Alexey Timofeev. Splintered Wind Russian PDF

XXI
XIV
Алексей Тимофеев
Расколотый
ветер
Русские и Вторая мировая война
в Югославии
Перевод на английский язык

Воина Майсторовича
Модест Колеров
М о с к в а 2 0 1 3
Alexey Timofeev
Splintered
wind:
Russians and the Second World War
in Yugoslavia
Translated by
Vojin Majstorović
Модест Колеров
М o s c o w 2 0 1 3
ББК 63.3(4Юго) 62-6
УДК 94(497.1) «1939/45»
Т 41
S E L E C TA
серия гуманитарных исследований под редакцией М. А. Колерова
Алексей Тимофеев
Т 41 Расколотый ветер: Русские и Вторая мировая война в Югославии / Пер.
на английский язык Воина Майсторовича. М., 2013 (на английском языке).
Вторая мировая война в Югославии сопровождалась тяжелой и многослойной
гражданской войной. События 1941–1945 г. были обусловлены, прежде всего,
экспансией Германии, которая пыталась сначала мирным путем, а после
и военными средствами подчинить себе территорию юго-востока Европы.
Сопротивление в оккупированной стране организовывали две силы, которые
имели разных внешнеполитических покровителей: пробританские, а позднее
проамериканские четники и просоветские партизаны. Во время войны
командование четников сделало ряд далекоидущих политических просчетов,
последовательно противопоставляя себя СССР, теряя поддержку англо-
американцев и неумело заигрывая с немцами, а лидеры партизанского движения
показали себя умелыми тактиками и мудрыми стратегами, ловко маневрируя,
и опираясь не только на СССР, но и на установленные отношения с англо-
американцами, а в самые тяжелые моменты вступая и в переговоры немцами.
В данном исследовании всесторонне изучена роль русского вихря, разбитого
на «красный» и «белый» потоки, но своими порывами вздымавшего бурю
на далеких Балканах. Какова была роль и судьба русской эмиграции в Югославии
в годы Второй мировой войны? Каков был вклад и численность подчиненных
А. Гитлеру коллаборационистов из Исторической России (Российской империи
и СССР) в борьбе с партизанами на Балканах? Как еще до начала Второй мировой
войны Коминтерн готовил к партизанской войне кадры будущих лидеров
югославского коммунистического движения сопротивления? Каковы были
взаимоотношения между четниками Д. Михайловича и СССР? Как советская
дипломатия и разведка влияли на развитие событий Второй мировой войны
в Югославии? На эти и на связанные с ними вопросы пытается ответить автор этого
исследования, опираясь на многочисленные архивные и мемуарные источники,
малоизвестную англоязычным исследователям литературу и сохранившуюся
в единичных экземплярах периодику времен Второй мировой войны.
978-5-905040-09-2 © А. Тимофеев, текст, 2013

© М. А. Колеров, состав серии, 2013
© С. В. Митурич, дизайн серии, 2005
In memoriam of Prof. Miroslav Jovanovic (1962/2014).
Unforgettable friend, You are always with us
CONTENTS
Translator’s foreword.............................................................................................. 9
Introduction...........................................................................................................13
The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia.................................17
I. ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN EMMIGRATION IN THE CIVIL WAR

AND THE OCCUPATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
Russian emigration on the eve of the civil war: from loyal minority to victims
of the April War.....................................................................................................29
Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia.............................................35
Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia..............47
The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia
during the war........................................................................................................63
The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country..............................67
The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on emigration and pro-German
Russian military units during the Second World War in Yugoslavia...................85
II. SOVIET COLLABORATORS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR

CONTRIBUTION TO THE GERMAN-LED MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
AGAINST THE PARTISANS AND THE RED ARMY
The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation
of the USSR? . .......................................................................................................99
Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia
and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945................................................................................. 113
III. ROLE OF THE USSR IN PREPARATION OF THE PARTISAN
AND CIVIL WAR
Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR until
the beginning of the Second World War............................................................. 141
Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing
for the partisan warfare.......................................................................................153
Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before
the Second World War.........................................................................................164
IV. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and

in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers
The Soviet influence on the launching of the struggle against the occupier
and the breakout of the civil war in Yugoslavia.................................................. 181
Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
before the War ....................................................................................................196
Contacts between the government in exile and četniks
with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 ........................................................... 215
Relations between the USSR and NOP...............................................................250
The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia..................................................268
Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation.....281
The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia.307
Conclusion...........................................................................................................330
Bibliography........................................................................................................334
Pictures................................................................................................................364
Translator’s foreword
Alexey Timofeev’s Splintered Wind: Russians and the Second World War in
Yugoslavia is a translation of his manuscript, which has been partially published
previously in various articles and books in Russia and Serbia from 2004–2012.
Timofeev’s exhaustive study illuminates the multiple ways in which White
émigrés and Soviet Russia influenced the course of events in Yugoslavia during
the Second World War. Naturally, a lot has been written about German policies in
the Balkans. As even a quick glance through this monograph’s bibliography will
reveal, much has also been written about the British involvement in Yugoslavia’s
prewar politics, their role in Yugoslavia’s civil war from 1941–1945, London’s
military support for Tito’s Partisans, and Churchill’s competition with Stalin for
influence in the postwar Balkans. However, far less is known about how the Soviet
Union shaped events in Yugoslavia during the war.
The Soviet dictatorship, which severely restricted access to its archives,
could be partially blamed for this shortcoming in the historiography. However,
Yugoslav Communists also sought to conceal the nature and the degree of Mos-
cow’s influence in Yugoslav affairs during this period. Socialist Yugoslavia’s
founding myths were its unique type of communism and Belgrade’s indepen-
dence from Moscow, which the Titoist regime maintained, could be traced to
the Second World War. Although much has been written in the last twenty years
to correct the Cold War era assumption that Yugoslav-Soviet relations were al-
ways riddled with difficulties, and furthermore, the assumption that the 1948
Tito-Stalin split was virtually inevitable, the Soviet role in Yugoslavia during
the Second World War remained unexplored in the English-language historiog-
raphy. In light of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, most Western
scholars understandably focused on ethnic relations and violence in the Balkans
in the period 1941–1945.
10 Translator’s foreword
However, without a proper understanding of the multifaceted nature of Russian

involvement in Yugoslav affairs, we simply cannot have a complete picture of the
region’s history. Splintered wind: Russians and the Second World War in Yugosla-
via fills this glaring gap in English-language scholarship. The present monograph
is based on extensive research in Russian and Serbian archives, libraries, memoirs
and contemporary newspapers. Additionally, Timofeev’s comprehensive study
brings to light the works of dozens of researchers from the former Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia who have labored since Perestroika on various aspects of émigré
Russian and Soviet connections with Yugoslavia during the Second World War.
Timofeev discusses wide-ranging forms of Soviet influence on the course of
events in Yugoslavia. These include (but are not limited to): the extensive Soviet
training of the future Yugoslav Partisan leadership cadres; Moscow’s changing
policies towards the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the eve of the war; the difficult
Soviet relationship with their British allies vis-а-vis Yugoslavia during the war, as
seen from Moscow’s perspective; the Kremlin’s role in the commencement of Par-
tisan military actions in Yugoslavia; the activities of the Soviet Military Mission
to Tito; the German deployment of sizeable Soviet collaborationist units against
the Yugoslav Partisans; the Red Army’s military operations in Yugoslavia in the
spring of 1944; and the Red Army’s relationship with the Serbian nationalist and
royalist Četnik followers of Draža Mihailović.
In addition, as Timofeev demonstrates, the large, well-organized and ir-
reconcilably anti-communist Russian community felt comfortable in Royalist
Yugoslavia in the interwar period. The Yugoslav authorities were, for most part,
sympathetic towards the plight of the Russian emigrants, while most Russians
living in Yugoslavia were loyal towards their second homeland. However, Rus-
sian mobilization in the German-led anti-communist crusade contributed to
the growing estrangement of ethnic Russians in Serbia from the wider Serbian
society, which, as the war progressed, was increasingly hostile towards the oc-
cupiers and their collaborators. Timofeev documents the exiled Russians’ varied
participation in the anti-communist struggle: personal contacts and friendship
between the Serbian far right and the leading Russian Church officials, the émi-
gré ties with the German military and political leaders in the Balkans, the Rus-
sian community’s fundraising for humanitarian causes, and their organization
into anti-Partisan military units which were deployed against Yugoslav Com-
munists. In view of the émigrés’ dedication to the anti-communist struggle, they
emerged as one of the most reliable anti-communist constituents in German-
dominated Serbia in the years 1941–1944. Arguably, it is impossible to have a
full picture of Serbian history during the German occupation without taking
into account the White Russian community’s extraordinary degree of mobiliza-
tion against communism.
Translator’s foreword 11
Timofeev’s study also illuminates numerous other issues, which could be of

interest to scholars in various fields. To cite just several examples, his book dis-
cusses at length how well-educated Russian emigrants contributed to Yugoslav
interwar society, culture and arts; Serbia’s wartime collaborationist government’s
activities; how émigré Orthodox Russians and collaborationist Cossacks in Croa-
tia fit into Ustaљa genocidal policies against the Orthodox Serbs; Red Army con-
duct towards the Serbian civilian population in 1944; and the military and social
encounter between the anti-Bolshevik émigré Russians, reinforced by Cossacks,
Vlasov’s army and various other units from the Soviet Union, and the Red Army
at the end of the war.
Although Timofeev’s book is primarily about Soviet and émigré organiza-
tions’ policies, he vividly and at times, extensively, depicts the human side of the
Russian factor in Yugoslavia during these extraordinarily tumultuous and violent
years. For example, he portrays the warm and alcohol fuelled encounter between
the Soviet Military Mission and leading Yugoslav communists after the former fi-
nally reached Yugoslavia, and the extremely difficult living conditions of the Red
Army soldiers who fought in the Balkans. Perhaps most tragic, and most poignant-
ly depicted, was the fate of the Russian émigré community in Belgrade which was
effectively annihilated when the Soviet and Yugoslav forces entered the city in the
autumn of 1944. At best, the White Russians were forced to flee from their second
homeland, a painful experience for many of them, which Timofeev illustrates with
clarity by quoting from émigré memoirs and poetry. At worst, they were hunted
down by Soviet security agents, and if they survived initial interrogations, they
were dragged to Soviet prisons.
Overall, Timofeev’s study presents a well-overdue look at Moscow’s role in
wartime Yugoslavia, from a perspective never seen before in English language
publications. As such, it will become an important resource for scholars interested
in the region.
Vojin Majstorović, University of Toronto.

From blood spilt in battles,
From powder turned into powder,
From suffering of punished generations
From souls baptized in blood,
From hateful love
From frenzied crimes
A righteous Russia will arise
For her I pray

And I trust in one eternal mission
She is forged by blasts of the sword
She is founded on the bones
In desperate battles she avenges
She is being built upon burning relics,
She is drowning in deranged prayers
Maximilian Voloshin, 1920
Из крови, пролитой в боях,

Из праха обращённых в прах,
Из мук казнённых поколений,
Из душ, крестившихся в крови,
Из ненавидящей любви,
Из преступлений, исступлений —
Возникнет праведная Русь.
Я за неё за всю молюсь

И верю замыслам предвечным:
Её куют ударом мечным,
Она мостится на костях,
Она святится в ярых битвах,
На жгучих строится мощах,
В безумных плавится молитвах.
Максимилиан Волошин, 1920

Introduction
In the 20th Century, Russia experienced a sharp and an unexpected schism.

Russian society was broken into two parts in 1917, as a result of internal and ex-
ternal circumstances. The Bolsheviks succeeded in gathering workers, peasants,
part of the intelligentsia and even the majority of the Russian Imperial Army’
General Staff under the banner of proletariat revolution and social justice. The
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Circassians, traditional-minded peasants from the Cos-
sack lands, monarchists and the University professors who preached democracy
and liberalism under the Czars rallied to the anti-communist camp. The victory of
the Reds in the Civil War (1918–1923) did not result in reunification of the society.
Instead, the schism was formalized with the emergence of two distinct, unequal
in strength, but conceptually opposed entities: the so called Soviet Russia and
Exiled Russia. The latter was comprised of the active first and second genera-
tion of Russian emigrants.1 The phenomenon of a divided nation by a civil war
was not something new in European history. To name just a few, there was the
American-English war in North America 1775–1783 and the French emigrants’
opposition to the republican France after the French revolution. However, Russia
was the first of several nations which were divided by a revolution in the 20th Cen-
tury. This division of Russia during the interwar period impacted other countries.
The Russian society’s fragmentation peaked during the Second World War.2 Some
1
See M. Јovanović, Ruska emigracija na Balkanu (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), for discussion of the
concept of Exiled Russia.
2
Over one million Soviets fought on Hitler’ side during the war. The sheer quantity of those willing to
assist the occupiers exposed divisions in the society as well as the fact that the wounds from the civil
war had not healed yet. The level of collaboration is also staggering in comparison with the insignificant
number of collaborators from the Russian Empire during the First World War (only the Polish legion)
or the small number of English soldiers in the service of the Nazis. See D. Littlejohn, Foreign Legions
of the Third Reich (San Jose: R. J. Bender Publishing, 1987).
14 Introduction
historians refer to the Second World War as “a European civil war.”3 According
to this theory, the events of 1936–1945 amounted to a great civil war between the
liberal (Anglo-American) and the totalitarian (USSR) variants of left-wing ideolo-
gies on the one hand, and the far right wing proto-fascist countries on the other.
What the Soviets and their liberal Western Allies had in common was the belief
in progress. Also, both were geared towards the modernization of their respec-
tive societies. Their opponents embraced the traditionalist, anti-modernizing and
anti-democratic ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism, Francoism and other similar
movements.4 In this theoretical framework, the great European civil war began
with the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), which anticipated the future fierce fight-
ing between Nazism and Communism. In this conceptualization, the liberal states
were less ferociously opposed to Nazi-fascism due to their resistance to suffering
high casualties which hindered the functioning of democratic institutions. The
temporary removal of the Soviet Union from the global slaughterhouse cannot
be explained by a genuine and natural geo-political partnership between Ger-
many and Russia. Instead, the Nazi-Soviet pact was a temporary reprieve before
a conclusive battle, which ultimately resolved the outcome of the European civil
war.5 The end of the war between the modernizing and the retrograde forces did
not bring an end to division of Europe, as it brought about a new conflict between
communist and capitalist camps.
These two wider civil wars influenced the situation in Serbia where several
internal conflicts raged. One civil war raged between the ‘Red’ Partisans on the
one hand, and ‘national’ JVuO (The Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland or also
3
This approach argues that as Europe lost its dominant position in the world, it simultaneously began
the process of forming a united European state. This theory was first formulated by K. M. Panikkar,
an Indian politician and historian. See K. M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance: a Survey of the
Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian History (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1953). In Europe,
however the idea of a European Civil War was first mentioned by the venerated American historian
S. Ambrose in the famous BBC Documentary The World at War. In scholarship, the notion that the
Second World War could be viewed as a European Civil War was raised in P. Preston and A. Mackenzie,
The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
R. Boyce delivered lectures from 2004 with the same hypothesis. For this, see R. Boyce and J. Maiolo
eds, The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
F. Ferrarotti from the University of Rome, A. Adamthwaite from University of California, Berkley,
and J. M. Roberts from The Duke University also contributed to development of this concept. Also,
see A. Adamthwaite, “The Spanish Civil War — ideological battleground of a European Civil War?”
(Keynote address at international conference “Democratic powers and the Right in interwar Europe”,
University of Salford UK, June 2006).
4
It is not accidental that these movements in various European countries, regardless how well estab-
lished they were, united in offering support to the Third Reich as the flag bearer of the anti-democratic
and anti-liberal tradition. Sometimes this happened even though there was traditional antipathy towards
the Germans (Zbor in Serbia, for example) or despite the formal lack of participation of its state in the
war (Falange in Spain).
5
It is indicative that German losses on the Eastern Front, as well as the Soviet losses, represent the major-
ity of military losses during the Second World War.
Introduction 15
known as Četniks) and soldiers loyal to the collaborationist government of Gen-

eral M. Nedić on the other. The second civil war was waged between the tradition-
alist forces of General Nedić and D. Ljotić who declared that they were fighting
on behalf of the traditional Serbian peasantry and Orthodoxy on the one hand,
and the modernizers on the other. The latter could be further subdivided into
D. Mihailović’s camp which raised the banner of liberal democracy and Josip Broz
Tito’s who fought for the workers’ democracy. In addition to this ideological back-
ground, the crisis of the Yugoslav state also resulted in an ethnic civil war between
the nations of that country (Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Kosovo Albanians, Vojvodina
Germans and Hungarians, Macedonians and Bulgarians). Even though the flames
of the ethnic civil war were obviously fanned by the neighboring countries, it
remains an undisputable fact that the majority of victims of the war in Yugoslavia
suffered at the hands of their co-citizens.6
Serbian society was bound to pass through the same path of Golgotha of na-
tional division which was experienced by Russia during the Revolution and the
Civil War. The Soviet Russia and Exiled Russia greatly influenced the Yugoslav
society, especially the Serbian society, in this process. However, if the Russian
society began to heal after the Second World War, with the divisions having been
definitely overcome in our time, the Serbian society’s schism was not bridged by
the Second World War, and intellectually, it remains present even in our time.7
The analysis of the Second World War in Serbia and more generally in Europe,
in the context of a multi-layered civil war, should not lead researchers to conclude
that this was a struggle between two equally criminal one-party dictatorships, as
6
According to recent statistical research, Germans killed around 125,000 Yugoslavs during the military
operations, the anti-Partisan actions and bombings. In addition, they exterminated 65,000 Jews from
Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. The number of Yugoslavs killed during the Second World War by oth-
er Yugoslavs was much higher. Only on the territory of NDH, the Ustaša henchmen murdered 320,000
Serbs. The total losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War were around one million people.
See B. Kočović, Żrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, (London, b. n. 1985); V. Žerjavić, Gu-
bici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Zagreb: Jugoslavensko viktimološko društvo,
1989); Z. Janjetović, Od Auschwitza do Brijuna. Pitanje odštete žrtvama nacizma u jugoslavensko-
zapadnonjemačkim odnosima (Zagreb, Srednja Europa) 2007.
7
Symptomatic of the healing of the wounds caused by the Russian Civil War is a conversation between
Vlasov, the Soviet officer, and Smyslovskii, a Civil War veteran, during their service in Wehrmacht: “in
April or May 1943, during a visit to the front around Pskov and Riga… after a good dinner, we talked
until four in the morning. The conversation lost its official character as Vlasov related to me at length
and very interestingly his military operations against the Germans. He was showing me on the map the
order of battle, and as he got carried away, he shouted: ‘Here we beat you well! ’ ‘Whom do you mean
you? — I asked him coldly. ‘The Germans of course’ — answered the general. ‘Ugh, so, you — com-
munists — defeated bloody fascists here? ’ Andrei Andreevich noted my expression and laughed. ‘No,
I think otherwise, ’ he said: ‘here Russians beat the Germans. Russians were always undefeatable! — I
added. ‘Of course! — answered Vlasov, and we dropped the fascist-communist topic, switching to
purely Russian topic, and in that way we found language which made it possible for us to have a very
interesting talk the entire night.” B. A. Hol’mston-Smyslovskii, “Lichnye vospominaniia o generale
Vlasove,” Suvorovets 30 (avgust-oktAJ, IABr’ 1949) 45–53.
16 Introduction
some German historians tend to do.8 A European wide civil war and civil wars
within several states definitely occurred. Yet, one must keep in mind that German
expansionism was an important factor in the war. Unlike the war on the Western
front, the wars in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were strongly influenced by
the Nazi regime’s perceived need for the so called living space. Apart from the
genocide of the Jews (the world history’s greatest and cruelest example of state
violence) and Roma, parts of the German elite led by Adolf Hitler wanted to con-
quer several Slavic nations. The Nazi leadership denied the statehood to countries
which stood in the way of German expansionism, while bringing into question
the physical survival of inhabitants of these states. The Poles, the Russians and
the Serbs belonged to this group of undesirable nations. Even the creation of their
military units (even as Wehrmacht’s allies) was permitted only after the worsen-
ing of the military situation for Germany. In its policies, the Reich relied on the
rich tradition of the Austrian Empire and tended to assign its dirty work to sepa-
ratist-minded nations in multinational Slavic states. For instance, the Nazis used
Ukrainians and to a lesser extent the Belorussian nationalists against the Poles,
while against the Russians, they utilized Baltic, Ukrainian and Asiatic nationalist
formations. Likewise, the Nazis deployed Albanian, Croatian and Muslim detach-
ments against the Serbs.
After the war, Yugoslav and Soviet ideology of proletariat internationalism
meant that their respective historiographies tended to deemphasize and marginal-
ize the ethnic aspect of these phenomena. The sensitive character of multinational
states also contributed to historians ignoring the fact that the resistance move-
ments in the USSR and Yugoslavia until 1944 came largely from nations most
threatened by the Nazis: the Serbs and the Russians. Neglecting the existential
character of the Second World War for the Serbs and the Russians would be as
wrong as ignoring the civil war which happened within these two nations. How-
ever, the question of ethnic character of the war is beyond the scope of this study.
The subject of our research is the character of the encounter between the Serbs
and the Russians within the context of the civil war in Serbia and Yugoslavia dur-
ing the Second World War.9 The first and main task of this study is to analyze the
Russian factor in Serbia and Yugoslavia during the civil war and to highlight the
multidimensional nature of the Russian involvement. The second very important
point is to reassess certain myths which pervade the Serbian and Russian histo-
riographies. The third goal is to attempt to analyze the mutual perceptions of the
Serbs and the Russians during the war, as an important factor which helped forge
8
I. Gofman, Stalinskaia voina na unichtozhenie, (Moscow: Ast-Astrel’, 2006).
9
Therefore, we will assess the Yugoslavs’ activities in Moscow during the war (the diplomatic mission,
activities of KPJ members and the formation of the 1st Yugoslav Brigade) as they related to the Soviet
involvement in Yugoslavia’s civil war.
The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia 17
the present-day mutual images of Serbian and Russian societies and elites. Within
the framework of this question, it is central to distinguish between realistic and
idealized mutual images and to determine the consequences of the lack of clarity
on this issue.
The historiography
of the second world war in Yugoslavia
The Second World War has probably been studied more extensively than any
other topic. Nonetheless, this subject is still relevant. The bibliographies and mono-
graphs on the Second World War can be divided into following categories:10
1) International background to the war and causes of the war

2) War in Europe and North Africa:
а) German invasion of Western Europe 1939–1940.
b) The Battle of Britain.
c) Operation Overlord and liberation of Western Europe.
d) Soviet-German war 1941–1945.
e) Battles for Mediterranean and North Africa, 1939–1945.
f) The Battle for Atlantic
3) War in the Far East:
а) War between Japan and China
b) Japanese expansion and collapse of colonial European Empires
c) The Battle for Pacific
d) The end of the war in Far East in 1945.
4) War’s periphery:
а) Colonial inheritance and war
b) War and the Latin American countries
c) War and the Middle Eastern Countries
d) War and the Sub-Saharan Countries
e) War and the British Commonwealth
5) Broader themes in the war:
а) Intelligence and special operations
b) Occupation and the so called New Order
10
E. L. Rasor and L. E Lee, World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a
handbook of literature and research (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 45–58; G. Weinberg, A World
at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
18 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia
c) Collaboration
d) Resistance movements
e) Economic mobilization in the Second World War
f) Prisoners of war and internees
g) Genocide and the Holocaust
h) Migration: refugees, expellees and people without homes in the war and
after it
i) The Influence of the war — mobilization and global changes in econo-
my — on society
j) Women and children in the Second World War
The scholarship from the superpowers which directly participated in the con-
flict in the Southeastern Europe is voluminous. The Anglo-Saxon historiography
has several monographs11 and monumental The History of the Second World War
which was published by Office of Public Sector Information.12 German histori-
ography of the Second World War also has several monographs,13 but its main
contribution is the ten volume Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite published by
Weltkrieg Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt between 1979 and 2008.14 The
main contribution of the Russian historiography is the six-volume Soviet-era
Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945 gg and the
twelve-volume Istoriia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1941–1945.15 The events in Yugosla-
via 1941–1945 were of limited significance within the framework of these classical
histories, as well as in the framework of the outlined scheme of division of topics
of the Second World War. It is evident that “the Yugoslav front was important.
However, it was one of many theatres of war, and not amongst those where the
decisive battles were waged by the great world powers.”16
11
J. F. Fuller., The Second World War 1939–1945. A Strategical and Tactical History (London: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1948); W. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 Volumes, (Cambridge: The Riverside
Press, 1948–1953); H. Liddell, History of the Second World War (London: Cassel, 1970).
12
Numerous volumes were published. The volumes were divided into series: United Kingdom Military
Series, United Kingdom Civil Series, Foreign Policy Series, the Intelligence Series, Medical Series.
There are also several volumes which are not part of the series. The first volume appeared in 1949,
and last in 1993. Presently, the second edition of several volumes is being published, most recently in
2004.
13
K. Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1959).
14
Especially impotant for Yugoslavia is the third volume, G. Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel:
Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa — Von der “non belligeranza” Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt
der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart:: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979).
15
Istoriia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1941–1945 6 volumes (Moscow: Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony
Soiuza SSR, 1973–1982) and Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945gg
(Moscow: Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony Soiuza SSR, 1960–1965).
16
M. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima kraljevske vlade i namesništva 1941–1945: (propaganda i stvar-
nost)” (PhD Dissertation, Belgradeski Univerzitet, 2004), 1.
The British and American,17 German,18 and Soviet19 historiographies formu-

lated their approaches to the Second World War in Yugoslavia relatively clearly.
The literature in English language offers the richest insight into the history of the
British and the American policies in the Balkans, especially towards Yugoslavia.
It also sheds light on Četnik and Partisan movements, their conflict and relation-
ship with the Anglo-Saxon allies.20
It must be noted that the Russian historiography is stagnating, as it continues
to focus on topics which it already explored. In these circumstances, it is hardly
in a position to offer something new to historiography of Yugoslavia.21 However,
the publication of Soviet documents, which until recently have been inaccessible
to researchers, have illuminated the events in Yugoslavia.22 The published docu-
17
M. Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1968); P. Auty and R. Clogg, eds, British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece
(London: Macmillan press, 1975); E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War,
London: Macmillan 1976); M. C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940–1943 (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1980); M. McConville, A Small War in the Balkans: British Military Involvement
in Wartime Yugoslavia (London: Macmillan 1986); W. Deakin et al., British Political and Military Strategy
in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1988); K. Ford, OSS and the
Yugoslav Resistance, 1943–1945 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992).
18
K. Olshausen, Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber. Jugoslawien und Griech-
enland von März bis Juli 1941 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973); K. H. Schlarp, Wirtschaft
und Besatzung in Serbien 1941–1944 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986); Sundhaussen H.,
Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens in nationalsozialistischen Großraum 1941–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1983).
19
S. S. Biriuzov, ed., Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v bor’be za osvobozhdenie narodov Iugoslavii (Mos-
cow: Voenizdat, 1960); V. I. Klokov, Bor’ba narodov slavianskih stran protiv fashistskikh porabotitelei
(1939–1945) (Kiev: AN-USSR, 1961); V. N. Kazak, Pobratimy. Sovetskie liudi v antifashistskoi bor’be
narodov balkanskikh stran (Moscow: Mysl’, 1975).
20
W. R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941–1945 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1973); M. J. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975); J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); L. Kachmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik
Movement, 1941–1942, New York: Gardlan Publishing Co., 1987); M. Wheeler, “Pariahs to Partisans
to Power: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia” in Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Eu-
rope, 1939–1948, ed. T. Judt (London: Routledge, 1989); Trew S., Britain, Mihailovic and the Allies,
1941–42 (London: Macmillan, 1998).
21
The Russian monographs which deal with the events in Yugoslavia 1941–1945 usually offer the ex-
panded version of the Soviet thesis from the 1960s. N. Vasil’eva, Balkanskii uzel, ili Rossia I “iugo-
slavskii factor” v kontektste politiki velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh v XX veke, (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-
MG, 2005); A. L. Moshchanskii, Na zemle IUgoslavii, Belgradskaia strategicheskaia nastupatel’naia
operatsiia (28 sentiabria — 20 oktiabria 1944) (Moscow: BTV-kniga 2005); A. L. Moshchanskii,
Bitva za Balkany. Boevye deistviia v IUzhnoi Evrope 28 oktabria 1940–1 iiunia 1941 goda (Moscow:
BTV-kniga 2007). Nonetheless, there are several Russian authors who have new approaches. A. Timo-
feev, “General Milan Nedich i ego pravitel’stvo. Serbskaia istoriografiia” in Dvesti let novoi serbskoi
gosudarstvennosti, ed. Volkov V. K. (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2005); N. Pil’ko, Sloveniia v gody
okkupatsii (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2009); S. Beliakov, Ustashi: mezhdu fashizmom i etnicheskim
natsionalizmom (Ekaterinburg: NOUVPO Gumanitarnyi un-t, 2009).
22
N. Lebedev and M. Narinskii eds., Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow:
RAN-IVI, 1994); L. Reshin et al., 1941 god v 2 knigakh (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond ‘Demokrati-
ia’, 1998); O. Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill. Vstrechi. Besedy. Diskussii: Dokumenty, kommentarii,
ments pertain to Stalin’s secretariat, NKID (The People’s Commissariat for For-
eign Affairs), NKVD (The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which in-
cluded the secret police), RU RKKA (the military intelligence) and the Comintern
(The Communist International).23 In addition, Russian studies of collaboration in
the USSR during the Second World War have added new insight into this topic as
it relates to the Balkans.24
Recently, the British and American scholars, and to a degree their German
counterparts, have begun to reevaluate the Serbs’ contribution to the anti-Nazi war
effort, while reassessing the importance of Nedić’s regime for the Nazis.25 The au-
thors of these studies are also redeveloping the fairly old thesis which minimizes
the significance of March 27 and Yugoslavia’s entry into the war, in comparison to
the more persistent Greek resistance.26 Also, some Western scholars are reexam-
ining the thesis about the prevalence of anti-fascist sentiments amongst the Serbs
of Serbia and NDH (the Independent State of Croatia), effectively placing terms
Serbian (associated with Četniks) and anti-fascist (associated with the Yugoslav
1941–1945 (Moscow: Nauka, 2004); A. Korotkov, A. Chernev and A. Chernobaev eds., Na prieme
u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.) (Moscow: Novyi
khronograf, 2008).
23
I. Linder and S. Churkin, Krasnaia pautina: tainy razvedki Kominterna. 1919–1943 (Moscow: RIPOL
Klassik, 2005); E. A. Primakov, ed., Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki 6 volumes (Mos-
cow: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, 1997–2006); V. A. Kirpichenko, ed., Pozyvnye voennoi razvedki
(Vospominaniia veteranov sluzhby radiosviazi voennoi razvedki) (Moscow: Geia, 1998).
24
About Vlasov and his project see S. Drobiazko, Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia (Moscow: AST,
200); K. Aleksandrov, Ofitserskii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945 (Saint
Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr “BLITS”, 2001); K. Aleksandrov, Protiv Stalina.
Vlasovtsy i vostochnye dobrovol’tsy vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine. Sb. statei i materialov (Saint Petersburg:
IUventa, 2003); K. Aleksandrov, Armiia general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova 1944–1945. Materialy k is-
torii Vooruzhennykh sil KONR (Saint Petersburg: SpBGU, 2004). About the Cossacks in the service of
the Third Reich see H. Felmy, The Cossack Corps. (n. p.:US Army Historical Division, 1946); S. Dro-
biazko, “Vostochnye legion i Kazach’i chasti v sostave Vermakhta,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo
osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); A. Khodo-
borodov, “Rossiiskoe kazachestvo v emigratsii (1920–1945 gg): sotsial’nye, voenno-politicheskie i
kul’turnye problem” (PhD Diss., MGU im. M. V. Lomonosova, 1997); A. Okorokov, “Kazaki i russkoe
osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,,
ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); N. Bugai, Kazachestvo Rossii: ottorzhenie, priznanie,
vozrozhdenie (Moscow: Mozhaisk-Terra, 2000); V. Belovolov, Kazaki i Vermakht (Murmansk: Stanitsa
Leningradskaia, 2003); P. Krikunov, Kazaki. Mezhdu Gitlerom i Stalinym. Krestovyi pokhod protiv
bol’shevizma (Moscow: Iauza, 2005). About the Caucasian and the Central Asian units which fought
on Hitler’s side, see G. Mamulia, Gruzinskii legion v bor’be za svobodu i nezavisimost’ Gruzii v gody
Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Tbilisi: Mamulia, 2003); O. Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legiony vo vtoroi mirovoi
voine (Moscow: AST, 2004); E. Abramian, Kavkaztsy v Abvere (Moscow: IAuza, 2006).
25
W. Manoschek, Serbien ist judenfrei. Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien
1941 / 42 Schriftenreihe des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1995);
P. Cohen and D. Riesman, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History, College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1996.
26
M. Von Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941: the Balkan Clue (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973); A. Zapantis, Hitler’s Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1987).
Partisans) in opposition to each other.27 This position has scholarly roots in the
Yugoslav historiography which equalized Četniks with fascists,28 and the Serbs’
memory of Jasenovac with the Croats’ memory of Bleiburg.29 In addition to these
studies colored by contemporary politics, there are recent histories of the Second
World War in Yugoslavia based on studious scholarly research. These studies have
reevaluated the realistic dimension of the partisan war in Yugoslavia, the damage
which the resistance movements caused to the Third Reich and the role of the al-
lies in spreading the flames of the civil war in Yugoslavia.30 Regardless of the ex-
isting diversity of scholarship, Dž. Sadković argued that there are few non-biased
English language studies about the Second World War in the Balkans.31
Present-day Serbian scholarship is in the process of reassessing the old Yugo-
slav historiography. However, it has practically failed to incorporate recent histo-
riographical trends in its scholarship.32 The Yugoslav historiography of NOB (The
National Liberation War) was voluminous, but its narrow focus on the communist
party considerably diminished its value. The quantity of research on the topic of
NOB in Yugoslavia can be judged by Bibliografija NOR-a, published in 1989,
which dealt only with Serbia. It listed 8,997 titles.33 An important tool for re-
searchers is Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije, which
was published in 1949–1985 and has 161 books.34 The best Yugoslav scholarship
is Branko Petranović’s voluminous study.35 Zundhauzen correctly concluded that
Yugoslav “literature about Yugoslavia / Serbia in the Second World War is almost
27
M. Hoare, “The Chetnik-Partisan Conflict and the Origins of Bosnian Statehood Yale” (PhD Diss Yale
University, 2000); M. Hoare, “Whose is the Partisan Movement?: Serbs, Croats and the legacy of a shared
resistance,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies V. 15 / 4 (2002); M. Hoare, Genocide and resistance in
Hitler’s Bosnia: the Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
28
The traditional Yugoslav historiography directly influenced these newer trends. For example, see
A. Dedijer and A. Miletić eds., Genocid nad muslimanima 1941–1945: Zbornik dokumenata i
svjedočenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990); E. Redžić, Bosna i Hercegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu (Sa-
rajevo: Oko, 1998); E. Redžić, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War trans Aida Vidan
(New York: F. Cass, 2005); Hoare, Genocide and resistance.
29
H. Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka (Belgrade: Clio, 2009), 367.
30
K. Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944 (Hamburg: Mittler, 2002); Heather W., Para-
chutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Lon-
don: Hurst, 2003).
31
J. Sadkovich, “North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater, 1939–1945” in World War II in Europe,
Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a handbook of literature and research, ed. L. Lee
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 144.
32
An exception is S. Pavlović, Hitlerov novi antiporedak. Drugi svetski rat u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: Clio,
2010).
33
Z. Panajotović, Bibliografija o narodnooslobidlačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji Srbije 1941–1944.
Godine: (knjige, brošure i članci 1944–1985) (Belgrade: Republički odbor SUBNOR Srbije, 1989).
34
Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda, Volumes 1–14
(Belgrade: Vojnoistorijiski institut, 1949–1985) = Zbornik NOR-a.
35
Petranović B., Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945, Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar,
1992).
endless.”36 Hence, it is possible to identify only the basic historiographical direc-

tions of these studies.
The Serbian historiography of the Second World War can be divided into sev-
eral groups. The first group seeks to shed light on the number of Serbian victims
during the Second World War.37 The second group, which deals with the end of
the Second World War and the period right after it, explores the impact of the Par-
tisans’ victory on the Serbian civil society and Serbia in general. This relatively
recent but popular approach follows two contemporary historiographical trends:
calculating the number of victims of the communist regimes while examining so-
cial history in decisive historical moments.38 The third group studies JVuO and it
represents a natural reaction to decades-long diminishment of the realistic signifi-
cance of Mihailović’s movement.39 This group has produced scholarship which is
well grounded in sources. However, there are also a large number of highly biased
studies amongst both the supporters of Partisans and Četniks.40
There are few newer studies of the occupation of Serbia and Yugoslavia, even
though there is a series of monographs which discuss the political and economic
aspects of the occupation.41 Unfortunately, the recent Serbian historiography has
36
Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 366–367.
37
For historiography of this group, see: M. Koljanin, “Istraživanje holokausta u Jugoslaviji” Izraelsko-
srpska naučna razmena u proučavanju holokausta (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2008). One
of typical works which exemplify this approach to studzing the Second World War in Yugoslavia is
M. Bulajić, Jasenovac ustaški logori smrti: srpski mit?: hrvatski ustaški logori genocida nad Srbima,
Jevrejima i Ciganima (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1999).
38
D. Bondžić, Belgradeski univerzitet: 1944–1952 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004);
S. Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića: represija u Srbiji. 1944–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu
istoriju, 2006); N. Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: Institut za
savremenu istoriju, 2009).
39
K. Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999); B. Dimitrijević
and K. Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović. Biografija (Belgrade, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004);
G. Davidović and M. Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja, knj.
1–3, (Čačak: Medjuopštinski istorijski arhiv, Kraljevo: Narodni muzej, 2002–2004).
40
On the one hand, there are publications by various explicitly pro-Partisan organizations such as SUB-
NOR branches, Society for the Truth about National Liberation War in Yugoslavia (Društvo za istinu
o NOR-u i Jugoslaviji), The Union of Anti-Fascists of Serbia (Savez antifašista Srbije). These publica-
tions include: J. Radovanović, Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović u ogledalu istorijskih dokumenata (Bel-
grade: Fondacija “Dragojlo Dudić”: Sekcija boraca Druge proleterske srpske brigade, 1996); B. Latas,
Saradnja četnika Draže Mihailovića sa okupatorima i ustašima (1941–1945). Dokumenti, Belgrade,
1999; M. Zečević, Dokumenta. Album iz istorije ravnogoroskog pokreta (Belgrade: Subnor Jugoslavi-
je, 2001); Stupar D., Patriotizam ili izdaja. Ravnogorsko četništvo 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Društvo za
istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945, 1999). There are also, on the other
hand, their similarly committed ideological opponents, M. Samardžić, General Draža Mihailović i
opšta istorija četničkog pokreta (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 1999); M. Samardžić, Borbe četnika protiv
Nemaca i ustaša (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2006).
41
M. Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak” i jugoistočna Evropa: 1940 / 41–1944 / 45: planovi o budućnosti
i praksa (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991); D. Aleksić, Privreda Srbije u Drugom
svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002); and the exhaustive research by
B. Božović Specijalna policija u Beogradu: 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Srpska školska knjiga, 2003) which
not produced any wide-ranging scholarship on society in Serbia and Yugoslavia

during the occupation.42 As a result, there are only highly prejudicial studies on
this topic from the communist period, and in part, some foreign works cover this
subject.43 Another gap in contemporary Serbian historiography is the shortage of
source-based studies which would objectively assess the Partisan movement with-
out the communist regime’s ideological fetters. Although there are no such recent
scholarly studies on these topics, there is a series of very polemical works which
rely on dubious sources.44
The complex situation in Yugoslavia during the Second World War45 was fur-
ther complicated by the fact that the events of 1941–1945 had the character of a
civil war.46 The numerous historiographical approaches and the divided memories
expanded the older Yugoslav historiographal research: B. Božović, Beograd pod komesarskom upra-
vom 1941 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998); M. Kreso Njemačka okupaciona uprava u
Beogradu, 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Istorijski arhiv Belgradea, 1979)..
42
There are few exceptions, however. See M. Savković, Kinematografija u Srbiji tokom Drugog svetskog
rata 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti, 1994); O. Milosavljević, Potisnuta istina: ko-
laboracija u Srbiji 1941–1944, Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006); Lj. Škodrić,
Ministarstvo prosvete i vera u Srbiji, 1941–1944. Sudbina institucije pod okupacijom (Belgrade: Arhiv
Srbije, 2009).
43
M. E. Reed, “The Anti-Fascist Front of Women and the Communist Party in Croatia: Conflict within
the Resistance” in Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. T. Yedlin (New York: Praeger,
1980), 128–139; B. Jancar, “Women in the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement: An Overview,”
Studies in Comparative Communism 14 (1981), 143–64; B. Jancar “Yugoslavia: War of Resistance,” in
Female Soldiers, ed. N. Goldman (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 85–106.
44
On the one hand, there are publication houses like Pogledi and others on the right of the political
spectrum. M. Samardžić, Saradnja partizana sa Nemcima, ustašama i Albancima (Kragujevac: Po-
gledi, 2006). On the other hand, there are their political opponents from the Society for the truth about
National Liberation War and their publications such as: Ustanak 1941. — 60 godina posle: (govori i
članci), (Novi Sad: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945, 2002);
Ćolić M., ed., Odbrana istorijske istine o NOR-u i SFRJ: zbornik saopštenja i diskusija sa tribine: Da
li đaci u Srbiji uče falsifikovanu istoriju, održane 17. januara 2003. godine u Beogradu (Belgrade:
Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945, 2003); Ćo-
lić M., ed., Antifašistički narodnooslobodilački rat u Jugoslaviji i savremenost: zbornik saopštenja i
diskusije sa istoimenog okruglog stola, Belgrade, 26–28. novembar 2003 (Belgrade: Društvo za istinu
o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945, 2004).
45
This situation in the Serbian historiography has been noted by numerous Serbian scholars. See:
T. Kuljić, Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka (Belgrade:
Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002); K. Nikolić, Prošlost bez istorije: polemike u jugoslov-
enskoj istoriografiji, 1961–1991: glavni tokovi (Belgrade: Institut, za savremenu istoriju, 2003). Bjela-
jac M., ed., Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije. Viđenje srpskog faktora, zbornik radova (Belgrade: Institut za
savremenu istoriju, 2007).
46
The situation is somewhat similar in Slovenia where attempts “to move beyond the civil war” appear to
have been more successful than in Serbia: Z. Klanjšćek, Pregled narodnoosvobodilne vojne 1941–1945
na Slovenskem 1941–1945 (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1989); J. Vodušek-Starič, Prevzem oblasti
1944–1946 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1992); B. Godeša, Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam: slovenski
izobraženci med okupatorji, Osvobodilno fronto in protirevolucionarnim taborom (Ljubljana: Cankar-
jeva založba, 1995); P. Borštnik, Pozabljena zgodba slovenske nacionalne ilegale, Ljubljana: Mladin-
ska Knjiga, 1998); B. Godeša, B. Mlakar and M. Šorn, “Žrtve druge svetovne vojne v Sloveniji,” in
Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2002); B. Mlakar, Slovensko
domobranstvo: 1943–1945: ustanovitev, organizacija, idejno ozadje, (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica,
of the civil war deserve to be studied on their own. In the last hundred and fifty
years, civil wars erupted in several countries with rich historiographical tradi-
tions: the USA (1861–1865), Russia (1917–1922), Spain (1936–1939) and Greece
(1946–1949). Regardless of circumstances of each of these civil wars, there was
only one way to overcome the legacy of the civil war in historiography: to exam-
ine the positions of all belligerents, without exception, and to analyze their moti-
vations and visions of the future, as well as to account for crimes committed by all
sides. The reasons why one side triumphed in a civil war need to be understood,
but attempts to compensate the losing with a “historiographical victory” should
be avoided.
2003).
Белград
Вернусь-ли я к тебе? Увижу-ли и скоро-ль

Глубизну твоих сливающихся рек
И обезумевший, ослепший город,
Где я была счастливей всех?
Н. Б., 1944
Я вновь брожу по улицам знакомым

Тем, что когда‑то отняла война…
Как хорошо! Я здесь — своя. Я — дома.
И словно юность мне возвращена.
Какой размах у всех воспоминаний.

И сколько лет ложится в каждый миг.
Я в этот парк спешила на свиданье…
А в этот дом за пачкой новых книг.
Сюда, дрожа, бежала на экзамен,

А там сиял искусства строгий храм…
Тоску о нем я пронесла годами
по всем ненужным и чужим путям.
Мне улицы протягивают руки,

Встречая дочь заблудшую свою,
Но после долгой и глухой разлуки
Не каждый дом в лицо я узнаю.
Я знаю: нет к прошедшему возврата,

Но все-ж душою, полною тепла,
Ищу окно, в которое когда‑то
Любовь, еще неузнанной, вошла.
Оно, как встарь, распахнуто. Навеки!

(Как неизменно счастье двух людей…)
А там, вдали, обнявшиеся реки
В голубизне немыслимой своей.
И старый парк, и церкви, и «Споменик» …

О, город мой, прости меня, прости!
Ведь неповинна я в своей измене,
Война смешала все мои пути.
Я — не твоя! Повернута страница.

С другой страной я связана судьбой.
Но ты всегда, всю жизнь мне будешь сниться
И в сердце яркой вспыхивать звездой.
Нона Белавина, 1977

Belgrade
Will I return? Will I soon see

The depth of your flowing rivers
And insane, blinding city,
Where I was happiest the most?
N. B., 1944
Again I am wondering in known streets,

From which the war took me away…
How good it is! I am here-my own. I am at home.
As if they returned my youth to me.
What speed the memories have.

And how many years can fit in one moment.
To this park I hurried to a date…
And to this house to collect a batch of books.
Trembling here I ran to an exam,

And there shone strict temple of arts…
Sorrow for it I carried for years
On all useless and foreign paths.
Streets offer their hands to me,

They are waiting for their lost daughter,
But after lengthy and complete separation
I cannot recognize the face of every home.
I know that there can be no return

But still with soul full of warmth,
I search for a window which once
An unknown love, unrecognized, entered.
It is, as formerly, open. Forever!

(As is the happiness of two people…)
And down there where rivers embrace
In its inconceivable blueness:
And old park, and church and “Monument”

Oh, my city, forgive me, forgive!
Because I am not at fault for my betrayal,
The war mixed up all my paths.
I am not yours! The page has turned.

With another country the destiny tied me.
But always, for eternity I will dream of you.
And in my heart I will protect you as a star.
Nona Belavina, 1977

I
Role of the russian

emmigration in the civil
war and occupation
of Yugoslavia
Russian emigration on the eve
of the civil war: from loyal minority
to victims of the April War
In early 1941 around 30,000 Russian emigrants lived in the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia, who obtained high level of rights and freedoms due to support of the ruling
Serbian elite. The life of the Russian emigration in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
has drawn considerable attention from historians who noted the Russians’ con-
tribution to science, arts and education in Serbia.1 In a largely agrarian country
after the destructive First World War, relatively well educated and trained Russian
emigrants succeeded in obtaining high positions in society.
First of all, the number of Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia must be deter-
mined. First important demographic characteristic of Russians in Yugoslavia was
their constant decrease in numbers from their arrival until the end of the 1930s, as
a result of natural mortality and immigration. The second characteristic was the
slowing down of this process and eventual stabilization of the Russian population
at the end of the decade, as children grew up and became adults. The total number
of Russian emigrants in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1937 was 21, 150.2 Accord-
ing to the census carried out in June 1941, around 20,000 Russian emigrants lived
in Nedić’s Serbia.3
1
V. A. Tesemnikov, “Rossiiskaia emigratsia v Iugoslavii (1919–1945),” Voprosy Istorii 10 (1982);
O. Đurić, Ruska literarna Srbija 1920–1941. Pisci, kružoci, izdanja (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje
novine, 1990); IU. A. Pisarev, “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Iugoslavii,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 1
(1991); V. I. Kosik, “Russkaia IUgoslaviia. Fragmenty istorii 1919–1944,” Slavianovedenie 4 (1992);
M. Sibnović, M. Mezhinskii and A. Arsen’ev, eds., Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka, zbornik
radova Volume 1–2 (Begrad: Filološki fakultet, 1994); M. Jovanović, Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u
Kraljevinu SHS 1919–1924 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).
2
Around 42, 500 Russian emigrants resided in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1924,
Jovanović, Doseljavanje, 163–186.
3
This information was based on the report of individual Russian colonies collected by the Bureau
30 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia
Until the withdrawal of German forces from Serbia in the autumn of 1944,
the number of Russians in Serbia fluctuated. First, the older generation could not
survive the hungry war years. Second, part of younger emigrants with or without
families moved to Germany and other European countries where they could find
employment more easily. Third, a number of Russians joined the German war ef-
fort in the East as translators, technical specialists and volunteers (their numbers
were not too large as a result of German suspicions of all Russians). Despite these
three factors, the number of Russians in Serbia increased as a result of concentra-
tion of the forces of the Russian Defense Corps and smaller police units comprised
of Russians from the entire Balkan Peninsula (NDH and other occupied parts
of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, as well as parts of the USSR under
the Romanian occupation). In exceptional circumstances, family members joined
these German mercenaries in Serbia.4
The social status of Russian emigrants in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not
only determined by their formal status as refugees (Yugoslavia offered the Rus-
sian emigrants more rights and privileges than any other country), but also by very
strong and informal connections with the Serbian-dominated elite of the interwar
Yugoslavia. These informal connections were based on the Serbian elite’s love
for Russia, devotion to Orthodoxy, generally conservative (but not traditional-
ist) views, opposition to communism and the shared belief that extreme left-wing
views must be repressed with violent methods.5
All of this meant that Russians were loyal to Yugoslavia and the ruling
Karađorđević dynasty. Their loyalty was based on friendly attitudes of a large
part of the Serbian elite towards Russian emigrants. These circles were led by the
King Alexander Karađorđević (1888–1934) and Patriarch Varnava Rosić, both of
whom were educated in Czarist Russia and sympathized with the Russian refu-
gees. Therefore, the Russian community in Yugoslavia comprised mostly of active
participants of the civil war and their families. The Russian colony turned into the
center for right-wing Russian émigrés, and as such was markedly different from
(GARF, R-6792, o. 1–2) and parts of the census are still preserved in the Special Police funds (AJ, IAB,
f. UGB SP II, d. 44–41).
4
The question of the families of the soldiers, from the occupied Soviet territories, serving in the Rus-
sian Corps emerged in early 1944. The Germans tended to transfer these families together with other
Soviet refugees to Galicia, which caused concern among their relatives from ROK (VA, k. 31, f. 1, dok.
14 / 1–56.
5
As a result, the following was quite popular amongst the Russians in Yugoslavia: lectures on military
topics, educating male children in the military (Cadet) institutions and reading military books. A large
number of books on military topics were continuously republished, illustrating the Russian commu-
nity’s interest in martial topics and science. J. Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice u Kraljevini SHS / Jugoslaviji.
Bibliografija radova 1920–1944. Pokušaj rekonstrukcije (Belgrade: Univerzitetska biblioteka “Sveto-
zar Marković”, 2003), 15–16.
Russian emigration on the eveof the civil war: from loyal minorityto victims of the April War 31
liberal émigré societies in Prague and Paris.6 This was apparent to Russian emi-
grants who came to Yugoslavia: “On the [train — A. T.] station in Novi Sad — as
if from the grave, a resurrected a picture of distant past [appeared — A. T.]: general
in Russian uniform with two Georges [sic! medals on the chest — A. T.]. Here in
Yugoslavia, many Russian soldiers have preserved their Russian uniforms.”7 The
positive atmosphere towards refugees from Red Russia was further cemented by
the Yugoslav government’s principled anti-communism, its refusal to establish
diplomatic ties with the USSR and to allow the legal existence of a communist
party.
After the death of King Alexander, who was a graduate of the elite Russian
school Pazheskii Corps, and the death of Patriarch Varnave, who studied at the
St. Petersburg’s Spiritual Academy, the Russian emigration lost its support in the
highest echelons of the Yugoslav state. Prince Paul, who took over after Alexander,
was born in St. Petersburg in 1893, and his mother was a Russian aristocrat. Upon
birth, he received Russian citizenship, obtaining Serbian citizenship only in 1904.
Nonetheless, his parents’ divorce in 1895 and more importantly his education at
Oxford University turned him into a classical Anglophile, who sympathized with
the British conservative circles. Patriarch Gavrilo, who had negative experiences
with Russian monks in Dečani monastery in his youth, was much colder towards
Russians than his predecessor Patriarch Varnava.8
In the menacing international situation, the Yugoslav and the Serbian rul-
ing elite began to polarize over foreign policy. The key question was whether the
country should orient itself towards Germany, Britain or the USSR. An improve-
ment in relations with the USSR would have led to mellowing of the regime’s
anti-communism, and therefore, invariably it would have worsened the status of
Russian emigrants. Improvement of ties with Germany or Britain did not influ-
ence the position of emigrants, but it increased the probability of Yugoslavia’s
involvement in the war. Yugoslavia no longer had the powerful political leaders
who could secure its neutrality.
Spring of 1941 brought the war to Yugoslavia’s doorstep. The gigantic battle
between Nazi Germany and democratic Britain shook the world. Each side had
its victories and losses, its fumbling ally (Italy and France) as well as a vision of
future for Europe and the world. It must be emphasized that the dark secret of the
Holocaust was not known yet. The USA and the USSR had still not joined the
6
Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVA), f. 730, o. 1, d. 173, 26.
7
Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 269.
8
Maevskii V. A., Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, (New-York: Istoricheskii
kruzhok, 1966), 225, 257; R. Radić, Život u vremenima; Gavrilo Dožić (1881–1950) (Belgrade: Institut
za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006). L. V. Kuz’micheva, “Predstaviteli imperatorskogo doma Romanovykh o
Karageorgievichakh i Petrovichakh, “ in Novovekovne srpske dinastije u memoaristici, ed. Živković T.
(Belgrade: Istorijski institute, 2007) 261–284.
war, and the British prospects for victory against Hitler seemed slim, as the Nazis
controlled almost entire Europe.
With hindsight, it can be concluded that there were no reasons for Yugoslavia
to join the war. At the time, all of Serbian territories were gathered within Yugo-
slavia. Also, all of Yugoslavia’s neighbors lost territories due to the creation of the
South Slavic state. Yugoslavia was an offspring of Versailles, and with the fall
of France, the Versailles system ceased to exist. Internal situation (tense ethnic
relations, political instability, and the youth of King Peter II), also did not favor
Yugoslavia joining the war.
Partial involvement of Yugoslavia in the Triple Alliance in these circumstanc-
es seemed logical, if absolute neutrality could not have been preserved. Virtually
all neighboring countries (except Greece) had already joined the Nazi-led bloc.
Therefore, the entry of Yugoslavia into the pact would definitely undermine their
open desire for partition of Yugoslavia, which in their view, was the last relic of
Versailles in the Balkans. The Comintern, to put it mildly, did not follow friendly
policy towards Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the price of joining the Triple Pact
was exceptionally small.9 Moreover, as Hitler pointed to Yugoslav negotiators,
Berlin was in an alliance with Moscow.10 The alliance was signed, and Yugoslav
politicians received “from German side a firm guarantee of their neutrality.”11 The
British government organized a coup d’état in Yugoslavia even though it knew
that the assistance from Britain would be unlikely and in the best of scenarios
only symbolic.12 The coup was followed by massive disorders on the streets of
Belgrade.13
Churchill wrote in his memoirs without a trace of remorse: “On the morning
of April 6 German bombers appeared over Belgrade. When silence came at last on
April 8, over seventeen thousands citizens of Belgrade lay dead in the streets or
under debris. Out of the nightmare of smoke and fire came the maddened animals
released from their shattered cages in zoological gardens. A stricken stork hobbled
past the main hotel, which was a mass of flames. A bear, dazed and uncompre-
hending, shuffled through the inferno with slow and awkward gait down towards
the Danube.”14
9
Yugoslavia would not have been forced to offer assistance to Germany and Italy militarily. It also did
not have to allow the Axis troops to transfer through Yugoslavia. Germany also guaranteed Yugoslavia
territorial integrity and it promised “to take into account interests of Yugoslavia in gaining access to the
Aegean Sea, which could be realized through recognition of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the port city
of Thessaloniki.” (N. D. Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika fashistskoi Italii. Ocherk Diplomaticheskoi
istorii (1936–1941), (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 241.
10
W., Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voina Volume II (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991), 76.
11
N. Belov, Ia byl ad’iutantom Gitlera (Smolensk: Rusich, 2003), 328.
12
Churchill, Vtoraia, 76.
13
Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika, 242.
14
Ibid., 86.
Russian emigration on the eveof the civil war: from loyal minorityto victims of the April War 33
After the attack by Germany and its allies on Yugoslavia, the Russian emi-
grants expressed, through their representatives Metropolitan Anastasii and Vasilii
Shtrandman (the head of the Delegation for Defense of Interests of the Russian
Refugees), “endless devotion of the Russian emigration and their unshakeable loy-
alty now and in future…”15 The editorial of the semi-official newspaper Russkii
golfs’ called on their compatriots to “restrain from conversations, to mind their
own business, and if necessary, to fulfill their debt towards the country which ac-
cepted them with such hospitality.”16
Russian refugees (as other citizens of Serbia) viewed the deliberately cruel
bombardment of Belgrade on April 6, 1941,17 as “brutal and senseless.”18 Belgrade
refugee colony was the biggest in the country, and therefore, numerous Russian
refugees became victims of the German air raid. The bombing did not only take
human lives. The fires engulfed Serbian (National Library, Patriarchy, and others)
and Russian cultural institutions. The scientific institute N. P. Kondakov building
was almost completely destroyed, as well as its library. In addition, D. A. Rask-
ovskii, the secretary of the Institute and researcher of nomadic nations was incar-
cerated by bombs together with his young wife.19
The Russian emigrants called up for military service answered the call unwav-
eringly. As a result, 12 % of Russian participants of the April War lost their lives.20
Nonetheless, on April 17, Yugoslavia quickly surrendered as a result of treachery
of the internal subversive elements (of several separatist minded national minori-
ties). In the midst of this catastrophe, 173 Russian emigrants found themselves
together with Serbian soldiers and officers in the German prisoner of war camps.
Majority of the Russian prisoners (officers, military technicians, military engi-
neers, pilots and air-defense specialists) were kept in the infamous Colditz Castle
between Leipzig and Dresden.21 The partition of Yugoslavia divided the Russian
emigration since maintaining contacts between disparate parts of occupied Yugo-
slavia became suddenly very difficult.22
15
Russkii golos, April 6, 1941, 1. Interestingly, this pronouncement did not represent the view of all the
Russian emigrants. Even though Germany was an enemy of the Russian emigrants’ host country, Yu-
goslavia, Russians infrequently sympathized towards Germany. Famous director Iurii Rakitin recorded
this pro-German attitude in his journal. See Iu. Rakitin’s uncatalogued Dnevnik in Pozorišni muzej
Vojvodine in Novi Sad.
16
Russkii golos, April, 6, 1941, 1
17
Belov, Ia byl, 332.
18
G. Ostrgorskii, Zametki k Slovu o polku Igoreve (Belgrade: Institut imeni N. P. Kondakova, 1941), 5.
19
Ibid., 1.
20
Šenšin A., “Sadašnje stanje ruske emigraciјe u Јugoslaviјi, 23. 11. 1943, MIP, prilog Pov. br. 6544 / 43”
in Јakovljević R., Rusi u Srbiјi, (Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2004).
21
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), R6792, o. 1, d. 515, p. 1.
22
Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-153, pp. 1, 2.
The attitude of Russian refugees towards Germany was quite ambivalent.

