Cases On Dispute

Settlement in WTO

Submitted By:
Akanksha Saxena
Shweta Tiwari
Supriya Rai
Vimal Panjwani
 INTRODUCTION

• From 1995 to 2010, a total of 402 cases were filed

• The major cases were relating to GATT and antidumping

disputes together comprising more than 50% of the
cases.

• The developed nations are often accused of creating

obstacles to trade arising from the developing countries.

• But with years developing countries become more

active.

Source : AB Annual Report,2009

 WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CASES TILL 2009

Appellate Body Other

Complaints Mutually
and Panel Settled or
notified to Agreed
Reports Inactive
the WTO Solutions
Adopted Disputes

Reporting since since since since

period/
date 1.1.1995 1.1.1995 1.1.1995 1.1.1995

Number 402 121 65 214

Source : www.wto.org
 STATUS OF CASES SETTLEMENT

Dispute Settlement Cases

30% Appellate Body and Panel Reports

Adopted3
Mutually Agreed Solutions

54% Other Settled or Inactive4 Disputes

16%

Source : www.wto.org
AGREEMENT-WISE SHARE IN COMPLAINTS FILED

Source: J Int. Disp. Settlement, Joost Pauwelyn, 2010

WTO Agreements Addressed In Appeals
1996–2009

77

62

27 24
13 10 7 6 5 3 3 2 2

TBT
DSU

ATC
SPS
SCM
GATT

GATS

TRIPS
1994

ping

Licensing
Agriculture
Anti-

port
ent

Safeguards
TO
Dum

Agreem

Im
W

Source: AB annual report, 2009

 PERCENTAGE OF PANEL REPORTS APPEALED
BY YEAR OF ADOPTION: 1995–2009
Panel reports other than
  All panel reports Article 21.5 panel reports
Article 21.5 reports b

Year of Panel reports Panel reports Percentage Panel reports Panel reports Percentage Panel Panel Percentage
adoption adopted c appealed d appealed e adopted appealed appealed reports adopted reports appealed appealed

1996 2 2 100% 2 2 100% 0 0 –

1997 5 5 100% 5 5 100% 0 0 –

1998 12 9 75% 12 9 75% 0 0 –

1999 10 7 70% 9 7 78% 1 0 0%

2000 19 11 58% 15 9 60% 4 2 50%

2001 17 12 71% 13 9 69% 4 3 75%

2002 12 6 50% 11 5 45% 1 1 100%

2003 10 7 70% 8 5 63% 2 2 100%

2004 8 6 75% 8 6 75% 0 0 –

2005 20 12 60% 17 11 65% 3 1 33%

2006 7 6 86% 4 3 75% 3 3 100%

2007 10 5 50% 6 3 50% 4 2 50%

2008 11 9 82% 8 6 75% 3 3 100%

2009 8 6 75% 6 4 67% 2 2 100%

Total 151 103 68% 124 84 68% 27 19 70%

 PANEL TO APPEAL RATIO
25

20 20
68%
19

17

15

Axis Title 12 12 12 12 Panel reports adopted

11 11 Panel reports appealed
10 10 10 10
9 9
8 8
7 7 7
6 6 6 6
5 5 5

0
y 1996y 1997y 1998y 1999y 2000y 2001y 2002y 2003y 2004y 2005y 2006y 2007y 2008y 2009

Axis Title

Source: AB Report,2009
 COUNTRY STATUS-WISE CASES

SHARE OF TOTAL CASES

10%
Developed Country against
Developing Country 
31%
18% Developed Country against
Developed Country 

