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satya acharya 2
1. Basics of Financial Leverage
Ignoringtaxes, and assuming a firm needs 500,000 shares if it
uses no debt financing:
A. With no debt:
EPS = EBIT/500,000
B. With Rs2,500,000 in debt at 10% -- view debt as an annuity,
principal needn’t be paid back at maturity:
satya acharya 3
Relationship between EBIT and ESP under different
capital structure
2
D/E =
1.5 0
1
satya acharya 5
What is the cross point?
Set EPS in A and B equal, we have
EBIT = Rs500,000
satya acharya 6
Break-Even EBIT
Find EBIT where EPS is the same under both
the current and proposed capital structures
If we expect EBIT to be greater than the
break-even point, then leverage is beneficial
to our stockholders
If we expect EBIT to be less than the break-
even point, then leverage is detrimental to our
stockholders
satya acharya 7
Choosing a Capital Structure
What is the primary goal of financial
managers?
Maximize stockholder wealth
We want to choose the capital structure that
will maximize stockholder wealth
We can maximize stockholder wealth by
maximizing firm value or minimizing WACC
satya acharya 8
The Effect of Leverage
How does leverage affect the EPS and ROE of a
firm?
When we increase the amount of debt financing, we
increase the fixed interest expense
If we have a really good year, then we pay our fixed cost
and we have more left over for our stockholders
If we have a really bad year, we still have to pay our fixed
costs and we have less left over for our stockholders
Leverage amplifies the variation in both EPS and
ROE
satya acharya 9
What is “Capital Structure”?
Definition
The Capital Structure of a firm is the mix of different securities
issued by the firm to finance its operations.
Bonds, Bank loans
Equity, Preferences shares
Warrants
satya acharya 10
Assumptions
Only two source of funding, perpetual debt and
equity capital
No corporate Tax
The dividend Pay out ratio is 100%
Total assets are given and no change on them
Business Risk is const and irrespective of the
financial risk of the firm
All investor have the same subjective probability
distribution of future expected earning of the firm
satya acharya 11
Value of Equity = Net Income/Cost of Equity
Value of Debt = Interest/Cost of Debt
Value of Firm = Value of Debt + Value of
Equity
Firm’s cost of Capital = Net Operating
Income/Value of Firm
WACC = Kd x prop of Debt + Ke x Prop of
Equity
satya acharya 12
Debt-equity Mix and the Value
of the Firm
Capital structure theories:
Net operating income (NOI) approach.(Durand)
Net income (NI) approach.(Durand)
MM hypothesis with and without corporate tax.
Miller’s hypothesis with corporate and personal
taxes.
Trade-off theory: costs and benefits of leverage.
satya acharya 13
Net Income (NI) Approach
According to NI approach both
the cost of debt and the cost of
equity are independent of the C ost
satya acharya 14
Net Income (NI) Approach
V = E + D = NOI - Int / Ke + Int / Kd
= NOI – Kd D / Ke + Kd D/ Kd
= NOI / Ke + D – KdD/ Ke
= NOI / Ke + D ( 1 – Kd / Ke )
The firm will substitute debt for equity and so long as Ke and Kd
are constant, the value of the firm V increases buy debt multiplied
by a constant rate (Ke -Kd) / Ke
satya acharya 15
Net Income (NI) Approach
Leverage( 0.00 18.18 33.34 46.15 66.67 94.74 100
D/V)
satya acharya 17
Net Operating Income (NOI) Approach
satya acharya 20
Capital Structure Does not Matter!
The Modigliani-Miller Propositions
Under the assumption that:
There are no taxes. and Full Pay out
Perfect Capital Markets
Homogeneous Risk Classes
The investment and operating policies of the firm are given.
☛ the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure
satya acharya 23
Arbitrage
U L
Net Op In 10000 10000
Int (6%) 0 3000
Net Income 10000 7000
Ke .100 .177
M V of Equity 100000 60000
MV OF Debt 0 50000
Value of Firm 100000 110000
WACC 0.10 satya acharya
.091 24
Arbitrage
Return fromLevered Firm:
Investment =
%10 ( − , 50=000
110,000 =) 60,000, ( 6 000
10% )
Return − ×6% ( 50,000
=10% 10,000
= − 1
=,000) 300 700
Alternate Strategy:
L 60,000× 6,000
1. Sell shares in : 10% =
2. Borrow(personal leverage): 10% ×
50,000= 5,000
3. Buy shares in : 10% × 10,000
U 100,000 =
Return fromAlternate Strategy:
Investment =10,000
Return =10%× 10,000
= 1,000
= ×
Less : Interest on personal borrowing 6% 5,000 3 = 00
= −
Net return 1,000 300 =700
=
Ca sh available 11,000 −
10,000=1,000
satya acharya 25
Investment Return
Inv In L’s Share α ( Vl-Dl) α ( X –Kd Dl)
Vl > Vu
Buy U Share α Vu αX
Borrow debt - α Dl - α Kd Dl
α ( Vl-Dl) α ( X –Kd Dl)
satya acharya 26
MM’s Proposition II
The cost of equity for a levered firm
equals the constant overall cost of C ost
capital plus a risk premium that ke
equals the spread between the overall
cost of capital and the cost of debt
multiplied by the firm’s debt-equity
ratio. For financial leverage to be
irrelevant, the overall cost of capital ko
must remain constant, regardless of
the amount of debt employed. This kd
implies that the cost of equity must
rise as financial risk increases.
