CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

VOLUME I & ii

i. 6 HOUR LECTURE
ii.3 HOUR LECTURE

By: PROF. ROLANDO A. SUAREZ

IN A 6 HOUR LECTURE, THE LECTURE CAN COVER
THE IMPORTANT POINTS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES,
VOLUME I AND VOLUME II OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 
IN A 3 HOUR LECTURE, THE LECTURER CANNOT
FINISH VOLUME I & II OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
PERHAPS HE CAN ONLY COVER 50% TO 60% OF
THE ENTIRE SUBJECT MATTER
 PRE-WEEK LECTURE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Important points, principles, definitions, distinctions,
Section 1 to 22, Bill of Rights
2.  Cases, Bill of Rights
3.  Important updates:
I.
a) Can the DOJ conduct a preliminary investigation of a
case taken cognizance by the ombudsman?
b)  How are decisions of the Ombudsman elevated for
review by the courts?
c)  How about the decisions of the ombudsman in criminal
cases?
d)  Does the ombudsman have jurisdiction over officers and
employees of GOCC’s
  II.
a) Regarding the illegality dismissed government employee who
is later reinstated, is he entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of illegal dismissal up to
his/her reinstatement?
b)  Does CSC have jurisdiction investigate a judicial employee
for its committed before his/her employment in the judiciary.
III.
c) Doctrine of continuing mandamus (Boracay Foundation, Inc.
vs. Province of Aklan, 674 SCRA 555)
d) MMDA vs. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA
661
 IN A 6 HOUR LECTURE, ALL THE ABOVE, CAN BE COVERED, TOGETHER
WITH THE IMPORTANT POINTS/PRINCIPLES AND CASES INVOLVED IN
VOLUME 1 OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1. National Territory, UNCLOS, GRP’s reservations before signing

the UNCLOS
2. Archipelagic doctrine, Sabah claim
3. The Baselines Law (At a Glance)
4. The three (3) Branches of Government
5. New Cases:
a) Belgica, et.al. vs. Ochoa
b) James Imbong et. al. vs. Ochoa
c) Grace Poe case Re SC’s annulment of Comelec Resolution
d) Cheryll Santos Leus of St. Scholastica College Westgrove
 e) Bagong Alyansa Makabayan (BAYAN) vs. Department of National
Defense (DND)
f) Cudia case
g) Ocampo, et. al. Enriquez, etc.
h) Is the Senate impeachment Court co-equal with Supreme Court?
i) Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan
6. Ruling of Permanent Court of Arbitration
7. Benham Rise – What right , if any, do we have over Benham Rise?
8. What right, if any, does China Have over Benham Rise
IN A 3 HOUR LECTURE, THE LECTURER CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
FINISH/COVER ALL THE FOREGOING MATTERS. HE CAN ONLY EXERT
HIS BEST EFFORTS TO COVER AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ALL THE
FOREGOING SUBJECT MATTERS
INTRODUCTION
1. Political Law: That branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State
and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its
territory. (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, Roa vs. Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil. 315.)
2. Political Law and Constitutional Law, distinguished: Political Law is
broader than Constitutional Law. The first not only treats of
Constitution and organic laws but also statutory laws
3. Constitution – (a) with particular reference to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines; (b) Constitution under the Social
Contract Doctrine. Explain this in relation to Marcos vs. Manglapus
4. Classification of Constitution – written or unwritten; conventional or
cumulative; rigid or flexible.
5. Qualities of a good written Constitution – Broad, brief and definite.
6. 3 essential parts of a Constitution – Constitution of Liberty,
Government and Sovereignty
7. Our Constitution can be amended or revised. This is referred to as
formal amendment. A change can also be effected when our courts
of justice interpret ambiguously worded provisions of the
Constitution to make it conform with realities. THIS BEING not a
formal process of amendment, the SC is merely modifying its
interpretation of the ambiguously worded provision involved and it
does so in accordance with the principle that it has the last word in
the construction of any law and even of the Constitution itself.
8. Distinction – Amendment/Revision. Explain Lambino vs. Comelec,
G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299, October 25, 2006
9. How may the 1987 Constitution be amended? (1) By Congress by ¾
of all its members; (2) By Constitution Convention; and (3) By
People’s Initiative.
10. Revision: (1) by Congress by ¾ votes of all its members; and (2)
By Constitutional Convention. If Congress chooses to call a
Constitution Convention to revise the Constitution, it may either:
(1) Call a Constitutional Convention by 2/3 of all its members or
(2) submit to the electorate the question or calling such a body by
a majority of all its members.
11. Requirements of a valid petition for initiative
12. Can proposed amendments to the Constitution be submitted at a
plebiscite which is scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections?
13. Is the power to amend/revise the Constitution included in the
general grant of legislative power to Congress?
14. Our Constitutions since the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government
PHILIPPINE AS STATE
1. State. Elements of a State. (People, Government, Territory,
sovereignty)
2. Right of the People to Self-Determination
a) Internal right of self-determination – The people are free to
determine their political rights, pursue the economic, social and
cultural development, but this shall not extend to a unilateral
rights of secession
b) External right of self-determination – The establishment of an
independent state, free association with an independent state, or
the emergence into any other political status arises in only the
most extreme cases and under carefully defined circumstances
3. De-Jure and De-Facto government.
4. Kinds of De Facto Government
5. Government of Cory Aquino
6. Government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
7. Functions of Government:
• Constituent Functions – Those which constitute the
very bond of society, hence, compulsory, not optional
(i.e. keeping of order, definition/punishment of crimes,
administration of justice, protection of
persons/property).
• Ministrant Functions – undertaken by advancing the
general interests of society, hence, optional (i.e. Public
works, public education, public charity, health and
safety regulation, regulation of trade and industry).
8. If the Philippines is invaded by a superior military force.
Effects on political law, civil laws and judicial decisions.
9. Power/jurisdiction of a state: (1) over persons/things
within its territory; (2) over its nationals; and (3) outside
its territory.
CASE:
CALLADO vs. IRRI (G.R. NO. 106483, MAY 22, 1995) – IRRI
enjoys immunity from penal, civil and administrative
privilege.
WHO vs. Aquino (48 SCRA 242 [1972]) – Diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question.
Powers of state
1. Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain and
Power of Taxation.

2. Similarities

3. Distinction
NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. Definition in Article I (Memorize and understand)
2. Archipelagic doctrine
3. Sabah Claim – Sulu Sultan Mohammed Kiram ceded sovereignty
and dominion over Sabah to the Philippine Government, though
President Macapagal. This is more strong and sustainable than the
claim of Baron de Overdeck and Alfred Dent, who, as mere private
individuals, could not and were not able to acquire dominion and
sovereignty over North Borneo/Sabah.
4. Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain – The MOA is contrary to law and our Constitution. Putting
a portion of our national territory to a status which, in effect, is
considered as a preparation for independence is not conducive to
national unity. Our Constitution does not contemplate any State in
this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State. The concept of
associated state is not recognized by the 1987 Constitution. (G.R. No.
183951, October 14, 2008)
5. The definition of (a) Our National territory and the
Archipelagic doctrine are in the book. They were asked in the
bar examinations two times and I suggest that you have a
mastery of the same in preparation for more important
questions.
6. What are not found in the book, except in my reviewer, are
the following:
a) The reservations of GRP before we signed the UNCLOS
Declaration of the Republic of the Philippines
10 December 1982
The government of the Republic of the Philippines hereby manifests that in
signing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does
so with the understandings embodied in this declaration, made under the
provisions of Article 310 of the Convention, to wit:
The signing of the Convention by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign
rights of the Republic of the Philippines under and arising from the
Constitution of the Philippines;
Signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic
of the Philippines as successor of the United States of America, under and
arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of
America of December 10, 1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the
United States of America and Great Britain of January 2, 1930;
Such signing shall not diminish or in any manner affect the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties under the Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the Philippines and the United States of America of August 30,
1951, and its related interpretative instrument; nor those under any other
pertinent bilateral or multilateral treaty of agreement to which the
Philippines is a party;
Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign
rights of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which
sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters
appurtenant thereto;
 The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner or
pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the Republic of
the Philippines; the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to
such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the
Philippines Constitution;
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes
do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an
archipelagic state over the sea lands and do not deprive it of authority to
enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security;
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal
waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits
connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights
of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation;

The Agreement of the Republic of the Philippines to the submission for

peaceful resolution, under any of the procedures provided in the
Convention, of disputes under Article 298 shall not be considered as a
derogation of Philippine sovereignty.
 For and on behalf of
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Sgd.) ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Chairman of Delegation

b) Our final stand when we signed the UNCLOS

“The final stand of the Philippine Government when it signed the UNCLOS
was based on and controlled by the national territory clause, as clearly
provided in the 1987 Constitution and even in our previous Constitutions”.

c) Are the KIG (Kalayaan Island Group) and the Bajo De Masinloc, also known
as Scarborough Shoal, included in the islands enclosed by the Philippines
Archipelagic Baselines?
Baselines law
(r.a. 9522)
 AT A GLANCE
BASELINES LAW (RA 9522)
Are not included in the islands
1. NEW CASE. IMPORTANT. enclosed by the Philippine
Archipelagic Baselines.
a. KIG (Kalayaan Island Group)
INSTEAD, they are treated as
b. Bajo de Masinloc, also known “Regime of Islands under the
as Scarborough Shoal Republic of the Philippines.

2. If they are treated as regime of Our basis is Art. I of the

islands under the Republic of the 1987 Constitution which
states that our national
Philippines, what is the basis of
territory includes “all other
the Philippine claim to the KIG territories over which the
(also known as the Spratley Philippines has sovereignty
Islands and the Scarborough and jurisdiction.”
Shoal)?
3. Is the use of the framework of Regime of Islands in RA 9522 to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
inconsistent with the Philippine claim of sovereignty over these areas?
No. Reasons:
4. The decision of Congress to classify KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
as “Regime of Islands” under the RP is consistent with Art. 121 of the
UNCLOS III.
5. It manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its Pacta
Sunt Servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
6. Under Art. 121, “any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide”, like the KIG, qualifies
under the category of “regime of islands” whose lands generate their
own applicable maritime zones. (Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No.
187167, August 16, 2011)
 d. What exactly is the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
the Hague regarding:
The PCA awarded the Philippines sovereign rights over:

a) Panganiban or Mischeef Reef;

b) Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal; and
c) Recto or Reed Bank of Palawan
e. Do we have sovereign right over Panatag or Scarborough Shoal
which is just over 120 nautical miles from Zambales? The PCA did
not award sovereign right to the Philippines over Panatag or
Scarborough Shoal (which is just over 120 nautical miles from
Zambales. HOWEVER, the PCA said that it was a traditional fishing
ground for several countries and neither China nor the Philippines
had the right to prevent anyone from fishing in the shoal.
f. What is the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
regarding China’s alleged “Nine Dash Line” over nearly all
the South China Sea?
PCA ruled:
1. Beijing has no historic rights to resources in the waters of
the South China Sea.
2. That such right were extinguished to the extent they were
incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided
for in the UNCLOS Convention.
3. The PCA noted that both the Philippines and China had
ratified the UNCLOS, on which the court ruling was
based. Hence, the award shall be complied with by the
parties to the dispute.
3. What about Benham Rise. Is it part of our National Territory?
If it is not part of our national territory, but the Philippines has
sovereign rights over Benham Rise for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting the natural resources therein. These rights were
confirmed by the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental shelf to be part of our extended continental shelf.
(ECS)
Said rights are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities without the
express consent of the coastal state. Moreover, the right of the
coastal state over the continental shelf does not depend on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express
proclamation.
4. What right, if any, does China have over Benham
Rise?
China has the following rights:
(1) To conduct fishery research (Reason: Because fish
in the continental shelf belongs to mankind);
(2) To conduct surveys or water salinity and water
currents. (Reason: Because water column in the
extended continental shall belong to mankind);
(3) To conduct surroundings for navigational purposes.
(Reason: Because there is freedom of navigation in
the extended continental shelf)
5.Regarding the exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep sea, what is
the status of the legal regime governing the exploitation of mineral
resources of the deep sea bed?
There are three views on this matter
1) Res Nulluis View – Under this view, the seabed and the subsoil thereof is
owned by no one and may therefore be explored and exploited by the first
state which claims the area to the exclusion of others.
2) Freedom of the high seas view – This view considers the deep seabed and
subsoil thereof as part of the freedom of the high seas that are open for
exploration and exploitation by any state but not subject to exclusive claims
or appropriation.
3) Common heritage view – This view considers the seabed and ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, as common heritage of mankind, hence, beyond the
limits of natural jurisdiction. In effect, no state and persons, natural or
juridical, shall claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
6. What is the principle of the “Freedom of the Seas”? It means that no part of
the sea as such can be subjected to the sovereignty of any State. It cannot
therefore be incorporated into the territory of any State through
occupation.
7. What is the meaning of the statement that the open seas are not property
of any State? This means that “it is the common highway of all,
appropriated to the use of all; and no one can arrogate to himself a
superior or exclusive prerogative there. Every ship sails there with an
unquestionable right or pursuing her own lawful business without
interruption. And whatever may be that business, she is bound to pursue it
in such a manner as not to violate others under the Latin Maxim, SIC
UTERE TUO, NON ALIENUM LAEDAS (Paras, quoting Justice Story). In
other words, they are open and available to the use of all States for a
variety of purposes (i.e. navigation, flight over them, laying submarine
cables and papers, fishing, research, mining, or in pursuing any lawful
business). Under Art. 88 of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the
high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes
 A CLOSER LOOK
AT THE ARBITRAL
AWARD
Q – What was rejected by the PCA (referred to as the Permanent
Court of Arbitration constituted under Article 7 of the UNCLUS?
A – It rejected: (a) China’s “nine-dash line”; (b) China’s claim of
indisputable sovereignty over almost the entire SCS (South China
Sea)
This is the reason why the SCS is open to freedom of navigation
by all countries.
Q – What was awarded by PCA to the Philippines?
A – The PCA awarded the Philippines sovereign rights over: CODE –
PAR
a. Panganiban or Mischeef Reef;
b. Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal; and
c. Recto or Reed Bank of Palawan
Q – Other than the said award, what was upheld by the
arbitral award?
A – The PCA upheld our maritime claims over the RIO (rocks,
islets, and other features in the Spratleys, and declared
unlawful the Chinese incursions into the UN recognized
baseline entitlements of our archipelagic state, thus:
1) Our 12-nautical mile territorial sea;
2) Our 24-nautical mile contiguous zone;
3) Our 200-nautical mile EEZ (exclusive economic zone);
4) Our 350-nautical mile extended continental shelf
Q – What is referred to as the WPS (West Philippine Sea)?
A – It is the entire sea area along the Westside of our country from
Appari to Sulu
Q – It has been repeatedly reported that China occupies and has
built structures on said “features”, does it mean that it has
maritime rights over WPS?
A – No, for the following reasons: (a) None of the disputed maritime
features is an island; (2) The arbitral tribunal did not award
rights over the land areas because the arbitration was about
maritime rights only and did not include land occupations,
reclamations and constructions.
 EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO EXPLORE AND EXPLOIT OUR
NATIONAL RESOURCES
 
In his state of the nation Address on July 21, 2019, President Rodrigo R.
Duterte said that the WPS (West Philippine Sea) is ours. There are no “if
and buts. It is ours. And he added: “We have been acting along that
legal truth and line but we have to temper with the times and the
realities that we face today. There is a time for everything, a time to
negotiate and a time to quarrel, a time to antagonize and the time to
make peace and a time to go to war, and a time to live and a time to die.”
Even then, his critics, (i.e. Former DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario and
Former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Rosales) made two statements:
“xxx no public officer, even the President, can share what international
law provides is the exclusive right to explore and exploit the natural
resources known in international law as sovereign rights”.
 
In a separate statement, Justice Antonio Carpio said: “xxx factually and legally, China
is not in possession of the entire WPS and that its claim over almost the entire China
Sea had been rejected by the said arbitral award. He said further that President
Rodrigo R. Duterte cannot by himself, in a private conversation with Chinese
President Xi Jimping, allow other states or their nationals to fish in our exclusive
economic zone (EZZ) because our 1987 Constitution reserves the use and enjoyment
of the marine wealth of our country’s EEZ exclusively to Filipino Citizens. Moreover,
traditional fishing rights are allowed only to foreigners at our “archipelagic waters
and territorial sea”.

Q – The question arises: Can sovereign states share their sovereign

rights? More specifically, can the exclusive right to explore and exploit
natural resources, known in international law, as sovereign rights, be shared
with other sovereign states?

A – The concerns and objections of the critics of President Duterte are

apparently based on their submission that what is or what are granted to us,
as sovereign states under our Constitution, are ours alone and cannot be
shared with other sovereign states without the concurrence of the Senate.
This view and is valid, on the basis of the strict interpretation of our
Constitution.
However, there are equally important considerations to consider, and
these considerations are unavoidable and cannot be absolutely detached
from the fact:
That our Constitution, Article II, Section II provides that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equally, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”. (Underlining
supplied);
That under our system of government, the President of the Republic of
the Philippines is the Chief Architect of our foreign policy, and when he
deems it desirable or necessary, for the sake of national interest, to
engage in joint fishing in our exclusive economic zone (EEZ), he can do
so, for in so acceding to that view, such an agreement is constitutional
especially so, when it has the concurrence of the Senate, and this can
clearly be attained because he enjoys the support of the majority of both
houses of congress.
It is easy to criticize the action of the President and his
administration, but being the leader of the executive branch
and the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Chief
Architect of our Foreign policy, and based on the authority and
guideline of Article II, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution, the
duty of the government and the President clearly overwhelms
strict interpretations because under that provision “the prime
duty of the government is to serve and protect the people”.
Finally, there is nothing in his pronouncement which proves
that he waived our maritime rights or even the arbitral award
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. He made that so clear
when he said: “The WPS is ours, no ifs and buts”.
 