On the one hand, they viewed Germans as enemies who attacked their second
homeland, while on the other, considerable number of Russian emigrants in Yu-
goslavia felt antipathy towards their allies from the First World War, France
and England. A renowned Russian scientist, Professor N. V. Krainskii,23 de-
scribed these sentiments in his voluminous book which attracted the attention
of numerous Russian refugees in 1940: “the crimes of our former allies from
the Great War against Russia are countless. Among them: assistance to foreign
states in spreading the flames of the revolution and support for the Bolshevik
regime in Russia during the previous twenty-five years. A series of Western
European political leaders continue the activities of the French and the English
ambassadors in Petrograd, who participated in the overthrow of the Imperial
government and afterwards supported the Soviet system… they wholeheartedly
supported the February revolution, the alliance of Miliukov-Kerenski, and af-
ter all this, the devastating for Russia Versailles peace treaty and separation of
western territories from Russia. Apart from all of this, they also played with the
White movement as a cat plays with mouse…” 24 Numerous Russian emigrant
authors and philosophers who were popular in Russian émigré circles supported
the Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War. The most well-known
among them were authors P. Krasnov and I. Shmel’ev, while not far behind them
was Ivan Il’in, the authoritative philosopher whose writings are viewed today
as the ideological foundation of modern Russia. He greeted the arrival of Nazis
to power in 1933 and was not willing to unconditionally condemn them even in
1948.25
Obviously, the majority of Serbs did not approve of such attitudes. As a result
of the Versailles Treaty and the interference of Britain and France in the Balkans,
most Serbs viewed the Western Allies in a positive light. Moreover, many Serbs
viewed the USSR as ‘mother Russia’, which signed a treaty of friendship and mu-
23
N. V. Krainskii (1869–1951) — a notable Russian scientist and psychiatrist, he worked on developing
a theory to treat patients who were chronically mentally ill. He was a Monarchist and he participated in
the Civil War in Russia. He taught at the Department of Psychiatry and experimental Psychology at the
University of Belgrade from 1928. He published more than 200 scholarly works. He returned with his
family to his native city of Kharkov in USSR, where he continued to pursue his interest in science until
his death. For more information, see P. T. Petriuk, “Professor Nikolai Vasil’evich Krainskii — izvestnyi
predstavitel’ otechestvennoi psihiatricheskoi shkoly (k 135 letiiu so dnia rozhdenia),” Psikhichne zdo-
rovia 2 (2004): 89–93; A. D. Kaplin, “Kto ne zahochet sdat’sia — inogda sumeet vybrat’sia. Zhiznen-
nyi put’ i nasledie N. V. Krainskogo (1869–1951): Kratkii ocherk,” (paper presented at the conference
Mezhdunarodnyi nauchnyi simpozium Khar’kovskii universitet i serby, Kharkov, Ukraine, 2009.
24
N. V. Krainskii, Fil’m russkoi revoliutsii v psikhologicheskoi obrabotke (Belgrad: Sviatoslav, 1940),
461.
25
P. A. Nikolaev, ed., Russkie pisateli XX veka. Biograficheskii slovar’ (Moscow: Simpozium, 2000),
778; N. Mikhalkov, Manifest Prosveshchennogo Konservatizma (Moscow: Sibirskii tsiriul’nik, 2010);
I. Il’in, “O fashizme,” in Sobranie sochinenii: v 10 t., ed. Lisitsa IU. (Moscow: Russkaia kniga, 1993).
Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia 35
tual assistance with Yugoslavia on the eve of the bombardment of Belgrade. The
dark side of communism (camps, destruction and expulsion of the national elite)
was skillfully hidden by communist agitators. An important segment of Yugoslav
society, workers and students mainly, viewed the communist ideology with con-
siderable sympathy.
Therefore, the Russian refugees’ unrelenting hostility to communism began
to influence how the local population viewed the Russian community as a whole.
S. N. Paleolog, who was in charge of the Russian refugee question in the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, described this attitude in 1921 in a secret report to
General Lakumski: “members of the higher classes act towards us without any
judgment (the government, clergy, intellectuals, and officers). All of them under-
stand very well Russia’s role in Serbia in the past and in the future, and they view
their assistance as their debt… the middle class (citizens of cities and traders) are
perfectly indifferent towards Russians, viewing us as a good element for exploita-
tion (they charge us a lot, especially for rent) and they always try to begin con-
versations with how Serbs are putting aside three millions for Russians. Feelings
of sympathy are very rare. Peasants, with whom we had very little contact, have
a benevolent attitude towards us, but they are honestly uncertain and they always
ask us: ‘why did we travel here from Russia’”.26
Russian emigrant civil organizations

in Yugoslavia
The standard German policy after occupying a European country was to orga-
nize the life of the local societies, including the Russian emigrants, by creating one
united organization which would answer to the security institutions of the Third
Reich.27 This forceful restructuring meant that all other organizations and press
would be abolished, while the legal association would be strictly controlled.
Russian emigrants immediately began to seek a new way to organize after
the occupation. As a result, conflicts erupted. On April, 10, 1941, the Commit-
tee for First Aid to Victims of the Bombardment met in the Russian House. The
committee comprised of S. N. Latishev, N. I. Goloshcapov, D. A. Persiianov and
R. A. Folkert. In the same building on April 13, with the help of Shtrandman
and financed by Americans, free food was provided with posters stating: “Ameri-
26
Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 260–261.
27
S. V. Karpenko, ed., Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym. Rossiiskaia emigratsiia i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (Mos-
cow: RGGU, 2004).
can Red Cross provides free lunch.” The Committee posted a written announce-
ment displaying its displeasure about the American involvement, and on May 15,
members of the Committee warned the representatives of the German occupying
forces about their opponent’s activities.28
This was not the only accusation which the right wing Russian émigrés
made against Shtrandman, who worked in the Russian embassy in Belgrade
before the First World War and was appointed Russia’s ambassador to the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by the Admiral Kolchak’s Omsk govern-
ment.29 Towards the end of the 1930s, an anonymous brochure was published,
which Gestapo believed, was written by the Don Cossack Colonel Rodionov.30
The pamphlet accused Shtrandman of being a Mason, which he and his friends
denied.31 It also charged him with being sympathetic towards left-oriented or-
ganizations, while sabotaging right-wing organizations, adding that majority of
his colleagues were “left-wingers… and destroyers of Russia and deceivers of
the emigration.”32
In similar vein, Vladimir Kutirin, an enthusiastic German collaborator de-
nounced Shtrandman, in order to reveal his true character, as he claimed.33 Kutirin
accused him of stealing money from the State Credit and cooperating with the
British intelligence. After the occupation, Shtrandman admitted to Gestapo that
he had friendly relations with the British embassy employees and that they hunted
and played tennis together in the diplomatic tennis club. He also confessed that
his acquaintances included British intelligence agents,34 who were in charge of
intelligence and subversive activities in the English embassy.35 According to Sh-
trandman, one of the British intelligence officers, Preen, offered him a salary of
3,000 dinars per month to become a British informer, but supposedly, Shtrandman
rejected the offer.36 It is difficult to determine whether Shtrandman was telling the
truth, but either way, Germans firmly believed that Shtrandman was not fit to be
28
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, 55.
29
M. Jovanović, Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevinu SHS 1919–1924 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture,
1996), 63, 66–68.
30
Probably, the author was the well known writer Ivan A. Rodionov, an author of numerous stories about
the life of Don Cossacks.
31
It is interesting that N. N. Berberova confirmed in her memoirs that Shtrandtman was a free mason,
even though she refered to him as “far-right.” N. N. Berberova, Liudi i lozhi (Kharkov: Kaleidoskop,
1997), 299.
32
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, X. Y. Z. (Rodionov?) G. g. Shtrandtman’, Struve, A. Ksiunin’, Pronin i Ko
Belgrad, b. g.,8.
33
34
35
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. H-36, 3–6.
36
This was an exceptionally generous offer. An average monthly income of a Russian refugee was 500–
600 dinars, which was sufficient to survive but not much more than this.
a leader of the Russian emigration. The Russian community was bound to receive
new structural organization and new leaders.
Aleksandr Ivanov, a Belgrade journalist and a bookstore owner, offered his
assistance to Germans to establish a Russian émigré organization in early May.
He made this offer to the Belgrade Military Commander who referred him on May
7 to the Special Commissar for Belgrade, D. Jovanović, who in turn forwarded
his ideas to Belgrade’s Einsatzgruppe.37 Ivanov shared his ideas with the Security
Service (SD) about the creation of an organization for Russians in Belgrade. In
response, Ivanov received gratitude and an explanation that steps in that direction
had already been taken and that his ideas will be used in its implementation.38
This new organization, which was mandated with organizing and defending
the Russian emigration, was headed by Mikhail F. Skorodumov (1892–1963).39
Skorodumov was a Guards Officer, he participated in the First World War from
the very beginning, he was wounded several times and he fell into captivity. He
tried to escape unsuccessfully, but he was swapped as part of a prisoner exchange
in 1917 after which he returned to Petrograd. Skorodumov fought in the Civil War
from the very beginning, participating in the Battle for Kiev, during the Dniester
March and in defense of Crimea. His fate after the Civil War was typical for a
White officer. He was evacuated to Gallipoli from where he was transferred to
Bulgaria with the mass of Russian soldiers. There, he actively participated in the
Russian All-Military Union (ROVS).40 The Bulgarian government, headed by the
Bulgarian Agricultural Alliance in 1921–1922, was in the process of improving
ties with the Soviet Union. Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Stamboliski even met with
the Soviet delegates in Geneva in April of 1922. As a result, the position of Rus-
sian émigrés began to considerably deteriorate in Bulgaria. The refugees were
forcefully evicted from the country, the embassy was closed, and there were sev-
eral instances of assault on Russian officers and their families.41 The Bulgarian
37
For more information about the organization of the occupational apparatus see Božović, Beograd.
38
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. I-6.
39
D. A. Vertepov, ed., Al’bom Russkogo Korpusa (New York: n. p., 1960); D. A. Vertepov, ed., Russkii
Korpus na Balkanakh vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 (New York: Soiuz chinov Russkogo Kor-
pus, 1963).
40
V. Tret’iakov, ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945 (New York: Ob’edinenie I polka Russkogo Korpusa, 1961),
2.
41
“From April (1922), the situation changed all of a sudden. Stamboliski’s government, seeking support
on the left, moved closer towards the communist party… the Bulgarian communists led a passionate
campaign against the Russian officers. They did not limit themselves to words. There were frequent at-
tacks and beatings of individual officers. A bomb was thrown during a Russian amateur play in a Junk-
ers’ school… Bulgarian soldiers searched Russian women in the roughest way possible. The arrested
are ill-treated and insulted, sometimes they beat them, as was the case with Colonel Samokhvalov.
However, none of them is accused of anything concretely, and none of the arrested are handed over
to the courts. The instances of Russians being beaten on the streets are increasingly more frequent.”
government expelled General Skorodumov to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats

and Slovenes.
In Belgrade, Skorodumov was one of the organizers of the action which gath-
ered in Belgrade Russian soldiers who were killed during the First World War
throughout Balkans. He was also central in organizing the construction of a ma-
jestic monument to the Russian soldiers at the New Graveyard (Novo Groblje)
in Belgrade.42 At an official ceremony marking their reburial on May 24, 1935,
Skorodumov had an opportunity to address the gathered emigrants: “Today, with
burying these bones we are not only burying the bones of our fallen soldiers, our
holy bones, but we are also burying our Russian stupidity.”43 He openly expressed
his view that the First World War was meaningless for Russia while criticizing the
countries which benefitted most from the war — England and France.44 Skorodu-
mov’s view of the First World War was shared by a part of the emigration gathered
around the Alliance of the former Czarist Russian Officers which was known as
the Russian National Army.45 The Russian National Army, headed by Skorodu-
mov, was a right wing organization. Its membership consisted of inflexible monar-
chists who refused to reconcile themselves with the defeat in the Civil War. They
viewed the Bolsheviks as occupiers of ‘Holy Russia’, accusing them of spilling
rivers of Russian blood and exiling from the country the national elite. The sym-
bol of the Russian National Army, the so called Militia Cross, appeared in 1935 on
the monuments of Russian soldiers at the New Graveyard and in 1941 on the iron
helmets of ROK members.46
All of Russian emigration, and not only in Yugoslavia, was divided into two
opposing camps: defenders and defeatists. The former believed that Hitler wanted
to destroy Russia, while the latter held that he only wanted to destroy commu-
nism. Therefore, defenders considered it necessary to assist Stalin in defense of
Russia, while defeatists wanted to aid Hitler. To be objective, it should be noted
that these oscillations were understandable at the time. Despite the unambigu-
ous nature of Mein Kampf, the German leadership was not comprised of open
42
This is the largest, and from aesthetic point of view, the most attractive monument to Russian soldiers
in Serbia. The Serbian daily Politika wrote about the opening of the monument on January 13, 1936.
43
M. F. Skorodumov’, Šta treba da zna svaki Sloven, a naročito slovenski političar (Belgrade: n. p.,
1939).
44
The victorious Allies treated Russia as if it had not been an ally, even though London and Paris had
formal relations with the so called White Russia. Holm Zundhauzen illustrated this point very well in
his overview of Serbian history by placing Russia in the same group of countries as the Central Powers
(Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union). Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 328.
45
M. F. Skorodumov’, Pamiatka Russkago Narodnago Opolchenia. Ideologia, zadachi, organizatsiia
(Belgrad: RNO, 1935); G. V. Nazimov, “Zabytye mogil’nye kholmiki. Posviashchaetsia General-maio-
ru Mikhailu Fedorovichu Skorodumovu,” Dobrovolets’ No. 2 (2), (2003); G. V. Nazimov, Zhiznennyi
put’ rossiianina bez Rodiny (Moscow: Zhurnal Moscow, 2009).
46
A. V. Okorokov, Znaki russkoi emigratsii (1920–1990) (Moscow: Collectors Book, 2005), 66–67.
Russophobes. At the time, Hitler had not openly expressed his wish to destroy the
Russian state.47 As an example, we can cite the German Field Marshal von Bock,
who was in charge of the Army Group Centre from the beginning of the attack on
the USSR until December 18, 1941. He found out only at the end of 1941 about the
Nazi leadership’s plans for Russians and the Russian state.48
The Russian refugees in Serbia were sometimes incredibly naïve. For exam-
ple, the journalist Sergei Zavalishin, addressed the Belgrade Gestapo for personal
reasons on May 24, 1941. As guarantee of his loyalty he cited that he was a cor-
respondent, editor and co-owner of the newspaper All-Slavic Cry (Vseslavianskii
klich) and All-Slavic Tribune. According to him, these newspapers held views
close to Axis powers.49 The pan-Slavic term All-Slavic and even the word ‘Rus-
sian’ must have raised doubts amongst Gestapo employees.
A good example of the German policy is the censorship of an article written
by J. P. Grabe, the Secretary of the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile in Serbia
(as he was called in his Gestapo dossier). In 1941, the Germans already formulated
their policies in the East. In the article which had a loyal title “The Serbian Church
against Communism” and which was published by an entirely loyal newspaper
Naša Borba, J. P. Grabe objectively analyzed the relationship between the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile after the First
World War. Nonetheless, the German censor found and deleted two “dangerous”
terms: “Yugoslavia” and “eternal, great, Slavic Russia.”50
V. K. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, who participated in the establishment of the Russian
Liberation Army (ROA), the organization of Russian Nazi collaborators, and was
ROA leader A. A. Vlasov’s friend, described an event which happened approxi-
mately at the same time. The Nazi ideologues ordered that the lyrics of the famous
Russian song about Stepan Razin be changed, replacing “the Russian river” with
“the mighty river.”51 Certainly, few people in the spring of 1941 could have pre-
dicted such turn of events.
On May 22, 1941, the Military Commander of Serbia ordered the creation of
an organization of the Russian émigrés — Bureau for the Defense of Interests and
the Assistance of Russian Emigrants in Serbia. Skorodumov was appointed its
chief. The Bureau’s permanent seat was in Belgrade in the Russian House.
On June 11, 1941, on the orders of the German Military Commander, the Bu-
reau participated in assisting the Belgrade’s municipal authorities in organizing
47
“Nazi’s Plan for the Future of Russia. 16. July 1941” in Himmler’s files from Hallein, Office of Military
Government for Germany (US), (N. p.: Office of the Director of Intelligence, 1945).
48
V. K. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, Protiv Stalina i Gitlera (Moscow: Posev, 1993), 40–41.
49
AJ, IAB, BdS, Podaci o licima, Zavališin Sergije.
50
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. G148, 21.
51
Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, Protiv, 175.
the census of the Russian diaspora in Serbia. All emigrants over the age of 16
received a special personal document, which was their proof of ‘Aryan ancestry.’
According to this census, 7,020 adult Russian émigrés lived in Belgrade. This
figure included only Russians who had the Imperial Russian citizenship and it
excluded Russians who received Yugoslav or any other citizenship.52
On May 15, General Skorodumov announced the Order Number 1.53 This
order explained the structure, aims and responsibilities of the Bureau. The Bu-
reau had six departments, which were led by following officials: the Chancellery
and Finances — Colonel N. L. Neielov; the Secretariat of the Bureau — Cap-
tain A. A. Obaturov; the Culture and Education — the Cavalry Captain I. V. Rich-
kov (the administrative-economic part); the Russian Red Cross — Professor Dr.
Krainskii (he was also the head of the Russian Educational-scientific institu-
tions; the Administrative Department — Senator S. N. Smirnov; Registration and
Press — A. V. Lan’in.54 The Order Number One also announced the creation of
an official list of members of the Russian colony in Serbia. It also envisioned the
creation of Higher Scientific-Educational Institution, with scientific and educa-
tional departments, which would include all military and educational forces under
Krainskii’s leadership. The Russian-Serbian gymnasium continued to operate in
the Russian House until the arrival of the Soviet troops in 1944. In the summer of
1941, a humanitarian cafeteria was opened for the poorest Russian refugees.
In the same order, Skorodumov announced that all other Russian organiza-
tions were to shut down and were obliged to hand over to the Bureau their fi-
nances and documentation. After receiving an approval from the Bureau, some
of the organizations could continue to operate. The same strict procedures were
introduced for the Russian press, except that they also required the approval of the
German authorities. Appeals by individual Russian émigrés and refugee organi-
zations were to be made only to the Bureau, severing ties between the Russians
and Serbian and German institutions.
On June 16, General Skorodumov addressed the refugees in a text which was
posted in the Russian House. Skorodumov again reminded the emigrants of their
difficult position due to “heavy catastrophe which befell the brotherly… by blood
nation which offered shelter” to the Russian refugees. He also mentioned the re-
cent “undeserved persecution and insults” caused by the English propaganda and
the Comintern. Skorodumov compared the contemporary situation with the events
of 1917 “when the same agents destroyed our Homeland. They also hid behind the
Czar’s name and with the treachery from above and the stupidity from below
52
AJ, IAB, UGB SP II, br. 44 / 41.
53
AJ, IAB, Žika Jovanović, br. 115 “Proglasi i objave 1941–1945,” “PRIKAZ’ 1.”
54
As stated in the text. The text is full of Serbian words and which reveals the penetration of Serbian
language into the everday language of the Russian refugees in Serbia.
they destroyed our Homeland.” He expressed certainty that, despite the temporary
misunderstanding by the Serbian people, “some time will pass until the cheated
Serbian people will understand” that Russians “based on Russia’s previous experi-
ence, anticipated the course of events and wanted to save…” the Serbian people
“from the catastrophe.”
Furthermore, Skorodumov cautioned the Russians to be careful in their ac-
tions and to take care of their internal refugee organization. He recommended that
the Russian emigrants should take the following steps:
1) Raise the moral, activate the role of priests in the modern world, lower taxes
on religious rites.
2) Unite all military organizations into one department, and remove divisions
between the elite Russian soldiers and the second-rate soldiers.
3) Redirect education into more national stream and introduce trades in all
male and female Russian educational institutions.
4) Create conditions for healthy families — the root of a healthy national
state.
5) The financial situation of the Russian emigration should not be based on
foreign donations but on development of competitive Russian private companies,
which could become a source of income for its founders as well as the unemployed
members of the community, the impoverished children and older people.
6) Humanitarian societies should be merged and placed under strict control,
while the employees of these institutions should not live off donation.
7) All previous political and other divisions should be forgotten. Everybody
should unite around the Bureau.
At the end, General Skorodumov called on emigrants to keep away from
those who spread rumors on behest of paid agents who want to spread confusion
and stage provocations. In the name of the Bureau he promised that he would
strictly punish, regardless of age, education or position, anybody who used too
much alcohol, caused fights in public space, bagged, as well as any Russian
woman caught behaving indecently, improperly dressed or publically engaging
in prostitution. The violators of these rules were to be sentenced to forced labor
in one of the monasteries without the right of return. In this way, Skorodumov
hoped to defend the honor and reputation of the “national, exiled Russia.” Sko-
rodumov was critical of the term “refugees” for Russians in Serbia, stating that
they were emigrants.55
During this period, the Nazis skillfully hid their anti-Slavic attitudes, while
emphasizing their anti-communism which was very close to ideas of the politi-
cally active members of the emigration. As a result, the Russian emigration be-
55
AJ, IAB, Žika Jovan. ović, br. 115 “Proglasi i objave 1941–1945,” “Obrashchenie nachal’nika Russko-
go Biuro b’ Serbii Gen. M. F. Skorodumova.”
came more active after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. At the time, an
interesting document appeared — a pronouncement addressed to “Russian People
in Emigration Everywhere,” which was written by Russian journalists in Serbia,
members of right-wing groups: A. V. Lan’in, V. M. Pron’in. E. Mesner, M. So-
lamahin, V. K. Gordovski, N. Talberg, N. P. Rklitskii, E. Shel’, D. Persiianov,
N. Chuhnov, Vl. Grinenko. They wrote that: “on June 22 came the moment which
was awaited by all nationally-oriented Russian people since 1917, the decisive
battle of the new world order… against the communist Soviet government.” More-
over, the authors of the pronouncement naively stated that “the German armed
forces… announced a merciless war not against the Russian people or Russia, but
against… the communist international… victory over… communists must bring
to the Russian people liberation and salvation, true liberty, peace, order, justice
and national Russian government, the government of Russians, and not interna-
tionalists, which will give birth to new Russia which will unite in friendly work
all… [the new state will — A. T.] give land… to peasants and Cossacks, it will
provide for workers and their families, it will defend private…” They called on the
Russian emigration to be ready for “prompt return to their homeland… to partici-
pate in construction of Russian future in alliance with two great Empires: Russian
and German.”56 It is interesting to compare this announcement with the statement
made by the Minister of Internal Affairs and SS leader, Heydrich Himmler, in
Poznan on October 4, 1943, which was recorded and used in Nuremburg process
as evidence against the Nazi police chief. In this speech, apart from acknowl-
edging the brutal destruction of the Jews, Himmler revealed his attitude towards
Slavic nations: “I am absolutely indifferent to how Russians live, how Czechs live.
All that is good in other nations which belong to good blood such as ours, we will
take from them, if necessary, and we will even take their children and raise them.
The question whether these nations live well or are starving, interest me only so
far as we need slave labor for our culture, and except this, it is of no interest to
me. I am not interested whether ten thousand Russian women will die during the
digging of anti-tank ditches. For me only one thing matters — when will this ditch
be ready for Germany…”57
Skorodumov’s activities after June 22, 1941, raised the alarm of the German
occupational authorities. The Bureau organized numerous preparatory courses for
future administrators in Russia. Skorodumov and his colleagues made several
statements about the prompt return of emigrants to Russia. Skorodumov’s belief
that the exiled Russians would be able to return to Russia after the Germans won
56
AJ, IAB, Žika Jovan. ović, br. 115 “Russkie zhurnalisty v’ Serbii — Russkomu narodu I Russkoi Emi-
gratsii.”
57
K. P. Gorshenin, ed., Sbornik materialov Niurnbergskogo protsessa nad glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi
prestupnikami, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1954) vol. 1, 788.
the war ran counter to Third Reich’s policies which were aimed at atomization and
weakening Russia. The Germans had no interest in allowing the banished former
elite to return to Russia. The Nazis were particularly concerned with Skorodu-
mov’s idea that the Russian National Army should be renewed. At the end of July,
Skorodumov began negotiating with Count von Heideck-Corwin, an SS agent in
Zagreb, about evacuating Russian emigrants from NDH. A group of 200 people
prepared to depart for Belgrade. In the last moment, the Belgrade SD intervened
and ordered the arrest of von Heideck-Corwin for overstepping his authority.58
Simultaneously, in the spring and the summer of 1941, the Četnik and then the
Partisan movements began to gain strength. Partisans began the uprising in Serbia
at the end of the summer, by attacking the Serbian municipal authorities and police
stations, opponents of the communist ideology, and less often, the Germans. Among
the victims were up to three hundred brutally murdered Russian emigrants and their
families, and even more Russians were attacked.59 The understanding between the
Russian refugees and the Serbian population was breaking down. ‘Batushka Stalin’
and the Red Army caused diametrically opposed reactions amongst the majority of
the Serbian population and the Russian anti-communist émigrés who remembered
very well what the Red Terror entailed. The Russian ‘white’ émigrés were viewed
as ‘blood enemies of ‘Batushka Stalin’, and as a result, there was a wave of murders
of Russians, not to mention the everyday arguments and assaults on the streets.
It was much easier to slit the throat of an isolated Russian family which due to
poverty found itself in the Balkan countryside, than to murder an armed German
soldier behind whom stood the mighty occupational apparatus, or even an ordinary
collaborator who had colleagues and relatives willing to avenge him. Skorodumov
wrote after the war that before the end of the summer “around three hundred people
fell at the hands of the Serbian communists.”60 It is impossible to verify the accuracy
of this number. The SD recorded a series of murders, assaults and robberies against
Russian émigrés, but it must be added that SD paid attention to attacks on Russian
émigrés only when they worked for a German institution. Otherwise, local police
authorities refused to conduct investigations, treating all crimes as criminal, in or-
der to avoid attracting the attention of Gestapo or Serbian Special Police. As an ex-
ample we can cite the tragic case which was described by Nona Belavina, daughter
of a priest Sergei Belavin.
At nine o’clock at night, three armed men forced their way into the municipal-
ity building and forced the municipal accountant to take them to Father Sergei’s
58
AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. N91, 4.
59
GARF, R6792, o. 1, d. 327, p. 28–32; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus na Bal-
kanakh vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 gg. Vospominaniia soratnikov i dokumenty. Sbornik vtoroi
(Saint Petersburg: S-Pb gos. un-t, 1999), 44.
60
N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 44.
apartment. Under the threat of arms, the accountant shouted: “Father Sergei!”
“Who is it?” — answered the calm voice. “Me, Bora” — continued the scared
accountant. “Enter, the door is open” — answered the priest. Two assailants en-
tered the apartment and stayed there one hour… afterward, they left, forcing the
priest to walk ahead of them with rifle butts. One of them carried a large bundle
wrapped in a table cloth. In the alleyway, the priest tried to run away, but the third
assailant caught him and viciously beat him with the rifle butt. The peasants who
gathered around the house of the unfortunate priest heard the gun shot and after a
certain period of time they came to the place of the tragedy. The priest’s body had
a wound and his throat was slit five to six centimeters deep. Several stab wounds
were on the chest. The Father Sergei was buried without proper rites because he
was the only priest in the area.61
Nona was studying in Belgrade and came to visit her father in a village near
Požarevac when he was murdered. Father Sergei was forty-nine years old and he
worked as a priest for eighteen years in various Serbian rural parishes. Despite the
sad circumstances of her life in Serbia, Nona lived a long and happy family life.
She succeeded in life as a poet, a mother, a grandmother and a respected member
of the Russian émigré community in the USA. Nonetheless, she preserved her
love for her second fatherland. Memories of her youth were hidden in the depth of
her soul, but she never forgot the country of her youth which she expressed in her
poem “Belgrade” which she wrote after her short visit to Serbia in 1977, for the
first time after she left the country in 1944, in order to avoid an encounter with
the Red Army.62
In the light of the worsening security situation, the Russian émigrés with
rich military experience began forming self-defense units on their own initia-
tive. Here is a typical example: “Cossack inhabitants of Šabac, after the Com-
munists slit the throats of five Cossacks and their families, formed two armed
detachments under the command of Lieutenant Iкonnikov, and afterwards, to-
gether with the German units, they defended against the attacks by communists
who had surrounded them and attacked them.”63 In the town of Bor in Eastern
Serbia, armed defensive detachments were also formed on the initiative of the
Russian émigrés.
In these circumstances, with German blessing, Skorodumov decided to or-
ganize the Russian Corps. Skorodumov planned and hoped that Russian Corps
61
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B922, 1–2.
62
N. Miklashevskaia (Belavina), Stikhi (New York: n. p., 1985), 122.
63
Pavel Ikonnikov’s detachment had 124 Cossacks and it existed from October 12, 1941. AJ, IAB, f. BdS,
d. I-122; AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP, d. IV 269 / 25; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus,
45; G. Babović Babović, Letopis Šapca. 1933–1944, ed. S. Petrović Todisijević (Šabac: Biblioteka
šabačka), 104, 119, 221.
would be transferred to the Eastern Front after it eliminated communism in Ser-

bia. On September 12, 1941, he announced mobilization of men aged 18–55.64
The speed of these events scared the Germans. Intoxicated by Blitzkrieg’s suc-
cess, the Germans were convinced that they could defeat the Red Army without
the assistance of Russian nationalists, who, the Nazis feared, could make it diffi-
cult to implement their plans for colonizing the occupied territories. In their view,
Skorodumov and the people around him were behaving too independently. On
September 14, the Belgrade-based Russkii Biulleten’ was banned and its publisher
Lan’in was arrested.65 General Skorodumov and the chiefs of departments whom
he appointed were removed from their positions. Skorodumov was temporarily
placed under arrest. According to Skorodumov’s contemporaries, he publically
announced his withdrawal from public life, saying that he would return to the
Russian Corps as an ordinary soldier when the Soviet Bolsheviks would come
to Serbia. In September of 1941 this announcement seemed silly, but Skorodu-
mov kept his word. After his release from jail until 1944, he lived off his small
business as a first-class cobbler. When the arrival of the Soviet troops to Serbia
was imminent, General Skorodumov again returned to the Corps as an ordinary
private and together with the Corps he left Serbia forever. Skorodumov and his
allies were replaced in the Bureau with more loyal people — General Vladimir
Vladimirovich Kreiter headed the Bureau, while Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon
(1881–1945) commanded the Russian Defense Corps.
Even though the majority of the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia was con-
centrated in Serbia, other parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia also had several
colonies which encountered their own problems after the occupation. The massa-
cres of the Orthodox population in NDH also affected Russian emigrants, mainly
the priests.66 Nonetheless, after the Germans intervened with NDH authorities, the
situation stabilized. The Russian emigration, typically, was subjected to a single
organization — the Representation of the Russian Emigration to NDH. The head
of the Representation was Georgii Fermin, the former Czarist consul in Vienna
and Zagreb, while his deputy was Dr. Engel’gardt.67 The Military Department was
led by notable participants of the Civil War in Russia, Generals Danil Pavlovich
64
65
Novo Vreme, September 15, 1941, 2.
66
ROCA priests and monks involvement with the so called Croatian Orthodox Church in 1942 is quite
a sensitive issue (out of sixty-two there were twenty Russian priests in this organization, among them
its head Germogen Maksimov). V. Djurić, Ustaše i Pravoslvlje (Belgrade: Kum, 1989); I. Goria-
chev, “Khorvatskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, “ in Vlast’ i tserkov’ v SSSR
i stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy, 1939–1958 gg: Diskussionnye aspekty, eds. Murashko G. P., Odints-
ov M. I., (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2003), 220–231.
67
GARF R5752, o. 1, d. 8, 3–4.
Drachenko (1876–194?) and Ivan Alekseevich Poliakov.68 As a result of active

lobbying by the Representation, parts of émigrés were returned to civil service,
which was the only source of income for the Russian refugee families. Also, Rus-
sian National-Socialist movement emerged in Croatia, a veritable curiosity. Small
and extreme, the movement had its emblem, bulletin and representation in Rus-
sian colonies in Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Mostar and Sarajevo. Mikhail Aleksan-
drovich Semionov from Osijek was the founder of the movement and the owner
of the industrial company Kaiser-Semenoff. He was also active in mobilizing the
Russian émigrés for the German police.69
The position of the Russians in NDH was especially perilous in the first year
of the Ustaša state. From August 1941 to January 1942, four Russian Orthodox
priests were murdered.70 Even though after the intervention of the German em-
bassy on May 31, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of NDH sent an explanatory
note to all of its offices that the limitations placed on Serbs did not affect the
Russian Orthodox population, this order had no real effect until the Croatian
policies towards the Orthodox population changed in 1942 as a result of the
state’s inability to suppress the Serbian uprisings in Bosnia and Croatia. During
1941, the Russian Orthodox emigrants, as well as Serbs, were forced to wear a
blue armband with the sign ‘P’ (pravoslavac — Orthodox). Russian monaster-
ies were shut down, the Archbishops Germogen and Teofan and eight monks
moved to a women monastery Hopovo. This was the sole Russian monastery
on the territory of the NDH, which the Russian nuns restored just before the
war. According to a Russian report in the autumn of 1941, Hopovo monastery
was on the verge of being shut down: the Croatian authorities closed the main
Church, orphanage, and monks were being forced to leave the monastery. A
bigger problem emerged when the NDH adopted a law that all Church holidays
had to be celebrated according to the Georgian calendar. The head of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) pleaded with the German Foreign Min-
istry to reverse this decision. As a result, the Russian priest in Zagreb received
permission to lead a mass according to Julian calendar, but the attendance was
strictly limited to Russians. The Russian emigrants’ situation improved only
after Pavelić’s regime created the Croatian Orthodox Church. Russians became
68
N. Rutych, Bigraficheskii spravochnik vyshikh chinov Dobrovol’cheskoi armii i Vooruzhennykh Sil
Iuga Rossii. Materialy k istorii Belogo dvizheniia (Moscow: Regnum: Rossiiskii Arkhiv, 2002). V. Ka-
lving, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Belye armii. Voenno-istoricheskaia biblioteka (Moscow: 2003).
V. Klaving, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Belye armii. Voenno-istoricheskaia biblioteka (Moscow:
AST, 2003).
69
Jovanović, Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Elaborat UDB, (Bileća: s. n., 1953), 655–659.
70
M. D. Smiljanić and D. Štrbac eds., Spomenica pravoslavnih sveštenika — žrtava fašističkog terora
i palih u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi (Belgrade: Savez udruženja pravoslavnog sveštenstva FNRJ,
1960), 39, 40, 48, 59, 86, 88, 96, 130.
Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia 47
useful in this new policy and the head of Croatia returned some Russians into
state service. However, this change increased the hatred of the Partisans towards
the emigrants, as a result of which several attacks were carried out against them.
Monastery Hopovo was burnt down by the Partisans in 1943, and the remaining
monks moved to Serbia.71
Smaller Russian colonies remained in other areas of occupied Yugoslavia,
under the rule of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Russian emigra-
tion found itself under the control of émigré organizations in the aggressor states.
Russian émigrés in the Italian part of Slovenia were united with Ljubljana colony
and incorporated into the Alliance of Russian Colonies in Italy, which was headed
by the Duke of Lichtenberg, Prince Sergei G. Romanovski (1890–1874),72 Several
Russian emigrants (professors of Ljubljana University Evgenii Vasil’evich Spek-
torski and Alexander Dmitrievich Bilimovich) unsuccessfully tried to return to
Russia to assist in its rebirth, as they stated in their written pleas to the German
consulate.73 Similar situation happened in Macedonia, where the local colony was
placed under the Sofia émigré organization. It was the same in occupied Vojvo-
dina and Montenegro under the Italian protectorate.
Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan

formations in Yugoslavia
A part of Russian emigrants participated in several military formations which
the Germans used against the Partisans during the war. The biggest such unit was
the Russian Defense Corps. After the suppression of the ambitious Skorodumov’s
projects, the Corps was used for only one purpose — anti-Partisan actions in
Serbia. Thereafter, the Corps received the German appellation, The Russian De-
fensive Group, and was placed under the German command.74
The unit numbered 1, 500 people towards the end 1941,75 and was used in
local anti-Partisan operations, as well as in defense of the mines near Krupanj,
Bor and Trepča. After the winter of 1941–1942, when Germans with the assis-
71
M. V. Shkarovskii, “Russkaia tserkovnaia emigratsiia na Balkanakh v kontse 1930‑kh — 1945 gg.,” in
Zarubezhnaia Rossiia, 1917–1939, ed. V. Iu. Cherniaev, (Sank-Peterburg: Liki Rossii, 2003).
72
Rutych, Bigraficheskii spravochnik.
73
74
Aleksić, Privreda, 230–231; M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti u političkoj delatnosti ruskih izbeglica u
Srbiji (1941–1945),” Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (1997). D. Petrović, “Kvislinške formacije ruskih beloemigra-
nata na teritoriji Istočne Srbije tokom Drugog svetskog rata,” Razvitak 6 (1966).
75
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 1, ed. M. Krstić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1973), 723.
tance of Nedić’s SDS (Serbian State Guard), Ljotić’s SDK (Serbian Volunteer
Corps), loyal Četniks and the detachments of the Russian Corps succeeded in
destroying the Partisan bases in Serbia, the second phase of the civil war and
occupation ensued in Serbia, which lasted until the arrival of the Red Army
units in the Balkans. During this time, the Russian Defense Group grew in size
due to volunteers arriving from the Russian communities in Bulgaria, Croatia,
Romania and Greece. The Russian Defense Group was integrated into Weh-
rmacht during 1942, and renamed The Russian Defense Corps. It comprised of
five detachments. The Corps never functioned as a united military formation.
The largest functional units of the Corps were detachments which were partially
or in their entirety placed under the command of various German or Bulgarian
occupational divisions as auxiliary troops. Apart from the occasional local op-
erations, the soldiers of the Corps mainly manned the bunkers which defended
bridges or railroads, especially in the Ibar River Valley. They also defended the
mines and factories of Bor Trepča and Majdanpek, Krupanj, and together with
the SGS, SDS and SDK units, the Corps protected the borders of Serbia along
Drina and Danube Rivers. According to contemporaries, “the Corps received
a very important strategic objective to defend the most sensitive places in the
economic mechanism of the occupied Serbia.” 76 The Corps was formed as a vol-
unteer unit, although there were threats and concealed blackmail against those
who refused to enlist. Over the years, a large number of male refugees entered
its units, which after the war, had a lethal impact on the demographics of the
Russian emigration in Serbia.77 The service in the German military forces addi-
tionally blackened the image of the Russian emigrants amongst the Serbs. There
were several cases of Russian émigrés being murdered in sneak attacks in the
late evening hours, when soldiers were on leave.78
In October 1944, the Corps organizers finally had the opportunity to meet
the units of the Red Army on the battlefield. At the time, 11,197 people served in
the Corps. The name of the Corps changed, as the ‘Defense’ appellation did not
fit the circumstances of the frontal battles. The Corps suffered heavy losses in
the unsuccessful attempts to block the penetration of the Partisans and the Red
Army into Serbia, as well as during withdrawal to Slovenia via Bosnia when
its units engaged in relatively cruel and bloody battles. After the unexpected
76
Ruska emigracija, 679.
77
It must be noted that the emigrants in Serbia made up only a part of the Corps. Apart from the emigrants
from other Balkan countries, the Corps was also reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. In February
and March of 1943, 300 Soviet prisoners of war from the camp in Rovno, Ukraine volunteered to serve
in the Corps and they were sent to Belgrade with the approval of General Bader. Bundesarchiv Mil-
itärarchiv (BA MA), Freiburg, RW 40 / 40.
78
D. Ćirić and B. Stanić, “Plakat br. 99” in Katalog zbirke političkog plakata Muzeja grada Belgrade
1941–2000 (Belgrade: n. p., 2005).
death of the General Shteifon, the Cossack Colonel Anatolii Ivanovich Rogo-
zhin became the commander of the Corps.79 By the end of the war, the bulk of
the Corps’ troops managed to leave the Yugoslav territory and surrender to the
British. At the time of the capitulation, the Corps had only 5, 584 people. Dur-
ing less than four years of its existence, 17,090 people served in the Corps, and
the total number of casualties (killed, seriously wounded or missing in action)
was 6,709.80
Another relatively large Russian émigré military formation in Yugoslavia dur-
ing the Second World War was the Variag Battalion which grew into a detach-
ment. This detachment was organized by the Commander of SS police forces in
Serbia Gruppenführer August von Meyszner, who was not satisfied with the Rus-
sian Corps monarchist ideology, which was free of racial prejudices.81 As a result,
M. A. Semenov was accepted into SS and he received the rank of Hauptsturmfüh-
rer (captain) in the SS division Prince Eugene. Semenov trained an infantry unit of
400–600 people, mostly the extreme right wingers, in the barracks of the Russian
Corps. Semenov and his fellow ideologues (N. Chukhnov, Grin’ev, Osterman and
E. P. Lavrov) were based in Palace-Hotel in Belgrade. The Russian Hipo Battalion
which had three platoons was based in the Guard Barracks in Banjica. The bat-
talion was financed by the SS but it was placed under the operational command of
the local Wehhrmacht commander. In the meantime, the adroit Semenov received
the German citizenship, becoming von Semenoff. Since there were not many vol-
unteers for a police career in the service of the Third Reich, Semenov was forced
to spread the rumor that his battalion was preparing for special operations on
the Eastern Front — an airborne attack on Novorossiisk. After the battalion was
formed, it received the status of an auxiliary police unit and was used against
the Partisans in Yugoslavia.82 The companies which were formed by Semenov
were based in Smederevo and Požarevac. A special cavalry squadron was formed
in 1943. It comprised of radical youth, and it was placed under the command of
79
There were rumors of a suicide, however, his sudden death would not have been surprising either in
view of sharp and controversial reversals in his life which could have undermined his health, especially
considering the hopeless situation he found himself in at the end of the Second World War. Rossis-
skii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), f. Lichnye dela ofitserov General’nobo
Shtaba, Shteifon B. A.; S. A. Man’kov, “Khar’kovskie tsekhovye — predki generala B. A. Shteifona
(1991–1945),” in Deviatye Peterburgskie genealogicheskie chteniia ‘Genealogiia gorodskikh soslovii
(Saint Petersburg: n. p., 2005); E. Zub, “I takie zemliaki byvaiut… Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon,”
Sobytie No 28 (2004).
80
Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 403–405.
81
This can be seen from Meyszner’s confidential report to Himmler on October 23, 1942. Zbornik NOR-a,
t. XII knj. 2, ed. D. Gvozdenović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1976), 805–809.
82
N. V. Chukhnov, Smiatennye gody: ocherki nashei bor’by v gody 1941–1965 (New York: Vseslavians-
koe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 24–25; V. Shatov, Bibliografiia Osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia narodov Rossii v
gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1941–1945) (New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel’stvo, 1961).
Mikhail Shidlovskii and was based near Grocka at first, and then near Bela Crkva.
Another émigré Hipo unit was based in Kikinda.83
There is very little information on what happened to these Russians in the Ger-
man police uniforms. In the Archive of Yugoslavia, the fund of Državne komisije
za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača (The State Commission for
Determination of Crimes of Occupiers and Their Collaborators) holds documents
of the Department for Material Aid for SS family members in Serbia, which was
based in Bečkerek (Petrovgrad). Out of 2,050 personal dossiers, 279 people can
be identified as Russians by their place of birth, or if they were born after 1921, by
their Russian first names and surnames. The majority of these people served in the
III Hipo Battalion which was part of the Second Volunteer Police Regiment ’Ser-
bia’ in 1944 (III Hipo.‑Batl. / Polizei Freiwilligen Regiment 2 Serbien). However,
a number of Russians also served in other parts of this Regiment. The Second
Volunteer Police Regiment ’Serbia’ was formed out of smaller Hipo units which
were consolidated in 1944.84 Judging by their personal SS numbers, the majority
of Russians SS troops were recruited in three or four waves from the middle of
1942 to early 1943. Based on this, we can presume that these people were young
anti-communists, nationalist Russian émigrés who were recruited by Semenov.
Part of the Russian émigrés remained in this unit until the very end of its
existence in 1945, but its most active members had a different fate. Lieuten-
ant N. D. Korvnikov, Semenov’s wartime comrade, told to his interviewer the fol-
lowing events which occurred several months into his service in the Smederevo-
based 11th Hipo Regiment. Semenov identified Korvnikov and several other young
men as reliable. Thereafter, he was transferred to a special training camp in Upper
Silesia in Germany at the end of 1942. After the training was completed, their unit
was reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. In early 1943, Semonov left Serbia
and joined their unit. For almost two years, these former Russian refugees from
Yugoslavia served in an organization known as Zeppelin (Unternehmen Zeppe-
lin / RSHA Amt VI). They engaged in diversionary tasks on the Eastern Front.
At the end of 1943, the surviving Russian émigrés from Yugoslavia were sent
for brief training to city of Cheb in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
where they were promoted to officers. Afterwards, their group grew into a larger
unit, which was reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. Eventually, three bat-
talions were formed, each comprising of three companies. Individual companies
were temporarily integrated into the German units and they participated in frontal
battles against the Red Army on the Eastern Front. At the end of 1944, Semenov
83
Ruska emigracija, 706; АЈ, f. DK, 724 Schiedlovski Michael, 609.
84
Neufeldt H.‑A., Huck J., Tessin G., Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936–1945 (Koblenz: s. n.,
1957); Nix P., Jerome G., The Uniformed Police Forces of the Third Reich 1933–1945 (Solna: Lean-
doer & Ekholm, 2006).
returned to Yugoslavia with his surviving soldiers to fight against the Yugoslav
Partisans.85
The first group of Semenov’s soldiers reached Kamnik, Slovenia, in Septem-
ber, 1944. They immediately engaged in battles with the Partisans. Semenov’s
unit was known as the SS Hunting Battalion (SS Jäger Bataillon), and it had
around 500 soldiers. The Battalion’s Commander was Hauptsturmführer Genadii
Grin’ov, a Don Cossack from Novocherkassk who escaped to Yugoslavia after the
Russian Civil War in Russia.86 Since Grin’ov and part of his officers were from
Cossack lands, they allowed the wearing of Cossack fur hats. As a result, the
Slovenian Partisans called them Cossacks. According to the Partisan information,
the battalion was comprised of three companies, each consisting of 150 people.
Each company had four platoons and one heavily armed platoon with machine
guns and light Italian mortars. In addition, the Battalion received a special mortal
platoon which was armed with 82mm Soviet mortars. The battalion had enough
automatic weapons — one German MG-34, four Soviet Maxims, four heavy Ital-
ian machine guns, six Czech light machine guns, several Soviet automatic rifles
and four anti-tank guns.87
Grin’ov, the Commander of the Battalion, and several of his officers arrived to
Ljubljana, in November, 1944. Semenov soon joined them, followed by a group of
Soviet prisoners of war in January, 1945, who were supposed to replenish the unit’s
ranks. A Regiment was formed out of émigré officers and ‘Soviet’ soldiers, which
was headed by SS Standartenführer Mikhail ‘von’ Semenov. His deputy was SS
Hauptsturmführer (and later SS Sturmbannführer) Genadiy Grin’ov), who also
added ‘von’ to his name in order to ‘improve’ his Slavic surname. The Regiment
had the 1st and 2nd Battalions and a special diversionary company which began
engaging the Partisans in February, 1945. Before the end of February, another bat-
talion was formed in Ljubljana, which was immediately thrown into battle against
the Partisans. In addition, the Regiment received a mortar company, an artillery
battery and a commander’s and a pioneer’s platoons. According to archival sourc-
es, the Semenov’s units numbered 2, 500 people on February 20, 1945. Its official
name was the First Special Regiment SS Variag (Sonderregiment SS I “Varäger”).
The Regimental headquarter staff comprised of émigré officers, however, five of
the most senior officers had taken German citizenship. The Commander of the 1st
Battalion was A. S. Orlob, 2nd battalion — Kachengin, and 3rd Battalion — Oster-
85
Kazantsev N., “O ’Variage’ — to, chto nikogda ne bylo skazano”, Nasha strana (Buenos Aires), May 8,
2010; Kovtun I. I., Zhukov D. A., Russkie esesovtsy v boiu. Soldaty ili karateli? (Moscow: Iauza-Press,
2009).
86
АЈ, DK, 25041 Grinjov Genady.
87
Podroben opis sovražnih edinic na teritoriju kontroliranem po NOV in POS (n. p.: s. n., 1945), 38; АЈ,
DK, 50024, Orlow Aleksander.
man. The lower-ranking officers came largely from the Soviet prisoners of war
who volunteered to serve for the Germans. The soldiers of the unit carried the
emblem ‘ROA’, and for propaganda purposes, they were treated as Vlasovites.88
The Regiment Variag deployed up to one battalion in any one operation, mainly
in the cleansing of terrain actions aimed at the Partisans. The success of the unit
was evident in the fact that the Commander the Regiment received the Iron Cross,
initially of the Second Class and then the First Class.89 At the end of the war, part
of the troops were captured by Partisans and executed in Kočevski Rog together
with other Yugoslav collaborators. The remaining part of the Variag, as well as
ROK, succeeded in fleeing Yugoslavia and they surrendered themselves up to the
British. The Soviet soldiers were handed over to the Bolsheviks, while émigrés
were offered an opportunity to move South America.90
The proponents of Cossack and Ukrainian separatism in emigration were less
successful than the Russians. A small group of Cossack separatists failed to form
a large organization, and as a result, the height of their activity was spreading
propaganda materials amongst the Russian Corps soldiers which had little impact.
The problem was that the majority of ordinary Cossacks were concerned with
everyday issues of survival; they created local households, had children who did
not speak Russian well, let alone preserve the tradition of Cossack separatism.
The educated Cossacks — the officers — were deeply imbued with the Russian
national spirit and monarchism.
The goal of creating a separate Cossack nation was without prospect for suc-
cess from the very beginning of the occupation. During the census of Russian
refugees in Serbia immediately after the occupation began, Germans did not even
offer the option of identifying oneself as a Cossack. Instead, all were declared
to be Russians. The only result which the Cossack separatists achieved was that
the Germans permitted the creation of All-Cossack Union in Serbia, which was
located in a private apartment in Belgrade in Bulevar Kralja Aleksandra 77, and
later in Street of Kraljice Natalije 90, next to the Russian House, where the Rus-
sian Bureau was based. The fact that the Cossack separatists had more Atamans
(leaders) than supporters, made the situation only worse. General Alferov, who
participated in these events, believed that the Cossacks had “neither peace nor
unity… [There was] too much politics and all type of intrigues and little honesty.
There is the struggle for power, even not for power, but for shadow of power. And
88
AIZDG, 64 / III, 157 / I–III, AFK, 281 / IV; Arhiv SUP Ljubljana, Mikroteka VII-10, 258; Zbornik NOR-a,
t. VI, knj. 18, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 711.
89
Zakharov V. V., Koluntaev S. A., “Russkaia emigratsiia v antisovetskom, antistalinskom dvizhenii
(1930‑e — 1945 gg.),” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed.
A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1998), vol. 2, 106–108, 471–472.
90
Drobiazko S., Karashchuk A., Russkaia osvoboditel’naia armiia (Moscow: AST, 1999), 4.
in this struggle the Cossack leaders and various types of characters who pretended
to be at the top forgot about the main thing: about the Cossacks.”91
Independent Cossacks did not want to be submerged with nationalist and
monarchist ROK soldiers. According to the head of the Cossack separatists in
ROK: “Russian action has reached its height. We are completely sidelined, we are
ignored, and all of our questions are answered with [the advice — A. T.] that we
should endure.”92 All attempts to create a unit independent of ROK failed. Pavel
Pol’iakov, the leader of the Cossack separatists in Serbia, desperately sought a
solution: “Few days ago a certain Mr. Semenov appeared here, who works for
German gendarmes. He had a meeting with me. And that conversation was in
form of half-interrogation, half-monologue. To Mr. Semenov’s questions of how
and to what degree could we Cossacks participate in the battle, I answered that we
had put forward so far at least ten plans for Cossack units of various types, from
administrative police units to labor and military units, but unfortunately, we had
no success. At this the conversation came to an end since Mr. Semenov did not
come to the second meeting which we arranged. At the beginning I offered him
250 people who were forty-six years old. Now, I know that Semenov, together
with Lan’in… opened an office in Belgrade and he is recruiting everybody… at
a ceremony for Russian police, a German colonel Kevish delivered a speech in
which he said that there were some Cossack generals who are agitating against the
police, so these generals should remember that we will take care of those who are
sabotaging German plans…”93
In December, 1942, ROK was reformed. Cossacks and Kalmyks (who in Czar-
ist Russia also sought the Cossack status) were concentrated in the 1st Regiment.
Despite this, the majority of Cossacks and officers of the Regiment were monar-
chists and Russian nationalists. They were definitely not separatists or supporter
of an independent Cossack state. General-Major V. Zborovskii, the Commander
of the 1st Regiment, was a former officer of the Czarist Cossack Guard, and later
on he was the Commander of the Guard.94 The Cossacks’ only success was the
creation of the 1st Company of Independent Cossacks as part of the 1st Regiment
of ROK. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Protopopov was the Commander of this unit.95
Nonetheless, the creation of a pro-separatist Cossack unit did not herald in new
German policy towards Cossacks.
Pol’iakov wrote on May 27, 1943: “the general line is going somewhere far
from us, and I could stand on my head, but even then nothing good will happen.
91
GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 2.
92
Ibid., 2.
93
Ibid., 2.
94
V. Tret’iakov, ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945, 8–10.
95
Ibid, 48.
It is difficult to force yourself as a friend on a man whom, it seems to me, is in-

different to this friendship. A man came to see me from the Eastern Front, not a
Cossack, but a smart and a judicious man. He said that they would only allow to
go to the East [Russia — A. T.] those who understood the German wishes, their
new ideas and the direction. After this, I tossed around in bed all night, and in
the morning I came to conclusion that I do not understand anything. It seemed to
me before that our wish to sacrifice everything in the name of the struggle in the
East, our general wish to participate in it under the slogans… of new principles
and new Europe, that our past anti-communist and nationalist activity was a suf-
ficient guarantee for everything. But no — we either did not get something, or we
are missing something, or we are completely unnecessary and we are too much
of a burden…”96
Pol’iakov’s greatest disappointment was in June 1943, when he met Dr. Him-
pel, the Eastern Ministry’s specialist on Cossacks. “In Belgrade, Mr. Himpel
had to meet General Zborovskii, Colonel Galushkin, Neumenko, Tatarkin and
Vdovenko. All of them… [were — A. T.] monarchists, from extreme to the usual…
he met me by accident… the conversation with me ended quickly, we did not even
talk for one hour… for two days while he stayed in Belgrade, Mr. Himpel talked
to Neumenko, Tatarkin, Vdovenko, Kreitor for more than two hours, he visited
Naumenko for dinner, and he visited him again for the second time… General
Kreiter was present everywhere, as well as his deputy Serdakovski. Kreiter — the
head of the Russian Bureau, and Serdakovski was his right-hand and a fan on Gen-
eral Turkul, our open enemy. At the dinner Kreiter delivered a brief speech: here
you go Cossacks, you have finally received the first aid. If you were always first
in Russia, you are also first now. He, Kreiter, hopes that soon after the Cossacks,
the other Russians will depart to fight together with Cossacks for the freedom of
the joint fatherland. All present were very satisfied with Kreiter’s speech… In my
conversation with Mr. Himpel, I paid attention to his words: ‘Cossack News’ (the
publication of Cossack separatists — A. T.) writes too sharply against Russia. He
told the same thing to General Shkuro, who narrated this to me in great detail,
because even though they did not invite him, he went to the dinner as the senior
Kuban officer. In my conversation, when I mentioned the Cossack literature, Mr.
Himpel mentioned Krasnov as an author renowned around the world. He did not
like my words about Cossack literature at all, and he literary said that in such a
case we can talk about the literature of the city of Tula. He knows nothing about
the young authors… Mister Himpel also followed Mr. Sturmbannführer Rexeisen,
a man who holds a very high position…He carries a lot of weight and his word
means a lot. I saw him only once. Our conversation did not succeed because when
96
GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 16.
I told him that I am only a Cossack, and not a Russian, he politely ended with me
all communication.”97
Similarly, the Cossack separatists in Bulgaria and NDH, who cooperated with
their Belgrade-based counterparts, had no success. “An attempt to form another
company failed… individual Cossacks arrived, but due to health problems or
old age, they were not accepted, and the remainder independently joined” po-
lice units.98 Ivan Pol’iakov, the Ataman of the Cossack National Union in Serbia,
summarized the meager results of the Cossack separatist activities in a letter to
Vasilii Glaskov, the leader of the Cossack National Movement, dated August 26,
1943. “Looking back on the two-year work of the Union, I can openly say — all
of this was in vain. Our line is obviously unacceptable, about national forma-
tions there is not even a word. The entire military operation is in the hands of
the Russian legitimists. German military authorities do not take us seriously. In
general, the Cossack question has been put on the backburner. The separation of
Cossacks in the Russian Corps was only nominal, a lot of Cossacks are left in
Russian Regiments… They view the Cossacks as type of a military formation,
and not a nation.”99 In Croatia, the Cossack separatists were even less successful.
Pol’iakov’s fellow ideologue from Croatia, S. K. Fastunov, wrote in May, 1942 that
there were only four Cossack nationalists in all of Croatia.100
The last recorded activity of the Cossack National Union in Serbia was a tele-
gram which a Cossack separatist leader, Glaskov, sent to Prague from Linz on
September 30, 1944: “three days ago I arrived to Linz with the first group of our
Union to Linz, where our brother Taburetskii was supposed to wait for me as…
promised to me in Belgrade. All day today I was looking for him but I could not
find him. We arrived with a group of police family members, we have been ac-
commodated in a settlement camp where we went through all formal checks and
now I don’t know what will happen with us next. We do not want to stay in the
camp because its administrators are Russians from Belgrade, who will definitely
hinder us. Now we are keeping ourselves apart as a special group. Please let me
know what’s going on with Taburetskii and what we should do next. Nedozhgin
stayed in Belgrade to collect the second group and he will come here with them.
Right now, there are thirty-four of us here with women and children. Be quick to
respond. Glory to the Cossacks! Engineer M. Morozov.”101
Ukrainian separatists also did not do too well in Serbia, but they encoun-
tered more understanding in Croatia since they were able to convince the political
97
Ibid, 21.
98
Ibid, 24.
99
Ibid, 24.
100
GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 8, 4.
101
GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 27.
leadership of NDH about the supposed historical similarities between Russian-

Ukrainian and Serbo-Croatian relations.102 V. Voitanovskii headed The Ukrainian
Representation to the NDH Government and simultaneously was the representa-
tive of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),103 a nationalist far right-
wing organization which was led by Andriy Manly.104 Soon after the formation of
the NDH, in the middle of the spring of 1941, General August Marić (1885–1946),
the head of the Ground Forces of Croatia, ordered the formation of a Ukrainian
battalion to be based in Bihać. Croats assumed the senior positions in the unit,
while junior officers and sergeants were Ukrainian nationalist refugees. A large
part of the soldiers were recruited from local Ukrainian and Russyn populations
who moved to the Balkans during the Habsburg Monarchy. By the end of 1941,
the Battalion suffered such high casualties that the “soldiers had lost moral and
martial spirit.” Therefore, the ranks were replenished with Croatian soldiers and
the battalion was turned into an ordinary unit of the Croatian Home Guard (Do-
mobrani in Croatian).105
Some Russian émigrés served directly in the units of puppet regimes which
were set up after the occupation of Yugoslavia. More than fifty former officers
in Croatia (mainly those married to Croats) continued their service in the ranks
of the Croatian Home Guard in the NDH.106 Some of these Russians in the 369th
Reinforced Infantry Regiment fought on the Eastern Front 1941–1943. The Croa-
tian Legion’s journal revealed several names of Russian officers — Lieutenants
Mikhail Korobkin, Mikhail Zubchevskii and Lar Tohtamishev. Also, the ‘Soviet
volunteers’ appeared in the unit, as well as in other German formations. Pavelić
gave out only three silver bravery medals to the Legionaries, two of which were
awarded to Russians — Korobkin and Zubchevskii. The remainder of the unit was
withdrawn from its positions on January 12, 1943, and it was transformed into two
labor companies consisting of Russian volunteers and prisoners, until they were
captured by the Soviets.107
There were practically no Russian émigrés in the Serbian military (as well
as in civil) service, unlike in Croatia. The reason for this was the Prime Minister
of Serbia General Milan Nedić’s decree of May, 1942, that all Russians must be
102
At the time, Serbian nationalists also noted the similar fate of Russians and Serbs who suffered from
the German mistrust, D. Ljotić, “Memorandum Nemcima (1.1944),” Sabrana dela Volume IX, ed.
Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003).
103
Ie. Matsiah, “Ukrai’ntsi v Horvatii’,” in Orhanizatsiia ukrai’ns’kyh natsionalistiv: 1929–1954 (s. l: s.n,
1955), 399.
104
S. A. Shumov and A. P. Andreev, Banderovshchina (Moscow: Eksmo, Algoritm, 2005).
105
106
Ibid.,715.
107
V. Mikić, Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut
Vojske Jugoslavije, 2000), 129–138; T. Likso T., D. Čanak, Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo u Drugom
svjetskom ratu (Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1998), 108–109.
released from the state service, regardless whether they had Yugoslav citizenship
prior to the occupation. One of Russian police civil servants, S. A. Golubev, wrote:
“according to the decision of the Sir Minister of the Internal Affairs… in May,
1942, I was fired from the state service based on… the Law on Official persons, as
a Russian.”108 The Serbian authorities fired non-Serbs in order to provide employ-
ment for the large number of Serbian refugees which were arriving from literary
all sides. Nikolai Dmitrievich Gubarev was a rare exception. Gubarev arrived to
Serbia as a child, early on he was left without his parents, but he started work-
ing in police from 1928.109 In 1941, he transferred to Special Police which fought
against the rebels: in the beginning he headed the Department for the Struggle
against the Communists, and later on he was the main specialist in the struggle
against Mihailović’s supporters.110 Several Russians fought in Nedić’s volunteer
units (mainly in Miloš Vojinović’s Detachment). However, all of Russians were
transferred to Hipo by the middle of 1942.111
The Russian émigrés heeded in great numbers the call to serve in various
formations in the Balkans. In this context, it is important to compare the number
of Russian emigrants in the Balkans (around 30,000 in Yugoslavia, and 15,000
in Bulgaria) out of whom the Russians Corps was mainly formed, in contrast to
other large Russian colonies which did not participate in such great numbers in
the events of 1939–1945. According to the information from the Nance Commit-
tee for the Support of Refugees, there were 100,000 Russians in France, 80,000 in
Poland, 40,000 in Germany, 9,000 in Czechoslovakia and 8,000 in Belgium.112 A
significant number of emigrants fought only in France on the side of the anti-Hitler
coalition, around 3,000, but mostly as a result of the compulsory mobilization in
1940, and not as volunteers as was the case in the Russian émigré units in the Bal-
kans. According to the contemporary German military doctrine, “…one million
civilian inhabitants can form around two divisions,”113 or it could provide 3–4 %
of the total population, considering that a German infantry division had around 17,
734 soldiers and officers.114 This average percentage of the normal mobilization
was greatly exceeded by the Russians in the Balkans and the number of volunteers
108
AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP, d. Golubjev Sergija.
109
Russians in the service of the Serbian police were not a rarity. The Serbian police especially valued their
reliable anti-communism in the struggle against such movements, АЈ, f. 14, f. 24, стр. 1–15, 83–150.
110
AJ, IAB, Suđenje saradnicima okupatora (Bećerevića Božidara, Vukovića Svetozara i Gubarev Nikole),
XXXVII / 73.
111
Kovtun I. I., Zhukov D. A., Russkie esesovtsy v boiu. Soldaty ili karateli? (Moscow: Iauza-Press, 2009);
Babović, Letopis, 103.
112
S. V. Karpenko ed., Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym. Rossiskaia emigratsiia i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (Mos-
cow: RGGU2004), 7.
113
F. Gal’der, Voennyi dnevnik, tom 3 kn. 1 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), 256.
114
B. Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii 1944–1945 gg (Moscow: Izografus, 2006), 86.
in the Russians Corps and auxiliary police formations, even if we take into ac-
count the specific demographic and social features of the emigrants in which the
men with war experience were more present than was normally the case.
We will try to reconstruct the motivation for this extraordinary mobilization.
First, material reasons should be considered. As a result of mass firings during the
war, emigrants had to provide for themselves and their families to survive. Due to
large number of Serbian and Slovenian refugees from NDH and Slovenian terri-
tories adjoined to the Reich, the Serbian government decreed in 1942 that all Rus-
sians should be let go from the state service regardless of their citizenship (even
those who had Yugoslav citizenship),115 which brought many Russians into a pre-
carious position. In these circumstances, service in the ranks of the Russian Corps
was a relatively attractive option. In 1942, rank and file soldiers and sergeants
received 60–75 Reich Marks (RM) per month (with bonus for family — 90–105
RM), junior officers from 105–145 RM (with bonus for the family — 145–210
RM), officers 210–340 RM (with the family bonus 270–430 RM), senior officers
(from captain to the colonel) 400–620 RM (with the family bonus 520–800 RM).116
In view of the artificial exchange rate (one RM for twenty Serbian dinars),117 the
Russians’ salaries were relatively large.118 It is noteworthy that the ordinary troops
and corporals in the Eastern Legions, the Russian and the Ukrainian Volunteer
Battalions in the service of the Third Reich received 30–42 RM (fifty-four for
those with families).119 In Variag and other auxiliary police units the salaries were
even higher, which attracted to their ranks individual soldiers and sergeants from
the Russian Corps.120
It must not be forgotten that by 1941 two decades had passed from the end of
the Civil War and that being a mercenary as a way of life was no longer as ap-
pealing as it was during the time of Colonel Miklashevskii.121 Even though the
115
“Rešenjem Gospodina Ministra unutrašnjih poslova III. br. 285 od 18. maja 1942. godine, otpušten sam
iz državne službe na osnovu § 104, t. 16 Zakona o činovnicima, kao Rus…” UGB SP, AO / PO, 15 / 5..
116
GARF R6792, o. 2, d. 68, 4, s. 97.
117
GARF R7493, o. 1, d. 10, 133.
118
One could rent a room in Belgrade for 275 dinars per month, 300 dinars was enough to feed one person
(eggs, fat, cornbread, flour, beans, coffee and wine (GARF R 7439, o. 1, d. 4, pp. 552–572). Nonethe-
less, the salaries which the German soldiers received, even after the Russian Corps was formally put
on the same footing as the Germans, were even larger. Die Besoldung eines Soldaten der Wehrmacht,
accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de / Soldat / Besoldung. htm.
119
Except that in the occupied part of the USSR one Reich Mark equaled 125 Soviet Rubles. S. I. Drobi-
azko, Pod znamenami vraga (Moscow: Eksmo, 2005), 182 1–183.
120
N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 128–129.
121
On Christmas Day in 1924, 200 Russian soldiers and officers under the command of Colonel Mikla-
shevskii, on behest of the Yugoslav government while funded by the Albanian opposition, entered
Tirana, overthrew the pro-communist government of Fana Noli and established the rule of Ahmet Zog.
Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 56–58; A. V. Okorokov, Russkie dobrovol’tsy. Neizvestnye voiny XIX–XX
vekov (Moscow: Avuar konsalting, 2004), 83–89.
majority of Russian émigrés who had arrived to the Kingdom of SCS participated
in the First World War or the Civil War (62 %), the number of professional sol-
diers in their ranks was relatively small (28.6 %),122 since the bulk of the Russian
professional army was killed in the bloody battles 1914–1918.123 The middle and
younger generations were totally integrated into peaceful civilian life, so that in
the case that they were fired, it was easier for them to leave for Germany which
had more employment opportunities.124 However, military service during a global
war, participation in active anti-Partisan operations in difficult mountainous ter-
rain against the numerous, ideologically motivated and a resolute enemy, required
more than mercenary motives. Those who wanted to secure themselves materially
without great risks did not stay too long in the Corps. These ‘military refugees’
caused bitter emotions amongst the ‘patriotic’ Russian émigrés. Anatolii Mak-
simov described such a situation. Maksimov joined the Corps but was quickly
disappointed and managed to leave it, heading off to work in safer Germany and
occupied France. When a fifteen year old girl from a Belgrade Russian emigrant
family, a daughter of Maksimov’s friend, found out about his plans to leave the
Corps, she was enraged. At first she impulsively threatened to call Gestapo, and
when she calmed down a bit, she threw out ‘the coward’ from the apartment re-
gardless of the curfew or the impoliteness of this act.125 Some émigrés really did
try to find new employment in Germany or the Protectorate and they left Serbia.
The daughter of Dr. N. V. Krainskii went to work in Germany, and she was sub-
sequently joined by the old professor. The traces of this migration movement are
preserved in Gestapo’s archives, which had to issue a security clearance to each
person who voluntarily asked to work in Germany.126
Undoubtedly, non-material motivations also influenced the Russian emi-
grants to take up the riffle after twenty years of a peaceful life. The members
of the anti-Partisan formation cited several non-material motives. As an initial
reason they cited the need to defend themselves against the Partisan and Com-
munist terror. It must be conceded that there were several murders of the Rus-
122
123
Russia lost in the First World War around 2, 300,000 officers and soldiers. At the beginning of the war,
there were 1,423,000 officers and soldiers in the Imperial Army. Krivosheeva G. F., Rossia i SSSR v
voinakh XX veka: statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), 91–109.
124
Russian emigrants who went to occupied Western Europe did not have problems with adapting to their
new environment. See M. Vasil’chikova, Berlinskii dnevnik, 1940–1945 (Moscow: Nashe Nasledie:
Poligrafresursy, 1994); AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. G-703). This was a consequence of the German policy of
maximally exploiting the labor resources of occupied countries and its satellites. Ristović, Nemački
novi poredak, 248; Aleksić, Privreda, 313.
125
Maksimov A., Kratkaia biografiia Anatoliia Maksimova dlia zhurnala ‘Foks’, chast tret’ia, accessed
September 16, 2012, http://fox.ivlim.ru / showarticle. asp? id=2463.
126
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. G-151, G-144, G-110, E-9, E-4, D-611, D-46, C-24, B-365, B-208, B-169, B-1087,
B-73, B-28.
sian émigrés and their families, and even more physical and verbal assaults
from the left-oriented inhabitants of Serbia, as a result of which the life of
émigrés in the provinces became unpleasant and even dangerous.127 The most
important motive to serve on the Nazi side was the wish to return to their place
of birth not as wretches who had to admit their mistake, but triumphantly
as victors. That is why the events of 1941–1945 in the collective conscious-
ness of the emigrants are viewed as continuation of the unfinished Civil War
in Russia against the Bolsheviks. The memories of the bloody and traumatic
events of the Bolshevik Revolution and the general hatred of ‘monsters in the
Red Kremlin’ were an important (perhaps even the most important) factor in
providing cohesion to the entire social group of the Russian émigrés. A let-
ter written by the organizer of the unit Russian Commandos, General Andrei
Grigorievich Shkuro, testifies to the importance of this factor amongst the
older and middle generations. The letter was sent in the summer of 1941 to the
leader of the Ukrainian emigrants in Zagreb, who were at the time the only
ones who could send their sympathizers to the Eastern Front. In this letter,
which was translated to Ukrainian language, Shkuro wrote about his wish to
return to his homeland and help in its liberation from communism.128 After the
creation of the Russian Corps, and the arrival to the Balkans of the 15th Cos-
sack Division, the General no longer had any use for pro-Ukrainian fighters
and he stopped writing letters to Ukrainian nationalists.
In these circumstances, the right-wing Russians viewed the Partisans as bear-
ers of the enemy ideology, while the Russian Corps was considered to be the
kernel of the future liberation army.129 This is the reason why the first fighters of
the Russian Corps in September, 1941, were educated youth who attended mili-
tary courses before the war as volunteers, instead of unemployed and unqualified
workers without permanent source of income (which is more typical of mercenary
armies). High-school and University students attended military courses before the
war and enlisted in the so called Detachment for Pre-Mobilization of the Youth,
which was formed by Colonel Mikhail Timofeeevich Gordeev-Zaretski and the
ROVS 4th Department (The Russian General Military Alliance).130 The junior of-
ficers and officers in the Detachment were young, mostly educated and employed,
Russian emigrants who had completed the three-year military-course run by
127
AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-922, J-408.
128
O. Kucheruk, “Bazhaiu shche raz posluzhiti moii bat’kivshchini… (general Andrii Shkuro i Organi-
zatsiia Ukrains’kikh Natsionalistiv),” Viis’kovo-istorichnii al’manakh No. 3 (2001).
129
P. P. Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus na Balkanakh i vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 gg. Istoricheskii
ocherk i sbornik vospominanii soratnikov (New York: Nashi vesti, 1963), 21, 90.
130
Russian General-Military Alliance (ROVS — Russkii obshchevoinskii soiuz) was the only direct de-
scendent of the White Guard units after they were evacuated from Crimea. ROVS had its branches in
all the countries where Russian emigrans lived.
ROVS.131 The Russian Corps’ fighters viewed the struggle with Tito’s Partisans
from a global perspective. They considered it to be a local front against the com-
munists. This global approach could be found in the works of Evgenii Eduardo-
vich Mesner, the Corps’ ideologue who also dealt with the strategy and the tactics
of the anti-Partisan operations.132
We must not ignore the evident integration of Russian emigrants in the Serbian
society, which had de facto become closer to them than the imagined and idealized
Czarist Russia which lived in their memories. After the lightening and mighty as-
sault of the motorized units of the Red Army in the autumn of 1944 against the 2nd
ROK Regiment, panic erupted in German and Russian garrisons along Danube.
As a result of their hasty withdrawal from Požarevac, the advancing Soviet and
Partisan forces captured the documents of the 2nd ROK Regiment.133 As a result,
the archive of the Military-Historical Institute in Belgrade holds a folder with
fifty-two dossiers of sergeants and junior officers of the 2nd Regiment.134 This col-
lection of documents offers a unique chance to investigate the men of the Corps.
The majority of dossiers belonged to the older people from the first generation
of émigrés. Only one dossier belonged to a younger man, whose father also served
in the Corps. This young man, Mikhail Lermontov, the namesake and descendent
of the famous poet, was a signaler, since as a young man he had more opportu-
nities to study according to German regulations. At the same time, the average
matrimonial status of this ROK sample was unusual. Based on these documents,
we can assert that members of the Corps were well integrated into émigré and
Serbian societies. According to dossiers, out of 52 Corps members, only 36 % were
single, while 64 % were married. Notably, the majority of those who were married
had Serbian wives. These relationships comprised happy families, and they were
definitely not ‘fictive’. Out of all the children mentioned in the dossiers, two thirds
were out of the Russian-Serbian relationships. It is interesting to note that the chil-
dren from these marriages had typically either Serbian names or Russian names
which could easily be adapted to the Serbian milieu. This testifies to the fact that
these people were well integrated into Russian émigré community, as well as the
Serbian society. In view of the fact that the absolute majority (fifty one out of fifty
two) of the people from the sample had higher education, we can say that the fertil-
ity rates were much higher than was typical for this category of Russian emigrants
in general.135 We can suppose that the marriage rate (including those married to
131
Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 52; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 56, 79.
132
E. Messner, Hochesh’ mira, pobedi miatezhvoinu! (Moscow: Voennyi universitet, Russkii put’, 2005).
133
Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 403–405.
134
The remainder of the archive was destroyed towards the end of the war just before ROK surrendered to
the Anglo-American allies.
135
For more details about the Russian emigrations in the Balkans, see Jovanović, Ruska emigracija.
women from their second homelands) would be higher had we had the sample
from 1st Regiment, which was formed by Don and Kuban Cossacks.
At the same time, other characteristics of the Corps’ members of this sample
are completely typical, which testifies to the fact they were representative of
wider émigré circles in Serbia. The majority of the fifty-two people were born
in the European part of Russia, and those born in the Southern and Western
Russia — Kharkov, Kiev, Grodnen and Vilnius regions — dominate the sample.
This was typical of the Russian emigration in the Balkans in general, who ar-
rived to the Southeastern Europe from Southern Russia. The religious and na-
tional composition of the men also needs to be noted. The majority of them were
indisputably of Great Russian (according to the surnames) origin. However,
there is one Pole (surname name and the Catholic religion), an Orthodox Ger-
man from Volga Region (surname) and several who definitely had Little Russian
and Belorussian roots (surnames and the places of birth). One Russian ROK
Lieutenant even recorded in the questionnaire the information for his wife, who
was an Orthodox Finn judging by her surname and place of birth. In this sense,
the general indifference towards the ethnic origins of the ROK members (in
the traditions of the Czarist Russian Military) was obvious. In their view, what
counted was the membership in the Orthodox community and the loyalty to the
Russian State Idea.
The level of mobilization of the Russian emigrants in the anti-communist
struggle in the civil war in Serbia and Yugoslavia became even more pronounced
in the last phase of the war from the autumn of 1944 to the spring of 1945. As
Germany’s defeat became evident, they developed the most varied ideas to avoid
defeat. During these decisive moments, contacts between Serbian and Slovenian
anti-communist formations multiplied with each other and the Russian anti-com-
munist formations. The general direction of withdrawal from Serbia to Slovenia
unified the Slovenian Home Guard led by Lav Rupnik, SDK and part of Četnik
leaders (Momčilo Đujic and others). They also developed contacts with units of
General Vlasov with the aim of realizing an adventurist idea — to set up an anti-
communist Slovenian state in Northern Yugoslavia.136 Ljotić held on to this idea,
and he even sent Božidar Najdanović to General Vlasov as an emissary. Ljotić
also established close relations with units of the 15th Cossack Division and with
officers of the Variag Regiment.137 These ideas were supported by Russians as
136
R. Parežanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotić (Belgrade: A. Ž. Jelić, P. Janković, 2001), 479–480,
483; B. Kostić, Za istoriju naših dana (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1996) 206–234.
137
B. M. Karapandžić, Građanski rat u Srbiji, 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1993), 429–430;
Ia. A. Trushnovich, ”Russkie v Iugoslavii i Germanii, 1941–1945,” Novyi Chasovoi 2 (Saint Petersburg,
1994).
The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war 63
well in 1945. Vlasov even congratulated Nedić on Christmas.138 Even though these
ideas did not end up materializing into anything concrete, their very existence was
indicative of the Russian mobilization in the Yugoslav civil war.
The anti-communist activity of civilian

Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war
The Russian emigration was also involved in the anti-communist propaganda
efforts during the civil war and the occupation of Yugoslavia.
Russian graphic artists, who played an important role in the ‘golden age of
the Yugoslav comic book’ and contributed greatly to the development of this
branch of art, participated in the visual struggle against the communist ideology.
Konstantin Kuznetsov, one of the founders of the Serbian comic book and a very
talented cartoonist, drew caricatures in Nedić’s humorous newspaper Bodljikavo
prase, mali zabavnik (Spiky piglet, a short comic book). He also drew posters:
Priča bez reči (A Story without Words), Laž sa istoka (A Lie from the East), and
others. He also designed brochures for the German propaganda publishing house
Jugoistok. Kuznetsov drew the famous posters Poljubac engleskog Jude (Kiss
of an English Judas), Ivane, šta misliš? (Ivan, what are you thinking?) for the
propaganda department of Jugoistok.139 His popular comic book which was pub-
lished during 1943–1944 Priča o nesrećnom kralju (Story about an Unfortunate
King) was famous. In the story, he wrote allegorically about various kings: the
Old King (Alexander), the Young King (Peter II), the Nobleman of the Evil Ruler
(Winston Churchill), the Bandit (Josip Broz Tito) and the Northern Bloodthirsty
Ruler (Stalin).
Vsevolod Konstantinovich Gulevich (1903–1964) created during the war a se-
ries of the so-called nationally-ideal heroes of the German Epoch (Nibulenzi) and
the Serbian Middle Ages (the Sword of Destiny).140 The famous Iuri Lobachev,
in dire need of money, also graphically edited Nedić’s newspapers.141 In addi-
tion, a series of lesser known Russian emigrant painters cooperated with Jugo-
138
Shatov, Bibliografiia; Anonymous, Nasha Borba No. 54 (1945), 2.
139
M. Jovanović et al, Ruske izbeglice u Jugoslaviji kroz arhivsku gradju: catalog izložbe (Belgrade: n. p.,
1997).
140
Z. Zupan, “Ruski emigranti u srpskom stripu,” Književna reč 27 503 (1998); Z. Zupan, “Konstantin
Kuznjecov,” Putevi 6 35, (1990); S. Draginčić and Z. Zupan, Istorija jugoslovenskog stripa (Novi Sad:
Forum, 1986); Ruska emigracija, 796; ‚O. L. Leikind, K. V. Makhrov and D. Ia. Severiukhin, Khudoz-
hniki russkogo zarubezh’a, 1917–1939. Biograficheskii slovar’ (Saint Petersburg: Notabene, 1999).
141
Đ. Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1997), 112, 114, 116, 117, 121.
istok, General Nedić’s Department of Propaganda and the contemporary press

more generally. Jugoistok published several works written by Russian authors or
their translations.142 The Russian émigrés also played a role in the Anti-Mason
and Anti-Communist exhibition which was organized by Belgrade municipality
in 1941.143
Russian émigré journalists also contributed to the wave of the anti-communist
propaganda. For instance, the already mentioned Evgenii Mesner, who had a good
military education (Mikhailovsk Artillery School and the Academy of the Gener-
al Staff), worked as a military commentator in Serbian (Vreme, Opštinske novine)
and Russian (Segodnya!) émigré newspapers before the war. During the war, he
served as a soldier in the Russian Corps. Also, he briefly edited the newspaper
Obnova and he actively worked for Novo Vreme where he wrote about military
events outside of Serbia.144
The émigrés employed in education delivered anti-communist lectures across
Serbia. Fedor Fedorovich Balabanov (1897–1972) was a theologian who studied
at the University of Belgrade. He worked before the war as a teacher of religion,
psychology, Church Slavonic language, petrology and philosophy in seminaries in
Prizren and Sremski Karlovci.145 After June 22, 1941, he pleaded with the German
authorities to let him go to his homeland to lecture “against communism and athe-
ism.” They sent Balabanov to Banat instead, where he delivered anti-communist
lectures about the Red Terror, collectivization, Kolkhozes, repressions and social
degradation under communism. He accepted this work with such enthusiasm that
he worked out an unsolicited general plan and methodological recommendations
for anti-communist agitation which he delivered to the Belgrade SD.146 Russian
émigrés delivered similar lectures in Serbia proper. Dr. Rostislav Vladimirovich
Pletnev,147 and Vasilii Ivanovich Al’tov,148 a history teacher and a seminarian re-
spectively, lectured throughout Valjevo region. They were accompanied by the
‘stars’ of the Serbian right-wing ideology, notable Zbor followers Mihajlo Olčan
and Borivoje Karapandžič.
142
G. Adamov and M. Shile, Tajne okeana: naučno-fantasticni roman (Belgrade: Jugoistok, 1943); J. Iz-
voljska and Ž. Kesel, Raspućin. Sumrak carstva (Belgrade: Jugoistok, 1942).
143
N. Jovanović, “Antimasonska i antikomunistička izložba u Beogradu,” in NOR i revolucija u Srbiji
1944–1945, eds. J. Marijanović, V. Glišić, M. Borković (Belgrade: Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta
Srbije, 1972); Kreso, Njemačka okupaciona uprava; K. Nikolić, Nemački ratni plakat u Srbiji 1941–
1944 (Belgrade: Bonart, 2000); VA sobr. Komandant Srbije, f. propagandno odeljenje Jugoistok.
144
Vojni Arhiv (VA), sobr. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 88, p. 14, d. 7, p. 2.
145
I. V. Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’ v Iugoslavii (20–40‑e gg. XX veka) (Moscow: Pravoslaveyi Sviato-Tik-
honovskii bogoslovskii institut, 2000), 230.
146
AJ, IAB, f. Bds, d. V-361, p. 5; d. V-336, p. 4–14.
147
VA, sobrd. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 30, p. 5, d. 1, p. 32, 78
148
VA, sobrd. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 30, p. 5, d. 1, p. 34, 77.
The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war 65
The informal contacts between individual Russian emigrants and the wider
Serbian surrounding was perhaps less obvious, but nonetheless, an important
feature of emigrants’ anti-communist activity. The traditionally close relations
between the Czarist Russia and Serbia influenced the spreading of idea amongst
an important part of the Serbian elite about the dangers of communism as a
violent, atheist, anti-national and anti-individualist ideology through their con-
tacts with Russian emigrants. The most obvious manifestation of this was the
close relationship between the Russian emigrants and the far-right movement
Zbor.149 These contacts were viewed positively by both Russians and Serbs.150
In addition, the military wing of Zbor, the Serbian Volunteer Corps, marched to
the Russian military melodies. This was unusual for the Serbian armed forces,
which typically blended Austrian and Balkan melodies. One of the most popu-
lar SDK tunes “Na suncu oružje nam blista” (Our weapons shine in the Sun)
was freely copied from a popular Russian military song “Oruzh’em na solntse
sverkaia,” which was written by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sabinin, an author of
many Russian love songs.151
The Russian emigrants participated in the civil war in Yugoslavia for other
reasons than anti-communism and desire to return to Russia with the victors
(Germans). The Russian emigrants were also integrated to a great degree into the
life of their new homeland, which manifested itself through high rate of mixed
marriages, the introduction of local expressions and habits into the language and
everyday life of the émigré community. The Russians in Serbia had created deep,
internal and intimate ties with the country in which they spent two decades. The
combination of these feelings and the extreme anti-communism led many to con-
clude that the battle with the Serbian resistance movement was about assisting the
Serbs. Pavel Avchinikov, an educated officer, an active participant in the Civil War
in Russia who worked in the local tax agency, vividly wrote about this reality to
his beloved wife Leposava Pešić from the snowed-in mountains of Western Serbia
two days before Christmas in 1942. Avchinikov’s Platoon was cleansing the ter-
rain near Mačkov Kamen, which ended in pursuit and heavy battles in which the
leader of the Partisan Detachment Vlatko Kovač the Spaniard was killed, four
Partisans were wounded and eleven were captured. He viewed this action as as-
149
AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. V-361, p. 5.
150
Trushnovich, ”Russkie v IUgoslavii”; Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 19, 358; D. Ljotić, “Memoar upućen
Vojnom zapovedniku u Srbiji (1943),” in Sabrana dela Volume VIII, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra,
2003); “Memorandum Nemcima (1944)”, “Pismo grofu Grabeu,” “Depeše Pavlu Đurišiću,” “Depeš
Momčilu Đuiću,” “Depeše Draži Mihajloviću” in Sabrana dela Volume IX, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade:
Iskra, 2003); G. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod vo II Mirovuiu voinu. Lektsiia (po magnitofonnoi zapisi)
(New York: n. p., 1978).
151
Najdanović D., Tvrđava. Zbirka dobrovoljačke lirike (Minhen: Iskra, 1977); B. Savchenko, Kumiry
rossiiskoi estrady (Moscow: Panorama, 1998); V. Kalugin, Antologiia voennoi pesni (Moscow: Eksmo,
2006).
sistance to peasants who “in majority of cases themselves ask for these outlaws to
be punished for all evils which they commit, taking away people’s food, poultry
and wine.” In his private letter, Avchinikov expressed open pity towards the “un-
fortunate, fooled, unconsciously mercenary agitators, who in most of the cases
succeed to escape…” The success of this action could not hide the feeling that
this “everyday life, full of dangers and efforts…” was meaningless and did not
provide answers to crucial questions: “for whom? What for? Who needs all of
this?” In the winter of 1941–1942, he was thinking about the departure for the
Eastern Front. He could not avoid concluding that “the holy God knows how and
what will be. We have fallen into a whirlwind, we had the best wishes and hopes,
now there is nothing else to do but to wait to see how the situation will develop
further. Personally, I want to believe in a positive outcome, because I have… ide-
als and pure intentions in my soul, so I will be patient, while I can endure it.” His
words were filled with sorrow.152 Unfortunately, the majority of emigrants came
to realize too late that Germans used émigré’s anti-communism to exploit the oc-
cupied country.
An exceptionally small number of emigrants decided to join the struggle
against the Germans. Only individuals joined the Partisans. Some of them died
completely anonymously but two men achieved success with Tito. Vladimir
Smirnov, an engineer and graduate of Belgrade University, went to the forest in
1941, in the colloquial jargon of the day. During the war he became a member of
KPJ and the head of the Technical department of the NOVJ Supreme Headquar-
ters. He contributed to the Partisans’ success at the Battle of Neretva (he was
responsible for destroying the bridge and then reconstructing the improvised
bridge over which the Partisans fled the encirclement). Fedor Mahin, the former
White officer who was recruited by the Soviet intelligence during the interwar
period, joined KPJ in 1939. He went to the forest in 1941 when he was fifty-nine
years old. He worked in the propaganda section of the NOVJ Supreme Head-
quarters and towards the end of the war he became the head of the Historical
Department of the General Staff. Finally, a smaller group of Russian refugees
decided to form the Union of Soviet Patriots (SSP), which acted illegally (mainly
in Belgrade) in spreading propaganda and offering aid to the Partisan in the
occupied territories.153 Even though the members of this movement cited the
middle of 1942 as the birth of SSP, neither Gestapo nor the Partisan intelligence
knew of this organization nor did they pay attention to their activities.154 The
152
AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. А-188.
153
J. Ž. Giljoten, Dve moje domovije (Gornji Milanovac: 1991); Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu,
118, 121, 129.
154
Delatnosti sovjetske obaveštajne službe u Jugoslaviji do 1948. Izveštaj za interne potrebe (Belgrade: n.
p., 1953).
The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country 67
Gestapo documents mention the leaders of SSP — F. Vistoropski, V. Lebedev,

I. Odiselidze — as ‘suspicious persons’ only several times.155
The social life of Russian emigrants

in the occupied country
It is quite hard to reconstruct the social life of Russian emigrants during the
occupation due to poorly preserved sources. Most sources come from the largest
Russian group in Yugoslavia during the war, which was concentrated in Belgrade
due to economic and security issues. When the occupying authorities replaced
General Skorodumov with Kreiter and Shteifon, the Germans wanted to rely on
ethnic Germans who had (or claimed to have) German blood, the so called Volks-
deutsche, who were viewed in the Nazi racial hierarchy as second only to Re-
ichsdeutsche. It was obvious that the newly appointed leaders of the emigration
identified themselves as Russian czarist officers rather than second-rate Germans.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Kreiter wrote in Russian in his communication with the
German authorities, and then had his messages translated with the official trans-
lator bureau, so as not to shock the Germans with his lack of knowledge of his
supposed mother tongue.156 Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon was not an ethnic Ger-
man — he was actually of Jewish origins. His father converted to Orthodoxy in
Kharkov, enabling his son to pursue career in the Czarist Military.157 However,
both of them viewed themselves (before the war officially, and after the breakout
of the war unofficially) as monarchist-legitimists (proponents of absolute monar-
chy in Russia), which influenced their behavior during the war.158
It must be noted that racism and ethnic close-mindedness were not typical for
the majority of Russian emigrants, which is why the ‘Russian-Serbian’ marriages
and their children were well accepted by the Russian milieu.159 In Serbian society
these children frequently felt themselves rejected or at least foreign, which led
to their isolation or desperate attempts to integrate into the wider Serbian mi-
155
M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti u političkoj delatnosti ruskih izbeglica u Srbiji (1941–1945),” Tokovi
istorije, 1–2 (1997): 148.
156
A. Timofejev, “General Krejter o budućnosti ruske emigracije u Rusiji,” Tokovi istorije 4 (2006).
157
RGVIA, f. Lichnye dela ofitserov Generalnogo Shtaba Shteifon B. A.; Man’kov, “Khar’kovskie tsek-
hovye”; E. Zub, “I takie zemliaki byvaiut… Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon,” Sobytie No. 28 (2004).
158
V. Bodisko, “Russkii Korpus 1941–1945,” Kadetskaia pereklichka No. 28 (1981); Ruska emigracija,
645–646.
159
The Russian tolerance unpleasantly surprised the Germans after the formation of the Russian Corps.
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 2, ed. D. Gvozdenović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1976), 808.
lieu.160 The Russian society, in contrast, viewed the Serbian wives of its members
as ‘newly acquired Russians’ and the offspring of such marriage were accepted
without any reservation. They observed, neutrally, that the “children from the
provinces [where emigrants were dispersed and where the mixed marriages were
more prevalent so that even children of Russian parents were integrated into the
Serbian surrounding — A. T.] speak Russian poorly.”161
Towards the end of the 1930s, and especially with the onset of the war in the
Balkans, émigrés expressed their anti-communism with increasing vehemence,
while not forgetting their Russian origins. As a result, part of the population (espe-
cially in the western parts of Yugoslavia) saw Russians as compatriots of the ‘Red
Plague’, while leftist Yugoslavs viewed them as the enemies of the so called first
country of socialism. The isolation grew with the death of two prominent Russo-
philes, King Alexander and Patriarch Varnava. These sentiments separated émi-
grés from the local milieu, and despite their successful integration,162 the refugees
increasingly lived in the all-Russian, relatively homogenous social group with
similar traditions, views, status and characteristics. The members of this group
often viewed themselves as the bearers of European ideas, habits, civilization and
progress in the Balkans.163 However, such ideas were limited to observation, and
did not grow into condescending behavior, as was the case with some members of
other European nations in the Balkans.164 The view of the Russian emigration as
the bearer of the cultural traditions of the Czarist Russia unified the Russian exiles
across the European boundaries.
After the beginning of occupation, many of the Russian community’s hab-
its had to change. The leading members of the emigration by their education
belonged to intelligentsia class, whose defining characteristic was the love for
160
Nashi vesti 296, 1984, 18–20.
161
Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy 32, 1942, 4; Russkoe delo 27, 1943, 3.
162
About the Russian emigrants’ adaptation to Yugoslavia see Jovanović, Ruska emigracija.
163
Novyi put’, 1942: 7, 4; 41, 3; 65, 2; 1943: 67, 1; Russkoe delo, 1943: 2, 5; 4, 4; 5, 4; 13, 4; 16, 4; 17, 4;
19, 4; 22, 4.
164
Germans, and even Italians, rated the populations of the Balkans relatively low, but strictly according
to the so called scientific method (Ristović, Nemački novi poredak, 248–270, 328–331). The English
attitude towards the people of the Balkans was also very arrogant, as recorded by numerous would be
Lawrences of Arabia who were in Serbia 1941–1944. Rootham’s memories lacked the self-restrain in
this regard. See J Rootham, Miss Fire: The Chronicle of a British Mission to Mihailovich, 1943–1944
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1946). He was quite condescending towards the local population (Serbs
and Vlachs). They wore “funny round gray hats,” he was “in a backward country amongst the most
backward [parts of that Yugoslavia — A. T.], where “the rate of illiteracy and venereal diseases was very
high, while marriages and loyalty was low,” and so on (Ibid., 27, 63). In the postwar memoirs written by
the Russian emigrants, there was a lot more understanding towards the local population of Serbia and
Yugoslavia, while the negative phenomena were treated as individual instances and not the dominant
trait of the Serbs as a whole. For instance, the Russian émigrés explained the worsening attitude towards
them on the eve of the war and during the occupation as a consequence of communist propaganda and
other external factors.
debate, as well as free expression of critical views on local and international

social and political events. Majority of émigrés participated in Russia’s Civil
War (or were family members of Civil War participants). Therefore, they were
prepared to risk their lives (or at least their material well-being and status) for
the defense of their social and political views. This is the reason why the pre-war
emigration had such a large number of periodicals, many of which were fleeting
and had tiny budgets, but covered a wide range of émigré views on political and
social issues.165
With the arrival of the Germans, this diversity was forcefully liquidated. In
the very beginning of the occupation, as a result of strict censorship, the publica-
tions of journals were completely curbed. Russkii Biulleten’, a weekly informa-
tional publication of the Russian emigration, edited by Aleksandr Lanin, appeared
only on June 13, 1941.166 Ten issues of the publication were published, before the
early victories on the Eastern Front convinced the Germans that they did not re-
quire the assistance of the Russian émigrés, as result of which they fired Sko-
rodumov and his colleagues, shut down Russkii Biulleten’ which was preparing
the émigrés for their return to Russia. After the Russian Corps was created on
December 23, 1941, a second weekly Vedomosti Okhranoi Grupy began to come
out. It was edited by Evgenii Mesner, a Russian police officer and a former Colonel
in the General Staff of the Imperial Army.167 The ROK weekly was a propaganda
mouthpiece, but it also featured articles about the daily life of civilian émigrés.168
The civilian emigrants in Serbia experienced a drastic shortage of information.
As a result, the Bureau decided to put out a special publication for their needs.
On February 8, 1942, the first issue of Novyi Put’ was published, under the edi-
torship of Boris Ganusovskii who had the identification of a Volksdeutche even
though his German origins were suspicious.169 Ganusovskii published twenty-one
165
Throughout the interwar period, at various times, there were more than 300 Russian publications in
Yugoslavia, Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 350.
166
Before the war he was a journalist, and he wrote for and edited a series of newspapers which espoused
right wing views such as Nashe budushchee, 1926; Svodka, 1927; Sloven, 1927; Vseslavianskii klich,
1938; Partizan, 1938; Obozrenie, 1939. Lanin was a member of the right wing group gathered around
Skorodumov. After the April War, he wrote a brochure which explained the reasons of the speedy
collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, A. V. Lanin, Agoniia Iugoslavii: vospominaniia ochevidtsa
(Belgrad: n. p., 1941). Even before the war Lanin, as a sympathizer of the Third Reich, established close
relations with the SD Sturmbannführer Kraus, who was tasked with creating a fifth column in Serbia.
After Lanin’s departure from the position of editor, he wrote reports to Gestapo under pseudonym M-12
in which he informed on Russian emigrants, AJ, IAB, f. BdS, D-250, D-818, kartoteka agentov; Kačaki,
Ruske izbeglice.
167
His theoretical works on anti-partisan operations were written after the war and they were based on his
experience in the Russian Corps, Messner, Hochesh’ mira.
168
Occasionally other shorter Russian Corps publications appeared: Signal. Izdanie Russkogo Korpusa
came out in eighteen issues in 1943. There were also thirty-five issues of Pomteshnyi Zhurnal russkogo
okhrannogo korpusa v Sofii during 1942–1943. All of this is according to Shatov, Bibliografiia.
169
Before the war Ganusovskii earned money by working as a driver and a car salesman. Even though he
issues of the newspaper. On June 1943, Novyi Put’ and Vedomosti Ohranoi Grupy
were merged into one weekly publication Russkoe Delo which was published until
November 15, 1944. The latter was edited by Konstantin Miler, who was also
a Volksdeutshce. In addition, a group of Cossack-separatists attempted to start
their own publication, Rech’. Rech’ existed for a short period of time due to lack
of resources and public interest, since the majority of Cossacks in Serbia were
opposed to an independent Cossack state.170 The last publication of the ‘white
emigration’ in the Balkans Russkoe delo disappeared when it was merged with
Za Rodinu, which was published from 1942 by the 693rd Propaganda Company of
the Wehrmacht’s 2nd Armored Army. The new newspaper was called Bor’ba and
it was edited by Mesner. Bor’ba was created with the intention of being used as a
propaganda pamphlet aimed at Soviet soldiers of the Third Ukrainian Front.171
The Propaganda Department of the Cossack Division also published periodi-
cals on the territory of the occupied Yugoslavia 1943–1945.172 Boris Ganusovskii,
a Lieutenant by this time, partook in this endeavor after the newspaper Novyi
put’ was shut down.173 This publication’s audience were the Division’s soldiers,
but invariably, it circulated amongst their relatives, acquaintances and in the sol-
diers’ wider environment.174 The 162nd Turkmen Division, which fought against
the Partisans in Croatia and Slovenia, also had its own newspaper.175 Also, the
ROA propagandists began to publish Russkii Vestnik in NDH, aimed at numerous
nationalities from the former Russian Empire fighting in the Balkans. Apart from
arrived to the Balkans without his parents with a group of evacuated cadets, he managed to enroll at
the University of Belgrade because of his abilities and the Yugoslav government support for the Rus-
sian refugees. Together with his friends from the Cadet Corps he began the humorous journal Bukh’!!!
(1930–1936) which was popular among the emigrants because of its firm anti-communism and humor-
ous approach towards the everyday problems faced by the exiles. B. Ganusovskii, 10 let za zhelezym
zanavesom. 1945–1955. Zapiski zhertvy Ialty. Vydacha XV kazach’ego korpusa (San Francisco: Globus,
1983).
170
GARF R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 24.
171
“Bor’ba, f. p. 47579. [1944: 6–7] [1945: 11–17 ianv.]” according to Shatov, Bibliografiia; A. V. Oko-
rokov, Osobyi front: Nemetskaia propaganda na Vostochnom frontye v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voyny
(Moscow: Russkii put’, 2007), 199.
172
Biulleten’ propagandista 1‑oi Kozachei divizii, Kozachii klich, Ofitserskii biulleten’ Pervoi Kazach’ei
divizii, Propoagandnyi vzvod Pervoi Kaach’ei divizii govorit vam o polozhenii appeared periodically
1943–1945.
173
B. Ganusovskii, 10 let; A. I. Skrylov and G. V. Gubarev eds., Kazachii istoricheskii slovar’-spravochnik
(Moscow: Sozizdanie, 1992).
174
Wherever the Division was stationed, there were contacts between the local Russian emigrants, the
Division and the anti-communist rebels. The ROK hospital was also used by the wounded soldiers
of the Division which also led to strengthening of ties between its members and the civilian Russian
population, and it had to have led to spreading of the news from the Cossack newspapers. Vojni muzej,
Zbirka fotografija, XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps.
175
It was called Svoboda. Organ 162‑i pekhotnoi nemetskoi divizii and it came out in 1942–1943, ac-
cording to Shatov, Bibliografiia; Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski
institut JNA, 1978), 629; J. Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien 1942 / 43: Das deutsche Heer und die Ostvölker
der Sowjetunion (Freiburg: Rombach, 1976).
these, members of military formations and the civilian émigrés also had access to
universal newspaper in Russian language — the Russian version of the German
propaganda newspaper Signal which was printed between October 1941 and July,
1944.
Despite the ban on Russian publications in the NDH, numerous home-made
publications circulated amongst the Russian community in Croatia, testifying to
the émigré’s cleverness rather than the number of printing presses.176 The Spe-
cial Representative of the Russian Emigration to the NDH, the Zagreb version
of the Belgrade-based Bureau, which was headed by the former Czarist Consul
in Vienna and Zagreb Georgii Ferminin, lacked the funds to publish newspapers
and journals. Nonetheless, individual members of the Representation periodi-
cally wrote and reproduced by hand a special Izvod vesti for the Russian colonies
in Croatia and Bosnia.177 Izvod Vesti was edited by General Daniel’ Dratsenko,
and from 1942 by General Ivan Poliakov.178 The number of Russian emigrants in
others parts of Yugoslavia was even smaller. Therefore, there was only a special
emigrant publication in Vojvodina, which was printed by the Russian Church in
Novi Sad.179
Two Church periodicals were published in Serbia: the official publication of
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad which was edited by the secretary of ROCA
Synod Iuri (Georgii) Grabe180 and the extreme right-wing publication which was
edited by Eksakustodian Maharablidze.181 Maharablidze headed the Protopresby-
tor Chancellery during the First World War, he was the former secretary of the
ROCA Synod, and although he was a critic of Grabe, he did not castigate Bishops
or the Synod. These were the only publications which were published by the Rus-
sian emigration before the war and during the German occupation. The extreme
elements of ROCA gathered around the Maharablidze’s periodical. Amongst them
were the famous publicist, preacher and a Protopresbytor Vladimir Vostokov and
the last Protopresbytor of the Russian Imperial Army Georgii Shavelskii.
The journalistic trends of the Third Reich reflected in the Russian press which
was published in Serbia during the war.182 The Nazi mentors introduced into the
Russian press the Bolshevik linguistic reforms which appeared in Russia after
176
Letopisi Vremennykh let 1642–1942 Butyrskogo leib-Zrivanskogo polka (Sarajevo: s. n., 1942); Iaro-
slavna (Zagreb: Izdanie molodezhi Russkoi kolonii v Zagrebe), 1942–1943.
177
Ezhenedel’noe izdanie russkikh voennykh organizatsii na territorii NDH, 1941–1944.
178
GARF, R5752, оo. 1, d. 8, 3–4.
179
Biulleten’ Predstavitel’stva Vysokopreosviashchennogo Serafima, Mitropolita Berlinskogo i German-
skogo i Sredne-Evropeiskogo okruga dlia pravoslavnykh russkikh prikhodov v Korolevstve Vengrii (ac-
cording to Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 49).
180
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1933–1944.
181
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1932–1944.
182
Novyi put’ No. 53, 1943, 2.
1918, resulting in negative reaction amongst the conservative emigration. Russkii

Biulleten’ which was printed by inflexible legitimists, held on to the rules of the
old orthography. The official voice of the ROCA, Tserkovnaia Zhizn’ also held on
to the old orthography. The Church opposition publication, Tserkovnoe obozre-
nie, took the middle course by dropping the ‘yat’ and ‘hard sound’ in September
of 1943, but it tried to keep other characteristics of the old complicated system
of cases. The editors, however, promised that they would reintroduce the ‘hard
sign’ and ‘yat’ in the future, explaining the fact that these letters were dropped by
their reliance on Bulgarian typewriters and printing press.183 The newspaper of the
Russian Corps discontinued the use of the ‘hard sign’ at the end of words in the
spring of 1942 in order economize paper. However, they continued to utilize the
old letters ‘yat’ and ‘i’.184 Novyi put’ similarly economized the space, preserving
the alphabet while dropping the ‘hard sign’ at the end of words.
The divisive question of orthography emerged with full force only after the
appearance of the newspaper Russkoe delo, which consolidated the publications
of the Russian Corps, Russian Hipo detachments and the Bureau for Defense of
the Rights of the Russian Emigration in Serbia. In the first issue, the editors an-
nounced that they would publish the newspaper according to the new orthographic
rules, “so that in this way we would eliminate even the unimportant barriers…
which could emerge in the exchange of ideas between the Exiled Russia with…
the detachments of the new Russian generation which is now fighting against Bol-
shevism in the name of Russia and who had partially joined our ranks.”185 Due
to too subtle attempt to explain the will of the German mentors, the editors were
bombarded with tens of angry and even aggressive letters, which accused the edi-
tors of lacking national consciousness, culture and resistance to the ‘red poison’.
In response, the editors called the authors of these letters ‘the new old believers’,
pointing out that the new orthography was used by 180 million Russians in the
homeland, that the new rules were prepared by the Czarist Academy of Sciences
before the Revolution, and that the reform was essential in uniting the entire mass
of the Russian people.186 Nonetheless, the editors had to advocate for linguistic
reforms in several issues. The editors published a detailed scientific explanation of
the new orthography, which was written by Aleksandr Pogodin, a historian and a
linguist, as well as a brief explanation of the essence and the bases of the new or-
thography by Vladimir Topor-Rabchinski, a Russian literature expert and teacher
183
This is a very strange explanation considering that until 1945 the Bulgarian alphabet had the hard sign
and double ‘e’. In addition to this obviously illogical argument, Makharablidze kept using the letter ‘i’
which did not even exist in Bulgarian alphabet, Tserkovnoe obozrenie 9, 1943, 1.
184
Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy, No. 14, 1942, 4.
185
Russkoe delo, 1, 1943, 2.
186
Ibid., 1943: 7, 5; 10, стр. 4.
of the Russian language and literature in the Cadet Corps in the Russian-Serbian
gymnasium.187 The linguistic reforms were probably also caused by the need to
economize paper. The problem of shortage of paper was critical as the émigré
newspapers were constantly decreasing in size. Russkii Biulleten’ had ten pages,
Novyi put’ had four, and Vedomosti Ohranoi Grupy had six, but with the twice
smaller format, which provided the Russian emigration in Serbia with seven pages
of weekly news. Russkoe delo initially had six pages, and from issue number nine,
it had only four pages.
The editors of émigré papers tried to compensate for the shortage of paper
and the outrage over the new orthography by increasing the emigrants’ fighting
spirit and strengthening its sense of community and missionary vision. A jour-
nalist of the newspaper Novoe vremia, with an Orthodox first name Vasilii and
the renowned surname in the New Europe Rosenberg, summarized the paper’s
achievements after the first year of its existence. Novoe vremia belongs to a “group
of idea newspapers of the renewed Europe… it creates public opinion… it de-
fends and explains the spiritual values which….it considers necessary for cultural,
moral and material development of the people and the nation.”188 This was an
open acknowledgment of the fact that the Russian émigré’s military publications
were an instrument of the German propaganda and that they simply copied the
political information from the German or Serbian (under the control of Germans)
newspapers.
Emigrants who were used to newspapers reflecting the social thought and po-
litical discussions of the Russian society, could not understand the new editorial
policy. Russian emigrants “situated in small Belgrade apartments in the attics
or in bunkers in the hills” tended to express their political ideas in letters to the
editors, thereby documenting the traces of passionate discussions which they en-
gaged in with their acquaintances, friends, colleagues and family. Unfortunately,
these political and hypercritical articles ended up in garbage bins.189 The editors
were flooded with countless articles, letters and advice about various issues. As
a result, the editors pleaded with the readers to stop writing “political essays,”
urging them instead to send “reports of informative character… about cultural ac-
tivities… testimonies of everyday life, literary pieces and notes,”190 not failing to
remind the readers that “Russia was ruined by criticism.”191 In this way the news-
paper (as the military’s propaganda arm) attempted to defend the society’s strate-
187
Ibid., 1943: 16 4; 16, стр. 4.
188
Novyi put’, 53, 1943, 2.
189
190
Ibid., 3, 1943, 5.
191
Ibid., 4, 1943, 5.
gic reservoir during the wartime — “the clarity of spirit.”192 The forced optimism
and the shortage of truthful information resulted in the Russian community trying
to read between the lines. As a result, they tended to read too much into published
information, such as when some Russians believed that the advertisement for Lev
Tolstoy’s play “The Living Corpse” was sign that things were not going to well for
the occupational authorities.193
The shortage of information was particularly felt by lonely soldiers of the Rus-
sian Corps in isolated garrisons and the crews in separated bunkers, as well as in-
dividuals in smaller émigré colonies in rural Serbia. Shteifon and Kreiter tried to
fill this gap through special Russian shows on Radio Belgrade.194 The first Radio
show was broadcast on August 17, 1943, and it lasted for thirty minutes. The show
began with the prayer “I Believe,” which was performed by the Russian Corps’
Choir. This was followed by General Shteifon’s brief address and information
about the everyday life of the Corps, an overview of political events of the week,
which were interrupted by the Russian Czarist marches, Russian national songs
and Russian poetry.195
The Russian shows were broadcast every Tuesday at 14 o’clock, and they
were repeated at 18 o’clock with additional content.196 The basic problem, how-
ever, was the shortage of radios. In order to listen to Russian radio shows, the
military radio-stations and radios were used in barracks of the Russian Corps,
as well as military propaganda machines which had a powerful PA system,197
which broadcast songs and announcements up to 200–300 meters.198 The Rus-
sian émigré colonies also organized free and public listening of radio, as was the
case in the theatre hall of the Russian House. They gathered to listen to political
news, radio dramas, Russian symphony, Opera arias and love songs, Don and
Kuban Cossack choirs, Russian and Ukrainian folk songs and chastushki (hu-
morous songs). The artistic part of the program was comprised of a mixture of
gramophone recordings from the collections of Belgrade Radio and live perfor-
mances by popular emigrant singers.199
192
Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy, No 75, 1943, 6; Russkoe delo, 1, 1943, 6.
193
Ibid., 25, 1943, 3.
194
Even though these were first radio programs in the Balkans for Russian emigrants, these were not first
radio programs in Russian language. In the summer of 1941, Radio Belgrade aired brief programs in
Russian and Ukrainian languages for the Ukrainians and the Cossacks, Kazachii vestnik No. 1, August
22, 1941, 7.
195
Russkoe delo, 1943: 11, 1; 12, 3.
196
Ibid., 1943: 13, 4; 14, 3; 23, 3; 24, 3.
197
Ibid., 13, 1943, 3.
198
D. Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D–Day to VE-Day (New York: G. W. Stewart
1949).
199
Russkoe delo, 1943: 24, 4; 25, 3; 26, 3; 28, 3; 29, 3; 30, 3.
The idea of members of the Russian community gathering for public listen-
ing of the radio was enthusiastically greeted by emigrants. Consequently, the oral
newspapers were created. Oral newspapers emerged in the military, Churches and
individual colonies. The oral newspapers became so popular because they allowed
the isolated Russian refugees to meet and socialize. According to the organizers
of oral newspapers: “In the monotonous life between mountain peaks and wild
forests in lonely small towns, they [Russian emigrants — A. T.] had a reason to
gather together for one to two hours, to relax from the pressure of responsibili-
ties, to relax and listen to some… reports,” songs, recitations and gramophone
records.200 It is difficult to precisely ascertain the degree to which emigrants at-
tended oral newspapers and whether they were as popular as the Russian propa-
gandists claimed.
The drinking of tea (chayanka), another form of public communication, was
less ideological and formal. Apart from this traditional Russian drink, emigrants
consumed other drinks and appetizers, but the drinking of tea marked an informal
way to socialize. Traditionally, there were two types of chayanka. The first was
a meeting of an organization, a society, school or a group with shared memories
(for instance, the meetings of Attendees of Professor Shumf’s Pedagogy or the
meetings of Students of Military-Scientific Courses Abroad organized by Gen-
eral Kornilov)201 and were carried out as ceremonial lunches at the expense of
the participants. The second type was known as chayanka-kontsert (tea drinking
concert), which was ordinarily organized for humanitarian purposes. The pro-
ceeds were collected for the winter needs of the poor, old and ill members of the
emigration, development of Russian educational institutions, improvement of nu-
trition and purchase of clothes for children in émigré orphanages. The money was
collected by organizations such as the Alliance of Russian Women or the Parents’
Union of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium and Cadets’ Corps. These events were
open to all interested parties. Typically, they were held in the hall of the Russian
House (or the colony’s local hall), with several tables and chairs set up near the
stage, while further away were lines of chairs. The restaurant sold tea, alcoholic
beverages and appetizers to patrons, who enjoyed various performances on stage.
The proceeds — which came from the symbolic entry fee, the cost of sitting at the
table, money collected from the restaurant, lottery and direct donations by partici-
pants — were donated to a humanitarian cause.202
The classical theatre performances and concerts staged in the Russian House
were also an important part of the life of the Russian community in Belgrade.203
200
Russkoe delo, 1943: 27, 4; 29, 4; 19, 3; 21, 3; 21, 4.
201
Noviy Put’, 1943: 50, 4; 53, 2; 54, 4; Russke delo, 3, 1943, 6.
202
Ibid., 1943: 2, 6; 3, 6; 5, 6; 7, 6; 9, 4; 22, 4; 23, 4; 24, 4; 25, 4; 28, 4.
203
This aspect of the cultural life is vividly described in V. I. Kosik, Chto mne do vas, mostovye Belgrada?
During the war, visitors to the Russian House could enjoy several dramas and
performances by ballet, opera and musical artists. During the last theatre season
in the Russian House (1943–1944), the Russian classical drama, ballet and opera
were on repertoire. The pride of the Russian audience, regardless of the war, were
classical opera performances Eugene Onegin and Czar’s Bride. The singers from
the Serbian National Theatre participated in the performance of these operas.204
The attendance at these performances was high, which can be inferred from the
fact that the entry fees covered the expenses of the Russian troupe. The Russian
troupe paid taxes to the Serbian government, from which only humanitarian and
amateur concerts were exempt.205 The diverse repertoire offered in the Russian
House 1941–1944 was the same as before the war, including Ibsen, Ostrovskii,
Hamsun and the forgotten in our time popular drama authors of the Czarist Russia
Lev Ukrvantsov and Aleksandr Kosorotov.206 Talented actor and director Alek-
sandr Cherepov207 led the troupe of the Society of Russian Scene Artists in Serbia.
The troupe was so successful that in July 1943, it announced an audition to accept
new members of both genders.208 Apart from the troupe of the Society of Russian
Scene Artists in Serbia and the Russian actors from the Serbian National Theatre,
the ensemble of the Russian Corps, Jolly Bunker led by its star Sergei Frank also
performed in Serbia. Sergei Frank’s ensemble was integrated into the Russian
Corps as a branch of the National Socialist organization Strength through Joy
(Kraft durch Freude, KdF). Nonetheless, it also performed humorous and musical
performances for Russian émigré civilians throughout Serbia. Apart from these,
the amateur troupe of the Russian-Serbian Belgrade Gymnasium, supported by
the Parents’ Committee, also performed regularly in the Russian House. Their
performances were humanitarian, and the proceeds were collected for impover-
ished students.209
The Russian emigrants also expressed themselves creatively through artis-
tic exhibitions. The largest exhibitions were organized in the summers of 1942
and 1943 in the Pavilion of Cvijeta Zuzorića on Kalamegdan Fortress.210 Sergei
Ocherki o russkoi emigratsii v Belgrade (1920–1950‑e gody) (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2007).
204
Each issue of Russkoe delo and Noviy put’ dealt with cultural events in Serbia in their respective sec-
tions “Theatre and Arts” and “Belgrade Chronical.”
205
Noviy put’, 54, 1943, 4.
206
Noviy put’, 58, 1943, 4; Russkoe delo, 11, 1943, 4.
207
O. Marković and D. Čolić, “Aleksandr Čerepov i Rusko Dramsko Pozorište za Narod” in Ruska emi-
gracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka, zbornik radova, t. II, eds. M. Sibinović, M. Mežinski, A. Arsenjev
(Belgrade: Filološki fakultet, Katedra za slavistiku i Centar za naučni rad, 1994), 136–137..
208
209
210
About the prewar history of this exhibition place see: R. Vučetić-Mladenović, Evropa na Kalemeg-
danu: Cvijeta Zuzorić i kulturni život Belgradea 1918–1941 Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju
Srbije, 2002).
Kuchinski, a popular artist in the interwar Yugoslavia amongst the emigrants, was
the organizer of exhibitions. He was actively assisted by a talented Russian émigré
artist Stepan Koleshnikov,211 as well as painters and artists Reznikov Sosnovski,
Verbitski, Zagorudniak, Rik and Rik-Kovalevska.
The first exhibition was opened on August 2, 1942, and 300 works of art
by twenty-four artists were exhibited (S. Alisov, K. Antonova, O. Benson,
A. Bikovski, G. Boiadzieva, A. Verbicki, O. Danilevich, V. Zagorodnuk, A. Zo-
lotarev, S. Koleshnikov, O. Kolb-Selecka, S. Kuchinski, S. Latishev, B. Lin-
evich, M. Orbel’iani, Reznikov, Rik, Rik-Kovalevska, Sosnovski, Hrisogonov,
Chelnokova, Shapovalov, Shramchenko and Iuzepchuk). The themes which the
exhibition covered were wide-ranging: Serbian and Adriatic Coast landscapes,
still life, scenes from everyday life in the Balkans and the Russian community,
and motives from Russian fairytales. The style on display was a mixture of
classicism and realism with elements of naturalism which fit well into the of-
ficial artistic taste of the Third Reich.212 The exhibition was firmly supported
by German, Serbian and Russian officials. On the opening day, the exhibition
was visited by the Serbian Minister of Education Velibor Jonić and the Belgrade
German Military Commander General-Major Adalbert Lonchar, while head of
the Russian Bureau General Kreiter opened the exhibition. On the last day of the
exhibition, the head of the Administration Staff of the Military Commander in
Serbia, SS-Gruppenführer Harald Turner was present. He had “a detailed con-
versation with every artist who participated in the exhibition.” 213 Regardless of
the August heat, the exhibition was well visited so that the organizers extended
it by seven days. Overall, more than 3,000 entrance tickets were sold, and the
visitors (Serbs, Russians, occupational officers and soldiers) bought numerous
paintings.214
A group of Russian artists met on November 28, 1942, to plan another exhibi-
tion, spurred by the success of its predecessor.215 Painters developed an ambitious
idea to gather artists not only from Serbia, but also from Bulgaria and other neigh-
boring countries. However, the occupational authorities rejected this attempt to
‘expand’ the geographical boundaries of the exhibition. The complex structure of
211
Т. Podstanitskaia, Stepan Kolesnikov (Moscow: Russkii Antikvariat, 2003) Podstanitskaia, Stepan
Kolesnikov.
212
H, Grosshans, Hitler and the Artists (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983); P. Adam, Art of the Third
Reich (New York: H. N Abrams, 1992). A. Steinweis., Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany:
The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Universi-
ty Press, 1993); E. Michaud, The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004).
213
General Turner was responsible for the murder of thousands of Jews and for organizing the notorious
concentration camp Sajmište. See: Manoschek, Serbien.
214
Noviy put’, 1942: 25, 3; 26, 3; 27, 1; 27, 3–4; 28, 3; 29, 3; 30, 3.
215
Noviy put’, 42, 1942, 4.
the competing Third Reich’s diplomatic, political and security services, respon-
sible for control of the Southeastern Europe, as well as the vanity of the Balkan
satellites made the unification of Russian artists very complicated. Due to the Ger-
man foot-dragging, the exhibition’s organizers failed to announce the event to all
of the interested Russian artists on time. Consequently, around two hundred paint-
ings by eighteen artists were exhibited, which was less than at the first exhibition.
The opening of the exhibition was attended by notable guests from the occupa-
tional apparatus, members of the diplomatic corps, and the Serbian government
representatives. The exhibition was opened on June 20, and since it was so well
visited, it was extended by seven days. This time, the artists sold a large number
of their works, but also “received orders for new portraits and landscapes.”216 As
a newspaper put it, the works which were “foreign to contemporary decadence,
the rotten esthetical taste… in the service of abstract ideas” were obviously well
received by the visitors.217 Artists who partook in the exposition belonged to those
who did not “bow to modernism” and suffer from its despotism, which invariably
drew the sympathy of visitors from the Reich and its allies.218
The commercial success of the exposition spurred the organizers to organize
another brief exhibition prior to the next scheduled event for the summer of
1944.219 The leading Russian painters in Serbia — Boiadziev, Verbicki, Zago-
rudniak, Zolotarev, Kovalevska, Kolesnikov, Kolb-Selecka, Kuchinski, Rik,
Sosnovski, Hritsogonov and Shramchenko — partook in this one-day exhibi-
tion. The exhibition was organized on December 15, 1943, and there was an auc-
tion of the paintings and a Russian music concert. Part of the proceeds was spent
on winter aid for the poor, ill and older members of the Russian emigration. It
should be noted that the first exposition in 1942 raised 6,000 dinars, while the
one-night event (December 15, 1943) raised 202,000 dinars for humanitarian
causes.220 This unexpected success convinced the artists that there was room for
one more event, which was advertised as New Year Exhibition which ran from
216
Noviy put’, 65, 1943, 4; Russkoe delo, 1943: 1, 6; 2, 6; 3, 6; 4, 6; 5, 6; 6, 6.
217
Russkoe delo, 6,1943, 4.
218
Ibid., 6,1943, 4.
219
This exhibition, like other cultural activities in the Russian House, was brought to an abrupt end in the
summer of 1944 when the evacuation of the German occupational apparatus and Russian émigré insti-
tutions began. It became obvious that the Red Army’s arrival to Yugoslavia would be inevitable in late
August, 1944, after the successful completion of the Yasso-Kishinev Operation which forced Romania
to switch sides in the war. The exhibition materials which were prepared to be evacuated, as well other
Russian House property, was lost in the chaos of withdrawal, according to the organizers of the evacu-
ation. T. Podstanitskaia, “Slikari ruske emigracije u Crnoj Gori. Vjekovne veze Crne Gore i Rusije,”
Pobjeda, December 20, 2008.
220
This was a lot of money, even if we take into account the inflated worth of the reichsmark to dinar (One
RM equaled twenty dinars). The most expensive painting which was sold by S. F. Kolesnikov “Seitel’”
cost 136,000 dinars or 6, 6800 RM, or an annual salary of a ROK Colonel. It is apparent that no indi-
vidual emigrant could pay such an exorbitant price.
December 19–20, 1943. As it turned out, this was the last émigré exhibition in
the Russian House.221
The preparations for the summer exhibition, as well as other cultural events in
the Russian House, were aborted in August, 1944, due to evacuation of the Ger-
man occupational authorities and Russian émigré institutions. The commence-
ment of the rapid evacuation was signaled by the lightening penetration of the
Red Army into Rumania and the capitulation of the Romanian Army, which was
trounced in the Yassy-Kishinev Operation (August 20–29, 1944). According to the
organizer of the exhibition, the art as well as other property of the Russian House,
was lost. The remaining traces of this exhibition can be found in the City Hospital
in Belgrade.222
Libraries also helped preserve the cohesiveness of the Russian community. Li-
braries were perhaps the most important cultural institutions due to their numbers
and accessibility to the wider Russian masses in Serbia. Even though the major-
ity of Russian colonies in Yugoslavia had their own libraries, the Russian public
library in the Russian House was unique. The Russian extreme emigrants who
negated the Russian inheritance of the Soviet culture, considered this library to
be “the biggest national Russian book collection.”223 More objectively, the library
of the Russian House was the largest contemporary Russian library abroad. The
library’s collection was expanded and maintained by subscriber fees. The library’s
collection grew during the war, because several social organizations (Zemgor,
Union of Russian Authors and others) were liquidated and the departure from
Serbia of several prominent Russian émigré families. Therefore, by 1942, the li-
brary’s collection exceeded 100,000 books. The Russian Public Library in the
Russian House had fifteen employees, and its monthly income in 1942 was 26,000
dinars, and on average, six hundred people visited the library every day. It cost
sixteen dinars to borrow a book before the war, but in 1942, the cost was twenty-
five dinars. Regardless, the number of the library’s permanent members was 2,
500, while in Belgrade and its surrounding there were around 6,000 Russians.224
By the summer of 1944, the Russian Public Library had more than 130,000 books
in its collection.225
In the autumn of 1944, after the entry of the Red Army and Partisan units into
Serbia, the Russian emigrants disappeared as a social group, a coherent cultural
factor and as bearers of independent socio-political views. The number of Rus-
221
Russkoe delo, 1943: 27, 4; 28, 4; 29, 4; 30, 4.
222
Podstanitskaia, Stepan Kolesnikov.
223
Noviy put’, 36, 1942, 3.
224
Noviy put’, 1942: 36, 3; 41, 4; 42, 3; 1943: 53, 4; Russkoe delo, 6, 1943, 6.
225
“Gibel’ russkikh zarubezhnykh knigokhranilishch v Iugoslavii,” Seiatel’, 56, 57–58, (Buenos-Aires),
1953; Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 49.
sians in Serbia after the departure of Germans is a very controversial question.

