Chemical Engineering Plant

Design

PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Dr. M. Azam Saeed

Fault tree analysis
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive reasoning technique
that focuses on one particular accident event.
• The fault tree itself is a graphic model that displays the
various combinations of equipment faults and failures that
can result in the accident event.
• The solution of the fault tree is a list of the sets of
equipment failures and human/operator errors that are
sufficient to result in the accident event of interest.
• The strength of FTA as a qualitative tool is its ability to break
down an accident into basic equipment failures and human
errors. This allows the safety analyst to focus preventive
measures on these basic causes to reduce the probability of
an accident.
 Purpose: Identify combinations of equipment failures and
human errors that can result in an accident event.
When to Use:
Design: FTA can be used in the design phase of the plant to
uncover hidden failure modes that result from combinations
of equipment failures.
Operation: FTA including operator and procedure
characteristics can be used to study an operating plant to
identify potential combinations of failure for specific
accidents.
• The fault-tree analysis (FTA) is primarily a means of
analysing hazardous events after they have been identified
by other techniques such as HAZOP.

• The FTA takes a top down deductive analysis approach (i.e.

from product failure to part failure).
• The FTA applies Boolean logic to identify how lower level
events could combine to produce upper level system states.
• The sequence of events forms pathways on the fault tree,
provided with logical ‘And’ ‘Or’ gates.
• The And symbol is used where coincident lower-order
events are necessary before a more serious higher-
order event occurs. By multiplying the probabilities of
each event in this set, the probability of the next
higher-order event is obtained.
• Correspondingly, when the occurrence of any one of a set
of lower-order events is sufficient to cause a more serious
higher-order event, the events in the set are joined by an
Or gate’ and the probabilities are added to obtain the
probability of the higher-order event.
• Estimation of failure rates with any precision is generally
difficult because of the limited prior data.
 Gate Symbol Gate Name Causal Relation

Output event occurs if all input events occur

1 AND gate
simultaneously.

Output event occurs if any one of the input events

2 OR gate
occurs.

Input produces output when conditional event

3 Inhibit gate
occurs.

Gate Symbols
 Intermediate event

Base events
• Once a fault-tree analysis has been completed, it
becomes rather easy to investigate the impact of
alternative preventive measures.
• The probability of these events, in turn, could be
reduced by the installation of an independent low-
pressure alarm to the tank.
• This process of reducing the probability of the most
probable event could be continued until an overall
acceptable risk level is eventually achieved.
• Magnitudes of events are typically expressed in terms of the
amount of flammable or toxic material released during an
event.
• Since release duration is directly related to the cause and
context of the release, its estimation is generally quite
subjective.
• To determine the hazard severity requires quantifying, with
the aid of state-of-the-art hazard models, the likely extent
of toxic or flammable vapor-cloud travel under different
atmospheric conditions.
 Contd..
• the thermal-radiation fields around vapour and 1iquid
pool-fires, the overpressure from any anticipated
explosions, and any missile or fragmentation activity that
may result from a confined explosion.
• These hazard events can then be translated into hazard-
zone estimates by incorporating criteria for human injury
and property damage.
• Finally, the results of various loss scenarios can be
combined and presented in risk profiles listing injuries,
fatalities, and/or property damage.
• These results can be compared with data for other risks to
the public and to workers in various related areas, and
these serve as the basis for an assessment of whether or
not the risks of the facility as designed are acceptable.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

• Failure mode - the way in which something

might fail

• Effects analysis – studying the consequences

of the various failure modes to determine
their severity to the customer.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
• The failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is generally
applied to a specific piece of equipment in a process or a
particularly hazardous part of a larger process.
• Its primary purpose is to evaluate the frequency and
consequences of component failures on the process and
surroundings.
• Its major shortcoming is that it focuses only on
component failure and does not consider errors in
operating procedures or those committed by operators.
• As a result, it has limited use in the chemical process
industry
 Example for failure mode
• Process Function: Receive order

• Potential failure mode:

