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LINCOLN ELECTRIC IN CHINA

Clck t edi M ast subt t e st e i o t er i l yl

Khurshi M ar at d w Agha I an rf

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INTRODUCTION
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Lincoln Electric Company was established in 1895 by John Lincoln at Cleveland, Ohio. In 1907 his younger brother James Lincoln also joined him and in 1914 took over leadership of the company. James Lincoln believed in self reliance, human progress and equality of management & employees. He developed an incentive plan, based upon a piecework pay system that bucked the wage system. He also introduced the Employee Advisory Board, a committee focused on major operational issues within the rm which included elected representatives from each department.

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INTRODUCTION
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By 1925 he introduced the first employee stock ownership plan, and one of the rst in the United States. During the next three decades the rm developed a job evaluation system to determine base pay rates and instituted a merit rating to determine employee bonuses. Indeed, Lincoln has shared prots with its employees since 1934, based upon Jamess belief that employees must partake in the direct fruits of the company in order to feel properly motivated to serve the very best interests of the rm.

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LINCOLN PRODUCTS

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Welding Equipment Electric motors business Stick electrodes welding wires Plasma cutters Engine-driven welders Wire feeder/welders Robotic/automation systems and

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PIECEWORK PAY SYSTEM


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According to this system, each factory job is rated according to skills, required efforts and responsibilities. A base rate wage comparable to those in similar jobs and then piece rates are set so that an average worker can earn the base rate. The compensation system encourages employees to focus on quantity but also on quality. Workers must rework faulty pieces in their own time, and most products can be traced back to the individuals who produced them. Quality is one of the ingredients in
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YEAR-END BONUS
Year-end Bonus
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In 1934 Lincoln suggested that they instead share in any increased prots should have a bonus system. A merit rating procedure, determines the yearly bonus. done biannually,

Production employees are rated on four criteria:

Output: Based on the amount of work that the worker produces. Quality: By tracing who has produced defective product parts. Dependability: On the number of absences, late arrivals, availability for overtime, etc. Ideas and cooperation: By taking account of the individuals participation in the companys suggestion program

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INTRODUCTION
Other Features
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The company has a stock purchase plan for employees who have been on the job for one year or more. A mainstay of the Lincoln system is their employment guarantee, and in return, employees must be willing to perform any assignment and work overtime when needed. There are no reserved parking spaces for any employee and no executive dining room. An open-door policy is practiced by senior management, who will often know employees by their rst names. The Employee Advisory Board meets every two weeks to discuss, though not decide on, issues of concern to the employees.

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INTRODUCTION
Other Features
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Traditionally the president has run the meetings. The employees in the Lincoln plants dont belong to a union and there has never been a strike. Lincoln has for many decades followed a policy of promoting from within, and all jobs are internally announced. New hires are typically hired to the factory or as a trainee in sales or engineering (turnover rates are 24 per cent. There are no paid holidays or sick days. Employees pay their health care themselves, although the rm does help them with access to collective health insurance plans. A study showed that worker productivity in the US plants was two and a half to three times higher than that in similar manufacturing operations.

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INTRODUCTION
International Expansion
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By 1986, Lincoln Electric factories in four countries:

operated

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Two in the US

One in Canada (established in 1925)

Australia (1938)

France (1955).

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INTRODUCTION
International Expansion
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By 1992, Lincoln Electric maintained manufacturing plants in fteen nations, including Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the UK in Europe; and Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America.

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Massaro found the Lincolns naivety regarding the incentive scheme, believing It could be quickly and cleanly implemented in any foreign context, contributed to problems. On this point, outgoing chairman Willis seemingly agreed, estimating that its going to take three to four years to implement the Lincoln system in its international operations. Indeed, by 1994 only plants located in the US, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and France used the piecework and bonus systems.12 Of these, only the Mexican operation had been added during the rapid internationalization.

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The unionized plant had roughly175 workers. Some of the workers and union officials were brought to the US facilities to discuss the incentive system with the US employees As an outcome of the trip two of the Mexican workers decided to take a chance on piecework. They also received a minimum income. After they had started to make more money than their fellow workers, others started to ask if they could become part of the system, too. After two years, the entire operation adopted piecework.