D ebt
M M 's P r o p o s iti o n II
satya acharya 27
MM Propositions I and II
MM Proposition I :
X
V=
ko
X
ko =
V
MM Proposition II :
X − kd D
ke =
S
ke = ko + (ko − kd )D/S
satya acharya 28
An all equity financed company has 10000
shares outstanding. The market value of these
Rs120,000.The expected operating income is
Rs 18,000.EPS,1.8.
Ke = 18000/120000 = .15
It is borrowing Rs 60000 at 6%
EPS = 18000-3000/5000= 2.88
Ke = .15 + (.15 -.06)1= 24%
satya acharya 29
MM Hypothesis With Corporate Tax
Under current laws in most countries, debt has an important
advantage over equity: interest payments on debt are tax
deductible, whereas dividend payments and retained earnings
are not. Investors in a levered firm receive in the aggregate the
unlevered cash flow plus an amount equal to the tax deduction
on interest. Capitalising the first component of cash flow at the
all-equity rate and the second at the cost of debt shows that the
value of the levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered
firm plus the interest tax shield which is tax rate times the debt
(if the shield is fully usable).
It is assumed that the firm will borrow the same amount of
debt in perpetuity and will always be able to use the tax shield.
Also, it ignores bankruptcy and agency costs.
satya acharya 30
LEVERAGEBENEFITUNDERCORPOATEANDPERSONALTAXES
satya acharya 31
MM Hypothesis with Corporate Tax
After-tax earnings of Unlevered Firm:
T
X =X −
(1T )
Value of Unlevered Firm:
X (1 −
T)
Vu =
ku
After-tax earnings of Levered Firm:
T
X =X
( −k Dd− + ) k Dd
)(1 T
= X− +) Tk Dd
(1 T
Value of Levered Firm:
X (1 −
T) Tk dD
Vl = +
ku kd
satya acharya
=V+
u TD 32
LEVERAGE BENEFIT UNDER CORPOATE AND PERSONAL TAXES
Unlev Lev Unlev Lev Unlev Lev Unlev Lev Unlev Lev
Corp tax 0% 0% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Corp tax on div 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Pers tax on div 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Pers tax on int 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 30% 30%
PBIT 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
Int 0 700 0 700 0 700 0 700 0 700
PBT 2500 1800 2500 1800 2500 1800 2500 1800 2500 1800
Corp tax 0 0 875 630 875 630 875 630 875 630
PAT 2500 1800 1625 1170 1625 1170 1625 1170 1625 1170
Div 2500 1800 1477 1064 1477 1064 1477 1064 1407 1064
Div tax 0 0 148 106 148 106 148 106 148 106
Tol corp tax 0 0 1023 736 1023 736 1023 736 1023 736
Div income 2500 1800 1477 1064 1477 1064 1477 1064 1407 1064
Pers tax on div 0 0 0 0 295 213 295 213 281 213
AT div income 2500 1800 1477 1064 1182 851.2 1182 851.2 1126 851.2
Int income 0 700 0 700 0 700 0 700 0 700
Pers tax on int 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 140 0 210
AT int income 0 700 0 700 0 700 0 560 0 490
AT total income 2500 2500 1477 1764 1182 1551 1182 1411 1126 1341
Net leverage benifit 0 287 370 230 216
satya acharya 33
When corporate tax rate and equity income
personal tax rate decreases ,the advantage of
borrowing decreases.
The benefit also when personal tax rate on
interest income increases.
When the firm will stop borrowing?
satya acharya 34
Miller’s Approach with Corporate
and Personal Taxes
After-tax earnings of Unlevered Firm:
T
X =X (1
− T )(1
− T )e
Value of Unlevered Firm:
X (1 −T )(1− T )e
Vu =
ku
After-tax earnings of Levered Firm:
T
X = (X − k Dd )(1
− T− + )e k −
)(1 T Dd (1 T d)
= X (1
− T )(1
− T+ )e k − d −T ) d k
D (1 − Dd(1−T )(1d T ) e
satya acharya 36
Miller assume that personal tax rate on equity income =
0.The investor will prefer to invest in equity.