Determining the relative (in relation to the prewar period) and absolute number
of Russians remaining in Serbia after 1944 could indicate the political orientation
of Russian emigrants. Therefore, calculating the number of emigrants who stayed
in Serbia is connected with the question of the degree of Russian community’s
collaboration.
Viktor Kosik asserted that one third of Russian emigrants left Serbia with the
German troops.226 His source for this claim was Andrei Tarasiev, a Subdeacon
and a Professor at the University of Belgrade. This meant that two thirds of the
Russians must have stayed in Serbia, which was either 14,000 (20,000 was the
approximate number of Russians in Serbia in 1941) or 18,000 (two thirds from 27,
150, the approximate number of Russians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1937).
Most likely, Tarasiev’s view was based on the 1948 census,227 according to which
there were 13, 329 Russians left in Serbia.228
The Church statistics offer another glimpse into the number of Russians who
remained in Serbia after the departure of the Germans. By the end of 1944 on the
liberated territories in Serbia (where the majority of Russians lived), the Church
had two parishes, two monasteries, twenty priests, fifteen monks, thirty-two nuns
and around 3,000 followers.229 In addition, according to Very Reverend Vladimir
Moshin, there were around eighty priests in Serbia in 1941.230 Considering that
there were only twenty priests left in Serbia in the autumn of 1944, it would be
logical to presume that there was an analogous decrease in the number of follow-
ers of the Church.
Finally, Serbian researcher Toma Milenković believed that “the majority of
Russian refugees had left Serbia in the middle of September 1944.”231 In his study,
Milenković did not cite specific sources for his estimates. G. Babović, chronicler
of Šabac area, also wrote that by September 21, 1944, “all… Russian families had
left Šabac,” and those who stayed behind were executed on October 27, as was the
case with the gymnasium teacher V. Kuzenko and the wife of an escaped Russian
émigré M. Iкonnikov.232
226
Kosik, Russkaia tserkov’, 165.
227
Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 15. 3. 1948. god. кnj. IX, Stanovništvo po narodnosti (Belgra-
de: Savezni zavod za statistiku i evidenciju, 1955).
228
The results of the 1948 census were not published for six years, that is, until the following census. The
conflict with the USSR must have led to political interference with the census results, since Moscow
accused Tito’s regime of repressive policies and violence against the Russian refugees, Noty sovetskogo
pravitel’stva iugoslavskomu pravitel’stvu. 11, 18, 29 avgusta, 28 sentiabria (Moscow: s. n., 1949)
229
Glasnik SPC, br. 10–12, 1944, 91.
230
Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’, 217.
231
T. Milenković, Kalmici u Srbiji, 1920–1944 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998).
232
Babović, Letopis, 213, 221.
The data provided by Russian emigrants (for instance, former ROK sol-
diers) are less precise. Even though everyone could leave, since Germans were
willing to evacuate everybody, not all Russians wanted to go into exile again.
Many hoped that the changes which the Red Army and the Partisans would
bring would be fleeting.233 The majority of those who stayed in Serbia soon
regretted their decision when they found themselves in the hands of the NKVD
and SMERSH in 1944 and 1945, or in the hands of UDB after 1948. The fate of
General Boris Litvinov, a historian of Turkestan and a talented icon painter, is
illustrative of this. When ROK officers suggested to him that he should evacu-
ate, Litvinov answered: “the arrival of the Reds will be temporary, that they will
not harm anybody… the old days have been forgotten and after them the English
and King Peter will arrive…” The SMERSH officers of the Third Ukrainian
Front arrested the seventy-two year old man, and he died in Siberia, while his
daughter who was a student of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium was interrogat-
ed in Belgrade.234 Roman Dreiling, Colonel of General Staff also died in a Soviet
camp, although he hoped that the fact that he was not involved in politics during
the occupation would save him. Viacheslav Tkachev, the first Russian Aviation
General in the Imperial Army was more fortunate, having survived for ten years
in the NKVD camps. Also, the famous Russian architect Valerii Stashevski died
in 1945 in the USSR.
In reality, the relationship between those who found the strength to depart
for new exile and those who decided to remain in Serbia was not as important
as it may seem in hindsight. What is significant, however, is that the major-
ity of active members of the Russian emigration and all Russian cultural and
educational institutions were destroyed in the autumn of 1944. Those who
remained gradually died off or melted into the new environment, afraid to
even tell their children the specifics of their biographies and concealing from
their milieu their Russian background, traumatized by their experiences in
1944 and 1948.235
Not all Russian emigrants greeted the German occupation with enthusiasm.
Immediately after their arrival, the Germans went after their ideological oppo-
nents amongst the Russian community. In this task they relied on their network of
collaborators amongst the ranks of the Russian refugees. Collaborators had vari-
ous motives for assisting Gestapo: ideological, opportunistic (financial rewards),
233
234
Ibid., 280; V. N. Chuvakov, Nezabytye mogily: Rossiiskoe zarubezh’e: nekrologi 1917–1999 t. 6 (Mos-
cow: Pashkov dom, 2004). 177
235
A very typical story of survival and assimilation by Russian emigrants in the Serbian milieu is provided
in the following memoir: Afanasjev V., Moj otac ruski emigrant — Porodična hronika (Belgrade: Graf-
nik, 2007).
and there were regular police officers who worked in Serbian police before 1941
and by default they continued working for the German occupiers.236
Russian refugees who viewed with sympathy Britain and its allies must not
be forgotten. LL. Nemanov237 and M. Lunin 238 worked for the French intelligence,
while A. von Eden cooperated with the American intelligence.239 The British
intelligence was particularly active and they also utilized Russian emigrants in
their subversive work. A. Al’bov, General Romanovski and others worked with
the British security services.240 Boris Hodolei voluntarily confessed to Gestapo
on June 16, 1941, that he started working in the English Embassy in 1925 as a
driver. Afterward, he worked in its Propaganda Department. He proffered to
Gestapo the information that from the end of the 1930s, the British Embassy
turned into a center for propaganda and subversive work in a wide zone which
included Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria and even Turkey. Hodolei de-
livered packages of propaganda materials in hermetically sealed boxes which
weighed as much as fifty to eighty kilograms. His British bosses maintained
that the packages contained ordinary cans, but nonetheless, they ordered him to
be very careful in transporting these mystical boxes. During the evacuation of
the British embassy after Yugoslavia was attacked by Germany, Hodolei tried
to leave the Embassy, but he was forced at gunpoint to drive to Užice, where
the British left him without money and documents. During this escape, one of
the cars which belonged to the British Embassy had an accident, which was
followed by a powerful explosion after a box with supposed cans detonated in
the car.241 One of the main targets of the British subversive activity was Đerdap,
where British agents hoped to impede navigation along Danube River with a
powerful explosion.242 Part of the explosives which the British could not carry
away was transferred to their American colleagues, who were unable to uti-
lize explosives. Afterward, Gestapo and Special Serbian Police found the ex-
plosives.243 It is noteworthy that Russians participated in the British attempt to
sabotage the navigation on Danube. Leonid Chukhnovski and Alexander Lan’in,
who were German agents, prevented this action by the Intelligence Service. As
a result of their assistance, a German Battle Group succeeded in capturing the
236
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-074, B-1318, B-336, B-508, B-635, C-86, C-123, D-111, G-166, H-83, J-45,
J-163.
237
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. А-439.
238
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. M-2019.
239
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. Е-29.
240
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. А-47, B-418, D-113,G-129.
241
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. H-36. 3–6.
242
About English plans with regards to Đerdap see Aleksić, Privreda, 116.
243
“Senzacionalno otkriće o radu britanskih agenata u našoj zemlji. Ekspoziv, puške i municija,” Novo
Vreme September 11, 1941, 1.
Serbian canal undamaged, despite the best efforts of the British special services
and resistance by several Serbian guards.244
Apart from these individual cases, there were more massive repressions
against certain groups of Russian refugees. First among them were Russians of
Jewish origins (together with other Serbian Jews). Already on April 16, 1941,
announcements appeared in Belgrade which ordered all people of Jewish back-
ground to gather around the city police station under the threat of death. The
majority of these people experienced suffering and death in Banjica Camp. Af-
terward, Gestapo sought out hidden Jews in the ranks of Russian emigration.245
The fate of those who were suspected of being Jews varied. In some situations, the
wealthier ones were able to save themselves. For instance, G. I. Flekser’s business
included trade in gold and jewelry and he was also an owner of a jewelry store.
To start up his business, he received a loan from the local Jewish community in
the 1920s. Even though his situation seemed fatal, a certificate that he suffered
from several difficult and incurable diseases was added to his dossier, followed
by a document issued by the Bureau testifying to his absolute Aryan ancestry.
Finally, he obtained the confirmation that he was a citizen of a neutral country
(Sweden).246 Unfortunately, such financial capabilities were exceptional among
Russian emigrants of Jewish origins. More typical of the tragic rule was the case
of Samuil I. Rovinski who worked as a doctor in Lazarevac. He was married to a
Serbian nurse and was completely integrated into the local society. Rovinski had
a good reputation as an educated expert (he graduated from the Czarist University
in Kharkov) and as a good man who treated poor patients for free. After his arrest,
more than a hundred Serbs, his acquaintances, friends, neighbors and patients
signed a petition addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, implor-
ing him to act upon the Prime Minister Milan Nedić to intervene with Gestapo to
release Dr. Rovinski. Rovinski was let go, but Germans soon changed their mind
and decided to arrest him again. When Rovinski tried to escape, the people who
signed the petition were taken as hostages. The unfortunate doctor bid farewell to
his children and wife, and hanged himself in front of his house.247
The Nazi justice system also went after masons in Serbia,248 among them
several Russians. Gestapo also arrested every refugee who came even close to
244
Dragoljub Petrović, Istočna Srbija u ratu i revoluciji (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, Institut za istoriju
radničkog pokreta Srbije, 1985) 26; M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti…,“143; R. Jakovljević, Rusi u Srbiji
(Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2004), 33–37; H. Spaeter, “Die Brandenburger — Eine deutsche Kommando-
truppe” (München, 1982), 117–119.
245
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-153, B-431, F-178, J-179.
246
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. F-178.
247
O. Marković, „Doktor Sima Rovinski,” in Mali čovek i velika istorija, ed., G. Miloradović (Valjevo:
Istraživačka stanica Petnica, 2002), 7–14; AJ, IAB, Banјički logor, 6286 (IV)
248
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. C-128, C-135, D-44, J-179, ST-131.
revising his views on the Soviet state and expressed sympathy for the USSR as a
communist Russia.249 Even those who entered the Soviet embassy only once (for
instance, those who sought the addresses of their relatives in the USSR, who were
interested in scientific literature or who wanted to find out about the everyday life
in the Soviet state) were usually detained and checked by Gestapo.250 After care-
ful and detailed examination, which included physical pressure on the detainees,
these unfortunate people were released after signing written statements that they
were forbidden from speaking about their arrest to anybody except their spouse,
who also had to sign a similar document.251
After the Germans arrived, any open conversation, even with closest friends,
could become a reason for arrest and lead to a sentence in a camp.252 In private
conversations, some emigrants upheld ideas which were completely opposed
to views of the leaders of extreme right wing emigration. These so called free-
thinking individuals believed that there was no more communism in Russia, that
Slavic patriots lived there who were fighting for a Slavic idea and unity of all the
Slavs.253 Gestapo’s attention could be drawn even by conversations at ordinary
meetings between friends who gathered to play a game of cards and drink a little
bit of wine.254 Tired of everyday exaggerated rumors, and wishing to obtain objec-
tive information, Russian emigrants, like the general Serbian population, tried
to compare the optimistic German propaganda with radio shows broadcast from
Moscow and London. As a result, the German Command issued an order on May
27, 1941, which banned listening to all non-German radio-stations at the pain of
prison or execution. Afterward, the responsibility for implementing this law was
passed onto Special Police and Gestapo.255 Nonetheless, some Russian refugees
organized collective listening of the forbidden radio stations and they continued
to spread foreign news content to their neighbors and colleagues in work places.256
Regardless of the pressure, only a few Russian emigrants had the wish to take
up arms against the Germans (or to oppose them without weapons). These few
individuals could express their views by being active in the illegal underground or
joining the Partisan Detachments, but they were unable to alter the group behavior
of the Russian refugees.257
249
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-56, A-116, C-70, C-75, C-76, D-90, D-184, D-195, G-318, I-5, I-51, J-13, J-810.
250
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-15, A-23, B-217, D-212, D-250, O-21.
251
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-361, 26.
252
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. I-50.
253
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-579. 2.
254
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. C-191.
255
AJ, IAB, UGB SP IV, br. 38 / 05, 266.
256
AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-50, B-112, H-222, I-54, J-235.
257
Giljoten, Dve moje domovine, 118, 121, 129.
The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on emigration... 85
The influence of the Russian Orthodox

Church on emigration and Pro-German
Russian military units during the Second
World War in Yugoslavia
The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad was one of the most important
factors in the life of Russian emigration. 258 The formation of ROCA on the
territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was announced in
Sremski Karlovci. Its administration transferred to Sremski Karlovci in 1921
at the invitation of the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Dimitrije,
who offered the Russian Church exceptional advantages and benefits on the
territory of the Yugoslav Kingdom. 259 The Second All-Exiled Assembly of
ROCA was held in August, 1938, in Sremski Karlovci. The meeting was led
by Metropolitan Anastasii Gribanovskii (1873–1965). During the Assembly,
participants visited the Monument to Russian Soldiers at the New Graveyard
in Belgrade, where a litany was recited and a ceremonial service was held for
the peace of the souls of Czar Nicholas II and his family, as well as everybody
who died fighting for their faith, Czar and the fatherland. At the end of the
Assembly, the participants signed two declarations: “To Russian people in the
suffering Fatherland” and “Russian Flock in Exile.” 260 Thereby, ROCA made
clear once again its determination to continue fighting communism and its
willingness to continue the Civil War. Considering that Europe was heading
towards a global war in August, 1938, it should be noted that pro-German
view held by ROCA did not represent a threat to the integrity of the Yugoslav
258
ROCA origins can be traced to May 1919, during the Civil War when the pro-White Temporary Higher
Church Administration in the South of Russia was established. The Russian Church splintered because
the All-Exile Russian Church Assembly held on November 8, 1921, in Sremski Karlovci, called for the
establishment of the rule of “legitimate Orthodox Czar from the Romanov dynasty” with the assistance
of the foreign military intervention. The Bishops in Russia were under direct threat from communists
and they were forced to explicitly repudiate and condemn the Assembly in Karlovci and they tried to
abolish the Temporary Administration. Much of the Russian Church beyond the Bolsheviks’ reach
joined ROCA: the numerous parishes and dioceses in Western Europe and America, two dioceses in
the Far East, as well as the important Spiritual Mission in Palestine. ROCA and the Synod of Moscow
Patriarchate broke off relations in 1927–1928, while the last contact was in 1936. P. M. Andreev, Kratkii
obzor istorii Russkoi Tserkvi ot revolutsii do nashikh dnei (Jordanville (NY): Holy Trinity Monastery,
1951); G. Grabbe, Pravda o Russkoi Tserkvi na Rodine i za Rubezhom (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Mon-
astery, 1961); G. Grabbe, K istorii russkikh’ tserkovnykh’ razdelenii zagranitsei, (Jordanville: Holy
Trinity Monastery, 1992); D. Pospelovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v XX veke (Moscow: Res-
publika, 1995).
259
Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 316–348; Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’,.
260
Deianiia 2‑go Vsezarubezhnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi zagranitsei (Belgrad: Merkur,
1939).
state and that the genocidal nature of the Nazi regime was not yet obvious to
the world. 261
After the breakout of the April War, ROCA called on its followers to invest
all of their strength into defense of their new homeland, while Metropolitan An-
astasii and Shtrandman signed a similar statement.262 During the bombardment of
Belgrade on April 6, 1941, ROCA clerics I. Sokal’, V. Nekl’udov, V. Tarasjev and
S. Noarov and Syncellus Averkii fulfilled their pastoral duties. They offered sup-
port to those whose spirit fell, they performed the last rites to the wounded and the
dying and they buried the deceased. They endlessly prayed and gave services in
churches and in places of their residence during the bombing. Bishop Metropoli-
tan Anastasii initially relocated to the Russian House, where he prayed with the
people who sought shelter there. Subsequently, he went to Zemun where he stayed
until Maundy Thursday, after which he returned to Belgrade where he worshipped
with his flock. All night services ended before 19 o’clock because of the war, while
the Easter morning service began at 6 o’clock.263 In April, 1944, similar situation
happened, when Russian nuns, evacuated from the Hopovo Monastery, led the
liturgy in place of their residence in Belgrade to defend it from the brutal Allied
air attacks.264
After capitulation, occupation and partition of Yugoslavia, ROCA found itself
in a conundrum, as some of its parishes were outside of Serbia’s new borders,265
with which it was very difficult to communicate due to the German censorship.
Metropolitan Anastasii, the head of ROCA and the Russian Orthodox municipali-
ties in Yugoslavia, was isolated.266
Apart from the external isolation, there was also internal isolation as the ties
with the authorities broke down. Germans immediately replaced Vasilii Shtrand-
man, the Russian community’s leader, who even spent some time in jail due to his
Pan-Slavism and close ties with Britain.267 Evgraf Evgrafovich Kovalevskii, the
head of the Russian Colony in Belgrade, was killed in the bombing. Skorodumov,
the new head of the Russian emigration, was too radical, and his relationship with
ROCA was troubled by his attempts to interfere in the Church’s internal affairs.
ROCA had to enter into direct relations with the Commander of the German Forc-
es in Serbia and with the local SD and Gestapo, via its Secretary of the Synod Iuri
Pavlovich Grabe. However, soon General Skorodumov was replaced by “General
261
“Blagodarstvennyi Adres Mitropolita Anastasiia Adol’fu Gitleru. 12 iiunia 1938 g.,” Tserkovnaia
Zhizn’, 5–6, 1938.
262
Russkii golos, April 6, 1941. +
263
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 4–6, 1941, 1.
264
A. Dubrova “Sila Molitvy,” Nashi vesti 369 (1978).
265
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1942: 7, 110; 9, 140, 142; 1943: 1, 11.
266
Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod.
267
AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. St-131.
Kreiter with whom there were no misunderstandings or clashes: he understood the

position of the Church very well.”268 The fact that Grabe established close relations
with Ljotić also helped ROCA. Ljotić was exceptionally warm towards Grabe,
agreeing even to write an introduction for his book devoted to the Jewish question.
Until the death of the Zbor, they corresponded regularly with each other.269 Bishop
Grigorii spoke of the good relations between Nedić and his circle with ROCA after
the war. According to him: “Ljotić was a great man. He was… a true believer and
very connected with the Church. I met him during the war and we became very
close friends. He knew how to talk to Germans while not abandoning his views…
On the other hand, M. Nedić was an accomplished General who was in familial
relations with Ljotić, and he was a very thorough man. He sought to preserve order
and defend the population from Germans…”270
The situation began to change at the end of June 1941, when Germany at-
tacked the USSR, which ROCA and its flock viewed as the beginning of the
long-awaited liberation. This attitude typified a large part of the White Russian
emigration, including its spiritual leaders — ROCA hierarchs. The Archbishop
of Berlin and Germany Serafim (Lade) and Archimandrite Ioann (Shahovskoi)
announced their support for Germany in the summer of 1941.271 This can be
partially explained by Church’s awful position in the USSR. In early June, 1941,
there were only 3, 732 active Orthodox Churches, 3, 350 of which were to be
found in the newly adjoined territories — the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine,
Western Belarus and Bessarabia. In remainder of the country, there were only
350–400 open churches. The number of functioning churches and active priests
(around 500 people) was utterly minor, and it comprised only 5 % of the work-
ing churches and active priests at the end of the 1920s. In occupied parts of
Russia, the number of churches expanded rapidly: in the Northwest — 470, in
Kursk Region — 332, in Rostov Region — 243, in Krasnodar Krai — 229, in
Stavrlopol’ Krai — 127, in Orlov Region — 108, in Voronezh Region — 116, in
Crimea — 70, in Smolensk Region — 60, in Tula — 8, and in Ordzhonikidze
Krai, Moscow Region, Kaluga Region, Stalingrad Region, Briansk Region and
Belgorod Region — 500 churches were opened. In total, 2, 150 churches were
opened. At least 600 Orthodox churches were opened in Belarus, and 5, 400 in
268
269
D. Ljotić D., “Predgovor za knjigu Georgija Pavlovića [Grabe] ‘Pod šestokrakom zvezdom. Judaizam
i slobodno-zidarstvo u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, ’” and “Pismo grofu Grabeu (29. 1. 1945),” in Sabrana
dela Volume VIII–IX, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003).
270
Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod
271
M. V. Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia i Pravoslavnaia tserkov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo
Patriarshego Podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2002), 247; S. p., ”Arkhiepiskop Io-
ann (Shakhovskoi) i ego korrespondenty (Materialy k biografii Arkhiepiskopa Ioanna)”, Tserkovno-
istoricheskii vestnik vol. 1 81 (1998).
Ukraine, which the Soviet state did not shut down after Germans’ withdrawal
for propaganda and political reasons. A letter written to Metropolitan Aleksei on
January 25, 1944, by S. D. Peskach, an ordinary Church singer in the small town
of Gdovsk was illustrative of the Church’s changing fortunes: “I can announce
that the Russian person has completely changed since the arrival of Germans.
Ruined churches have been renovated… the priests’ clothes were brought from
where they were preserved… Happiness and peace appeared. When everything
was ready, they invited the priest and the Church was blessed. At the time, there
were so many happy events that I cannot even describe it.” 272 The wish to begin
fighting the violent communist dictatorship led to the growth of numerous vol-
unteer and armed units which fought against the USSR.
The most radical ROCA members were a group of believers who gathered
around Eksakustodian Ivanovich Maharablidze which was even in opposition to
the vehemently anti-Bolshevik ROCA Chancellery of the Synod. Maharablidze
came from a family of military priests, and he graduated from the St. Petersburg
Seminary and the Faculty of Law at the St. Petersburg University. During the First
World War, Maharablidze headed the Protopresbytor Chancellery. During the Civil
War, he was the chief of Protopresbytor Chancellery Armed Forces in the South of
Russia. After the formation of the Temporary Higher Church Administration, he
became Secretary and the head of the Chancellery of the Karlovci Synod.273 Ma-
harablidze authored the essay addressed to the Karlovac Assembly on September
1, 1922, which dealt with Patriarch Tikhon’s controversial act, which was the first
step in the breaking up of ROCA from the Russian Orthodox Church. In his essay,
Maharablidze doubted the authenticity of the Patriarch’s signature, he established
that the text was a Bolshevik dictate and concluded that Karlovci Synod should not
accept the authority of a Patriarch which he deemed to have been opposed to the
Orthodox cannons.274 Due to personal and financial misunderstandings, Mahar-
ablidze was fired from the position as head of the Chancellery,275 which resulted
in the shutting down of Tserkovnye Vedomosti (1922–1930), a publication which
he edited. ROCA launched a new newspaper Tserkovnaia zhizn’ (1933–1944) after
a delay, which was edited by Grabe, the new Synod Secretary. At the same time,
the Russian far right emigration in Yugoslavia obtained another Church news-
272
TsGA SPб, f. 9324, o. 1, d. 7, 3. For an interesting take on the Third Reich’s policies towards Christian-
ity, see D. Zhukov, Okkul’tizm v Tret’em reikhe (Moscow: Iauza, 2006).
273
N. A. Struve, Bratstvo Sviatoi Sofii: Materialy i dokumenty. 1923–1939 (Moscow — Parizh: 2000),
297; G. Shavel’skii G., Vospominaniia poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota (Moscow:
Krutitskoe patriarshee podvor’e, 1996).
274
See the text of Mekharablidzea’s essay in the fund of the ROCA Synod: GARF, f. 6343, o. 1, d. 4;
A. V. Popov, “Arkhiv Arkhiereiskogo Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi tserkvi za granitsei v GARF,” in
Zarubezhnaia Rossiia 1917–1939. Sbornik statei, ed. V. Iu. Cherniaev, 403–411.
275
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 2, 1942, 18–19; Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 7–9, 1941, 7–12.
paper Tserkovnoe Obozrenie (1932–1944), which expressed harsh judgments on

certain employees of the Chancellery of the Synod, but did not officially criticize
any members of the Synod. Maharablidze edited Tserkovnoe Obozrenie, while
the newspaper also published articles by the renowned Orthodox publicist and
Protopresbytor Vladimir Igantievich Vostokov, the last Protopresbytor of the
Czarist Army and the Navy Georgii Ivanovich Shavel’skii and other less known
authors.276
Tserkovnoe Obozrenie welcomed the Nazi Germany’s attack on the Bol-
shevik USSR with unconcealed joy: “the decisive battle is going on. The light
against the darkness. Her mighty hand announced the battle until death. All
believers, all Christians, and especially us the Orthodox sons of Russia, must
turn this battle into an all-Christian Crusade, and led by sincere prayers, we
must partake in it in every way possible.” 277 The newspaper which was edited
by Maharablidze lavishly praised the new world order and its creator. 278 The
official ROCA newspaper Tserkovnaia zhizn’ which ceased with publication
between the April War and the end of 1941, followed a more moderate line.
The several month-long interlude in its publication enabled it to assess the
newly developing situation more soberly. The first issue of this newspaper un-
der the German occupation was accompanied by the German translation of the
title ““Das kirchliche leben” (as opposed to Maharablidze’s newspaper which
did not translate the title of his newspaper to German). The first issue was not
filled with immoderate boasting because of the German attack on the USSR,
but it was not completely apolitical due to the lengthy article by Metropolitan
Anastasii. The Bishop accented the anti-Christian and anti-humanitarian na-
ture of communism, while not neglecting “the difficult battle… with the forces
of evil.” 279 In the next issue of the official ROCA, an unsigned article clarified
the editorial view on the unfolding events: “on the entire planet Earth the Rus-
sian Church Abroad follows the course of war intensely and carefully, and it
supports the fighters against the Godless with prayers and it is always ready
to assist in this struggle with all its strength… which is waged… in one shape
or another around the world in all its parts and states.” 280 In his Christmas and
276
Maharablidze and his supporters were not in an open conflict with the Synod Chancellery and they only
expressed their personal views on certain events. His loyalty was never brought into question, and the
disagreements did not exceed the boundaries of internal Church discussions. This can be inferred from
the decision made by the Synod on June 8 / 21, 1941, at the recommendation of Metropolitan Anastasii,
that one of the most frequent contributors to that newspaper, Vladimir Vostokov, be decorated with a
large golden cross.
277
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1941: 4–6, 12; 7–9, 3–5; 10, 10–12; 1942: 4–6, 6–7.
278
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1–3, 1942, 4–8; 6, 1943, 5; 2–3, 1944, 7.
279
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 3–12, 1941, 37.
280
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1, 1942, 11.
Easter greetings in 1941 and 1942, the Metropolitan Anastasii expressed sup-
port for the “crusading soldier, who is on the battlefield… to achieve the great
deed of love and self-sacrifice… for values which are greater and more costly
than life because they have an insurmountable and eternal importance.” 281
Nonetheless, the rhetoric changed with the Easter Message in 1943. Although
the Patriarch repeated the enumeration of the Bolshevik misdeeds, his fascina-
tion with the “fighters against Bolshevism” was replaced with more reflective
feelings about “…victims and suffering… moans and the last breath… concern
about what will come… death which cuts down…thousands of young lives…
of every nation… and the daily increase in animosity and malevolence which
is growing into Satanic cruelty…” 282
Anstasii’s discourse changed because ROCA realized that “the Germans do
not want to offer… support in [Church’s — A. T.] work in Russia… that they want-
ed more than anything to deepen divisions… that they deliberately hindered con-
tacts with… Metropolitan Serafim in Germany. They did not want him to be tied
to us at all, and they did not allow him to contact the government about Church
issues, especially in the occupied territories in the East.”283 The Nazis even tried to
prevent contact between the Soviet prisoners of war and ROCA. Therefore, ROCA
attempts to establish regular Church life in Russia had to be made indirectly. For
example, a large number of Orthodox publications were transferred to a Brother-
hood in Slovakia which possessed its own printing press. The German suspicions
originated in the highest levels of the Third Reich’s government,284 and it led to
attempts to keep the emigrant Church active only in the exile.
Attempts to break out of emigration did not hinder ROCA to actively pursue
its pastoral duties towards its believers among the refugees. Apart from the regular
activities in the Russian House, ROCA ran courses for anti-atheist propagandists
who were thought by numerous renowned teachers. Later on, ROCA ran courses
on icon-painting by Hieromonk Antonii Bartoshevich.285
Bishop Anastasii paid a lot of attention to educating and training the youth,
and he visited the Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva several times,286 where religion was
thought by the gifted Hieromonk Antonii Bartoshevich who was respected and
beloved by his students. He also visited the Russian Gymnasium in Belgrade the
same subject was thought by famous Georgii Vasil’evich Florovskii. 287
281
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1942: 4, 50–51; 12, 180.
282
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 4, 1943, 49.
283
284
M. Pickers, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942 (Bonn: Athenäum, 1951), 46.
285
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1, 1942, 12; 8, 1943, 122.
286
287
The Bishop also visited the traditional Christmas Tree for children of the poor-
est Russian emigrants.288 In addition, ROCA participated in helping out the lonely,
the old and the dispirited members of the Russian community, whose numbers
grew during the war. ROCA also ran nursing homes in Kikinda,289 Belgrade,290
and a Russian Hospital in Pančevo. Vladika regularly visited them and offered the
necessary support to its patrons.291 Metropolitan Anastasii offered his blessing and
attention to another émigré project — a joint agricultural estate in Banjica, where
the hard-pressed emigrants tried to grow produce necessary for survival.292
Regardless of the German embargo, ROCA sought to participate in the rebirth
of Orthodox life in the occupied USSR. In middle of the summer in 1942, ROCA
Synod collected books and other church objects for the Church in Russia.293 The
Synod succeeded in sending into Russia via third parties a large number of church
books and crosses. The German attitude towards ROCA improved only in 1943
when Stalin allowed the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Pa-
triarchy (RPC MP) to be elected, requiring the Nazis to elevate ROCA status. In
order to condemn the election of the Moscow Patriarch, ROCA meeting was held
in Vienna which criticized the “unjust” election of the new Patriarch.294
ROCA realized how difficult the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church
was — its leader was imprisoned and a large number of Bishops were killed or
were forcibly separated from their clock. In his postwar lecture, Bishop Grigorii
(Grabe) recalled that Metropolitan Anastasii congratulated Saint Day to Patriarch
Gavrilo and Bishop Nikolai, regardless of the isolation which was forced upon the
arrested and the opposition from the German authorities. ROCA also adopted a
correct stance on the question of the so called Croatian Orthodox Church. How-
ever, Bishop Hemogen (Maksimov) (1861–1945) participated in its organization.
According to the data from 1942, out of sixty two clerics in service of the Croatian
Orthodox Church, twenty of them were Russian.295 The Metropolitan Anastasii
made negative comments about the Croatian Orthodox Church, as soon as he
heard of its establishment. ROCA condemned Bishop Hemogen, and it reported
this condemnation to the Serbian Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Josif. The
288
289
290
291
292
Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 6, 1942, 87–89.
293
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1942: 7–8, 4; 11–12, 6; 1944: 2–3, 9; Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 11, 1942, 161–164,
170;, Shkarovskii, “Russkaia tserkovnaia…,” 201–203.
294
295
Ćurić, Ustaše i Pravoslvlje; Goriachev, “Khorvatskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov…“; M. V. Shkarovskii,
“Sozdanie i deiatel’nost’ Khorvatskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, “ Vestnik
tserkovnoi istorii No. 3 (2007).
German occupational authorities, however, banned ROCA from advertising their

censure of the Croatian Orthodox Church. As a result, ROCA priests denounced
the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church to their parishioners. The Ser-
bian hierarchs appreciated ROCA support. After the war ended in 1945, Patriarch
Gavrilo said during a visit in London that “Metropolitan Anastasii held himself
wisely and with great tact and that he was always loyal to the Serbs.”296
The head of the Chancellery of the Synod Grabe’s view of the internal situa-
tion in Serbia could be discerned from his remarkably positive attitude towards
Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić (whom he called his personal friend), as well
as positive impressions of the anti-communist formations which were under
their command (the Serbian Volunteer Corps and the Serbian State Guard).
Although Grabe expressed this view several decades after the war, this gen-
eral picture is confirmed by contacts between ROCA and the German-created
Russian Liberation Army. Metropolitan Anastasii and Grabe personally visited
General Vlasov, the head of the Russian Liberation Army.297 After the Russians
evacuated Belgrade in the autumn of 1944, Metropolitan Anastasii travelled in
General Vlasov’s car.298
A part of the Russian clergy, especially those who served in the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church’s parishes in the country’s interior, were vehemently anti-communist.
Consequently, numerous Russian priests,299 as well as their Serbian counterparts,
were killed by the Partisans.300 It was impossible for ROCA to overlook these
relatively large losses in official Church newspapers.301
It should be noted that the number of Orthodox priests killed by communists
in Serbia during the Second World War was relatively high in comparison to the
296
M. V. Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia i Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitsko-
go Patriarshego Podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2002), 206; I. M. Andreev, Kratkii
obzor istorii Russkoi tserkvi ot revoliutsii do nashikh dnei (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1951),
134.; Serbian Orthodox Church in the U. S. A. and Canada Calendar (Pittsburgh: s. n., 1991), 105.
297
“V pravoslavnom kafedral’nom sobore v voskresen’e, 19 noAJ, IABria 1944 g. Slovo mitropolita An-
astasiia (radio-zapis’),” Volia Naroda 3–4 (1944), 5.” This is according to Shatov, Shatov, Bibliografi-
ia.
298
Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod; A. Kiselev, Oblik generala Vlasova (Zapiski voennogo sviashchennika)
(New York: Put’ zhizni, 1977), 106. Kiselev recalled in his memoirs the warm relationship between
General Vlasov and ROCA leadership. He also mentioned Vlasov’s attendance at the Church-organized
formal presentation of Vlasov’s movement on November 18, 1944, and the ceremonial prayer for the
victory of the “Russian weapons” in the large Russian Orthodox Church in Berlin which was led by
Metropolitan Anastasii, who had just escaped from Belgrade several months earlier. Kiselev, Oblik
generala, 67, 86, 92. Konstantin Kromadii, the head of the General Vlasov’s Personal Chancellery, left
a detailed account of the first meeting between Anastasii and Vlasov in the autumn of 1944. Kiselev,
Oblik generala, 137; K. Kromiadii, Za zemliu, za voliu… Na putiakh russkoi osvoboditel’noi bor’by
(1941–1947 gg.) (San-Francisco: Globus, 1980)..
299
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1943: 1, 8; 8, 6; 9, 3.
300
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 7–9, 1941, 7; 1942: 7–8, 4; 11–12, 6.
301
losses inflicted by the other warring parties. Based on postwar research of the
Serbian Orthodox Church, we know that six Russian priests working for SOC
were killed by the occupiers and their collaborators: four were killed by Ustaše
in NDH and two by Germans for unknown reasons in Vojvodina. Another priest,
about whom little is known except that he was Russian monk in the Monastery St.
Naum, died at the hands of unknown people near Ohrid. Allegedly, two priests
were liquidated by the JVuO in Central Serbia.302
The anti-communism of the Russians priests who served in the Serbian par-
ishes in rural Serbia led them to become targets for the Partisans.303 This was
particularly the case in Braničevo parish in Eastern Serbia,304 where Partisans
killed numerous priests a large number of whom were Russian. In Braničevo
parish, between 1941–1944, at least three Serbian and seven Russian priests
were killed. Priest Viacheslav Iakovlevskii was killed in July, 1942. During the
Civil War in Russia he was a priest in the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army. Upon
his arrival to Serbia in December, 1920, he served in Brza Palanka Parish in
Timočka Diocese, after which he was transferred to Braničevo Diocese. The
priest Viacheslav Zein was killed in July, 1942. He was nephew of the famous
F. A. Zein, Governor of the Duchy of Finland. Viacheslav Zein was a clerk
before the revolution, becoming a priest only in exile. For a time he served in
Mozel, France, after which he came to Serbia, where he died during the war.305
Priest Panteloimon Kokaiev was killed in August, 1942. His father came from
a respected Ossetian family, and he graduated from Stavropol Seminary with
excellent grades. After his arrival to Serbia he served in Jovačka Parish in Niš
Diocese. In August 1942, Sergei Belavin, priest of Braničevo Diocese, was
murdered.306 Priest Grigorii Volkov from Klenj Parish in Braničevo Diocese
was killed in March 1943, only several months after Venjamin, the Braničevo
Bishop honored him for his excellent service. Finally, priest Vasilii Tolmachev
was killed in March 1943.307 Venjamin expressed “bitterness and sorrow” to
Metropolitan Anastasii that “Godless bandits are killing Serbian and Russian
priests” in the Braničevo Diocese. Consequently, Venjamin issued an “order that
all victims be introduced into diptychs of all Dioceses, killed by the insanity of
302
M. D. Smiljanić and D. Štrbac eds., Spomenica pravoslavnih sveštenika, 39, 40, 48, 59, 86, 88, 96,
130.
303
Tserkovnoe obozrenie 8, 1943, 6.
304
However, the murder of Russian emigrants was not rare in other areas of the country. For instance, in
April of 1943, Milovoje Simić, who served in Vojvoda Budimir Ilić’s Company around Cer, slit the
throat of a Russian priest Novosel’skii, as well as his family, in the village of Miličevići. V. Tret’iakov,
ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945, 48.
305
Evlogii (Georgievskii), Put’ moei zhizni (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1994).
306
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1, 1943, 8.
307
the Godless… at the same time, steps were taken with the responsible authori-
ties to protect the lives of Russian and Serbian priests.”308
ROCA support for the Russian Corps likely contributed to the murders of
Russian priests.309 Metropolitan Anastasii blessed his flock who enlisted in this
unit, as well as the Russian Corps itself. He regularly participated in the Corps’
military parades, he served liturgy on special occasions. He received a statement
of appreciation from the Commander of the Corps “for everyday attention to-
wards spiritual needs of the Corps.” In 1943, Metropolitan Anastasii blessed the
Regimental field Church with the Miraculous Icon of the Mother of God from
Kursk.310
During the Easter Week in 1943, the Russian Corps soldiers en mass visit-
ed the Church of Holy Trinity where a large group of Russian émigrés warmly
greeted them. The young soldiers of the Russian Corps attended a special ser-
vice by Metropolitan Anastasii, who addressed the soldiers with an inspirational
speech.311 Apart from the continuous attention from the Metropolitan, the Regi-
mental ROCA priests were also involved in the soldiers’ lives. These priests par-
ticipated in the daily life of the Russian Corps, and as a result, they were exposed
to all of the risks of the war. For example, during the Battle for Čačak in 1944,
Father Nikon and his assistant Hierodeacon Vasian tirelessly administered the
sacraments to the wounded and they buried the killed, despite the intensive fire of
the Soviet artillery and the Katiusha rocket launchers. During the fighting, Father
Nikon was wounded while his Hierodeacon was killed.312 Priests of the Corps
were held in exceptionally high esteem, which can be indirectly ascertained from
the fact that four of the former priests from the Corps were appointed to be Bish-
ops in various ROCA Dioceses.313 Considering that the Corps’ priests fell under
the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Anastasii, who was in charge of administration of
the Russian Diocese in Serbia,314 they regularly mentioned the name of the worldly
ruler King Peter II Karađorđević and the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church
Patriarch Gavrilo.315 In the autumn of 1944, three weeks before the entry of the
308
309
Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 11–12, 1942, 6–7; 1943: 1, 7; 8, 4–5; Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 10, 1942, 142; 1943:
1, 1; 5, 73–74; 8, 113; 8, 122.
310
N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 268–269.
311
Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 39–40, 115.
312
It must be noted that not all ROCA clerics desired to be military chaplains. Vladimir Rodzianko, for in-
stance, wanted to avoid service in the military. 1, Russkaia Tserkov…Prilozhenie II — “iz vospominanii
Vladyiki Vasiliia (Rodzianko).”
313
N. Prot-ov, “Polkovye sviashchenniki Russkogo korpusa,” Nashi vesti 438 (1995).
314
This was not the case with other Russian collaborationist units, where chaplains recognized the author-
ity of the Patriarch in Istanbul and even Moscow, in addition to ROCA, D. Konstantinov, Zapiski voen-
nogo sviashchennika (n. p., 1980), 26.
315
Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia, 205.
Red Army and Partisans in Belgrade, ROCA leaders left Serbia with numerous
Russian anti-communist émigrés.316 Grabe recalled these difficult days: “at the
end… we received a [train — A. T.] carriage. We started packing the Chancellery
into cases….all [Russians — A. T.] were leaving Belgrade. Already, pupils and
teachers had left, as well as my children and wife. Three weeks after our departure
from Belgrade, the Bolsheviks captured it. Once we approached the train, we real-
ized that instead of the carriage which was promised to us [to the ROCA Synod —
A. T.], they gave us only a part of a third class carriage. The current Bishop Averkii
was travelling with us. He had so much private things, that he could not carry the
Miraculous Icon, so I had to take it. Our entire luggage was thrown into the only
available transport carriage on the train. Naturally, things were thrown there with-
out any receipts. That is how we left for Germany.”317
It must not be forgotten that a number of priests and their flock decided to stay,
offering “resistance to the idea of departure of the Miraculous Icon… and the
Metropolitan.”318 This was “a smaller part of the emigration — the so called left-
wingers and ‘Soviet patriots’… [who believed that they — A. T.] should not fight
against the Bolsheviks because the interests of the Soviet power coincided with
interests of Russia. This group was led by two priests: Protopresbyter I. Sokal’
and Protopresbyter V. Nekliudov.”319 It should be noted that this sympathy towards
the communists was not caused by the Red Army’s success. Individual ROCA
followers wanted to establish ties with Moscow Patriarchate even before the war.
Nekliudov taped over the picture of Nicholas II with paper in the Russian Iver
Chapel on the New Graveyard in 1938.320 During the war, Sokal’ and Nekliudov
gathered the people around the Church of Holy Trinity and tried to persuade them
not to go into the Russian Corps, advising them not to be afraid of communists
because “there are no more Bolsheviks, only the Russians have remained. Both of
these priests… during the offensive of the Soviet troops talked a large part of their
flock into staying in Belgrade.”321
All of the decision-making powers of the Russian Church in Yugoslavia,
during the withdrawal, was left in the hands of the Dioceses Council which was
comprised of the following clerics: Ioann Sokal’ (vice president), Vitalii Taras’ev,
316
N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus 278–280.
317
318
Ibid.
319
Their views were sincere and not dictated by the looming Red Army’s arrival. They held pro-Soviet
views as early as 1938, well before the war. Individual ROCA believers and clerics also started contem-
plating reconciliation with the Church in Russia before the war. V. A. Maevskii, Russkie v Iugoslavii:
Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, 275; Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’ chapter 4.
320
Maevskii V. A., Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, 275; Kosik, Russkaia
Tserkov’, chapt. 4.
321
Vladimir Moshin, Vikentii Fradinskii (secretary).322 The power transferred into

the hands of the most senior Russian cleric Protopresbyter Sokal’. At that moment,
the Russian Church had two municipalities, two monasteries, twenty priest-teach-
ers, fifteen monks, thirty-two nuns and around 3,000 believers.323 Four priests
decided to stay in the largest Russian Church in Belgrade, the Church of the Holy
Trinity: I. Sokal’, V. Nekliudov, V. Taras’ev and V. Moshin.324 Upon request of
ROCA Parish Council and the Bishop Council, the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox
Church decided to place the elders of the Russian Church under its protection in
November 1944.325 In this way a new chapter began in the life of the Russian Or-
thodox Church in the new Tito’s Yugoslavia.
322
Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’.
323
Glasnik SPC No. 10–12, 1944, 91.
324
Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov… Prilozhenie I — “Iz vospominanii akademika, protiereia Vladimira Moshi-
na.”
325
R. Radić, Život u vremenima: Gavrilo Dožić (1881–1950) (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju, 2006).
Ii
Soviet collaborators
in Yugoslavia
and their contribution
to the german-led
military campaigns
against the partisans
and the Red army
The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil
War during the occupation of the USSR?
For several decades historians of the Second World War have been fascinated
by the German unexpected and speedy success in 1941, and just as the unexpected
(considering the previous German victories and the German economic, industrial
and human resources of almost entire continental Europe) reversal of Axis for-
tunes on the Eastern Front.
Historians usually explain Wehrmacht’s early success by the removal of a
large number of Soviet high and middle-ranking officers during the repressions
of the 1930s which led to the general degradation of the army. Historians also
contend that the party elite did not believe the accurate intelligence reports and
the correct advice from foreign diplomats about the date of the attack. In addition,
scholars argued that Wehrmacht was superior to the Red Army in the early phases
of the war in quality as well as quantity of weaponry (this explanation was used
by historians of the former Eastern Bloc).1 Historians also proffered following
reasons for the Soviet victory: Russia’s difficult environmental conditions (espe-
cially the cold winters), the countless human resources which the Soviets wasted
recklessly, the Blocking Detachments which fired into the backs of Soviet soldiers
who wanted to withdraw, the great economic and military-technical assistance
given by the Western Allies and the leading role of the Communist Party (this was
the favorite explanation of historians from the Eastern bloc).
However, from the 1990s, historiography began changing due to the fall of
communism and the subsequent opening of a number of state, party and military
archives, as well as more objective history writing on both sides of the former
Cold War divide. Historians without access to archives and researchers who could
1
Historians have cited other reasons such as the incomplete rearmament program and the newly estab-
lished borders in the western part of the country which had not been fortified yet.
100 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns...
not freely express their views in totalitarian socialism made a series of claims
which were refuted by the newly available sources.2
For instance, D. A. Volkogonov claimed that Kremlin repressed 40,000 of-
ficers.3 However, statistics published by the Russian State Military Archive tell a
different story. In this time period, 37,000 thousand individuals were fired, out of
which only 22,000 were fired for political reasons (the rest for disciplinary viola-
tions such as drunkenness and immoral behavior). In addition, by 1940, 13,000
political convicts were restored to army, 8,000 were jailed and 5,000 were execut-
ed.4 It is important to point out that contemporary researchers have indisputably
demonstrated the fact that the educational level of the high ranking officers had
considerably improved after the purges. Before the beginning of the repression,
29 % of officers had high military education, while by 1938, 38 % of high rank-
ing officers had higher military education and in 1941 that figure had reached
52 %. Amongst the newly appointed higher-ranking officers, there were 45 % more
graduates than amongst the dismissed officers which they replaced.5 It should be
noted that amongst the repressed officers, considerable number of them were the
so called political commanders who advanced professionally during the Civil War
when they fulfilled special orders issued by the Bolshevik Party. Basically, many
of them did not reach their rank due to their proven military capabilities on the
field against an organized enemy army. According to a study which quantified
and qualified disciplinary violations, the Red Army was typified by the lack of
discipline, orderliness and organization.6
Likewise, the Soviet historians’ favorite theories have proven false, such as
that Hitler had at his disposal countless number of well-armed troops in 1941,
which was not the case with the supposedly peace-loving USSR which relied on
international agreements for security.7 It should be pointed out that in the military-
technical sense, the Soviet troops were not far behind their German opponents. By
the beginning of the war, the Soviets had developed BM-13 (the famous Katiusha
rocket launchers) and T-34. The latter was the best tank of the Second World War
which received the greatest praise from the German tank virtuoso H. Guderian:
“in November 1941, well-regarded constructors, industrialists and officers of the
2
For the re-evaluation of their positions see I. Pykhalov, Velikaia obolgannaia voina (Moscow: Olma
Media Grupp, 2005).
3
D. A. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina I–II (Moscow: APN, 1989).
4
N. S. Cherushev, 1937 god: Elita Krasnoi Armii na Golgofe (Moscow: Veche, 2003), 39; Cherush-
ev N. S., “Statistika antiarmeiskogo terrora, “ Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv 3 (1998): 41–49.
5
G. I. Gerasimov, “Deistvitel’noe vliianie repressii 1937–1938 gg. na ofitserskii korpus RKKA, “ Rossi-
iskii istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1999): 48–49.
6
A. Smirnov, “Bol’shie manevry, “ Rodina 4 (2000): 93.
7
L. E. Reshin and V. P. Naumov, eds., 1941 god: v 2 knigakh (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond.
‘Demokratii’ Moscow), 1998; A. V. Isaev, Antisuvorov. Desiat’ mifov Vtoroi mirovoi (Moscow: Eksmo,
Iauza, 2004).
The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? 101
Institute for Armaments came to my tank army to familiarize themselves with

the Russian tank T-34, which surpassed our military machines; immediately they
wanted to understand and undertake steps which would enable us to obtain tech-
nical superiority over the Russians…” The frontline officers recommended that
the Germans should commence immediately with production of tanks identical
to T-34. The constructors were not ashamed of copying the so called Eastern in-
feriors, however, they were concerned that it would be impossible to begin the
production of the most important T-34 parts with the necessary speed, especially
the aluminum parts of the diesel engines.8 Even the quality of the Red Army’s
infantry weapons were on par with their German counterpart, and sometimes they
were even better, as was the case with aviation machine-gun SHKAS and the
semi-automatic rifle SVT-40.9
Finally, the thesis that the Soviet party elite completely overlooked the Ger-
man attack and fell into state of temporary shock and collapse because it ignored
the intelligence and diplomatic reports about the pending German attack is spuri-
ous. Recent document publications testify to the fact that this claim is far from
correct. Even though the Soviet intelligence services found out about the plan for
Operation Barbarossa on December 29, 1940, eleven days after Hitler announced
it,10 accurate and convincing data about the date of the attack were never received
on time.11 The claims about the shock and the collapse of the higher party circles
after June 22, 1941, have also proven to be false. According to this theory, the
leadership’s confusion, caused by Stalin’s certainty that Hitler would not violate
the pact, prevented him from issuing orders in the first days of the war.
The emergence of Stalin’s visitors’ log which was kept by his security team
shed new light on this issue. This document reveals that the Kremlin dictator came
to his work place in the first hours after the attack by the Third Reich and that he
met with numerous visitors — Politburo members, high-ranking officers and min-
isters.12 This information was publicized already in the uncensored G. K. Zhu-
8
G. Guderian, Vospominaniia soldata (Smolensk: Rusich, 1999), 380. This view was an exception.
See B. Miuller-Gillebrandt, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii 1939–1945 (Moscow: Yauza, 2002), 284.
9
D. N. Bolotin, Istoriia sovetskogo strelkovogo oruzhiia (Saint Petersburg: Poligon, 1995), 77, 235.
10
S. V. Stepashin et al., eds, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine
t. 1, (Moscow: Akademiia FSK RF, 1995), 409.
11
The official statement made by Colonel V. Karpov, an employee of the Russia’s Intelligence Agency’s
Bureau for Communication with Media to a Ministry of Defense newspaper: Karpov V. et al., “22 iiunia
1941 goda. Moglo li vse byt’ po-inomu?” Krasnaia zvezda, Issue 108 (23409), June 16, 2001, 4; V. K
Vinogradov et al., comp., Sekrety Gitlera na stole u Stalina: razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke
germanskoi agressii protiv SSSR, mart — iiun’ 1941 g. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv,
1995), 11–13.
12
Izvestiia TsK KPSS, June, 1990, 216–220. It must be mentioned that the document was strictly confi-
dential (it was not intended for publication), so it could not have been a forgery. Complete publication:
A. V. Korotkov, A. D. Chernev and A. A. Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly)
zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.) (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2008). Korotkov,
kov’s memoirs, even though the Marshal was critical of Stalin after he dismissed
him from leading positions after the end of the war. “They say that in the first
week of the war J. V. Stalin was supposedly so depressed, that he could not even
talk on the radio, offering his speech to Molotov instead. This claim does not cor-
respond to real events.”13
Hitler’s changing fortunes in late autumn of 1941 also need to be reevaluated.
The climate and difficult environment hindered the Russians and their technol-
ogy as much as they represented an obstacle to German advance.14 The human
resources who were under direct or indirect Hitler’s control were greater than
what was available to the Soviet leadership. The number of ethnic Russians in
the Red Army (the Russians from Russia, Eastern Ukraine, Belarus, and North-
ern Kazakhstan) was comparable to the German ethnic element of the invading
Axis powers (Germany, Austria, Southern Tyrol, Sunderland, Silesia, Pomerania,
Danzig, Alsace and Lorraine, Romania, the Netherlands, Belgium and Yugosla-
via). Even the activity of the brutal security apparatus, according to the published
archival information, was not as massive as historians from the Western camp
liked to claim to have had a decisive impact on the breakdown of the German
war machine in Russia.15 Finally, a complex statistical study was published of the
Soviet human losses in the wars in the twentieth Century.16 It turned out that the
Soviet and the German losses were similar, and that the higher number of Soviet
deaths was influenced by the Nazi inhuman treatment of Soviet prisoners. The
mortality of Soviet prisoners taken by Germans was 57 %, while the morality rate
of German prisoners was 12.4 %.17 The Soviet army, Navy and Security forces
deaths during the war were 8, 668, 400 people.18 The truth also emerged about the
Anglo-American wartime assistance which was ignored by the Soviet research-
Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina.

13
G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniniia i razmyshleniia, Izd. 13‑e, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe po rukopisiam
avtora I–II (Moscow: Olma-press, 2002), Kniga I, 265–266.
14
See the new memoir series Voina i my and Soldatskie dnevniki compiled by A. Drabkin in Moscow,
“Soviet WWII-veteran Memoirs,” in Soviet WWII-veteran Memoirs, accessed September 17, 2012,
http://english.iremember.ru / .
15
N. P. Patrushev et al., comp, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 2 (Moscow: Akademiia
FSK RF, 2000); V. K. Vinogradov et al., comp, Lubianka v dni bitvy za Moskvu: Materialy organov
gosbezopasnosti SSSR iz Tsentral’nogo arkhiva FSB Rossii (Moscow: Zvonnitsa, 2002); V. K. Vinogra-
dov et al., comp, Stalingradskaia epopeia: Materialy NKVD SSSR i voennoi tsenzury iz Tsentral’nogo
arkhiva FSB RF (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2000); A. T. Zhadobin et al., comps., “Ognennaia duga”:
Kurskaia bitva glazami Lubianki, (Moscow: TsA FSB RF, 2003).
16
G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deist-
viiakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993).
17
M. M. Zagorul’ko, M. M. Zagorul’ko, S. G. Sidorov and T. V. Tsarevskaia eds., Voennoplennye v SSSR.
1939–1956. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Logos, 2000).
18
G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat, 131.
ers and extolled by the Anglo-American historians.19 According to the data from
the archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the quantity of
received weapons did not exceed 5–6 %. The aid had a greater impact when it
came to food, cars and oil derivatives, however, it never exceeded more than 37 %
of the overall quantity of these goods produced in the USSR from June, 1941 to
May, 1945.20
However, it is indisputable that the above indicated issues played a role in
determining the outcome of the war between the two giants, Germany and the
USSR. There was at least one more neglected factor — the sudden change of the
Soviet (especially the Russian) people’s attitude toward the German troops. The
beginning of the war, when a large number of Red Army soldiers were taken
prisoners and Soviet soldiers lacked enthusiasm to fight for the Soviet power, co-
incided with the relatively neutral stance of the population toward the German
occupational forces. This was typically the case in the Baltic Republics, Western
Ukraine and even in Eastern Ukraine and RSFSR.21 “The population of Smolensk
territory [Russia — A. T.] secretly wished for arrival of Germans. The attitude of
the local population towards the Red Army was unfriendly and they barely hid
it.”22 Apart from separatism, which was a feature of every multi-national state,
there was a well-hidden but deeply rooted anti-communist sentiment amongst a
certain part of the population. The Red Terror, forceful collectivization, dictator-
ship of the bureaucratic apparatus and poor living conditions created and strength-
ened those dissatisfied with the regime. During the Soviet-Finnish war, before the
Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, active enemies of the regime appeared in the
ranks of the Red Army. They joined the war on side of the Finns and the Finnish
‘Soviet’ units were disbanded only after the war.23
The weakening of the anti-regime sentiments which followed the first phase
of the military operations influenced the changing fortunes on the frontlines. This
was a consequence more of the policies pursued by Nazi Germany than the So-
19
Soviet historiography had only one monograph on Land Lease, which was marked for “internal pur-
poses.” Postavki soiuznikov po Lendlizu i drugim putiam vo vremia Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1956).
20
P. S. Petrov, “Fakticheskaia storona pomoshchi po lend-lizu,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 6 (1990);
M. N. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnye kovoi, 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997).
21
See for example numerous documents about the Russian population’s pro-German sentiments as late as
1943 in Lokot’ area after the Kursk Battle in the collection of documents A. T. Zhadobin et al., comps.,
Ognennaia duga. For more information see A. Dallin, “The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet
Disaffection,” in Revolution and Politics in Russia. Russian and East European Series vol. 41 (Bloom-
ington: University of Indiana Press, 1972); R. Michaelis, Die Brigade Kaminski: Partisanenbekämp-
fung in Rußland– Weißrußland — Warschau (Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1999); S. Verevkin, Vtoraia
mirovaia voina: vyrvannye stranitsy (Moscow: Iauza, 2006).
22
I. A. Dugas and Ia. A. Cheron, Vycherknutye iz pamiati. Sovetskie voennoplennye mezhdu Gitlerom i
Stalinym (Parizh: YMCA-press, 1994), 76.
23
K. M. Aleksandrov, Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005).
viet government’s attempts to win over the people. The attack on the USSR was
inspired by the Nazi plan ‘Ost’, which called for transfer of the Soviet boundaries
to the A-A line (Archangelsk-Astrakhan), and not by the Nazi leaders’ anti-com-
munism (as a certain number of Soviets hoped) or by the wish to prevent future
Soviet aggression (as Germans had claimed). According to Dr. Vetcel, Hitler and
his closest allies planned to “liquidate Jews inhabiting all the territories,” “to ex-
pel the racially undesirable local population to Western Siberia” (80–85 % of all
the Poles, 65 % of Ukrainians and 75 % of Belarusians), and to “Germanize the
local population in the Baltic countries” in the occupied territories.24 With regards
to Russians, the Germans planned to “undermine the biological strength of the
nation,” to struggle with its national culture and to replace the Cyrillic alphabet
with its Latin counterpart.25
The local population’s attitude, in addition to changing fortunes on the frontlines,
also influenced the emergence of a feature peculiar of the Eastern Front — the inten-
sive military collaboration.26 A part of the population of the Soviet Union, mainly
separatists and anti-communists, joined the Nazis. This was the case not only for in-
habitants of the Baltic Republics, Central Asia, the Caucuses and Western Ukraine,
but also for Russians, Belarusians, eastern Ukrainians and Cossacks — all of whom
wanted to take revenge on Bolshevik leaders and the NKVD for repressions, hunger,
violent requisitions of property and bureaucratic torture. According to German data,
at the end of 1943, there were 500,000 Soviet citizens in the ranks of Wehrmacht.27
This statistics includes only soldiers and it does not take into account the civilians
who worked in the administrative-police apparatus and in institutions of the local
self-government. According to recent research based on archival documents, “the
total number of Soviet citizens and emigrants who served in Wehrmacht, SS, police
or paramilitary units, at one time or another, was around 1, 200,000 people (among
24
“Der Generalplan Ost,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1958): 291; „Plan Ost. Pis’mo M. Bor-
mana Rozenbergu otnositel’no politiki na okkupirovannykh territoriiakh ot 23.07.1942 g. “, Voenno-
istoricheskii zhurnal No. 1 (1965): 82–83; Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal vol. XXVI (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), Document 1017,
547–554; M. Pickers, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 72.
25
„Plan Ost. Pis’mo M. Bormana Rozenbergu otnositel’no politiki na okkupirovannykh territoriiakh ot
23.07.1942 g. “, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal; Trial of the Major War Criminals before the Internatio-
nal Military Tribunal vol. XXVI (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), Document 1017;
Picker, Hitlers Tischgehsprache, 72.
26
It must be admitted that collaboration was present in all the countries during the Second World War. The
collaborators in the administrative, police and military institutions in the Western Europe were far more
numerous than the resistance movements in the same countries, M. I. Semiriaga, Kollaboratsionizm.
Priroda, mitologiia i proiavleniia v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 2000). For the topic
of collaboration in Yugoslavia see N. Popović, Koreni kolaboracionizma (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i
novinski centar, 1991); Ž. Jovanović, ed., Kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–1945: zbornik građe (Belgrade:
Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2001); O. Milosavljević, Potisnuta istina: kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–
1944 (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006).
27
Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 342.
them were 700,000 Slavs, up to 300,000 from the Baltic nations and around 200,000
from the various nations from the Caucuses, Tartars and a number of Turkic and
other smaller nations),” but maximum number of Soviet collaborators at any one
time was 800,000–900,000 people.28
The changing attitude of the local population led to a general decline of dis-
cipline, moral, desertion in Soviet collaborationist units.29 Therefore, on October
10, 1943, Hitler issued an order to transfer Eastern Battalions to France, Italy and
the Balkans.30 As a result, a number of Russian, Turkestan and Cossack quisling
units (usually battalions or half-battalions) were deployed from the Norman Island
to Warsaw suburbs, and from the Danish coast to the Alps.31
We will examine the composition of large individual units, as well as the typi-
cal formations of this so called hidden army. The largest (and the most famous)
were SS divisions which were comprised from the nations which were annexed by
USSR during 1939–1940. The inhabitants of Western Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia
and Latvia did not succumb to the Soviet propaganda and they did not view the
Red Army as their own. Consequently, numerous police units and powerful mili-
tary formations were formed in these republics with relative ease after the Ger-
man arrival. The 14th SS division Galicia was formed on April 28, 1943. According
to testimony of former soldiers, the number of volunteers exceeded the anticipated
number of recruits (13,000–14,000), and several additional police regiments were
formed which were eventually absorbed by the division. Latvians responded even
more enthusiastically, and in November, 1941, they began forming units to assist
the Germans against the USSR. The 15th Latvian SS Division was formed in Feb-
ruary, 1943, and in January 1944, the 19th Latvian SS Division was created.32 The
20th Estonian SS Division appeared in the spring of 1944, which was formed out
of smaller military and police units, as well as volunteers.33 Lithuania and Belarus
did not have independent SS division but they proffered numerous police battal-
ions which participated in repression of the Soviet Partisans.
Already in November, 1941, Hitler ordered the formation of four national le-
gions: Turkestan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian-Mohammedan. On April
15, 1942, he personally ordered that the legions should be grouped together with
the official allied units (such as Croats, Romanians, Hungarians, and others). In
October, 1941, Abwehr began forming battalions for special operations by recruit-
28
Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga.
29
M., Cooper, Nazi war against soviet partisans (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 120.
30
Littlejohn, Foreign Legions, 330.
31
J. Thorwald, Illusion: Soviet soldiers in the Hitler’s armies (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1975), 233; Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 314.
32
Michaelis, Die Grenadier.
33
A. A. Voitsekhovskii and G. S. Tkachenko, Ukrainskii fashizm (Kiev: Soliuks, 2004).
ing volunteers from the prisoner of war camps, in order to hasten the Wehrmacht’s
advance into the Caucuses and Central Asia. On November 15, 1941, the first
Turkestan Wehrmacht unit was created. The soldiers proudly called it the Turke-
stan Regiment, but it was officially known as the 811th Infantry Battalion. The for-
mation of Turkestan units was speeded up in January and February 1942, when the
headquarters and training facilities of the Turkestan Legion was opened in Poland.
This occurred after Hitler’s conversation with two Turkish generals who pleaded
with Hitler to help their brethren in the German prisoner of war camps.34 During
1942 and 1943, fourteen Turkestani battalions were sent to the Eastern Front from
Poland. Germans occupied the position of company commanders and higher. The
battalions’ arsenal included infantry weapons and anti-tank guns, heavy mortars
and other weapons captured from the Soviet armament depots. In May 1942, the
headquarters of the 162nd Division were dissolved and another centre for the for-
mation for Turkic and Caucasian units was opened. Dr. O. von Niedermeyer (colo-
nel and after September 1942, major-general), an Abwehr officer and the leading
German specialist on Russia and the Islamic World, headed the training centre.
Until May, 1943, twenty five Eastern Legion battalions were formed, the majority
of which joined the 6th Army of General-Colonel F. Paulus.
In May 1943, the Centre for Forming Eastern Legions in Ukraine was trans-
formed into the 162nd Turkestan Infantry Division under the command of General-
Major von Niedermayer. There were 50 % Germans in the Division, amongst them
numerous Volksdeutsche from the USSR. The large German cadre guaranteed
loyalty and it helped German soldiers to learn the traditional Turkestani expertise
of concealing and survival in the wild.35
The special Caucasian unit Bergmann was well known for its brutality. The
Königsberg University professor and Abwehr officer Theodor Obrlender orga-
nized the unit. The Battalion was formed between November, 1941 — March,
1942, in the city of Neuhammer and it was comprised of five companies (1st, 4th and
5th Georgian Companies, 2nd Northern-Caucasian Company and the 3rd Azerbai-
jani Company) with 900 people from the Caucuses and three hundred Germans.
In addition to volunteers from the prisoner of war camps, 130 Georgian emigrants
from the special unit Tamara II were included in the battalion. The Battalion was
armed with light infantry weaponry, it completed military-mountain training in
Bavaria, and it reached the Eastern Front at the end of the summer in 1942.36
Due to the need for conspiracy, members of the Battalion had to pretend that
they were Bosnian Muslims. Upon their arrival to the frontline, part of the le-
gionaries were parachuted into the Northern Caucuses behind the frontlines to
34
S. Chuev, Prokliatye soldaty (Moscow: Eksmo; Iauza, 2004), 465
35
Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 419; Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien, 182–183.
36
Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legiony, 287.
collect intelligence and engage in diversionary attacks. The rest of Bergmann was
deployed against the Soviet Partisans in Northern Caucuses, and in October they
were transferred to the frontlines. These lightly armed units fought bravely and
proved their loyalty to the Third Reich.
During the battles, four additional companies (Georgian, North Caucasian,
Azerbaijani, and mixed reserve) were formed out of local population, Soviet
deserters and prisoners of war. Also, one Georgian and three North Caucasian
cavalry squadrons were created. As a result, at the end of 1942, Bergmann was
transformed into a Regiment.37
During German withdrawal from the Caucuses, Bergmann protected the ex-
posed German positions, it carried out special diversionary tasks, and it destroyed
the industrial objects on the abandoned territories. In February, 1942, Bergmann
was transferred to Crimea where it was used in anti-Partisan operations. There
was a plan to transform the Regiment into a division, but this plan was post-
poned.38 In the autumn and winter of 1943–1944, together with the other German
units, Bergmann was used in the defense of Crimea from the advancing Soviet
forces. Larger part of the Regiment (1st and 3rd Battalions) was transferred to the
Balkans, and the 2nd Battalion was moved to Poland where it participated in the
repression of the Warsaw Uprising.
Unlike other nations of the Soviet Union, Hitler was suspicious of the Russians,
fearing that Germans could lose the control of large Russian units. Nonetheless,
the German generals on the Eastern Front, despite their ideas about racial supe-
riority, had an important reason to form and deploy Russian units in the struggle
against the partisans. The NKVD strictly controlled the Soviet partisans, which
defined the movement in several ways: it had a strict organization, it was decisive
in action and indifferent to retaliatory German massive repressions. As a result,
the civilian population (especially in villages and small towns, where the Soviet
system did not have many sympathizers due to its policies towards the peasantry),
did not favorably view Soviet partisans. Therefore, they were susceptible to Ger-
man propaganda. Local units were formed already in 1941 (with Wehrmacht’s
approval) by rabid anti-communists. They willingly arrested and exterminated
communists who tried to conceal their identity and former employees of the So-
viet administration, as well as the straggling commanders and commissars of the
Red Army. In November, 1941, according to the Himmler’s order, all of these
units were disbanded, and their soldiers were used to create Schutzmannschaft
der Ordnungspolizei, the auxiliary police forces.39 The peak of German policy of
using Russian collaborators against the partisans was associated with the names
37
E. Abramian, Kavkaztsy v Abvere (Moscow: Iauza, 2006), 141–149.
38
Drobiazko and Karashchuk, Vostochnye legiony, 13–14.
39
N. Thomas, Partisan Warfare 1941–1945 (London: Osprey, 1983), 15–16.
Bronislav Kaminskii and Konstantin Voskoboinikov. Both of them had completed

