ACM CCS Conference Tutorial

Nov. 2009

Cyber Security
for the Power Grid:
Cyber Security Issues &
Securing Control Systems

Andrew Wright CTO, N-Dimension

Cyber Security Solutions andrew.wright@n-dimension.com
For <Client Name>
Power Grid Communications & Control Systems

borrowed from NIST Smart Grid Twiki

Internet Control Systems
Agenda

• High-Level
– Industrial Control Systems and Cyber Security Issues
– Securing Control Systems

• Detailed
– Security Issues in Industrial Control Systems
– Today’s Threats
– Securing Control Systems
A Control System

Sensor(s) +
Actuator(s) +
Controller(s)
Types of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

Supervisory Control And Data Process Control

Acquisition (SCADA) Systems (PCS)

Distributed Control
Systems (DCS) Automation
Historical ICS

• Proprietary
• Complete vertical solutions
• Customized
• Specialized communications
– Wired, fiber, microwave, dialup, serial, etc.
– 100s of different protocols
– Slow; e.g. 1200 baud
• Long service lifetimes: 15–20 years
• Not designed with security in mind
 Modern ICS Trends Internet

Enterprise Network Enterprise

Enterprise
Network
Workplaces

IP
Optimization
Suite
Firewall Third Party
Application Mobile
Server Operator

Services
Network
Connectivity Historian Application Engineering
Server Server Server Workplace

Control
Network

Serial, OPC
Redundant
or Fieldbus

Device Network

Third Party
Controllers,
Servers, etc.

Serial RS485
Technology Trends in ICS

• COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) technologies

– Operating systems—Windows, WinCE, embedded RTOSes
– Applications—Databases, web servers, web browsers, etc.
– IT protocols—HTTP, SMTP, FTP, DCOM, XML, SNMP, etc.
– Networking equipment—switches, routers, firewalls, etc.
• Connectivity of ICS to enterprise LAN
– Improved business visibility, business process efficiency
– Remote access to control center and field devices
• IP Networking
– Common in higher level networks, gaining in lower levels
– Many legacy protocols wrapped in TCP or UDP
– Most new industrial devices have Ethernet ports
– Most new ICS architectures are IP-based
New IP-Based Industrial Control Systems

• ODVA (Rockwell) • Honeywell Experion

• Profinet • Emerson DeltaV
• Foundation Fieldbus HSE • Yokogawa VNET/IP
• Telvent • Invensys Infusion
• ABB 800xA • Survalent

• IP to the Control Network or even Device Network

• Not all are fully compatible with “ordinary IP”
Security Risks to Modern ICS

• COTS + IP + connectivity = many security risks

• All of those of Enterprise networks and more
Worms and Viruses
DOS and DDOS impairing availability
Unauthorized access
Unknown access
Unpatched systems
Little or no use of anti-virus
Limited use of host-based firewalls
Improper use of ICS workstations
Unauthorized applications
Unnecessary applications
Open FTP, Telnet, SNMP, HTML ports
Fragile control devices
Network scans by IT staff
Legacy OSes and applications
Inability to limit access
Inability to revoke access
Unexamined system logs
Accidental misconfiguration
Improperly secured devices
Improperly secured wireless
Unencrypted links to remote sites
Passwords sent in clear text
Default passwords
Password management problems
Default OS security configurations
Unpatched routers / switches
When ICS Security Fails

• Loss of production
• Penalties
• Lawsuits
• Loss of public trust
• Loss of market value
• Physical damage
• Environmental damage
• Injury
• USSR pipeline explosion, 1982
• Loss of life
• Bellingham pipeline rupture, 1999
• Queensland sewage release, 2000

$$$.$$
• Davis Besse nuclear plant infection, 2003
• Northeast USA blackout, 2003
• Browns Ferry nuclear plant scram, 2006
 So How Do We Secure
Industrial Control Systems?

ACM CCS Tutorial

Nov. 2009
There is No Silver Bullet!

