his house, the first accused cut his neck with a kakut (chaff
cutter). Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the trial court of offence under S. 302, IPC against A1 and under S.
301 read with S. 109, IPC against A2.

In Joseph Kurian v. State of Kerala the apex court held that S. 109 of IPC is by itself an offence though punishable in the context
of other offences. When his direct involvement in these crimes could not be established, it is difficult to uphold the view of the
high court that he could lopsidedly be taken to have answered the charge of abatement and convicted on that basis. There would, as
is plain, be serious miscarriage of justice to the accused in causing great prejudice to his defence. The roles of the perpetrator and
abettor of the crime are distinct and stand apart from each other.

Further, in Wakil Yadav v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court laid down that an offence under S. 109 is a distinct offence. Section
111 holds the abettor liable when the act done is different from the act abetted. The section enunciates the principle of constructive
liability.
As the person abetted is working as an agent of the principal, the abettor is responsible in law for his deeds. The liability of the
abettor under this section is based on the well-established principle of criminal law that 'every man is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequence of his act'. A natural and probable consequence of an act is one which is likely or which can
reasonably be expected to follow from such an act.

Section 111 extends the liability of an abettor in respect of an act done, which was not contemplated by the abettor, provided the
later act was the probable consequence of the act abetted, and is committed under the influence of the abatement. But an unusual
act, which could not be expected to ensue as a result of abatement cannot be said to be the probable consequence of an act abetted.
In other words, the abettor is liable for the act committed, if:

(i) it was a probable consequence of the abatement, and

(ii) it was committed

(a) under the influence of the abatement, or

(b) in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted abatement.

Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, if present when the act or offence for which he
would be punishable in consequence of the abatement is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.
There are three essential ingredients of S. 114:

1) The abatement should be prior to the commission of the offence;

2) The abatement must be complete by itself;
3) The abettor must be present at the time of the commission of the act. If these ingredients are present, the section provides that
the abettor shall be deemed to be liable for the punishment as if he had himself committed the offence.

Thus, the section applies to a case where a person abets the commission of an offence sometime before it takes place and happens
to be present at the time when the offence takes place and the abettor helps in the commission of the offence. In such a case, the
person is guilty of committing the offence itself and not merely of abatement.
Based on this principle, the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High
Court and acquitted the appellant who was charged with offences under S. 467 read with S. 114, IPC, for forging some documents
in respect of an alleged sale of some agricultural land. The appellant was alleged to have helped the other accused Pyatal
Bhimakka, to impersonate another person. Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa, the real owner of the land in question who had died in
1953, forged a document and took her to the sub-registrar's office (where documents of sale, mortgage etc., are registered), helped
her affix the thumb to the document and get it registered.

The High Court had acquitted the appellant, although on facts it held that the offence under S. 457 read with S. 114, IPC had been
proved on a technicality, namely, on the question whether a private complaint could have been filed or whether the criminal
complaint should have been filed under S. 195(l)(b) of Criminal Procedure Code, by the court before which a civil dispute over the
same land had been instituted.

The Supreme Court, however, confirmed the conviction under S. 467 read with S. 114, IPC against the appellant and sentenced
him to one year's rigorous imprisonment.68 It should be noted that S. 114 is evidentiary in nature and not punitive because it
established a presumption which is irrebuttable that actual presence plus prior abatement can mean nothing else but prior
participation.
Chapter VII
This chapter relates to the offences against an officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the army, navy or air force of Government of
India. In addition, these words are common to all the sections right from Section 131 to 140.
Ingredients
1.Abetment of committing a mutiny by an officer(officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the army, navy or air force of Government of
India)
2.Attempting to seduce any officer from his allegiance or his duty.
Mutiny is the uprising against the lawful authorities in the army. It can be very well compared to sedition. The concept of abetment
in this chapter is analogous to Chapter V and Chapter XVI. The only difference being Chapter VII comes under the category of
offences against the state, hence severe penal sanctions.
Chapter XVI
Abetment to Suicide:
Instigation as a form of abetment has generally been the most essential consideration in cases of abetment to suicide and dowry
death. Another important consideration to charge anyone for abetment to suicide is to prove beyond doubt that the death in
question is a suicidal death.
Section 306, IPC reads as if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine. The definition of
abetment in section 306 needs to conform with the definition given under section 107 of the IPC.
If A persuades B to kill himself and he does it, then according to this section, A would be liable as an abettor. Proving the direct
involvement by the accused in such abetment to suicide is necessary. However, abetment of suicide is a long mental process and
rarely easy to prove. A conviction cannot be handed over under 306 unless clear mens rea is proved. The elements that need to be
satisfied in order for an offence to come under section 306 IPC are suicidal death, and abetment thereof held in Sangarabonia
Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
Clear mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non for conviction under Section 306 IPC:
•Merely because wife committed suicide in matrimonial house, husband and in-laws can’t be charged for abetment to suicide.
This principle is laid down in the case Channu v. State of Chattisgarh
•In order to convict a person for abetment of suicide, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence- held in the case
Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab