XIV.

Being as
Good, or Valuable
 ■ Meaning and Nature of the
Good
The next great transcendental property. This corres-
ponds to the other great drive of the human spirit: that
of the drive of the will toward BEING AS GOOD,
valuable.
valuable
● The good appears as the correlative of the appetitive
drive, i.e., as the object of our desiring, loving, valuing,
admiring, both sensitive and spiritual.
● Aristotle defines it as "that which all things seek.”
seek
● The good appears as the valuable:
valuable that which is, or
can be, the object of any positive act of valuing or
valuation, which in a very wide analogous sense can be
called an act of loving. Hence the good is that which is
in some way lovable.
 TRANSCENDENT
AL
Relation to being:
being The good does not add something on
to being that is really distinct from it as an absolute or non-
relative quality. The good signifies the object or being itself
that is valued, precisely as the object of valuation, i.e.,
considered in relation to some valuer.
Good as synthesis of objective and subjective poles.
poles
Problematic:
Problematic “Is something good (or called good) simply
because we seek it, or do we seek it because it is good?”
Is the good a purely subjective aspect that we confer on
things precisely by our seeking them, without it being at all
objectively grounded in the thing sought itself? Or does
the good signify something intrinsically in things that
makes them worth valuing by us or the valuer in question?
 ■ Meaning and Nature of the
Good
The proper understanding of the meaning of the good
should include both the objective and subjective poles,
i.e., -
The good is that which is valuable. i.e., possesses some
positive quality (or "perfection") that renders it apt or
worthy to be valued by some valuer.
Two main grounds for valuing something as good:
(a) as something perfective of the valuer, to be possessed
by the valuer: the good-for-me;
(b) as something to be admired, approved, esteemed in an
objective and disinterested way, as perfecting another, or
simply the universe as a whole, as good for being itself
(better that it be than not be).
 Since the goal or object of the will is this universal, unres-
tricted good, to love whatever is good, for itself, is precisely
the highest self-fulfillment and self-perfection of this faculty
and hence of the human being. Thus the metaphysical and
psychological paradox that the highest self-perfection for the
human being is precisely to go beyond his own particular finite
self and its immediate concerns in universal self-forgetting
love.

“He who loses himself shall find

himself.”
(1) The good is analogous like being, just as is the dy-
namic act of valuing of which it is the object, depending
on the varying kinds of appetites, kinds of objects
valued, and kinds of perfective relations involved.
(2) Moral goodness is that proper to a moral act, as
conforming to the moral norm of what ought to be done
here and now by a free and responsible person. This is
the concern of Ethics.
Ontological goodness belongs to the order of the is,
not the ought, and signifies that which is in fact valuable
or perfective of someone in the existential order, whether
he ought morally to seek it now or not. Our concern here.

■ KINDS OF
GOOD
 ■ HOW TO JUDGE OBJECTIVE
GOODNESS
What is the objective ground for discerning and judging this
value in things?
(1) The Relative Order:
Order the good in question is restricted to the
horizon of a particular being or type of beings. Such goods are
expressed linguistically in such ways as this: "This is a good
man. This is a good friendship, a good painting, good Scotch,
etc." Or it can also be expressed in "good-for" terms.
The good here is judged against the basic metaphysics of
nature as dynamic center of action, . . . nature as naturally
oriented towards its own self-fulfillment or actualization. An
objective good or value for a given being is whatever fulfills in
some significant way its natural potentialities--always
potentialities with a
view, of course, toward the integrated harmony of these
potentialities contributing toward the unified perfection or
fulfillment of the whole being as such.
(2) The Absolute Order of Being itself: itself This occurs
where a being or kind of being is declared to be in itself
without qualification a good or value in itself, as seen
within the whole horizon of being, i.e., on the absolute
scale of all being as intrinsically good. This is expressed
linguistic-ally in such ways as: "Friendship is good. Beauty
is good. Humanity is good. God is good.“
The basic norm for judging the good here is simply how
much a being participates in the basic perfection of exist-
ence, the degree of its fullness of being in relation to the
Infinite perfection of God as Ultimate Source of all being.
 Good as Transcendental
Property of Being: Every
Being is Good.
ARGUMENT: Why Every Being as Being Is Good
Every real being, precisely as
being, because it has some degree
of real existence of its own, stands
out from the darkness of non-being,
is good, and to be valued as such.

And since
Hence – every
the intellect,
will, following
since itsthe
natural
guidance
orientation
of its
is the unrestricted
intellect, is ordereddrive
by nature
to knowto love,
all oforbeing,
at least
is
fulfilled in
respond bysome
admiration,
way by knowing
to the any
wholerealunlimited
being.
range of real being, it follows that every real being
is a good, a value, to be admired for its own sake.
(2) Empirical argument: All living things exhibit a
fundamental drive or tendency toward survival, and
attaining the growth that fulfills their potential.
Hence their continued existence and growth is a
basic good, a basic value, so that its being appears as
a good for itself.
(3) Every being is a good for every spiritual intellect
and will. . . . From the very fact that something is at
all, it participates in the fundamental ground of all
perfection, the act of existence, which is also a
participation in the perfection of the divine nature
itself.
 The Problem of