Clearly there is no abuse of discretion on his part in
making such a decision. That is his sound desecration and
it is a political question.
Being the Chief Architect of our foreign policies and
foreign relations, the action of the President is a judgment
call, and in such cases, the other branches of government,
particularly the judicial department of the government,
should follow the action of the political branch. In fact.
The other branches of government should follow the
action of the political branch and it is not wise nor
diplomatically prudent to embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
CONTINENTAL SHELF
1. What is the definition of Continental Shelf? It is the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas extending beyond the territorial sea of the
coastal state throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory
up to (1) the outer edge of the continental margin, or to (2) a distance
of 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea, which
ever is the farthest. (UNCLOS, Art. 76)
2. What right, if any, does the coastal state have over the continental
shelf? It has the sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources. These rights are now recognized as
customary international law.
The said natural resources consist of the mineral and other non-living
resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to the sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at
the harvestable state, either are immobile on or under the seabed or
are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the
seabed or the subsoil. (Art.77 (4), UNCLOS)
3. What is the legal nature of said rights? The said rights
are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state does not
explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities without
the express consent of the coastal state. Moreover, rights
of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation. It is in the nature of the rights to
explore and exploit natural resources, and for no other
purposes.
4. What exactly is the ruling of the international court of
justice regarding the rights of the coastal states to the
continental shelf?
CASES:
North Sea Continental Shelf
“ The rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf
that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and
under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural
resources, In short there is here an inherent right (ICJ Reports, 1969, pp.
3, 23).
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case
“…it is solely by virtue of the coastal State’s sovereignty over the land that
rights of exploration and exploitation in the continental shelf can attach
to it, ipso jure, under international la. In short, continental shelf rights
are legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the
territorial sovereignty of the coastal State. (ICJ Reports, 1978, para. 86)
5. Do the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf
change or, in any way, effect the status of the superjacent
waters? No, they do not affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters,
under Art 78 (1), UNCLOS. Hence, the coastal state in the
exercise of its rights shall respect the rights and freedoms
of other states, such as the freedom of navigation and of
over flight and the right to lay submarine cables and
pipelines (78.2, 79.1 and 79.2, UNCLOS
SABAH CLAIM
1. Is Sabah a part of our National Territory? Sabah is part of the
Philippines because sovereignty rights over Sabah were officially
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the Sultanate of Sulu
on September 12, 1962, during the term of President Diosdado
Macapagal long before the promulgation of the 1987 Constitution.
For this reason, Sabah has not been excluded at all from the scope of
our national territory under the 1987 Constitution.
2. What, if any, is our legal basis to support our Sabah Claim? That Sabah
was given as a gift by the Sultan of Brunei to the Sultanate of Sulu for
helping Brunei to suppress a rebellion then against the Sultan of Brunei.
This was given in 1658;

That the right pertains to a lease of the said territory by the Sultan of Sulu to
Baron De Overbeck and Alfred Dent (arising from the Padjak Agreement);
 

 
It is clear that what is involved is a proprietary right arising from the
said lease by the Sultan of Sulu to Baron De Overbeck and Alfred Dent;
This is separate and distinct from the sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the said territory which cannot in any way be acquired by private
individuals, or even by a private company like British North Borneo
Company;
As such, they have no international legal personality following the rule
in international law that “Only States may be parties in cases before the
Court”;
It is on this aspect where then Sultan Mohammed Kiram requested the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, through then President
Diosdado Macapagal, for help and assistance and the government
accepted by filing then a claim before the International Court
 
Province of Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain – The MOA is contrary to law and our
Constitution. Putting a portion of our national territory
to a status which, in effect, is considered as a preparation
for independence is not conducive to national unity.
Our Constitution does not contemplate any State in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State. The concept
of associated state is not recognized by the 1987
Constitution. (G.R. No. 183951, October 14, 2008)
unclos
1. Reservations. (Read Philippine Declaration on the signing of
the convention of the law of the sea, page 70-71 of my
reviewer)
2. Implications of the foregoing reservations ( page 71-72 of
my reviewer)
3. Three Navigable Rivers – (1) Inland/Internal waters, (2)
Territorial Sea and (3) High seas or Open Seas
4. Inland Waters/Territorial Sea – Comprise what is generally
known as the territorial waters of a State.
5. NOTE: A State exercises sovereignty over these waters to the
same extent as its land territory but foreign vessels have a
right of innocent passage (Art. II, Convention of the Law of
the Sea)
TERMS USED:
1. Contiguous zone - It is the zone extending up to 12 nautical miles
from the territorial sea. Although it is not technically a part of the
territory of the State, the coastal State may exercise limited
jurisdiction over the contiguous zone as a preventive measure to
insure that customs laws, immigration and sanitary laws are properly
and effectively enforced
2. Exclusive economic zone - It is the zone which extends up to 200 miles
from the low water mark or the baselines as the case may be.
3. Territorial sea - This is also known as the maritime belt. It is that
portion of the sea adjacent to the coast of a State which is under its
jurisdictional control.
4. Freedom of the sea - It means that no part of the sea as such can be
subjected to the sovereignty of any State. It cannot therefore be
incorporated into the territory of any State through occupation.
5. Easement of Innocent Passage - It is the right of foreign
vessels to pass through territorial waters, especially those
connecting two open seas, provided: (1) That the passage is
“innocent” which means that there is no ulterior motive for
the passage, and all the regulations of the State concerned
must have been complied with; and (2) That there is only a
passage which means that there is merely a passing through,
with no loading or unloading of any person or goods.
6. Freedom of navigation - It refers to the right to sail ships on
the high seas, subject only to international law and the laws
of the flag state.
7. Continental shelf - It is that part of the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas contiguous to the coast but outside the
area of the maritime zone
Declaration of
principles
1. Principle of Republicanism – Sec. 1

2. Separation of powers, checks and balances.

Blending of Powers.

3. Political question and justiciable question

4. Protesta Delegata Non Deligari Potest.

5. Can legislative powers be delegated?

 CASES: Belgica et al s. Ochoa, et.al. (G.R. NO. 208566, November 19,
2013) – Pork Barrel System
1. It is violation of Separation of Powers (When it confers unto legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine).
2. It is a violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power
(when legislators have been accorded post enactment authority to identify
projects they desire to be funded from the pork barrel allocations; post
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment; when
requests or release of funds are required to be supported by prescribed
documents and formally endorsed by the House Committee on
appropriations and Senate Committee on Finance; when realignment of
funds must be submitted to the House Committee of Appropriations and
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement)
3. It is a violation of the principle of local autonomy (because the PBS allows
the national officers to substitute their projects in utilizing public funds for
local development)
6. Operative fact doctrine (the law is recognized as unconstitutional, but
the effects of the unconstitutional law prior to the time it was
declared a nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and
fair play. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law). Void for vagueness rule (When a statute
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application, that law is deemed void. Such kind of
statute violates the first essential of due process of law because it
denies the accused the right to be informed of the charge against
him). Overbreath doctrine (a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily and broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedom).
7. Rule of majority. Different interpretations of what constitutes a
majority.
8. Constitutional Authoritarianism
Renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy (Sec. 2)
Civilian Authority (Sec. 3)
Separation of Church and State

CASE: James Imbong vs. Ochoa, et.al. (G.R. No 204819,

April 8, 2014)
New explanation of separation of church and State-
Based on mutual respect

It cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the

church.
STATE
It cannot question its faith and dogmas and
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion
and discriminate against another

It cannot impose it beliefs and convictions on

the State and the rest of its citizenry.
CHURCH It cannot demand that the nation follows its
beliefs even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Important policies
in section 7 & 8,
article II
1. Independent Foreign Policy
2. Policy of Freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.
In pursuing said policies, what are the paramount
considerations that shall guide us?
CODE: NATE-NARI
3. National Sovereignty
4. Territorial Integrity
5. National interest
6. Right to self determination:
a) Right to internal self determination
b) Right to external self determination
• Just/Dynamic Social Order (Sec. 9)
• Social Justice – Old and New Concept (Sec. 10)
• Full Respect for Human rights and Dignity of every person (Sec. 11)
• Sanctity of Family Life (Sec. 12) Role of parents and government in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character.
• When does life begin? (Upon fertilization)
• Vital Role of the youth in nation building (Sec. 13)
• Role of women in nation building (Sec. 14)
• Right to Health of the People (Sec. 15)
• Right to balance and healthful ecology (Sec. 16)
• Priority to education/science/technology/arts (Sec. 17)
• Labor as a Primary Social Economic Force (Sec. 18)
• Self-reliance and independent national economy (Sec. 19)
• Encouragement of Private Enterprise (Sec. 20)
• Comprehensive Rural Development and Agrarian Reform (Sec.
21)
• Right of indigenous cultural communities (Se. 22)
• Encouragement of NGO/Sectoral organization (Sec. 23)
• Vital Rule of Communication and Information in nation building
(Sec. 24)
• Autonomy of Local Governments (Sec. 25)
• Equal access to opportunity for public service (Sec. 26)
• Honesty and Integrity in Public Service (Sec. 27)
• Full Disclosure of all State Transactions involving public interest (Sec.
28)
a) Public office is public trust
b) Government of laws and not of men
c) Transparency in public service
Q – When does life begin?
A – “Whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a specifically well-defined moment of conception, that
is upon fertilization. (James M. Imbong, et. al. vs. Hon Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
THEORY ADVANCED BY HON. EDCEL LAGMAN
Life begins at implementation. He argued that fertilization and conception
are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. Citing the
letter of WHO, he said: medical authorities confirm that the implantation of
the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected.”

STAND OF THE SUPREME COURT REGARDING THE ARGUMENTS OF

CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN
“The theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or
scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the
viability of the fetus.”
“The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an incriminate object - it is a loving
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. “
Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual
infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Q – What is the component to the right to life?

A – A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health.

BASIS: Section 9, 11, 12, and 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
“Section 9. Consumers protection from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.”
“Section 11. Dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.”
“Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally (protect of the life of the mother and the
unborn.
“Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building.
Q – Can Congress legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices
are safe and abortifacient ?
A – No. There must first be determination by the FDA, that they are safe, legal and
abortifacient effective.”
Q – Can there be predetermination by Congress that the same are safe, legal, and
abortifacient?
A –There can be no pre-determination by Congress without the proper scientific
examination.
 
Q – Does the RH Law does sanction abortion?
A – The RH Law does not sanction abortion. “It is the Court’s position that life
begins at fertilization. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier.
The Court said further: “as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that
induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, is an
abortifacient.”
OTHER PRINCIPLES

1. Doctrine of Incorporation Political Law

2. Doctrine of State Immunity

3. Act of State Doctrine

4. Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

 LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
(SECTION 1 TO 22)
 P-ower (The power to propose, enact, amend and repeal
laws. This is vested in Congress. However, Congress also
performs powers which are non-legislative in nature [i.e.
canvassing of votes of P/VP, impeachment, to try and decide
all cases of impeachment, power to declare the existence of a
state of war; power to concur/confirm amnesty; power to
Section ratify treaties, power to propose amendments or revision of
1 to 11 the Constitution)
C-omposition (Senate and HR)

Q-ualifications (Senator and HR) Senator – Natural-born

citizen, 35 years old, Able to read and write, A registered
voter; two years residence immediately preceding the day of
the election; HR – Natural-born citizen, 25 years old, able to
read and write, A registered voter; one year residence
immediately preceding the day of the election.
 S-alaries – P204,000.00 per annum (Sec. 17, Art.
18)
T-erm (Senator/HR) Term – the period of time
Section during which the officer may claim to hold office;
12, 13, 14 Tenure – represents the term during which the
& 15
incumbent actually holds the office.
I-mmunities (Privilege from arrest and
Parliamentary privilege of speech)
 Full Disclosure (shall make a full disclosure of their
financial and business interest upon assumption of office;
shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict
interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors)
Section
12, 13, 14 Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (they cannot
& 15 hold any other office or employment in the govt.,
or in any subdivision, instrumentality, including
govt. owned or controlled corp., or their
subsidiaries, during their term of office without
forfeiting their seats)
 Inhibitions and Disqualifications (of Senator/HR)
During their term of office,

1. They cannot personally appear as counsel in: (a) any

court of justice; (b) or before the Electoral Tribunals; (c)
or before quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Section 2. They cannot directly or indirectly, be interested
12, 13, 14 financially (a) in any contract with, (b) or in any
& 15
franchise or special privilege granted by, the
government, or in any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary.

3. They shall not intervene in any matter before any office

of the Government for their pecuniary benefit or where
they may be called upon to act on account of their office
 Session (every 4th Monday of July) (Regular, Special, sine die)
Quorum It refers to the number of members, whose presence
is required before a meeting can legally take action (Avelino
vs Cuenco) Jose Avelino walked out of the session hall with
his followers, after adjourning the session. Twelve (12)
Senators were left & continued meeting. In the process, they
Section replaced Jose Avelino with Mariano Cuenco as Acting
12, 13, 14 President. Avelino questioned the validity of the election of
& 15 Cuenco on the ground that the 12 senators did not constitute
a majority and could not, therefore, constitute a quorum,
there being 24 members of the Senate. RULING: (1) 12
senators constitute a quorum, the said number being a
majority of 23, not 24. Because one Senator was then in the
United States; (2) The remaining senators can therefore
“adjourn from day to day and compel the attendance of
absent members.
 Suspension – Can a member of Congress be suspended by the
Courts? Cases: Osmeña vs. Pendatum; Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan (Suspensión) It depends on Congress what
constitutes disorderly behavior, and if it is was indeed
committed. This is a political question which is beyond the
amvit of judicial review/interference.

Section Journal and enrolled bill – The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
12, 13, 14 the court as regards the tenor passed by Congress and
& 15 approved by the President.

The “enrolled bill” being the official copy of the approved

legislation and which bears the certification of the presiding
officer of the legislative body. (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 1947)
However, when a co-equal department repudiates the enrolled
bill, the journal must be accepted as conclusive. (Astorga, etc.
vs. Villegas. 1974)
 ET-Electoral Tribunal (Senate/HR) (9 members- 3
members designated by the Chief Justice and 6
members (Senate/HR)
CA-Commission Appropriation (12 Senators, 12
Section HR, with the Senate President as ex-officio
1 7, 18, 19
& 20 chairman)
Constitution of ET and CA- to be constituted
within 3 days after organization of Senate and HR
Records books of accounts of Congress- shall be
preserved and open to the public.
 DISTINCTION
Sec.22 – Power of Congress to
conduct a question hour
Sec.21 – Right to Conduct Inquiry
in aid of Legislation) 1. To obtain information in pursuit
of Congress oversight functions.
1. To elicit information that may
be used for legislation 2. Attendance is discretionary. The
Pres. may require that her
2. Attendance is compulsory.
consent be required first.
3. Congress can compel
3. Congress cannot compel
attendance of executive
appearance if the required
officials. .
consent is not obtained first and
if consent is not given.
Cases:
• Senate of the Philippines, et. al. v. Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777 Promulgated on April 20, 2006 – Sections 2 (b) and 3 of
EO No. 464 are void and were invalidated on the ground that
they authorize an implied claim of privilege without any specific
allegation of the basis thereof. Congress has the right to know
why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. A claim of privilege, being claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information, must therefore be clearly
asserted.
It is for this reason why Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO No. 464 are
invalid per se. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons
for the claim, it only invokes EO 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It
severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
• Romulo Neri v. Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
– The refusal of Secretary Neri to answer three questions; [(a) Whether or not the
President made a follow up (Re National Broadband Network Projects), (b)
Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve it] are covered by presidential communication privilege,
and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department.

• Akbayan, et al. v. Thomas Aquino in his capacity as undersecretary of the

Department of Trade, et al., G.R. no. 170516, July 16, 2008 – The petitioners filed
a mandamus petition in the Supreme Court to compel the DTI , DFA and DOJ,
NEDA and the Executive Secretary to furnish them with the full text of the JPEPA
(Japan, Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement) as well as documents on its
negotiation. Petitioners said that the government cannot sign the Trade
agreement with Japan without a full disclosure of its provisions to the public.