technical Universities, served in the Red Army during the revolution, but were
disappointed by communism after the Civil War. Both were victimized by the
OGPU, as a result of which they were forced to live outside of large urban centers.
They chose the town of Lokot’ in the densely forested areas of Western Russian
near the border with Belarus for their temporary residence.
The program of their People’s Socialist Party called for liquidating the collec-
tive farms, the division of land by peasants and recognition of private property.
These plans were attractive to a large part of the population which suffered from
the Soviet partisan requisitions and did not want to see the return of Soviet power.
Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army which be-
longed to the Army Group Centre, was the representative of the German military
administration. He believed that the local population was an important factor in
strengthening the occupational apparatus. The forested areas of Western Russia
were exceptionally difficult to control without the support of the local popula-
tion. Lokot’ Autonomy came about in the territory where the German forces were
not stationed but Soviet Partisans could not establish themselves. Kaminskii and
Voskoboinikov managed to organize an enclosed economic organism, and to as-
sure a living standard for the local population higher than in other occupied areas
of the country. 600,000 people lived Lokot’ area, and several large factories oper-
ated which supplied the population with food and clothes, there were ten middle
and 335 elementary schools, nine hospitals, thirty-seven ambulances, several the-
atres, radio-stations and a developed social system. All of this assured Kaminskii
and Voskoboinikov massive support of the population, but it also turned them
into targets of numerous NKVD assassination plots. Voskoboinikov was killed,
after which Kaminskii strengthened his security. In order to protect themselves
against the Partisans, Germans allowed Kaminskii to form large volunteer units
which used the weaponry abandoned by the retreating Red Army. In July 1943,
when the Red Army broke up the collaboration, Kaminskii Brigade had more
than 20,000 soldiers: five infantry regiments, an artillery battery, a tank battalion,
pioneer battalion and a defensive (security) battalion. After Lokot’ was evacu-
ated, the Brigade was transferred to the city of Leped, Belarussia, where it was
effectively used against the Partisans. Afterward, it was used in the repression of
the Warsaw Uprising. It may seem paradoxical, but Kaminskii, who was of Polish
origins, was one of the founders of the Russian Liberation People’s Army, and he
fought against the Warsaw Uprising with such brutality that he was liquidated by
his German overlords who were surprised by his bestiality.40
40
For more on this see: Dallin A., “The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection”, Revo-
lution and Politics in Russia. Russian and East European Series, vol. 41, Bloomington (Indiana), 1972,
Michaelis R., Die Brigade Kaminski: Partisanenbekämpfung in Rußland — Weißrußland — Warschau
The NSDAP leaders developed the idea to form large Russian formations only
at the end of 1944. The last-ditched German attempt to overturn the course of the
war in the face of looming defeat was connected with the so called Vlasov move-
ment. Andrei Vlasov, Major-General of the Red Army and Commander of the 2nd
Shock Army on Volkhov Front fell into the hands of Wehrmacht (he was handed
over to the Germans by local villagers) on July 11, 1942, after his army was sur-
rounded and destroyed. As a prisoner, he wrote an open letter entitled “Why did
I embark on the path of struggle against Bolshevism” and he issued the so called
Smolensk Declaration in which he announced the aims of his movement. None-
theless, until 1944, Vlasov’s name was used only in propaganda purposes by the
Germans who used the name of the phantom Russian Liberation Army (RLA) as
an alternative to the Soviet system, which the Germans supposedly offered to the
Russian people. The situation began changing towards the end of the war when
Germans had evacuated most of ethnic Russian territories. Himmler met Vlasov
in September, 1944, agreeing to create the Armed Forces of the Committee for the
Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (AFCLPR), which was headed by Vlasov. The
AFCLPR manifesto was announced on November 14, 1944, in Prague. Vlasov
became the Supreme Commander of the Russian Liberation Army. The first real
Vlasovite formation was created only in February, 1945 — the 1st RLA Division.
In early May, 1945, officers of the 1st Division again decided to change sides in the
war, and parts of the division helped the Prague’s population to eject German units
from the city. Upon the arrival of Marshal Konev’s forces, the division headed
west in an attempt to surrender to the Americans. Vlasov gave himself up to the
Americans on May 11, 1945, but the next day he was arrested by SMERSH. After
a closed trial in Moscow, he was hanged on August 1, 1946.41
Some Russian collaborators, nonetheless, were able to engage in the armed
struggle against the Red Army as part of larger formations, because Germans be-
lieved that Cossacks were a separate nation. Germans developed the idea even be-
fore the Second World War that Cossacks were descendants of Goths and as such
were not related to Russians. The Cossack separatism was given an opportunity
to flourish during the bloody whirlwind of the Civil War, when Peter Krasnov, a
(Berlin: Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1999); S. I. Drobziako and I. G. Ermolov, Antipartizanskaia respub-

lika (Moscow: Eksmo, 2001); B. V. Sokolov, Okkupatsiia. Pravda i mify (Moscow: AST-press, 2002);
S. Verevkin, Vtoraia mirovaia voina: vyrvannye stranitsy (Moscow: Iauza, 2006).
41
More about this see: I. Khoffmann, Istoriia vlasovskoi armii (Paris: YMCA-PRESS, 1990); Shtrik-
Shtrikfel’dt, Protiv Stalina i Gitlera; N. M. Koniaev, Dva litsa generala Vlasova. Zhizn’, sud’ba, legeny
(Moscow: Veche, 2001); Drobiazko, Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia; K. M. Aleksandrov, Ofitser-
skii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945 (Saint Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii
informatsionnyi tsentr “BLITs”, 2001); Aleksandrov, Protiv Stalina; Aleksandrov, Armiia general-leit-
enanta. And for the view from the other side see A. N. Kolesnik, General Vlasov — predatel’ ili geroi?
(Moscow: Tekhinvest, 1991); Iu. Kvitsinskii, General Vlasov: put’ predatel’stva (Moscow: Sovremen-
nik, 1999); O. S. Smyslov, “Piataia kolonna“ Gitlera. O
Czarist officer, scientist and author, led the Cossack state under German tutelage,
which had its own money, foreign and domestic policies.42 Upon their arrival to
Cossack lands around Don, Kuban and Terek rivers, Germans were pleasantly
surprised with the number of volunteers willing to fight against the communists.
Some of these Cossacks fought against the Bolsheviks in the Civil War. Cheka-
OGPU-NKVD detachments carried out massive executions in these areas, while
Cossack rights were annulled after the Revolution,43 and many people lost their
civil rights, most of their property and were forcefully led into collective farms.
In the autumn of 1941, Baron Von Kleist sent a report to General Staff urging it to
form special Cossack units and use them to fight against the partisans. Already on
October 6, General E. Wagner ordered the formation of such units by November,
1941, behind the frontlines of the Army Groups North, Centre and South.44
The first Cossack unit was organized behind the Army Group Centre on Oc-
tober 28, 1941. This was a Cossack Squadron under the command of Don Cos-
sack I. N. Kononov, the former Red Army Major. The Cossack Cavalry Regiment
Platov was formed on June 13, 1942. The Regiment was comprised of five cavalry
squadrons, a heavily armed squadron and an artillery battery. The Regiment was
used in anti-partisan operations. The Cossack Cavalry Regiment von Jungschulz
was another large Cossack unit. It was also formed in the summer of 1942, and it
was named after its commander. It participated in battles against the Soviet cav-
alry in rear of the German troops.
According to orders issued on June 18, 1942, all Cossack volunteers among the
prisoners of war were to gather in one centre — Slavuta. By the end of the month,
42
See the biographical note on Ataman of the Don Republic Petr Krasnov in the foreword of P. Krasnov,
Sochineniia v 2 kn (Moscow: NPK ‘Intelvak’, 2000).
43
Four and a half million Cossacks lived in the Cossack areas of the country until the First World War.
They were freed from taxes, and in return, they formed elite cavalry units which served the state. In the
First World War, the Cossacks formed 170 regiments. See the introduction to the photo album, F. de
Launa, Kazaki Pannvitsa. 1942–1945 (Moscow: AST, 2006), 9–11.
44
The Cossack support for the Germans during Second World War has been researched by Russian scholars
after 1991. They mostly focus on the role of the Cossack units in the Second World War on the territory
of the former USSR. K. M. Aleksandrov, “Kazachestvo Rossii v 1941–1943 gg.: Neizvestnye stranitsy
istorii,” Novyi chasovoi 3 (1995); K. M. Aleksandrov, “Tragediia russkogo kazachestva 1943–1945,”
Novyi chasovoi 4 (1996); K. M. Aleksandrov, “Kazachestvo Rossii vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine: k istorii
sozdaniia Kazach’ego Stana (1942–1943)”, Novyi chasovoi 5 (1997); S. Drobiazko, “Kazach’i chasti
v sostave Vermakhta,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed.
A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); A. L. Khudoborodov, Rossiiskoe kazachestvo v emigratsii
(1920–1945 gg.): sotsial’nye, voenno-politicheskie i kul’turnye problem (Moscow: MGU im. M. V. Lo-
monosova, 1997); Okorokov, “Kazaki i russkoe osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie;” S. Drobiazko and A. Karash-
chuk, Vostochnye legiony i kazach’i chaste v Vermakhte (Moscow: AST, 2000); N. F. Bugai, Kazachestvo
Rossii: ottorzhenie, priznanie, vozrozhdenie, (1917–90‑gody) (Moscow: Mozhaisk-Terra, 2000); Belovo-
lov, Kazaki i Vermakht; Krikunov, Kazaki; For now, there is only one article in Serbian, B. Jevtić, “Ruski
i kozački dobrovoljci u sastavu Vermahta”, Orden br. 5 (2005). The older historians classified Cossacks
together with Turkestan and Caucasian volunteers in one deliberately general group which they referred
to as Circassians. See the article D. Trifunović, “Čerkezi,” Vojna enciklopedija 2 (1971): 248.
there were 5,826 people in Slavuta. Due to the lack of Cossack officers (during
the repressions, Cossacks were politically suspicious and the regime promoted
them only in small numbers), Germans had to appoint officers who were not of
Cossack background. The 1st Officer School Ataman Count Platov and a school for
noncommissioned officers opened. Eventually, the following units were created:
the 1st Ataman Regiment, the 2nd Leib Cossack Regiment, the 3rd Don Regiment,
the 4th and 5th Kuban Regiments, and the 6th and 7th Combined Cossack Regiments.
All of these units were placed into barracks by August 6, 1942.
The Cossack Assembly was held in Novocherkassk in September, 1942, which
called on the Cossacks to rise up against communism and it elected the Campaign
Headquarters of the Ataman of Don Cossacks which was headed by S. V. Pavlov.
In November, 1941, the following units were formed from Don Volunteers: the 1st
Don Regiment, the 2nd Sinegor Regiment, the 1st Kuban Cavalry Regiment and
the 1st Volga Regiment. By April, 1943, there were twenty Cossack Regiments in
Wehrmacht, each consisting of 400–1,000 fighters. In total, there were more than
25,000 Cossack soldiers and officers serving in the German army.45
The 1st Cossack Division was created in the middle of September, 1943, in
Mlava, Poland, It was headed by the German Cavalry General von Pannwitz. This
was the first larger military formation which fought on the side of Germans which
comprised of Russian volunteers. The Germans held a number of officer and techni-
cal positions (for instance, on November 1, 1943, the Division had 222 German and
191 Cossack officers).46 The 5th Don Regiment was the exception as it did not have
a single German officer. This Regiment was headed by Ivan Nikitich Kononov. His
life story is relevant in order to understand the character of the so called Second
Cossack Uprising. Kononov was born on April 2, 1900, near Taganrog, into the fam-
ily of a Cossack officer. His father was hanged by the Bolsheviks in 1918, his older
brother and several relatives died during the Civil War fighting against the Bolshe-
viks, while two of his brothers were arrested and executed during the repressions
1934–1937. Kononov was able to conceal his family background, and he entered the
Red Army in 1922. As a Cossack he had an inherited predisposition for military
service, his talents were immediately recognized and he was sent to the school for
junior officers, and later on, he completed the Cavalry Department of the military
school VTSIK and the Frunze Military Academy. He distinguished himself during
the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, and he was decorated with the Red Star for
bravery. In 1941, Kononov was a Major and a commander of a respected regiment on
the Soviet Union’s western borders. He switched to the German side on August 22,
45
C. Jurado, Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht 1941–45 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)
28–29; Littlejohn, Foreign Legions, 272–277; Drobiazko and Karashchuk, Vostochnye legiony, 34–39;
Krikunov, Kazaki, 90–414.
46
VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, 184.
1941, with most of his officers and soldiers including the Commissar of the Regi-
ment D. Panchenk. His group surprised the Wehrmacht officers by expressing their
wish to fight against the Bolsheviks. The German command allowed the formation
of a unit under his command on October 6, 1941, and on October 27, the 102nd Cos-
sack Volunteer unit was formed, which was reinforced with volunteers from the
prisoner of war camps. In winter of 1942, a group of Russian émigré officers from
camp VI–C (for captured officers of the Yugoslav Royal Army) joined Kononov’s
102nd Battalion on the frontlines. The officers were led by A. N. Pupovochnikov who
worked closely with Kononov. Kononov’s men participated in operations against
Partisans and paratroopers in Western Russia and Belarus.
Kononov was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1942, since the
idea of forming Cossack units seemed to Germans to have been successful. At
the end of the same year, his Battalion grew into a Division. The 5th Don Cossack
Regiment was formed in Mlava in 1943, out of the forces of Kononov’s 600th Cos-
sack battalion, which entered the 2nd Brigade. In 1944, Kononov was promoted
to a Colonel. At the end of the same year, Special Cossack Infantry Brigade was
formed under Kononov’s command, which included the Kalmyk Cavalry Regi-
ment. However, the Brigade was not transformed into the 3rd Cossack Division. At
the end of the war, the Brigade consisted of the 7th and 8th Infantry Regiments, the
9th Cavalry Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion which had 7,000 fighters.
At the end of the war, Kononov was promoted to Major-General. After the war he
reached Austria, where he hid until the beginning of the Cold War when the Brit-
ish and Americans stopped handing over Soviet citizens to the USSR. Afterward,
Kononov moved to Australia where he lived in isolation with his family.47
It is difficult to distinguish between justifiable struggle for freedom against
the Soviet expansionism and communist totalitarianism, on the one hand, and the
extreme chauvinism, anti-Semitism and criminal behavior towards other nations
by the numerous collaborators. Their fate after the war was determined whether
they lived within the Soviet borders of 1939 or 1941. Latvians, Lithuanians, Es-
tonians and Western Ukrainians, if they had luck to fall into the hands of the
Western allies, received political asylum and were allowed to live in freedom and
relative prosperity. These individuals have enriched the historiography with nu-
merous memoirs. Russian collaborators and their counterparts from the Central
Asia and the Caucuses were mainly handed over to Stalin by the Western Allies,
and they came out of Siberian camps only after his death. With their health wast-
ed, and without an opportunity for decent employment, they mostly lived off the
47
K. Aleksandrov, “Tragediia donskogo kazaka Ivana Kononova,” Posev 5 (2000): 43–46;, 43–46;
A. Okorokov, “Ne sotvori sebe kumira…” Stantsiia 2 (2001); J. Hoffmann, Deutsche und Kalmyken
1942 bis 1945. Einzelschriften zur militarischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Freiburg [im
Breisgau]: Rombach, 1986).
Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 113
minimal state pension while concealing from their family and their surrounding
why it took them so long to return from the war.
The fate of collaborators also differed in the post-communist historiography.
In the Baltic Republics and Ukraine, the majority of these veterans have witnessed
complete rehabilitation and glorification. Political, social and religious leaders of
these countries participate in commemorations connected with the SS veterans,
while their traditions have been integrated into military and state holidays. They
have been honored by a series of magnificent monuments which paralleled the de-
struction of monuments which celebrated the anti-fascist fighters. The attempts at
revising the Second World War have been more limited in the Caucuses and the
Central Asia. In Belarus and Russia, during Shushkevich’s and Yeltsin’s presiden-
cies respectively, there were attempts to revise history. The revisionists relied on
the opened archives and they published a large number of monographs, memoirs,
document collections and articles. Parts of the society at large even accepted some
of the slogans under which the Russian and Belarusian anti-Soviets fought. In cur-
rent circumstances, however, there is no possibility of recognizing the legality of
the so called hidden army. Consequently, Russia and Belarus are the only countries
in European part of the former USSR who are consistent in their celebration of the
Soviet and the Red Army inheritance. Regardless of the policies pursued by the cur-
rent government, the tradition of respecting those who fought against the Germans
1941–1945 remains a national myth for majority of contemporary Russians. This
attitude is rooted in the fact that Russia experienced the Second World War as an
existential threat, and it has much less to do with the memory of Stalin or the Soviet
system. Russians were able to suppress this direct threat to the existence of the Rus-
sian nation only in the ranks of the Red Army. In contrast, a large number of ordi-
nary people in the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine see the collaborators
primarily as opponents of Russian expansionism and communism.
Soviet citizens in the German occupational

forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945
After Hitler issued the order to transfer the Eastern Battalions to France, Italy
and the Balkans on October 10, 1943, large units made up of Slavs (Cossacks),
Central Asians, and people from the Caucuses found themselves in Yugoslavia.48
48
D. Littlejohn, Foreign legions of the Third Reich I, 330.
Bergman was the most famous of Eastern Battalions before its arrival to Yu-
goslavia. It was comprised of the 1st Georgian battalion and the 3rd North-Cauca-
sian Battalion. Most of the soldiers hailed from mountainous regions and Ger-
mans honed the highlanders’ traditional skills with special training in mountain
warfare. Their battle moral was increased by the unit’s hatred of Orthodox Slavic
nations and communism. In the Caucuses, the unit’s soldiers acquired reputation
as effective and brutal fighters against the Russian Partisans around Piatigorsk.
The 1st and the 3rd Battalions were transferred to the Balkans in March, 1944. In
August 1944, Bergmann took part in the battle against the Yugoslav Partisans
around Kičevo (Macedonia). The Georgian 1st Battalion fought in the operational
zone of the Luftwaffe 11th Field Division. In the autumn of 1944, Bergmann was
placed on the old Bulgarian border in anticipation of the arrival of Soviet troops.
After a two-day battle, Bergmann was withdrawn behind the frontlines. At first, it
was moved to Resava region in Serbia, and later to Bosnia, where it was stationed
near Višegrad in operational zone of the Wehrmacht’s 181st Infantry Division. On
February 2, 1945, the Bergmann staff units were eliminated. However, the unit’s
soldiers continued serving the Reich in national battalions, and they kept wear-
ing their insignia and symbols. In the beginning of 1945, the Georgian Battalion
carried out special operations in Srem, while the North Caucasian Battalion led
the anti-Partisan activities in Eastern Slavonia. Bergmann participated in battles
against NOVJ near Karlovac in April, 1945. Bergman soldiers were in Slovenia
when Germany capitulated. The Georgian Battalion was taken prisoner by Yu-
goslav units, while the North Caucuses Battalion managed to surrender to the
Anglo-American Allies, but both of them ended up in the end in the hands of the
Soviet military-intelligence agency SMERSH.49
Other units from the Caucuses participated in German attempts to suppress
the Yugoslav Partisans.50 At the end of the war, the fighting spirit of these
inhabitants of the Caucuses and Central Asia had diminished considerably,
resulting in desertion and even armed rebellions. There were at least two such
events: an Azerbaijani unit from FAT-215 (near Trebinje) and Tajik unit from
FAT-207 (near Raška) slit the throats of their German officers and escaped
to the mountains.51 There were also regular Wehrmacht units in Yugoslavia
which were made up of people from the Caucuses. The I / 125th Armenian In-
fantry Battalion was based in Kosovo and Metohija on the Yugoslav-Albanian
49
Jeloschek A., Richter F., Schütte E., Semler J., Freiwillige vom Kaukasus, Graz — Stuttgart, 2003, str.
250–251.
50
FAT (Frontaufklaerungstrupp) — one of Abwehr’s intelligence group
51
Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. V, s. n. (Belgrade: UDB III odeljenje, 1958), 336–337; Nemačka
obaveštajna služba. t. VI, s. n. (Belgrade: UDB III odeljenje, 1960), 188.
border.52 The 842nd and 843rd Northern Caucuses Reinforced Half-Battalions

and the 814th Armenian Infantry Battalion participated in anti-Partisan opera-
tions in Croatia and Bosnia.53
In addition, there were Wehrmacht Turkestani units in the Balkans. The larg-
est of these was the 162nd Turkestan Division formed out of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Uzbeks, Tajikistanis, Turkmen, Kalmyks and Azerbaijanis. However, they spoke
a similar language and that is why they formed one division. After its formation
and training, the division arrived in Yugoslavia in September, 1943, and it partici-
pated in anti-Partisan operations in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia.54 The major-
ity of the unit was based in Istria,55 and after Italy capitulated, it was reinforced
with the captured weaponry especially suited for mountain warfare.56 The Divi-
sion received a new commander — R. von Hagandorf in May, 1944. The Divi-
sion was sent to the frontlines against the Anglo-Americans in Italy twice during
1944–1945. Even though the legionaries of the Turkestan Division were poorly
disciplined,57 their German commanding officers from the division valued their
high level of aggression and personal loyalty to their immediate officers which
was exceptionally useful in local anti-Partisan operations.58
General Glanz von Horstenau, the Wehrmacht representative in NDH, de-
scribed in his journal the meeting with General Oskar von Niedermayer on Sep-
tember 28, 1943, who was the Commander of the 162nd Division. At the time, the
units of the 162nd Division were arriving to Croatia and Northern Italy via Reich.
The arriving units were travelling through Karlovac-Ogulin area. Horstenau re-
corded what Niedermayer said of his soldiers: “We cannot offer them some politi-
cal ideals, that is understood. They feel loyalty only to their commander. They
are mercenaries who want to eat well, drink, and they like women very much.
When a man leads them, he must promise them these three things. Only then will
they go into the battle.” Niedermayer chose 10,000 most loyal men out of 40,000
which arrived to Neuhammer and the senior positions in the division were taken
over by Germans. According to Horstenau, the approach to anti-Partisan opera-
tions in the 162nd Division was simple. “The German command hands them over
the villages which they conquer. When they enter the village, they kill the men,
rape the women, and all of property belongs to them.” Archbishop Stepinac was
shocked by this approach. Horstenau recorded Stepinac’s understanding of how
52
N. Thomas, The German army in World War II (London: Osprey, 2002), 63.
53
Thorwald, Illusionp. 233.
54
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 629.
55
VA, NAV-T-312, r. 1638, str. 493; VA, NAV-T-312, r. 1639, str. 106–107.
56
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 595
57
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 158; Miuller-
Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 419.
58
Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien, 182–183.
the soldiers from the 162nd Division behaved: “he was desperate: members of the
Turkish nations which are under Niedermayer’s command have sacked his native
village Krašić and had taken with them three hundred ‘completely innocent, good
people’. He asked me if I could at least do something so that they are not killed.
He also mentioned the possibility that amongst the kidnapped people are probably
some of his relatives…”59
In addition, the 789th and I / 76 Turkestan Battalion, the 804th, 806th, 820th, I / 4,
I / 101, I / 73 Azerbaijani Battalions which later on joined the 162nd Turkestan Di-
visions were transferred to the Balkans to be used against the Partisans.60 There
was a plan to concentrate all of these units from the Caucuses and Central Asia
on the territory of Yugoslavia and form a Caucasian Liberation Army and The
National Army of Turkestan. This plan did not materialize because the small
Asiatic units were spread out all over Europe.61 Later on, the Germans intended
to create an SS Cavalry Division out of Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian and
Northern-Caucuses soldiers, but the capitulation of Germany prevented the re-
alization of this plan as well.62 After the Red Army’s entry into Serbia, there
were direct battles between the Soviet forces and collaborationist units from
the Caucuses and Central Asia. In the biggest battle of the Second World War in
Yugoslavia, the Battle for Batina Bridgehead, the Soviet soldiers and Yugoslav
Partisans were opposed by German, Hungarian and Croatian units, which stood
shoulder to shoulder with a Turkestan Battalion which on November 11, 1944,
prevented the crossing of the Danube by the Red Army’s 703rd Regiment of the
233rd Riffle Division of the Red Army.63
The SS 14th Division Galicia, created in June, 1943, also comprised of former
Soviet citizens. It was one of the first Slavic SS Divisions, and it was transferred to
Slovenia in February of 1945.64 The division marched 700km, and they continued
with the Eastern Front tradition of providing for themselves through plunder. As
a result, the division was forbidden from staying in private residences while they
59
Horstenau, Između Hitlera i Pavelića (Belgrade: Nolit 2007), 310, 331; Gabelica I., Blaženi Alojzije
Stepinac i hrvatska država, Zagreb, 2007.
60
Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 546.
61
Thorwald, Illusion, 233; Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 314.
62
Mamulia, Gruzinskii legion, 94–96.
63
Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony RF (TsAMO), f. 233 sd., d. 37, p. 283; d. 34, p. 201.
64
Numerous pro-independence Ukrainian SS soldiers who served in Yugoslavia described the activi-
ties of their Division. Their reminiscences can be found (without the enumerated pages) in a digital
library online at http://lib.galiciadivision.com. These books include: Ju. Tis-Krohmaljuk, Shchoden-
nyk natsional’noho heroia Selepka Lavochky (Buenos-Aires: Iuliian Serediaka, 1954); I. Nahaievs’kyi,
Spohady pol’ovoho duhovnyka (Toronto: Ukrai’ns’ka Knyzhka, 1955); V. D. Haike, Ukrai’ns’ka
Dyviziia “Halychyna“ (“Vony hotily voli“), Zapysky NTSh: Tom 188 (Toronto — Paris — Munich:
Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv 1‑oi’ UD UNA, 1970); R. Lazurko, Na shliahah Evropy (Chicago: Vydavnytstvo
Bratstva kolyshnih Voiakiv 1 UD UNA, 1971); Ie. Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozai’ka moi’h spomyniv (Mu-
nich- London: B. V., 1982); Ia Ovad, Bo viina viinoiu… Spohady (L’viv: Spohady, 1999).
were in Germany. The unit suffered heavy losses during their transfer to the front-
lines, since a large part of Slovenia was within the reach of the Allied air forces.
At the end of February 1945, the division reached its destination and was located
in Styria and Carinthia where it actively participated in anti-Partisan operations.
The Partisans were very active in the territories where the Ukrainian SS divi-
sion was stationed, and it was not safe to travel by car between Maribor and Celj
even during the day. The Division’s Chief of Staff, Major Wolf-Dietrich Heike,
recalled that the Partisans were much more powerful in Slovenia than in Slovakia,
where his unit was previously stationed. The police units were dispersed in vari-
ous fortified positions and they frequently engaged in defensive battles against the
attacking Partisans. There was no civilian control or general control of the entire
area in early 1945. The increased Partisan activity was also recorded by a non-
commissioned officer of the Division: “There was an unwritten rule in Yugoslavia
then — one must not stand on the road because of enemy snipers. You had to move
constantly so as not to be an easy target.”
The SS soldiers were unhappy by their smaller allowance because the area in
which they were stationed was classified as behind the frontlines. Their conduct
caused dissatisfaction by the local population and the civil administration, and the
situation was improved only when the status of ‘participant in battle operations’
was returned to the Division, alongside the corresponding allowance. Afterward,
the relationship between Slovenians and Ukrainian soldiers improved because the
Ukrainian SS soldiers started to engage in small trade with the local population.
Thereafter, the number of complaints against the SS soldiers decreased and the
majority of problems occurred during anti-Partisan operations. Soldiers of the
Division recalled: “the boys liked to confiscate a hog, shooting at it instead of the
Partisans.” A noncommissioned officer Lazurka remembered that “in operations
against the Partisans we learned to find small food supplies hidden in peasants’
houses, and to determine immediately by the peasant’s face and eyes whether he
was ‘clean’ or had something on his consciousness. In this way we obtained bar-
rels full of fat and cracklings, sacks of flour, cans of honey, dried vegetables and
even… sweets. In this way we could supply our Company well.”
After the Division’s arrival to Yugoslavia, its first assignment was to cleanse
the terrain north of Ljubljana around Menin Mountain. The Partisans had airstrips
there which the Allies used to supply the Yugoslav Communists. Menin Mountain
was surrounded by the following Partisan units: 13th Slovenian Brigade Mirko
Bračić and the 2nd Slovenian Shock Brigade Ljubo Šercer.65 The division had to
march for 100km, and after several hours of rest, it had to climb the snow-capped
mountain peaks. The Division’s task was to surround and destroy the Partisan
65
J. Dobnik, Vodnik po transverzali kurirjev in vezistov NOV Slovenije (Ljubljana: Domicilni odbor kurir-
jev in vezistov NOV Slovenije pri Združenih PTT organizacijah Slovenije, 1980).
units there. The operation could have been successful only in case of rapid and
unexpected attack. However, the Division was forced to move through impassable
terrain beyond roads, and the soldiers were forced to leave behind in the valleys
all of their belongings including radio stations. In the mountainous terrain, the
light and portable radio stations which the SS soldiers were able to carry did not
assure regular radio contact during the movement. Therefore, it was important to
be extremely punctual with regard to the scheduled movement. Nonetheless, after
three days of exhausting marches (March 14–16), it turned out that the Partisans
managed to withdraw their main forces prior to the troops’ attack. The Ukrainian
SS men managed to capture several Partisans and numerous boxes of ammuni-
tion. The losses suffered by the Division were also minimal: several wounded,
and one fighter killed. After ten days, the Division again participated in operation
to cleanse the mountainous area around Golta- Ljubno -Solčava and the Moun-
tain Peak Boskovec, where they were tasked with locating and destroying the
Partisans’ base centered on an airstrip which Western Allies used to supply Yu-
goslav Communists. The Division was split. Part of the soldiers marched towards
their departure points from where they were supposed to embark on their mission,
while another part took off by train. Unexpectedly, the train was attacked by Al-
lied airplanes and two locomotives were destroyed, and numerous Ukrainian SS
soldiers were killed and wounded. The operation was even less successful than
its counterpart on Mountain Menina. In general, the idea of utilizing the Division
turned out to be unsuccessful.
According to Major Eugene Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, the deputy head of the Di-
vision’s Reserve Regiment, the struggle against Yugoslav Partisans was very dif-
ficult. Partisans knew the area well, especially the mountain passes, they had a
well-developed intelligence network, and they relied on support of the local popu-
lation. Therefore, the lengthy marches aimed at surrounding and surprising the
Partisans mostly failed. The authors of various memoirs noted that the previous
experience of fighting against the Slovak partisans was insufficient for fighting
against the experienced Yugoslav Partisans. According to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren,
the local Partisans were comprised of Slovenes, Serbs and other Yugoslav nation-
alities, as well as American, British and Soviet officers who had wealthy experi-
ences in diversionary and partisan warfare. Another problem was that Ukrainian
“soldiers did not like the mountain. The very appearance of these dark mountains
caused uncomfortable feelings. Soldiers, inhabitants of the flatlands, were openly
afraid of mountains.”
In addition, the Division’s troops had to understand the nuances of the local
Civil War, where apart from the ‘Red Partisans’ there were also ‘Royal Parti-
sans’ the Slovenian Četniks loyal to Mihailović. Even though the Supreme Ger-
man Command did not approve of contacts between the Ukrainian SS troops and
Četniks, according to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, these contacts were unavoidable and

necessary for the soldiers. According to the priest of the 14th SS Division Galicia,
Isador Nagaevski, the troops were not afraid of Četniks and did not even use pa-
trols in areas where they predominated. “Sometimes Četniks invited our younger
officers and soldiers for gatherings and they treated them sincerely.” V. D. Haikea
recollected that there were fewer Četniks than Partisans, but that they were bet-
ter organized, armed and supplied. Četniks operated mainly in the areas East of
Maribor, where there were neither German troops nor Partisans. They were wary
of Germans but they did not engage them in battles. The contacts between Ukrai-
nians and Slovenian Četniks had another dimension when the 31st SD Battalion,
known as the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense, arrived to Slovenia in order to
be integrated into the division. Soldiers of the Legion arrived at the end of Feb-
ruary, 1945, by railroad from Maribor and they were stationed in the villages of
Spiefild, Oberschwarzach and Unterschwarzachhof. During their movement the
soldiers engaged in robbery: “during the air raid alarm, German troops had left
the wagons and ran for cover, but our boys used this opportunity to do ‘recon-
naissance work’. After this, vodka, sausages, rice, sugar and other valuable food
staples appeared.”66
The Legion had 600 people and it was divided into four companies, it was sup-
plied with Soviet riffles and the following supporting weapons, several light and
heavy machine guns and anti-tank cannons. On March 5, 1945, the day that the
Legion was supposed to join SS Galicia, there was a special celebration with an
orchestra to greet the Commander. However, large part of the Legion (250 soldiers
according to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren and up 400 soldiers according to Haikea), led
by Sergeant Roman Kiveliunko and Sergeant Koval’ went into the forest on March
4, 1945, where they sought help from Četniks. The Legionaries understood that
the Germans were defeated. Their plan was to wait in the forest until the Germans
withdrew, and then join the British as Allies instead of prisoners of war. In order
to hide in the forest, they needed the help of locals who knew the terrain, which
they sought from “Slovenian Četniks of General Mihailović.”67 However, accord-
ing to participants of these events, it turned out that “the Yugoslav Četniks were
German Allies and when Germans gave the order, they could have handed over
the rebels… before the arrival of the Allies.”68 The rebels sought out shelter in for-
ests east of Maribor in vain. Četnik officers were suspicious of these arrivals and
they informed the German Military Administration of their position. The division
established contacts with Četniks who provided Germans with up to date infor-
mation about the movement of the rebel soldiers. After negotiations and promise
66
V. Stanislaviv-Makuh, Lis pryimaie povstantsiv (Kremenets’: n. p., 2002), 174.
67
Ibid., 176.
68
Ibid., 181.6
of amnesty, the Legionaries decided to return to Division on March 8. The only

victim was Seargeant Koval’, whom the Germans executed on trumped up charges
in order to take revenge for organizing the rebellion.
At the end of March, 1945, the division was in a difficult situation. At a meet-
ing of military leaders of the Third Reich held in Berlin on March 23–24, 1945,
Hitler asked for the Division to be disarmed. According to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren,
true to his style, Hitler announced that it was well known that “the Austrian
Rusyns (Western Ukrainians — A. T.) are sheep, and not warriors.” The disorder
which began at the end of the war saved the Division from being disarmed. These
“critical days” were described by Haikea. In April, 1945, the Division engaged the
units of the Third Ukrainian Front, hindering Soviet advance on the old Austrian-
Yugoslav border. After the failure of this operation, the SS Ukrainian soldiers left
Slovenia. In March, 1945, the division had more than 20,000 people.
Nonetheless, the 1st Cossack Division was the largest Soviet collaboration-
ist unit in occupied Yugoslavia. This large formation was turned into to the XV
Cavalry Corps in the second half of 1944.69 After its arrival to Serbia (October 15,
1943), the Division had around 18, 702 people and 10,091 horses,70 and after half a
year (March 1, 1944), there were 18, 686 people and 14,004 horses.71 The Division
had two brigades. The 1st Brigade was composed of the 4th Kuban, the 2nd Siberian
and the 1st Don Regiments. The 2nd Brigade was comprised of the 6th Terek, the 3rd
Kuban and the 5th Don Regiments. In addition, the division had two artillery bat-
teries equipped with 75mm cannons, a reconnaissance and an engineer battalion
and auxiliary units.72 Immediately after its formation, the division was transferred
to Southeastern Yugoslavia where it participated in anti-Partisan operations. It
was subjected to General-Colonel L. Rendulich’s command, the commander of
the 2nd German Tank Army.
Helmuth von Pannwitz, the experienced German Cavalry officer headed the
division. He was different than Niedermeyer and he was neither skeptical nor cyn-
ical towards his soldiers. From his conversation with Pannwitz, Horstenau con-
cluded: “Cossacks impress him. Racially, they are great type of people. Many look
like they are from Scandinavia… Pannwitz claims that there are more illiterates in
France than amongst his Cossacks.” Pannwitz believed that his “Cossacks have a
clear ideology which is called liberating Russian from the Bolshevik power.” Ac-
cording to Horstenau, Pannwitz believed even in the autumn of 1944 that “there
69
Before the war, a German cavalry division was supposed to number 5,000 soldiers. After the reorgani-
zation, the largest cavalry unit according to the mobilization plan in 1939–1940 was supposed to have
6, 684 people and 4, 552 horses. Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 21, 84.
70
VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, str. 132.
71
VA, NAV, T-314, r. 1547, str. 724.
72
VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, str. 75.
will be a turnaround in the war. This will enable him to inhabit the Caucuses with
his Cossack units. It is so beautiful there!”73
The arrival of the 1st Cossack Division to Yugoslavia was accompanied with a
propaganda campaign. “Belgrade witnessed an unusual spectacle on a sunny au-
tumn October day. Sound of hoofs echoed throughout the city… endless columns
of Cossack cavalry were moving through the city.”74 Serbian weekly illustrated
journal Kolo published a large photograph devoted to this event: tight lines of Cos-
sacks in fur hats in central Belgrade.75
General von Pannwitz addressed the Cossacks and the local population in
Croatian language, in order to suppress conflict and magnify the propaganda of
using former Soviet soldiers against the Partisans. “We are in a country of friendly
people. You are familiar with your task: ruthless extermination of bandits who as
Bolsheviks and standard-bearers of communism are your mortal enemies. De-
stroy them, wherever you encounter them! By fulfilling this task, you will not
only fulfill a military task, but the peace will be returned to the hardworking and
good people of this country. These people, who will help you everywhere, you
must defend and consider them to be your friends. They will become what you
will become: free and peaceful citizens of new Europe, and from you as their al-
lies they expect the most honorable thoughts and martial-Cossack behavior. You
must again provide proof of your correct understanding of your tasks: you are
noble fighters and leaders of freedom. Show to the well-meaning inhabitants of
this country that you understand the meaning of this war, and that you bring death
and destruction only to those…who oppose you… this battle is not about who is
Croatian, Serbian, German — member of German minority, Catholic, Orthodox
or Protestant. It only matters who is for or against our joint thing [cause — A. T.],
that is, the destruction of communism. All those who correctly behave towards
you, they are our friends and we will protect them. Our judgment is reserved for
all others. Long live the new order!”76
His message was similar to the local population: “Cossacks have come to your
country. You have already heard, and so you know what the goals are of these
volunteers in fight against the Bolshevism: destruction of bandit detachments by
all means available. Nobody knows the misery which Bolshevism brings to people
as well as those soldiers. Therefore, they will not stop at any method so that the
countries of the Balkans can be free of this global plague. In fulfilling this order,
73
Horstenau, Između, 356–357.
74
K. S. Cherkassov, General Kononov (Otvet pered istoriei za odnu popytku) t. 2 (Mel’burn-Miunkhen:
n. p., 1963–1965), 10.
75
Kolo Issue 93, October 9, 1943.
76
Narodna Biblioteka Srbije (NBS), Rare books and proclamations, “Kozaci! Nalazimo se u zemlji
prijateljskog naroda. …!”
the Cossacks, who were until recently peasant defenders of their ancestral homes,
have a historical mission. The Cossack does not know the differences of the popu-
lation of this area. Croats or Serbs, Catholics or Orthodox. He only knows the en-
emies of the legal order. Who recognizes this order and abides by the laws of this
state, he can be sure that the Cossacks will be defenders of his home… his life and
his family. But who fights on the side of the bandits or helps them in any way, he
can be sure of the stiffest punishment, including the confiscation of his property.
Show to the Cossacks that you are with them in their struggle against the bandits
and behave accordingly, as your government asks of you. In that case, you will
enjoy the fruits of freedom, which will be assured for you in New Europe.”77
A poster was published which showed numerous photographs of Cossacks and
other Soviet collaborators. The purpose of this German propaganda was to show
to the Serbian population the large number of willing collaborators which Weh-
rmacht encountered in the East. A poster written in Serbian Cyrillic announced:
“In struggle against the destructive forces of Bolshevism, initially humble vol-
unteer detachments were formed out of the ranks of the local population in 1941.
They placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans out of personal reasons in
order to carry out various and frequently very important tasks, happy that they
were beyond the reach of the Bolshevik whip and their commissars. From then
on, the number of units from the local population has been on the increase due to
large inflow of volunteers. As the number of units increased, their tasks became
more varied. They fought against the bandits in the rear and fulfilled police tasks.
Finally, with weapon in hand and shoulder to shoulder with German soldiers and
their European allies, they went into frontal battles against their hated Moscow
oppressors. These volunteers feel that they too have a right to fight against Bol-
shevism. Their hatred against those who destroyed them… and their families is
as fierce as is their wish to free their brothers under Moscow’s oppression. All of
them: Russians, Ukrainians, Turkestani, Cossacks and Caucasians are fighting in
hope that after the victory over the Bolsheviks, a new and happier development
awaits their nations.”78
With the aim of improving the damaged image of their Division, in late au-
tumn of 1943, the Cossacks from the 2nd Brigade based in Slavonski Brod orga-
nized a spectacle for the local population displaying their skills in horse-riding.79
Germans liked the idea of using the Soviet prisoners to spread the anti-Soviet
propaganda.80 Nonetheless, the propaganda campaign was not very successful.
Apart from the natural skepticism towards military propaganda, the Cossack units
77
Ibid.
78
NBS, Rare books and proclamations, “Oslobođeni crvenih okova bore se protiv boljševizma!”.
79
Krikunov, Kazaki, 493.
80
AJ, f. 110, d. 598 / 648.
pursued policy of ‘providing for themselves’ in the Southeast. This tactic was
recommended to Pannwitz by Jodl, the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed
Forces High Command, on September 24, 1943.81 The fruits of this approach can
be seen in the drastic increase in the number of horses at the Division’s disposal
after only several months in the Balkans. In the Croats’, Slovenes’ and even Serbs’
collective consciousness, the Cossacks and the troops from the Central Asia and
the Caucuses belonged to one undefined community of Cherkassians who were
definitely viewed negatively. The fur hats of all of these ‘Eastern units’, approxi-
mately same time of their arrival to Yugoslavia, and the similar cruelty towards
the local population and the Partisans contributed to this.82
The propaganda did not have much success with Cossacks. After their ar-
rival to the first Serbian railway station, they were surprised at “almost Russian”
signs.83 Soon enough, there were contacts with the local population, except that “a
part of the conversations was understandable, and a part was not understandable,
and a part was guessed…” It became obvious that “the Serbs were Orthodox with
similar traditions, Croatians — Catholics.”84 The Germans propaganda stressed
that the Cossacks came to the region to struggle against the communist disorder
and chaos,85 and it insisted that the Cossacks should view the Serbian population
suspiciously and look upon the local Germans, Hungarians and Croats with sym-
pathy.86 Nonetheless, it became apparent to the Cossacks in NDH that “Croatian
authorities initiated a real religious war. Orthodox Churches were destroyed in all
of Croatia… Croats-Ustaše slit the throats of entire Serbian villages.” Cossacks
were surprised by this cruelty, as well as by the Serbs who preserved their faith
despite all the pressures.87
81
VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 39, p. 498.
82
Horstenau, Između, str. 330; Trifunović, ”Čerkezi”, 248.
83
It would be appropriate here to mention that the Bolshevik policies throughout the 1920s and the first
half of the 1930s were aimed at erasing the Slavic national consciousness (as part of the Russian cul-
tural-historical inheritance). Numerous prewar generations studied the so called science of society in-
stead of Russian history. See A. I. Alatortseva, “Sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka na perelome 20–30‑kh
godov,” Istoriia i stalinizm (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991); N. N. Maslov, “Ob utverzhdenii ideologii
stalinizma,” Istoriia i stalinizm (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). The Soviet so called scientists discovered
that the Russian language was closer to Georgian than the Slavic languages of “feudal Poland,” “bour-
geois Czechoslovakia” and “the military-fascist Yugoslavia (the work of N. Ia. Marr and his students).
84
“Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez
retushi II, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 24.
85
“Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez
retushi III, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 119; NBS, Rare books and
proclamations, “Kozaci! Nalazimo se u zemlji prijateljskog naroda. …!”
86
Numerous documents in the archive of the 15th Cossack Division testify about the ethic character of the
village in which the Cossacks operated. “Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,”
Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi II, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev,
2003), 26.
87
Ibid., 24; “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia
The fact that Orthodoxy facilitated communication between Serbs and Cos-
sacks was noted by Germans.88 The Cossacks and Ustaše had one master (the
Third Reich), but their relations were strained and they could not be repaired even
by orders issued by the German commanders nor appeals by the NDH leadership:
“Ustaše…were fierce nationalist, they hated the Serbs very much; inhumane con-
duct towards the Serbian population was not exceptional. This could not have left
Cossacks indifferent because the Serbs were of the same fate, and generally, what
Cossack could allow destruction or desecration of an Orthodox Church?”89 Sev-
eral conflicts between Cossacks and Ustaše caused by the latter’s brutal treatment
of the Serbs have been recorded. For instance, the 1st Don Cossack Regiment was
stationed near Đakova. The Cossacks discovered that Ustaše herded 200 Serbian
men, women, children and elderly people into brick ovens, and that they were col-
lecting fuel to set them on fire. Cossacks reported this to a German Major, urging
him to take action to prevent the atrocity from taking place. He agreed, and with
a hundred Cossacks he went to the site of the planned massacre, where he asked
the people to be released. Ustaše categorically rejected this and told the Cossacks
they should leave and not interfere in the affairs of their state. The Cossacks then
forced the brick ovens’ doors open and released the Serbs. Ustaše began firing at
the Cossacks, who returned fire. There were wounded and killed on both sides.90
Something similar happened in April, 1944, in village Gora near Petrinje.
A Squadron of the 5th Don Regiment was passing through a village, and they
noticed that approximately twenty Ustaše were preparing to blow up an Ortho-
dox Church. The Commander of the Squadron, Lieutenant Pashcenko, decided
to report the event to the Commander of the 5th Regiment, I. Konov, who ordered
the Church to be saved. Cossacks “surrounded the Church and Pashcenko, who
approached an Ustaša officer, ordered the mines to be removed [from the Church]
and that the icons which the Ustaše had removed be returned to their place. ‘Our
Croatian state is independent — we are bosses here, and you get lost from here’ —
pompously and challengingly responded the Ustaša officer. Pashcenko responded
that the Cossacks will not take away from Croats their ‘independence’, but that
the Cossacks cannot allow Ustaše to burn down an Orthodox Church and to de-
stroy the Orthodox people…” An argument broke out, followed by a fight, but
the Church was demined and the icons were returned.91 Another feature of the
mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 119.
88
VA, NAV-T-314, r. 561, str. 340.
89
“Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia,
bez retushi II, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 26.; “Vospominaniia
kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed.
N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 127; Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 25.
90
Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 10.
91
Ibid., 26.
relationship between the Cossacks and the local population were the Regiment’s
children. Individual units adopted Serbian boys who lost their parents at the hands
of Ustaše.92 There were even contacts between Cossacks and Serbian Četniks in
Bosnia. An informal leader of the Cossacks and the Commander of a Brigade
Colonel I. N. Kononov at the end of the war met Mihailović’s representative in
Prnjavor area.93 The Cossack’s enthusiasm when they encountered “in Serbian
villages in Srem Cyrillic signs” frightened the Germans. In conversation with
Hostenau, Pannwitz guessed that “on that occasion the Cossacks had set up cer-
tain ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church.” He believed that the “nature of these
ties were not without dangers” for the Germans.94
NDH officials accused the Cossacks of committing robberies and helping the
Serbian population, but it is difficult to ascertain which revolted them more.95 This
led to worsening relations between the Cossacks and the Croatian military and ad-
ministration, and it affected Germans in the ranks of the Cossack Division. There
were arguments and hysterical attacks by NDH officials who accused the Cos-
sacks of assisting the Serbs, cursing their Croatian mothers and violent behavior
towards Croatian officials.96 Encouraged by the German generals responsible for
anti-Partisan operations, the highest NDH leadership tried to resolve the problem-
atic relationship with the Cossacks. Several older Cossack officers received NDH
state awards, with the aim of coopting them. Meanwhile, Germans stressed to the
Croatian administration the allied nature of their relationship with the Cossacks.
In an attempt to improve the ties, the Cossack Division paraded on Ban Jelačić
Square in the center of Zagreb, with the highest NDH military leadership in the
audience.97
The Cossacks’ principal task in the Balkans was to fight against the Partisans.
Cossacks were skillful warriors with plenty of experience in fighting the Soviet
Partisans. For these reasons, they were transferred to the Balkans. Before their ar-
92
Ibid., 30, 36, 73, 90, 148.
93
“Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia,
bez retushi III, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 127; Cherkassov, General
Kononov t. 2, 24, 26. ROA leaders and various Serbian anti-communist leaders (Mihailović, Nedić and
Ljotić) had contacts and mutual interests, Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 24–27, 138; K. Alek-
sandrov., “Vostochnye voiska Vermakhta i vooruzhennye sily KONR: k isktorii razvedyvatel’nykh
i kontrrazvedyvatel’nykh sluzhb,” Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza,
Eksmo, 2005), 191; Chukhnov, Smiatennye gody, 119–120.
94
Horstenau, Između, str. 356–357.
95
B. Alfer’ev and V. Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman bat’ka fon Panvits (Moscow: Kommercheskii vestnik,
1997), 67–69.
96
VA, K. 22, f. 17, d. 11.
97
Nerazvrstane fotografije i filmski materijal iz arhiva Vojnog muzeja i Jugoslovenske kinoteke (Un-
organized fotografs and film materials from the archive of the Military Museum and the Yugoslav
Kinoteka).
rival to Yugoslavia, the German command hoped that the Cossack Division would
pacify Slavonia and Srem.98
The German plan was to use the tactic which proved useful on the Eastern
Front — combining the defensive actions with rapid offensives against the enemy
with the aim of encircling and destroying the Partisans. “When Cossack units
capture some place, they immediate secure it with near and long-distanced pa-
trols. The near patrols move through the forests and undetected approaches to the
villages, listening and observing whether there are any military units… for recon-
naissance of Partisan positions and institutions of the Yugoslav National Libera-
tion movement in the Partisans’ rear, they sent the so called Wolf Groups. In most
of the cases, Wolf Groups were comprised of volunteers led by a Russian or a Ger-
man noncommissioned officer.” The fighters were armed with automatic weapons
or riffles. The tactic of these detachments was simple: reconnaissance attacks or
setting up traps. The main aim of the operations was to locate the Partisan base
and its detachments, as well as taking of prisoners in order to obtain intelligence.
Cossacks possessed traditional skill in the battle against irregular opponents in
forested and hilly areas.99
On April 30, 1944, the German command concluded: “From early October,
1943, the 1st Cossack Division was introduced into the battle against the Com-
munist gangs, which is inflicting heavy losses on the enemy in terms of people
and technology with its bold and courageous approach.”100What did this bold and
courageous approach consist of? Pannwitz admitted to Captain Grishaev, the in-
vestigator at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, on January 12, 1947, that
he worked according to the “circular order issued by the SS Obergruppenfuhrer
Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski which provided a detailed description of behavior
during the battle against Partisans.” The circular emphasized that the Partisan
warfare was illegal, and therefore, leaders of the anti-Partisan units were free
to decide what to do with the suspected Partisans and those assisting them, as
well as their property. Under the pressure from his Soviet interrogators Pannwitz
“remembered…the following facts. In winter 1943–1944 in area of Sunja-Zagreb,
under his orders, fifteen hostages from the Yugoslav population were hanged. In
the same area in 1944, on the orders of the Cossack Lieutenant…the Cossack
division executed three citizens, supposedly for spying even though there was no
evidence for this. At the end of 1943, in area of Fruška Gora, Cossacks of the 1st
Cavalry Regiment hanged five or six peasants in a village. Cossacks of the 3rd, 5th
and 6th Cavalries Regiments in the same area committed a mass rape of Yugoslav
women. In December, 1943, the executions and rapes occurred in the area around
98
99
Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 88.
100
Na kazach’em postu, 26 / 1944, 3.
the city of Brod. In May, 1944, south of Zagreb in Croatia, Cossacks of the 1st
Regiment burnt one village. The same Regiment in June 1944, committed a mass
rape of women from the city of Metlik [Slovenia — A. T.]. On the orders of the
commander of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel of the German Army
Wolf or the Commander of his Brigade Bosea, village of Čazma was partially
burnt down, west of the city of Bjelovar. At the same time, in the summer of 1944,
Cossacks of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment burned several houses in area of Požega
and Darvar. I can remember that in December, 1944, Cossacks of the 5th Cavalry
Regiment under the command of Colonel Kononov, during an operation against
the Partisans in area of river Drava, near the city of Virovitica, committed mass
killing of citizens and rape of women.”101
The so called October Cossack Offensive of 1943 and the particularly violent
behavior of Cherkassians in Srem, as the Yugoslavs called the Cossacks, are still
remembered by the local population.102 According to Hostenau, the Cossack be-
havior differed little from the conduct of Central Asians from the 162nd Division,
but unlike Dr. Niedermayer’s men, Cossacks placed greater value on horses, pigs
and sewing machines.103 Nonetheless, it must be noted that Horstenau’s attitude
towards the Cossacks was very negative. He was willing to accept all Croats’
complaints about the Cossacks, even when the Croatian authorities complained
about unusual events: “Cossacks, in accordance with their traditions, attacked a
Roman-Catholic village near Đakova at night and locked up to 120 women and
raped them… in the following morning, women were allowed to go home.” Even
when the mixed German-Croatian commission admitted that this was a fabricated
case, he still believed its veracity.104
The Cossack Commander General Pannwitz, unlike the Commander of Turke-
stan Division Niedermeyer, did not tolerate robberies and rapes. As a result of out-
rages committed in Srem, Pannwitz addressed the Cossacks on October 25, 1943,
two weeks after their arrival on the Yugoslav territory. The Commander of the
Division said: “amongst many Cossacks, even amongst some officers” there were
“cases of diminishing and little discipline… even in peaceful villages, where there
were no military operations, Cossacks are behaving as robbers and marauders.
They are forcing their way into homes, asking for vodka and in drunken state they
commit other crimes, such as raping women… stealing watches, bed sheets, and
similar things, undermining the authority and refusing to listen to the command-
101
Considering the quantity and the precision of this data we can assume that this was a signed statement
previously prepared by the MGB in cooperation with their Yugoslav colleagues. For the stenographic
notes of this interrogation see Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 141–142.
102
M. Lukić, Nemirno ognjište: zapisi iz prošlosti Sremske Kamenice (Novi Sad: SUBNOR SR Srbije za
Vojvodinu, 1967), 316, 363–368.
103
Horstenau, Između, 331.
104
Ibid., 344–345.
ers’ orders,” and there were attempts “to sell weapons and equipment.” Those who
were convicted of these crimes were executed. Among other negative develop-
ments, Pannwitz mentioned “independent requisition of horses in peaceful places
and in the fields… disturbing and ill-treatment of the German population,” as well
as “close friendship with the local Serbo-Croatian population based on getting
drunk together.”105
Later on, in conversation with Horstenau, Pannwitz tried to explains the ex-
cesses which his Cossacks had committed in Srem: “for the first fourteen days of
their stay in Croatia there was a ‘crisis’. It has been resolved now…” after which
“fifty Cossacks were ordered to be executed because of robberies and similar vio-
lations.” In addition, Pannwitz agreed to have Croatian officers and police in Cos-
sack units.106
Germans believed that the explosion of disciplinary violations amongst the
Cossacks was caused by the fact that around 30 % of the soldiers arrived to the unit
straight from prisoner of war camps, where they lived in exceptionally difficult
conditions.107 Civil War traditions also influenced the Cossacks. After a successful
counter-offensive at the end of 1944, Colonel Kononov, the Commander of the 5th
Cavalry Don Regiment carried out an inspection of his troops and Soviet prison-
ers of war. He found Cossacks and Soviet prisoners sitting in one large room in
underwear, smoking, eating bread… and playing cards while their weapons were
in the corner.108
The 1st Cossack Division carried out its first anti-Partisan action in Octo-
ber, 1943, in Fruška Gora. The Operation Arnim (October 14–17, 1943) was
planned before the arrival of the Cossack Division to Yugoslavia.109 The Op-
eration’s main aim was the destruction of Partisan detachments and their bases
to the north and northwest of Belgrade. Almost the entire Division participat-
ed in the Operation, but it failed because the Partisans refused to engage the
more numerous enemy. Nonetheless, the Operation was viewed positively by
the German commanders because the Cossacks managed to find and destroy
several Partisan bases.110
In the middle of October, parts of the division were transferred west of the line
Vukovar-Vinkovci-Vrpolje to defend communication lines. The Division’s Staff
105
VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 31, 521.
106
Horstenau, Između, 356.
107
VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 30, 588.
108
Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 155.
109
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 613. In recon-
structing the military path of the Division (and later the Corps), we relied on archival sources as well as
memoirs by Cherkassov, Pawnitz’s interrogation, and works by Kern, Newland, Krilov and Krikunov.
110
VA, NAV-T-313, r. 189, mf. 7448780; VA NAV-T-314, R. 1544, mf. 67; S. J. Newland, Cossacks in the
German Army 1941–1945 (Portland: F. Cass, 1991), 150–51.
was based in Vinkovci and then in Đakovo. Small groups of Cossacks defended
parts of the railway tracks and important roads from Partisan attacks.111 Upon the
Division’s arrival, the German Command noted noticeable decrease in Partisan
activities.
At the end of November, the 2nd Cossack Brigade was temporarily placed un-
der the command of the 15th German Mountain Corps around Sarajevo to suppress
Partisan activities in the area and to defend Derventa-Doboj-Gracačanica com-
munication.112 The 2nd Brigade carried out the anti-partisan Operation Wildsau
(October 26–29, 1943) in area of Brod-Doboj-Zvornik.113 At the same time, The
Divisional Staff, the 1st Brigade and Division’s auxiliary services dislocated into
two groups northwest of Sisak: around Sisak-Petrinja-Glina and Sisak-Sunja-Ko-
stajnica. The Division was then partially placed under the command of the 11th
SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. The 2nd Cossack Brigade spent
December and beginning of January in preparation for Operations Napfkuchen
(January 3–6, 1944)114 and Brandfakel (January 11–16, 1944)115 aimed at Partisans
in central Bosnia, who were attacking Gora-Glina communication.116 In the mid-
January, the 2nd Brigade returned from Bosnia to its permanent location. After
the completion of operation for securing Glina-Gora communication, the division
was transferred to Zagreb-Karlovac area.117
Apart from the anti-Partisan operations, there were attempts to use the Cos-
sacks for propaganda purposes. For example, at the end of 1943, the Cossacks of
the 2nd Brigade near Brod performed a traditional Cossack performance for the
local population. The 6th Terek Regiment organized a similar performance for the
locals which displayed their horse-riding skills.118
In the autumn of 1944, the Divisional Command was stationed in Nova
Gradišca, while the 1st Cossack Brigade was stationed on the right bank of Sava
southeast of the line Zagreb-Sisak-Sunja-Kostajnica. After several successful
operations involving Wolf Groups, in May 1944, the 2nd Siberian Regiment car-
ried out a small anti-Partisan operation Ingeborg (May 7–8, 1944), aimed at
surrounding and destroying the enemy between Karlovac and Sisak.119 The sub-
111
112
Ibid., 723.
113
Ibid., 600, 613–616; VA, NAV-T-313, r. 189, mf. 7448772 and 7448793.
114
V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 knj. II, (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski in-
stitut JNA, 1957–1958), 47–51; M. Andrić et al., Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije
1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1964), 649.
115
VA, NAV-T-314, r. 561, mf. 166–177; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 649.
116
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 727, 733.
117
118
Krikunov, Kazaki, 493.
119
VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 762.
sequent Operation Schach (May 19–30, 1944)120 was undertaken at the same
time as the famous Operation Rosselsprung (airborn attack on Drvar and the
supporting operations).121 In this operation, the 1st Cossack Brigade fought in
area southwest of Glina-Topusko.122 Operation Schach was not successful be-
cause the Partisans managed to withdraw and the 2nd Brigade tried to return
to its initial position. During this withdrawal, the 2nd Siberian Regiment found
itself in a difficult position southwest of Glina. They were blocked by Partisans,
and only after heavy fighting did the 2nd Siberian Regiment manage to penetrate
the Partisan blockade and join the main forces of the 1st Brigade.
At the end of June, the 1st Cossack Division carried out operation Bienenhaus
(June 24–28, 1944) with the forces of the 1st and 4th Regiments of the 1st Brigade on
the territory of Čazme and Ivanić Grad.123 The operation Blitz was undertaken by
the forces of the 3rd and 5th Regiments of the 2nd Brigade around Đakovo.124 In July,
large part of the division was engaged in trying to curtail the Partisans’ attempted
sabotage of the harvest.125 At the end of July, the 3rd and 5th Regiments of the 2nd
Brigade participated in the anti-Partisan Operation Feuerwehr around Prnjavor.126 In
mid-August, 1944, the same 2nd Brigade destroyed several Partisan detachments and
bases near Daruvar-Pakrac. In the second half of August, the 1st Cossack Division
carried out Operation Wildfang aimed at the Partisans on the Mountain Moslavi-
na.127 At the end of September, the Cossack Division participated in the battle with
large Partisan forces between Bosanska Gradiška and Banja Luka.
In early December, 1944, the 2nd Brigade was sent to engage the forces of
Marshall Tolbukhin’s Third Ukrainian Front, which were sent to establishing a
120
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 283–286,
310–311.
121
Ibid., 279, 293.
122
VA, NAV-T-314, r. 563, mf. 338; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 788 и 794; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1546,
mf. 445–446 and 461–464; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 137–39; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat,
761–762; F. Schraml, Kriegsschauplatz Kroatien. Die deutsch-kroatischen Legions-Divisionen — 369.,
373, 392. Inf. Div. (kroat.) — ihre Ausbildungs- und Ersatzformationen (Neckargemünd: K. Vowinckel,
1962), 187–188.
123
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 383, 403;
Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 28, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 705–708;
Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 29, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 64–72, 97–100;
VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 832–838; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1546, 264; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat,
161; M. Andrić et al., Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945, 793.
124
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 383, 871;
Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 28, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 494–504,
574–599, 709–711; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 29, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA,
1963), 49–53, 631–651, 675–679, 683–686; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 834 и 842; M. Andrić et al.,
Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945, 794.
125
126
Ibid., 899.
127
Ibid., 932.
connection with Partisan detachments in Northern Croatia. As a result, the 3rd, 5th,
and 6th Detachments, as well as the Reinforced Artillery Division, Engineer Bat-
talion and supporting formations departed for Korpivnica via Kutina, Popovače
and Kloštar-Ivanića, despite the Partisan attacks and their mining of roads and
communications. The Cossacks reached Koprivnica on December 19, 1944. At the
time, parts of the 233rd Soviet Infantry Division under the command of Colonel
Sidorenko occupied positions on the right bank of River Drava, waiting for the
Yugoslav Partisans. The 6th Regiment carried out a violent reconnaissance, as a
result of which Pannwitz decided to immediately attack the Soviet troops and to
prevent them from connecting with the Partisans.
The Pitomače Battle became known as “last battle of the Civil War” in Rus-
sian historiography, because majority of fighters on both sides were Russians..128
A detailed reconstruction of the tragedy on Drava River has been carried out.129
The Cossacks attacked in the direction of Pitomače which was defended by the
following Soviet troops: the 703rd Riffle Regiment of the 223rd Division, the 23rd
Flamethrower Battalion, two batteries of the 684th Artillery Regiment, one pla-
toon of Air Defense machine gunners and parts of the NOVJ 32nd Division of the
10th Corps. The attack by Cossacks had three directions: the 3rd Kuban Regiment
went to the north of Pitomača, the 5th Don Regiment attacked Pitomača frontally,
while the 6th Terek Regiment went to the south of Pitomača. At nine o’clock in
the morning, the Cossacks of the 5th Regiment managed to capture the village of
Klodare, near Pitomača, but the 703rd Regiment checked the Cossack advance to
the northwest and south of Pitomača, holding the position until its forces were
almost completely depleted. The Commander of the Red Army’s 223rd Division
decided to redeploy in order to block the Cossacks’ drive to envelop Pitomača
from the south. He dislocated south of Pitomača the reserve forces of the 703rd
Regiment, a company of machine gunners, and to the southeast of Pitomača he po-
sitioned two batteries of the 684th Artillery Regiment. Additional forces departed
from the direction of Virovitica. Nonetheless, the 6th Terek Regiment continued
the attack and at twelve o’clock it captured the Soviet battery’s positions, Stari
Gradac, which was southeast of Pitomača, blocking the road to Virovitica. Then,
it started to attack Pitomača from east. Simultaneously, the 3rd Kuban and the 5th
Don Regiments continued the offensive. The Cossack Artillery Battery joined the
attack and it managed to silence the Soviet artillery. At fifteen o’clock the Cos-
sacks managed to penetrate the defense of the 703rd Regiment to the southwest of
Pitomača. The Soviet units were surprised to hear Cossacks chant “Ura!” and by
128
N. D. Tolstoi, Zhertvy Ialty (Moscow: Russkii put’, 1996), 248.
129
K. M. Аleksandrov, “Russkoe kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi
ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005), 105–141.
their skillful use of mortars, panzerschreck and panzerfaust at short distances,130