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Exchai m an D onal H ast ngs al agr r d i so eed w i h M assar s t o di agnosi addi s, ng: The r oot cause of t cr si w as t he i s hat Li ncol s l n eader i udi s, ncl ng m ysel,had gr n over f ow confdent i t com pany abii i and i n he s lt es syst s ...W e had assum ed t em hat t i he ncent ve syst i em and cul ur coul be t ansf r abr t e d r er ed oad and t hat t w or or coul he kf ce d be qui y r i ed. ckl eplcat

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Lincolns trouble was not restricted to overseas operations. While Cleveland was performing exceptionally well given the circumstances, lifted by an inspiring local effort to generate sales and boost productivity employees gave up a total of 614 weeks of vacation time to meet elevated production and shipping goals) discontent was brewing amongst the ranks

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Despite the firms best efforts to uphold their incentive commitment to these employees (taking short-term loans to pay bonuses in 1992), the company found it difficult to uphold the same level of remuneration that employees were used to bonuses as a percentage of total compensation dropped to 4050 per cent. A minority of employees were discontented and there were even murmurs unionization.

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However, unionization ideas fizzled out as the firms fortunes rebounded in 1997 Lincoln paid out a record US$75 million in bonuses, up from US$65 million in 1996 (in 1996, more than twentyfive workers made over US$100,00016). More meetings were also held to try to better understand employee sentiment. By 1995, international operations started to enjoy growing profitability and competitiveness (but without the full Lincoln incentive system).

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After successfully managing the turnaround of the international operations, Anthon Massaro was appointed president and CEO of Lincoln in 1996, and in May of 1997 became chairman of the company. Massaro, better than anyone, understood now the problems Lincoln faced in their internationalization effort. he also recognized that the future prosperity of the firm relied upon increasing, not decreasing, global presence, and particularly within developing regions, such as Asia, where long-term growth was expected to outpace North America and Europe.

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To be sure, Lincoln as a whole would have to learn from its recent setbacks. But the lessons were complex the incentive system was working well in a number of fairly diverse cultural and legal settings, although not in all, and the firm remained committed to this tradition. Could it therefore work in most settings but under more benevolent start-up conditions? Was it mostly an issue of implementation, perhaps requiring the firm to attempt more greenfield start-ups, as opposed to (more culturally challenging) acquisitions? Or would Lincoln have to abandon its incentive system when it came to foreign operations, accepting the norms of each host country when it came to compensating and motivating employees? The next playing field would be in Asia.
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Lincoln Electric in Asia


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In the mid-1990s, Lincoln made a new effort at expanding its operations in Asia, following the closure of the Japanese operation. This followed the introduction in 1995 of a new management structure for the corporation consisting of new executive positions (presidents) and accompanying staffs to manage each of five key strategic regions: North America, Europe, RussiaAfricaMiddle East, Latin America, and Asia (including Australia).

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Michael Gillespie was appointed president for the Asian region, of British nationality and having joined Lincoln from ESAB, Lincolns principal competitor in Asia and in Europe. Asia was now a key target of the firm and Gillespie was called upon by Massaro to provide a fresh and aggressive strategy for the region. Gillespies plan was to create local (regional) competencies and construct an integrated sales and manufacturing business with Asia.

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The i ent on w as t st r nt i o op egar ng Asi Pacii as a m ar di a fc ket t w hi o ch w e coul expor ,t w hi w e coul sel our sur us pr d t o ch d l pl oduct on.So i w hat w e t i t do w as t br ng Li r ed o o i ncol t Asi r her t n o a at han j ust sendi Am er can or Aust alan pr ng i r i oduct i o Asi and deci s nt a, ded t hat t r ght t ng t do w as t pr he i hi o o oduce w i hi t r on f t r on, t n he egi or he egi pr oduct t s hat w er appr i e t t r on,r her t e opr at o he egi at han si pl m y t yi t sel pr r ng o l oduct t s hat w er r ght f t U S or Eur e i or he ope.( i M chael G il lespi e)

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A regional office was established in Singapore. The regional organization was to be responsible for strategic planning, technological support to the manufacturing units, and financial control. The regional organization had a high degree of autonomy from headquarters. The principal control consisted of following up that the region achieved its financial objectives. Gillespie was aided by Ray Bender, now the vicepresident for manufacturing in the Asia region. Bender was a veteran in the Lincoln organization and had worked for three years on restructuring the companys operations in Europe when, in 1995, he met Gillespie and opted to move to Singapore. Gillespie and Bender recognized that at least two issues would weigh heavily in their strategy for Asia welding
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With the exception of Japan, manual (stick) welding was still the predominant technique in Asia the shift semiautomatic and automatic welding was occurring only slowly and in concentrated areas. While Lincoln was competing, through export channels, in the more automated welding technologies, it was unable to compete in the stick welding market. High tariffs and considerable transportation costs, among other things, made exports of low-end consumables close to impossible. There were also a large number of national and regional competitors who were well established in Asia, although, Lincoln believed, without the dedication to quality and service that Lincoln wanted to bring to the 4/ 12 28/

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While this market on its own did not look attractive, pumping out mainly low-margin products, Gillespie and Bender knew that this was an important vehicle for building brand recognition, boosting the firms prospects in the automated machinery as new technology was absorbed Gillespie and Bender also recognized that motivating and managing employees wouldbe complex.

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Regional governments could prove to be unstable, legislation regarding the treatment of employees more complex or possibly ambiguous, and local attitudes towards Western firms and practices uncertain while some might welcome foreign operations, and the technologies and skills they bring with them, others might resent the presence of foreign firms and foreign practices Moreover, each nation brought with it very specific cultural traits that could inhibit (or, of course, promote) traditional Lincoln management practices.

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A strategy for Asia


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Gillespie decided to build operations in three locations: Indonesia, the Philippines, and China. The Indonesian operation was the first to be launched (1996/97), established as a joint venture with Lincolns local distributor (Lincoln would maintain a 60 per cent stake) The scope of operations, however, would be modest, focusing strictly on stick electrodes. Similarly, the Philippine operation, launched in early 1999, also focused exclusively on stick electrodes These would be the entry vehicles, along with the Australian operation, for providing the most commonly used products to the region. However, Gillespie recognized that Lincoln would also have to build capacity in the higher-end market, building 4/ 12 28/ the groundwork for the regions inevitable technological

G il lespi added: e Basi l t w el ng i caly he di ndust y st t w i h t st ck el r r ar ed t he i ect ode over a hundr year ago.I has m oved t ough t sold w i e f m of ed s t hr he i r or aut at on t t cor w i e.W hat w e have seen i m ost of Asi i om i o he ed r n a s t hat t m aj i y of t w el ng has been done w i h st cks and ver he or t he di t i y lt l has been done w i h sem i om at c pr ite t aut i ocesses.H ow ever m or i , e s bei done w i h aut at c and w e beleve t ng t om i i hat i w ilbe no dif ent t l f er her f om anyw her el fr of al,aut at c i m or pr e r e se i st l om i s e oduct ve, i secondl i r y t equi es som ew hat l r ess skil The dow nsi i t i t al l. de s he ni i i nvest ent cost but t s i am pl r m , hi s y epai by t pr d he oduct vi y once i t peopl under and i .W e e f e st t r ocusi on i her ng t e.

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J f ey Kundr ef r ach,expl ns: ai . The nat alhub f t s oper i w as Chi ur or hi at on na A l ge per ar cent age of t w el ng youlsee i Chi i st ck he di l n na s i el r ect odes.But t e a m ove t ar t hi her s ow ds he gher t echnol ogy t ype of pr ocesses,especi l t capi alze on t hi aly, o t i he gher ef i ency and pr fci oduct vi y of t i t hese syst s.Ther i a em e s t em endous num ber of st ck el r r i ect ode m anuf ur s and t act er he gover ent i ver i er ed i m ovi aw ay f om t nm s y nt est n ng r hat l er ow end t echnol ogy i o t hi nt he gher end G il lespi added t e hat t e ar l s of l her e ot ocaly ow ned st ck l i el r ect ode com pani t es hat ar fght ng each ot e i i her t deat and o h w e saw t oppor uni y t com e i w i h a good qualt he t t o n t iy [ om at c t aut i echnol ogy] bot f t Chi m ar , h or he na ket and f or expor . t

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Lincoln Electric, Shanghai Entering China


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Lincoln had established a representative office in Tianjin (northeast China) in the late 1980s, employing mostly local welding engineers who were sent to Cleveland for an eight-month technical training program and returned to China to help push Lincoln products. There were no direct sales efforts, however, as sales were solely through Lincolns local distributors. Although sales (both stick and automatic technologies) were modest, Lincoln was becoming better known in China and buyers associated Lincoln Electric with good quality. In 1996 a second representative office was added in Shanghai. Initially, Gillespie believed the best mode of entry for a new operation would be with a local partner, probably a state-owned manufacturing firm.
4/ 12 28/ Several meetings took place to discuss a possible joint

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The belief was that a local company could deliver the important distribution vehicle into the region, where customer contact seemingly required a local touch. In the end, Lincoln decided against a joint venture with a manufacturer, concerned with their outdated manufacturing processes and that Lincoln might not be able to adequately protect its intellectual property. There were also concerns about the Chinese firms ability to support the company in aggressively selling products in different parts of China Gillespie and Bender had also done their homework to find that there were a lot of horror stories of local joint venture partners, so we stepped back and took a breather for a while,
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Instead of a manufacturing partner, Lincoln decided to only seek the collaboration of its distributors. Thus, the investment in the Lincoln Electric (Shanghai) Welding Company was made, with a 68 per cent stake by Lincoln and 8 per cent by each of four of Lincolns distributors in Asia. Two of the distributors were already active in China and a third soon entered the market. To obtain permission to establish the wholly foreignowned firm, Lincoln had to agree to a 30 percent export quota.

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The decision to build an advanced manufacturing facility in Shanghai had good reasons. For one thing, Shanghai was home to the Pudong New Area, a massive new development area located southeast of the Huangpu river and home to a large number of free trade zones One of the free trade zones is called the Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, lying in the northeast of Pudong. It is adjacent to the mouth of the Yangtze river, 20 km away from the downtown core and 15 km away from the planned Pudong New Airport. It is the first comprehensive and multifunctional free trade zone in China, enjoying easy shipping access and a generous tariff system.

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For example, supplies could be imported tax free; only if the final products were sold on the Chinese market do customs and VAT have to be paid, then only on the nonChinese content. If the products are exported, neither customs nor VAT are paid on the imported supplies This was a crucial advantage as the plant could be used to serve other Asian markets with advanced consumables products. Lincoln also believed that by locating in Pudong it could avoid possible pressure from local governments wanting to protect their own manufacturing companies. Lincoln decided to lease a building site, providing it with flexibility concerning how to further develop Lincolns China operations
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The management team and method


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The young welding engineer appointed country manager In early 1997, Julius Wu was at our clients test shop, when he and general manager of the kneeled. for Chinafound out who Li was, almostShanghai operation. Harbin is No.1 for metal research and his qualifications and the originally from Taiwan and experienced in the Wu was way theyre be written on his business card mean a lot. electric motor industry in Taiwan and mainland China. Wu was first sent to Cleveland for an eight-week training program, and then returned to Shanghai to start the companys operations out of the representative office in Shanghai. Shortly after he arrived in Shanghai, Wu met Dr Li Yan. Dr Li was a professor at theb Institute of Metal Research at Harbin University and a well known expert in the Chinese welding industry, as one Lincoln manager recounted an encounter with a client representative:
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Li had also spent three years as a postdoc in the UK, was fluent in English, and a connoisseur of new welding technologies. An advocate for greater cross-cultural understanding, Dr Li was seen as a perfect bridge between Lincolns foreign technologies and management practices and Chinese business customs and attitudes. Not surprisingly, Wu offered Li the job as plant manager, which Dr Li accepted, having been actively searching for a position with a foreign firm.

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In the fall of 1997, Dr Li spent six weeks in Cleveland before starting to work on the start-up of the Shanghai plant. Li decided on all hires for the new company. The first three hires managers and technicians were all made through Lis contacts in the welding industry. Because managers and technical people tended to already know the Lincoln brand name they were relatively easy to hire. More difficult would be the skilled operators, who didnt recognize the Lincoln brand name and were relatively scarce.

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To get skilled people to apply for operator positions Li had to make several visits to peoples homes to inform them about the company. Soon, word of mouth helped spread the news of Lincolns job openings and positions were gradually filled. Virtually all of the employees had worked in the welding industry and would therefore be aware of industry practices in operations and employee management. Finally, most of the employees lived on the other side of the river, in old Shanghai, and were brought to the factory every morning by company bus or van.

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I spend one or two days through a three-month probation All employees had to go interviewing and working with each of them. I whom subsequently the floor to let him period, some ofassign some work onleft the company have others were for how leave. while a real feelingasked to this operation is functioning. And I try to get a real understanding of how the person is In several dont want to hireappearedand new hiresthem working. I of these cases it persons the then see lacked a clear understanding of what Lincoln expected. leave. Dr Li therefore began spending more time assessing and working with candidates

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At this point there was no system of guaranteed employment. Salary levels in the company were on a par with other foreign companies in Pudong, possibly slightly above. All employees, except the managers, were paid normal salaries. Dr Li was the only local person with a bonus clause in his contract.

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While Lincoln had transferred its used machinery to the new plant in Indonesia, in China it acquired brand new technology, rolled out simultaneously to both the Cleveland and Shanghai plants the idea was that each operations experience could benefit the other

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In fact, it turned out that there were fewer problems with the new production lines in China than were experienced in the Cleveland plant, Dr Li having worked extensively with suppliers and operators on the set-up of the machinery. There were also extensive communications between Cleveland and Shanghai

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While Julius Wu handled strategic issues, Dr Li was handling most of the technical interactions, spending late evenings communicating with Cleveland (twelve-hour time zone difference). Being responsible for the plant and also being the only technical person fully fluent in English, Li translated all instructions into Chinese. Every operator had a small book with written instructions for their job Thus, when Anthony Massaro officially opened the plant in May 1998, the operation was on course for a successful beginning. The final members of the management team were put in place in late 1998. In November 1998, Peter Grant was hired as sales and 4/ 12 28/ marketing manager. Grant, an Australian with a flare for

All of his sales people were university qualified welding engineers. The regional finance manager, Jason Foo, initially handled the finance and accounting function from his base in Singapore. In February 1999, Shan Bing, a Chinese accounting expert in his early thirties who had more than five years of experience from foreign investment companies in Shanghai, was hired as finance and control manager

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By March 1999, Lincoln Electric Shanghai employed forty employees in production, ten engineers and lab technicians, another ten service people, and ten administrative staff. The sales people were affiliated with the representative office in Shanghai and with the other offices in Tianjin, Xian, and Shenyang. By all accounts, the first year of Lincoln Electric Shanghai was a marked success and the company was experiencing very large growth, despite the slump in other parts of Asia and the downturn in the Asian economy in general. Lincoln executives were already looking into the possibility of expanding their operations into an increasing range of Lincoln products.
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Although the future looked bright, many critical issues were looming. First, there were concerns that product quality would be maintained as the operation grew and quality was emphasized as a key advantage of the Lincoln brand.

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Ray Bender : Wet ook al ki l nds of st eps t ham m er i qualt t di o n i y, o scuss qualt i y, m ake sur t e hat w hat w e m ake i w hat t m ar s he ket w ant ...W e go s over boar as f as our qualt assur d ar iy ance depar m ent i t s concer ned.W e i nvest a l of m oney i t [ ed ot n he qualt assur iy ance] equi ent and w e br ng audi or i f om t U ni ed St es on a pm , i t s n r he t at r egul basi so t ar s hat w e don get l l i o t nki t t uled nt hi ng hat ever hi i good.So t yt ng s hey com e i and audi t syst . n t he em

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The company also started to post production outcome and quality data on the board located in the workshop so that all employees could follow how the manufacturing process was running.

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Second, Julius Wu fell ill during the fall of 1998 and needed significant time for convalescence. While Jeffrey Kundrach, experienced in several of Lincolns foreign adventures, would fulfill immediate leadership needs as the general manager, it was uncertain how the leadership would play out in the future. But perhaps the trickiest issue for the company was if and when to introduce the distinctive Lincoln incentive system

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Lincoln devotees remained dedicated to the Lincoln way and believed strongly in the logic of bonuses and piecework. Although Lincoln had not attempted to introduce the incentive system in Shanghai, the issue was being seriously discussed. Regarding bonuses, Bender believed this was an important way of providing both meaningful feedback to employees while also having this feedback linked to something tangible. This was being considered throughout the plant, including the sales force. Yet bonuses were not considered sufficient motivators by themselves, certainly not as powerful as the piecework logic
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Bender expl ned ai Ther i a defni e advant e s i t age i si t ng dow n t i a year w i h al your n ti w ce t l em pl oyees and t lng t eli hem w hat t r st engt ar w her t hei r hs e, e hey coul do bet er w hat d t , w e have t do i o n or der t get our over lgoal I not ng el you need t do t ,i a o al .f hi se o hat t s w ay of f ci you or ng t si dow n and t k t your peopl t r l be f ank w i h t o t al o e o ealy r t hem on how t hey e doi r ng. You can m easur pi e ecer e w or ef i ency so you can di at k fci scuss t r hei out .A qualt put iy syst em w i h t num ber of r ect i al ver quant t i so you can t he ej s s so y i at ve si dow n and di t scuss hi qualt ver easiy.H i at endance can al be di s iy y l s t so scussed. But It nk,i you e l hi f r ooki t get anot ng o her 20 per cent out of your equi ent t best pm , he w ay t do t o hat i on pi s ecew or Pi k. ecew or i t day- ok s he t day dr ver i . Tw i a year t e i a ce her s 4/ 12 28/