The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

1. The first demand has become moot and academic, because it has already been
made accessible to the public since Sept. 11, 2006.
2. The second demand was denied because the claim of executive privilege is valid
• Gen. Francisco Gudani, et al. v. Lt. Gen. Generoso Senga, G.R. no.
170165, August 15, 2006
FACTS:
Gen. Gudani and Balutan were invited to appear before the Senate
Committee on Defense and Security in connection with inquiry
regarding alleged cheating during the 2004 Elections. A day before they
testified, Gen. Senga ordered them per instruction of the President to the
effect that “No AFP personel shall appear before any congressional or
senate hearing without the President’s approval. Gudani and Balutan
appeared at the hearing and testified on the conduct of the 2004
elections. Subsequently, they were charged with violating Articles of
War 65 and 97.
Gudani and Balutan sought to annul the said directive of the President,
contending that it is unconstitutional. It interferes with the power of
Congress to investigate in aid of legislation, and asked the Court to stop
the AFP from continuing the court martial proceedings against them.
(Sec.23) Sole power to declare the existence of a state of war
(Congress by vote of 2/3 of both houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately; shall have power to declare the
existence of a state of war)
(Sec.24) Answers the question- Can a member of Congress
(Senate and HR) introduce any kind of bill or law?
(Sec.25-32) to simplify these long provisions, I suggest that the
students should memorize/understand the following:
 
1. PROHIBITIONS- PP. 512 (RAS Political Law
reviewer)
PP. 512 CODE: EBITAT (Expost facto law; Bill of attainder;
impairment of the obligation of contract; title of royalty
or nobility; appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
Tax exemption)

2. PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS (PP. 512-513, RAS

PP.
Political Law reviewer)
512-513
imposed by the 1987 Constitution
Special Topics in Legislative Department:
1. GERRYMANDERING - practice of creating a legislative
district composed only of towns or localities where a
preferred candidate is expected to win, and excluding
from said district those towns or localities where a
preferred candidate is not expected to win..
2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION RE GERRYMANDERING
– Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
3. Legislative apportionment is a justiciable question.
4. 3 RULES REGARDING APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS?
CODE: UCR

a) Uniform and progressive ratio: Apportionment shall be made in

accordance with the number of respective inhabitants (among
provinces, cities and Metro Manila area), on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio subject to the following rules: (a) Each city
with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to at least
one representative; and (b) Each province, irrespective of number of
inhabitants, is entitled to at least one representative.
b) Contiguous, compact and adjacent: Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory in order that gerrymandering may be avoided.
c) Reapportionment within 3 years: Congress shall make
reapportionment of legislative districts within three years following
the return of every census.
5. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law.
6. Can our courts make reapportionment of legislative
districts? No, Reason This is the power and prerogative of
Congress.
7. NOTE.
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT RE-APPORTIONMENT
It is the determination of the It is the realignment or change in
number of representatives which a legislative districts brought about
State, country or other subdivision by changes in population and
may send to a legislative body mandated by the Constitutional
(Black’s Law Dictionary). It is the requirement of equality of
allocation of seats in a legislative representation.
body in proportion to the
 EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1 TO 23
Sec.1 – P-ower [Executive Power – power to enforce and administer the
laws of the land. (Secs. 1 and 17, Art. VII); Presidential Power of Control –
the power to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former to the latter. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary; Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency – the act of department Heads, promulgated in the course of
business, are presumptebly the act of the President unless disapproved or
reprobated by the President; Residual Power – power borne by the
President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution]
Sec.2&3 – Q-ualifications (a natural-born citizen, registered, able to read
and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of the election, and 10 years
residence)
Sec.4 – T-erm (eligibility of Joseph Estrada to run again)
Sec.5 – O-ath or affirmation
Sec.6 – O-fficial residence and salaries
Sec7&8 – PS- Presidential Succession – NOTE. Section 7 lays down
the rule to be applied if there is a vacancy before the beginning of the
term of the President; Section 8 lays down the rules to be applied if a
vacancy occurs during the incumbency of the President.
Example: Section 7
1. In case of death or permanent disability 1. The Vice-President elect shall become
of the President-elect President.
2. In case of failure to elect the President 2. The Vice-President shall act as the
President until the President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
Section 8
1. In case of Death/Permanent Disability, 1. The Vice-President shall become the
Removal or Resignation of the President. President to serve the unexpired term.
2. In case of Death/Permanent Disability, 2. The Senate President, or in case of his
Removal or Resignation of the President inability, the Speaker shall act as
President until the President or Vice-
President shall have been elected and
qualified.
Sec.9 – In case of vacancy in the Office of the VP during the term for which he was
elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Sec.10 – Is there a vacancy in the offices of the President and VP – Congress shall convene
within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a VP.

Sec.11 – When the President is unable to discharge the powers & duties of his office – the
VP shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office of the Vice-President.

Sec.12 – Serious illness of the President – The public shall be informed of the state of his
health, Members of Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness.
Sec.13 – Inhibitions of President (is the President immune from
suit?)

1. He shall not hold any other office during his tenure.

2. He shall not, during his tenure, directly or indirectly practice any

other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

3. He shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of his

office.
4. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)

Is the President immune from suit? He enjoys immunity during

his tenure. After his term, immunity for non-official acts is lost.
Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State, he
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser
Sec.14 – Appointments extended by Acting President – This
means that the Acting President has the power to appoint but his
appointment may be revoked by the elected President within 90
days. Discuss Dominador R. Aytona v. Andres Castillo

Sec.15 – Restraints to President or Acting President in extending

appointment. – Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Q –Does the ban on “midnight appointments” under Sec. 15, Art. VII apply to the
judiciary?

A–No, the prohibition does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. The prohibition is confined to appointments in
the Executive Department. (De Castro v. JBC, 615 SCRA 666, March 17, 2010)

Q –May the succeeding President revoke appointments to the Judiciary made by an

Acting President?

A – No, Sec. 14, Art. VII refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no
application to appointments in the judiciary because temporary or acting appointments
can only undermine the judiciary due to their being revocable at will. Prior to their
mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first or second level courts and the
justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the members of the
Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment. (De Castro v. JBC, 615 SCRA
666, supra)
Sec.16 – Scope of President’s appointing power or (HAO-OAA)

Q –What is the scope of the President’s appointing power?

A–The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the following:

CODE: HAO-OAA
H–eads of the executive department (subject to confirmation by CA)
A–mbassadors, or other public ministers and consuls (subject to confirmation by CA)
O–fficers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain (subject to
confirmation by CA)
O–ther officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (not subject to
confirmation by CA)
A–ll other officers of the government whose appointments are not provided for by law (not
subject to confirmation by CA)
A–nyone whom he can appoint by authority of law.

Sec.17 – Presidential Control of all executive department/business and offices

Sec.18 – The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Sec.19 – Executive Clemency subject to the following limitations:
(a) It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment;
(b) It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment; (c) It cannot
be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections.

Sec.20 – Power of President to enter into contracts/guarantee

foreign loans.

Sec.21 - Diplomatic Power

Sec.22 – Budgetary Power

Sec.23 – SONA
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
 
M-ilitary Power
M-artial Law Power
D-iplomatic Power
A-ppoinment Power
P-ardoning Power
B-orrowing Power
B-udgetaryPower
I-nforming Power
O-ther Power
M - MILITARY POWER OF THE PRESIDENT – The President shall
be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
 
M- MARTIAL LAW POWER OF THE PRESIDENT – In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for
a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
 
D - IPLOMATIC POWER – The President has the power (1.) to make
treaties; (2.) appoint ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls;
What is the scope of the President’s appointing power?
A-PPOINMENT POWER – The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the following:

CODE: HAO-OAA

H –eads of the executive department (subject to confirmation by CA)

A –mbassadors, or other public ministers and consuls (subject to confirmation by CA)

O –fficers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain (subject to confirmation by CA)

O –ther officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (not subject to confirmation by
CA)

A –ll other officers of the government whose appointments are not provided for by law (not subject to
confirmation by CA)

A –nyone whom he can appoint by authority of law. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution) (3.) to receive
ambassadors & other public ministers daily accredited to the Philippines.
P-ARDONING POWER – It is an act of grace given by those who have the power and authority to
execute laws which exempts the individual subject of pardon from the punishment which the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. Section 19 of Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
authorizes the President of the Republic of the Philippines to grant not only pardon but also
reprieve, commutation of sentence, remission of fines and forfeitures and amnesty. Section 19
provides the following:

BORROWING POWER – The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall submit to Congress a report on loans within
30 days from the end of every quarter. (Sec. 20, Art. VII)

BUDGETARY POWER –The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of
every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of expenditures
and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Sec.
22 Art VII)

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time. (Sec. 23, Art VII)
O-THER POWER

1. VETO POWER - Already mentioned/discussed in connection with the discussion of the

approval and disapproval of bills.

2. The President may approve or veto bills. (Sec. 27. Art. VI)

3. General supervision over local government - (Sec. 4, Art. X and Sec. 16, Art. X, 1987
Constitution)

4. President's power to give consent to deputized government personnel by the commission

on elections and to discipline its deputies. (Sec. 2 (4), Art. IX (c) and Sec. 2 (8), Art. IX (c)

5.  The President may call Congress to a special session

6. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
7. Presidential power of control- it Is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what his subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."(Ibid.) the power of supervision is the "power
of a superior officer to ensure "that the laws are faithfully executed" by Inferiors." The
power of control necessarily includes the power of supervision but the power of
supervision does not include the power of control .

8. The President has the power to issue administrative acts or commands embodied in
executive orders.

9. The President, if authorized by Congress, and subject to limitations and restrictions

Congress may impose, can fix, within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export
quotas and demurrage and wharfage dues. (Sec. 28 (2).

10.The President may exercise emergency powers (In times of war or other natural
emergency, Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulation to carry a
declared national policy.
Remember my CODE in my textbook, Const Law, VOL-I

CODE: W A L I N A R E

WA (there must be war or national emergency)

LI (It must be for a limited period.)

NA (It is subject to restrictions imposed by Congress).

RE (It is subject to regulations declared by national policy)

 JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1 TO 16
Sec.1 – JUDICIAL POWER – vested in one SC and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

TRADITIONAL CONCEPT – to settle controversies or disputes involving rights

that are enforceable and demandable.

NEW DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL POWER – The said traditional concept plus

what is now referred to as the expanded justification of SC to determine
whether or not grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government has been
committed.

CODE:  P-ower

Sec.2 – DPA (Define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts)
This means that Congress can create new courts but subject to the following
limitations:

1. This power may not deprive the SC of the jurisdiction over cases in Sec.5.
2. No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its members.
Sec.3 – FA (Fiscal Autonomy) – Appropriation for the judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year. And after approval shall be automatically and regularly
released.
• Authority of the SC to interpret the law is final.
• JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE – This upholds the principle of INTER-Departmental
Courtesy that each branch of government is separate, equal, coordinate
and supreme within it’s own sphere under the legal and political reality of
one overarching, Constitution that governs one government and nation
for whose benefit all the three separate branches must act with unity.
• Certain information contained in the record of cases before the court are
considered confidential and are exempt from disclosure.
• While a senator may invoke legislative privilege, a justice may like to
invoke “JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE” in the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court
Sec4.1 – C-omposition –
• Chief Justice and 14 associate justices. May sit en
banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7
• Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof.
• Cases heard by the Supreme Court en banc
1. All cases involving the constitutionality of (Code: TIEL)
a. A T-reaty
b. An I-nternational Agreement
c. An E-xecutive Agreement
d. A L-aw
2. All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc.
3. All cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of:
a. Presidential Decrees
b. Proclamations
c. Orders
d. Instructions
e. Ordinances
f. And other regulations
 
• SC is free to create division of 3, 5 or 7
• When en banc – SC declares by the concurrence “of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon

 
 SECTION 5(1) AND (2) (JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME SECTION 6, AUXILIARY ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
COURT OVER CASES) SUPREME COURT
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Section 5(3). Assign tem-porarily judges of the lower courts
Section 5(1). The Supreme Court shall have the power to to other stations as public interest may require. Such
exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over the consent of the judge concerned.
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, manda mus, quo Section 5(4). Order a change of venue or place of trial to
warranto, and habeas corpus. avoid a miscarriage of justice.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION Section 5(5). Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
Section 5(2). The Supreme Court shall have the power to enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
judgments and orders of lower courts in: underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
Section 5(6). Appoint all officials and employees of the
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative
issue.
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
• Congress may not diminish the jurisdiction granted by the
Constitution itself but it may diminish the jurisdiction granted by
a statute.

• Power of judicial review or judicial supremacy

• It is the assertion of the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to

the Judiciary by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the right which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. (Angara v. Elec. Com., 63 Phil.
139)

• Requisites of judicial review or inquiry

• Requisites of judicial review or inquiry

1. There must be an actual case or controversy;

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the

proper party;

3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest

possible opportunity; and

4. The decision of the constitutional question must be

necessary to the determination of the case itself. (Macasino
v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236)
EXPLANATION EACH

1. THERE MUST BE AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY. There must be a real and

substantial controversy, and not merely a dispute of a hypothetical character, parties have
contrasting claims, praying for reliefs contrary to the other.

2. IT MUST BE RAISED BY THE PROPER PARTY. Those who are not indispensable but who
ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties.

• i.e. – Taxpayers who raise the constitutionality of a law that provides special retirement
benefits

• i.e. – An association of citizens/taxpayers challenge the contract between the PCSO and a
foreign corporation. The issues raised affect the social, economic and moral well-being of
the people even in the remotest barangays

3. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE

OPPORTUNITY. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial
and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
 
EXCEPTION - question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime even on appeal.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION – Zamboanga City Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Buat . “Petitioner
cannot raise the issue of jurisdiction, under the principle of estoppel. Reason: Petitioner participated
in the proceedings from start to finish. It filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter. When the
decision of the Labor Arbiter decided in its favor, petitioner said nothing about jurisdiction. It was only
when the Resolution of the NLRC was adverse to the petitioner that it raised the issue of jurisdiction.”

4. THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE NECESSARY TO THE

DETERMINATION OF THE CASE ITSELF. Power of judicial review is vested in the SC but this does not
mean, the SC will assume jurisdiction over every constitutional case that is brought to its
determination. i.e.:

5. Alejandrino v. Quezon – SC refused to interfere even if the suspension of Alejandrino is

unconstitutional. Reason: Legislative has its own power to discipline its own members. (46 Phil. 83)
6. SC also refused to interfere when Sergio Osmeña, Jr., was suspended for disorderly behavior
7. In Paredes case SC distinguished between suspension on the basis of disorderly behavior and
suspension under R.A. No. 3019.
Sec.6 – A-uxiliary Administrative Powers of the SC as above-mentioned

Moot and Academic Principle- Courts can decide cases otherwise moot and
academic on the following instances:

1. When there is a grave violation of the Constitution.

2. When the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is

involved.

3. When the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

4. When the constitutional issue requires formulation of controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar and the public.

5. When there is a voluntary cessation of activity complained of by the defendant or

doer. (i.e. The suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenge or act, the
tribunal can hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot)
Sec.7 – Qualifications of SC Justice and lower Court Judges –
1. natural-born citizen
2. At least 40 years of age,
3. 15 years or more, as judge or practitioner
PLUS – must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.

• Said qualifications cannot be altered by Congress

Sec.8 – JBC-
• FUNCTIONS
1. It recommends the appointees to the Judiciary.
2. It may exercise such other functions and duties as SC may assign to it.

• In turn, SC supervises the JBC

 
• Composition

1. Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman

2. Secretary of Justice as ex officio member

3. Representative of Congress as ex officio member

4. Representative of the Integrated Bar

5. A Professor of Law

6. A Retired Member of the Supreme Court

7. Representative of the Private Sector

• Rotational schemes

1. Of the Member first appointed, the representative of the

Integrated Bar shall serve for four (4) years.

2. The professor of law for three (3) years.

3. The retired justice for two (2) years.

4. The representative of the private sector for one (1) year.

• Salaries – determines by the SC

• Secretary of JBC – the clerk of court of SC.

Sec.9 - SC Members & Judges of lower courts – shall be appointed by the SC from the list of
at least 3 nominees prepared by the JBC.

• Said appointees need no confirmation

• For lower court judges – the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list

• Notes:

1. Vacancy in the SC – vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from submission of the list.

2. Vacancy in the lower courts – The President shall issue the appointment within 90 days
from the submission of the list.

 
Sec.10 - The salary of SC, Justices and CJ

• Shall be fixed by law.

• During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased

• It may be increased if Congress so decides

Sec. 11

• SC justices shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.

• Lower Court Judges – They may be disciplined, by the SC, or may be

dismissed by a vote of a majority of the SC Members who actually took part in
the deliberations in the case and voted thereon.
Sec.12 - SC members and of other courts shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions

Sec. 13 – Conclusions of the SC

• Shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member

for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

• Certification to this effect shall be signed by the CJ

• The same procedure shall be observed by all lower courts.

• A certification, signed by the CJ copy thereof attached to the record of the

court
Sec.14 – The decision shall express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is founded. Petition for
review/motion for reconsideration shall be refused due
course or denied without starting the legal basis therefore.

Sec.15 – SC Decision - shall state the facts and the law on

which it isCOURT
SUPREME based. LOWER COLLEGIATE
LOWER COURTS
COURTS

Within 24 months from Within 12 months from Within 3 months from the
date of filing of the last the date of submission of date of submission of the
pleading, the last pleading/brief or last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.” the court itself.”
Sec.16 shall submit to the President & Congress an annual
report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary
within 30 days, from the opening of regular session of the
Congress,
CASES
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General, NEDA, et. al., G.R.
No. 167798 April 19, 2006 – President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued EO 420 directing all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations to
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their
existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners alleged that
EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch
of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
Is it constitutional?
1. No. EO 420 is VALID. There is nothing legislative about
unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the
Judiciary.
2. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO
420 applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their
regular functions under existing laws.
2. Metropolitan Development Authority vs. Dante O. Garin G.R.
No. 130230, April 15, 2005 – The power to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s license without the need of
legislative enactment is an unauthorized exercise of police
power.

3. Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 – After the death of

Ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos has chosen Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice.
Tacloban is Mrs. Marcos’ domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought the family to Leyte, and since
Mrs. Marcos was a minor at the time, she followed the
domicile of her parents.
4. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, APRIL 24, 2012 – When Jalosjos
came back to the Philippines in November, 2008, lived with his brother
in Zamboanga, Sibugay, and registered as a voter, it is evident that he
did so with intent to change his domicile for good. Besides, when he left
Australia, and gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
allegiance to the said country, and thereafter, reacquired his old
citizenship and took his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he,
by his acts, forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, and gave up his
domicile in Australia. In fact, he was issued a Certificate of Acquisition
of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration.
The fact that Jalosjos merely stayed in the house of his brother is of no
moment. “x x x A candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It
is sufficient that he should live there even if it be a rented house or in
the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate owns the
house where he lives would make property a qualification for public
office.”
5. Social Justice vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al., G.R. No. 157870,
NOVEMBER 3, 2008 – Mandatory drug testing: (1) Of candidates for
public office; (2) Of students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) Of
officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) Of persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

RULING:
1) CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE: Unconstitutional. Reason: It
imposes additional qualifications to senatorial candidates when the
Constitution already fixes their qualifications in Section 3, Article VI.
2) STUDENTS OF SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SCHOOLS:
Constitutional. It is within the prerogative of educational institutes
to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable
school rules and regulations and policies. The right to enroll is not
absolute.
 
3. OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFICES:
Constitutional. Reason: (1) Mandatory drug test is an effective
way to prevent and detect drug use among employees in private
offices. It is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
(2) If R.A. 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.
4. OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CERTAIN OFFENSES:
Unconstitutional. Reason: (1) To impose mandatory drug testing
on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution. (2) It violates a person’s right to
privacy guaranteed under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. (3) Worse still, the accused person is veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
6. Antonio Trillanes vs. Hon. Oscar Pimentel Sr., G.R. No. 179817,
June 27, 2008 – Legislative: doctrine of condonation; the
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law
7. Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995 –
Apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts
belong to the legislative department, not the Comelec.
8. Sena v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700, 2008 – THE POWER TO
CREATE OR REAPPORTION LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT CANNOT BE
DELEGATED BY CONGRESS BUT MUST BE EXERCISED BY
CONGRESS ITSELF.
9. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 573 SCRA 290 2008 – Plebiscite
was never a requirement in legislative appointment or
reappointment. The court noted that the need for a
plebiscite in the creation, division, merger or abolition of
local government units was not constitutionally
enshrined until the 1973 Constitution.

After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite

was always identified with the creation, division, merger,
abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government
units, never with the concept of legislative appointment
10. Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma and Zamora, G.R No.
138965, June 30, 2006
 HELD:
1. The PCGG Chairman cannot serve as CPLC at the same time. The
concurrent appointment is unconstitutional. REASON: Article IX-B,
Sec. 7 of the Constitution prohibits the concurrent appointments of
Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC because they are incompatible
offices.
2. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices is: Whether one office is subordinate to the
other in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the
other.

3. Incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman

and PCLC. REASON: The CPLC gives independent and impartial
legal advice on the actions of the various department’s heads and
agencies; reviews investigations of said department heads and other
presidential appointees. For this reason, the actions of the PCGG
Chairman are subject to review of the CPLC.
11. Robert Z. Barbers v. COMELEC G.R. No. 165961, June 22, 2005 – The senate
electoral tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the senate. This authority which
is provided in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and Rule 12 of the
revised rules of the senate electoral tribunal, is categorical and complete.

12. Senate of the Philippines, et. al. v. Eduardo R. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777
Promulgated on April 20, 2006 – Sections 2 (b) and 3 of Executive Order No.
464 are void and were invalidated on the ground that they authorize an
implied claim of privilege without any specific allegation of the basis thereof.
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. A claim of privilege, being claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information, must therefore be clearly asserted.

It is for this reason why Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 are
invalid per se. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it
only invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has
not given her consent. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
13. Romulo Neri v. Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008 – The refusal of Secretary Neri to answer three questions; [(a)
Whether or not the President made a follow up (Re National Broadband
Network Projects), (b) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) Whether or not she directed him to approve it] are covered by
presidential communication privilege, and that this privilege has been
validly claimed by the executive department.
REASONS:
1) The information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic and
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
2) Communications were received by a close adviser of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, Neri can be a close adviser, being
a member of the President’s cabinet.
3) Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and the
presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need for
the three answers to the questions in the enactment of any law under
Sec. 21, Article VI.
 executive DEPARTMENT

1. Alfredo Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259,

July 29, 2004 – Any reasonable doubt about the validity of
the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
Executive immunity cannot be used to shield a non-sitting
president and any person acting pursuant to the president’s
orders cannot claim immunity because he derives his
authority from one who is no longer sitting as president.
2. Estrada vs. Desierto, et.al. – The Supreme Court already ruled that
“using the totality test” (which was determined “from his acts and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001, or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue”,
“we hold that petitioner resigned as President.” This being expressly
pronounced by final judgment, it is clear that former President
Estrada, by his own acts, already completed the term of six years, and
for this reason, the second sentence of Section 4, Article 7, applies to
him, which means that he is not eligible for any re-election.
3. Legarda vs. De Castro, P.E.T. CASE No. 003, March 31, 2005 – The
constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), in Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution
4. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 635 SCRA 783 (2010)
and 651 SCRA 239 (2011)
1) The contention of the petitioner assailing the creation of the PET as
“Separate tribunal”, complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set
of personal and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
mandate, was rejected by the Supreme Court.
2) “The establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was
statutory before the 1987 Constitution”, of saying that Section 4,
paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation, and that the
different tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET,
are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of
government, but not separate therefrom.”
3) “xxx the PET is not simply an agency to which members of the Court
were designated. The PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department.”
5. Soliven vs. Judge Makasiar, G.R. 8287, November 14, 1988 – The
privilege from immunity from suit pertains only to President
Aquino by virtue of the office, hence, it may be invoked only by
herself and not by any other person in her behalf.
6. De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666, March 17,
2010
Q – Does the ban on “midnight appointments” under Sec. 15,
Art. VII apply to the judiciary?
A – No, the prohibition does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. The prohibition is confined to
appointments in the Executive Department (De Castro vs. JBC
615 SCRA 666, March 17, 2010
 Q – May the succeeding President revoke appointments
to the Judiciary made by an Acting President?
A – No, Sec. 14, Art. VII refers only to appointments in
the Executive Department. It has no application to
appointments in the judiciary because temporary or
acting appointments can only undermine the judiciary
due to their being revocable at will. Prior to their
mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first
or second level courts and the justices of the third level
courts may only be removed for cause, but the members
of the Supreme Court may be removed only by
impeachment. (De Castro vs. JBC, 615 SCRA 666, supra)
 
7. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22 – An Ad Interim
appointment is a permanent appointment.
8. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. 96409, February 14,
1992 – Presidential Power of Control – It extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk and has been held to mean, “the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with
that of the latter.
9. Prof. Randolf S. David, et.al. v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(Constitutionality of PP1017), G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

1) The President is not authorized under PP1017 to temporarily

take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.

2) CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence.

3) The provisions of PP1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws

not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

4) The warrantless arrest of Prof. David is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

10. Renato Constantino, Jr., vs. Hon. Jose B. Cuisia, G.R. No.
106064, October 13, 2004
1) The Constitution allows the President to contract and
guarantee foreign loans.
2) The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside
from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is
that the loans must be subject to the limitations provided
by law.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997 – In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher
bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos,
the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
2. Guigona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 24, 1991 – The issue
of whether or not the country should honor its international debt
is a political question.

3. Demosthenes P. Agan, Jr., et.al. vs. Philippine International Air

Terminals, Co., Inc., et.al., G.R. No. 155001 – Findings in a
Congressional Committee report is not binding to the court.

4. Administrative Matter No. 02-12-01-SC, November 24, 2004 –

Undersecretary Mario L. Relampagos sent two letters to the SC
advising the Supreme Court to disallow the five-year lump sum
gratuity claimed by the heirs of the late Judge Melvyn Calvan
and Judge Emmanuel Real. HELD: (1) Under R. A. No. 910, a
situation whereby a Justice or Judge dies while in actual service
but without having attained the twenty-year length of service
requirement is not expressly provided for. (2) Once this court
has interpreted a law, such interpretation becomes a part of the
law itself.
5. Interdepartmental Courtesy, SCRA February 14, 2012 – During and
in the course of the impeachment trial of Former Chief Justice Renato
Corona, there were requests made to the Supreme Court relative to
the examination and production of certain documents and records as
well as testimony of justices, officials and employees of the court,
including the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the
agenda and the minutes of the deliberations relative to certain cases.
What was the position taken by the Supreme Court relative to the said
requests?
The Supreme Court leaned in favor of protecting “judicial privilege”
and upholding the principle of “inter-departmental courtesy”, holding
that each branch of the government is considered separate, co-equal,
coordinate and supreme within its own sphere, under the legal and
political reality of one overarching Constitution that governs one
government and one nation for whose benefit all the three separate
branches must act with unity.
6. Hon. Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R.
No.16417, Feb. 20, 2006 – Importation ban of used cars is void
for its sweeping and unnecessary application to the Freeport
which is considered to some extent as foreign territory.
7. Buno vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R.
No. 91649, May 14, 1991 – Policy issues are within the domain
of the political branches of government.
8. Chavez vs. Judicial Bar Council, 696 SCRA 496 - HELD: the
tenor of Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1) of the Constitution is to treat each
ex-officio member as representative of one co-equal branch of
government. The lone representative of Congress is entitled to
one full vote.
The scheme of splitting the vote into halves between two
representatives of Congress is disallowed.
 SIMPLE
QUESTIONS
1. Question: A, a taxpayer, filed a petition to the Supreme
Court to declare a law unconstitutional on the ground that
it involves the illegal or provident disbursement amount of
public funds.. Is A a proper party? Reason.
Answer: Yes. Reason: He has sufficient interest to prevent
illegal expenditure of money.
2. Question: A law has been in force for three (3) years and
has been relied upon by public officials for the performance
of official acts. Can the government question the validity of
said law? Reason.
Answer: Yes. Reason: The fact that it was not questioned
before does not mean that the government cannot question
it later if the government has a valid reason to question it.
3. Question: Can the question of constitutionality be raised
for the first time on appeal? Yes or No. Explain.
Answer: Yes, such as in the following cases:
1) In criminal cases, the question of constitutionality may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings subject to the
discretion of the court;
2) In civil cases, where the issue of constitutionality is
indispensable to the adjudication of the main case
itself; and
3) In every case, where the constitutional question to be
resolved is the jurisdiction of the courts. (People vs.
Munar, 53 SCRA 278, October 222, 1973)
4. Question: Are the final pronouncements of the Supreme Court
subject to further review by any other department?
Answer: No. To subject final pronouncements of the Supreme
Court to further review is a gross violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
5. Question: The Local Government Code of 1991 provides that
locally elected officials may be removed from office through the
recall system on ground of loss of confidence. May a locally
elected official who is ousted on such ground seek judicial
intervention?
Answer: No. Loss of confidence as a ground for recall is a
political question. It belongs to the realm of politics. (Garcia vs.
Commission on Election, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993 citing
Evardone vs. Comelec, supra)
Citizenship
article iv
1. Who are citizens of the Philippines?
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.)
2. Three kinds of citizens
1) Natural born citizens – They are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship (Article IV, Section 2,
1987 Constitution). Under the second sentence of Section 2,
those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3, Section 1 thereof, shall also be deemed
natural-born citizens.
2) Naturalized citizens – They are citizens who become such
through judicial proceedings.

3) Citizens by election – They are citizens who become such by

exercising the option to elect a particular citizenship,
usually within a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority.
3. Is there a difference between a natural-born citizen and a native-
born citizen? Yes, a natural-born citizen is a citizen referred to in
Section 2, Article IV. A native-born citizen is one who was born in a
country in which he is a citizen. A child born therefore to a Filipino
father in Italy is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, but not a
native-born Filipino citizen.
4. There are two theories, namely:
1) Jus Soli – Under this theory, a person is a citizen of the country
where he was born. Example: A child born in the U.S. of Filipino
parents has dual citizenship. He is considered a citizen of the U.S.
because he was born in the U.S. He is also considered a Filipino
citizen because his parents are Filipino citizens. The doctrine of jus
soli is not applied in the Philippines.
2) Jus Sanguinis – Under this theory, one follows the citizenship of his
parents. This is referred to as citizenship by blood. This doctrine is
the one that is followed in the Philippines
5. Note that under Article IV, Sec. 1, the following are natural
born citizens of the Philippines.
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine Citizenship; and
2) Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
6. Note Section 4, Article IV: “Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it”.
7. 2009 BAR QUESTION – Warlito, a natural-born Filipino, took up permanent
residence in the United States, and eventually acquired American citizenship.
He then married Shirley, an American, and sired three children. In August
2009, Warlito decided to visit the Philippines with his wife and children:
Johnny, 23 years of age; Warlito, Jr., 20; and Luisa, 17.

While in the Philippines, a friend informed him that he could reacquire

Philippine citizenship without necessarily losing U.S. nationality. Thus, he
took the oath of allegiance required under R.A. 9225.

a) Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, is Warlito a natural-born or a

naturalized Filipino citizen today? Explain your answer.

b) With Warlito having regained Philippine citizenship, will Shirley also

become a Filipino citizen? If so, why? If not, what would be the most
speedy procedure for Shirley to acquire Philippine citizenship? Explain.

c) Do the children – Johnny, Warlito, Jr., and Luisa – become Filipino

citizens with their father’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?
Explain your answer.
ANSWERS:

a) Warlito is a natural-born Filipino citizen. REASON: Because he was a

natural-born Filipino citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, and he
was restored to his former status as a natural born Filipino citizen. (Benson
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001).)

b) No. REASON: Shirley is not benefited by Warlito’s reacquisition of Filipino

citizenship (R.A. No. 9225). To be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, she
can file a petition for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration
before the Bureau of Investigation. In her petition, she should allege that on
account of her marriage to Warlito, she should be deemed to have become a
Filipino citizen, and she must also state and prove that she possess none of
the disqualifications to become a naturalized Filipino citizen. (Bureau vs.
Republic, 51 SCRA 248 (June 15, 1973) in relation to C.A. 473, Section 2)

c) No, only Luisa, who is seventeen years old, become a Filipino citizen.
REASON: Because Johnny and Warlito were 23 years of age and 20 years
respectively, and both of them are married. Only Luisa is below 18 years of
age.
8. Note that it is dual allegiance, not dual citizenship, which is
inimical to national interest.

9. DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of This refers to a situation in which a
the concurrent application of the different person simultaneously owes, by some
laws of two or more states, a person is positive act, loyalty to two (2) or more
simultaneously considered a national of the States.
said States.  
Example: Dual allegiance is a result of an
individual volition.
A’s parents are citizens of the Philippines
(which follows the principle of jus
sanguinis) is born in the U.S.(which follows
the principle of jus soli). A, ipso facto, and
without any voluntary act on his part, is
currently a citizen of both states.

In the said example, dual citizenship is

10.LOPEZ VS. COMELEC AND TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA G.R. No. 182701, JULY 23, 2008

Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

R.A. No. 9225. Explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first
"make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.“

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. It is true that respondent was able to
regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath
of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los
Angeles, California, but the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. R.A.
9225 mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied
with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof, respondent cannot run for Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
11. LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, ET.AL., VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

A non-resident may, as an exception to the residency requirement in the preceding section,

be allowed to vote. R.A. 9225 does not provide that “duals” actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise the right to vote.

Petitioners were successful applicants for reacquisition of the Philippine Citizenship

under Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003).
They sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” from the
Comelec. However, the Comelec denied their request stating that they have no right
to vote yet due to lack of one-year residency requirement mandated by the
Constitution. It averred that the “duals” upon renouncement of their Filipino
citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally
abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a
consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second citizenship then, “duals” must
for purposes of voting, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through
positive acts.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners who have retained and/or

reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225
may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. 

2. Whether or not the “duals” can enjoy their right to vote

only if they meet the requirements of Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws.
 
RULING:

1. Yes. Sec. 1, Art. V prescribes residency requirement as a general illegibility for the right
to vote. Sec., Art. V authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may
vote. This implies that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency
requirement in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. Following this mandate,
Congress enacted R.A. 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting act of 2003.

2. No. R.A. 9225 does not provide that “duals” actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise the right to vote. In fact, Sec. 5 (1)
of R.A. 9225 grants the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189. This law aims to enfranchise all overseas Filipinos as much as possible, who
are qualified to vote, except for the residency requirements required of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions. Likewise, the Court noted that the expanded thrust of
R.A 9189 includes the next generation of duals. This may be deduced from the
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225. It is very likely that the
next generations of duals may avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political
rights under Sec. 5 of the Act.
12. Q – Is dual citizenship constitutional?
A – RA9225 which allows dual citizenship to a natural-born Filipino
Citizen who has lost Philippine Citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country, is constitutional as a mode of re-acquiring Filipino
Citizenship. Whether they retain foreign citizenship is for the foreign
country to determine. (Calilung vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 60869, May
11, 2007)

Q – Mr. A is a green card holder permanently residing in the U.S. Is he

eligible to hold public office?
A – No. A green card holder is disqualified from holding elective office
unless he waives his permanent resident status in the U.S. (Ugdoracion,
Jr. vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008)

Q – Mr. A is a Filipino Citizen who is a permanent resident in a foreign

country. Can he register as an absentee voter if he executes an affidavit
stating his declaration that he will resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines within two (2) years?
A – Yes, the residency requirement is not applicable to Filipinos abroad.
12. Q – Is dual citizenship constitutional?

A – RA9225 which allows dual citizenship to a natural-born

Filipino Citizen who has lost Philippine Citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country, is constitutional as a
mode of re-acquiring Filipino Citizenship. Whether they
retain foreign citizenship is for the foreign country to
determine. (Calilung vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 60869, May
11, 2007)

Q – Mr. A is a green card holder permanently residing in the U.S. Is

he eligible to hold public office?

