The Role of Professional Societies in Communication During a Nuclear Crisis: Lessons Learned from Fukushima

Paul T. Dickman,
Senior Policy Fellow, Argonne National Laboratory

Laura A. Scheele,
Communications & Policy Manager, American Nuclear Society

American Nuclear Society Special Committee Report

Speculation Substituted for Fact

much of the information of interest was
simply not available, with the result that at times speculation substituted for fact.

International Nuclear Safety Group letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano July 26, 2011.

Moving from Risk to Crisis Communication

Risk Communication- teaches, provides basic facts, builds public trust. Crisis Communication- informs, provides direction, controls misinformation. Prior to Fukushima, ANS focused primarily on risk communication.

How Fukushima Changed the ANS Communication Role

Fukushima was overwhelming: informing, not educating, was the immediate need. Fukushima was the major news story on a global basis, with 24-hour news coverage. Experts were created overnight without any credentials due to the media demands. ANS members demanded the Society counteract misinformation.

ANS Response-Main Media

Established list of credentialed experts to serve as media spokesmanclearing house for real experts. Organized fact checking network of ANS members to analyze technical information. Established information exchange between ANS members and Japanese colleagues to fact check media stories. Created support network to organize media placements and training.

ANS Response-New Media

ANS blogsite, ANS Nuclear Cafe, was converted to collect news and reference sources.

Used an ANS email listserv group of nuclear

professionals who are active in social media to counter misinformation and reach out to

traditional media.
Encouraged members to respond to on-line stories to correct information and post links to

factual stories and references.

Key Lessons Learned-1

With traditional media, ANS quickly exhausted society resources: volunteer spokespersons cannot volunteer indefinitely. The more that ANS became known as a credible source, the greater the demand became: ANS could not respond to the escalation due to resource limitations.

Key Lessons Learned-2

New media served as most effective communications outlet for both the public and media. Social media listserv became a real-time resource to obtain the expertise of ANS members and other nuclear professionals. Media professionals do read emails and comments posted by ANS members and did correct their stories.

Key Lessons Learned-3

ANS became reliable technical resource for TV news reporters but TV news producers wanted dramatic personalities. ANS became important resource in objectively analyzing unfolding events and providing informed speculation. Misinformation spreads quickly via new media. ANS had more flexibility to counteract misinformation that government or industry sources.

Next Challenges
How to maintain consistency and incorporate

lessons learned from crisis communications

into risk communication. How to improve the societys support of ANS

members who serve as volunteer educators

and communicators. How to work with government agencies in

helping with their crisis communication

efforts.

ANS Fukushima Special Committee Members

Dale Klein Michael Corradini Paul Dickman Jacopo Buongiorno Hisashi Ninokata Michael Ryan Craig Sawyer Amir Shahkarami Akira Tokuhiro Laura Scheele

Questions and Answers

Thank you for your attention.
ANS Special Committee Web Site Fukushima.ANS.org