Firm will borrow to reduce the corporate tax
Tax paying investor will be attracted if the firm offer
them a higher pre tax return..10 (1-.2) = 12.5.Income tax
is progressive.
The firm will stop borrowing when personal tax rate
equals to corporate tax rate,
the interest rate = kd/(1-T)
satya acharya 37
%
Demand rate of
interest
id = io/(1 – Tb)
Supply rate
of interest
Borrowing
satya acharya 38
U L
NoI 100 100
Int 0 50
IBT 100 50
Corp tax rate (35%) 35 17.5
IAT 65 32.5
Income to share holder 65 32.5
Div tax(12.5%) 7.22 3.61
Div 57.78 28.89
Personal tax on Div 0 0
Div after tax 57.78 28.89
Int to debt holder 0 50
Per tax on Int(30%) 0 15
Int after tax 0 35
Total income to Investor 57.78 63.89
Int tax shield satya acharya 6.11 39
Financial Distress
Financial distress arises when a firm is not able to meet
its obligations to debt-holders.
For a given level of debt, financial distress occurs
because of the business (operating) risk . with higher
business risk, the probability of financial distress
becomes greater. Determinants of business risk are:
Operating leverage (fixed and variable costs)
Cyclical variations
Intensity of competition
Price fluctuations
Firm size and diversification
Stages in the industry life cycle
satya acharya 40
Consequences of Financial Distress
Bankruptcy costs
Specific bankruptcy costs include legal and administrative
costs along with the sale of assets at “distress” prices to
meet creditor claims. Lenders build into their required
interest rate the expected costs of bankruptcy which reduces
the market value of equity by a corresponding amount.
Indirect costs
Investingin risky projects.
Reluctance to undertake profitable projects.
Premature liquidation.
Short-term orientation.
satya acharya 41
Debt Policy and Shareholders Conflicts
Shareholder—manager conflicts
Managers have a tendency to consume some of the firm’s
resources in the form of various perquisites.
Managers have a tendency to become unduly risk averse and
shirk their responsibilities as they have no equity interest or
when their equity interest falls. They may be passing up
profitable opportunities.
Shareholder—bondholder conflicts
Shareholder value is created either by increasing the value of
the firm or by reducing the the value of its bonds. Increasing the
risk of the firm or issuing substantial new debt are ways to
redistribute wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
Shareholders do not like excessive debt.
satya acharya 42
Monitoring
Outside investors will discount the prices they are willing
to pay for the firm’s securities realising that managers may
not operate in their best interests.
Firms agree for monitoring and restrictive covenants to
financial distress
PV of interest
tax shields
Value of levered firm
Value of
unlevered
firm
Optimal amount
of debt
Debt
satya acharya 44
Optimum Capital Structure:
Trade-off Theory
The optimum capital structure is a function of:
Agency costs associated with debt
The costs of financial distress
Interest tax shield
satya acharya 45
Pecking Order Theory
The announcement of a share issue reduces the share price because
investors believe managers are more likely to issue when shares are
overpriced.
The most profitable firms borrow less not because they have lower
target debt ratios but because they don't need external finance.
satya acharya 46
Pecking Order Theory
Implications:
Internal equity may be better than external
equity.
Financial slack is valuable.
If external capital is required, debt is better.
satya acharya 47
Features of an Appropriate Capital
Structure
Return
Risk
Flexibility
Capacity
Control
satya acharya 48
Approaches to Establish Appropriate
Capital Structure
EBIT—EPS approach for analyzing the
impact of debt on EPS.
Valuation approach for determining the
impact of debt on the shareholders’ value.
Cash flow approach for analyzing the
firm’s ability to service debt.
satya acharya 49
Cash Flow Approach to Target
Capital Structure
Cash adequacy and solvency
In determining a firm’s target capital structure, a key issue is the
firm’s ability to service its debt. The focus of this analysis is also
on the risk of cash insolvency—the probability of running out of
the cash—given a particular amount of debt in the capital
structure. This analysis is based on a thorough cash flow analysis
and not on rules of thumb based on various coverage ratios.
Components of cash flow analysis
Operating cash flows
Non-operating cash flows
Financial cash flows
satya acharya 50
Reserve financial capacity
Reduction in operating and financial flexibility is costly to
firms competing in charging product and factor markets.
Thus firms need to maintain reserve financial resources in
the form of unused debt capacity, large quantities of liquid
assets, excess lines of credit, access to a broad range of fund
sources.
Focus of cash flow analysis
Focus on liquidity and solvency
Identifies discretionary cash flows