and their desperate struggle in hand to hand combat.131
At seventeen o’clock, street battles began which continued until the night.
Only at twenty-one o’clock did the remaining parts of the 703rd Regiment try to
break through the enemy ring in the southeastern direction. The Soviet units man-
aged to recapture Stari Gradac, but did not dare go any further, assuming defen-
sive positions instead.
On the morning of December 27, Pitomača was completely cleared of Soviet
troops. The Cossacks managed to seize the armaments and supplies of the Riffle
Regiment, the Flamethrower Battalion and the two batteries. The Soviets loses
were 204 killed and 136 captured. The Cossacks lost around 200 fighters.132 In
addition, sixty Cossack prisoners taken in the morning attack were executed on
the Soviet officers’ orders before the last Cossack attack. The Cossacks did not
execute the Soviet prisoners, accepting them with surprising warmth. The victory
after a twelve-hour battle near Pitomača was an important tactical success which
was mentioned in the regular report by the German Supreme Command.133
After this success, the 2nd Cossack Brigade fortified itself around line Pitomača —
Stari Gradac — Špisić — Bukovica, where they were constantly shelled by Soviet
artillery located on the left bank of Drava. NOVJ attacked them persistently from
the south. NOVJ aim, with the support of Soviet artillery, was to break the defensive
line defended by parts of the 5th Don Regiment. The first attempt by Cossacks to take
Virovitica with the forces of the 2nd Brigade was unsuccessful due to strong artillery
fire,134 while the 6th Terek Regiment (which suffered heavy losses) was directed at
NOVJ units which controlled the hills and forests to the south of Pitomača.135 At the
same time (January 7–8, 1945), the 1st Brigade was transferred towards Sava,136 and
it prevented NOVJ from breaking the front on the line Banova Jaruga — Lipik —
Pakrac, while offering support to the 2nd Brigade which was attacking Virovitica.
In the meantime, the German Command decided to change the status of the
Division. From autumn, 1944, numerous large and small Cossack groups from
all over the Third Reich were being placed under Pannwitz’s command. Among
them were the following: the 69th Police Battalion from Cracow, the Battalion of
Factory Security from Warsaw, the Battalion of Factory Security from Hannover,
130
“Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez
retushi III, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 126.
131
Аleksandrov, “Russkoe kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” 123.
132
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 771, 1124, 1126;
Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 37, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1968), 58–82, 439–443.
133
H. Detloff v. Kalben and C. Wagner, Die Geschichte XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps, (n. p., 1987)
134
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 771, 1133.
135
Ibid., 1133, 1135.
136
Ibid.,1131.
parts of the 360th Cossack Regiment from France and a series of smaller Cos-
sack formations — volunteers from the prisoner of war camps and Soviet workers
who worked in Germany. On November 4, 1944, the division became part of SS,
however, this did not mean that the system of ranks and uniforms changed.137
As a result, on February 25, 1945, the 1st Cossack Cavalry Division became the
SS 15th Cavalry Corps,138 while the 1st and 2nd Brigades changed their names to
1st and 2nd Cossack Divisions, without the accompanying changes in the internal
organization of these units. On February 25, 1945, Pannwitz had 25,000 soldiers
and officers under his command. Apart from the Cossack units, several larger in-
dependent units formed out of former Soviet soldiers and officers were subjected
to the Corps’ Command: Kalmyk Regiment (around 5,000 fighters), the Caucuses
Cavalry Battery, the Ukrainian Battalion and ROA Tank Group.139
In early spring of 1945, von Pannwitz’s Corps participated in the last great of-
fensive by the Third Reich near the Lake Balaton, but it soon returned to NDH.140
After exhaustive fighting around the Lake Balaton, the Germans managed to con-
quer territory on the left bank of Drava to the northwest of Osijek. Facing the
Germans on this front was the Soviet new ally — the 1st Bulgarian Army. The 4th
Kuban Regiment surprised the Bulgarian artillery positions during the night of
March 24–25, taking numerous prisoners.141 Almost until the end of the war, the
15th Cossack Corps was in the first line of defense against the Bulgarian and NOVJ
troops. The 1st Cossack Division began to withdraw only in early May from its
positions around Sokolovac-Koprivnica-Drava in direction of Ludbreg-Varaždin.
Several days later, (May, 6), the 2nd Division received its orders for withdrawal.
Despite the steep mountains and Partisan traps, the Cossack Corps succeeded in
withdrawing to Austria where it surrendered to the British on May 11–12. There
was hope amongst the Cossacks that the Great Britain would not transfer them
to Stalin. This turned out to be false, however. The Cossacks and their families,
who joined them in exile, as well as the majority of other Soviet citizens who
found themselves outside of the Soviet borders, were forcefully extradited to
the Stalinist judicial system. 142 The extradition itself was exceptionally bru-
137
This can be seen from the photographs and the military booklets, as well as the fact that the Cossack
units were sometimes mentioned next to the “SS and police formations” and sometimes had the SS
adjective in their appellation. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski
institut JNA, 1979), 792, 793, 796, 800.
138
Ibid., 832–834, 927, 1110.
139
E. Kern, General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken (Gottingen: Plesseverlag, 1964).
140
141
Newland, Cossacks in the German Army 1941–1945.
142
According to calculations made by present-day Russian historians, 138, 850 Don Cossack refugees
withdrew with the Germans, 93, 957 Kuban Cossacks, 23, 520 Terek Cossacks and 11, 865 Stavraopol’
Cossacks respectively left their ancestral lands with the departing Germans, Аleksandrov, “Russkoe
kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” 171.
tal.143 Sholokhov’s favorite illustrator, Sergei Korol’kov, the famous Don Cossack
painter and sculptor who had escaped his native land in 1943 under the threat of
the return of Soviet power, drew this scene in his monumental picture “The Ex-
tradition of Cossacks in Linz.”144 Part of those extradited were executed, while the
rest were sent to Siberia. The few lucky ones managed to get lost in the postwar
chaos and they moved to America or they stayed in Germany.145
The Cossacks’ social-political life in Yugoslavia was also noteworthy.146 Af-
ter they captured Virovitica in February, 1945,147 Colonel Kononov took an unex-
pected initiative. On his suggestion, All-Cossack Congress was held in Virovitica,
on March 24, 1945, under the formal presidency of the Cossack Lieutenant-Colo-
nel N. K. Kulakov, a disabled person from the Civil War who managed to conceal
his identity and evade the Soviet authorities until the Germans arrived.148 Kononov
offered the following political program to the Congress: transfer of Cossack units to
Vlasov’s army, abolishing GUKV (the Main Administration of the Cossack Army)
and resignation by General Krasnov,149 withdrawal of German officers from the
Cossack units who opposed Cossack aspirations, the establishment of contact with
Mihailović, concentrating all Cossack troops in the area of Klagenfurt and Salzburg
in order to create a Shock Army and Kononov announced the Declaration of Cos-
sacks’ Military Aims.150 The Congress approved his program and it elected von Pan-
nwitz its Ataman (Supreme Military Commander) of all Cossack troops. On April
20, 1945, Vlasov approved the Congress’ decisions with regards to the election of
143
V. G. Naumenko, Velikoe Predatel’stvo (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2003); H. Stadler, M. Kofler and
K. C. Berger, Flucht in die Hoffnungslosigkeit. Die Kosaken in Osttirol (Innsbruck: Studienverlag,
2005). Also see the project пројекат Die Kosaken in Osttirol. Archäologische und volkskundliche As-
pekte zur Tragödie an der Drau which has been initiated at the Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte
sowie Mittelalter- und Neuzeitarchäologie, Institut für Europäische Ethnologie / Volkskunde at the Uni-
versity of Innsbruck at http://www.uibk.ac.at / kosaken / projekt / , accessed September 16, 2012.
144
V. Bykadorov, “Sergei Grigor’evich Korol’kov. (1905–1967 g.), Stanichnyi vestnik 12 (1993): 23; see
the picture at http://www.armymuseum.ru / art3_r. html, accessed September 16, 2012.
145
N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres (London: Century Hutchinson, 1986); N. N. Krasnov-
mladshii, Nezabyvaemoe (San Francisco: Russkaia zhizn’, 1957).
146
Apart from this operations, parts of the 15th Cossack Division / Corps participated in other operations:
Panther (December 7–20, 1943) near Glina; Weihnachtsmann (December 25–30, 1943) between Kupa
and Sava, Cannae (March 17–19, 1944) along the Hungarian border in Slavonia, Dunkirchen I (June
27 — July 2, 1944), Dunkirchen II (July 8–17, 1944) near Žumberka, Arras (July 2–3, 1944) near
Lipik, Werwolf (February 4–21, 1945) near Papuk, Waldteufel (March 6–8, 1945) near Donji Miholjac,
Bergwind (March 8–17, 1945) near Moslavačka Gora.
147
Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 37, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1968), 58–61, 82–88.
148
Cherkassov, General Kononov, 165.
149
GUKV ‘Glavnoe upravlenie kazach’ikh voisk” — “Hauptverwaltung der Kosakenheere” the Main
Administration of the Cossack Army was formed on April 30, 1944, on the orders of the Supreme
Commander of the Eastern Volunteer Troops General Ernst-August Köstring. It was mainly a formal
institution which dealt with propaganda. GUKV was an expression of Germans wishes to encourage the
Cossack separatism. GUKV was headed by General P. N. Krasnov.
150
Chuev, Prokliatye soldaty, 189.
von Pannwitz and the integration of Cossacks into KONR. Later on, on April 28,
1945, Himmler approved the All-Cossack Congress decisions.151
The Cossack Division was mainly formed out of anti-Soviet volunteers
and prisoners of war, but nonetheless, it kept active contacts with Russian
emigrants who sought refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Cossacks were
regularly visited by Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan Atamans — Generals
Tatarkin, Naumenko, Vdovenko, L’akhov, and General Shkuro.152 These visits
looked like friendship between the Division’s officers (mainly Russians) and
other heroes of the Civil War who wanted to share their experiences of fight-
ing against communism. General Shkuro was most successful. Shkuro was re-
nowned in the Czarist Army for advocating “military-partisan” (diversionary)
actions during the First World War. During the Civil War, he was a successful
leader of diversionary-partisan unit of the Cossack movement’s Wolf Compa-
nies, which was active behind the Bolshevik lines. During the interwar period,
Shkuro was involved in construction business in Southern Yugoslavia.153 In
the middle of 1944, he was appointed inspector of the Cossack reserve troops
of the Eastern Ministry. When majority of the Eastern troops were transferred
to the SS, on September 5, 1944, Shkuro was appointed head of the Cossack
Reserves by SS Obergruppenführer G. Berger. In his journal, V. G. Naumenko
wrote on September 13, 1944, that he had met Shkuro in Berlin and found out
that he was “appointed head of Cossack reserves, and that he was accepted as
General-Lieutenant with the right of wearing German general’s uniform, and
had a salary according to his rank… He has a Headquarter, in which there are
numerous officers. Shkuro is collecting people and sending them to a military
camp near Graz. Cossacks are arriving in great numbers.” Shkuro’s volunteers
were sent to the Reserve Regiment of the Cossack Division which was headed
by Lieutenant-Colonel Shtabin. After the Cossack Division was turned into
an SS Corps, the Regiment received the appellation the 9 th Reserve Regiment.
It comprised of around 11,000 Cossacks and Kalmyks, Ossetians and other
people from the Northern Caucuses.154
In addition to the Cossack émigré leaders’ visits, Cossacks came to Belgrade,
“where they visited the Russian House and met many Russian emigrants,” whom
they befriended or argued with.155 Finally, some emigrants who surely had higher
education, and the necessary military qualifications, took up officers’ position in the
151
“Pis’mo Fon Pannvitsa Generalu Vlasovu 30.04.45.”, Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 150–151.
See the same source for the stenogram of Pannwitz’s interrogation, 119–120.
152
Cherkassov, General Kononov, 32–58, 69–72.
153
A. G. Shkuro, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Zapiski belogo partizana (Moscow: AST, 2004).
154
GARF, f. 5761, o. 1, d. 13, 183; Naumenko, Velikoe Predatel’stvo, 324–325.
155
Cherkassov, General Kononov, 80–81.
Division.156 The main priest of the Division was Protopresbyter Valentin Rudenko
who was appointed by Metropolitan Anastasii. Father Valentin was a Kuban Cos-
sack, and during the Civil War, he was the main priest in General Wrangel’s Head-
quarters. The Commanders of the Propaganda Platoon and the Headquarters’ Sup-
porting Company were also Russian emigrants who obtained the military education
in Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva. The students of the Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva regu-
larly visited their family members in the Division.157 There were also formal and
informal ties between the soldiers of the émigré Russian Corps and the Cossacks.
The formal ties were facilitated by the Russian Hospital in Pančevo, which treated
soldiers of the Russian Corps and Cossacks.158 In addition, the Division’s newspaper
carried news of “the life of the 1st Cossack Regiment of the Russian Corps.”159
These contacts with the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia raised the Cos-
sacks’ morale as it showed that their service in the German army against Serbian
Partisans, who fought for communist ideas and for independence of their coun-
try, had wider meaning.160 According to P. N. Krasnov, the Cossacks wanted to
“destroy communists everywhere… not caring about their own lives.”161 Many
of them believed that “the war was approaching in its character a Civil War but
in much more complicated situation and in global dimensions.”162 Nonetheless,
the majority were haunted by the impossibility of their situation. At the time that
most countries fought against German, Italian and Japanese extreme rightists, the
leftwing Soviet experiment appeared to them to have been a greater evil. Anglo-
Americans and their allies did not listen to Stalin’s opponents in Russia while
Hitler was in power in Germany. After their departure from Mylau, the Cossacks
had become collaborators and, as much as the thought may have seemed evil to
them, fierce enemies of Orthodoxy. Despite their aspirations and best intentions,
they clearly fought for foreign interests. That is why it is impossible to accept the
thesis advocated by Cossacks historians in Russia and especially abroad, that the
Cossacks participated in the Civil War in Russia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945.163
156
Ibid., 75.
157
G. Mordwinkin, White guards: autobiographical story (Scottdale (Pa.): G. Mordwinkin, 2001), 149–153.
158
There are several photographs of wounded Cossacks “recoupperating in the Russian Corps’ Hospital in
Pančevo.” Vojni muzej, Zbirka fotografija, XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps.
159
Na kazach’em postu, Issue 18 / 1943, 2–3.
160
Na kazach’em postu, Issue 14 / 1943, 14.
161
A. K. Leninov, “Pod kazach’im znamenem v 1943–1945 gg.,” Kubanets 1 (1992): 44–45..
162
Na kazach’em postu, Issue 7 / 1943, 3.
163
The most obvious examples of such an approach to the issue of the Cossack role in war was the erection of a monu-
ment in 1944 to the Cossacks of the 15th Cossack Division and General Pannwitz in the courtyard of the Church of All
Saints in Moscow, as well as the rehabilitation of Pannwitz in 1996. The latter was approved by the Military Prosecu-
tor of the Russian Federation, however, it was cancelled upon the interference of the executive branch of government
in 2001. In the town of Elanskaia, Sholokhov raion, Rostov Oblast’, a large memorial complex “Don Cossacks in the
struggle against the Bolsheviks” was built. In the forefront is a four meter tall sculpture of P. Krasnov.
Встреча
Покамест полковники водку пьют,

покуда смакуют виски,
доколе пехотные песни поют
по‑русски и по‑английски —
мы ищем друг друга глазами.
На взгляд отвечая взглядом.
Вторая в моем поколенье война
садится со мною рядом…
Не пьем. Не поем. Но молчим и молчим.
И ставим на памяти метки.
Разведка, наткнувшаяся на разведку,
мечи, застучавшие о мечи.
Сегодня подписана и утверждена —
Сегодня! Девятого мая!
Вторая в моем поколенье война —
Третья мировая.
Борис Слуцкий
The Encounter
As long as colonels drink vodka,

While they are tasting whiskey,
While infantrymen sing songs
In Russian and in English —
We are seeking each other out with our eyes.
We return a glance, with a glance.
Second war in my generation
Sit next to me…
We are not drinking. We are not singing.
We are silent and silent.
We put marks on our memory.
The Reconnaissance has encountered the reconnaissance
Swords collided with swords.
Today has been signed and assured —
Today! The ninth of May!
Second war in my generation —
The Third World War.
Boris Slutskii
III
Role of the USSR

in preparation
of the partisan
and civil war
Organization and preparation of the Partisan
war in the USSR until the beginning of the
Second World War
The events of 1941–1945 in Serbia and Yugoslavia amounted to a full scale

civil war. The Communists waged a partisan war, which ended with their victory.
The partisan and guerilla tactics were employed by two resistance movements
against each other and the occupier — the Partisans and the Četniks. The guerilla
warfare is based on theory and methodology, as all other martial activities. The
military theory views the partisan warfare and anti-partisan operations as part of
the same process.
From April 1941 to October 1944 all belligerents on the Yugoslav territory
relied on knowledge of the partisan warfare which assisted them in their struggle.
The German occupation machine, in their fight against the Yugoslav resistance
movements, relied on specially trained units in anti-partisan and mountain war-
fare such as Brandenburg, the SS division Prince Eugene, Bergmann unit and later
on a network of Hunting Commando Detachments (Jagdkommando) which were
most active in parts of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.1
The Royalist resistance movement (JVuO) also relied on tactics developed
before the war. We do not have in mind the Četnik Flying Command which was
formed relatively late into the war and was not important for the organization of
1
Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. V, 645–710; Michaelis R., Die Gebirgsdivisionen der Waffen-SS, Ber-
lin, 1998; Casagrande T., Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”, Frankfurt am Main, 2003;
Spaeter H., Die Brandenburger — Eine deutsche Kommandotruppe, München 1982; Lefèvre E., Bran-
denburg Division — Commandos of the Reich, Paris, 2000; Bentzien H., Division Brandenburg —
Die Rangers von Admiral Canaris, Berlin, 2004; Günzel R., Walther W., Wegener U. K., Geheime
Krieger — Drei deutsche Kommandoverbände im Bild. KSK, Brandenburger, GSG 9, Kiel, 2006.
142 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war
Ravna Gora movement.2 What we have in mind here is the continuous develop-
ment of this type of warfare in Serbian and later on in the Yugoslav Royal Army
from the middle of the Nineteenth Century. The Serbian military’s scholarly inter-
est in this topic was born out of the Serbian Outlaw (Hajduk) traditions and the
ideas relating to guerilla warfare developed by foreign authors.3
The tradition of the First Serbian Uprising and Nevesinje Riffle were contin-
ued by Serbian četniks (literary meaning members of detachments). Before the
Balkan Wars, during the Balkans Wars and World War One, Serbian detachments
were active behind the Bulgarian, Austro-Hungarian and German armies, provid-
ing a good example of the Serbian military ideas about guerilla warfare.4
Bosnia and Krajina also had the tradition of guerilla warfare, and they provid-
ed most support to Partisans.5 According to official Yugoslav historiography, these
national traditions were the only source of support for Partisans, which grew to
critical levels due to the wisdom of talented KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia)
leaders. Admittedly, the civil war and the fight against the occupiers did produce
2
N., Šehić, “Četnici kao nosioci gerilskog oblika ratovanja u planovima najviših vojnih vlasti predratne
Jugoslavije” Godišnjak društava istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine XVIII, 1970; A. Životić, “Jurišne
(četničke) jedinice vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1940–1941. godine“ Vojnoistorijski glasnik br. 1–2,
2003
3
Translations: M. Ban, trans., Pravila o četničkoj voini. Protolmačio iz polskoga sa nekim promenama,
izmetcim i dodatcima Matia Ban (Belgrade: Knjigopečatnja kneževine Srbije, 1848); J. Dragašević,
Načela četovanja napisao Don Santijago Paskual i Rubijo biv. oficir u štabu đen. Mine s nemačkog
preveo Dragašević oficir i profesor (Belgrade: Državna pečatnica, 1864). Original works: Lj. Ivanović,
Četovanje ili četničko ratovanje (Belgrade: Državna pečatnica, 1868); Uput za četničko ratovanje.
Ministarstvo vojske i mornarice (Belgrade: Ministarstvo vojske i mornarice, 1929); A. Erhart, Četnički
rat: mišljenje nemačkog vojnog stručnjaka o našim četnicima i o četničkoj borbi u budućem ratu,
(sadrži: Savremena pešadija: engleski vojni stručnjak o potrebi reorganizacije najvažnijeg roda oružja
od Lidela Harta) (Belgrade: Sedma sila, 1940).
4
R. Kosmajac, Četovanje u odnosu na predeo: Kolašin i severni deo Albanije (Belgrade: Miloš Veliki);
V. Balk, Taktika knj. 6: Nauka o boju: noćne borbe, borbe oko šuma i mesta, borbe oko tesnaca,
borbe oko rečnih tokova, planinski rat, četničko ratovanje i etapna služba, trans [to Serbian] Ž. Mišić)
(Belgrade: Balkan, 1912); Hadži Vasiljević, Četnička akcija u staroj Srbiji i Maćedoniji (Belgrade:
Sv. Sava, 1928); S. Krakov, Plamen četništva (Belgrade: Vreme, 1930); K. Pećanac, Četnička akcija:
1903–1912 (Belgrade: Dom, 1933); J. Derok, Toplički ustanak i oružani otpor u okupiranoj otadžbini
1916–1918. godine (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1940); A. Mitrović, Ustaničke borbe u Srbiji: 1916–1918.
(Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1987); A. Iu. Timofeev, Istoki kosovskoi dramy (Moscow: s.
n., 1999); Đ Đekić, Počeci srpskog četništva: organizacija četničkog pokreta u Kneževini Srbiji u 19.
veku (Belgrade: Slobodna knjiga, 2000); A. Iu. Timofeev, “Serbskie chety v Staroi Serbii. 1903–1912,”
in Iugoslavianskaia istoriia v novoe i noveishee vremia: Materialy nauchnykh chtenii, posviashchen-
nykh 80‑letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia professora V. G. Karaseva (1922–1991), ed. G. Matveev, (Moscow:
Izdatel’’stvo Moskovskogo gorodskogo ob” edineniia arkhivov, 2002); A. F. Timofeev, “Staraia Ser-
biia — mif ili real’nost? Istoriografiia voprosa,” Slavianovedenie 3 (2006); M. Pešić, Stari četnici
(Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2000); V. Ilić, Srpska četnička akcija: 1903–1912. (Belgrade: Ecolibri, 2006);
A. Iu. Timofeev, Krest, kinzhal i kniga. Staraia Serbiia v politike Belgrada (1879–1912) (Saint Pe-
tersburg: Aleteiia, 2007); B. Vučetić, “Sećanja Antonija Todorovića na revolucionarnu akciju srpskog
naroda u Turskoj 1904–1914. godine”, Mešovita građa — Miscellanea 28 (2007), 265–305.
5
F. Tuđman, Rat protiv rat: partizanski rat u prošlosti i budućnosti (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske,
1970).
Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... 143
a series of talented military leaders. Nonetheless, the Soviets played an important

role in the development of partisan detachments and in forging their military and
political tactics and strategy. Many Partisan leaders were either trained in the
USSR before the Second World War or in Spain by Soviet instructors.
Wilhelm Hottl, the German expert on the Southeast and the head of the RSHA
(the Reich Main Security Office) Vienna Office VI Department (foreign intel-
ligence service) believed that the tactics employed by the Communist Partisans
in Yugoslavia had a lot of similarities with tactics used in China in the 1920s.6
Nonetheless, Soviet and Yugoslav postwar scholars minimized the Soviet influ-
ence on the Yugoslav Partisan wartime tactics. In order to better understand the
nature of this relationship, we must take into account the development of the idea
of partisan warfare in Russia, as well as the specific role played by Comintern in
this enterprise.
In the first place, we must say several things about the terminology. We can
determine relatively accurately the emergence of tactics which later received the
name of guerrilla or partisan war. The idea of partisan warfare developed only
after the emergence of an organized system behind the frontlines. As long as
armies’ supply chains did not have storages and communication for transport-
ing supplies to the frontlines, the partisan activity (strikes by small forces in the
enemy’s rear) were not very important. The system of mobile supplies and req-
uisitions began to be displaced by the system of stationary storages during the
Thirty Years War (1618–1648). Partisans (from French ‘partie’ — a detachment)
appeared at the time, as mercenaries wrought havoc in the enemy’s rear without
any particular plan. Later on, this experience was expanded during the war be-
tween Denmark and Sweden (1675–1679), when the Danes gave official approval
to their officers to form volunteer detachments in occupied regions of Denmark.
The partisan detachments became even more important during the Northern War
(1700–1721) and the Seven Year War (1756–1763). American military historians
view the American Rangers from the War of Independence (1775–1783) as the first
organized partisan fighters. The American experiences from the American Civil
War (1861–1865) were only incorporated into the armies of the New World, and
even there half-heartedly.7
In Europe, the conquered people’s struggle against the Napoleon is usually as-
sociated with the first partisan warfare. The Spaniards’ “small war,” which is what
guerilla means in Spanish, was so important in development of guerilla warfare
that it provided the name for this type of activities for most of Western European
6
W. Hagen, Unternehmen Bernhard, Ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die grösste Geldfälschun-
gsaktion aller Zeiten (Wels: Verlag Welsermühl, 1955), 120.
7
N. N. Sukhotin, Reidy, nabegi, naezdy, poiski konnitsy v Amerikanskoi voine 1861–1865 gg. (Saint
Petersburg: V. Berezovskii, 1887).
languages. It should be noted that the first Serbian expert works on “Četnik War-
fare” (as Matija Ban dubbed the guerilla method of waging warfare) were directly
or indirectly connected with the Spanish experience. Matija Ban translated the
instructions on insurrectionary warfare from Polish, which were based on the
Spanish experience,8 while the second book on the topic was Jovan Dragošević’s
translation of a Spanish author from German.9 The ideas of Spanish authors great-
ly influenced Ljubomir Ivanović.10
It is not widely known that the Russian modern guerilla experience was rooted
in the Imperial-era Russian military-theory. Modern Russian military historians
believe that Peter I was the founder of the Russian tradition of “the small war.”
Peter I deployed special units for “diversion in the enemy’s rear, whose aim was
to starve and disturb the enemy” against more powerful opponents in 1706.11 The
military partisan warfare appeared in Russia in similar circumstances as in Spain.
Smaller military detachments or ‘parties’ (which gave the name for partisan war-
fare in French and Russian languages) under the command of very competent of-
ficers Dennis Devidov and Seslavin Figner were sent behind the enemy frontline
with the aim of acting in the enemy’s rear and organizing national resistance.
Soon, the military partisan operations started acquiring national features. Even
officers, who ordinarily had short haircuts, shaved their beards regularly and pa-
raded in ceremonial uniforms, had to start changing. “I put on a peasant over-
coat, grew my beard, and instead of the St. Anna Medal I put around my neck St.
Nicholas icon” — these were the first steps taken by Dennis Davidov, a Russian
nobleman and a former officer of the Czar’s Guard, in organization of the partisan
detachment in the occupied territories.12 Dennis Davidov summarized his expe-
rience “as the first Russian partisan” in a series of articles in a special study.13
He also broached a series of exceptionally important questions. He enumerated
special circumstances required for a successful partisan war: the predisposition of
certain nations (“Asian nations”) and ethnic groups (“the Cossacks”) for waging
partisan warfare and the fact that the personal consciousness and indoctrination
level was incomparably more important in partisan warfare than in ordinary war.
Davidov also stressed the importance of partisan targeting communications, cou-
8
M. Ban, trans., Pravila o četnčičkoj voini.
9
J. Dragašević, Načela četovanja.
10
Lj. Ivanović, Četovanje ili četnicko ratovanje.
11
Voennoi ustav s Artikulom voennym, pri kotorom prilozheny tolkovaniia, takzhe s kratkim soderzhaniem
protsessov, ekzertsitsieiu, tseremoniiami, i dolzhnost’mi polkovykh chinov, (Saint Petersburg: Impera-
torskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1748 goda); V. V. Kvachkov, Teoriia i praktika spetsial’nykh deistvii (Mos-
cow: s. n., 2004).
12
D. Davydov, Partizanskii dnevnik 1812 goda (Saint Petersburg: A. F. Smirdin, 1840).
13
D. Davydov, Opyt teorii partizanskogo deistviia (Saint Petersburg: S. Selivanovskii, 1822); D. Davi-
dov, “O partizanskoi voine,” Sovremennik 3 (1836), 138–151; Davydov, Partizanskii dnevnik.
riers, storages and certain garrisons stationed in the rear. According to him, just
as important was preserving the loyalty of the population in the occupied territory,
combating the enemy propaganda, suppressing the local population’s cooperation
with the enemy by creating sense of insecurity, fear and panic among the enemy
troops behind the frontlines. Davidov’s concepts went beyond military partisan
warfare and was more similar to the future concept of all-out people’s partisan
movement typical of the Twentieth Century.
Subsequent military theoreticians of the Czarist Russia built upon Davidov’s
ideas.14 They developed tactics of the partisan warfare and defined more precisely
the partisans’ material, moral, political and strategic aims. At the same time, they
identified the features of the partisan warfare which hindered its adoption by the
Czarist Russia army: the need for the type of free-thinking and independent offi-
cers leading the partisan detachments and the difficulty in controlling the partisan
detachments’ activities by their superiors. This is the reason why the attempts to
use Chinese partisan detachments against the Japanese during the Russo-Japa-
nese war ended in failure.15 Guerilla warfare began to be viewed as an exclusively
military operation led by a small group of soldiers and officers who engaged in
surprise attacks. With the poor military organization and the slow bureaucratic
apparatus of the Czarist Army, Russia’s partisan warfare during the First World
War was limited to several diversionary actions of doubtful tactical value.16 An
officer of the General Staff concluded that “the Supreme Command believed that
this approach was meaningless and dangerous because it undermines discipline,
the foundation of a regular army.” The officers who believed in the partisan war-
fare’s future took note of this.17
The same reasons which prevented the development and adoption of the par-
tisan tactics by the absolutist state, made them attractive to revolutionary circles.
Aleksandr Vannovskii, one of the leaders of the Military-Technical Bureau of
14
I. V. Vuich, Malaia voina (Saint Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Voennaia akademiia, 1850); N. S. Golit-
syn, “O partizanskikh deistviiakh v bol’shikh razmerakh, privedennykh v pravil’nuiu sistemu i
primenennykh k deistviiam armii voobshche i nashikh russkikh v osobennosti,” Voennyi sbornik 8
(1859), 41–74; N. D. Novitskii, Lektsii maloi voiny, chitannye v Elisavetgradskom ofitserskom kvaleri-
iskom uchilishche podpolkovnikom General’nogo shtaba N. D. Novitskim (Odessa: L. Nitche, 1865);
F. K. Gershel’man, Partizanskaia voina: Issledovanie Fedora Gershel’mana, General’nogo shtaba
polkovnika, nachal’nika Orenburgskogo kazach’ego iunkerskogo uchilishcha (Saint Petersburg: Depar-
tament udelov, 1885); Sukhotin N. N., Reidy; V. N. Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia. Opyt rukovod-
stva (Saint Petersburg: V. Berezovskii, 1894); Kedrin S., “Malaia voina prezhde i teper’,” Voina i mir 4
(1907).
15
Kedrin, “Malaia voina.”
16
A. Popov, Napadeniia na zheleznye dorogi, telegrafy i razlichnogo roda sklady s tsel’iu porchi ikh i
razrusheniia (Saint Petersburg: Berezovskii, 1904); A. I. Ipatovich-Goranskii, V. V. Iakovlev, Konno-
sapernoe delo: Porcha i razrushenie sooruzhenii i orudii: Kurs kavaleriiskogo uchilishcha (Saint Pe-
tersburg: A. Markov, 1902).
17
P. Karatygin, Partizanstvo: nachal’nyi opyt takticheskogo issledovaniia (Khar’kov: Izdatel’stvo UVO,
1924).
the Moscow Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party,18 developed a series of

methodological recommendations for guerilla warfare for revolutionary purposes
during the first Russian Revolution of 1905–1907.19 The leader of the Russian
Marxist-Bolsheviks, Lenin, insisted on separating the concepts of “partisan, “an-
archy” and “brigand,” having great hopes for the so called small war as a special
form of people’s struggle.20 In this way, the partisan warfare began to take on the
connotation of the all-out people’s war which could be traced to Davidov’s works
in the Nineteenth Century.
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks immediately employed partisan
tactics. Already in January, 1918, the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs
formed the Central Staff for Partisan Detachments. The Rulebook of the Work-
ers-Peasant Red Army (RKKA) had a separate chapter on partisan warfare in
1918.21 On June 29, 1918, Nestor Makhno left Moscow for Ukraine to organize the
partisan units against the occupational German forces and their local collabora-
tor Hetman Skoropadskii.22 The Bolshevik party cadres were directly engaged
in organizing the resistance struggle against the White Guards and occupational
German and Allied troops. During the crisis of the Civil War and general shortage
of goods there was an over-printing the old books about partisan tactics.23 Gener-
als B. E. Borisov and V. N. Klembovskii, as well as Colonel P. P. Karatigin who
worked on theory and practice of partisan warfare before the revolution, joined
the Bolsheviks after 1917, aiding them in waging the guerilla warfare.24 The older
officers transferred their knowledge of partisan warfare to the newly created Bol-
shevik formations, but they could not adapt to the new system. Eventually, they
18
E. A. Korol’chuk, Sh. M. Levinym, comps., Deiateli revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Rossii: Biobibli-
ograficheskii slovar’:Ot predshestvennikov dekabristov do padeniia tsarizma. T. V: Sotsial-demokraty.
1880–1904. Vol. 5 V — Gm, ed. V. I. Nevskii (Moscow: Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo politicheskikh kator-
zhan i ssyl’no-poselentsev, 1931), 634–642.
19
S. Vychegodskii (pseudonim), Taktika ulichnogo boia, (n. p., 1907); S. Vychegodskii (pseudonim),
Taktika militsii (n. p., 1907); Vychegodskii Men’shevik (pseudonim), “O podgotovke k vooruzhennomu
vosstaniiu,” Proletarii 1 (1907).
20
V. I. Lenin, “Zadachi otriadov revoliutsionnoi armii,” “K voprosu o partizanskoi voine,” “O parti-
zanskom vystuplenii PPS,” “Partizanskaia voina,” “Sovremennoe polozhenie Rossii i taktika rabochei
partii,” “Marksizm i vosstanie,” “Takticheskaia platforma k ob’edinitel’nomu s’ezdu RSDRP,” “Uroki
moskovskogo vosstaniia,” etc. in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. 5th edition (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo polit-
icheskoi literatury, 1960).
21
Kvachkov, Teoriia.
22
Even though Makhno was an anarchist, there is no doubt that his discussion with the Bolshevik lead-
ers in Kremlin played a role in his instigation of uprisings in Ukraine, V. Golovanov, Nestor Makhno
(Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2008)..
23
Malaia voina (samostoiatel’nyi vid voiny, vedomoi slaboiu storonoi protiv sil’nogo protivnika). Izv-
lechenie iz taktiki Balka. Izdaetsia kak prakticheskoe rukovodstvo dlia komandnogo sostava (Moscow:
Voennoe delo, 1919); V. N. Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia. Issledovanie (Petrograd: s. n., 1919).
24
A. Savinkin, I. Domnin, comps., Groznoe oruzhie — malaia voina, partizanstvo i drugie vidy assim-
etrichnogo voevaniia v svete naslediia russkikh voennykh myslitelei (Moscow: Russkii put, Voennyi
universitet, 2007), 747–750.
ended up either in emigration or prison. They wanted to focus on the military

operations behind the enemy lines, while neglecting the all-out people’s uprising
approach, viewing the latter as of little use instead of something progressive and
new.25 Their line ran counter to the wishes of the Bolshevik leaders.
The logic of the Civil War imposed the idea of partisan warfare as an all-out
people’s war. Soon after the October Revolution, new and specialized publications
about the partisan warfare written by Bolshevik authors began appearing. Most
likely, the first independent publication about the partisan tactics was published by
Moscow Defense Region in 1919, a difficult year for the Bolsheviks.26 M. F. Frun-
ze, a prominent Bolshevik party and military leader, noted the importance of
partisan warfare in his study published in 1921, at the end of the Civil War. In an
article entitled “A Unitary Military Doctrine of the Red Army,”27 Frunze noted
that the state and the General Staff must pay close attention to guerilla war, and
that it must be prepared for in a systematic and planned fashion. The partisan
battles in Siberia, the uprisings in the Cossack lands, the Muslim movement’s
rebellion in Central Asia, Makhno’s movement in Ukraine offered a great wealth
and diversity of materials for students of the partisan warfare. Frunze recognized
that the Soviet Russia’s rich partisan experience must be used in order to defeat the
technically superior enemy armies. This article was practically the last time that a
highly placed Soviet official admitted publically to preparing for guerilla warfare
during the peacetime.
From then on, the veil of secrecy began to gradually descend on the topic of
partisan warfare in the USSR. The most obvious reason was that military prep-
arations were not discussed publically in order to keep them from the enemy.
However, there was another, a deeper reason — the USSR relentlessly waged and
organized guerilla warfare near and far away from its borders. Naturally, public
admission of continuously preparing for and waging partisan warfare would have
destroyed the Soviet diplomats’ attempts to normalize relations with the world,
necessary for stabilizing the communist regime in the Soviet Union. Simultane-
ously, the partisan detachments continued to be active after the Civil War outside
of the Soviet Union with the same intensity. Stanislav Vaupshasov, a Lithuanian in
the service of the Red Army left descriptions of how the Soviet partisan activities
were transferred beyond the Soviet borders. After the Civil War, his partisan de-
tachment was sent to Lithuania, Poland and Western Belarus, where it continued
25
V. Borisov, “Partizanskaia, narodnaia voina,” Voennoe delo 7 (1918); V. Borisov, “Malaia voina,” Voen-
noe delo 8 (1918)
26
S. I. Gusev, Instruktsii po organizatsii melkikh partizanskikh otriadov utverzhdeny komanduiushchim
Moskovskim sektorom t. Gusevym (Moscow: n. p., 1919); Polozhenie o melkikh partizanskikh otriadakh
(Moscow: s. n., 1919).
27
M. V. Frunze, “Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia armiia,” Krasnaia Nov’ 1 (1921): 94–106.
to struggle against “the foreign conquerors and domestic reactionaries” at the time
that the Soviet Russia was in the process of concluding a peace treaty with Poland
and Lithuania.28 Later on, the Soviet state institutions participated in organizing
and implementing partisan wars in Spain and parts of China.
The practice of the partisan warfare, new perspective on the role of the masses
in partisan movements and the experience of the Czarist Army brought about
a new synthesis. In the first years of peace, Soviets published a series of mili-
tary-theoretical monographs29 and program articles30 on the topic of the partisan
warfare. Soviet theoreticians of the so called small war studied the tactics de-
ployed by partisans in countries from around the world.31 The development of
the Soviet theory and practice of the partisan warfare was mostly influenced by
M. A. Drobov’s voluminous study and Peter Karatygin’s monograph.32 Karatygin,
a former colonel in the Czarist Army, a Bolshevik and a Red Commander, synthe-
sized the traditional Russian and the new revolutionary experiences. Karatygin
carefully examined the new ideas of the partisan warfare in modern circumstance,
while paying particularly close attention to the numerous technological advances
which could have influenced the guerilla warfare in the Twentieth Century.
Mikhail A. Drobov’s research represented an important step toward develop-
ment of the theory of the so called small war as a crucial tool in the hands of a
revolutionary party. Drobov utilized in his study numerous works of the Civil War
28
S. A Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974).
29
S. I. Gusev, Uroki grazhdanskoi voiny (Khar’kov: Izdatel’stvo RIO UKRPURA, 1921); Sistema i tak-
tika bor’by s banditami-partizanami, (Moscow: s. n., 1921); A. N. Iatsuk, Pomoshch’ aviatsii deistvi-
iam partizan (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1921); Muratov ed., Ulichnyi boi. Sbornik statei
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1924); V. M. Voronkov, Kak deistvuiut partizany (Moscow —
Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1927); I. Kosogov, Uchastie konnitsy v partizanskoi voine
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1928); M. Svechnikov, Reidy, konnitsy i oborona zheleznykh
dorog (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1928).
30
R. Eideman, “Povstanchestvo i ego rol’ v sovremennoi voine,” Armiia i revoliutsiia 3–4 (1922);
N. N. Domozhirov, “Epizody partizanskoi voiny,” Voennyi vestnik 5–6 (1922); V. Lubin, “Krat-
kii ocherk istorii partizanskoi povstancheskoi konnitsy,” Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia 6 (1922);
Iu. Z. Dobrovol’skii, “Tekhnika v maloi voinem,” Voina i revoliutsiia 5 (1925); A. Borisov, “Voprosy
upravleniia v maloi voine,” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1927); N. Kotov, “Taktika krest’ianskikh vosstanii,”
Grazhdanskaia voina T. 2 (Moscow, 1928).
31
P. Tikhomirov, Uroki bolgarskogo vosstaniia. Sentiabria 1923 goda (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
izdatel’stvo, 1924); M. Dobranitskii, “Zelenye partizany,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia 8–9 (1924);
M. Braginskii, “Vedenie voennykh operatsii v Marokko,” Voennaia mysl’ i revoliutsiia 4 (1924);
M. Pogorelov, “Kurdskii vopros,” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1925); M. Pogorelov, “Vosstanie druzov,” Voi-
na i revoliutsiia 5 (1925); V. Gurko-Kniazhin, “Vosstanie v Sirii,” Novyi vostok 10–11 (1925); O. Dis-
bakh, “O metodakh i organizatsii oborony Shveitsarii,” Voina i revoliutsiia 9 (1926); P. Smolentsev,
“Kitaiskaia krasnaia gvardiia” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1926); K. Bocharov, “K rokovym dniam, ocherk
sobytii 1923 goda v Bolgarii i taktika BKP (t. s.),” Voina i revoliutsiia 10–11 (1927); B Shumiatskii,
“Spornye voprosy noveishei istorii Persii (Khorosanskoe vosstanie),” Revoliutsionnyi vostok 1, 1927..
32
Karatygin, Partizanstvo; M. A. Drobov, Malaia voina: partizanstvo i diversii (Moscow: Voenizdat
NKO SSSR, 1931). The latter was written in 1929, but at present only an edition from 1941 is avail-
able.
by White and Red authors, research from Czarist Russia and the authors from
abroad. His reliance on the wide-ranging foreign as well as domestic studies of
the partisan warfare enabled Drobov to create a veritable compendium of parti-
san operations, with detailed explanations of tactics and strategy. According to
Drobov, the guerilla war was only a part of class (or national-liberation) warfare.
In his view, the so called small war was a transitional form of class armed struggle
on the path of an all-out uprising with the aim of capturing power and establish-
ing the dictatorship of the rising class. As a result, the partisan tactics were ac-
ceptable during peacetime, as well as war. Drobov divided guerilla warfare into
diversionary and partisan warfare. He paid particular attention to the core rebel-
lious guerilla of the organized partisans. Drobgov offered the model for future
national liberation wars in three steps: 1) Partisan detachments are organized by
previously prepared domestic cadres; 2) an all-out people’s partisan war is waged
by attracting the wider masses; 3) the growth of the people’s uprising into an
organized partisan army while simultaneously creating institutions of people’s
power. Apart from this, Drobov emphasized the close connection between the
partisans’ activities and circumstances of the uprising. According to him, growth
of the partisan movement must correspond to the intensifying class war, it must
be accepted by the masses and it cannot be imported from outside. In addition,
Drobov argued that period which it takes for a movement to grow from an upris-
ing into a larger military unit occurs rapidly because (imperialist) wars fasten the
pace of revolution.
Drobov also specified steps which a partisan movement should undertake:
propagandizing the idea that the partisan struggle was crucial for a successful
armed uprising against social (and national) oppression amongst the masses; cre-
ating organizations for workers and peasants to carry out operations; attracting
wider masses to the revolutionary path with the aim of quickening the process
of class differentiation in society; weakening the enemy’s forces and gradually
undermining the bases of the reactionary regime (or the occupational apparatus);
creating and securing revolutionary organizations, institutions of people’s power
and the political leaderships of the new society; forming and organizing a revolu-
tionary army in order to establish new revolutionary authority. Dobrov noted the
importance of diversionary actions as part of guerilla war’s special operations,
which required specially trained cadres. Drobov believed that the diversions could
serve economic, political and military aims, however, they could not directly lead
to an all-out people’s uprising. The importance of this studious research was that it
offered a methodological definition of the partisan war (and not just declaratively,
as in previous works by Bolshevik leaders). Drobov particularly highlighted the
need for special training of “the party fighters,” viewing the partisan warfare as a
method in the struggle for political power.
The People’s Commissariat for Defense took on the responsibility for training
partisan cadres in the USSR. Diversionary troops, even those who were supposed
to work on Soviet territory (in case of occupation) were trained in secret. Later on,
political complications related to training of partisans almost completely turned
this into an invisible issue.33A good example of this can be found in the previously
mentioned Vaupshasov’s memoirs. In his reminiscences, he states that he received
“an unexpected” call to go to Spain, where he accidently ran into five of his col-
leagues from the partisan organization in Poland where he served 1920–1925. As
Vapshasov said, “this was a small world.”34 All of his old comrades were “advisers
for organization of smaller independent units,” which Vaupshasov referred to as
Army for Special Purposes (Spetsnaz) in the Soviet jargon. The veil of secrecy
of the Red Army’s preparation of partisan warfare began to be lifted only after
the collapse of the USSR, when a series of studies based on the recently opened
archives began to appear.
Nonetheless, the strange destiny of one man, Il’ia Starinov (1900–2000), played
the biggest role in illuminating the truth surrounding the training of partisan cad-
res. His long and intensive life offered to historians an incredible opportunity to
obtain memoirs of one of the founders of the Russian Spetsnaz.35 Later on, numer-
ous other memoirs testifying to Soviet preparations for partisan warfare surfaced.
Their authors wrote honestly even though they did not have the opportunity to
publish them during their lives.36
After the opening of The Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, the Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation and regional archives — it became apparent that preparations for the
partisan warfare in the USSR in the 1920s and the 1930s were intensive. The
military political leadership of the Soviet Union actively prepared for the partisan
warfare 1924–1936. The program of training the partisan cadres had several direc-
tions: creating a conspiratorial network of diversionary groups and individual di-
33
The nature of these complications we will explain later on in the text.
34
Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh.
35
After a month long training session in diversionary tactics in 1919, Starinov joined the Red Army, and
after the Civil War, he began his lengthy career as an instructor in diversionary tactics. He worked in
this field from 1922 to 1987. During this period he trained domestic and foreign students from the
countries of Asia, Europe, Africa and Americas. Unfortunately, Starinov’s memoirs of the period after
the Second World War have not been published because of the confidential information which they con-
tain. I. G. Starinov, Zapiski diversanta ( Moscow: Vympel, 1997); I. G. Starinov, Miny zamedlennogo
deistviia: razmyshleniia partizana-diversanta (Moscow: Vympel, 1999); I. G. Starinov, Soldat stoletiia
(Moscow: Geroi Otechestva, 2000).
36
G. M. Lin’kov, Vospominaniia o proshlom s vyvodami na budushchee (Moscow: n. p., 1961) accessed
September 16, 2012, http://vrazvedka.ru / starinov / vosp. html. The online version contains parts which
the censors cut out in the Soviet-era publication, G. M. Lin’kov, Voina v tylu vraga. Vospominaniia o
proshlom s vyvodami na budushchee (Moscow: n. p., 1961); V. Boiarskii, ed., Diversanty Zapadnogo
fronta. Artur Sprogis i drugie. Stranitsy Pamiati (Moscow: Krasnaia zvezda, 2007).
versionary soldiers in strategically important centers and on the railroad network;

forming and training future partisan detachments and groups prepared for the
battle in unknown terrain, even abroad; additionally educating the veterans of the
Civil War era partisan detachments; training partisans for struggle against enemy
partisan detachments; perfecting existing technologies and developing new tech-
nologies which were useful for partisan war-waging; creating hidden depots with
supplies and technological equipment for future partisan formations throughout
the USSR. Partisans were trained by the Fourth (Intelligence) Directorate of the
Red Army General Staff in partnership with analogous OGPU institutions.37 By
end of 1929, a lot has been accomplished in creating a network of partisan schools
and courses, and the state had the sufficient number of trained cadres. Also, a net-
work of small diversionary groups was being trained who were supposed to turn
into larger partisan formations during the war. Selected individuals received the
information about the secret locations of explosives, weapons and other military
technology necessary for the future partisan detachments.
Starinov at the time worked as an instructor of diversionary tactics in the Red
Army’s schools in Ukraine and Moscow’s suburbs. His memoirs, as well as the
recollections by A. K. Sprogis who headed a special school for training partisan
leaders, reveal the wide-ranging scope of preparations for the partisan warfare.
According to Starinov, the Soviets trained six detachments comprising of 350–
500 people in Belarus, while anonymous specialists in diversionary tactics were
trained for service in the cities and around important railroad hubs. Hundreds of
kilograms of explosives, 50,000 riffles and 150 machine guns were kept in con-
cealed depots and underground hiding places. In Ukraine alone, 3,000 Partisan
experts were trained and numerous concealed depots with supplies were prepared.
According to Starinov, the largest partisan schools where in Kharkov, Kupiansk,
Kiev and Odessa. The cadres for the partisan warfare were also trained in the
Leningrad Military District.
In order to conceal training of such a large number of future partisans, the or-
ganizers ran courses, formally, as excursions into nature by voluntary associations
of fishermen and hunters. The commanding and the political cadres of the fu-
ture formations attended courses on general military preparedness, technical and
special skills and methodology of recruitment of nucleus of partisan units. Each
course lasted around six months, and on average, there were about thirty-five to
fifty students in a single cohort. Five to twelve people were trained at any one time
in two schools for diversionary tactics around Kiev. A special program existed for
partisans’ elite forces, the guerilla fighters trained in diversionary tactics. Their
training focused on conspiracy, work with explosives and various other types of
37
V. Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera, segodnia, zavtra (istorikodokumental’nyi ocherk) (Moscow: Gran-
itsa, 2003).
armaments. The program for training partisans was based on textbooks, while
expert-lecturers and practice in various environments widened the scope of the
curriculum. Partisans who specialized in diversionary tactics were also educated
in building improvised explosives.
The preparations for the partisan operations peaked during the large military
exercises. Partisan units participated in separate as well as general exercises.
For instance, military exercises were carried out near Leningrad and Moscow
in which partisans from several military districts participated. In coordination
with the parachutists and the soldiers from the Division for Special Purposes, the
partisans were tasked with blocking communications in all of Belarus, Ukraine
and Moldavia and with initiating a wave of partisan uprisings in these republics
in the case of a successful attack on the USSR.38 However, with the strengthen-
ing of Stalin’s power (or according to Starinov, from 1933–1934), the Red Army’s
preparations for partisan warfare began to stagnate. After the purges in 1937, the
entire partisan system was destroyed. The absolutist Stalinist regime was afraid of
individuals trained in diversionary tactics and prepared for independent military
operations. In fact, the Stalinist state’s fear of hidden partisans motivated by larger
strategic aims, instead of strict military orders, was similar to the attitude of the
Czarist Russia towards the rebels and partisans from the time of Klembovskii and
Golitsyn. The totalitarian Soviet state had less and less trust in its citizens, which
was reflected in the restrictions on access to the state and the party institutions, the
right to possess arms and the stricter control of movement within the country.
At the same time, the country and society were in state of a flux and funda-
mental transformation, and Stalin’s fears were not entirely unreasonable. By cre-
ating partisan units and independent partisans trained specifically in diversionary
tactics, their organizers in the higher military echelons were creating a mighty
weapon in their hands which was almost impossible to control by the political
leadership of the country. It is indicative that heads of the Belarusian and Kiev
Military Districts, I. E. Iakir and I. P. Uborevich, as well as the deputy head of
Leningrad Military District were repressed in purges. These three border areas
played a very important role in training of partisans in diversionary tactics. In
addition, Iakir carefully overlooked the development of these units. He personally
selected instructors for partisan schools and he was also involved in selection of
students. Significantly, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition in 1927 tried to use
printing presses for special purposes, which existed in case of the victory of the
reaction. Similarly, Stalinists believed that the opposition could use the cadres of
the partisan detachments.
38
Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera.
Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare 153
In Stalin’s struggle against the organized opposition networks, the NKVD

completely put a stop to further training of partisans, arrested a large number of
instructors and already trained partisan cadres and destroyed the depots in hidden
locations. A large number of textbooks were also destroyed. For example, Kara-
tygin’s and Drobov’s books published in thousands of copies were so rigorously
destroyed that only a few of them survived. Typically for the Soviet social system,
the enemies of the regime were punished, their achievements were denied and in
some cases even their existence was denied.39 All of this added to the mystery sur-
rounding the prewar organization of partisan detachments.
The initial success of the German attack on the USSR forced the Soviet lead-
ership to renew the partisan ranks. However, what could have been done during
peacetime — and what is worse, what was done and then destroyed — could not
have been as quickly accomplished during the war. This is the reason why par-
tisan detachments were unsuccessful until 1942. At the cost of great human and
material losses, the network of partisan detachments was organized, the system of
training partisan cadres was renewed and the old cadres who survived the repres-
sion wave were restored to their duties.40 It was difficult to explain to the masses
that joined the partisans, driven by patriotism and antipathy towards the foreign
conquerors, why logistics for partisan warfare were destroyed only a few years
earlier. In order to conceal these mistakes, Soviet historians and censors tried
to completely hide any remaining traces of information about preparations for
the partisan warfare during the interwar period. Role of the Soviet military and
security structures in organizing the partisan warfare were also a taboo topic. The
Soviet historiography acknowledged only the people’s patriotism and the commu-
nist party (in form of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement) as having played
a role in partisan warfare.
Role of the Comintern in organizing

