Murder

The offence is defined under s 300 and the defendant will be charged the
under s 302. The courts will have to analyse the adduced evidence to decide if
the raised subsection has been satisfied.

Cases to read include:

PP v Moo He Hong and Anor. [2018] 3 CLJ 662.
T PARAMASPARAN THANIGAJALAM v. PP[2012] 4 CLJ 309
Wong Ban Chong lwn PP [2016] 1 LNS 166.
PP lwn Mohd. Shah Rizan Mohd Suliman [2014] 5 LNS 165.
Dourin Murah v PP [2013] 5 CLJ 25.
 Case : PP v Manimaran Amas and Ors. [2013] 1 LNS 851
S 34 was used on all three accused persons and they were found guilty of
murder and were sentenced to death under s 302.

The under s 300 – The prosecution is required to prove the ingredients of

murder against all the 3 accused beyond reasonable doubt, namely:

1. Death of victim ;

2. It was caused by the acts of the accused; And

3. The acts by which the death was caused were done

 Definition of Murder under s 300
(a) with intention of causing death; or

(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the accused
knew to be likely to cause the death of victim to whom the harm was
caused; or

(c) with the intention of causing bodily injury to victim and the injury
intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death; or – (PP v Frans Hiu & Anor [ 2012] 1 LNS
908

(d) or with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous
that it must in all probability cause death, on such bodily injury is
likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
 PP lwn Premraj Khrishnasamy (2019) 1 LNS 204

Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, pihak pendakwaan

bergantung kepada cabang ketiga bagi membuktikan Tertuduh
dengan kesalahan membunuh itu. Dengan itu pihak pendakwaan
hendaklah membuktikan bahawa:
S 300(c) was raised:
(i) Prakash a/l Krishnasamy telah mati;
(ii) mangsa telah mati akibat bencana tubuh/kecederaan yang di
alaminya;
(iii) bencana tubuh/kecederaan yang dialami oleh mangsa adalah
akibat perbuatan Tertuduh; dan
(iii) Tertuduh berniat untuk mendatangkan bencana tubuh ke arah
mangsa dan bencana tubuh itu cukup ada lazimnya menyebab kan
kematian.
Distinction between s 300 (a)
and S 300(c)
Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura dalam kes Tan Chee Wee v. PP
[2004] 1 SLR 479 memutuskan:

"... The key difference between these two provisions is one of

intention.
Section 300(a) provides that the act by which the death is
caused must be done with the intention of causing death.

In contrast, the mens rea required under s. 300(c) is lower in

that the intention need only be to cause bodily injury and that
bodily injury so inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.
Section 300(c) thus envisions that the accused
subjectively intends to cause a bodily injury
that is objectively likely to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature.

There is NO necessity for the accused to have

considered whether or not the injury to be inflicted
would have such a result.

It is also irrelevant whether or not the accused did

intend to cause death, so long as death ensues from
the bodily injury or injuries intentionally caused".
In our opinion cls. (a) and (c) of s. 300 are meant to cover
different acts, i.e, acts done with different intentions.

The cases show that cl. (c) is meant to apply in circumstances

where the assailant had no intention of causing death but has
nevertheless intentionally (and not accidentally) inflicted a
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death.
Under cl. (c) once the intention to cause the bodily injury
actually found to be present is proved…
It is irrelevant and totally unnecessary to enquire what kind
of injury the accused intended to inflict. The crucial question
always is, was the injury found to be present intended or
accidental. As was observed by Bose J in Virsa Singh's at p.
476:
 In PP v Yusof Saruan (2019) 7 CLJ190

The Court had to decide if the killing was

Murder Or an offence under s 299
Taken from the case…

14] In our view, the crux of the learned DPP's submission

concerns the question of whether, after considering all the
circumstances in this case, it had been sufficiently established
that there was the necessary intention to cause death as
required by law, specifically s. 300 of the Penal Code
[15] Now, as alluded to earlier, the learned judge had on two
occasions ruled that the evidence established only a charge for
culpable homicide and not murder.

The reasons for coming to this conclusion were also set out
earlier.