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I dont see any workers were proving to be an open on The production of that here, I really dont. It depends and your approach and so amiable group so far. on, but you can walk down that line and theres nothing wrong with putting a hand on Grant suggested the dividing lines between management someones back and saying, How are you doing? or and workforcetry and carry on a conversation or evenas in whatever and were not necessarily as thick in China his native Australia if you cant speak the language, acknowledge them Any piecework system would seemingly require such mutual trust.

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Nevertheless, there were cultural impediments to consider. ]For one, the lack of a common language between workers and most managers might hinder effective communication. Also, having the workers bear more of the downside risk for poor company performance might not be acceptable in a country where people were generally not exposed to such remuneration systems

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Prolonged depression of peoples earnings might even raise accusations of exploitative practices and possibly introduce government intervention. The traditional Lincoln system would also require the ability of the workforce to speak out and make suggestions for improvements in processes something that would not come easily in the hierarchical Chinese society where superiors were expected to make initiatives and decide on most organizational matters. However, Grant, along with others, was trying to encourage the local employees to become more active:
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Ipush m y peopl t debat w i h m e,t ar e o e t o gue w i h m e at t r ght t he i t m e and Iw el i com e t t com e i and t lm e w her t he o n el e hey t nk I hi am w r ong w i h ei her a deci on or som et ng Ive sai or w hat I t t si hi d am pl anni t do.Ipush t ng o hem t do t . o hat

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Some, however, did not find the cultural impediments compelling indeed, they believed many workers would be more than willing to have their pay scheme clear, transparent and rewarding of hard work, the competitiveness involved something Chinese workers were not expected to shy away from. Furthermore, although traditionally there have been very small salary differences in Chinese organizations, a growing number of both foreign and local Chinese companies had recently introduced performance-based compensation systems.

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Som e of t Li he ncol m anager ar n s gued t hat t m ai concer w as i pl ent i and t m i he n n m em at on i ng,as Bender not ed: I m y i pr ts m essi t on hat pi ecew or i a concept t k s hat pr obabl coul be y d accept her but one of t t ngs t ed e, he hi hat w e have t be concer o ned about i t s hat i i not done f r y i coul end up bei a pr em .So f ts ai l t d ng obl w e have t do a l of hom ew or t m ake sur t o ot k o e hat w e e goi t r ng o keep t per he son busy i pi n ecew or t k, hat t pr ce st uct e t he i r ur hat w e set i f r and t s ai , hat i goi t sust n i sel.O ne of t w or t ngs you ts ng o ai t f he st hi coul do i set a pi d s ecew or pr ce and t k i hen r i t ealze hat you m ade a m i ake and t st hen go back and change i .Peopl don under and w hy t e t st you cut t r pr ce w hen t hei i hey w er m aki a l of m oney. e ng ot

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H i vi s w er shar by Kundr s ew e ed ach: You can i r t nt oduce a pi ece- at syst r e em unt lyou have a i st eady,st e pr abl ocess.And t s i hi s f new equi ent I new f t cor at on,peopl have or pm . ts or he por i e t go up a l ni cur o ear ng ve,and you cannot i r nt oduce a pi ecew or syst k em on t hat l ni ear ng cur you w oul have t adj ve d o ust t pi he ecew or syst k em al t t m e ...i you j ar t ar l l he i f ust bi r iy change t pi he ece r e because at som ebody i m aki 20 per s ng cent above t basi t he s, hen t he t ust f or i gone. r act s

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As Lincoln Electric Shanghai entered its second year it was at least clear that how to sustain growth and boost productivity while maintaining a motivated and committed workforce would have to be closely considered.

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