Developing Country against

Developed Country 

Developing Country against

Developing Country 

41%

Source: AB report, 2009 WTO

Developing & Developed Country Cases

Source: J Int. Disp. Settlement, Joost Pauwelyn, 2010

 WTO Member Participation In Appeals
1996–2009
300
289

250
Appearances before the Appellate Body

200 173
150 135

100
65 57
45 45
50
18
0
Appellants Other Appellants Appellees Third Participants

Developed Countries Developing Countries

Source: AB annual report, 2009
US as Respondent: 114 Cases

Source: WTO, 2010 data

US as Complainant: 103 Cases

Source: WTO, 2010 data

SCENARIO FOR US

Source : USTR, July,2007

India as Complainant: 20 Cases

Source: WTO, 2010 data

India as Respondent: 20 Cases

Source: WTO, 2010 data

 DS352
India — Measures Affecting the
Importation and Sale of Wines and Spirits
from the European Communities
 DS352
Short title: India — Wines and Spirits

Complainant: European Communities

Respondent: India

Third Parties: Australia; Chile; Japan; United

States of America
Agreements cited: GATT 1994: Art. III:4, XI
(as cited in request for
consultations)

Request for Consultations 20 November 2006

 received:
 CASE PROCEEDINGS
• On 20 November 2006, the European Communities requested
consultations with India regarding duties applied by India and
restrictions on retail sale. 

• According to European Communities this adversely affect

exports of wines and spirits from the European Communities
to India.

• The complaint focused on three aspects of India’s regime for

the importation and taxation of wines and spirits.

•  First, India imposes a federal Additional Duty on imported

wines and spirits to compensate for excise duties levied at
State level on domestic products.
• This Additional Duty appears to exceed the level of excise
duties.

• Second, a number of Indian States impose duties, taxes and

fees on imports of which are apparently either not levied on
domestic products or levied at higher rates on imported
products.

• Third, seven Indian States appear not to have adopted any

policy for the taxation and licensing for (retail) sale of
imported wines and spirits which restricts importation and
sale.
• On 1 December 2006, the United States requested to join the
consultations.

• At its meeting on 24 April 2007, the DSB established a panel.

Australia, Chile, Japan and the United States reserved their third-
party rights.

• The 2007 draft budget made public on 28 February 2007 does not
remove the additional duties that the EC considers illegal.

• The investigation concluded that the Additional Duty is contrary to

Article II of the GATT 1994, and that restrictions on retail sale of
wines and spirits applied by the State of Tamil Nadu are contrary to
Article III of the GATT 1994.
ARTICLE II

• The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party,
which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their
importation into the territory and subject to the terms, conditions or
qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties
in excess of those set forth and provided therein.  Such products shall also be
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind

• ARTICLE III

• The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges,
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.

O N
T I
LA
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V
• At the Doha meeting the proposed market access formula suggested that
the bound rates be reduced to 84 %.

• The most likely a venue for attaining this objective is the EU- Indi
a Free Trade Agreement negotiations.

• Spirits and wines remain among the EU’s priorities for negotiations. A
favorable outcome in this regard was expected by end of 2010 on
finalization of the FTA.
 DS357
United States - Subsidies And Other
Domestic Support For Corn And Other
Agricultural Products
 DS357
Short title: US — Agriculture
Subsidies
Complainant: Canada
Respondent: United States of
America
Third Parties:
Agreements cited: Agriculture: Art. 3.2,
(as cited in request for consultations) 3.3, 6, 8, 9.1, 10.1
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures: Art. 3.1, 3.2,
4.2, 5, 6.3, 7.2, 2.1, 2.3
GATT 1994: Art. XVI

Request for Consultations received: 8 January 2007

CASE PROCEEDINGS

• On 8 January 2007, Canada requested consultations with the

United States concerning four different categories of
measures.

• Canada claimed that the

“United States provides subsidies to the US corn industry that
are specific to US producers of primary agricultural products
and/or to the US corn industry.”

• Canada considers that the measures at issue are inconsistent

with Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement
 VI
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• Article 5: Adverse Effects
No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to
the interests of other Members which is a serious prejudice to
the interests of another Members.
ACTIONABLE SUBSIDY
• Secondly, Canada considers that these domestic support
measures are “contingent on market prices” have resulted in
excess production and thus exports.