A – No. A green card holder is disqualified from holding elective

office unless he waives his permanent resident status in the U.S.
(Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008)
Q – Mr. A is a Filipino Citizen who is a permanent resident in a
foreign country. Can he register as an absentee voter if he
executes an affidavit stating his declaration that he will resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines within
two (2) years?

A – Yes, the residency requirement is not applicable to Filipinos

abroad. When Mr. A. made the said declaration in his affidavit,
he merely expressed his intention that he has not lost his
domicile in the Philippines. (Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2000
 BILL OF RIGHTS
Important (memorize Sections 1 to
22)
CODES:

1. DP-EQ
2. SS
3. PCC 1. Due process in Criminal
4. F4 proceedings
5. FR 2. Habeas Corpus
6. LA 3. Speedy deposition of cases
7. RI 4. Right against self
8. RA incrimination
9. JC 5. Freedom of Political belief
10. Impairment of obligation of 6. Right against excessive
contracts fines, degrading and
Sec.1 (Due Process/Equal Protection)

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.”

No exact definition of due process. This is left to the best judgment of the
judiciary considering the peculiarity and circumstances of each case.

Darmoth v. Wordward – a law which hears before it condemns, which

proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.

Purpose: (1) It’s a guaranty against any kind of abuse and arbitrariness,
even by the government; (2) from confiscation, seizure, forfeiture, and
destruction without a trial.
Due Process to ensure security of employees

a. Regular employment – The employer shall not terminate the services of a

regular employee EXCEPT for just cause or when authorized by this title;

OTHERWISE, the said employee shall be entitled to:

1) Reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
2) Full backwages
3) Other benefits from the time compensation was withheld up to his actual
reinstatement.

b. In case of probationary employment – a probationary employee may be

terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement.

An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be

considered a regular employee.”
c. Just causes: (Art. 282)
1) SM/WD – Serious misconduct or willful disobedience;
2) G/HN – Gross and habitual neglect of duties,
3) Fraud or willful breach of trust;
4) Crime/offense;
5) Other causes analogous to the foregoing

d. Authorized causes: (Art. 283 & 284)

1) I – nstallation of labor saving devices;
2) R – edundancy;
3) R – etrenchment to prevent losses; and
4) Closing or cessation of operation
5) Disease (whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees
Twin Requirements of Due Process:
a) Substantive due process – there must be a lawful cause to terminate the services
of an employee;
b) Procedural due process – Due process must be observed before terminating the
services of an employee.

Two aspects of procedural due process

c) Procedural due process in judicial proceedings
d) Procedural due process in administrative proceedings.

Requirements of procedural due process in judicial proceedings (CODE: IJOJ)

1) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and
over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. (CODE:
HTDEDJB)

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3) The decision must have something to support itself;
4) The evidence must be substantial;
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
Procedural requirements before an employee can be dismissed.

1) The first written notice to be served to the employee stating

the specific causes/grounds of termination said employee is
given the opportunity to submit their written explanation
within a reasonable period. Contained as five (5) calendar
days from receipt of the notice.

NOTE: (a) General description of the charge is not enough. (b)

Notice should specifically mention which company rule/s is
violated, what ground under Art. 288 of the Labor Code is being
charged against the employees.

2) Hearing or conference – For the employees (1) to have

opportunity to explain and clarify his defense; (2) to present
evidence in support of his defense. Employees shall have a
chance to defend himself, or with the assistance of counsel.
 3. After determining that termination is justified, the
employer shall serve the employees a written notice of
Termination indicating: (1) That the circumstances
involving the charge against the employees have been
considered; and (2) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of employment
IF SAID STEPS ARE NOT PROPERLY OBSERVED:
4. Dismissal is illegal
5. Corresponding backwages & separation pay will be
awarded, in lieu of reinstatement.

 
RIGHT TO LIFE –
1. It is not merely a right to the preservation of life but also
the security to the limbs and organs of the human body.
2. It includes the right to pursue a lawful calling or
occupation.
3. It includes the right to write or even paint his ideas as
long as he does not transgress the right of others.
4. It includes the exercise of the freedom of choice,
whether this is in the area of politics, religion, marriage,
philosophy, employment or even in the planning of his
family.
5. In general, to do and perform any lawful out or activity
which, in his judgment, will make his life worth living.
LIBERTY –
1. Right to be free not only from mere physical
restraint of his person, but also the right to be free
in the engagement of all his faculties.
2. To be free to use them in all lawful ways.
3. To live and work.
4. To pursue any livelihood.
5. To enter into all contracts which may be proper.
6. In general, to do anything provided that he does
not violate the law and the better rights of others.
PROPERTY –
1. Property refers to things which are susceptible of appropriation
and which are already processed and found in the possession of
man.
2. It includes the fruits of one’s employment.
3. It includes a perfected mining claim, on a perfect homestead, or
final judgment
NOT REGARDED AS PROPERTY RIGHTS
4. Public office
5. Certificate of public convenience.
6. License to operate Jai-alai; a lotto outlet.
7. Right under a driver’s license
8. It does not include the continuance of any doctrine or
jurisprudence
9. Right to bear arms
CASES
1. WenPhil v. NLRC 1. RP vs. Cagandahan
2. Seranno v. NLRC 2. People vs. Silverio
3. Agabon v. NLRC 3. Anonymous vs. Radam
4. Yrasuagi v. PAL 4. Himagan vs. People
5. Cheryll Santos Leus vs. St. 5. Duncan Association of
Scholastica's College Westgrove Detailman, et.al. v. Glaxo
6. First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Wellcane Phil., Inc
Cudia of the PMA vs. The 6. City of Manila vs. Laguio Jr.
Superintendent of the PMA –
7. Pimentel vs. Committee of the
7. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion Whole
8. Francisco I. Chavez vs. 8. Association of Small Land
Honorable Alberto G. Romulo Owners vs. Secretary of
9. Tomas G. Velasquez, etc., et al. Agrarian Reform
 BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASES

1. WenPhil v. NLRC – Employee was dismissed for grave misconduct and insubordination, a
just ground for termination, but employee failed to extend the right to an investigation.
(employer was ordered to indemnity P1,00.00 to employee

2. Serrano v. NLRC – The employer also violated the notice requirement but the same was not
considered a violation of Due Process. The dismissal is INEFFECTUAL and employer must
pay the backwages.

3. Agabon v. NLRC – SC said: The better rule is to abandon the Serano doctrine and to follow
WenPhil, BUT sanctions must BE STIFFER than those imposed in WenPhil.

4. Yrasuagi v. PAL – Obesity be a ground for dismissal. An employee may be dismissed if an

employee is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. .

5. Cheryll Santos Leus vs. St. Scholastica's College Westgrove – Pre-marital sexual relations
between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular
view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS.
6. First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the PMA vs. The Superintendent of the PMA –
1) Substantive grounds: (1) Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable
to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because the former’s rights have
already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity; (2) The
PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations
that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline; (3) The
power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation
for any act done by the student prior thereto; (4) A formal trial-type hearing is
not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision
can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial
evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where the
opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. (Underlining Supplied)
2) Dismissal of Cudia is affirmed

3) In connection with the Cudia case, a question surfaced as to

whether the commission on Human Rights is a Court of Justice
or a quasi-judicial agency, what was the ruling of the Supreme
Court on the said question? The Commission on Human Rights
is only a fact finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-
judicial agency. It has no power to adjudicate claims on the
merits or settle actual case or controversies. The CHR can only
investigate, receive evidence and make findings of facts
regarding alleged violations of human rights. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication.
7. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion – an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Besides, it is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will
be adjudged in the court of the State where he will be extradited.

8. Francisco I. Chavez vs. Honorable Alberto G. Romulo – (1) Right to bear arms is a
mere statutory privilege not a constitutional right; (2) licenses are not property
or property right; (3)right of the people to be arm is not a right granted by our
constitution.

9. Tomas G. Velasquez, etc., et al. v. Helen b. Hernandez – In fact in Pefianco v.

Moral, the Court had the occasion to rule that a respondent in an administrative
case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges against him.
10. Quinto v. Commission on Elections – The laws involved in this case are Sec. 13 (3rd
paragraph) of R.A No. 9369, Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 4(a) of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678 — all of which provide for the automatic resignation
of appointive officials and employees upon filing their Certificates of Candidacy.

The Court held that said laws are unconstitutional, and justified its finding of
constitutional infirmity on overbreadth, citing the following reasons: (1) “x x x The
provision pertains to all civil servants holding posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker
in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his
CoC for the 2010 elections”; (2) “x x x This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in
the political world. While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek
public elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government,
laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind.”;
11. RP vs. Cagandahan - The Court held that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
12. People vs. Silverio -A change of name is a privilege not a right. A person's first name cannot
be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

13. Anonymous vs. Radam – If the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not
ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. It may be a not-so-
ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does not give
cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother
under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual
sexual activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any
fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a document that accommodates
various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.

If the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than the
mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the
mother. In such a case, the “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of having
extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally
recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union.
Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married
persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
14. Himagan vs. People - The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The
legislative intent is to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP
charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case
against him is terminated.

15. Duncan Association of Detailman, et.al. v. Glaxo Wellcane Phil., Inc – Gloxo’s
policy prohibiting the employee for having a relationship with an employee
of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.

16. City of Manila vs. Laguio Jr. – Regarding ordinance ordering the closure of hotels
and motels. Said lawful establishment may be regulated but not prohibited from
carrying on their business.
17. Pimentel vs. Committee of the Whole – The Committee of the Whole refused to
publish the Rules of the Committee inspite of its own provisions requiring
publication. Was there violation of due process and equal protection? HELD: The
Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or
Senate. They need not be published.

18. Association of Small Land Owners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform – R.A 6657 is
constitutional. Due process was not violated. It is within the power of state to take
the regulate private property for which payment of just compensation is provided

19. Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan – The judge participation is limited to clarificatory

questions; it should be sparingly and judiciously used; the judge should stay out of
it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the
trial.

20. MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN – The “Inside Story” being a TV program, it is within the
jurisdiction of MTRCB and within its power to screen, review and examine
21. OLD CASES
A. Agustin vs. Edu, SCRA 195 – The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signal, which was ratified by the Philippine Government
under P.D. No. 207 recommended the enactment of the local
legislation of the safety signs devices.

Acting on that recommendation, Letter of Instruction No. 229 was

issued requiring the procurement by all motor vehicle owners of
reflectorized triangular early warning devices as a means of
preventing nighttime vehicular accidents.

Discuss briefly the validity or invalidity of said LOI for the standpoints
of (1) international law; (2) police power; and (3) due process.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines ratified the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, hence the said LOI was issued precisely to
be able to fulfill its obligation to install safety signs and devices and to carry out the
recommendation of the said convention. The said LOI is therefore valid.

The said Letter of Instruction is a valid exercise of police power. It is a measure

designed to insure traffic safety and to avoid traffic accident.

The said LOI did not violate due process. As mentioned, the said LOI is a valid
police power measure which is precisely for the protection of motorists.
Conjectural claims of petitioner as to number of nighttime vehicular collisions
cannot be a basis for setting aside a requirement of law that was promulgated after
a careful study by the Executive Department. The Letter of Instruction is issued in
the exercise of police power for traffic safety. Furthermore, there is nothing in
Letter of Instruction No. 229 which compels car owners to purchase the prescribed
early warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device themselves with a
little ingenuity. (Agustin v. Edu, SCRA 195)
B. Social Justice Secretary (SJS) et al. v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., etc., et al. –
Under Ordinance No. 8027 of the City of Manila, a certain area described
therein was reclassified from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from
the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

Among the businesses situated in the area are the so called “PANDACAN
TERMINALS” of the oil companies.

ISSUES:
The issues involving political law and constitutional law are the following:
1. Is ordinance No. 8027 a valid police measure?
2. Is ordinance No. 8027 violative of the equal protection of the law?
 HELD:

1. It is valid police measure: because it is intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just a particular class.

2. Ordinance 8027 is within the power of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of the City of Manila.
Any resulting burden for those affected cannot just be unjust.

3. Ordinance 8027 does not violate guarantee of equal protection of the law. The Supreme
Court said: “The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. Here, there is a
reasonable classification. We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a
catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the
surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or
explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire
or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment
of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes
the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance. The classification
is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the
area it delineated.”
C. The harbor pilots association challenged the validity of said administrative order on
the argument that it violated the harbor pilots’ right to exercise their profession and
their right to due process of law and that the said administrative order was issued
without prior notice and hearing. The PPA countered that the administrative order
was valid as it was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision
over harbor pilots under PPA’s legislative charger; and that in issuing the order as a
rule or regulation, it was performing its executive or legislative, and not a quasi-
judicial function.

Due process of law is classified into two kinds, namely, procedural due process and
substantive due process of law. Was there or was there no violation of the harbor
pilots’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?

This is actually the case of Roberto Corona, et al. v. United Harbor Pilots Association of
the Philippines, et al. (G.R. No. 111953, Dec. 12, 1997, 89 SCAD 607), reported and
discussed in pp. 82-86, Principles, Comments, and Cases in Constitutional Law II by
Rolando A. Suarez. The Supreme Court ruled that:
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the
right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a certain sense of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and
undergoing years of on-the-job training they would have a license
which they can use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by
the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance,
they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license
which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of
their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are
suddenly faced with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the
end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a
“rigid evaluation of performance” which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
“renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily
makes PPA-AO 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a
true sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
D. Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta, the Sandiganbayan - During the
prosecution of the crime allegedly committed by Luis Tabuena and
Adolfo Peralta, the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning
of defense witness and of the accused themselves. Was the active
participation of the Sandiganbayan Justices in the trial, violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process?
Yes. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due
process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with
its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. A
trial judge has the right to question witnesses with a view to satisfying
his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial
of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be
limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly
and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as
much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of
the trial. In this case, these limitations were not observed. (Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501-03, Feb. 17, 1997, 79 SCAD 582)
E. Leiden Fernandez, et al. v. NLRC, Marguerite Lhuillier and/or Agencia
Cebuana Lhuillier, - A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioner
against private respondents. During the scheduled cross-examination of one
of the complainants, the counsel of Lhuillier was absent. According to the
Labor Arbiter, the private respondents can no longer present its evidence as
it has waived its right to cross-examination. Consequently, the NLRC
reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that while private
respondents have waived their right to cross-examination, they have still the
right to present their evidence. Were private respondents deprived of due
process of law by the Labor Arbiter?

Private respondents were not deprived of due process of law for they were
able to file their respective position papers and supporting documents all of
which were duly considered by the Labor Arbiter. The holding of an
adversarial trial is not a matter of right but discretionary on the part of the
Labor Arbiter. The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter have authority under the
Labor Code to decide the case on the basis of position papers and supporting
documents. (Leiden Fernandez, et al. v. NLRC, Marguerite Lhuillier and/or
Agencia Cebuana Lhuillier, G.R. No. 105892, Jan. 28, 1998, 90 SCAD 793)
F. Almonte v. Vasquez – A subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with its investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB (Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau) has been illegally disbursed. The petitioner moved to quash the
said subpoena on the issue, among others, that it violates the right to equal
protection of the law. Petitioner complained that “in all fora and tribunals,” verified
complaints and sworn statements are necessary whereas in proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman, anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. Is this
a violation of the equal protection clause?

The Supreme Court ruled that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to equal
protection of law since in the first place the procedure of the proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman is provided in the Constitution itself. Second, it is apparent
that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in any manner,” the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrong-doings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them. (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995, 61 SCAD
274)
Sec.2 (SEARCH and SEIZURE)

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
Who are protected under Section 2? All persons, including aliens are protected
under Sec. 2, whether accused of a crime or not (Moncado v. People’s Court, 80
Phil. 1). Artificial persons, like corporations, are also protected but they may be
required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the
exercise of the police power or the power of taxation. (Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383)
What is protected by the phrase “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature”? It is a protection of (1) the sanctity and privacy of a
person himself; and of (2) the inviolability of a person’s home and his
possessions.
The second portion of the right protected by Sec. 2 is as follows: “No search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.” Is this rule absolute? No. There are exceptions to this rule (People
v. Rosa Aruta, etc., G.R. No. 120915, 93 SCAD 387, April 13, 1998) and they
are as follows:

1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d. “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3) Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4) Consented warrantless search;
5) Customs search;
6) Stop and frisk; and
7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
NOTE: The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law
enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionality guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essential
requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances which should lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is
in the place to be searched. (People v. Rosa Aruta, supra)
Who determines Probable cause? Distinguish.
PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD A PERSON PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE A
FOR TRIAL WARRANT OF ARREST

Probable cause to hold a person for trial The determination of probable cause
refers to the finding of the investigating to issue a warrant of arrest is a
prosecutor after the conduct of a judicial function. A judge cannot be
preliminary investigation, that there is compelled to issue a warrant of
sufficient ground to hold a well- arrest if he or she believes honestly
founded belief that a crime has been that there is no probable cause for
committed and that the respondent is doing so. (People v. Court of Appeals,
probably guilty thereof and should be G.R. No. 126008, Jan. 21, 1999, 102
held for trial. SCAD 375)

If there is such finding, the investigating

prosecutor files the corresponding
Search warrant and the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Distinguish.
BEFORE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
OF ARREST WARRANT

PROBABLE CAUSE: The facts and PROBABLE CAUSE: Facts and

circumstances which would lead a circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has man to believe (1) that an offense
been committed. has been committed and (2) that the
objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
Procedure to be observed in enforcing search and seizure order:

1. The search must be done in the presence of the occupants. In the absence of
occupants, two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality may be called to witness the search.