and preparing for partisan warfare
Apart from the military and security structures, the Comintern (IKKI) was
also involved in preparations for the partisan warfare in the USSR. In Soviet and
Yugoslav historiographies, the Comintern was treated as an advice-giving body,
39
See the illustrative example of this approach to collective memory, D. King, The Commissar Vanishes:
The Falsification of Photographs and Art in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997).
40
Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera; A. Iu. Popov, NKVD i partizanskoe dvizhenie (Moscow: OLMA-Press,
2003).
akin to the Society of People for the communist parties.41 The opening of the
Comintern archives in the early 1990s, however, allowed reevaluation of the Co-
mintern’s role. It was a powerful and a centralized organization which directed,
financed and controlled the internal life of legal and especially illegal communist
parties.42 In reality, the Comintern provided finances, logistical support, as well
as a place to recuperate, restructure and educate the cadres of foreign communist
parties. An important part of educating the foreign parties was to prepare foreign
communists them for an uprising and partisan war. From the end of the Civil War
in Russia in 1921 and until its dissolution in 1943, the IKKI was under firm con-
trol of the Bolshevik leaders. After 1929 (with departure of Nikolai Bukharin as
president of IKKI), the Comintern worked on Stalin’s orders.
The first Comintern’s military school was opened in 1920.43 The Bolsheviks
undertook the idea of preparing and organizing revolutions in other countries after
the regime stabilized in Russia. On September 25, 1922, it was agreed to create a
permanent commission which would collect and study experiences of communist
parties in armed struggles with the bourgeoisie. The Commission studied tactical
problems, and they wrote and published works and made methodological recom-
mendations to communist parties’ military organizations, which were illegal and
hidden from the masses and regular party members.44 Their advice took into ac-
count the particular circumstances of various communist parties but it always
encouraged foreign communists to take steps towards civil war and revolution as
the only way for the victory of the proletariat. The victory of the proletariat (or
absolute power by the communist party, to be more precise) could not have been
conceived without a decisive battle.
A good example of Comintern’s policy was the secret instruction that the IKKI
sent to the military organization of the Bulgarian Communist Party in August,
1924. The report was based on the unsuccessful September Uprising in 1923. The
instructions contained recommendations for development of a plan for an armed
41
See A. Sobolev, ed., Kommunisticheskii Internatsional. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow:
Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1969) or P. Morača, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Bel-
grade: Rad, 1966). This view, in somewhat milder form, was maintained in the official Yugoslav
historiography and ideology in later years. J. Pleterski, D. Kecić, M. Vasić, P. Damjanović, F. Trgo,
P. Morača, B. Petranović, D. Bilandžić and S. Stojanović, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Bel-
grade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985).
42
The Comintern’s control of the CK KPJ can best be seen through the documents of Tito’s personal file
in the Central Archive of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Due to the importance of
the fund we will cite it in full, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 495
“Komintern”, o. 277 Lichnye dela (Iugoslaviia), d. 21 “Broz Tito Iosip (Val’ter Fridrikh, Georgievich,
Rudi, Pepo, Stari).”
43
G. M. Adibekov, E. N. Shakhnazarova and K. K. Shirinia, Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna.
1919–1943 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 31.
44
I. Linder and S. Churkin, Krasnaia pautina: tainy razvedki Kominterna. 1919–1943 (Moscow: RIPOL
klassik, 2005).
uprising, tactical and strategic suggestions which were adapted to the local geo-
graphical, social and class conditions, methodology of legal and illegal preparation
of partisan cadres before and during the uprising. The Comintern also advised the
Bulgarian Party about supplies, choice of weapons and where they should be kept
and which policies it should pursue to facilitate the disintegration of the army and
the police, how to deal with domestic nationalists and members of the Russian
White Guard. They also provided advice on sabotage and use of communications
and telegraphic systems, technical organization of an intelligence service before
and during the uprising. The Comintern’s uncompromising spirit was illustrated
in the following instructions as well: “every communist must firmly remember
that he is not only a communist in words, but a veritable member of the party
in a civil war (emphasized in the original — A. T.), and as such must take care
to procure weapons.” The advice to the Bulgarian party elite also reflected the
character of the Comintern’s recommendations. The military organization’s intel-
ligence “must find out where the people who must be ‘liquidated’ live (address
of their residence) at the moment of the uprising and conditions under which the
terrorist acts are possible.”45
Courses for younger and middle commanders were also organized by IKKI.
The aim of these courses was to train sufficient number of party members to
successfully begin the initial phase of the uprising, 100–200 senior leaders who
had to be educated in groups not bigger than ten each. The courses lasted for six
weeks, six days per week, eight hours per day (288 hours in total). IKKA preferred
students who were former soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers with
war experience. The program included three parts: military-political, military-
technical and tactical components.
A military-political part of the course included selected works of Marxist-
Leninist classics which focused on preconditions of successful uprising, how to
transform a national and imperialist war into a civil war, how to prepare politically
for an armed uprising and how to create revolutionary institutions in conditions of
civil war. The military-political part of the course also focused on how to secure
power: organizing a red army, police and extraordinary commissions, apparatus
of civil administration (revolutionary and executive committees), an intelligence
agency for external and internal needs in order to obtain information about the
class enemy and to suppress enemy intelligence.
The military-technical part of the course covered the following issues: how to
maintain communications and how to destroy them; familiarization with techni-
cal aspects of transport for war needs (armored trains and armored cars) and how
to fight against them; use of explosives; the use of various type of weapons typical
45
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 27, d. 14, 7–14.
of mountainous terrain; knowledge of military topography. The instructors par-

ticularly emphasized the necessity of improvisation — from improvised armored
trains and cars to home-made mortars.
The third (tactical) part of the course also concentrated on partisan warfare
in a small hilly agrarian country. The practical tasks included: attacks on build-
ings held by the enemy, attack on military barracks, blocking access to barracks,
disarming police stations, defense of captured parts of a town and organization of
defensive positions. After the completion of the course, students were expected to
know how to organize an uprising in various tactical circumstances: uprising in
a weakly defended area without expected help from the outside, uprising in well
defended area with the expected outside help, uprising in a well-defended area
without the possibility of outside help.46
After the special training, the Comintern cadres actively participated in orga-
nizing uprisings in Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia and China. Even though none of the
uprisings ended well for communists, each uprising brought new knowledge and
experience, which was reflected in the Comintern’s constantly updated teaching ma-
terial. The IKKI also had a military commission, which developed a wide-ranging
plan of anti-war activity for foreign communist parties which included: recruiting
from the ranks of the state army, encouraging its disintegration, preparation for an
armed uprising and coordination of its activities with the defense of the USSR.47
Using the opportunity to educate new cadres, while reeducating the old foreign
communist parties’ members, the Comintern prepared new teaching materials each
time that it ran its courses. Among them was a script written in 1925 by Nikolai
Kotov, the prototype for the protagonist from N. Mikhalkov’s film Burnt by the Sun.
The text was eighteen pages long and it was marked top secret. Kotov, who was a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Czarist Military and the organizer of the Red Partisan
Detachments in Ukraine during the Civil War, discussed issues surrounding the
organization and the tactics of the partisan warfare. It is apparent that the author of
this text tried to compensate the lack of theoretical training for the future partisans
by focusing on the practical problems of partisan warfare on the ground.48
The failure of the communist revolutions in numerous European and Asian
countries, as well as the internal logic of the development of the USSR, led to
certain changes in the Soviet foreign policy. Disappointed by the failure of the
world revolution to break out, Stalin announced at the 5th IKKI Extended Ple-
num the slogan of Building Socialism in one Country. Even though the policy
of fermenting uprisings in the neighboring states was abandoned, the Comintern
46
Ibid., 16–22.
47
Linder and Churkin, Krasnaia pautina, 446.
48
“Tezisy kursa po voprosam organizatsii i taktiki partizanskoi i povstancheskoi bor’by,” RGASPI, f.
495, o. 154, d. 247, 2–9.
continued to educate cadres for the needs of the communist parties’ military or-
ganizations. The break with the Trotskyite idea of the Permanent Revolution did
not lead to cessation of military training of various communist parties. At the end
of the 6th Comintern Congress, held in Moscow July 17‑September 1, 1928, the
new Comintern line was “Struggle against the Dangers of War” and “Defense
of the USSR.” The new line required the foreign communists who were trained
in partisan warfare to help the USSR in case of war. After the 6th Congress, the
Comintern’s control over the “military direction” was strengthened by the Orga-
nization Department of IKKI.
In the new circumstances of temporary truce, the Comintern had an oppor-
tunity to educate the carefully selected cadres. The teaching material was based
not only on the experiences of the Russian Civil War, but on the failed uprisings
from Estonia to Bulgaria, and from China to Hungary. The courses ran in par-
tisan schools,49 organized for preparation of guerillas by the Red Army’s intel-
ligence agency.50 In addition, a large academy operated near Moscow (in the town
Balashikha),51 which trained diversionists and organizers of the so called small
war. The academy was headed by Karol Swierczewski.52 The school was under the
control of the Red Army’s intelligence service, but formally it was part of the Co-
mintern. By the end of the decade, it mainly trained partisan diversionists for the
Comintern’s needs. Three parallel isolated groups were educated at any time, each
consisting of forty people. Instructors wore civilian clothes in order to conceal the
fact that they belonged to the military or security structures.53
49
R. W. Leonard, Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918–1933 (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1999), 47–48.
50
Since the Red Army’s Intelligence administration changed its name eight times between 1922 and 1945,
we will use the generally accepted but unofficial name — RU RKKA (The Intelligence Administration
of the Red Army).
51
The school in Balashikha continued to exist even after it was used for training of the Comintern’s par-
tisans. During the Second World War it trained the elite diversionary-partisan cadres for the Red Army.
After the war, under the control of the state security, the school continued its existence as the Higher
School of KGB USSR. In addition to the domestic cadres, the Higher School of KGB USSR also
trained members of various nations from the Latin America, Africa and Southeastern Asia. The famous
KUOS KGB USSR (the predecessor of all the FSB RF special units) also operated out of Balashikh. For
instance, the veterans of the school in Balashikh participated in the well known assault on Amin’s Pal-
ace in Afghanistan under the command of Colonel G. I. Boiarinov who died in the attack. From 1981,
the building in Balashikh was turned into a base for the training of special KGB units. At present, the
base is used to train FSB units. E. Kristofer and O. Gordievskii, KGB: Istoriia vneshnepoliticheskikh
operatsii ot Lenina do Gorbacheva (Moscow: Nota bene, 1992).
52
Swierczewski participated in the October Revolution and the Civil War. He graduated from the Military
Academy M. V. Frunze and he became an officer in the Red Army. Later on, as a general with the pseud-
onym Valter, he participated in the Spanish Civil War. He was the Commander of the 14th International
Brigade and the 35th International Division. He participated in the Second World War, and later on he
organized the pro-Soviet People’s Army in Poland. He was killed fighting against the forces of the
Home Army in 1947.
53
V. I. Piatnitskii, Razvedshkola 005 (Moscow — Minsk: AST-Kharvest, 2005).
In addition, the Comintern’s partisan cadres were trained in other partisan

schools in case that they needed specific skills or for conspiratorial reasons. Stu-
dents who showed talent in military skills were offered an opportunity to receive
further education in Frunze Academy or in the infantry-military institutions.54 In
order to acquire more knowledge about illegal activities, students and graduates
of party schools took a special course — “Practice of Uprising and Conspiracy.”
These courses ran in KUNMZ 1921–1936 (The Communist University of the Na-
tional Minorities of the West), KUTK 1925–1930 (The Communist University of
the Toilers of China), KUTV 1921–1938 (The Communist University of the Toilers
of the East) and MLSH 1925–1938 (The International Lenin School).55 The addi-
tional course in party institutions had several features: theory, practical exercises
and camp meetings (several days of exercises outside of the city). The length of the
military training lasted from 180 hours per year in KUNMZ up to 300 hours in
MLSH.56 Special exercises and preparations were held in secret Comintern objects
through Moscow and Moscow region.57
What did the party cadres learn in these courses? The Comintern’s party cad-
res above all needed special knowledge of conspiratorial activities, the so called
party technique. A good example is The Rulebook of Party Conspiracy, prepared
in 1928 by IKKI specialists. This manual dealt with the subversive-propaganda
activities. The Rulebook included following sections: general recommendations;
conspiracy during legal and semi-legal existence of the party; conspiratorial
apartments; methods of preserving ties; party pseudonyms; notes, letter writing,
documents and codes; maintaining and hiding archives; illegal printing presses;
conspiratorial meetings; conspiracy in illegal activities; living illegally in towns;
the ways to inform about arrests; how to struggle against counter-intelligence and
police agents; how to behave in case of arrest; how to behave during question-
ing and in jail.58 This was just one out of many brochures. The MLSh library in
1931 had a series of works on the same topic: The Program of Studying Illegal
Work, Program of Practical Work of Illegal Techniques, Program of Conspiracy
for Foreign Students residing in the USSR. These studies were mainly written by
54
The specially selected Comintern cadres often received military training in the Riazan’ Infantry School,
which later on became the Riazan’ Institute for the Airborne Troops (also known as the parachute acad-
emy).
55
A detailed examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this study. However, the funds of these in-
stitutions are preserved in the former CPSU Archive. RGASPI, f. 529 “Kommunisticheskii universitet
natsional’nykh men’shinstv Zapada imeni Iu. Markhlevskogo”; f. 530 “Kommunisticheskii universitet
trudiashchikhsia kitaitsev”; f. 531 “Mezhdunarodnaia Leninskaia shkola”; RGASPI, f. 532 “ Kommu-
nisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka.”
56
57
V. I. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii i Komintern na vesakh istorii (Minsk: Kharvest, 2004), 271.
58
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 25, d. 1335, 1–65.
IKKI instructors and they were approved by the Soviet military and the security
structures.
The study plan varied based on concrete needs. In 1931–1932, in Swiercze-
wski’s school, according to a report, the political component of the curriculum
took 25 % of the course, the military-political 15 %, general tactics 25 %, military
technique 30 %, the party technique — 5 %. Sverchevskii pointed out that the most
important topics were: theory and practice of an armed uprising, splitting up the
bourgeois armed forces, handling the explosives, handling and maintaining light
infantry weapons of various models.59
The teaching materials also dealt with the preparations for the partisan op-
erations, its tactics from the uprising to formation of institutions of the new
government and the state apparatus. After the failure of the revolution in several
countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the Comintern students received a
series of brochures and collections of articles, as well as the already discussed
Drobov’s and Karatygin’s studies. However, the communist parties’ partisan
cadres required more voluminous publications which would contain more com-
prehensive information. The first such study was Der Weg zum Sieg. Eine theo-
retische Erörterung über Marxismus und Aufstand (The Path towards Victory:
the Art of the Armed Uprising), written by Finnish Communist Ture Lehen
(1893–1976) under the pseudonym of Alfred Langer.60 Lehen participated in the
Civil War, he was a Red Army officer, instructor of the Comintern’s so called
Military Commission (1926–1939), he participated in the Spanish Civil War, and
he was also the Interior Minister in the marionette Finnish communist govern-
ment in 1940.61 The Comintern leadership was not pleased with the limited size
of Lehen’s study (32 pages) and his focus on mass disorders in urban conditions
instead of partisan operations in the field. As early as 1928, in a conversation
with Erik Voleberg (an agent of the military intelligence), Iosef Piatnitskii, the
chief of the IKKI Department for International Relations, expressed an interest
in replacing The Path towards Victory with a new study which should be written
by a group of expert authors.62
59
Drabkin eds., Komintern, 789.
60
A. Langer, Der Weg zum Sieg. Eine theoretische Erörterung über Marxismus und Aufstand (Zürich:
Selbstverlag, 1927).
61
W. R. Kintner, The Front is Everywhere: Militant Communism in Action (Norman: University of Okla-
homa Press, 1954), 47; S. T. Possony, A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolu-
tion (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953), 178; B. Lazitch and M. Drachkovitch M., Biographical Diction-
ary of the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover institution press, 1986), 251; N. I. Baryshnikov, Rozhdenie i
krakh “teriiokskogo pravitel’stva” (1936–1940gg.) (Saint Petersburg — Khel’sinki, 2003); J. Saares
ed., Tuure Lehén — jämsänkoskelainen “punakenraali”. Jämsänkoskella 23. — 24. 1995 pidetyn semi-
naarin satoa, (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän kesäyliopisto, 1996).
62
Leonard, Secret Soldiers, 45–46.
Soon enough, the study which Piatnitskii requested appeared, and it was pub-
lished in Russian, German and French.63 The book had twelve chapters. There
were four study cases — unsuccessful uprisings in Tallinn (1923), Hamburg
(1923), Guangzhou (1927) and Shanghai (1926–1927); the activities which the
communists should undertake in order to weaken and encourage the disintegra-
tion of the ruling classes’ armed forces; organization of proletariat’s armed forces;
leadership in creating an army; special characteristics of military actions in the
initial phases of the uprising; specific characteristics of the military actions dur-
ing the uprising; military operations in rural environment. Nordberg’s study was
used in the course, as well as Rovetskii’s book about the battles between the police
and anti-regime units in urban environments, which also contained methodologi-
cal recommendations about organizing public disorders.64 Apart from the general
studies such as monographs by Klembovskii, Karatygin and Drobov,65 in order
to teach its students specific skills relating to partisan warfare, the Comintern
courses utilized special limited secret publications: Technique and Tactics of Di-
versionary Work printed in twelve samples, Ambushes on Roads printed in ten
samples, The Bases of Conspiracy for City Partisans, Basing the Partisan Units
in Forests and Prairies printed in two samples, and others. In addition, smaller
samples (only thirty copies) of the following rules were printed: “Hiding the Am-
munition and Weapons in Hideouts,” “Guarding the Explosive and Mine Devices
in Hideouts,” “Work with Mines and Explosions for Partisans and Diversionary-
Partisans,” “The Bases of Radio-Communication in Partisan Units,” “Preparation
for and Securing of Partisan Bases in Forrest-Swamp Areas,” and others.66 These
textbooks were only aides, while the courses were based on the personal contact
with teachers who had personal experience in partisan warfare.
The weapons used in IKKI educational institutions offer a glimpse into the
technical and diversionary training which the foreign communists underwent.
Guns and revolvers: Steyr (Austria), Mauser Parabellum, Walter (Germany),
Browning (Belgium), Colt (USA), Korovin, Nagant (USSR). Rifles: Mannlicher
(Austria), Mauser (Germany), Mosin (USSR), Mannlicher-Karkano (Italy), Leb-
el (France), Ariska (Japan). Automatic rifles: Bergmann (Germany), Thompson
(USA), Fedorov (Russia). Machine guns: Gochkis (France), Lewis (England),
63
A. Neuberg, Der bewaffnete Aufstand (Zürich: s. n., 1928); A. Neuberg, L’insurrection armee (Paris: s.
n., 1931); A. Iu. Neiberg., Vooruzhennoe vosstanie, Per. s nem. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1931); at present, the English version is most readily available which has
a controversial introduction to the book. A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection (London, 1970); T., Craword,
“Armed Insurrection, “ International Socialism, No. 46, (1971): S. Quinn-Judge, Ho Chi Minh: The
Missing Years, 1919–1941 ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
64
65
Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia; Karatygin, Partizanstvo; Drobov, Malaia voina.
66
I. G. Starinov, Podgotovka partizanskikh kadrov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989).
Madsen (Denmark), Maxim (Germany), Browning (Belgium) and Colt (USA).67

Represented here were the majority of light weapons from the interwar period.
Equally impressive were lectures in diversionary-tactics and explosives delivered
by I. Starinov. The traces of these lectures can be found in Starinov’s prewar ar-
ticle in an expert journal, as well as his book and an anonymous textbook written
during the Second World War.68 The lectures covered the most diverse ways of
utilizing explosive devices: regular instructions for handling the mines, factory
and military explosives of Soviet and foreign origins and from the most primitive
method of setting things aflame to the sophisticated methods of utilizing chemical
and electrical lighters of the industrial and homemade production. Each example
was followed by the detailed recipe how to produce the explosive device. Starinov
also offered a detailed explanation how to produce explosives from unexploded
grenades, mines and airplane bombs. For their production he suggested the forma-
tion of specially trained partisans. Starinov also trained his students how to build
homemade bombs and devices for causing fire. He paid particular attention to the
type of work which diversionary partisans would engage in. He taught his stu-
dents various ways to blow up trains, railroads, cars and trucks, industrial objects
and buildings. Evidently, the Soviets deemed it very important to train partisans
in diversionary tactics.69
The program for partisans was brief and highly intensive. Depending on the
knowledge and the needs of a group of students, the length of the training var-
ied. If the parties had an opportunity to organize additional classes in their own
country, the training lasted for three months. In contrast, members of completely
illegal parties took classes for five-six months,70 and in special cases even longer
(from eight months to one year).71
All general and introductory information was eliminated from the curricu-
lum, and the end result of this approach was the complete contrast to the so called
widely educated specialist. For example, lectures dealing with topography only
covered the terrain in which the students were likely to be active. Careful selection
of students was another way in which the education was expedited. Soviets trained
young and active individuals, with previous war experience or at least in excep-
tional physical condition, free of family obligations, careful but adventurous.72
The future cadres were expected to be loyal, morally upright, but they had to be
67
68
I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki podryvnogo dela. I,” Voina i tekhnika 6 (1929); I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki
podryvnogo dela. II,” Voina i tekhnika 3 (1930); I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki podryvnogo dela. III,” Voina
i tekhnika 4–5 (1930); I. G. Starinov, Razrushaite tyl vraga (Chernigov: Voenizdat, 1941).
69
70
Ibid., 789.
71
Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 272.
72
Ibid., 198.
able to freely return to their countries.73 Starinov recalled his conversation with
Iakir, who pointed out the complicated nature of the partisan training process.
“You must teach experienced and deserving people. Very experienced! Therefore,
you must teach in a way which will not disappoint them. They should not study the
bases. They need to have as much as possible of the new material. As much as pos-
sible! And you should keep in mind — the students of tactical partisan operations
for now perform better than you. So do not insult their egos and learn from them
everything which you may need.”74 J. Kopinič described the Comintern’s reliance
on brief, intensive, highly professional and rich in content courses in preparation
of its cadres.75
For efficient and fast-paced lectures on subversive operations, the instructors
were expected to utilize the experience of all students. This was reflected in the
fact that a graduate of these courses could become a full-fledged teacher of the
next generation of students. Swierczewski wrote that even though most of the
military teachers worked for the 4th Department (the military intelligence), the aim
of the courses were “to study the elementary military subjects (general tactics,
partisan and street warfare, handling weapons, and so on)…in the future, these
comrades will lead a series of teaching groups independently, under the leader-
ship of only one qualified specialist.”76 Active circulation of ideas, later on, con-
fused West European authors who were not aware of the branched-out mechanism
for preparation of the partisan warfare in the USSR 1921–1937. As a result, they
compared Mao Tse-tung’s brochure “The Question of Strategy of the Partisan
Warfare against Japanese Conquerors” published in 1937 and the communist par-
tisan war in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. Due to similarity of the
activities undertaken by the Chinese and the European communist partisans, they
came to the conclusion which at first glance may appear absurd that “the partisan
movement in USSSR was based on Mao Tse-tung’s concept.”77 The lectures were
taught in the major international languages of that time: German and French (ex-
cept Russian and Polish in some circumstances). This approach greatly facilitated
the exchange of ideas amongst communists around the world.78
The atmosphere of relatively liberal partizanshchina did not fit into the general
direction of the Soviet state in the second half of the 1930s. The investment over
73
74
This conversation was described in great detail in Starinov, Zapiski diversanta, chapter “Partizanskaia
shkola.”
75
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 84.
76
Ia. S. Drabkin eds., Komintern i ideia mirovoi revoliutsii. Dokumenty (Moscow: RAN IVI, FAS RF,
RTsKhIDNI, 1998), 790.
77
C. A. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954),
46.
78
the years into the world revolution appeared to be an irrational waste of resources
which were necessary for the industrialization and the militarization of society
on the eve of the looming global conflict. A good example of Stalin’s disappoint-
ment in Comintern and the international brotherhood of the working class were
his reports at the 16th, 17th and 18th Party Congresses in 1930, 1934 and 1939, re-
spectively.
In 1930, Stalin believed that the working classes of the capitalist countries
would not allow their countries to attack the USSR.79 Likewise, this belief re-
mained unchanged in 1934 when Stalin promised to those gathered at the Con-
gress that “the war will not take place only on the frontlines, but also in the rear
of the enemy… numerous friends of the working class of the USSR in Europe
and Asia will try to strike into the rear of their oppressors, who began a criminal
war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries… already on the
second day of this war, some governments will not be in power who currently
reign with ‘God’s will’.”80 At the Congress in the spring of 1939, this optimism
disappeared, and a rebellion in the countries ruled by “bourgeois intervention-
ists” was not mentioned. Interestingly, Stalin enumerated seven bases of support
for the Soviet foreign policy in a speech in 1939. The workers of the world came
in second last, after the strength of the state, unity of the society, the strength of
the Red Army and the skillfulness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even this
mentioning seemed to have been formal, as Stalin did not mention the possibility
of a military rebellion. Instead, workers offered “moral support to workers of all
the countries interested in preserving peace.”81
After the 7th Comintern Congress (1935), the Cadres Department (OK) took
over the control of the Comintern’s military affairs.82 As well as the Department
for International Relations (OMS), the Comintern’s intelligence agency, the OK
was connected with various Soviet special services. OMS also had conspirato-
rial schools for signalers, which were different from diversionary schools which
were run by the Organizational Department and the Cadres Department.83 How-
ever, OMS and OK were controlled by the NKVD. In this way, the important
changes occurred in Comintern, as well as in the way the USSR controlled for-
79
I. Stalin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1–13, (Moscow — OGIZ — Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo
politicheskoi literatury, 1946–1951); vol. 14–16, (Moscow: Pisatel’, 1997); vol. 17–18 (Tver’, Sever-
naia korona-Soiuz, 2004–2006)
80
I. Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVII s’ezdu partii,” in ibid. tt. 13. Published for the first time in Pravda on
January 28, 1934.
81
I. Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVIII s’ezdu partii o rabote TsK VKP (b)” in ibid., tt. 14. Published for the
first time in Pravda on March 11, 1939.
82
G. M. Adibekov, E. N. Shakhnazarova and K. K. Shirinia, Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna.
1919–1943 ( Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 194–195.
83
eign communist parties. The Spanish Civil War was the first practical test for
Comintern’s partisans, and it also offered an opportunity to test the willingness
of the working masses for revolution. Even the cadres which were not seriously
prepared for military action were sent to Spain. The bloody misfortune of the
Spanish people was used to test new military technology, as well as the useful-
ness of partisan tactics.
Education and preparation

of the Yugoslav partisan cadres
before the Second World War
Cadres from all the communist parties underwent training for the partisan
warfare, and so was the case with KPJ. This type of training was more secre-
tive than general-theoretical courses, and therefore, it was less mentioned in
published memoirs. The USSR and foreign communists agreed on this point.
The former wanted to conceal the preparations for subversion as well as the
hypocrisy of their policies; the Foreign Ministry preached peaceful coexistence
while the Comintern trained the military-partisan cadres of every important
party in the Comintern. The latter wanted to avoid the label of being foreign
mercenaries, which was a powerful propaganda line by the communists’ oppo-
nents. After the Second World War, the topic of partisan training became even
more sensitive. In countries in which the rebellion “succeeded” and in which
the communists participated in the resistance movement to various degree (Chi-
na, USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Slovakia, France, Italy), communists tended to
view the rebellion as an expression of the spontaneous support of the masses for
the communist ideology, while neglecting other factors. In countries in which
Comintern judged that the rebellion would lead to senseless destruction of the
party and where the trained cadres were used for military-intelligence purposes
(Germany, Austria, Hungary), the work of the graduates of special schools had
anti-state connotations, which communists tried to hide behind the mask of
“spontaneity” and “people’s dissatisfaction.” After 1948, the Yugoslav leaders
began to insist on the absolutely independent origins of their Partisan movement
and they did not have any reason to bring into the picture facts which countered
this assertion.
Nonetheless, evidence of the Comintern’s involvement in preparing KPJ for
the Partisan warfare can be found in autobiographies written for the IKKI internal
Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War 165
purposes and the Comintern documents accessible to researchers 84 We will try to

put the pieces together of this exceptionally fragmented mosaic.
Mustafa Golubić’s autobiography, written on January, 31, 1933, for the Com-
intern, is one of the earliest sources which mention the participation of Yugoslavs
in the Comintern schools. According to Golubić, in January, 1930, the party sent
him to Moscow to a special school, where he studied for four months, after which
he was hired by the Comintern to work in its apparatus.85 In his characteristics
written by an OK IKKI agent on February, 10, 1941, it is stated that Golubić com-
pleted a four-month course in MLSh.86 He had rich experience even before his
specialization in the USSR.87 After he completed the IKKI school, he was used for
tasks requiring expertise. For instance, in 1934, he was sent to Germany with the
aim of reorganizing the Central Military Organization of German Communists
and their intelligence agency (Nachrichten dienst).88 In memoirs written later on,
Vlajko Bogović described the life of a KUNMZ student. “It was not difficult for
us to study day and night. We competed in studying and our Yugoslav group was
frequently among the first at the University. For this, it was necessary not only to
work, but also to help those who were falling behind. We learned military science,
war techniques and achieved great results in firing from rifles, automatic rifles and
machine guns. We went on lengthy night marches with military equipment and
masks covering our faces, sometimes in temperature of minus twenty degrees. We
spent nights clearing the snow from railroad tracks, went to kolkhozes to convince
the disinterested peasants to sow the earth on time, and we helped them to do this.
We did a lot of other things; but nothing was too difficult for us.”89
Josip Kopinič studied at KUNMZ, and after it was shut down, he was sent to
MLSh until 1936. He recorded this in the biographical section of his report to the
Comintern about his participation in the Spanish Civil War, written on November
28, 1938. Kopinič’s report is interesting because it reveals what he was taught in
84
The Comintern archive is kept at RGASPI. However, a significant part of documents relating to the
Comintern’s intelligence agency are missing (or they are inaccessible to researchers), as well as com-
munication between the Comintern and the Soviet military and police intelligence services. According
to the leading Russian biographer of Tito, N. V. Bondarev, some important documents are held at a depo
in the city of Yokshar-Ola.
85
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804, 37.
86
Ibid., 45.
87
Nonetheless, M. Golubić began to cooperate with the Russian military intelligence during the First
World War. He was part of the Serbian Royal Mission in 1915 which pleaded with the Russian military
authorities to allow them to recruit volunteers from the Russian prisoner of war camps in Central Asia.
There were not many volunteers — 321 soldiers in total from two prisoner of war camps. O. P. Nad-
tochii, “Iugoslavskie voennoplennye v Turkestane (1914–1917),” in Voprosy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi
istorii dorevoliutsionnogo Turkestana: Sbornik nauchykh trudov Tashkentskogo gosudarstvennogo uni-
versiteta im. V. I. Lenina, ed. G. A. Khidoiatov (Tashkent: TashGU, 1985), 64–80.
88
89
AJ, f. MG, d. 2047 / 2, 25–26.
MLSh, and how he utilized this knowledge in practice. Upon his arrival in Spain,
Kopinič was assigned a task based on his military expertise. He was allowed to
choose between joining the navy (he was educated in the Yugoslav Royal Navy) or
to become an infantry commander. However, from his report, it becomes obvious
that the education which Kopinič obtained in Comintern did not fit with the role
of a classical infantry commander. He was sent to organize a partisan detachment
with the help of colleagues from the Comintern, under the leadership of Comrade
Kurta, “a specialist for partisans, explosives and military affairs.” His narrow
specialization in organizing partisan detachments and engaging in diversionary
activities in the enemy’s rear becomes obvious from further reading of the report.
Kopinič did not even consider the possibility that he could join “the permanent
frontline where the police and soldier detachments could be found.” Since par-
tisan operations were impossible in Estremadura, he was consequently forced to
ask to be relocated elsewhere. He was sent to Mengibar, where was also unable to
organize partisan detachments. Thus, he became a military instructor (teaching
military tactics, the handling of weapons and other military skills). Kopinič and
another colleague from the Comintern also worked as military-security investi-
gators. They “questioned refugees and peasants from the fascist-held territories
about the enemy positions, strength, and so on.” At the same time, Kopinič partici-
pated in organization of nighttime attacks behind the enemy’s frontline, with the
aim of destroying railroad stations and bridges. These operations were not com-
pletely successful because Spaniards refused to approve his plans. Afterwards,
people from Kurtov’s group (Kopinič among them) were transferred to special
units of foreigners, each consisting of twenty-five people. The units engaged in
diversionary actions against the railroads to stop the fascist offensive on Madrid.
Within this group Kopinič was also responsible for training the soldiers and he
participated in nighttime attacks on the most sensitive locations. Later on, he or-
ganized peasants into armed and diversionary groups, and with help of the former,
he organized the defense of specific places. With the help of the latter, he tried to
organize diversionary attacks in the enemy’s rear. Simultaneously, he was busy
arresting and neutralizing “Trotskyite and fascist agents” among officers subordi-
nated to him. In lectures with the younger generation of diversionary-partisans he
mostly dealt with the subject of mining railroads to derail the trains. Only after all
of these activities, Kopinič was transferred to navy.90
Numerous Yugoslav communists were trained in the Comintern’s schools in
the USSR (which meant that they were also trained in the skills relating to parti-
san warfare). We will only mention the more prominent organizers of the partisan
warfare. Rodoljub Čokalović left the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the USSR in
90
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 67–79.
1933, where he graduated from MLSh. After, Čokalović worked in the Comin-
tern apparatus, and in 1936 he was sent abroad for conspiratorial work and as
many other future partisan leaders he participated in the Spanish Civil War. Ivan
Gošnjak also graduated from MLSh. After this, he received additional military
training, and then he was transferred to Spain. Milan Blagojević was educated in
the USSR 1935–1936, and he eventually became the first Commander of the First
Šumadija Partisan Detachment. Edvard Kardelj was educated at MLSh in 1935–
1936 (and later on he worked in MLSh and KUNMY as an instructor), and he be-
came the organizer of Partisan detachments in Slovenia. Ivan Lavčević-Lučić was
educated at KUNMY, and in April, 1941, he was appointed head of the Military
Commission of the Communist Party of Croatia. Aleš Bebler also studied in the
USSR. He was the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Partisan Detachments
in the initial phases of the uprising, and an author of a series of instructions for
partisan warfare. Svetislav Stefanović Đeđa studied at KUNMY 1930–1933. In
1941 worked as an instructor for the Communist Party of Serbia and organized the
Partisan Detachments in Šumadija.91
As was already mentioned, after completion of their studies, good stu-
dents participated in the process of training the next generation of students.
Božidar Maslarić also had something to say about the “technological school
of the Comintern.” 92 Already as a student and a teacher at KUNMZ, Maslarić
attended a six-month “technical international Comintern school” with a larger
group of communists from Germany. His main motive for transferring was fi-
nancial — he was attracted by a stipend of thirty rubles. At the time, thirty
rubles was a relatively small amount of money to change professional profile
and future destiny. As a result, it can be guessed that he did not wish to openly
talk about the details “of the technical school.” Later on, Maslarić was a teacher
in the technical school, but he emphasized “order and unity” (that is, the lack
of fractional fighting) which were present amongst his students. Maslarić does
not mention any “specialized subjects” which were, as we have seen from the
above mentioned sources, obviously present in Comintern schools, MLSh and
KUMNY. After the Civil War began, the Comintern sent Maslarić to Spain. In
his description of his activities in Spain, Maslarić also tried to minimize his
“military-political” contributions. However, according to Kopinič (who wrote
the report for Comintern) and Vlahović, the partisans definitely did not fit into
the category of ordinary fighters. Later on, Maslarić said more accurately that
91
Vojna enciklopedija, tt. 1–10, 2. izd., (Belgrade: Redakcija Vojne enciklopedije 1970–1978); Leksikon
narodnooslobodilačkog rata i revolucije u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1980);
Narodni heroji Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1982–1983).
92
Even though he published his memoirs, (B. Maslarić, Moscow — Madrid — Moscow (Zagreb: Prosv-
jeta, 1952) the archive of the so called technical school has more interesting information, see AJ, f. MG,
d. 1489 / 4.
the time which he spent with partisans in Spain was connected with the work of
special diversionary group which tried to prevent Franco’s offensive on Madrid
by wreaking havoc behind the fascists’ frontlines. Maslarić was transferred to a
commanding position in an international unit after he was wounded.93 Blagoje
Parović was educated at KUNMZ, and he also taught there. He was killed as a
political commissar of The International Brigade. Karlo Mrazović (1902–1987),
responsible for control of the Yugoslav students at KUNMZ, discussed the se-
lection of cadres who were undergoing training in Moscow. According to him,
there was a “secret department,” which was controlled by the GPU, which had a
strictly guarded index of students, their biographies, information from the ques-
tionnaires, and photographs. Except KUNMZ and the graduate school, Mrazović
also completed The Military Academy and had the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel
in the USSR.94 Evidently, Mrazović’s reminiscences which were written in 1960
were cautious and coordinated with the official Yugoslav line.95
Periša Kostić offered the most precise information about his education in
the USSR. He completed a special NKVD school, which was certainly differ-
ent from the Comintern’s educational system, since it specialized in educating
security agents. Nonetheless, he was used to prepare future flag-bearers of com-
munism in the Balkans. Kostić was educated in a “special NKVD school on the
Albanian Square” in Moscow (he probably had in mind the Arbat Square in cen-
tral Moscow) for twenty four months (1934–1936). According to his memories,
Kostić had twenty one subjects, out of which he remembered military training,
shooting, physical education and Jiu Jitsu, radio-telegraphs, mathematics, to-
pography, motors, aerodynamics, ciphering and diversion.96 “Special attention
was paid to diversions, types of explosives, how to handle explosive devices,
different type of mines…” During those years, there were five to six Yugoslavs
with Kostić.97
93
AJ, f. MG, d. 1489 / 4, 1–5.
94
AJ, f. MG, d. 2020, 1–3.
95
Mrazović’s admission that he supposedly received the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel after the completion
of the academy but before his departure for Spain is significant. Mainly, a foreigner could have obtained
this rank in the USSR in the 1930s only in the NKVD or RU RKKA. Even more interesting is the
fact that the rank of lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent the senior battalion commissar did not appear
in the Soviet military system until September 1, 1939, according to the Law on the General military
Obligation. Evidently, these ranks were being assigned when the Spanish Civil War was already over.
Mrazović was already in Yugoslavia illegally, where he was arrested at the end of 1939 and held in jail
in Lepoglav. In the system of security structures, the rank lieutenant-colonel appeared even later, by a
special order which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR signed on February 9, 1943.
96
Kostić probably confused Jiu Jitsu with Sambo, the Russian martial art (abbreviations for Self-Defense
without Weapons), V. P. Volkov, Kurs samozashchity bez oruzhiia „Sambo“. Uchebnoe posobie dlia
shkol NKVD (Moscow: Izdanie shkol’no-kursovogo otdeleniia otdela kadrov NKVD SSSR, 1940).
97
M. Kovačević, Ispovest Periše Kostića, majora NKVD iz Župe Nikšićke (Belgrade: P. Kostić, 2004),
93.
It must not be forgotten that Josip Broz Tito himself was educated in a techni-
cal school and that he himself taught there.98 Tito’s personal dossier held in the
Central Party Archive of the Communist Party of the USSR testifies to this fact.99
His official biographer, V. Dedijer, cites that Tito claimed that he read books inde-
pendently in Moscow. “I paid most attention to studying economy and philosophy.
I also read extensively the military literature, reading above all Frunze… and then
especially German classics Clausewitz and others. In this way during my stay
in Moscow I greatly expanded my knowledge about military problems.” Dedijer
admitted that Tito delivered lectures at the International Lenin School and at the
Communist University of National Minorities of the West, but only to Yugoslav
groups at the rate of twenty rubles per hour.100 Records of Tito’s education and
lectures in the USSR in his Comintern dossier are fragmented.101 Nonetheless,
there are several traces of information about the future Yugoslav leader’s educa-
tion in the USSR.
There is an indication that Tito could have completed a course on conspiracy
in Moscow. He wrote a poem on the backside of a paper which discussed how
to create ink for a hectograph, which he left amongst his personal belonging in
the USSR.102 German language was used in the Comintern’s military-techni-
cal schools, and the recipe for hectograph ink most likely originated from the
course on the party technique, which dealt with the question of illegal printing
presses. A document from the OK testifies that Josip Broz was an instructor.
KPJ representatives to the Comintern, Vladimir Ćopić under the pseudonym
Senjko (1891–1939) and Ivan Kariavanov who headed the cadre questions of the
98
P. Simić, Tito agent Kominterne (Belgrade: ABC Product, 1990); N. V. Bondarev, Zagadka Tito. Mosk-
ovskie gody Iosipa Broza (1935–1937 gg.) (Moscow: FIV-RISI, 2012); E. V. Matonin, Iosip Broz Tito
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2012).
99
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21. Part of the documents which deal with the prewar period do not have
page numbers and they are not chronologically arranged.
100
V. Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, prilozi za biografiju (Belgrade: Kultura, 1953), 237.
101
By comparing Tito’s dossier with the similar dossiers from opis 277 (the Comintern agents in Yugo-
slavia), we can conclude that Tito had at least one more dossier. This guess is based on the fact that
Tito’s dossier in RGASPI does not contain any original documents about him from the war and postwar
periods. Also, there is a relatively large quantity of archival copies from the postwar period, which also
indicates that there is another dossier to his name. Likely, the FSB Archive or the Presidential Archive,
which are reluctant to grant access to scholars, has this dossier which one day will throw light on Tito’s
personality.
102
Hectograph — machine for reproduction of various types of texts (printed, drawn, written) on a gelatin
bar. It was invented in 1869 by a Russian chemist M. I. Alisov. Due to its simplicity the hectograph
became a popular tool in Czarist Russia for the opposition, and after 1917, for those who opposed
the communist dictatorship. As a result, from 1922 until the collapse of the USSR, unlicensed use of
hectograph was banned. In the atmosphere of fear and seclusion which reigned amongst the Comintern
employees in Moscow in the 1930s, a private exchange of opinions on this topic seems unlikely. Even
though in the early 20th Century the hectograph was widely used in numerous European countries, the
recipe for hectograph ink could not have been a topic of private communication in the USSR and it is
almost impossible that any of the foreign communists would have carried the recipe around.
Balkan Secretariat, wrote a recommendation on Tito’s behalf on May 21, 1935,

which claimed that “Comrade Friedrich Walter deserves trust to perform educa-
tional tasks.” Apart from these archival documents, a series of memoirs mention
these events. Jasper Ridley, one of Tito’s biographers, cites that Tito attended
lectures on military tactics in a Red Army school. His source was an interview
with M. Buber-Neumann, who was active in the IKKI in Moscow, 1935–1936.103
Starinov, an instructor in pre-war special schools and from June, 1944, the Chief
of Staff of the Soviet Military Mission in Yugoslavia, agreed with this claim.
He had several contacts with Tito and until the end of his life (interviews in
1997–1999) he had an exceptionally positive opinion and respect for the Partisan
leader. Starinov claimed that “Tito had a solid partisan training.”104 Kopinič also
recalled that Tito taught some courses in Moscow.105 In the already mentioned
book, Vladimir Piatnitskii wrote: “some lectures in military-political school
were held with the assistance of translators. Two to three months passed, and
he was already unnecessary… lectures were delivered by… Togliatti, Gekert,
Knorin, Manuil’skii and Tito…”106 The present-day leading Tito’s biographers,
P. Simić and N. Bondarev, believe that it is very likely that Tito received spe-
cial training and that he participated military-political lectures in Comintern
schools.
Considering that Tito’s Comintern dossier does not have any direct informa-
tion about his education in these institutions, we should be careful in making
any firm conclusions. At the same time, if the indirect information from memoirs
written by Piatnitskii, Buber-Neumann and Starinov) are correct, then the lack
of information about Tito’s education in the Comintern schools in his Comintern
dossier can mean only one thing — Tito completed his studies in educational insti-
tutions belonging to other institutions (NKVD or RU RKKA) who did not inform
the Comintern about their cadre decisions.107
As was already said, the Spanish Civil War was exceptionally important in
maturing of the Comintern’s partisan cadres. The older students who attended
Comintern’s schools had an opportunity to prove their knowledge in practice,
while the younger generation of fighters had an excellent opportunity to test their
knowledge in battle conditions, instead of school desks. It must be pointed out
that some Comintern cadres did not appreciate their baptism by fire, even though
103
Dž. Ridli, Tito — Biografija (Novi Sad: Mir, Prometej, 1998).
104
Starinov, Miny.
105
V. Cenčić, Enigma Kopinič (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), 44–46.
106
107
In this context, R. Zorgea’s case is illustrative. He worked for RU RKKA for many years, while IKKI
viewed him as an ordinary, almost useless German communist until his arrest. N. S. Lebedeva and
M. M. Narinskii, eds., Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Sbornik dokumentov Chast II (Moscow:
RAN IVI, FAS RF, RTsKhIDNI, 1994), 17.
the Civil War in Spain was the last step in the prewar preparation of the partisan
cadres. The Yugoslav cadres were present in school desks of partisan academies
until the very end of their existence, that is, until the Spanish Civil War began.
The KPJ students were present in the last year that the partisan academies oper-
ated in the USSR in 1936–1937.108 As NKVD hunted down “the participants of
the military-terrorist conspiracies,” the Soviet instructors could prepare the new
partisan cadres only in Spain.
According to Mrazović, responsible for the Yugoslav cadres, the number
of Yugoslavs in the international brigades in Spain was exceptionally high. He
claimed that the Yugoslavs were the second (after the French) most numerous
nationality amongst the volunteers. There were 1, 200–1, 300 Yugoslavs in the
volunteer brigades, most of whom where Slovenians and Croats, even though all
Yugoslav nations had their own representatives. Even though only half of the Yu-
goslavs survived the Spanish war, according to Mrazović, six hundred qualified
and ready fighters was an exceptionally high number.109 V. Vlahović’s data con-
curs with this number.110
Ivan Gošnjak, the future commander of Croatia’s General Staff, provided the
most detailed description in his memoirs of the preparation which the Comint-
ern cadres underwent before their departure for Spain.111 Gošnjak was in the So-
viet Union attending a course in a party school at the beginning of the Spanish
Civil War. He wrote: “in the party school in Moscow we studied many military
subjects such as: tactics, topography, infantry weaponry; we fired from rifles
and guns. In addition to all of this, we went camping for three weeks where we
studied partisan and street battles.”112 During 1936, out of twenty-five Yugoslavs
in Gošnjak’s group, “only” three people went to Spain: the head of the group
B. Maslarić and two students. In the autumn of 1936, it was time for the rest of
the group to depart.
At the end of 1936, the Comintern’s Department of Cadres (the Comintern’s
internal security service which worked closely with other Soviet intelligence agen-
cies — NKVD and RU RKKA), invited Gošnjak to visit them. Gošnjak wrote: “I
was greeted by a comrade, I don’t know who he was, or his nationality. He posed
several general questions to me… he asked me whether I would be ready to prove
my beliefs in practice. After I gave him a positive reply, he asked me whether I
would be ready to go to China. This question surprised me, but I gave him a posi-
108
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 20, d. 848, 2–3.
109
AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5.
110
AJ, f. 512, d. II / 2–87, 13.
111
I. Gošnjak, “Iz Sovjetskog Saveza u Republikansku Španiju,” Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja,
302–303.
112
Ibid. 303.
tive answer.”113 Majority of his comrades from school were also called into the
Department for Cadres. They were asked the same questions, except that some of
them were asked about going to Spain. Gošnjak pointed out that nobody from the
party leadership knew about the conversation.
In early January, 1937, Gošnjak and his school comrades were signed out of
the Lenin School in Moscow and were sent to Ryazan. The future Red Command-
ers were placed in barracks, they were given Soviet army uniforms and they were
told that they were about to attend a military course before being sent to Spain.114
Gošnjak said: “the conspiracy was huge. We could not leave the barracks indi-
vidually. We did not even get to keep the conspiratorial names which we used in
Moscow, instead, each one of us instead of a name received a number. I was num-
ber thirty-six.”115 At the end of the course, with a falsified Czechoslovak passport,
Gošnjak was sent to Spain with his friends.
The story of their departure from the USSR must be complemented with how
they arrived to Spain, which was described by Božidar Maslarić.116 Immediately
after their arrival to Madrid, Maslarić went to the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of Spain. The cannon fire was firing over the city, while in some
parts rifle shots could be heard, but there were many communist flags. Jose Dias
and Pasionaria at first began to question “how their struggle was viewed in Mos-
cow, what were the political news, who is on the way to Spain from Moscow, and
finally, what are Maslarić’s war skills and his military education“?117
After a lunch and a conversation, they sent Maslarić to the 5th Regiment’s
Headquarters. There, he encountered a conference. The topic of discussion was
the defense of Madrid. General Kleber, an Austrian advisor to the 5th Regiment,
was delivering a speech in front of a military map. Lister, the Commander of the
5th Regiment, Karlos, the political commissar of the unit, and other commanders
of the unit were present at the conference. They spoke English, but it was trans-
lated to Spanish. Kleber was explaining the situation and offered his advice on
what needed to be done. The following quote captured the level of the Comintern’s
and Moscow’s involvement in these events: “They spoke English slowly. Vidya-
laya translated to Spanish, while we were winking at each other. I was irritated by
this. I was turning in my chair and thinking that by working like this, so slowly,
every battle must be lost. I almost shouted…: ‘why don’t you speak Russian, when
113
Ibid., 302.
114
The base in Riazan’ where Gošnjak and his comrades were trained was part of the Riazan’s Infantry
Academy, an elite school for infantry officers. Later on, Riazan’s Higher Academy for Officers of the
Airborn Troops was formed on its bases. This Academy is somewhat analogous to the famous American
Fort Bragg.
115
Gošnjak, “Iz Sovjetskog Saveza…“303.
116
Maslarić, “U zemlji borbe” in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja, 11–12.
117
Ibid., 11.
more than fifty percent of participants of this conference know that language be-
cause most of them were in the Soviet Union?” Kaiser explained to me after the
conference that a directive from Moscow urged them not to speak Russian, so as
to conceal Moscow’s meddling in Spanish internal affairs”.118
The importance of the military school for the Comintern’s Yugoslav graduates
is difficult to overestimate. Mrazović, in charge of Yugoslavs who were educated
in the USSR, wrote: “A large number of these people completed political schools
in the USSR, and also through military schools they obtained higher military
education. The majority had higher officer ranks… the fact was that the schooling
of these people cost Comintern millions… the Spanish volunteers became sworn
enemies of fascism through the battles and everything which they survived…
they gained military experience, which they transferred to their countries. The
Yugoslav Spanish volunteers during the National Liberation War and the Revolu-
tion were the political and military cadre of their party and the people.”119 Even
young generation of the Yugoslav Partisan agreed with this view. According to
Vlahović, the Civil War in Spain “was an inexhaustible source of the open beauty
of the battle.”120
There is no doubt that the organization of the partisan war in Spain had its
drawbacks and mistakes (the best proof of this is the fact that the war was lost).
After the Cominform Resolution, the Yugoslav Spaniards criticized in their mem-
oirs the Comintern and the USSR for the way in which they organized the partisan
war in Spain, as well as for irrational use of military specialists ready for organi-
zation of the partisan war.121 Kopinič’s detailed report about the war was different,
and perhaps more realistic.122 He cited a series of factors which hindered the com-
plete realization of plans for the partisan warfare behind Franco’s units: poor orga-
nization as a result of the multi-party system in which each party pushed its own
military line and lack of trust by the Spanish commanders.123 The most important,
however, was the resistance of local fighters towards the newcomers. According
to Kopinič, the local commanders “did not have the slightest wish to counter the
wishes of their fighters, because as they told us, if we attack the enemy, he will
attack us, and it’s more peaceful without that. They viewed us from this point of
view — a group of foreigners — who are supposedly leading an action and in this
way disturb the ‘peace’.” I. G. Starinov mostly agreed with Kopinič, recollecting
118
Ibid,, 12.
119
AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5–6.
120
АЈ, f. 512, d. II / 2–70, 3.
121
AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5; АЈ, f. 512‑LFVV, d. II / 2–51, 1–4.
122
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 69.
123
The officer corps was typically skeptical towards the usefulness of the diversionary tactics before the
Second World War.
that he was prevented from engaging in diversionary actions because of the fear
of causing civilian casualties and bad publicity.124
The revolutionary cadres from various communist parties obtained practical
experience which none of the training in the Soviet Union could offer. The whis-
tling of enemy bullets, wounds and sudden death of close friends were a painful
but important experience for the future leaders of the Yugoslav Partisan forma-
tions.125 There was another important, but less visible, side to this war — the
Soviet instructors were active in Spain in providing special training to partisans.
Vlahović discussed Braco Vice in this context. Vice was a student before the Civil
War, and he was a machine gunner in Spain, and after “Braco…was in a partisan
brigade. This was actually a detachment for diversionary actions, which crossed
the enemy line twice a month, with special tasks, and after fulfilling its task it
would return back to the base.”126 In order to organize a new government, the
republicans needed a security service. Vlahović worked for a time (unsuccess-
fully) as an investigator in the counter-intelligence agency of the International
Brigades (Servicio de Investigacion Militar). Unlike the specialists in diversion-
ary acts, who had to learn to work with explosives and to obtain other similar
skills, members of the security institutions had to learn investigative work, they
had to become masters of conspiracy and they had to be unquestioningly obedient
towards the higher authorities. Apart from investigative functions (uncovering
conspiracies and unmasking the enemy agents), the new security cadres had to
learn other specific skills. According to Vlahović, the higher authorities decided
how to deal with the arrested enemy agents. As for them, he said: “who the higher
authorities were and where they were located, I didn’t know and it didn’t interest
me.”127 This blind obedience was unrivaled, even for the NKVD investigators who
had to know from where they took orders.
The Yugoslav participants of the Spanish Civil War did not discuss in their
memoirs the role of the Soviet military-technical instructors who taught the tactics
of the partisan and diversionary warfare to selected members of the International
Brigades. We already mentioned Vaupshasov who together with his friends from
Belorussia became an “advisor for organizing special units.”128 One of these in-
structors for diversionary actions — I. Starinov- wrote about this work in greater
detail. Starinov’s immediate chief was Ian Berzin (1889–1938) who was in charge
of RU RKKA from 1924 to 1935.129 He was basically the founder of the Soviet
124
Starinov, Zapiski diversanta.
125
АЈ, f. 512‑LFVV, d. II / 2–51, 1.
126
Ibid.,, 1.
127
АЈ, f. 512‑LFVV, d. 2 / 48, 1.
128
Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh, chapter “Partizanskii korpus”.
129
military-security service, and from 1936 he was the main military advisor to the
Republican Spanish Army.130 Berzin personally chose Starinov’s task — “to train
cadres in the techniques of diversion and tactics of partisan warfare.”131
A leading RKKA specialist in these areas, Starinov tended to share his knowl-
edge with his students in field conditions without the support of special laborato-
ry.132 Starinov was not only an instructor. He often personally led the international
diversionary-partisan units in action. He and his group successfully targeted Gre-
nada’s hydroelectric plant, numerous bridges, important, strategic railroads and
trains loaded with soldiers, munitions and supplies.
With the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain,
the preparations went by quickly. The first school was set up in Valencia’s suburbs.
The first group of twelve young students was headed by Captain Domingo Ungri-
ja.133 Later on, Starinov’s unit was transferred to Albacete, where Spaniards were
reinforced with the fighters from International Brigades. Starinov recollected that
at first two Yugoslavs appeared — Ivan Hariš and Ivan Karbovanc.134 Ivan Hariš
was stocky, while Ivan Karbovanc was thin and tall. Their friends called them jok-
ingly Pat and Patachon. Later on, in Domingo’s Detachment they received nick-
names Huan the Small and Huan the Great. Both of them were sailors, and they
knew English, French, Spanish and Russian, while Ivan Grande also knew Italian.
Starinov described Hariš as a quiet, reliable and good student, as well as a depend-
able friend and a bold fighter.135 In one mission, a group of fighters under Hariš’s
command succeeded in destroying a group of enemy troops sixty kilometers be-
hind the frontlines. Starinov also mentioned Ljuba Ilić, another famous Yugoslav
in the Diversionary Battalion, who reached the position of the unit’s Chief of Staff.
He left the Diversionary Battalion only after he was wounded. Starinov talked
130
O. A. Gorchakov, Ian Berzin — komandarm GRU (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2004).
131
132
Starinov prepared the TNT from the mines made for seas, and he turned the cheap wrist watches into
ticking lighters. For production of improvised ticking lighters he used potatoes, apples, and in Spain, or-
anges. The ticking lighter was ignited by a rotting fruit when it would completely dry up. For these im-
provised ticking lighters, Starinov suggested that any natural ingredients could be used: sugar, drought,
bad weather, even mice. In this way, the ticking could be set from few minutes up to one year. Again,
as in the courses in the USSR, Starinov explained how to produce homemade bombs and mines from
melted explosives or pieces of water pipes filled with nails and barb wire. Against the cars on the roads,
he used improvised bombs and ordinary mechanical traps made from several pieces of metal wire
which would blow up the car tires, Starinov, Zapiski diversanta, chapter “My — internatsionalisty.”
133
O. Gorchakov, “Ian Berzin, on zhe general Grishin. Sud’ba komandarma nevidimogo fronta,” Novaia i
Noveishaia istoriia 2 (1989): 131–159.
134
It was not clear to them why Starinov used another name. Ivan Hariš said that he reached Starinov
with Filip Vodopija, who according to the Society of Spanish Fighters, died on September 20, 1939,
at Levant Front, I. Hariš, Diverzant (Zagreb: n. p., 2007), 33; I. Hariš, Dnevnik diverzantskih akcija u
Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Spektar, 1977), 7–8.
135
Starinov had a high opinion of Hariš and recorded exceptionally positive remarks about him, RGVA,
lichnyi fond I. G. Starinova.
about Ilić with unconcealed sorrow, as he described the heroic way in which he
held himself after he was wounded in an explosion. Starinov’s unit, in addition to
the Yugoslavs, also had fighters from Germany, Austria, France, Finland, Italy,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, USA and Bulgaria.
The Soviet instructors used the reproductive principal in Spain, so that sev-
eral Yugoslavs not only mastered the skills in partisan-diversionary tactics, but
became instructors as well. Hariš was one of these Yugoslavs, and he wrote about
this in his memoirs. “I learned the practical school of diversionary warfare in
Spain, in the Civil War. While in guerilla units, I received training in a special
course in diversion-skills offered by the Soviet instructors. I successfully com-
pleted the course in diversionary-skill in a fortress in Figueres and after a two-
month training I was sent to train Spaniards and members of the International
Brigades in diversionary tactics. I held several such courses, and then together
with other diversionary-partisans I crossed the frontline with the task of destroy-
ing communications, electric power plants, transmission lines, factories and other
objects in Franco’s rear… in the Civil War, I went all over Spain destroying fascist
communications.136
P. Kostić also wrote in his memoirs about his work as an instructor. Immedi-
ately after completing the NKVD school in Moscow, Kostić was given an oppor-
tunity to use his knowledge in Spain. “Then, I was transferred to a military school
in Pozerubio which was attended by proven fighters. They have shown heroism,
special dedication and responsibility in battles. They deserved to be promoted,
but they needed to go through expert military training. In the school, there were
members of International Brigades from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and other
countries. From ours [the Yugoslavs — A. F.], Ćićko Pavlović taught political les-
sons, Božidar Maslarić, whom I knew from Beli Manastir, and me were respon-
sible to train the students in diversionary actions. In school I ran again into Špiro
Vidović, and I met Ilija Hariš Gramovnik with whom I became close…In school in
Pozerubio and outside I quickly encountered many Yugoslavs. Apart from Andrija
Milić, Špiro Vujović and Ćićko Pavlović, I met Veljko Vlahović and others from
that group of students, fourteen of them. This was already in 1937. I also ran into
Kosta Nadj, noncommissioned officer in the Yugoslav Royal Army, who was a
commander on the Madrid Front and had his own unit. There were many Monte-
negrins. I remember Vesa Brajević, a student Kovačević, who was not from Gra-
hovo and was not related to Sava Kovačević, but he was from Durmitor. But there
were Kovačevićs from Danilovgrad, all students. Luka Vujačić from Grahovo was
in Spain…I met Danilo Lekić, I heard of Peko Dapčević but we did not meet him
in Spain. Amongst the Montenegrins there was Pero Dragišić. There were many
136
Hariš, Dnevnik, 7–8.
people from Lika in the International Brigades. I will mention Marko Orešković
and Beriša Vukša. I met the majority of our countrymen in the military school in
Albacete. That was the case with some Dalmatians, one of which was Ivo, he lost
his eye in Spain. Otmar Kreačić was in the school.”137
The considerably expanded unit trained by Starinov was transferred from Al-
bacete to Jaen, after which it undertook diversionary attacks near Cordoba and
Grenada. Later on, this unit was filled with international cadres until it became
a Diversionary Battalion. This unit became famous and it was visited and writ-
ten about by I. Erenburg, M. Kol’tsov and E. Hemmingway. “The creation of the
Battalion for special purposes posed a question — who are we? Previously, they
called us miners, and explosive command and partisans. Explosive commands and
miners set up explosives and mines usually on their own territory, for example,
during a withdrawal, and partisans must work behind the enemy line. We did not
fit any of these types. That is why they began to call us diversionists. Diversion-
ists must know how to set up explosives and mines undetected, and to withdraw
undetected, and if required, to stay on the enemy territory undetected as long as
was necessary. This was how the First Diversionary Battalion was born.” This
was not the only such unit, however. Starinov mentions a series of Vaupshasov’s
colleagues (M. K. Kochegarov, N. A. Prokopuk and A. K. Sprogis) as instructors
in other special partisan-diversionary units.138
The unit in which Starinov worked as an instructor grew from a Diversionary
Battalion into the famous XIV Partisan Corps, which had three thousand fight-
ers. Until Starinov’s departure from Spain at the end of 1937, the Corp managed
to carry out around two hundred actions, as a result of which the enemy lost two
thousand soldiers and noncommissioned officers. During this period, the unit lost
only fourteen fighters.
Starinov was not the only Soviet instructor who participated in the organiza-
tion of partisan detachments in Spain. At the time when Starinov was “an advisor
for diversion” in Domingo Ungrija’s unit, H. U. Mamsurov was the senior advi-
sor for intelligence matters from August, 1936 until October, 1937.139 G. Syroezh-
kin, L. P. Vasil’evskii, N. G. Kovalenko, S. A. Vaupshasov and others worked in
the XIV Partisan Corps as advisors.140 Apart from the school in Valencia where
I. G. Starinov worked, another school for preparation of partisan cadres existed
137
Kovačević, Ispovest, 106–107.
138
E. A. Parshina, Dinamit dlia sen’ority: Dokum. povest’ o A. K. Sprogise: Otr. iz isp. Dnevnika (Mos-
cow: Sov. pisatel’, 1989); Boiarskii, ed.,.Diversanty Zapadnogo fronta; L. K. Parshin, E. A. Parshina,
Razvedka bez mifov (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985).
139
A. Prasol, “Po kom zvonil kolokol,” Krasnaia zvezda, September 15, 1993; Boiarskii, ed.,.Diversanty
Zapadnogo fronta.
140
Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh, 207–208..
in Barcelona.141The Soviet instructor Zh. A. Ozol’ was the head of this school,
while A. F. Zvagin ran courses in explosives and diversionary tactics.142 After Sta-
rinov’s departure, the advisors in the Corps were N. K. Patrahal’tsev and later on
V. A. Troian; all three found themselves in the Balkans as advisors for diversionary
activities in Yugoslavia and Greece, 1944–1945.143 The last Soviet military advi-
sors for “special skills of partisan warfare” — H. U. Mamsurov, N. Patrahal’tsev,
N. I. Shchelokov and others — left Spain at the end of the war in a submarine.
Their experience was valued and used in the USSR, unlike numerous other Soviet
leaders in Spain whose lives ended in NKVD jails. Mamsurov became the head
of RU RKKA Diversionary Department “A,” Patrahal’tsev became his deputy,
and Shchelokov became senior advisor.144 Starinov was appointed the head of the
Central Scientific-Experimental Firing Range.145 Vaupshasov stayed in Spain until
the very fall of the Republic, maintaining relations with Domingo Hungría, the
commander of the XIV corps.146
Starinov highly valued his experience as an instructor in Spain. In his mem-
oires he wrote with pride that the Civil War in Spain was “the place of birth of the
modern diversionary- warfare.” Moreover, according to Starinov, the experiences
in diversionary warfare by fighters of the XIV Corps greatly assisted them in
organizing the communist partisan detachments in France, Italy and Yugoslavia
during the Second World War. Some of the veterans continued with this work af-
ter the Second World War, so that four of them landed with Fidel Castro on Playa
Giron.
141
The precise geographical location of this school has not been determined. Ivan Hariš and Periša Kostić
provide the geographical location for two schools. The former obtained his first education in diversion-
ary tactics in the Fortress of Figueras. Afterward, he was assigned to Starinov’s unit. Kostić mentioned
another school Pozerubino, which he later referred to as the school in Albacete. Vaupshasov mentions
two other places, schools in Barcelona and Valencia. O. Gorchakov said that the Partisan schools ex-
isted in Valencia, Haen, Vilanueva-de-Cordava and another more mysterious school twenty kilometers
northwest of Barcelona. Gorchakov, Ian Berzin.
142
Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh, 168–169.
143
V. Troian, “Chetyrnadtsatyi spetsial’nyi,” in My — internatsionalisty. Vospominaniia sovetskikh
dobrovol’tsev — uchastnikov natsional’no-revoliutsionnoi voiny v Ispanii, comp. S. M. Aleksan-
drovskaia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986).
144
I. Shchelokov and S. Kozlov, “Moia istoriia: Diversantom on stal v Ispanii, “ Bratishka 1 (2006).
145
Starinov, Soldat stoletiia, 5.
146
Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh..
IV
The soviet role in the

serbian civil war
and in the liberation
of Yugoslavia from the
occupiers
The soviet role in the serbian
civil war and in the liberation of
Yugoslavia from the occupiers
The soviet role in the serbian civil war

and in the liberation of Yugoslavia
from the occupiers
Fighters from the International Brigades who remained in Spain until the end
of the Civil War did not turn out to be more fortunate than the Soviet instruc-
tors during the repressions of 1937–1938. The Yugoslav Spaniards were banned
from returning to Yugoslavia, and they ended in camps for interned persons in
France.1
Their return to Yugoslavia was very unusual. Vlada Popović2 and Ivan
Gošnjak3 left most detailed accounts of their return home. In the spring and in
the summer of 1941, the Yugoslav fighters legally (they declared themselves to
be remorseful Croats) and illegally (they escaped from the camp in France for
interned participants of the Spanish Civil War) went to Third Reich. There, they
found employment in numerous factories which were left without workers as a
result of the mobilization. With hard work they earned their temporary leaves
which allowed them to travel legally to occupied Yugoslavia. The Comintern’s in-
volvement was apparent through the Communist Party of France, which informed
the Yugoslav Spaniards that they needed to volunteer for labor in Germany. The
French Communists also helped hide and transfer the Yugoslavs who could not be
legally freed.
Second part of the operation included locating the Yugoslav “Spaniards”
spread out throughout Germany, organizing a network to assist them in linking
up with the communists in Ustaša Croatia or in parts of Slovenia integrated into
1
Autori delova knjige, in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja knj. 4, 7–281.
2
V. Popović, “Organizovanje povratka u zemlju naših drugova ‘Španaca’ iz Nemačke,” in ibid., 281–285.
3
Gošnjak I., “Od Vernea do oslobođene teritorije,” in ibid., 285–316.
182 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers
the Third Reich. The Gestapo had completely destroyed the network of the Com-
munist Party of Germany.4
According to the official version proffered by notable Yugoslav communist
Cvetko Većeslav known as Flores, they managed to escape from Germany in
June, 1941. Flores established contact with Popović, who passed on to Flores Tito’s
order that he should return to Germany, find the Yugoslav ‘Spaniards’ and inform
them about the need to return to their country. Flores was also ordered to assist
them in their return to Yugoslavia. KPJ prepared a center to help the ‘Spaniards’
to get to Yugoslavia, and in Zagreb KPJ had several places for accommodating the
communists.5 In his memoires, V. Popović wrote that Flores managed to “set up in
short period points in Dessau, Espenhain, Bitterfeld, Leipzig and Graz…he came
into contact with our comrades who worked in and around Leipzig and Berlin…
and he succeeded in getting around sixty of our comrades in smaller groups to the
border.”6 Some Yugoslav Spaniards managed to reach Yugoslavia on their own.
All of this occurred, as Popović pointed out, “without anybody’s aid.”7 In this way,
“Flores and other comrades realized the inadequacies of the police apparatus of
the fascist Germany.”8 Ivan Gošnjak reached Yugoslavia through similar chan-
nels, and also found this story unusual, noting in his memoirs that “it is hard to
say” how this adventure succeeded.9 Transferring to Yugoslavia and concealing
from Gestapo the mass of Yugoslavs would have been truly amazing were only
Flores and several of his colleagues from KPJ involved.10
The archives of the Soviet organizations which were apparently involved ac-
tively in this ‘wonder’ are still closed. Nonetheless, it is obvious that somebody
had to aid the Yugoslav communists to reach their homeland where the partisan
warfare was soon to break out.11 An indirect proof of this can be found in personal
4
R. Müller, Menschenfalle Moskau. Exil und stalinistische Verfolgung (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition,
2001); Jörn Schütrumpf and Ernst Thälmann, An Stalin. Briefe aus dem Zuchthaus 1939 bis 1941 (Ber-
lin, 1996); Eric D. Weitz, Creating German communism, 1890–1990. From popular protests to socialist
state (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);, D. E. Barclay, E. D. Weitz, eds., Between reform
and revolution. German socialism and communism from 1840 to 1990 (New York: Berghahn Books,
1998); A. Merson, Kommunistischer Widerstand in Nazideutschland (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag,
1999); H. Weber, A. Herbst, Deutsche Kommunisten: biographisches Handbuch 1918 bis 1945 (Berlin:
Karl Dietz Verlag, 2004).
5
Popović V., “Organizovanje povratka u zemlju naših drugova ‘Španaca’ iz Nemačke,” in Španija.
1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja knj. 4, 281–282.
6
Ibid., 282.
7
Ibid., 282.
8
Ibid., 283.
9
Gošnjak I., “Od Vernea do oslobođene teritorije,” in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja jugosloven-
skih dobrovoljaca u Španskom ratu, knj. 4, 294.
10
For example, in 1939 in Germany there were around 20,000, and in early 1943 186,533 workers!
Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak,” 249–251.
11
The USSR viewed Yugoslavia and the Balkans as fertile soil for spreading the flames of partisan war
in the enemy’s rear. The Soviet experts studied the history of partisan warfare in the Balkans. The
The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers 183
Comintern dossiers, especially in dossiers of numerous Yugoslav communists.12