• This in turn, have caused low international prices and have

resulted in “serious prejudice” to Canada.
VI
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• Article 6(c).  Serious Prejudice NS IO
Where the effect of the subsidy is a significant price
undercutting in the subsidized product as compared with the
price of a like product of another Member in the same market
• Thirdly, Canada claims that, the United States provides
support in favour of domestic producers in excess of the
commitment levels specified in prescribed Schedule.

• Fourthly, Canada claims that the United States makes

available to its exporters premium rates and other terms
more favourable than those which the market would
otherwise provide.

• Two major types of direct payments are made under U.S.

farm programs which do not qualify for WTO exemptions
from reduction commitments.
PROHIBITED SUBSIDY
 VIO
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• AOA, Article 3 : Incorporation of Concessions and NS
Commitments
3.2 Member shall not provide support in favour of domestic
producers in excess of the commitment levels specified.

3.3 Member shall not provide export subsidies listed in

paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products in
excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels
specified in Part IV

• Article 8 : Export Competition Commitments

Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies
otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the
commitments as specified.
• Further Australia, Argentina, Brazil, the European
Communities, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Thailand requested
to join the consultations.

• Subsequently, the United States informed the DSB that they

had accepted all the requests to join the consultations.

• On 7 June 2007, Canada requested the establishment of a

panel.

• On 11 July 2007, Brazil requested consultations with the

United States concerning two distinct categories of US
agricultural measures:
(i) Domestic support for agricultural products
(ii) Export credit guarantees for agricultural products.
• Brazil also indicated that the United States has not made any
notifications on domestic support included in its total AMS.

• Brazil claims that the above-mentioned measures result in possible

inconsistencies with AOA

• Those measures result in possible inconsistencies with Articles 3.3,

8, 9.1 and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and also Articles
3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM.
• Further Canada, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, European
Communities, Argentina, Australia, India, Nicaragua, Thailand
requested to join the consultations.

• Subsequently, the United States informed the DSB that it had

accepted all the requests to join the consultations. 

• On 8 November 2007, Canada and Brazil each requested the

establishment of a panel.

• On 15 November 2007, Canada withdrew its first request to

establish a panel dated 7 June 2007. At its meeting on 27
November 2007, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel.
PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY PROCEEDINGS
• Further to a request to establish a panel from both Canada
and Brazil, the DSB established a single panel at its meeting
on 17 December 2007.

• Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, the European Communities,

India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, South Africa,
Chinese Taipei and Thailand reserved their third-party rights.

• Subsequently, Turkey and Uruguay reserved their third-party

rights.

• By late February 2008 the case had stalled due to the inability
of the three parties to agree on a panel of arbitrators.
• Then, in late April 2008, Brazil and Canada informally agreed
to postpone proceeding with their case.

(Postponement was thought to be provisional and based on

success in achieving further disciplines in the current Doha
Round of WTO trade negotiations)

• U.S. officials had offered to substantially cut domestic

agricultural subsidies in Doha round.

• Presently, no date has been announced for the resumption

of the case.
 DS 26/48
The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute
 DS 26/48
Short title: EC — Hormones
Complainant: United States of America
Respondent: European Communities
Third Parties: Australia; Canada; New Zealand;
Norway
Agreements cited: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(as cited in request for consultations) (SPS): Art. 3, 5, 2
Agriculture: Art. 4
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT): Art. 2
GATT 1994: Art. III, XI
Request for Consultations received: 26 January 1996
Panel Report circulated: 18 August 1997
Appellate Body Report circulated: 16 January 1998
Article 21.3(c) Arbitration Report  29 May 1998
circulated:
Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration 12 July 1999
Reportc irculated:
Use of Hormones in Meat Production-

• Growth-promoting hormones are used widely in beef

production in the United States and in other meat-exporting
countries.

• In U.S. their use approaches 100%.

• Growth-promoting hormones include Estradiol, progesterone,

testosterone and zeranol.