No Silver Bullet!
Defense in Depth

• Perimeter Protection
– Firewall, IPS, VPN, AV
– Host IDS, Host AV
– DMZ
• Interior Security
– Firewall, IDS, VPN, AV
– Host IDS, Host AV
– IEEE P1711 (AGA 12)
– NAC IDS Intrusion Detection System
– Scanning IPS Intrusion Prevention System
• Monitoring DMZ DeMilitarized Zone
VPN Virtual Private Network (cryptographic)
• Management AV Anti-Virus (anti-malware)
NAC Network Admission Control
50000 Foot View

Internet
IT Stuff
Enterprise Network IT Stuff

VPN FW
Proxy AV IPS
Scan Host IPS Host AV Log Mgmt IPS
IDS Event Mgmt FW
Control Network Partner
NAC Reporting 62351 Site
Host IDS Host AV VPN
FW
VPN P1711
IDS FW
AV Field Site
Scan Field Site NAC
Field Site
 Security Issues in
Industrial Control Systems

ACM CCS Tutorial

Nov. 2009
Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality

• Enterprise networks require C-I-A

– Confidentiality of intellectual property matters most
• ICS requires A-I-C
– Availability and integrity of control matters most
– control data has low entropy—little need for confidentiality
– Many ICS vendors provide six 9’s of availability
• Ensuring availability is hard
– Cryptography does not help (directly)
– DOS protection, rate limiting, resource management, QoS,
redundancy, robust hardware with high MTBF
• Security must not reduce availability!
DoS and DDoS Attacks

• Denial of Service (DoS) attack overwhelms a system

with too many packets/requests
– Exhausts TCP stack or application resources
– Defenses include connection limits in firewall
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
coordinates a botnet to overwhelm a target system
– No single point of attack
– Requires sophisticated, coordinated defenses
– Weapon of choice for hackers, hacktivists, cyber-extortionists
• DoS, DDoS particularly effective when Availability is
critical, i.e. against ICS
Fragile ICS Devices

• Many IP stack implementations are fragile

– Some devices lockup on ping sweep or NMAP scan
– Numerous incidents of ICS shut down by uninformed IT staff
running a well-intentioned vulnerability scan
• Modern ICS devices are much more complex
– Some IEDs include web server for configuration and status
– More lines of code leads to more bugs
– Modern IEDs require patching just like servers
Unpatched Systems

• Many ICS systems are not patched current

– Particularly Windows servers
– No patches available for older versions of windows
• OS and application patches can break ICS
– OS patches are tested for enterprise apps
• Uncertified patches can invalidate warranty
• Patching often requires system reboot
• Before installation of a patch:
– Vendor certification—typically one week
– Lab testing by operator
– Staged deployment on less critical systems first
– Avoid interrupting any critical process phases
Limited use of Host Anti-Virus

• AV operations can cause significant system disruption

at inopportune times
– 3am is no better than any other time for a full disk scan on a
system that operates 24x7x365
• ICS vendors only beginning to support anti-virus
– Anti-virus is only as good as the signature set
– Signatures may require testing just like patches

• AV may be losing ground in enterprise deployments

– impact on hosts, endpoint security not getting better
– virus writers have learned to test against dominant AV
• application whitelisting can be a good alternative
– enumerate goodness rather than badness
Poor Authentication and Authorization

• Machine-to-machine comms involve no “user”

• Many ICS have poor authentication mechanisms
and very limited authorization mechanisms
• Many protocols use cleartext passwords
• Many ICS devices lack crypto support
• Sometimes passwords left at vendor default
• Device passwords are hard to manage appropriately
– Often one password is shared amongst all devices
and all users and seldom if ever changed
– This is happening AGAIN in Smart Meter deployments!
Poor Audit and Logging

• Many ICS have poor or non-existent support for

logging security-related actions
– Attempted or successful intrusions may go unnoticed
• Where IDS logs are kept, they are often not reviewed
• Various regulatory requirements are driving some
change in this area
– NERC—North American Electric Reliability Corporation
– FERC—Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
– Sarbanes Oxley and PCAOB (Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board)
– FISMA—Federal Information Security Management Act
Unmanned Field Sites

• Many unmanned field sites

• Many with dialup access
• Some with high-speed connectivity to control center
• Most with poor authentication and authorization

backdoor to the
control center!
Legacy Equipment

• Much legacy equipment

• Usually impossible to update to add security features
• Difficult to protect legacy communications
– but see IEEE P1711 for serial encryption
• Password protection is weak
• Little or no audit and logging
Unauthorized Applications

• Unauthorized apps installed on ICS systems can

interfere with ICS operation
• Many types of unauthorized apps have been found
during security audits
– Instant messaging
– P2P file sharing
– DVD and MPEG video players
– Games, including Internet-based
– Web browsers
Inappropriate Use of ICS Desktops

• Web browsing from HMI can infect ICS

– Browser vulnerabilities
– Downloads
– Cross-site scripting
– Spyware
• Email to/from control servers can infect ICS
– Sendmail and outlook vulnerabilities
• Disk storage exhaustion can crash OS
– Storage of music, videos
Little or No Cyber Security Monitoring