Evil
The "existence" of evil raises serious metaphy-
sical problems for the metaphysician, especially if
he holds that all being is good.
 What is the nature or status in being of evil? Is it
a positive mode of being or merely a negation? How
can a being be both good and evil at the same time?
 Is the existence of a good God compatible with
evil?
evil If he is good and omnipotent, could he not
prevent all evil? If he does allow it and cooperate
with it, is he not responsible for it?
XV. Evil and
Being
 Nature and Status in Being of Evil
(a) Evil is a positive being or aspect of
being. Both good and evil are positive beings
deriving from two distinct ultimate Sources or
Gods, a God of good and a God of evil, who are in
conflict over the mastery of the world.
(b) Evil is matter, i.e., matter is source of evil.
(c) Evil is merely the metaphysical status of all
finite things as imperfect,
imperfect lacking some perfection,
affecting all things below God.
(d) Evil is a subjective illusion, due merely to
our incomplete
Conclusion: Evilfinite
is notview of the being
a positive universe from but
in itself a
islimited
rootedhuman
in someperspective.
form of negation, non-being.
 SOLUTION: Evil is a Privation of a Due Good
Step 1: Evil cannot be a positive being or mode of being.
being
(i) It is impossible to locate evil in any positive property
of a being or situation. Any time we analyze any case of
evil, we discover we cannot actually identify the evil
until we come to some negative or not-being element.
(ii) We could also argue this a priori: Since we have
already seen that all being is good, as through and
through in all its positive being a participation of God
no being in itself can be evil.
SOLUTION: Evil is a Privation of a Due Good

Step 2: Evil cannot be simply a negation.

By evil, we do not mean that which lacks some
perfection possible. We do not call a tree evil because
it cannot see, but we do a dog or man. Hence evil
must be that special kind of negation that we call a
privation:
Evil is the absence of some good or being that should
be present, i.e., Evil is the deprivation of some due
good.
It is precisely the gap between what is and what
ought to be (for whatever
Conclusion: reason)
Evil is the in a given
privation incase.
some
being of a good that should be there, or,
more brief-ly: Evil is the privation of a
due good.
Hence, evil is essentially a parasite on the good: it
can exist only within some positive good being. It
is the absence in some positive being of some good
that should be there. Pure evil is a contradiction in
terms: if there is nothing positive there which lacks
something, there can be no evil either; it destroys its
own base. Evil is always evil for and in something
positive, good. Pure lack is a lack of no one, hence
not a lack at all!
This solution, “EVIL IS NOT A REAL BEING,
BUT ONLY A PRIVATION RESIDING IN A
GOOD BEING, seems to be the most
reasonable. It does justice to the essentially
negative and relational character of evil and
yet keeps the balance between these two
truths:
(1) evil is not a real being in itself, no real
beings as such are evil; and yet –
(2) it is definitely true that many real
situations contain evil within them, so for
good reason can be called evil in their whole
relational context.
God by nature must be both omnipotent and all-
good (all-loving). Now if God is omnipotent, he
could prevent all evil. And if he is all-good, he
would do so, since it is the characteristic of a good
person to prevent evil wherever possible. But in
fact he does not prevent all evil, even though he
could, but allows a vast amount of it, both physical
and moral, as is evident in the world around us.
Therefore, it follows that God is either not
omnipotent or not all-good. In either case such a
being could not be God. Hence there is no God.
David Hume
THE PROBLEM OF GOD

God and
SOLUTION: There is a fundamental flaw in the
argument. The alternatives are incomplete. It is not
the case that a morally good and wise person is
bound to prevent any evil wherever it is possible to
do so. There is another condition not mentioned,
i.e., unless a greater good can be achieved by allow-
ing this lesser evil, which could not otherwise be
achieved.

God’s positive reasons for allowing precisely the

evil that he does allow remain for the most part a
mystery hidden from us in this life.
 Some general reasons why it is reasonable for
God to allow evil!

PHYSICAL EVIL: If God intervenes constantly to

block evil, it would radically change, even annul, the
basic nature of the world.
May it not be precisely because it is the vocation of
human beings as embodied spirits to work out their
destiny in a world where chance is at work?

God is responsible for physical evils resulting from

the actions of non-free agents, because he gave them
such natures to begin with, such that they can or will
inevitably produce some evils along the way. At least
he is ultimately responsible.
MORAL EVIL: God is not the cause of moral evil, not
responsible for it.
Although he cooperates positively, collaborates, with
all the positive good that any creature does when it goes
into action pursuing the good, he is not responsible for
the prior saying "No" to a higher good in which
precisely lies the evil. Since this is not a positive act, it
is our responsibility alone.
One of the highest perfections God has decided to
give to humans is the gift of freedom, intelligent free
self-governance of one’s life. But to take this gift
seriously, God allows us to exercise it freely – including
the possibility of making evil choices.
God's positive reasons for allowing
evil, precisely the evil he does allow,
remain for the most part a mystery
hidden from us in this life. But the fact
that evil remains a mystery does not in
the least entail that any valid objection
can be made out of it against God. All
such objections are logically invalid
because the basis necessary for their
proof is necessarily lacking to any hu-
man being: the infinite knowledge of
God himself. How could one show
that God could not bring some greater
good out of allowing this evil?