The learned DPP had urged upon us that the conviction should
be for the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code as
the learned judge had failed to sufficiently consider the
overwhelming evidence establishing the necessary intention
under s. 300 of the Penal Code.
[16] In this context, we agreed that the learned judge was in
error in failing to consider various compelling evidence
adduced by the prosecution.

Firstly, there was the evidence of the post-mortem report on the deceased
(exh. P60 at pp. 187-192 of appeal record vol 3) and the court testimony of
the pathologist SP14. That post-mortem report concluded as follows:

Postmortem examination revealed multiple stabbed wounds on the body

which had penetrated internally to cause injuries namely to the rib cage,
pericardium and heart, diaphragm, stomach, liver and small intestines which
had led to his death. These stab wounds to the body were consistent with
infliction by a sharp, penetrating object and was of homicidal in manner....

In my opinion, the cause of death is attributable to the multiple stab wounds

to the body as sustained by the deceased.
[17] It is a fundamental principle in criminal
law that the burden of proving any criminal
charge is on the prosecution throughout the
case and never shifts to an accused person...

So the question before us, was whether the

elements of the charge of murder had been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case –

taking into account the multiple stab wounds inflicted on

vital organs in the body, there can be little doubt that
there was at least the intention to cause such bodily
injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death.

In fact, the bodily injury caused was such that the

respondent knew would cause the death of the
deceased. So, intention under elements (b) and (c) of s.
300 of the Penal Code were proved.
[32] In the circumstances, and for the reasons we have given,
we were of the view that there were merits in the appeal.

Having scrutinised the whole of the evidence, and for the

reasons provided, a conviction for murder under s. 302 of the
Penal Code was warranted.

Accordingly, we set aside the conviction and sentence for

culpable homicide not amounting to murder and substituted it
with a conviction for murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code.
As a necessary consequence, the respondent was sentenced to
death as required by law.
 If the defendant raises any of the four defences under
this section and if it is leaded successfully the charge
could be reduced from murder to culpable homicide
– s 299.

Exception 1 – Exception 4
 In PP v Yusof Saruan (2019) 7 CLJ190

In this case the defense of provocation

was raised.

[22] The law on what amounts to grave and sudden provocation is well-
settled. In Lorensus Tukan v. PP [1988] 1 CLJ 143; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 162,
the Supreme Court through the judgment of George Seah SCJ observed (at
p. 165):
The test of "grave and sudden" provocation is whether a reasonable man,
belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the
situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose
his self-control
(see Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra [1962] AIR SC 602).
[23] In order to set up provocation as a defence to reduce the
offence of murder to one of culpable homicide, it is necessary
to show such grave and sudden provocation as would cause
any reasonable person to lose his or her self-control as
provided by Exception 1 to s. 300 of the Penal Code.
In this way, a mere statement by an accused that he lost his
self-control is insufficient. The test of gravity is an objective
one. So the test is: would such provocation cause a reasonable
man to lose his self-control. By this test, an "unusually
excitable or pugnacious individual" is excluded (see Mancini
v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1). So would a
person who is unusually sensitive or is hot tempered. The law
must be applied evenly as otherwise persons who are hot
tempered or have a thin skin would always escape the heavier
punishment.
[24] Nevertheless, what is grave to the point of causing loss of self-control
is a question of fact which depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case.

Even so, the type and manner of retaliation must not be disproportionate to
the provocation. So, for example, bringing a knife and stabbing someone
multiple times after a mere verbal spat would be thoroughly
disproportionate.
[
25] Reverting to the instant appeal, it appeared to us that the
action of the respondent was certainly out of proportion to the
gravity of the provocation. The nature of the provocation was
at most mere verbal abuse for a debt due. Such provocation
would not be met by any reasonable person with multiple
stab wounds to vital organs of the body. In our considered
view, the actions of the respondent must fail the "grave and
sudden" requirement of provocation. The response of the
respondent to mere verbal abuse, and that too by an unarmed
man, informed us that he was a callous man with a total
disregard of human life.
[26] In our respectful view, the learned judge was in error in
holding that grave and sudden provocation had been
established.