• The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and (USDA)

cooperate in regulating growth promotants for livestock.
• In addition to the US other countries that have approved the use of
these hormones in beef production are Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, Chile, and Japan, among other
countries.

• However EU continues to ban imports of hormone treated meat and

restricts most meat exports.

• Initially the ban covered meat and meat products from animals
treated with six growth promotants.

• In 2003, the Commission amended its policy to permanently ban one

hormone—estradiol-17β—while provisionally banning the use of the
five other hormones.

• The Commission has justified its ban as necessary to protect

consumer health and safety.
 HORMONE DISPUTE IN THE WTO

• The United States has continued to challenge the EU’s beef

hormone ban in the WTO.

• Question whether the ban is consistent with the EU’s WTO

obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement

• United States continues to question whether the EU has

conducted an adequate risk assessment to support its
position
• All this was violating Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS): Art. 3, 5, 
2 ; Agriculture: Art. 4 ; Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT): Art. 2 ; GATT
1994: Art. III, XI

• In retaliation, starting in the late 1980s, the United States imposed trade
sanctions—as authorized by the WTO—in the form of high import tariffs
on selected EU agricultural products.

• To further complicate matter, finally the WTO issued a mixed ruling that
allows the US to continue its trade sanctions, but also allows the EU to
maintain its ban.
 Case Proceedings

• In 1986-87 United States first invoked GATT dispute settlement under the
Tokyo Round’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement

• In 1996, both the United States and the EU had requested WTO
consultations in an attempt to resolve the dispute

• Australia, Canada, and New Zealand joined the United States in the
complaint

• In 1997, the WTO dispute settlement panel released its report agreeing
with the United States that the ban violated several provisions of the SPS
Agreement
• In 1998-EU appealed the ruling

• WTO Appellate Body found that the EU ban did contravene

the EU’s obligations under the SPS Agreement, but left open
the option for the EU to conduct a risk assessment of
hormone-treated meat

• In 1999 United States retaliated by imposing its current trade

sanctions against U.S. imports of EU products.

• In 2004, the EU requested WTO consultations, claiming that

the United States should remove its retaliatory measures
• In March 2008 panel report cited fault with all three parties
(EU, United States, and Canada) on various substantive and
procedural aspects of the dispute

• In October 2008, the WTO Appellate Body issued a mixed

ruling

• In January 2009, USTR announced changes to the list of EU

products subject to increased tariffs under the dispute

• EU claimed that USTR’s action constitutes an “escalation” of

the dispute and is “more punitive” than the current trade
sanctions
 DS210
Belgium —Administration of Measures
Establishing Customs Duties for Rice
 DS210
Short title: Belgium — Rice
Complainant: United States of America

Respondent: Belgium
Third Parties: India; Japan
Agreements cited: Agriculture: Art. 4
(as cited in request for consultations) Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT): Art. 3, 5, 6, 7, 2, 9, 2.2,
2.4, 2.5
Customs valuation (Article
VII of GATT 1994): Art. 1,
Annex I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2, 10,
14, 16
GATT 1994: Art. I, II, II:1, VII,
VIII, VIII:1, VIII:3, X, X:1, X:2,
X:3, XI, XIII:1

Request for Consultations received: 12 October 2000

Mutually Agreed Solution notified: 2 January 2002
 CASE PROCEEDINGS

• On 12 October 2000, the US requested consultations with the EC concerning

the administration by Belgium of laws and regulations establishing the
customs duties applicable to rice imported from US

• US considered that Belgium has failed to administer the pertinent laws and
regulations in a manner that is consistent with its WTO obligations.

• This has lead to the assessment of duties on rice imported from the US in
excess of the bound rate of duty, in contravention of the GATT 1194.
 VI
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• GATT, Article II : Schedules of concessions N S IO
Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other
contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that provided for
in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this
Agreement.

• Also Belgium’s use of reference prices in the calculation of the

applicable import duties would appear to be inconsistent with
Article VII of the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation Agreement.