2. The detailed receipt of inventory must be given to the lawful occupant.

3. The inventory receipt must be certified under oath by any of the members of the
raiding team.

4. PP vs. Huang Zhen Hua & Jogy Lee - Unannounced intrusion into the premises is
permissible in the following instances:
a) The party refuses to open, upon demand
b) The party already knew of the identity of the officers & their authority
c) The officers honestly believe that there is imminent peril of the life and limb
d) The party is aware of the presence of someone outside.
 
 Evidence shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door before entering the
condominium unit. The police did not break open the door. The SC did not believe that there
was a frame-up.

PP vs. Feliciano Galvante vs. Hon. Orlando Casimiro

a) Complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offence

b) It is not penalized under RPC or any special law
c) The remedy of petitioner against warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil under
Art. 32 in relation to Art. 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code
d) What the RPC punishes are:

a. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained
b. Searching domicile without witnesses.

WHO vs. Aquino – Bar Q - The court should follow the action of the political branch and
should not embarrass the latter by assuming antagonistic jurisdiction
 
Feliciano Galvante v. Hon. Orlando Casimiro, etc., et al.

1) The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or any other special law.

2) What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:

a. Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any
other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period of prison
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or
use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
b. Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their
default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
WHO vs. Aquino – The Court issued a search and seizure of the personal effects contained
in several crates of an official of the World Health Organization (WHO), allegedly for the
reason that it contained contraband items. The WHO officials protested and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs advised the court that the WHO official concerned has diplomatic
immunity. This was supported by the Solicitor General. The RTC denied the motion. Decide.
The diplomatic immunity of World Health Organization was sustained. The Supreme
Court justified its decision in this manner: “As a matter of state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, the Philippine government adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 20). It is a recognized principle of
international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity
is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination
by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government. It is the duty of the
court to accept the claim of the immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his direction.”
(Diplomatic immunity was sustained in WHO v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]. The same
ruling was reached in Lasco, et al. v. UNRFNC, etc., G.R. No. 109095, Feb. 23, 1995.
Can a warrant of arrest be issued by administrative agencies of the
government? This is allowed only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of a violation of law, such as an order of deportation, or an order of
contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution.
(Gatchalian v. Board of Commissions, 197 SCRA 854). In this connection, it was
ruled that the arrest contemplated by Sec. 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940,
refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying an order for deportation and not
the arrest prior to the proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in
the country (Djumantan v. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746, 58 SCAD 612; Moreno v.
Vivo, 20 SCRA 562). Hence, the order of deportation is purely administrative. Its
purpose is merely to return the alien to his country for violating the conditions
of the local state.

NOTE: The Secretary of Labor not being a judge, may no longer issue a search
or arrest warrants.
People v. Huang Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee, G.R. No. 139301,
September 29, 2004

1) Reports ware received by PARAC (Public Assistance and

Reaction Against Crime), that the accused are engaged in
drug trafficking

2) Authorities secured search warrant. And seized two kilos of

shabu, paraphernalia machines and tools.

3) Accused claims that there are certain irregularities in the

issuance & implementation of search warrant (i.e. Police
operators failed to show search warrant; the policeman
gained entry by force
HELD:

There is no violation. Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible in the

following instances:

1. A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon

demand, to open it;

2. When such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers
and of their authority and persons;

3. When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril
of the life or limb; and

4. When those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because,
for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity
which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of
evidence is being attempted.
The appellant’s defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a
common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense
cannot and should not always be considered as contrived,
nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be
concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers are, after all,
presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their
official functions, in the absence of clear and convincing proof
to the contrary, or that they are motivated by ill-will.
Sec.3 (Privacy of Communication and Correspondence)

“(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except

upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

Is the use of a telephone extension in order to be able to listen to a private

conversation prohibited as a tap? The use of a telephone extension line cannot be
considered as tapping because the extension line is installed not for the purpose of
deliberately tapping the line but is, an ordinary office or home use, hence, there is
no violation of the privacy of conversation and correspondence.

The said letters became part of the judicial record and have become a matter of
concern for the entire Court (In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382). It is not
covered by the constitutional guarantee.
In a criminal prosecution for murder, the prosecution presented as witness, an employee of the
Manila Hotel who produced in court a videotape recording showing the heated exchange
between the accused and the victim that took place at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes
before the killing. The accused objects to the admission of the videotape recording on the ground
that it was taken without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his right to privacy and Anti-
Wiretapping Law. Resolve the objection with reasons. The objections to the admission of the
videotape is not correct. REASON: the exchange of heated words between the accused and the
victim that took place at the lobby of the hotel was not private. What is prohibited is the
overhearing, intercepting and recording of private conversations. (R.A. No.4200)

Use of telephone extension is not prohibited as a tap.

Hello Garci Tape

In Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information, et al., (1) The act
complained of has already been accomplished. In fact, the said tapes have already been played
and heard by the members; (2) The reports on the “Hello Garci” inquiry, have already been
completed and submitted to the House in plenary; (3) Hence, the petition is already moot and
academic.
Sec.4 (Freedom of Speech and of the Press)
 
“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.”

Four (4) aspects of the Freedom of the Press

1) Prior restraint – restrictions or conditions in advance of actual publication or
dissemination (i.e. This means the exercise of the freedom depends on the prior
approval of the government, submission of speech before approval, clearance before
publication).
2) Freedom from subsequent punishment- this means freedom from punishment as a
consequence of or in connection with a speech, utterance or writing.
3) Freedom of access to information- (Sec. 7, Art III)
4) Freedom of circulation- Dissemination of what has been written, whether this refers to
expression of view, thoughts, ideas, or information which complements the larger right
of the association and expression.
3 Standards/Tests to be used to determine the liability of a person for ideas expressed
by him:

a) Clear and present danger- substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished.

b) Dangerous tendency rule- under this rule, a person can be punished for words
uttered or for ideas expressed which create a dangerous tendency or which will
cause or bring about a substantive evil which the State has a right to prevent.
(PP v. Perez)

c) Balancing of interest rule- a principle which requires a Court to consider the

circumstances in each particular case, and later, it shall settle the issue of which
right demands greater protection --- the right of privacy as asserted by
respondent, or the freedom of expression as invoked by petitioner, or as
between the exercise of expression and the need to protect national security,
which shall preferred. (i.e. Marcos v. Manglapus)
ILLUSTRATION: OLD CASES & NEW CASES

OLD CASES:

1. PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO, 80 PHIL. 71 — In Primicias v. Fugoso, the refusal of Mayor Fugoso to

allow the Nacionalista Party to hold a meeting at Plaza Miranda was based on his fears that
speeches may likely result in some violence considering the tension and the bitterness of the
losing candidates as well as their leaders and followers. The Supreme Court ruled against the
claim of Mayor Fugoso and said that the fact that the speech is likely to result in some
violence or in the destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be probability of serious injury to the State. Even imminent danger cannot justify resort to
prohibition of those functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is
relatively serious. (Primicias v. Fugoso, citing Whitney v. California, 276 U.S. 357)

2. NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS, 31 SCRA 730 — In Navarro v. Villegas, an application for a permit to

hold a rally at Plaza Miranda was filed by certain student groups. Mayor Antonio Villegas
refused to issue a permit but offered an alternative place. His refusal is based on his fear that a
public disorder may ensue as a result of speeches to be delivered during the meeting. Unlike
in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Supreme Court sustained Mayor Villegas
3. REYES V. BAGATSING, 125 SCRA 553 — A similar application for issuance of a
permit to hold a rally was also filed in Reyes v. Bagatsing. Unacted upon, Justice
JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to compel the
issuance of a permit to hold a rally at the Luneta, and thereafter, to march to the
U.S. Embassy. Like in the two cases aforementioned, Mayor Bagatsing denied the
issuance of the permit on account of his fear that subversive elements may
infiltrate the meeting. Instead, he suggested another place like Rizal Coliseum.
During the hearing of the said case, another argument was invoked to the effect
that the rally will be a violation of a City Ordinance which requires the receiving
state to protect foreign embassies. The Supreme Court ruled that the denial of the
permit was not valid there being no clear and present danger that might arise on
account of the meeting. The use of public streets could not be prohibited by the
authorities. What they can do is only to regulate the proper use of the streets. The
issue regarding Ordinance No. 7295 was not passed upon there being no proof
that the rally will be held within five hundred feet of the U.S. Embassy.
NEW CASES

BAYAN KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP) V. EDUARDO ERMITA,

ET AL

FACTS:

In the last quarter of year 2005, there were massive rallies against President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration. It was at this time when Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita issued a policy via press release. The policy pertains to the strict implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 also known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985, and it provides for
the strict enforcement of “no permit no rally policy,” and arrest of all persons violating the laws
of the land, and dispersal of unlawful mass actions.

ISSUE:

1. Is B.P. Blg. 880 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the constitutionally
guaranteed right to peaceful assembly?

2. Is the CPR Policy (Calibrated Preemptive Response) legal?

HELD:

1. B.P. Blg. 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL. REASON: It does not curtail or unduly

restrict freedom; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time,
place and manner of assemblies.

2. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid
because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present
danger” standard.

3. CPR Policy is illegal. REASON: The maximum tolerance policy mandated

by B.P. Blg. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as
maximum tolerance, and is illegal if it means something else. Therefore,
what should be followed is MAXIMUM TOLERANCE (the highest degree
of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities
shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.”)
OTHER RULINGS OF SC IN SAID CASE:

1. If no action on the application – However, there is need to address the situation adverted
to by petitioners where Mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the
police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately
dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum
tolerance, rallyists who can show the application to the police, rally per application
without the need to show the permit (grant of the permit being then presumed under the
law)
2. Burden of Authorities – Is to show that there has been a denial of the application, in
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum
tolerance prescribed by the law.
3. To safeguard liberty – Supreme Court gave local governments a deadline of 30 days
within which to designate specific freedom parks per B.P. Blg. 880.
4. All parks and municipal plazas of municipality or city – Shall in effect be deemed
freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly
therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the Mayor’s office
to allow proper coordination and order activities
IBP VS. ATIENZA – The National President of IBP requested for a permit to
rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006, from 2:30 P.M. to
5:30 P.M. Mayor Joselito Atienza issued a permit to hold a rally on said date,
but he indicated that the rally be held in Plaza Miranda. IBP claims that it is
contrary to the Public Assembly Act, hence, contrary to freedom of
expression and public assembly. HELD: Mayor Atienza committed a grave
abuse of discretion for failure to inform IBP immediately; That it should have
been given the opportunity to be heard first on the Mayor’s alleged
perception of imminent danger of substantive evil.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS – According to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan –

Verily, in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential
prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily
exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Sec.5 (Freedom of Religion)

“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

Definition

a. In a broad sense, religion includes any form of belief in regard to the relation of
human beings to some supernatural powers, or as defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 Phil.
201), it is “a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
creator.” Persons holding the same religious beliefs are generally associated in groups
which may or may not be organized as corporations.

b. In a more specific or restricted sense, religion is a system of belief, or worship, or

philosophy not necessarily in the existence of God, or power of a more superior
being, but in a philosophy or way of life detached from any reverence or obedience
to God.
Two aspects of Religious Freedom:

a. Freedom to believe – this is absolute

b. Freedom to act on one’s belief – Not absolute. It may be regulated if

it clashes with accepted norms of social behavior, established order
and decency. 

Three principal parts

c. First Part: Non-establishment clause (First Sentence, Sec. 5, Art. III)

d. Second Part: Free exercise clause (Second Sentence, Sec. 5, Art. III)

e. Third Part: Non-religious test clause (Third Sentence, Sec. 5, Art. III)
Examples:
a) First Part: non-establishment clause – Neither the State nor the Federal Government can set-
up a church; nor pass laws which recognize one religion, all religion, or prefer one religion
or another or force or influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.

The clause” requires the State to be neutral. (Everson v. Board of Education)

b) Second Part: Free exercise clause – A person has the right to worship according to the
dictates of his conscience, or not to worship Him at all. to live as he believes he ought to live.

This is liberty of conscience. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54)

c) Third Part: Non-religiois text clause – No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.

That means that a person or citizen may exercise civil right (i.e., the right to acquire
property) or a political right (i.e., the right to vote or hold particular religious beliefs) (Pamil
v. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413)
OLD CASE:

Engel vs. Vitale – A student was expelled because he refused to recite the
prayer “Almighty God”, we acknowledge our dependence upon thee and
beg the blessings upon us, etc.”

HELD: Expulsion is not valid. Reason: It is not part of the business of

government to compose official prayer for any group of individuals.
Religious freedom even guarantees the right of a person not to believe in
God.

Gerona vs. Secretary of Education –The flag salute Law required

compulsory participation by public school students. HELD: The flag is
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag therefore does not
involve any religious ceremony.
Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu – reversed the
ruling of Gerona.

HELD:
1. Forcing a religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate
in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive
to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

2. What petitioners seek is only an exception from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools were they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the acts,
sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a
vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of “patriotism, respect for
human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship and moral and spiritual values.”
U.S. CASES

West Virginia Board of Education vs. Barnette – Those who refused to participate in
a flag ceremony, to recite an oath of allegiance and to salute the American flag
while it was being raised, were subject to expulsion until readmitted upon
compliance. Jehovah’s witnesses protested. HELD: U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
same “Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unity of the graveyard.”

PHILIPPINE CASES

Jehovah’s request to hold a meeting in the plaza near the Roman Catholic Church.
They were allowed to use only the northwestern part of the plaza. The Jehovah’s
claim that it is a violation of the freedom of speech, assembly and religious worship.
HELD: The said refusal is valid. Reasons: The authorities deemed it better and wise
in the name of public order to deny the permit especially so because the Johovah’s
witnesses advocated tenets which are derogatory to those of the Catholic Church.
DISSEMINATION OF ONE’S BELIEFS

American Bible Society vs. City of Manila – Sale or peddling by a religious organization
of religious literature and other materials from house to house conducted not for the
purpose of profit. Imposition of license or permit fees on such sale or peddling is an
impairment of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance – Imposition of a tax on the sale of religious materials.
This is not prohibited.

Marsh vs. Alabama – a woman who distributed religious literature in the premises of a
privately-owned town despite prohibitions of the town authorities. HELD: complaint of
trespassing against said woman was not upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court,. Reasons: (1)
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner for his
advantage opens up his property for use by the public in general; the more his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. (2)
The public has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner
that the channel of communication remains free.
NEW PHILIPPINE CASES:

Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad S. Escritor – Soledad S. Escritor, court interpreter,

lived with a man, not her husband, and out of her live-in arrangement with said
man, they had a child. She was charged with “disgraceful and immoral
conduct”. She claims that her conjugal arrangement has the approval of her
congregation, claiming that she executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
after living together for ten years. She pleaded for exemption.

HELD: (1) Said conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized; (2) The benevolent
neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance; (3) Invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to higher sovereignty.
Dominador Taruc, et. al., vs. Bishop Perfirio Dela Cruz – Petitioners,
members of Philippine Independent Church, clamored for the transfer of B
to another parish. Bishop Cruz denied the said request and declared their
expulsion/excommunication from their church. Petitioners filed complaint
for damages with injunction against Bishop Cruz.

HELD: The courts cannot exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of discretionary and official functions.

OLD CASES (PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE):

In Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660 [1919]) – A law which
created reservations for Mangyan Tribes was challenged as a deprivation of
liberty but the law was justified by general welfare and public interest.
In Villavicencio vs. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 780, 787) – The Supreme Court granted a writ of
habeas corpus and ordered the return to Manila of prostitutes who were shipped to Davao
on the ground that it can only assist in retaining “a government of laws, and not of men.”

In Caunca vs. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) – The Supreme Court sustained petitioner’s liberty of
abode and ruled that her detention was not constitutional. The claim of the employment
agency that it has advanced some amounts of money to a prospective employee was
rejected. The court nevertheless sustained that said agency has absolutely no power to
curtail the freedom of the maid even if she has not yet paid the amount advanced.

In Salonga vs. Hermoso (17 SCRA 121, April 25, 1980) – A petition for mandamus was filed
to compel the issuance of a permit to travel abroad. Before the case could be heard,
however, the permit was issued and the case became moot and academic. The pertinent
portion of Chief Justice Enrique Fernando’s statement is as follows: “x x x in view of the
likelihood that in the future, this Court may be faced again with a situation like the present
which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel
Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to
inconvenience or annoyance.”
Sec.6 (Liberty of Abode, Travel)

“The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law”.

SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS – Silverio was criminally charged for violating
the Securities Act. He posted bail. Two (2) years after the filing of information, the
people moved to cancel Silverio’s passport because he went abroad several times
without the court’s permission, resulting in postponements of arraignment the trial
court ordered the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to cancel Silverio’s passport
and for the Commission on Immigration (CID) to prevent him from leaving the
country, which the Court of Appeals (CA) granted. Silverio appealed. HELD:
Holding/preventing Siverio’s departure is a valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
REMEDY: Habeas Corpus

CASES:

(1) Villavicencio vs. Lukban

(2) Caunca vs. Salazar (82 Phil. 851)

(3) Salonga vs. Hermoso (17 SCRA 121, April 25, 1980)

(4) Marcos vs. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668 [1989])

DENIAL OF THE REQUEST OR DEMAND OF THE MARCOSES – Decided not only

on the basis of Section 6, Article III, but also on the basis of other principles and
considerations which calls for a balancing of the general welfare of the people.
Rationale by the Supreme Court by Justice Irene R. Cortes, Justice Marcela B. Fernan,
et al.

1. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-
emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are
perceived as apt to become serious The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though
still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious

2. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead
to total economic collapse.

“To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive
action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of
government. The preservation of the State — the fruition of the people’s sovereignty — is
an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibil ity

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic
collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.”
Sec.7 (Right to Information)

“The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.”