• internal monitoring is essential to detect low profile

compromises
– IDS
– port scanning
– vulnerability scanning
– system audit
• without internal monitoring don’t know whether
systems have been compromised
Requirement for 3rd Party Access

• Firmware updates and PLC, IED programming are

sometimes done by vendor
– Many ICS have open maintenance ports
– Infected vendor laptops can bring down ICS
• Partners may require continuous status information
– Partner access is often poorly secured
– Partner channels can serve as backdoors
• 3rd parties may include:
– ISO, transmission provider or grid neighbor,
equipment vendor, emissions monitoring service or agency,
water level monitoring agency, vibration monitoring service,
etc.
People Issues

• ICS network often managed by “Control Systems

Department”, distinct from “IT Department” running
enterprise network
– ICS personnel are not IT or networking experts
– IT personnel are not ICS experts
• Majority of control systems workforce is
older and nearing retirement
– Few young people entering this field
– Few academic programs
Harsh Environments

• Temperature
• Vibration
• Dust
• Humidity
• Electrical
Transients
Attack Vectors into Control Systems

Includes Infected
Laptops and Is Growing

Source: 2003–2006 data from Eric Byres, BCIT

Security Assessments on ICS

• Various groups perform security assessments and

penetration tests on ICS (generally under NDA)
– Idaho National Labs
– Sandia National Labs
– N-Dimension Solutions
– Other private organizations
• Vulnerability assessments always uncover problems
• For penetration tests, we always get in
– Not a question of “if”, but “how long”
Other Issues

• Unusual physical topologies

• Many special purpose, limited function devices
• Static network configurations
• Multicast
• Long service lifetimes
For More Information ...

• See Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy and

Requirements, NISTIR 7628, www.nist.gov/smartgrid
– particularly Appendices C and D
 Today’s Threats

ACM CCS Tutorial

Nov. 2009
Intense Media Visibility on the Cyber Security Issue

Smart Grid Security Frenzy: Cyber War Games, earth2tech.com

Worms and Spies in Smart Grid (June 09)

President Obama: securing the electric infrastructure

is a national security priority (June 09)

Hiroshima, 2.0 – Cyberspying of the

US Electric Grid (April 09)

Cyberspies penetrate electrical grid (April 09)

'Smart Grid' vulnerable to hackers (March 09)

CIA: Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities

(Jan 2008)
Limited Information About Incidents

• Little information sharing about actual attacks

– BCIT incident database has about 30 incidents per year vs.
100s of thousands of incidents per year in CERT database
– Few cyber attacks on ICS for which details are public
• Little information sharing about actual vulnerabilities
– some are not easily or rapidly fixed
– assessments are done under NDA
• Difficult to estimate risk
– Difficult to demonstrate ROI for security spending
• But… lots of data about significant financial losses in
enterprise and e-commerce
– Why would control systems be immune?
Accidents Happen ...
Attacks Can Cause Similar Results

INL National Lab Aurora Demonstration, March 2007

 Cyber Security Regulatory Requirements

FERC releases Smart Grid Policy - cyber security

mandatory for Utility rate recovery (July 09)

Regulators provide Smart Grid Stimulus Funding

criteria - cyber security is mandatory (June 09)

Strengthened Cyber Security Standards Approved for

North American Utilities (May 09)

Ontario Green Energy Act Drives Smart Grid With Security

(May 09)

NIST developing interoperability and security standards for

Smart Grid

AMI-SEC working group developed security

requirements for AMI
AMI-SEC Task Force
 Securing
Control Systems

ACM CCS Tutorial

Nov. 2009
Adversaries

• Script kiddies
• Hackers
• Organized crime
• Disgruntled insiders
• Competitors
• Terrorists
• Hactivists
• Eco-terrorists
• Nation states
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #1

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web
Email
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #2

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web
Email
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #3

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web
Email
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #4

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web Vendor Web
Email Server
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #5

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web Vendor Web
Email Server
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #6

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web
Email
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
How an Attack Proceeds—Step #7

IED Engineering
Workstation Management
Console HMI
IED
Modem Pool
Data
Historian
Web
Email
Server
Server
RTU Control
FEP System
Network
enterprise
Firewall

ICS Enterprise
Firewall Network Internet
Web
Server

Domain Name
Server (DNS)
Business
Workstation Attacker
Database Server
Defending ICS

