DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

The death of the defendant will NOT extinguish the obligation based on quasi-delict. An action survives even if the defendant dies during the pendency of the case if the said case is an action to recover for an injury or property by reason of tort committed by the deceased. The case will continue through the legal representative who will substitute the deceased.

Facts:

Maria Aguas Et.Al vs. Hermogenes Llemos (L-18107 Aug 14, 1967)

On 14 March 1960, Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar (Civil Case No. 4824), to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.

On 1 April 1960, before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. On 21 July 1960, the heirs filed a motion to dismiss, and by order of 12 August 1960, the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein

Issue: Whether or not even after the death of Hermogenes Llemos the complaint against him will prosper even after his death.

Resolution: It is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the case at bar) survive the death of the latter. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants;

for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and these words (also used by the Rules in connection with attachments and derived from the common law) were construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182, 189-194. to include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. (Art. 1106, Civil Code) An action based on quasi-delict prescribes in four years (4) from the date of the accident. (Art.1146, Civil Code)

Ernesto Kramer Jr. Vs Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 518 1989)

Facts: Early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.

Issue: Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.
Resolution:

The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, 16

This Court held as follows- The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.

It is believed that this is a complete defense in quasi delict cases and the defendant is therefore not liable if force was exerted on him. Persons using violence or causing fear are primarily liable for acts committed by third persons actiong under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear. If there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable secondarily. (Art. 101 Revised Penal Code)

When the defendant was forced to drive his vehicle by armed men. He was at pain of death, forced to drive at a very fast clip because the armed men were escaping from policemen. It is believed that the defendant cannot be held liable, if a bystander is hit as a consequence.