TWO RIGHTS – (1) Right to information on matters of public concern; and (2) the right
to access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development. They shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

“PEOPLE” refers to the citizens of the Philippines but this is without prejudice to the right
of aliens to have access to records of cases where they are involved. In any case, said
right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
REMEDY of a person who is unlawfully denied the right to information, or the right to access
to official records
1. Petition for mandamus
2. Civil action for damages

Does the two (2) rights, as aforementioned, carry with at the right to compel the public
officer in custody of the record to prepare the same? The person requesting the data has to
prepare it, and as long as the data are open and made available to the public, this is sufficient
compliance with the law.

Hello Garci – In case of conflict between the right of information (Sec.7) and the right of
privacy (Sec.7) which prevails? The right to information should prevail. REASON: It is
already the right of the sovereign people which is at stake. This right, including the right of
the people to know the truth, overwhelms the argument that invokes the right the right of
privacy.

Besides, it is the right of the Filipino people to be liberated from the bondage of ignorance and
fear, an interest higher than the mere alleged right of privacy which benefits only one or a
few
Sec.8 (Right of Association)

“The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.”

the right is part and parcel of the freedom of expression and assembly, hence, it
is subject to limitations imposed by law and to the dominant police power of
the state

Does the right of government employees to organize may include the right to
form unions or associations and the right to strike?

Majority View – Said employees can organize and form unions or associations
but it does not include the right to strike and to engage in similar activities.
Dissenting Opinion:

1. Justice Isagani Cruz who said – (1)The fact that they belong to the civil service has
not deprived them of their freedom of expression; (2) It would be ridiculous to
even suggest that by accepting public employment, the members of the civil
service automatically and impliedly renounce this basic liberty; (3) This freedom
can at best be regulated only but never completely withdrawn.”

2. Justice Hugo Gutierrez who said – employees have freedom to speak when they
are demeaned by low salaries and inattention to their needs; (2) Their freedom of
speak far outweighs conventional adherence to orthodox service rules on proper
conduct and behavior.”

GESITE VS. COURT OF APPEALS – 800 teachers assembled in front of the

Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) and they defied the order of
Secretary Isidro Cariño to return to work within 24 hours. HELD: They have the
right to assemble peacefully but it does not include the right to strike.
Sec.9 (Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation)

“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”

What may be subject of expropriation?

1. Any private property, subject to payment of Just Compensation (JC).

2. Franchise, if it is for public good and there is genuine necessity.

3. Services are considered property which may be subject of expropriation (the

Bureau of Telecommunications may demand interconnections between the
Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that it could make use of
the lines and facilities of PLDT).

4. Real properties may, be subjected to an easement of right of way to just

compensation as determined by the court.
Can properties of the church be expropriation? Yes, based on the
principle that the power of eminent domain. If the government is
reluctant, it is not because it cannot do so but only because of
deference to the principle of separation of church and State.

Is everything compensable? No. It may not be compensable if the

taking is justified under the police power.
COMPENSABLE AN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND
THEREFORE NON-COMPENSABLE

1. Low standing and take-off flights 1. Construction of a new road under

which made the residential area the general welfare clause which
unlivable. (Griggs v. Allegheny limited one’s access to the national
Country, 369, U.S. 84 [1962]) road. (Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 786731, March 18, 1991)
2. Flight of planes from a nearby military 2. Ordering a subdivision to open a gate to
airport over plaintiff’s property which a road within the subdivision.
ruined his chicken farm. (U.S. v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 [1946])

3. Repeated firing of guns over a piece of 3. Owners whose coconut trees were
land. (Portsmouth Harbor Land and ordered cut down to prevent the further
Hotel Co. v. U.S. 327 [1922]) spread of infection.

4. Construction of a dam which 4. A building on the verge of collapse may

permanently indicated a farmland and
be ordered demolished for the sake of
the owner is prevented from the land.
public safety. In the light of the current
(U.S. v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 445)
flood and calamity in many parts of
the country, the houses and structures
constructed in “danger areas,” may also
Reason why the owners of the properties in said instances are not entitled to
compensation – There is a justified and valid exercise of police power in said
instances, for they are needed to (1) to protect public safety; (2) to serve and
improve general welfare; (3) even if there are losses that are sustained, the
same are in the nature of damnum absque injuria; and (4) In police power,
property is taken because it is a public/nuisance, being obnoxious to society,
hence, they should be destroyed.

Just Compensation – The just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing appropriated suffer by reason of the appropriation

NOTE: Compensation must not only be fair to the owner but also to the
appropriation. Therefore, if the compensation is in excess of the full and
complete equivalent of the loss sustained – it is prejudicial to the public,
hence,, it will not satisfy the requirements of just compensation.
Can immediate possession of a property subject of condemnation or
expropriation proceeding be given to the government before compensation is
given to the owner? Before, payment of compensation is required prior to
deprivation of property (Art. 249 of the Old Civil Code; Sec. 247 of the Code of
Civil Procedure). Now, immediate possession of the property subject of
condemnation or expropriation proceeding may be given to the government
even before the financial ascertainment of just compensation and even before
just compensation is given to any plaintiff.

Is a hearing required to determine provisional value? The prevailing

jurisprudence is that a hearing is not required to determine provisional value it
being sufficient that the owner of the property sought to be condemned is
notified of the condemnation proceeding (National Power Corporation v. Judge
Jocoson, G.R. No. 94193-99, Feb. 25, 1992). This ruling departed from the
reasoning expressed in Tuason v. Court of Appeals (L-18128, Dec. 26, 1961).
1. Said ruling departed from the remaining expressed in Tuason vs. Court
of Appeals.

2. I said: “The said case of Tuason v. Court of Appeals is a case which

although decided under the 1935 Constitution, is respectfully submitted
to be more in line with the concept of due process even under the 1987
Constitution. REASON: Both under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitution, “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.” The guarantee has not changed. To say
therefore that a hearing is not required and what is required is mere
notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned, amounts to
confiscation of one’s property without due process, especially so that
from the time of such condemnation, the said owner has already been
disturbed of the rights accruing from his ownership and possession.
Anyone in the shoes of an owner of a condemned property wants to be
paid. To be merely assured of just compensation, conscious of the reality
attendant to delays of court proceedings, compounds the problem of
being already disturbed and deprived of his rights. His peace of mind,
which is priceless, is saddled with uncertainties and anxieties.

“Public use,” as it is used in Sec. 9, may offer consolation to some but not
to all, for others may not be situated under the same conditions and
circumstances. One, for instance, who has no other wealth to lean on; or
one who is bedridden waiting for his death and saddled with huge
obligations and expenses, are undoubtedly in dire need to be paid at once.
This is more in keeping with the realities of life than mere legal niceties.
Determination of just compensation:
During the Martial Law Regime, IS -
Either the sworn evaluation made
President Ferdinand E. Marcos by the owner; or
promulgated several decrees The official assessment thereof,
providing that the basis of just whichever was lower (NHA v.
compensation for property Reyes, 123 SCRA 245)

After the Edsa Revolution and after Said decrees where ivalidated by the
the new Constitution in 198 Supreme Court In EPZA v. Dulay
(G.R. No. 59603 April 29, 1987)
RULING IN EPZA v. DULAY Is Impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives
The method of ascertaining
under the aforecited decrees
REASONS:

1. It tends to render this court inutile in a matter which under the

Constitution is reserved to it for final determination;

2. Following the said decrees, the court’s task is relegated to simply

stating the lower value as declared by the owner or the assessor;

3. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to

appoint Commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court;

4. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in what is

just or fair.
QUESTIONS:

When is the property subject of expropriation assessed? At the time of the taking
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.

When is compensation fixed? At the time the property is taken. If the

expropriating authority chooses not to take possession of the property until after
judgment is rendered, the moment of taking, for purposes of fixing compensation,
is not the filing of the condemnation suit but the date of judgment

When does taking take place? It takes place when the owner of the property is
ousted therefrom and deprived of its beneficial use. There is taking when the
condemnor entered and occupied the property and such entrance and occupation
is for a permanent or indefinite period.
 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, ET. AL. VS.
ANGELES URGELLO TONGOY, ET. AL.,

FACTS: Two (2) Lots were expropriated by the government to expand Lahug Airport
in Cebu City. The trial court ruled in favor of the government. The respondent filed
an appeal. During the appeal, the parties had a verbal compromise agreement (the
owners agreed to withdraw their appeal in consideration of a commitment that there
is an expansion plan). This did not, however materialize because ATO (Air
Transportation Office) decided to move its operations to the Mactan Airbase, and to
lease out the area, the Lahug Airport.

Respondents sought to repurchase the said properties from the government. but ATO
refused to sell the said lots, on the ground that it still needs the property for its
operations.

Respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and reconveyance of

ownership of properties with damages.
ATO failed to present testimonial/documentary evidence, and to cross-
examine the witness of respondents,

RTC ordered ATO to restore possession and ownership and to remove all
improvements therein upon reimbursement of the just compensation paid
to the respondents at the time of expropriation.

ISSUE: Can owners of expropriated properties repurchase the same on the

basis of the alleged oral compromise agreement

HELD: (1) The previous owners were able to prove the commitment of the
government to allow them to repurchase the land; (2) That the
expropriated properties may be recovered by the owners once the airport
is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness to the respondent
testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed to their previous owners.
Sec.10 (No Law Impairing the obligation of Contracts shall be passed)

“No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”

A law impairs a contract when it enlarges, abridges, or in any manner change the
intentions of the parties and this is true even if the change is done indirectly.

Parties have no vested right in particular remedies or modes of procedure – They

are made in the exercise of the police power of the State.

Considerations prevail over contracts

Demands of police power arising from social justice, general welfare, public
health, safety, amelioration of labor conditions. Reason: Salus Populi Est Suprema
Lex,

1. Republic Act No. 6657,

2. Presidential Decree No. 27,
 Automatic conversion from agricultural share to agricultural leasehold was
made applicable to sugarland tenants.

Franchises

Compulsory arbitration in certain cases

Batangas CATV Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals

Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 “terminating all franchises, permits or
certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local
governments.”Now“onlypersons/associations/partnerships/corporations or
cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the
NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render
cable television service within a service area.”
Sec.11 (Free Access to Courts & Quasi-judicial Bodies & Adequate Legal Assistance)

“Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.”

This is a collective primary responsibility of all lawyers, judges, prosecutors, legislators,

and executives in government including all its employees

Examples of existing laws that alleviate the disadvantages caused by poverty.

a) Free transcript of stenographic notes

b) A litigant to prosecute his action or defense as an indigent
c) Republic Act No. 7438 (April 27, 1992), “any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel”
d) Counsel de officio

PAUPER – is a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense.

INDIGENT – He has no money or property sufficient and available for food/shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
Sec.12 (Right to Remain Silent and to have Competent & Independent counsel)

“Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law
shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.”

May all the rights in Section 12 be waived? No. Only the right to remain silent & to be assisted
by counsel can be waived, and in case they are waived, the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

When can the right of the accused be invoked? From the time the person is taken into custody
and asked incriminating question.
Meaning of the right to be informed of one’s right – it is not enough that a
police officer will just repeat to the person under investigation the provision
of the Constitution. He must also explain the effect in practical terms.

Case of Extrajudicial confession given before the police who investigated the
case and Atty. Parawan. A Barangay Captain.

HELD: Atty. Parawan is not an independent counsel. The Constitution

requires an independent and competent counsel who can effectively
undertake the client’s defense without an intervening conflict of interest.

A person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question.
More than this, his silence may not be used against him.
When are the rights under Sec. 12 not available?

Answer: They are not available before investigators become involved.  In the following
cases, Section 12 does not apply.

1) Section 12 does not apply to admissions made during an investigation conducted by

officials of the Philippine Air Lines (People vs. Judge Ayson, G.R. 85215, July 7, 1989)

2) Section 12 does not apply to admission or confession made to a private individual

(People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985)

3) Section 12 does not apply to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is
not a law enforcement officer. (Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 53 SCAD 174, 294 SCRA
175 [1994])

4) Section 12 does not apply to a person who voluntarily surrenders to the police and
voluntarily admits the killing. In this case, it cannot be considered that the
surrenderee is already under investigation. (People vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373, 378-
379 [1981])
EXAMPLES

Q – At what stage shall E have the right to counsel?

A – E shall have the right to counsel from the moment the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to illicit information or confession or
admission. This right however, can be waived but the said waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, 162
SCRA 642 [1988])

Q – Supposed E is alone at the time he was in the police precinct and he is

requested to have a reenactment of how the crime was committed. Is he
entitled to the assistance of a lawyer?

A – Yes. REASON: Reenactment amounts to disclosure of incriminatory facts,

hence, it is covered by the inhibition in Sec. 12.
Q – Are the constitutional rights of Hadji Pangatanga under Section 12
properly conveyed?

A – The facts did not state that the explanation of the constitutional
rights mentioned in Sec. 12, Art. III, were explained to Hadji
Pangatanga and made in a language understood by Hadji. If Hadji
Pangatanga who is a Tausog does not speak or understand Tagalog or
Pilipino, it is submitted that the explanation of the said constitutional
rights were not properly conveyed, and therefore, not admissible
(People v. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1, Oct. 1, 1985). If Hadji Pangatanga
understands Tagalog or Pilipino (for instance, he has been a resident of
Quiapo, Manila for a long period of time), and the explanation were
effectively conveyed to him in a language which he understands, it is
submitted that the constitutional rights were properly conveyed to him .
Q – A is under investigation by B, a police investigator in the Police
Precinct. B told A: “Do you have a lawyer who can assist you in this
investigation?” A answered: “Wala po, pwede po bang mabigyan
niyo na lang ako at handa po naman ako na magbayad ng
kaukulang pera para sa kanyang serbisyo?” B said: “I will tell Atty. X
who has a law office across the street if he can assist you.” A agreed
and made no objection. Atty. X came up and assisted A. Thereafter, A
subscribed to the truth of his statement before the swearing officer.
Is Atty. X who was provided by B deemed engaged by A?

A – Yes. REASON: A agreed to engage the services of Atty. X and he,

in fact, subscribed to the truth of his statement.
Q – A had no counsel while giving his statement because Atty. X whom he
called by telephone encountered traffic along Sucat Road. The
interrogation was about to end when Atty. X arrived. Atty. X immediately
requested the police investigator to allow him to talk to A. He discussed
with A regarding the statements he already made. Thereafter, A signed the
statement. Is the constitutional requirement about the presence of counsel
complied with?

A – It was considered as substantial compliance in the case of Estacio v.

Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 75362, March 6, 1990) but in subsequent cases,
involving a similar situation, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to
counsel was a right to effective counsel from the first moment of
questioning and all throughout. (People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 91535, Sept.
2, 1992)
SEC. 13 (Right to Bail)

“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”

Rule, as simplified – All persons shall before conviction, be bailable by

sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong.

Rationale – An accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is proven beyond

reasonable doubt by final judgment. The right to bail gives the accused not
only an opportunity to obtain provisional liberty but also the chance to
prepare for trial while continuing his usual work or employment.
Basic principles of the right to bail

1. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.

2. Excessive bail shall not be required.

3. Factors to consider
a) Ability to post bail;
b) Nature of the offense;
c) Penalty imposed by law;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
e) Health of the accused;
f) Strength of the evidence;
g) Probability of appearing for trial;
h) Prior forfeiture of bonds;
i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive when he was arrested; and
j) The fact that the accused was under bond in other cases.
Responsibility of Sureties – Sureties become in law the jailers of their principal.
Hence, it is responsible to keep the accused under its surveillance, to see to it
that the accused does not live our country so he will not be beyond the reach of
court orders and processes.

Conditions of the Bail

A. Before conviction – The accused shall answer the complaint or information

in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for trial.

B. After conviction – The accused will surrender himself in execution of the

judgment that the appellate court may render.

C. In case of new trial – The accused will appear in court to which it may be
remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof.
Is posting bail a matter of right? From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by officers of the law, he can claim his right to bail and he
retains this right unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

When is bail available? Available in criminal proceedings and not in administrative

proceedings such as a deportation proceeding. This is discretionary on the part of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

When accused is convicted by the trial court, the grant of bail is the discretion of the
court

Posting of a bail bond – When this is posted, the accused is estopped from
questioning the validity of his arrest.
When is bail a matter of right? When is it a matter of discretion?

1. Before and after conviction by the 1. Upon conviction by the RTC of

MTC, in MTC in Cities and MCTC. an offense not punishable by
It is a matter of right for all death, reclusion perpetua or life
persons in custody to be admitted
imprisonment. The accused may
to bail with sufficient sureties, or
be granted the right to bail upon
to be released on recognizance
the discretion of the court
2. Before conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. It is a matter of
right for all persons in custody to
be admitted to bail, with sufficient
sureties, or to be released on
recognizance.
Anita Esteban vs. Hon. Reynaldo A. Alhambra

1. Petitioner posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for the temporary liberty of
his brother in law.

2. While out on bail, Gerardo Esteban(his brother-in-law) was charged with another
crime for which he was arrested and detained.

3. Fed up, petitioner refused to post another bail. Instead, she applied for the
cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four (4) cases. She said she is
terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is in jail.

4. The same was denied. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner
alleged the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: As far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the money
of the accused, hence it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that may be
imposed by the court.
When is the right to bail a matter of discretion? Section 5, Rule 11a answer this.

“Sec. 5, when discretionary- Upon the conviction by the Regional trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court on application may admit
the accused to bail.

The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.” –x x x x–

Right to bail – Available only in criminal proceedings, not in administrative proceedings

Difference between Reclusion Perpetua and Life Imprisonment .