• Separate control network from enterprise network

– Harden connection to enterprise network
– Protect all points of entry with strong authentication
– Make reconnaissance difficult from outside
• Harden interior of control network
– Make reconnaissance difficult from inside
– Avoid single points of vulnerability
– Frustrate opportunities to expand a compromise
• Harden field sites and partner connections
– mutual distrust
• Monitor both perimeter and inside events
• Periodically scan for changes in security posture
50000 Foot View

Internet
IT Stuff
Enterprise Network IT Stuff

VPN FW
Proxy AV IPS
Scan Host IPS Host AV Log Mgmt IPS
IDS Event Mgmt FW
Control Network Partner
NAC Reporting 62351 Site
Host IDS Host AV VPN
FW
VPN P1711
IDS FW
AV Field Site
Scan Field Site NAC
Field Site
Logical Overlay on SP99 / Purdue Model of Control

Level 5 Enterprise Network

Enterprise
Email, Intranet, etc.
Zone
Level 4 Site Business Planning and Logistics Network

Terminal Patch AV
Services Mgmt Server

DMZ
Historian Web Services Application
(Mirror) Operations Server

Production Optimizing Engineering Site Operations

Level 3 Control Control
Historian
Station
and Control

Supervisory HMI Supervisory HMI Area

Level 2 Control Control Supervisory
Control Control
Zone

Level 1 Batch
Control
Discrete
Control
Continuous
Control
Hybrid
Control
Basic
Control

Level 0 Process
Logical Architecture

• Enterprise Zone contains typical business systems

– Email, web, office apps, etc.
• DMZ provides business connectivity
– Contains only non-critical systems that need access to both
Control and Enterprise Zones
– Enforces separation between Enterprise and Control Zones
– Consists of multiple functional sub-zones
• Separated by Firewall, IPS, Anti-Virus, etc.
• Control Zone demarcates critical control systems
– Consists of multiple functional sub-zones
• Internally protected by Firewall, IDS, Anti-Virus, etc.
How NOT to connect Control / Enterprise

• Dual-homed server
• Dual-homed server with Host IPS / AV
• Router with packet filter ACLs
• Two-port Firewall
• Router + Firewall combination

• See NISCC Good Practice Guide on Firewall Deployment for

SCADA and Process Control Networks, NISCC and BCIT, Feb
2005
DMZ—Logical View Emergency
Disconnect

IDS
AV Proxy VPN
Terminal Patch AV FW
Services Mgmt Proxy
IPS

Multiple
Functional Scan DMZ
Sub-Zones IDS

No Direct
Historian Web Application
Traffic
Mirror Services Server
Host AV Operations

Host IPS Emergency

Disconnect
DMZ Design Principles

• DMZ contains non-critical systems

• Multiple functional security sub-zones
• Traffic between sub-zones undergoes firewall (& IPS or IDS)
• DMZ is only path in/out of Control Zone
• Default deny for all firewall interfaces
• No direct traffic across DMZ
• No control traffic to outside
• Limited outbound traffic from Control Zone
• Very limited inbound traffic to Control Zone
• No common ports between outside & inside
• Emergency disconnect at inside or outside
• No network management from outside
• Cryptographic VPN and Firewall to all 3rd party connections
DMZ Implementation (1)
Enterprise
LAN

NAT Security
Appliance
DMZ LAN 2 With
Multiple
DMZ LAN 3 Ports
Routing
DMZ LAN 4 FW
IPS

Anti-Virus
Proxy

Host IPS / Anti-virus

DMZ/Control
Interconnect
WAN/LAN
DMZ Implementation (2)
Enterprise
LAN

VLAN-capable
L2 switch NAT
DMZ VLAN 2 Security
Appliance
dot1q
DMZ VLAN 3 trunk
Routing
FW
DMZ VLAN 4 IPS
NOT L3!
VLAN
Anti-Virus
Proxy

Host IPS / Anti-virus

DMZ/Control
Interconnect
WAN/LAN
DMZ Implementation

• Sub-zones implemented by physical LANs or VLANs

– Physical LANs require multi-port Security Appliance
– VLANs require:
• VLAN-capable Security Appliance and Switch
• anti-VLAN hopping protections on switch and FW
• NO L3 (routing) on switch
• FW implements policy between
– DMZ LANs, Enterprise Zone, Control Zone
• Anti-virus proxy controls outbound HTTP and/or FTP
access to enterprise or Internet resources
• Host IPS and/or Host Anti-virus protects DMZ servers
Remote Access
Enterprise
LAN