 
 Article VII-Valuation for Customs Purposes

a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on

the actual value of the imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of
like merchandise, and should not be based on the value of merchandise of
national origin or on arbitrary or fictitious values.

b) “Actual value” should be the price at which, at a time and place determined
by the legislation of the country of importation, such or like merchandise is
sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of trade under fully competitive
conditions.

• Moreover Belgium’s refusal to recognize widely accepted industry standards

associated with the grading of rice appears to be inconsistent with Articles 2, 3,
5, 6, and 7 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
 VI
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Article 2 & 3: Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations
by Central Government Bodies and Local Government Bodies as well as Non-
Governmental Bodies.

Article 5 & 6: Procedures for Assessment of Conformity by Central Government

Bodies and local government bodies respectively

• Belgium has failed to administer its customs valuation determinations and its
assessment of tariffs in a transparent manner, thereby impeding trade, and
appears to have applied the measures in a manner that discriminates against
rice imported from the US

• It violated article I, X and XI of GATT and article 4 of AOA

• Further to a second request to establish a panel by the US, the
DSB established a panel at its meeting of 12 March 2001.

• India and Japan reserved their third-party rights.

• On 29 May 2001, the US requested the Director-General to

determine the composition of the Panel. On 7 June 2001, the
Panel was composed.

• On 26 July 2001, the US requested the Panel, pursuant to Article

12.12 of the DSU, to suspend its work until 30 September 2001
in light of ongoing consultations between the US and the EC.
• On 27 September, the US requested a further suspension of the
Panel till 9 October 2001.

• Further also panel work was suspended until 30 November 2001.

• On 18 December 2001, the US and the EC informed the DSB that

they had reached a mutually agreed solution pursuant to Article
3.6 of the DSU.
 DS177
United States — Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb
from New Zealand
 DS177

Short title: US — Lamb

Complainant: New Zealand
Respondent: United States of
America
Third Parties: Australia; Canada;
European Union;
Iceland; Japan
Agreements cited: Safeguards: Art. 3, 4, 5,
(as cited in request for consultations) 2, 11, 12
GATT 1994: Art. I, II, XIX
Request for Consultations received: 16 July 1999
Panel Report circulated: 21 December 2000
Appellate Body Report circulated: 1 May 2001
• On 16 July 1999, New Zealand requested consultations with the US in
respect of a safeguard measure imposed by the US on imports of lamb
meat from New Zealand .

• New Zealand alleged that by Presidential Proclamation under Section 203

of the US Trade Act 1974,
“US imposed a definitive safeguard measure in the form of a tariff-rate quota
on imports fresh, chilled, or frozen lamb meat effective from 22 July 1999”

• New Zealand contended that this measure is inconsistent with Articles 2,

4, 5, 11 and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards, and Articles I and XIX of
GATT 1994.
 VI
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• AOS, Article 4.2(a): Determining whether increased imports
are causing injury
To determine whether increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry,
the competent authority shall evaluate the share of the domestic
market taken up by increased imports, changes in the level of
sales, change in the level production, sales, productivity and so
on.

REASON: The United States International Trade Commission’s report did

not explain adequately the determination that there existed a threat of
serious injury to the domestic industry.
 VI
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• Article 4.1(c) N S IO
This article says that domestic industry can be defined as
1. Producers as a whole of like or directly competitive products
2. Those industries whose collective output of the like or
directly competitive product constitutes a major portion of
the domestic production.
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

REASON: The United States International Trade Commission, in the lamb

meat investigation, defined the domestic industry as including input
producers like producers of the lamp feed.
 VI
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• Article 4.2(b).  Determination of causative factors N
A TI
S
When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to
O
domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be
attributed to increased imports

REASON : USITC’s determination did not establish that increased

imports were by themselves a necessary and sufficient cause of
threat of serious injury, and in that the determination did not
ensure that threat of serious injury caused by “other factors”
was not attributed to increased imports;
 VI
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• Article XIX:1(a) of GATT N S T IO
If, as a result of unforeseen developments, any product is being
imported into the territory of such that cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or
directly competitive products, the contracting party may take
steps to remedy such injury. 