 Does not receive order
 Receive incorrect order
 Receive too many order
 Receive too little order
Safety Indexes
• The safety and loss prevention guide developed by the
Dow Chemical Company provides a method for
evaluating the potential hazards of a process and
assessing the safety and loss-prevention measures
needed.
• In this procedure, a numerical “Fire and Explosion Index”
is calculated, based on the nature of the process and the
properties of the materials.
• The index can be used two different ways. In the
preliminary design, the Dow index will indicate whether
alternative, less hazardous processes should be
considered in the manufacture of a specific chemical
product.
• In the final design, after the piping and instrumentation
diagrams and equipment layout have been prepared, the
calculated index is used as a guide to the selection and
design of the preventive and protective equipment needed
for safe plant operation.
• The Dow index applies only to main process units and
does not cover process auxiliaries. Also, only fire and
explosion hazards are considered.
• Recently the index has been expanded to include
business-interruption losses.
• The principles and general approach used in the Dow
method of hazard evaluation have been further developed
by Mond in the United Kingdom to include toxicity
hazards. This revised Mond index is described in a paper
by Lewis.
 Safety Audits
• The principal function of most safety audits in the past has
been to verify the adequacy of safety equipment and safety
rules.
• The former includes equipment for fire protection,
personnel protection, and on-site emergency responses.
• In addition to reviewing the general safety rules, the audit
has provided explicit safety rules for new process areas and
associated emergency response procedures.
• However, with the greatly increased concerns for
environmental health, safety, community relations, and loss
prevention, safety audits have become significant, as well
as continuous activities for all chemical process companies.
• Detailed checklists have been developed that cover every
aspect of health, safety, and loss prevention.
• It becomes apparent that considering these items only
at the end of the design is unwise because decisions
have been made that foreclose what might have been
the optimum control option for occupational health
reasons.
• Experience has shown that continuous integration of
environmental, safety, and occupational health issues
into all design stages leads to the most cost-effective
design.
• Examples of the kinds of interactions and hazard-
control choices that need to be made at the various
design stages are highlighted in the text by Lipton and
Lynch.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
• Because of the greater concern for the continued
degradation of the environment, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has systematically been
rewriting and tightening many policies and regulations.
• The EPA has also been encouraging state and local
governments, as well as industry, to take a more active
role in environmental issues.
• Some of the important issues include the disposal of
wastes, both hazardous and non hazardous, effluent
controls on wastewater and storm water runoff, and
hydrocarbon emissions to the atmosphere.
• The EPA is also encouraging companies to perform
environmental audits.
 Contd..
• Waste disposal is a serious problem for many chemical
plants.
• The EPA initiative that has greatly curtailed land disposal
has had a great effect on waste disposal.
• The 1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) amendments have also made it more difficult to
dispose of solid wastes.
• In addition, RCRA required all interim status hazardous-
waste facilities to meet groundwater monitoring and
insurance requirements by late 1985.
• The disposal of waste streams that contain large
amounts of water is another challenge which faces a
process engineer.
• Deep-well injection has been used in the past, but this
method has been constrained by regulatory agencies.
• Recently, refinery wastewater and storm water runoff
has been subject to more stringent Best Available
Technology (BAT) effluent controls.
• The agreement covers nonconventional pollutants such
as phenolic compounds, ammonia sulfide, and toxic
pollutants such as chromium and hexavalent chromium.
• It is becoming increasingly clear that chemical
engineers must be versed in the latest federal and
state regulations involving environmental protection,
worker safety, and health.
• This need is especially great for engineers in design-
related functions, such as capital-cost estimating,
process and equipment design, and plant layout.
• It is particularly important to learn what is legally
required by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and corresponding regulatory
groups at the state and local levels.
• Every design engineer must be certain that a standard
being used has not been revised or deleted.
 Environmental Regulations
• This checklist must also consider applicable state and local
codes.
• Often these may be more stringent than the federal codes
or may single out and regulate specific industries.
• The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) requires that
federal agencies prepare such a statement in advance of
any major “action” that may significantly alter the quality
of the environment.
• This includes project parameters that will have a positive
environmental effect, negative impact, or no impact
whatsoever.
 Contd..
• The preparation of an Environmental Impact Assessment
requires determining what environmental standards
require compliance by the project, obtaining baseline
data, examining existing data to determine
environmental safety of the project
• Preparing an effluent and emission summary with
possible alternatives to meet acceptable standards, and
finally preparing the environmental statement or report.
 Contd..
• It becomes clear that environmental considerations not
only can play a major factor in the choice of selecting a
plant site but can also be quite costly.
• On the other hand, a detailed environmental assessment
may quickly eliminate possible sites because of their
highly restrictive standards.