Remote
Terminal AAA Certificate
Access
Services Server Authority VPN

DMZ

Remote Access Pool

DMZ/Control
Interconnect
WAN/LAN
Remote Access

• Security Appliance terminates Host-to-site VPN into

remote access pool
– IPSEC VPN, SSL VPN, PPTP VPN
• Authenticates user via:
– AAA server, LDAP, Active Directory, etc.
– Can enforce use of multi-factor hardware token
• Time-varying password tokens for vendor access
• Clients use VNC, Citrix, or Remote Desktop (RDP) to
connect to Terminal Server
• Then VNC, Citrix, RDP, or Control System Apps to
Control System Servers
Control Zone—Logical View

DMZ

Production Optimizing Engineering Site Operations

Level 3 Control Control
Historian
Station
and Control

Supervisory HMI Area

Level 2 Control Supervisory HMI Supervisory
Control Control
Control
Zone

Level 1 Batch
Control
Discrete
Control
Continuous
Control
Hybrid
Control
Basic
Control

Level 0 Process
Control Zone Design Principles

• Multiple functional security sub-zones

• Firewall and IDS between sub-zones
• Minimal number of connections to DMZ
• Control Zone independent of DMZ, Enterprise
– Separate Security Appliance from DMZ
– Separate Time Server
– Separate AAA
– Allows emergency disconnect from DMZ
• Cryptographic VPN and Firewall to all offsite IP connections
(Field Site or Partner)
• IEEE P1711 for all offsite serial ICS connections
• Host IDS, Host AV, or app whitelisting where feasible
• Management only from management zone
Control Zone Implementation—Hierarchical

• Fast routing between • ACLs between VLANs

VLANs via L3 switch but no Stateful Firewall

DMZ/Control Interconnect WAN/LAN

FW FW
Level 3
L3
L3
IDS
SPAN Gigabit Control
Scan
L2 L2 Zone
Level 2 dot1q Trunks
QoS, Shaping, Policing
Port Security

10/100
Level 1

Host IDS Host AV

Control Zone Implementation—Ring

• Ring reduces wiring for linear • but spanning tree can have
sites like power dams problems with large rings

DMZ/Control Interconnect WAN/LAN

FW FW
Level 3
L3
L3
IDS
SPAN Gigabit Control
Scan
L2 dot1q Trunks L2 Zone
Level 2
QoS, Shaping, Policing
Port Security

10/100
Level 1

Host IDS Host AV

Perimeter Protection in Utilities

Firewall
Site-to-site
IDS/IPS
VPN
Client VPN

DMZ

Proxy
Network AV
Host IDS/IPS
NAC
Interior Protection in Utilities

IDS
Port Scan
Vuln Scan

Firewall
NAC
SCADA VPN
Firewall
SCADA VPN
Port Scan
IDS
Monitor, Log, Analyze, Report

Log Managed
Analyze Security
Report
Compliance
Beyond Network Security

• Planning, processes, procedures, physical security, etc. are also

important
• NERC CIP Regulatory Requirements provide reasonably good
guidance in this area:
• CIP-001: Sabotage Reporting
• CIP-002: Critical Cyber Asset Identification
• CIP-003: Security Management Controls
• CIP-004: Personnel & Training
• CIP-005: Electronic Security Perimeters
• CIP-006: Physical Security
• CIP-007: Systems Security Management
• CIP-008: Incident Reporting & Response Planning
• CIP-009: Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets
See www.nerc.com -> Standards -> Reliability Standards -> CIP
Summary

• Today’s ICS are mix of

modern and legacy
– vulnerabilities due to both
lack of security design in
legacy and security issues
in newer equipment
• Defense in depth is essential
– both perimeter (DMZ) and
interior security are crucial
• Regulation and government
action is driving change
• Smart Grid must be
designed with strong
security
Thanks!
andrew.wright@n-dimension.com

ACM CCS Tutorial

Nov. 2009
Standards Efforts

• NERC CIPs
• NIST Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Project
• NIST SP800-82
• NIST SP800-53
• NIST PCSRF Protection Profiles
• AMI-SEC
• ISA SP99
• ODVA

• IEEE P1711 (AGA 12) -- serial SCADA encryption

A Few References

• www.nist.gov/smartgrid
• Securing Your SCADA and Industrial Control
Systems, Version 1.0, DHS, ISBN 0-16-075115-8
• Guide to SCADA and Industrial Control System
Security, NIST SP800-82
• ISA99 Industrial Automation and Control Systems
Security, www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?
MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821
• AGA 12/IEEE P1689 SCADA Encryption Standard,
scadasafe.sf.net