  LIFE IMPRISONMENT RECLUSION PERPETUA

1. Life imprisonment is indefinite
2. Life imprisonment is a penalty
imposed by special laws.
3. Life imprisonment does not carry
accessory penalties.
1. The duration of reclusion perpetua is
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day
to forty (40) years. (Section 17, Rep.
Act. No. 7659)
2. Reclusion Perpetua is a penalty imposed
by the Revised Penal Code.
Anita Esteban vs. Hon. Reynaldo Alcantara, (G.R. No. 135012, September 7, 2004).

FACTS:
1. Petitioner posted bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his brother-in-law.

2. While on bail, his brother-in-law was again charged with another crime for
which he was arrested and detained.

3. Fed up, petitioner refused to post another bail. Instead, she applied for
cancellation of the cash bonds she posted. She said: She is “terminating the cash
bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail. “

4. Her motion was denied. Despite MR, it was denied again.

HELD:

The Supreme Court said that the respondent judge did not commit abuse of
discretion. In this connection, the court ruled, thus:
Sec.14 (Due Process in criminal Proceedings)

“(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after the arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable/”

IN CRIMINAL CASES - No person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.
IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS:

P – (1) The accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,

E – (2) The accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,

I – (3) The accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him,

SIP – (4) The accused shall have the right to speedy, impartial, and public trial,

MEET – (5) The accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face,

COM – (6) The accused shall have the right to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

HOWEVER, AFTER THE ARRAIGNMENT – Trial may proceed notwithstanding the

absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.)
 FOR A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF SECTION 14,
RIGHTS BEFORE THE TRIAL
(The period after the filing of the complaint against the accused and before he is
arrested)

1) He is entitled to preliminary investigation

2) If arrested in flagrante delicto or surrenders to the authorities, he is entitled to

counsel. He may not be asked without the assistance of counsel.

3) When arrested, he may exercise his right to bail as long as the offense committed
is not punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is not strong.
4) In case of irregular warrant, and the accused is arrested, he may ask that the
same be quashed.

5) If detained due to his inability to post bail, he is entitled to be visited by his

counsel. He may confer with his counsel at any hour of the day, or even at
night, in urgent cases. (Section 14, Rule 113)

6) While under custodial investigation, the accused has rights under Section 12,
right against self-incrimination, confession may not be extracted by violence,
force, threat, intimidation or other measures which vitiates consent.

7) No secret detention places, solitary or incommunicado, or other similar forms

of detention
 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL
(The period or stage after the case against the accused
was filed in Court)

1. He is be presumed innocent until his guilt is proved.

2. He is entitled to know the nature and cause of accusation against him .

3. He is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel.

4. He is entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial;

5. To meet the witnesses face to face and

6. To have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the

production of evidence in his behalf.
 RIGHTS AFTER THE TRIAL

1. The accused may either be acquitted or convicted. If he is acquitted, the case against
him is dismissed. If he is convicted, he shall have the following right s:

a) He can appeal his case;

b) He is entitled to a right against the imposition of excessive, cruel, degrading or

inhuman punishment;

c) If the case is dismissed without his consent, he enjoys the protection of the double
jeopardy clause.

.
 EXPLANATION OF EACH
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

1. The prosecution has the burden to prove the guilt of the accused.
2. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not in the weakness of the
defense.
3. Right to be presumed innocent must be offset by guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Any doubt as to the guilt of the accused must be resolved in his favor of the accused.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

Can the accused defend himself personally? The accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel. (Sec., Rule 115, NRC)

TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM – The

accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information. Hence,
If an accused is not informed of the particular act or acts imputed to him, the information is
void as to the accused.
 SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
NOTE:

1. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. What the

Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which renders rights nugatory. (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R.
117211, August 14, 1996)

2. Trial inside the judge’s chambers does not violate constitutional right to public
trial Anyone interested may observe

3. The public can be excluded from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced
during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals.

4. Speedy trial is guaranteed by the Constitution but the same shall not be
utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting
criminals.
Examples of long delay in the termination of Preliminary
Investigation and the filing of the information.

1. Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 7233539, March 31,

1988;

2. Salonga vs. Paño, etc. et al. (G.R. No. 59521, February 17, 1985

Remedy for violation of one’s right to speedy trial

3. Dismissal of the case,

4. Release from detention if accused is under detention,
5. Habeas Corpus
.
Right to confrontation
1. Can be invoked in criminal civil administrative proceedings
2. Benefits of Right to Confrontation
3. It secures the opportunity to cross-examine,
4. To see/observe the demeanor of the witness
5. To assess the credibility of the witness
6. To obtain the benefit of the moral impact of the courtroom atmosphere
7. Right to Confrontation is not available in Preliminary investigation

To have Compulsory Process to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses

8. This can be done through:

(a) Subpoena testificandum,

(b) Subpoena duces tecum, supported by efficient of the accused.
Benito Astorga vs. People of the Philippines – A group of DENR operatives were sent to
Daram, Western Samar, to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats being constructed at
Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram,
who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between Benito
Astorga and the DENR team. Astorga called for reinforcements and later, a boat bearing
ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived. The DENR team was then brought to
Benito Astorga’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2: 00
a.m.

Benito Astorga was charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention based on said facts.
It is guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD: When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one
of which presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a
guilty man than to convict an innocent man. Benito Astorga was acquitted
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan – the accused were acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. Later,
the Supreme Court ordered a new trial. Is this order a violation of due process? No, the
said trial was a sham trial, “a mock trial – the non-trial of the century”. There was
predetermined judgment of acquittal which is unlawful and void ab initio”. (i.e. (1)
secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985, where President Marcos discussed
with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel; (2)
The acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto are
themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified).

Instances when there is violation of due process?

1. Law or regulation was not published.

2. The law requires preliminary investigation but the same is denied.
3. There is a preliminary investigation but there is inordinate delay in conducting the
same
4. When the new lawyer is not a bona fide member of the Philippine Bar.
5. When the accused is entitled to appeal, but the same is denied.
Sec.15 (Habeas Corpus)

“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended EXCEPT in cases
of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.”

Writ of Habeas Corpus – writ or order directed to the person detaining another and
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place,
with the day and the cause of his detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.

Eden Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan

Filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because in the preliminary investigation that
was conducted, he was not notified. HELD: Absence of Preliminary Investigation, or
invalid Preliminary Investigation, cannot be invoke in a petition for a writ of habeas, but it
was allowed as a ground for a motion to quash the said information.

NOTE: The President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ONLY
ON TWO GROUNDS (1) Invasion; (2) Rebellion when the public safety requires it.
 DIFFERENT SITUATIONS
a) There is restraint but the same is
voluntary.

b) To regain custody of a minor younger Habeas corpus is not available. (Kelly,

sister who is voluntarily living with a etc. vs. Director of Prisons, 44 Phil.
married man.   623)
c) A daughter who is of legal age lives
voluntarily with a married man, can Habeas corpus is not available.
he ask for a writ of habeas corpus. (Macazo vs. Nuñez, et al., 105 Phil. 55)

d) A hospital that detains a patient for

failure to pay his hospital bills.
e) A foreigner whose detention is illegal
in the beginning but which was
subsequently legalized with the
issuance of a court order
commanding his arrest.
Habeas corpus is available. It is not a
ground to detain a patient. (Carmona vs.
UDMC, 93 SCRA 440, October 15, 1979)
Habeas corpus is not available (Harvey
vs. UDMC, 93 SCRA 84)
 Distinction:

Preliminary citation to show Peremptory writ of Habeas

cause why a writ of habeas Corpus
corpus should not issue.

Illegality of one’s detention is not It is issued when the cause of

patent from the petition, and for detention appears to be patently
this reason, the court issues a illegal and non-compliance is
citation to the government officer punishable
who has custody of said person to
show cause why the writ of habeas
corpus should not issue
Said power is subject to the following limitations. (Section 18, Article VII, 1987
Constitution)
1. Suspension of habeas corpus shall not exceed sixty days. If invasion or
rebellion persists after 60 days, Congress may extend upon the initiative of
the President, and period of extension shall be determined by Congress.
2. Congress may revoke the suspension by at least a vote of the majority of the
members of Congress, voting jointly, which revocation may not be set aside
by the President.
3. The Supreme Court “may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen”, the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. The Supreme Court
must promulgate its decision within thirty (30) days from the filing.
4. Suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.
5. Persons detained/arrested during the suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise, he will be released.
Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil. 87 [1905]) and in Montenegro vs.
Castañeda (91 Phi. 882)
(1) The Executive Department has the superior competence to assess
the peace and order situation in the country; (2) Suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question. THIS IS
NOW ABANDONED. Now, Section 18, paragraph 3, Article VII, says
that Supreme Court may is an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, may review if there sufficient the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or privilege of habeas corpus, or the
extension thereof.
 
NOTE: There is right to bail even when the privilege of habeas
corpus is suspended. This rule is not applicable when evidence of
guilt is strong. This will be determined by the judge on the evidence
presented.
Sec.16 (Speedy Disposition of Cases Before) All judicial , quasi-
judicial or administrative Bodies

“All persons have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases

before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.”

Distinction:
SPEEDY TRIAL SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

1. The right to speedy disposition of cases

1. The right to speedy trial is what is provided under Article IV, Section 16
is provided under Article III, of the 1973 Constitution, and now
Section 17 of the 1935 found likewise in Article III, Section 16
Constitution. of the 1987 Constitution.

2. It covers all phases of the proceedings,

2. The right to speedy trial whether judicial, quasi-judicial or
pertains only to criminal administrative. This right is therefore
prosecutions which are at the broader than speedy trial and applies to
trial stage. civil, criminal and administrative cases.
Similarity between the two – Both rights are given a relative
concept consistent with reasonable delays considering the
circumstances. (Martin vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745).
Remember that there is no hard and fast rule on how long a case
be tried and disposed of. The Rules of Court can only fix several
periods to file different pleadings, appeals, etc. Explain thi
Sec.17 (Right against self-incrimination)
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
Purpose – To protect the witness or accused from committing perjury,
(2) to prevent a witness or accused from being coerced, whether
physically, morally and/or psychologically into incriminating himself.
NOTE: Said right is available in criminal prosecutions civil,
administrative or legislative investigations.
Coverage of right
• The protection is only against being compelled to testify against
himself.
• However, a person may be compelled to submit himself for physical
examination to determine his involvement in the offense he
allegedly committed.
 Example:
1. Paraffin test; to undergo finger printing, photographing, or when
a woman accused of adultery is subjected to examination to
determine if she is pregnant or not. Reason: They are mechanical
acts only.
2. Other mechanical acts –extracting virus from the body; to
remove his shoes or shirts; to place one foot on a piece of paper to
secure his footprints).
How about compelling an accused to write down a specimen of his
handwriting. He cannot be compelled to do so because Writing is not
purely mechanical act. It requires the application of intelligence and
attention. (Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil. 570)
Right against self-incrimination is not available to juridical persons –
Because the State can demand from a corporation (to whom is issued a
franchise) to purchase its corporate books and papers.
Sec.18 (Freedom of Political Belief)
“(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
Related to freedom to believe which is absolute
Return to work order – The workers may choose not to return to work, but if
they choose not to return to work, they have to give up their work. (Sarmiento
vs. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676)
Sec.17 of RH Law which requires private and non-government health care
service provides to render 48 hours of pro bono reproductive health services –
HELD: NOT an involuntary servitude. REASON: Reproductive health providers
have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Population Control – may not be beneficial to the country in the long run
Sec.19 (Right Against Excessive) Fines, Degrading and Inhuman Punishment
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee on the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by
law.”

Is death penalty cruel? Conflicting opinions. Explain. REASONS:

FIRST:  The first most important resource of our country is its people but not
everyone deserves the help and sympathy of our government and the
majority of the people who live in peace. It has been said that even those who
have wronged should receive the same protection, otherwise, they will no
longer be reformed but this should not be made available to those who are
not willing to be reformed as shown and evidenced by repeated criminal
heinous acts that have been committed. It is them, not the government that
have chosen their fate.
SECOND: It is no longer shocking to the moral sense of the
community if the drug pushers are executed by firing squad. For as
long as they were accorded due process, that kind of execution is
perceived by many as befitting, proper and effective deterrent to
rampant drug related offenses which have victimized thousands
upon thousands of young boys and girls, and their parents and
families, and which destroyed their future. Why give more
sympathy and protection to rascals and hardened criminals than
those who are more worthy numbers of our society?
THIRD: Good men and women cannot watch helplessly from their
peaceful homes. Those in authority should be able to impose a
discipline that will make our country a better place to live in.
Otherwise, chaos, and turmoil will prevail; our values will be
destroyed and disrepected; our young children will be easy prey for
the wicked, the corrupt and the criminals.
Sec.20 (Right Against Imprisonment)
“No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.”
Lozano vs. Martinez (146 SCRA 323)
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the non-payment of the obligation
is not what the law punishes. What is punished is the making and
issuing of a worthless check or a check which is dishonored upon its
presentation of payment. Moreover, the law punishes the act not as an
offense against property but against public order. The purpose of the
law is to protect the integrity of the check as a commercial instrument
and prevent the proliferation of worthless checks from creating havoc in
trade circles and in the banking community.
Sec.21 (Double Jeopardy)
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.”
Requisites of Double Jeopardy
a) In order that an accused may not be subjected to another trial and
punishment for the same offense, the following requisites must be
complied with, to wit:
b) There must be a valid complaint or information;
c) Said complaint or information must be filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction;
d) The accused has pleaded guilty to the charge; and
e) The accused has been acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without his express consent. (People vs. Vergara, 41 SCAD 13, 221 SCRA
560; People vs. Navallo, 234 SCRA 175)
EXAMPLES:
a) A was prosecuted for estafa. Same was dismissed by RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. Thereafter, a charge for the same offense was commenced in
the RTC.

Accused moved to quash invoking double jeopardy: HELD: No double

jeopardy because the accused had not been in danger of conviction in the
original persecution.

b) Information was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by a court which

actually competent to hear it. HELD: The dismissal will inure to the
benefit of the accused.

c) If the dismissal of a case against the accused, even if with his express
consent, is based on (a) Insufficiency of evidence; (b) or denial of his
right to speedy trial. HELD: The dismissal is considered an acquittal.
Hence, the dismissal cannot be appealed by the prosecution and will bar
another prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is true
even if the dismissal is erroneous.
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT \

Q: May an accused be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development

changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already
been charged or convicted?

A: Yes, under the doctrine of supervening event.

BASIS: Rule 117, Sec. 7, Rules of Court

Meaning and example of said doctrine

It is a rule in criminal procedure which holds where a new fact supervenes that
would change the character and nature of the first offense to a graver one for
which the defendant had already been convicted, then the accused may still be
prosecuted for the new offense without placing him in double jeopardy. (Melo v.
People, supra)

EXAMPLE: A hit B with his fist after their heated altercation. As a result, B fell
which caused his head to hit a cemented pavement. B filed a complaint against A
for physical injuries. The prosecutor was about to file a case for physical injuries
against A, but he was informed by the family of B that the latter died as a result of
the same physical injuries suffered by B. The said death of B change the character
of the offense for which A may be prosecuted for homicide.
Another Principle - When one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds
from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions.
EXAMPLE: (1) X is indicted for smoking opium. He cannot be charged with
possession of opium. (2) X has stolen several things from B on the same date and
time. X can be charged only with the crime of theft.

Hypothetical Case

Prof . A invited Ms. X, his student to a dinner. After the dinner, Prof drives his
car to a motel. While inside the motel, he started to kiss Ms. A and started to
undress her.

Ms. X convinced Prof. A to take a bath first before she gives in to his demand for
sexual intercourse. While taking his shower, Ms. A went outside the motel, took
a taxi and went home.

Later, she filed an administrative case for disbarment against Prof. A and she also
filed attempted rape against Prof. A. The disbarment proceedings did not prosper
but the office of the City Prosecutor filed a case of attempted rape against Prof. A

Can Prof. A invoke double jeopardy? No. The case being a criminal case and the
other being an administrative case.
Same facts except that Prof. A was able to consummate rape. The City
Prosecutor filed the case but the complaint filed in Court was dismissed.
Later, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed a case, this time upon the
complaint of the offended party.
Question: Is the filing of a new case a valid ground for Prof. A to
invoke double jeopardy?
Answer: The first element for double jeopardy to apply is not present.
The first information's is not valid in form and in substance. Hence,
Prof. A cannot invoke double jeopardy.
1) BAR Question –1984

Upon arraignment A pleaded guilty to the charge of serious physical

injuries. 10 days later, the victim died. Hence, the Fiscal moved for
amendment of information so as to charge the accused with the crime of
homicide.

Accused objected on the ground of being convicted of the crime of serious

physical injuries and that another presentation for homicide for the same
act under an amended infarction. constitute double jeopardy. RESOLVE.

Answer: No double jeopardy and motion of the accused should be denied.

His plea was only with respect to the charge of physical injuries, but not
with the crime of homicide.

2) Galman – Aquino Double Murder Case

Reopening of case is not double jeopardy. The proceedings that took place
was a sham and a mock trial which resulted to the denial of the State’s right
to due process.
SEC. 22 (Right Against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder)
“No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted”
DEFINITIONS:
Ex Post Facto Law – A law which punishes an act which at the
time of its commission was not punishable.
Bill of Attainder – A legislative act which infects punishment
without judicial trial
Bill of Pains and Penalties – A legislative act which impose a
penalty less than death, without the benefit of judicial trial.
DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO PRACTICE MEDICINE – Criminal in
Nature
SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE – Not a penalty
THE END