REASON : US has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of

GATT 1994 by failing to demonstrate as a matter of fact the
existence of “unforeseen developments”
 Panel & Appellate Body proceedings

• On 14 October 1999, New Zealand and Australia requested the

establishment of a panel.

• At its meeting on 27 October 1999, the DSB deferred the

establishment of the panels.

• Further to the second requests to establish a panel by New

Zealand and Australia, at its meeting on 19 November 1999, the
DSB established a single panel to examine the complaints
WT/DS177 and WT/DS178.

• Canada, the EC, Iceland and Japan reserved their third-party

rights.
• On 21 March 2000, the Panel was composed.

• The panel concluded that US has acted inconsistently with

Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 ; Article 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of
the Agreement on Safeguards.

• On 31 January 2001 US notified the DSB of its intention to

appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and
legal interpretations developed by the Panel.

• Appellate Body circulated its report on 1 May 2001

• The appellate body upheld the Panel’s finding that the US acted
inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 , Articles
2.1 ,Article 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards

• The DSB adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel
Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, on 16 May
2001.
 Implementation of Results
• US said that it intended to implement the DSB’s
recommendations in a manner that would respect its WTO
obligations.

• The US further stated that it would need a reasonable period

of time for implementation and, for that it would enter into
discussions with the complaining parties.

• At the DSB meeting on 21 November 2001, the United States

informed the DSB that on 14 November 2001 it had
completed the necessary legal steps to the DSB's
recommendations and rulings.
 REFERENCES

• Member Spending on Domestic Support, by Randy Schnepf, and CRS Report RL32916,

• Bown, Chad P (2009),

Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement, Brookings
Institution Press.

• “Brazil, Canada Subsidies Challenge Stalled Over WTO Panel Selection,” Inside U.S. Trade,
February 29, 2008.

• Brazil Changes Course by Filing Separate Case Rather than Joining Canada,” Jim
Wiesemeyer, AgWeb.com, July 12, 2007.

• Voxeu.com

• USDA, Farm Service Agency, Fact Sheet, Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment Program
Wild Rice, Fruit, and Vegetable Provisions, February 2003, at http://
www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/ publications/facts/html/fav03.htm.
• “Holding Up on the US Corn WTO Case,” Washington Trade Daily, Vol. 16, No. 88,
May 3, 2007.

• National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), “Fact Sheet: Growth Promotant Use
in Cattle
Production,”http://www.beefusa.org/uDocs/factsheetgrowthpromotantuseincattle
production811.pdf.

• Information on approved hormone products are at 21 CFR Parts 522, 556, and 558.
FDA requirements for the review and approval of new animal drug applications is
at http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceCompliance Enforcement/
GuidanceforIndustry/ucm123821.htm.

• CRS Report RL31860, U.S.-European Union Disputes in the World Trade

Organization.

• EC, “EU complies with WTO ruling on hormone beef and calls on USA and Canada
to lift trade sanctions,” October
• United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones
Dispute,” WT/DS320, First Written
• Yong-Shik Lee, “Critical Issues in the Application of thbe WTO Rules on
Safeguards,” Journal of World Trade, 34(2): 131-147, 2000.
• 1981 CV case on Lamb Meat (Lamb Meat from New Zealand, Inv. No. 701-
T-80 (Preliminary), USITC Publ. 1191, (Nov. 1981))
• Swinbank, Alan & Carolyn Tanner (1996). Farm Policy and Trade Conflict:
The Uruguay Round and CAP Reform. The University of Michigan Press:
Ann Arbor
• The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory Policy Innovation in theEuropean
Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies Nedergaard, Peter (2006). ‘The
2003 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy:
• Against all Odds or Rational Explanations?’ Journal of European
Integration 28(3): 203–223
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