Each dossier had several questionnaires which were added when Comintern mem-
ber was assigned an important task. The questionnaire included recommenda-
tions, characteristics, biography and assessments of how he or she completed the
task. During this period, questionnaires were added to the dossiers of many Yugo-
slav veterans of the Spanish Civil War, which stated that the questionnaires were
opened on the request of an external organization. In the Soviet Union in 1940–
1941 there were not too many organizations which could have requested from
Comintern to give them personal details of foreign communist partisan members
trained for the future partisan war. It is highly likely that this request was directly
connected with transferring ‘the Spaniards’ to Yugoslavia on the eve of the Parti-
san uprising, which KPJ could not have achieved alone as Yugoslav Communists
disingenuously claimed.
Around 250 Yugoslav Spaniards participated in the Partisan war in Yugosla-
via, and they were one of the most important factors in creation of the Partisan
movement. Every fourth Yugoslav who served in the Spanish Civil War was de-
clared to be a national hero. The ‘Spanish’ fighters were present in almost every
regional staff, in numerous command positions of the armies, corps and divi-
sions.13 It should be mentioned that not every ‘Spaniard’ had special training, but
amongst majority of them, that was the case.
The experience which these fighters obtained in Spain offered them great con-
fidence, which sometimes crossed into arrogance. From the outside, the ‘Span-
iards’ appeared to form a closed club, which invariably caused envy among those
without that experience: “with time, a cast was formed out of former fighters of the
International Brigades, with which the regular mortal could not compete. After
usurpation of the commanding positions, the ‘Spaniards’ did not allow comrades
who proved themselves during the National Liberation War to come close to them.
However, among them there were several leaders who did not have talent to truly
be leaders. Nonetheless, they not only fought for leading positions, in which they
were aided by the high command, but they also tended to push out anybody who
did not belong to this ‘elite’ — We are Spaniards! — and they begin to brag…
Numerous ‘Comrados’ (that’s how they called each other) were former first year,
at most second year, students, usually at the Faculty of Law, with all the short-
comings typical of students who did not graduate. Their transcripts said that they
barely passed the Roman Law. Knowing many of them well, I am convinced that
traces of these ideas have remained in the studies published before the Second World War broke out.
M. Rybakov, Praktika maloi voiny v okkupirovannoi Serbii (Moscow: Voennaia akademiia RKKA im
M. V. Frunze, 1936).
12
RGASPI, f. 495 Ispolkom Kominterna, o. 277 “Lichnye dela (Iugoslaviia).”
13
Vojna enciklopedija, t. 1–10; Leksikon knj. 1–2; Narodni heroji Jugoslavije 2 knj.
they departed for Spain not only because of ideas and politics, but also to ‘see the
world’, running away from the upcoming exams. One had to hear with how much
hatred they talked about communists who completed universities, and in this way
in their view they betrayed the great revolutionary movement! They humbly intro-
duced themselves as ‘professional revolutionaries’. Camrados- had complicated
nicknames with foreign origins. They talked in a mixed jargon of West European
languages amongst themselves, they sang incomprehensible songs, in general they
tried to play the role of people with dual nationality — half Yugoslavs, half Span-
iards. It was difficult and unpleasant to have them as subordinates. Their envy and
intrigue always surfaced. From top of the Partisan Olympus, ‘Spaniards’ came
to their aid, to defend their praetorian rights… [but there were — A. T.] fighters
from international brigades who did not speculate with their participation in the
anti-fascist war in Spain, and they were least concerned about their careers and
rewards…”14
These fighters from Spain were even influential in naming National Liberation
movement. According to Djilas, other names were used in the beginning. “The
term ‘guerilla’, ‘guerilla detachment’ and so on were introduced in Montenegro…
during the preparations for the uprising… the term ‘partisan’…was well known
from books about the Napoleonic invasions of Russia in 1812 and about the Rus-
sian Civil War 1918–1922. This term was known… because Radio Moscow al-
ready spread the news of partisan actions in the German rear and called upon the
oppressed nations to create partisan detachments. But in our language the word
partisan does not have meaning which it has in Russian… and it barely exists…
with meaning — ‘a supporter’, ‘a party member’. I was against accepting Rus-
sianism and I liked more the international appellation ‘guerilla’, even though it
was also not domesticated — our… appellations were either unacceptable or they
were already taken by other organizations opposed to us — for example Četnik,
Ustaša. Definitely, I was influenced in this by the volunteers from the Spanish
Civil War — concretely: Peko Dapčević. It is interesting that — independently
of us in Montenegro — our comrades in Croatia, Western Bosnia acted similarly,
probably also under the influence of volunteers from the Spanish Civil War…”
The Spaniards also introduced the special Partisan greeting with a fist.15
It is very difficult to precisely determine the role which the partisan training in
the USSR and Spain had on the Yugoslav communists’ success. Definitely, there
were more important factors such as local conditions and the Yugoslav commu-
nists’ talent for military affairs. The occupiers’ policies and the genocide commit-
ted by their Croatian allies certainly led to the growth of the Partisan movement
14
P. S. Popivoda, Partizani (Moscow: n. p., 2003), 141.
15
M. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990), 84–85, 104.
and its eventual superiority over its opponents. It is well known that the mass of
rank and file Partisans until 1943 were Bosnia’s and Croatia’s Serbs, exposed to
the terrible violence of the Ustaša regime.16 Indicative of this was one of Tito’s
first reports which reached Moscow on June 28, 1941. Even though Tito did not
abandon the traditional Comintern line about greater Serbian bourgeoisie, he also
did not overlook the Croats’ role in Yugoslavia’s destruction: “the fifth column
had its representatives in the most sensitive places. In departments which supplied
the army there were White Guards and Croats, who worked in such a way so as to
lead to break down of the supply system during the battles… the moral spirit of
the soldiers, especially the Serbs, was very high.”17 Probably for the first time, the
Comintern began saying positive things about the Serbs, instead of the Croats.18
The masterful KPJ policies which managed to attract the support of Yugoslav
nations engaged in a fraternal war around the idea of restoring a united federal
Yugoslavia and communist ideology, testified to talents and skills of Josip Broz
Tito and his collaborators.
Nonetheless, the role which the Soviet instructors played, who trained KPJ
cadres for partisan, military and diversionary warfare before the outbreak of the
war in the Balkans, was not unimportant. Even though some KPJ members who
visited the USSR 1929–1936 did not undergo military training, the number of
people who were taught military skills was considerable. Also, the very fact that
the USSR was the world leader in various subversive and diversionary technol-
ogies — such as parachute divisions, mass training of snipers, development of
methodology of the partisan warfare and creation of partisan schools — was also
of significance.19 As a result, the USSR became the center for development of
ideas about partisan warfare by foreigners who had an opportunity to participate
in work of its internal, security and Comintern structures.
16
J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks: war and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1975), 106. It is indicative that in his speech at the Second AVNOJ Session, the Croatian
communist Vladimir Bakarić said: “At the first assembly we were more representatives of the Ser-
bian resistance in Croatia than the representatives of NOP Croatia,” S. Nešović, AVNOJ i revolucija:
tematska zbirka dokumenata: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1983), 281.
17
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 11, d. 371, 44.
18
The fact that the Serbs were the primary German enemies in Yugoslavia was ignored in Moscow.
Already on June 22, 1941, however, in his speech over the radio, Molotov mentioned only the Serbs
as victims of Nazism in Yugoslavia. V. M. Molotov, “Vystuplenie po radio zamestitelia Predsedatelia
Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov Soiuza SSR i Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del tov. V. M. Mo-
lotova,” Pravda, June 23, 1941.
19
The German intelligence service at the time was preoccupied with survival, the American intelligence
was not formed, while the English and French intelligence services took too much comfort in their vic-
tory in the First World War and did not develop subversive technologies. For more details on the prewar
knowledge of subversive and guerilla technologies, see biography of the greatest guerilla expert in the
English army during the Second World War, P. Wilkinson and J. B. Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London:
Leo. Cooper, 1993).
The study of this phenomenon is complicated by the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.

The sharp break with the USSR made the reminiscences of the training which
the Yugoslav communists received from the Soviet special services at first physi-
cally dangerous, and then completely unpopular. The authors who received Soviet
training before 1941 were either completely silent on this issue, or if that was
impossible, they minimized it. Unfortunately, this trend continues until the pres-
ent day.20
This is an example of traditional Yugoslav interpretation: “based on the analy-
sis of the character of the Second World War, conditions in Yugoslavia after the
occupation, the experiences of liberation wars and revolutions and… the Marxist
science about the armed people in concrete conditions in which the nations and
nationalities of Yugoslavia found themselves, Tito created a whole and original
concept of the partisan war. It was… the most effective type of an armed upris-
ing… [which grew into an — A. T.] all out people’s liberation war of the nations
and nationalities of Yugoslavia and complete takeover of the strategic initiative…
during the entire National Liberation War, in all of its stages, Tito found original
solutions within the realm of military science. He enriched partisan tactics with
new elements, which expressed themselves in military organization and coordina-
tion of partisan warfare (diversionary actions, ambushes, and going behind enemy
lines) with strategic-operational tasks of NOVJ units.”21 These views were shared
by party historians.22 None of these authors expressed any doubt that there was
more to this than Tito’s reading of Frunze and Clausewitz.23
20
This approach to modifying and ‘deleting’ the unwanted historical reality was very popular in the Soviet
historiographical tradition. Soviets even deleted the unwanted people from the famous photographs
(D. King, The Commissar Vanishes). Unfortunately, the similar approach could have been noted at the
exhibition In the honor of the Spanish fighters, which was staged by Muzej Istorije Jugoslavije (The
Museum of History of Yugoslavia) September 14 — October 8, 2006. Even though the exhibition
was devoted to the memory of the Yugoslav volunteers in Spain, it is shocking that the USSR was not
mentioned on any photographs or in the explanatory texts. Moreover, several photographs mentioned
the English and the French assistance to the Spanish Republic, as well as German and Italian aid to
Franco’s forces. The only indirect mentioning of the USSR was photograph of Trotsky’s supporters
in Spain. Regardless whether the Soviet Union’s role was positive or negative, the organizers of the
exhibition — the Serbian Society of Spanish Fighters 1936–1939, the National Archive of Catalonia,
the Archive of War and Expellees and P. Iglesias Foundation — simply erased the USSR. The pickiness
in terms of “desirable” and “undesirable” anti-fascism can also be detected in the European Resistance
Archive which offers its picture of resistance movements in Europe. European Resistance Archive, ac-
cessed September 16, 2012, at http://www.resistance-archive.org / en / resistance.
21
Lj. Bošnjak, Diverzantska dejstva u Narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistori-
jski institut, 1983), 26.
22
P. Morača, “Tito — Strateg partizanskog rata, “ Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma br. 9 (1974): 3–43.
23
For instance, “Instruction how to defend liberated territory” and “Instruction how to conquer populated
places” written in October, 1941, could not have appeared outside of the context of special partisan
instructions and directives, which in the prewar USSR could not have been at the disposal of a foreign
communist who was interested in self-education. J. B. Tito, Vojna djela, Т. I: 1941–1945 (Belgrade:
Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1961), 30–36.
As an example, we can cite Ivan Hariš, whom Starinov mentioned as his fa-
vorite student in a special diversionary unit during the Spanish Civil War. On the
orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, Ivan Hariš
began running special courses in diversionary tactics on Mountain Viševica on
August, 15, 1941. These were the first courses in diversionary tactics during the
war. Later on, Hariš showed himself to be an excellent organizer and instruc-
tor of diversionary groups and he became the head of the Diversionary Section
of Croatia’s Main Staff and commander of the Croatia’s Group of Diversionary
Detachments, where he participated in destruction of twenty-seven bridges and
150 trains.24 Hariš described Soviet instructors in his autobiography and he did not
negate their influence on the initial phases of his Partisan career.25 This openness
was permitted to a young military pensioner, but this was not the case for most of
his comrades who were pursuing political careers in Yugoslavia, where revealing
the close prewar relations with the USSR would have damaged their chances of
promotion.
After Stalin’s puppet, G. Dimitrov, became Comintern’s new leader in 1935
and especially after repressions in 1937–1938, Comintern began losing its inde-
pendence with regards to other Soviet institutions, especially the NKVD and the
military intelligence. At the same time, Moscow imposed firm discipline on the
communist parties which belonged to the Comintern. Tito’s reports to Moskvin,
who oversaw the Comintern on behalf of the NKVD, are illustrative of this. “In
October, 1936, KI sent me to work in the country while the new leadership was not
appointed yet. Initially, they tasked me with travelling to Vienna, and after to the
country [Yugoslavia — A. T.] where I had to lead the country and to be the most
responsible person in the new leadership,”26 he wrote in a report on September
15, 1938. In December, 1938, IKKI approved Tito’s leadership of KPJ, the Co-
mintern’s OK verified and approved his appointments within KPJ, it determined
financial support for the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia (SKOJ) and it
invited certain KPJ leaders to Moscow “for rehabilitation.”27
The German occupation of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 diminished the
Soviet official presence in Yugoslavia, but it did not change much in the relationship
between the IKKI and the KPJ. A good example of the Comintern’s control func-
tions could be found in its relationship with the Communist Party of France. The
Comintern’s directives in winter and autumn of 1939 encouraged struggle against
the war: resistance “to Anglo-French Imperialist” plans and their attempts “to draw
24
Hariš, Diverzant.
25
Hariš, Dnevnik, 7–8.
26
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21, 249.
27
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21, 228.
Scandinavia into the war and to instigate a world war,”28 “no support with human
or material resources in an imperialist war. The basic aim…- end the war!”29 At the
same time, the German communists were tasked with “strengthening the friendship
between the USSR and the German people” and to resist the bourgeois, Catholic
and Social-Democratic circles in their attempts to orient Germany towards France
and England. In March, 1940, IKKI believed that communist parties must system-
atically attack the myth of the anti-fascist character of the British and French war
effort, which in its view relied “on bourgeois and social-democratic parties in Scan-
dinavian countries to deceive the people, to hide the imperialist character of the war
and their support for the Anglo-French war camp.” The idea of the struggle against
the British Imperialism in Europe and in the Far East corresponded to the equally
vehement propaganda against the Japanese imperialism.30
Nonetheless, the condemnation of the British did not lead to support for the
German occupiers. After the occupation of Western Europe, Comintern propagated
“the fight against the robbery of the country by the occupier… and for the restora-
tion of the political independence of the country. There must be no collaboration
with the Dutch elements who work with the occupier…”31 In conditions of the occu-
pation by an official ally of the Soviet Union, the West European communist parties
found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. With regards to this, the Co-
mintern’s recommendations were clear. “…When operating legally, avoid anything
which could be judged to show solidarity with the occupier.”32 The importance of
this instruction was obvious, when we take into account that the Dutch and Belgian
communists were able to officially print their newspapers. The Dutch Communists
even published an article in a June edition of their journal which called on the Dutch
population “to be correct towards the German troops.”33 The French communists
addressed the German occupational forces with a plea to permit them to legally
print their newspaper L’Humanité, but the German authorities rejected them. When
the French police learned about this contact between the communists and the Ger-
mans, the members of the French delegation were arrested but on the intervention of
the German occupational forces they were freed.34
Nonetheless, the domination of Europe by Nazi Germany presented a threat to
the security of the USSR, which is why as of July, 1940, the Comintern called on
the communist parties in occupied countries: “using strictly illegal methods, avoid-
28
Lebedeva and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 18.
29
Ibid.,, 19.
30
Ibid.,, 21.
31
Ibid.,, 27.
32
Ibid.,, 33–34.
33
Ibid.,, 27.
34
Ibid.,, 33–34.
ing open propaganda and without drawing in the party, orient the wider masses to
passive resistance in all spheres. Avoid all premature measures which would be in
the interest of the occupier, you must support the open expression of the masses’
dissatisfaction…”35 In this way, from the second half of the summer and especially
in the autumn of 1940, the Comintern told the West European communist parties
to support passive resistance towards the German occupiers, while simultaneously
distancing themselves from the puppet regimes and the governments in exile. In-
terestingly, the Comintern’s new line was launched just after the German began
preparing for Operation Barbarossa on June 21, 1940. The conversation between
Molotov and Dimitrov at the end of 1940 was symptomatic of this: “we are taking on
a line which will disorient the German occupational troop in various countries, and
we want to strengthen this work without raising alarm. Will we not hinder Soviet
policies in this way?” To this Dimitrov’s question, Molotov answered: “Surely, this
must be done. We would not be communists if we would not take on such a line. Just
do this without noise.”36 The KPJ decision at the Fifth Conference in Zagreb to form
the KPJ Military Commission occurred within this wider context.
The Comintern suggested to the communist parties of the still neutral Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia to strengthen the alliance of the anti-war parties. This can
be seen in instructions sent to the Bulgarian Party to stay clear of anti-bourgeois,
anti-Royal and anti-German slogans in their propaganda campaign for an alliance
between the USSR and Bulgaria.37 Dimitrov gave Tito similar advice: “take on a
firm position against capitulation to Germany, support the movement for people’s
resistance to the policies of military intervention, demand friendship with Soviet
Union.”38 Dimitrov repeated these suggestions, after consulting Molotov after the
coup d’état on March, 27, 1941: “avoid armed clashes between the masses and
the authorities… do not respond to the enemy provocations. Do not expose the
vanguard of the people to the violence and do not throw them into the fire too
soon. Carry out repeated explanations and completely prepare yourself and the
masses — this is the basic aim of the party.”39 The Yugoslav communists literary
implemented the IKKI suggestions. The Central Committee of the KPJ issued a
pronouncement on March 15, 1941, “Against the Capitulation — for Mutual As-
sistance Pact with the Soviet Union.”40 The Comintern’s advice to carry out secret
work on preparing the party and the masses was also pursued. In a radiogram on
35
Ibid.,, 35–40.
36
SSSR — Germaniia 1939–1941. Dokumenty i materialy o sovetsko-germanskikh otnosheniiakh t. 2
(Vil’nius: Mokslas, 1989), 108, 118–120, 125–126.
37
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 41.
38
Ibid.,, 43.
39
Ibid.,, 519.
40
Petranović ed., Odnosi,, 16–18, 23–24.
May 13, 1941, Tito told the IKKI: “we are organizing fighting detachments, we
are educating our military cadres, we are preparing for an armed uprising in case
of an attack against the USSR.”41
It was mentioned previously that contemporary scholars have criticized the es-
tablished historiographical myth that the USSR was not ready for war — that Sta-
lin hindered and even forbid his subordinates from preparing for war, and that the
attack on Germany was so shocking to Stalin that he did not fulfill his duties for
several days. This idea became exceptionally popular because it corresponded to in-
terests of various people who ordered research in the Soviet Union. While Khrush-
chev was in power, the idea of the Soviet complete unpreparedness for the war was
used to undermine the myth of Stalin’s infallibility. Similarly, Soviet ideologues
and generals could not concede that in 1941, the German army — strengthened
in previous battles, infused with ideology of national superiority and applying the
superior Blitzkrieg tactics — was organizationally more powerful and its generals
better than their Soviet counterparts. In addition, Soviet historians were wary of dis-
cussing Moscow’s preparations for the war before 1941, because they did not want
to offer additional proof to revisionists of the West European historiography who
sought to prove Goebbels’s claims that the German attack on the USSR was aimed at
preventing Soviet aggressive intentions.42 In addition, the myth of the Soviet unpre-
paredness was popular in the Yugoslav and West European historiography because
it fit into the image of evil and stupid Stalin and smart Churchill (and Tito). They
foresaw the war and advised Stalin, but driven by his maniacal paranoia, he rejected
the advice, was the argument of these historians.
However, recent research based on military and state archives of the former
USSR have rejected this ideological argument. Despite all the errors which re-
sulted in German success and heavy Soviet losses in the early phases of the war, it
has become obvious that the USSR was doing everything to prepare itself against
the inevitable German attack.
In January and February, 1941, F. I. Golikov, the head of the RU RKKA, ordered
exercises of the high-ranking officers of the military districts and armies. At the end
of the exercises, Colonel Vinogradov, the head of the security service of the border
districts, activated “Plan of General Staff for Organization of Intelligence Actions
of Districts and Armies,” which included forming partisan bases and reserves in
41
Ibid,, 16–18, 58.
42
F. U. Kherster, “‘Spor istorikov’ v FRG,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 3 (1988); N. S. Cherkasov, “FRG:
‘Spor istorikov’ prodolzhaetsia?,“ Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 1 (1990); A. I. Borozniak, “22 iiunia 1941
goda: vzgliad s ‘toi’ storony”, Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (1994); G. Iubersher, “22 iiunia 1941 g. v sov-
remennoi istoriografii FRG. K voprosu o ‘preventivnoi voine, ’” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 6 (1999).
After 1991, this debate entered the Russian historiography: on the one hand, the countless Viktor Rezun’s
publications (so called “Suvorov”), accessed September 16, 2012 http://www.suvorov.com / books / and
their critics (A. V. Isaev, Antisuvorov (Moscow: Eksmo: Jauza, 2004).
areas which could be occupied by the enemy.43 In anticipation of the German at-
tack, NKVD began active preparations: from January 27, 1941, the military security
structures began using “Instructions for the NKVD during Mobilization.”44
The USSR began developing a general plan for resisting the enemy in 1940,
and it was ready in May, 1941. According to this plan, the preparations for resist-
ing Germany and its satellites, whose attack was deemed inevitable, were devel-
oping rapidly.45 In early June, 1941, partial mobilization was implemented and
800,000 soldiers filled divisions on the western borders; in middle of May, four
armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and an infantry corps started moving from ter-
ritories deep inside the country towards Dnieper and Western Dvina Rivers. In
June, more than half the reserve divisions in all the western border districts were
activated. On June 14, leaves were cancelled for soldiers and officers in western
districts. Finally, order for complete battle preparedness was sent to Soviet units
in the night of June 21–22, several hours before the German attack.46
Within this context, it is important to note that IK KI (that is, the Soviet lead-
ership), relying on Lenin’s scheme of ‘just’ and ‘imperialist’ wars, characterized
the April War of 1941 as a ‘just’ war (unlike the previous English-German and
Franco-German wars, which were deemed ‘imperialist’).47 At first glance this
dogmatic change in definition of the war may seem unimportant, but in reality it
represented an important change — a break with loyalty towards Germany and
preparation of the Comintern member parties for the struggle against collabo-
rationist regimes and German troops. The sudden change in IKKI policies was
evident in its instructions to the Communist Party of France, sent on April 26,
1941: “the main task is in the struggle for national liberation. The struggle for
peace begins with struggle for national independence. Peace without national lib-
eration means slavery of the French people… the main conditions for the success
of this struggle are following: 1. National unity with the exception of traitors and
43
V. Spiridenkov, Lesnye soldaty. Partizanskaia voina na severozapade SSSR (Moscow: Veche, 2007),
15.
44
A. G. Bezverkhnii, ed., SMERSH: Istoricheskie ocherki i arkhivnye dokumenty (Moscow: Glavarkhiv,
2003), 70.
45
E. I. Ziuzin, “Soobrazheniia ob osnovakh strategicheskogo razvertyvaniia Vooruzhennykh sil Sovetsko-
go Soiuza na Zapade i na Vostoke na 1940–1941gg.,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal 12 (1991), 1 (1992);
The documents have been fully published in the collection L. Reshin, comp., 1941 god. Vol. 1, ed.
V. P. Naumov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 1998) 181–193; 236–253. The plan can
be found in the Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. TsAMO, f. 16, o. 2951,
d. 237.
46
P. N. Bobylev, “Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v general’nom shtabe RKKA
vozmozhnoi voiny s Germaniei v 1940–1941 godakh,” Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (2000); Iu. A. Ni-
kiforov, “Sovetskoe voenno-strategicheskoe planirovanie nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v
sovremennoi istoriografi,” Mir Istorii 2–3, 4 (2001); A. V. Isaev, Ot Dubno do Rostova (Moscow: AST,
Tranzitkniga, 2004).
47
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 525–526.
capitulators. The formation of a wide national front in order to struggle for inde-
pendence… the party is ready to support every French government, every organi-
zation and all people in the country who are ready to wage a true struggle against
the occupiers… from this standpoint, the party must not take on hostile attitude
towards De Gaulle’s allies, [but you may offer — A. T.] adequate criticism of his
reactionary colonialist views.”48
On June 22, 1941, IKKI sent a report to the communist parties of Germany,
France, Netherlands, Bulgaria, China, Sweden, Yugoslavia, England and the USA,
and later on to other parties, which stated that the fatherland war in the USSR had
begun and that it required military involvement of communists in occupied coun-
tries and unification with all the forces which want to fight against the Nazism and
fascism regardless of their ideology.49 The IKKI carefully followed the reaction of
various communist parties, and it immediately reacted to the slightest deviation
from the new line.
Molotov and Dimitrov had an important conversation after the German at-
tack on the USSR: “each hour is valuable. Communists must take most decisive
steps everywhere to help the Soviet people. The most important task is to disor-
ganize the enemy’s rear and to encourage the disintegration of its armies.” On the
same day, the IKKI sent Tito a message: “the Fatherland War of the Soviet people
against Hitler’s bandit attack is a gigantic struggle to death, on which depends
not only the destiny of the USSR but also the freedom of your people. The hour
has come when communists must raise the people into an active struggle against
the occupiers. Not waiting a minute, organize partisan detachments and begin a
partisan war in the enemy’s rear. Set ablaze military factories, storages, oil fields,
airports, destroy railroads, telephone and telegraph networks, don’t forget about
troop transports and munitions. Organize the peasants to hide wheat in the earth,
and cattle in the forests. The enemy must be terrorized in all ways possible, to feel
as if he were in a besieged fortress. Confirm the acceptance of this message and
inform us about the facts of its implementation.”50
In parts of Yugoslavia inhabited by Serbs, IKKI instructions fell on a fertile
soil. M. Djilas described those days in Montenegro: “the authorities existed, but
they did not function. All of people grew apart from the authorities and turned
into conspirators. Political and neighborly arguments were forgotten. Defeats and
despondence were also forgotten… in the people, there was only restlessness and
wish for victory… and there was ‘mother Russia’. Even without the communist
propaganda amongst the people… with energy and feeling insulted, ancient ties
with Russia were revived together with mythical representation of its might and
48
Ibid., 525–526.
49
Ibid., 6.
50
Ibid., 9, 106; Cenčić, Enigma, 213–214.
greatness.” KPJ members felt these feelings even more intensely: “the Soviet
Union at war and us communists will fight until the last… we communists were
together with the USSR and under its influence…”51
The party reacted with “KPJ Central Committee Announcement regarding
the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union,” which the official Yugoslav
historiography dated on June 22, 1941.52 The text of this announcement was very
similar to Comintern’s text:
KPJ Comintern
“The fateful moment has arrived, “The moment has come the fatherland war
the blood of the Soviet people is being of the Soviet people against the Hitler’s
spilt not only for defense of the country bandit attack is a gigantic struggle to
of socialism but also for the final death, the result of which will determine
social and national liberation of the fate of not only the USSR but freedom
the entire working humanity” of your people”
At the same time, the differences were apparent: KPJ accented the communist
and proletarian aims of the struggle, while the Comintern skillfully concealed
the ideological component of the German-Soviet clash, emphasizing the Father-
land War of the Soviet people and the struggle for the freedom of the Yugoslav
people. Also, KPJ pronouncement shortened the Comintern’s list of suggestions
how to fight against the Germans. KPJ mentioned only sabotage, while avoiding
diversionary actions. In terms of preparing for the guerilla war, KPJ said that “our
valuable cadres must be preserved, which we need in this struggle today more
than ever.” These comparisons were explained by Nikola Popović, who ironically
noted that it was impossible to determine whether the Comintern influenced KPJ
or vice-versa.53 In KPJ historiography, there were cases of deliberate corrections
of dates of certain events because of everyday political needs.54 IKKI reaction
soon followed. In its response, the Comintern called on the Yugoslav communists,
in its next message, to offer active resistance to the enemy, while it emphasized the
51
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 52, 68.
52
Tito, Djela t. 7, 43–47; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 16–18, 61–65.
53
N. Popović Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945) (Belgrade: Institut za
savremenu istoriju, 1988), 42.
54
Even historians loyal to the Yugoslav line wrote about such cases. For instance, L. Bošnjak cited an ex-
ample “editing the journal of the Staff of the Diversionary Detachments of the NOVJ on May 9, 1945,”
as a result of which the first instance of diversionary attack (the destruction of a train on Zagreb-Sisak
railroad) was wrongly dated to have occurred on May 31, 1941. Bošnjak, Diverzantska dejstva, 10. Ac-
cording Hariš, the communist fighters managed to destroy the first train only on July 19, 1941, which
was travelling between Zagreb and Split, Hariš, Dnevnik, 27.
“all-people’s” nature of the struggle waged by VKP (b) and it suggested to KPJ to
embrace similar “national front direction.”
Rapid German penetration towards Moscow considerably influenced the level
of the Comintern’s control over its cadres abroad, KPJ included. Here it should be
noted that the Soviet control of the Yugoslav party was exercised through several
channels. The Soviet Union had numerous intelligence services: RKKA had the
RU of the General Staff, the NKVD (and later on the MGB) had its 5th Department
(later on the 1st Department), the Comintern had OMS IKKI (later on Service of
Connection– SS IKKI [Sluzhba sviazi]). The Navy and the Commissariat of For-
eign Affairs also had their own intelligence institutions. In Yugoslavia, like in oth-
er European countries of any significance, the NKVD, RU RKKA and SS IKKI
agents were active. The SS IKKI network was headed by J. Kopinič,55 and the RU
RKKA network was led by Mustafa Golubić.56 However, there is still no definitive
information who headed the NKVD network in the prewar Yugoslavia.57
In the first half of 1941, and especially after the German entry into Yugoslavia,
the Soviet control over its intelligence centers began to weaken. In Golubić’s dossier
in the Comintern archive, there is a letter from F. Golikov, the head of the military
intelligence service, addressed to G. Dimitrov, sent in March, 1941. Golikov asked
Dimitrov to influence Tito to desist from attacking Golubić and hindering his work.58
There is no response or comment to this atypical letter in Golubić’s dossier. Usually,
the IKKI representatives, and especially members of the communist parties belong-
ing to the Comintern, tended to avoid conflict with RU RKKA. Such conflicts could
have very unpleasant consequences, unless one had the NKVD support.
In this concrete case, Tito did not suffer any consequences. Soon after Golubić’s
arrival to Belgrade, after an anonymous source informed the Germans about his
55
Kopinič certainly was not an ordinary Comintern radio-telegrapher, as Milenko Doder claimed. The
role of a Liaison Service agent did not boil down to simply maintaining relations. Instead, it included
control and executive power, which is corroborated by numerous Comintern documents, as well as the
above indicated research of the internal structure and activities of the Comintern. Therefore, Kopinič’s
role was more realistically depicted by Vjenceslav Cenčić, regardless of the sensationalism of his book.
Kopinič’s statement was true that it was ridiculous to accuse him of wanting to take over the leading
position in the Croatian party, since as the head of the Comintern’s Liaison Service Station responsible
for contact with several communist parties, he already held a powerful position, M. Doder, Kopinič bez
enigme (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1986), 204.
56
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804. Mustafa Golubić’s personal Comintern dossier holds the exchange
between the head of the RU RKKA, F. Golikov, and the Comintern’s General Secretary G. Dimitrov,
which contains information which corroborates that Golubić worked for the military intelligence.
About Golubić, also see: S. Trhulj, Mustafa Golubić čovjek konspiracije (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga,
1986); B. Nešković, Mustafa Golubić (Belgrade: B. Nešković, 1985); Đ. Labović, Tajne misije Mustafe
Golubića (Belgrade: Beletra, 1990); U. Vuјošević, “Prilozi za biografiju Mustafe Golubića: (nepoznati
dokumenti iz arhiva Kominterne),” Istorija 20. Veka 1–2 (1993): 217–230.
57
We are speaking in plural because it is very possible that NKVD networks amongst the Russian emi-
grants, the illegal KPJ and in the ranks of the Yugoslav civil society were not connected.
58
RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804.
presence, Golubić was arrested by Gestapo. He was brutally tortured without re-
sults, and eventually he was executed. It must be noted that there is no evidence
for the rumor that Golubić was connected with the explosion in Smederevo, after
which he was supposedly caught.59 The Gestapo officer who interrogated Golubić
did not even pose questions about this incident. More significantly, the explo-
sion occurred on June 5, almost two weeks before the Operation Barbarossa was
launched. In conditions of maximal alertness, ordered by Stalin, such a diversion-
ary attack was unimaginable. None of RU RKKA workers would risk providing
the Germans such a good excuse to attack. In addition, prior to June 22, 1941, the
British intelligence service was active in diversionary attacks on Danube, in their
attempt to “set Europe ablaze.”60 This is not the only legend surrounding Golubić.
There were other rumors, such as that he was a Soviet general and that he was in-
fluential in the Soviet intelligence services. Likewise, the inscription on his grave
that he was a hero of the USSR is not true. Golubić’s name is not recorded in any
existing lists of national heroes.61
According to Gestapo documents, it seems that an anonymous report sealed
the fate of the RU RKKA illegal network in Yugoslavia, which was headed by
Mustafa Golubić, known in RU RKKA under his pseudonym Omega.62 As a result
of another anonymous tip, Ivan Srebrenjak, another RU RKKA agent in Yugosla-
via, was also arrested.63
Kopinič’s fate was better, but the result was similar to the previous cases.
After a series of intrigues (Kopinič’s conflict with the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Croatia, Kerestinac case), he ceased being an SS IKKI agent.
He became the so called one of Comintern’s technical personnel — he operated
one of IKKI radio stations. In early 1943, according to a report by I. Morozov, the
head of the SS IKKI, the Comintern had three active radio-stations in Yugoslavia:
in Croatia, Slovenian and in the Partisan region of Yugoslavia.64 With these, the
Comintern maintained contact with the Yugoslav, Italian, Austrian and Albanian
parties. After the Comintern was abolished, the SS IKKI continued its work under
the name Institute Number 100, as part of the Department for International Infor-
mation (OMI) Central Committee VKP (b) — the Comintern’s reincarnation.
59
M. Janković, “Izdao me Tito! Ali, neka ga…,” Press, December 14, 2008, 4.
60
AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-193, H-36, H-46; H. Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945 (London:
Muller, 1957), 366; Mackenzie, W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: Special Operations Execu-
tive 1940–1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), 23–28, 103–133.
61
A. Zakharov, “’Nash chelovek v Belgrade’ (zhizn’ i smert’ Mustafy Golubicha),” Sekretnoe dos’e.
istoriko-publitsisticheskii zhurnal 2 (1998); I. N. Shkadov, ed., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza: Kratkii bi-
ograficheskii slovar’, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988).
62
A. Dienko, Razvedka i kontrrazvedka v litsakh. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ rossiiskikh spetssluzhb
(Moscow: Russkii mir, 2002)
63
Cenčić, Enigma, 320–329.
64
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 10, 61–62.
Nonetheless, from the summer of 1941, reports about the activities of the Yugo-
slav Partisans reached the Soviets regularly from Tito, the talented Partisan leader
and a skillful master of intrigues. Officially, the next real Soviet representatives in
Yugoslavia appeared only in February, 1944, as part of General Korneev’s mis-
sion. There is no firm evidence that one of the Soviet intelligence agents (not secret
agents, some of whom must have been in Tito’s surrounding) stayed in Yugoslavia
before February 23, 1944. We can only guess that such a figure must have existed
in Tito’s immediate circle. There are some indications that Fedor Makhin fulfilled
this role. Dedijer, as well as V. Tesemnikov, the author of a biographical article
about Makhin, suggest this.65 Still, it is not clear why the suspicion does not fall on
Vladimir Smirnov, a Russian emigrant and head of the Technical Department of the
Supreme Command during the entire war? Any further speculation of who could
have been sent from Moscow to be officially, but not publically, the representative
of Soviet intelligence institutions in Tito’s inner circle, have no source base and they
are based on guesses of unreliable memoirs. Soviet historian B. Starkov, without
citing any sources, claims that Ivan Krajačić was the RU RKKA agent in Tito’s
circle.66 Likewise, similarly unreliable are Gestapo’s conclusions in Serbia, which
unsuccessfully tried to arrest F. E. Makhin,67 his assistant V. A. Laudanskii,68 the
mysterious V. Lebedev,69 as well as a series of other Soviet intelligence officers.
Official relations between the USSR

and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
before the War
Even though the first official Soviet representatives began to serve in Yugosla-
via in the second half of the 1940, the Yugoslav police received reports well before
the Second World War began of Soviet special agents arriving illegally into the
65
V. Dedijer, Dnevnik (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska knjiga, 1951), 142; V. Tesemnikov, “Iugoslavskaia odis-
seia Fedora Makhina,” Rodina 8 (2007); V. Tesemnikov, “Promenljiva sudbina generala F. E. Mahina,”
Tokovi Istorije br. 1–2 (2008)..
66
B. Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii. Novye dokumty, novye podkhody,” in Evropa
i Srbi: međunarodni naučni skup, 13–15 decembra 1995, ed. S. Terzić (Belgrade: Istorijski institut,
1996), 485..
67
AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127 / 6.
68
AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 11 / 16 SP. IV-11 / 59.
69
AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127 / 6.
Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War 197
country. In the middle of 1938, Eduard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia,70

issued a plea to the NKVD chief in Prague, Zubov, to pass onto Stalin a message
with regards to Yugoslavia. Beneš asked the USSR to finance a military putsch
against Stojadinović’s government in Yugoslavia, to install in Belgrade an An-
glophile military junta which would decrease the German pressure on Czecho-
slovakia. Beneš suggested to the Soviets that $ 200,000 in cash should be paid to
Serbian officers before the coup d’état. Zubov obtained the requested money from
Moscow, and he was ordered to initiate the operation, after which he travelled to
Belgrade. In Yugoslavia, Zubov concluded that the officers which Beneš recom-
mended were “a handful of unreliable adventurists,” and he refused to pay them
the advance. Upon his return to Prague, he sent a report to Moscow. Stalin, who
personally overlooked the operation, was angry because Zubov did not carry out
his orders and did not pay the money to Serbian officers. Stalin wrote on Zubov’s
report: “arrest him immediately.”71
The Soviet special services used individual Russian emigrants as their perma-
nent agents, whom they recruited by exploiting their material difficulties or their
families which remained in the USSR. They also used prisoners of war from the
Soviet Union, who managed to pass through the filtration network.72 Immediately
after the Civil War, GPU managed to penetrate ROVS ranks in Yugoslavia. From
1921, the Balkan GPU sector, headed by Boris Bazarov from 1927, had its agents
in Belgrade.73
Leonid Lenitskii group began operating in Serbia in the early 1930s. Len-
itskii came to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with a group of Russian
emigrants in early 1920s. Using his status as an emigrant, he studied medicine at
the University of Belgrade. After he received his degree in 1931, OGPU recruited
Lenitskii. The circumstances surrounding this event are quite unclear. Lenitskii
cooperated with the intelligence department of the 13th Soviet Army during the
Civil War, while his mother, wife of a deceased Czarist cavalry officer lived in
Kiev. In the 1930s, Lenitskii’s mother was fired because of her origins and was
left without the means to survive. OGPU representatives promised Lenitskii that
they would help his mother, but they were not in a hurry to do so. Regardless of
his motivation, Lenitskii formed an intelligence group which was tasked with fol-
70
We should separate the representatives of the party (the Comintern and its special services) and the state
institutions (NKID, OGPU, NKVD). The former had their agents in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from
the moment of its creation, while the latter began to pay attention to Yugoslavia only in the 1930s, as a
result of the internal and external situation in the USSR.
71
P. A. Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’ (Moscow: Geia, 1996), 72–73, 106; B. Dimitrijević and K. Nikolić,
Đeneral Mihajlović. Biografija, 88, 93.
72
M. Jovanović M. “Boljševička agentura na Balkanu 1920–1923,” Istorija 20. veka 2 (1995): 37–50;
G. Miloradović, Karantin za ideje. Logori za izolaciju “sumnjivih elemenata” u Kraljevini Srba, Hrva-
ta i Slovenaca (1919–1922) (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004).
73
Bazarov Boris Iakovlevich, accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / baz. htm.
lowing the work of the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia. Due to his calling as
a doctor, he managed to infiltrate several layers of the Russian émigré society in
Yugoslavia. He was the Resident Agent, the head of the NKVD illegal network in
Yugoslavia, 1933–1935. His deputy, Captain Shkl’arov, was arrested when he tried
to break into the vault of the leader of right-wing émigré organization NTS, which
at the time was close to the Nazis. Shkl’arov confessed to the police that Leonid
Lenitskii was his boss. Lenitskii was arrested on December 5, 1935, in the Russian
House during the performance of Natalka Poltavka in a spectacular fashion. He
was seized at the moment that he was talking with General Barbovich, the chief of
the local ROVS Department. Lenitskii’s wife, who at the time was in the theatre,
hurried home and she burnt compromising documents and mail which he was
preparing to send to the NKVD center. Members of his group were arrested, and
after a trial and brief jail terms (1935–1937), they were evicted from the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia.
The punishment was relatively lenient (Lenitskii got two years and eight
months of jail) because there was no proof for their subversive activities against
Yugoslavia, only against the émigré organizations. The group was not rooted out
completely, and in 1941, brother of Lenitskii’s lover, N. Daragan, tried to form a
new group but he was arrested by Gestapo. In June, 1944, Lenitskii was parachut-
ed into Yugoslavia, where he joined the Staff of a Partisan formation in Croatia,
until April, 1945, when he returned to Moscow.74
Roland Abia worked with Linitskii’s group. Abia was in Yugoslavia from July,
1932, until February, 1935, and he worked against émigré organizations. Abia’s
pseudonym was Vladimir Pravdin, and he established intelligence contact with
Makhin. After he left Yugoslavia, Abia was engaged in several important tasks —
he participated in assassination plots against Trotsky in 1935 and 1937, he secured
the shipment of arms for Republican Spain, and “he personally found and liquidat-
ed ‘Raymond’ (former NKVD agent, I. Poretskii, who quit NKVD and publically
criticized Stalin — A. T.) after which he returned to the Soviet Union. Russian em-
igrants who were recruited from the Alliance for Return to the Fatherland actively
participated in Abia’s last assignment. As a result of the successful cooperation
of the pro-Soviet emigrants and the NKVD executioners (the Frenchman Roland
Abia and the Bulgarian Boris Atanasov), the Swiss police found Poretskii’s body
in September, 1937, with five bullets in his head and seven in the body. In the
meantime, Abia’s son, citizen of Monaco, born in Britain in 1904 and having left
74
During his second tenure in Yugoslavia, Lintskii was wounded but he continued working and at the end
of his second stay he received the Yugoslav award the Partisan Star of the 3rd Order for “bravery and
self-sacrifice in battle.” AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. D-275; V. V. Orekhov, “Belgradskii protsess,” Chasovoi No.
165–166 (1936); N. A. Ermakov, “Nepovtorimyi put’ L. L. Linitskogo,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi
vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosh-
eniia, 1997). S. Iu. Rybas, General Kutepov (Moscow: Olma-press, 2000).
Russia during the Civil War, arrived to USSR and received Soviet citizenship.
From September 1941, and until 1946, under the pseudonym Sergey, he pursued a
career in NKVD under the cover of a TASS journalist. He went from an NKVD
operative to Soviet Resident Agent in New York, where he maintained intelligence
contacts with the members of the Yugoslav emigration in the USA.75
The Soviet special services also recruited among the Yugoslav ‘Spaniards’,
part of whom were trained in the USSR.76 D. Milojević, a Serbian ’Spaniard’
was arrested by Gestapo. Prior to his execution, Milojević described the method
of recruitment and how the work of a small group of the NKVD agents led by
Č. Popović and R. Uvalić was directed.77 What Milojević told German investiga-
tors revealed that the Soviet intelligence was not aimed at the Kingdom of Yu-
goslavia, instead, its goal was to prepare the resistance to an eventual Italian or
German occupation of the country.
Soviets became most active in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the twelve months
preceding the Third Reich’s attack on the USSR (from the summer of 1940 to the
summer of 1941). Diplomatic relations were established on June 24, 1940, and
Moscow ended the mission after Yugoslavia’s capitulation, even though the So-
viet diplomats did not immediately cease their activities.78 Viktor Plotnikov was
the Soviet representative in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Viktor Lebedev was his
advisor, Alexander Samohin was the military attaché, and Peter Kovalenko was
the assistant to the attaché.79 The destiny of these people, who represented Soviet
interests in Yugoslavia during the fateful months 1940–1941, is very interesting.
Alexander Georgievich Samokhin was born in Verhniaia-Buzinovka in the
Don Cossacks’ territories, on August 20, 1902. During the Civil War he supported
the Reds, and on May 4, 1919, he joined the Red Army, after which he participated
in battles on the Siberian Front. A responsible youth, he pursued a successful mili-
tary career: in 1920 he joined VKP (b), and he was the commander of a battalion
1923–1931. In 1921, he completed courses for officers (at the time, the Bolsheviks
75
“Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #8,
File 35112, Vol. 8, 233“ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collection:
Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm; АЈ,
CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 204.
76
For example, I. Hariš who later on headed the Diversionary Section of Croatia’s Main Staff and was the
Commander of Croatia’s Diversionary Group of Detachments, Starinov, Zapiski diversanta.
77
AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127, 33–41.
78
Limited information is available about the activity of technical staff of the Soviet Embassy in occupied
Serbia until their complete evacuation in May, 1941. The Belgrade Gestapo and Nedić’s special police
were constantly concerned about the activities of the Soviet diplomats in Serbia, AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d.
B-76, D-250, D-818; f. sp, d. IV-127 / 6.
79
Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, Diplomaticheskie
predstavitel’stva — RSFSR — SSSR — Polnomochnye predstavitel’stva, missii, posol’stva —
Missiia — Polnomochnoe predstavitel’stvo SSSR v Iugoslavii, accessed September 16, 2012,
http://www.knowbysight.info / 6_MID / 00557.asp.
avoided the term officers, using the word ‘commander’ instead), in 1923 he com-
pleted the Military Higher School L. B. Kamenev, and in 1934, he graduated from
the Infantry Faculty at the Military Academy M. V. Frunze. After the Academy,
Samokhin worked in staff of an Infantry division — he headed the operational de-
partment and later the Chief of Staff of various infantry Division. Samokhin was
educated and was always willing to learn more, and he was appointed the head of
the Infantry Officer School Ordzhonikidze, and in 1939, the Deputy Head of the
Main Directorate of the Military-Educational Red Army Institutions. In August,
1940, Samohin became General-Major and he was sent to Belgrade to be the mili-
tary attaché. His return to the USSR in the spring of 1941 is also noteworthy.
Immediately after his return from Yugoslavia, Samokhin received another re-
sponsible and difficult task — he was appointed commander of the 29th Lithuanian
Rifle Corps.80 In September, 1941, General-Major Samokhin was appointed depu-
ty to the Commander of the 16th Army on the Western Front in the rear. Consider-
ing the intensity of the German offensive at the time, his function was not classical
for commanders in the rear. Apart from the complicated measures which he had
to undertake in the extreme conditions of rapid withdrawal with heavy fighting,
Samokhin had to engage in battle against German diversions and their Soviet
collaborators. In December, he was promoted to Head of the 2nd (informational)
Department of the RKKA General Staff.81 In view of the extremely difficult posi-
tion in which the Soviet Union found itself, it is understandable why Samokhin
wanted to go to the front. He was appointed commander of the 48th Army on the
Brianskii Front.82
General Samokhin immediately went towards his new job’s location. On the
way to his new Staff in the city Elets, his pilot was disoriented, he flew over the
German front line and he was shot down. Samokhin fell into captivity, and the
Germans found important and strictly confidential documents: operational map
and confidential order from the Supreme Commander of the USSR, Stalin.83 De-
spite his circumstances (it would have been very dangerous for him to return to
80
That Corps represented the former army of the independent Lithuania after it was annexed by the
USSR. The Soviet military planners believed that this unit would be useful if it were called up to
defend the territory of the socialist Lithuania from Hitler. Nonetheless, a significant part of the Corps
surrendered without any resistance. The Germans later on formed police units out of a large number
of the former Corps soldiers. The Nazis used them against the Partisans in Russia and Belorussia, as
well as for the liquidation of Jews. Tragediia Litvy: 1941–1944 gody. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov
o prestupleniiakh litovskikh kollaboratsionistov v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Evropa, 2006).
“
81
V. Lur’e and V. Kochik, GRU: dela i liudi (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2002), 295–296.
82
“Samokhin Aleksandr Georgievich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kom-
munisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012,
http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp.
83
F. Sverdlov, Sovetskie generaly v plenu (Moscow: fond Kholokost, 1999).
the USSR considering that he was in German captivity), General-Major Samokhin

refused German offers to help their propaganda. In May, 1945, Samokhin and sev-
eral other Soviet higher officers captured early in the war, were freed by Ameri-
cans, and they evacuated them to Paris.
Samokhin and other prisoners were in Paris until May 26, 1945, when they re-
turned to Moscow by an airplane. After the circumstances of his arrest were clari-
fied, and the loss of strategically important document was established, Samokhin
was sentenced on October 21, 1945, to a twenty-five year stint in a labor camp.84
After Stalin’s death, on August 15, 1953, the conviction against Samokhin
was overturned and he was released from the camp. After his return to Moscow,
he decided to continue studying and in 1953–1954 he was a student at the Higher
Academic Course of the Military Academy of the General Staff.85 Nonetheless,
his military career was over regardless of his conviction’s annulment. In 1954, the
General-Major received the Order of Lenin, he was pensioned and appointed Pro-
fessor of General Direction at the Department for Training of Reserve Officers at
Lomonosov Moscow State University.86 Due to high stress which he experienced
in his life, he died relatively young on June 27, 1955.87
Viktor Plotnikov’s destiny was also difficult.88 Viktor Andreevich Plotnikov
was born on August, 26, 1898, in Astrakhan. His father died young, and his moth-
er moved with Viktor to Moscow. She was a seamstress and in Moscow she had
more chances of finding employment. Viktor Plotnikov graduated in 1917, and
he enrolled in Moscow’s Commercial Institute.89 Russia in 1917 was not suitable
for studying financial finesse and the majority of students joined the revolution.
Upon recommendation of the head of VTsIK Cossack Department, L. A. Ko-
robov, Plotnikov joined the Agitation Detachment the Defense of the Rights of
Working Cossacks, Peasants and Workers,” and in February, 1918, he joined VKP
(b).90As a member of the Agitation Detachment and representative of VTsIK Cos-
sack Department, Plotnikov worked in military units in Cossack areas 1918–1921.
As a representative of the Siberia Revolutionary Committee, on the orders of the
84
S. S. Gagarin, Miasnoi Bor (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991), 538.
85
Lur’e and Kochik, GRU, 295–296.
86
”Samokhin Aleksandr Georgievich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kom-
87
Lur’e and Kochik, GRU, 295–296.
88
The author of this study is greateful to Viktor Plotnikov’s son, Valerii Orlov, for his written statements
and documents connected with his father.
89
“Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i
Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.
asp.
90
“Avtobiografiia Plotnikova V. A. 14 / IX 1937 g. dlia NKID, from V. Orlov’s family archive.”
Soviet government, he organized and participated in the polar expedition on the

Iamal Peninsula in 1921.91
After the expedition, Plotnikov continued his education at the Faculty of
Economy at the Timariazev Agricultural Academy. Later on, he worked on or-
ganizing credit cooperatives in Moscow, around the Caspian Lake, Aral Lake
and Turkmenistan. Afterwards, he was transferred to Moscow Department of the
Worker-Peasant Inspection.92 Later on, he was moved to the People’s Commis-
sariat for Foreign Trade, where led the representation in Persia and Xinjiang.93 At
the end of 1936, Plotnikov returned to Moscow, but in 1937, he was moved to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as a legal secretary he was sent to Budapest.94
Hungary under Horthy was exceptionally difficult for Soviet diplomats, since it
resembled Nazi Germany in internal and external policies, and in some cases it
was even more extreme. For example, Hungary was the first European country
which adopted anti-Semitic laws (the so called Nуmerуs claуsуs), the culmination
of which was the murder of 600,000–800,000 Hungarian Jews. A loyal German
ally, Hungary participated in partition of Czechoslovakia, and it annexed Slovak
and Rusyn regions of the country.95
In March, 1939, Plotnikov was transferred to Finland, which was equally im-
portant to the Soviet foreign policy, where he was an advisor. He quit Helsinki
91
“Lichnyi listok po uchetu kadrov na Plotnikova V. A., from V. Orlov’s family archive.”
92
“Avtobiografiia Plotnikova V. A. 14 / IX 1937 g. dlia NKID,” from V. Orlov’s family archive.
93
Xinjiang, a Muslim region in present day People’s Republic of China’s northwest. From the early
1934, the Red Army units equipped with tanks, aviation and artillery entered the region upon the
invitation of the local governor Shen Shicai to help him in the struggle against his Muslim separat-
ist opponents who relied on the Japanese for support. The situation was so complicated that the
Soviet units had to masque themselves as Russian emigrants (they wore the uniform of the Russian
Czarist army and they removed all Soviet insignia from their uniforms and equipment). Later on,
Shen Shicai was accepted into VKP (b), and there was even a plan for the Soviet Union to annex
Xinjiang as Istochnoturkestanskii SSR (The Eastern Turkmen SSR). However, this adventure was
aborted because of the German attack on the USSR. See: Iu. L. Kedrov, “Bor’ba za nezavisimyi
Kitai,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et
al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 217; V. A. Barmin, Sovetskii Soiuz i Sin’tszian
1918–1941 g. (Barnaul: BGPU, 1998); V. A. Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheni-
iakh 1941–1949 g. (Barnaul: BGPU, 1999); V. V. Chubarov, “Voennye konflikty v Kitae i pozitsiia
SSSR (1927–1933),” in Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika 1917–1945. Poiski novykh podkhodov
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992); N. G. Kozlov, “V nebe Kitaia. 1937–1940, “ in
Vospominaniia sovetskikh letchikov-dobrovol’tsev (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). L. Benson, The Ili Re-
bellion. The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944–1949 (London: M. E. Sharpe,
1990).
94
“Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i
asp.
95
L. Kontler, Istoriia Vengrii. Tysiacheletie v tsentre Evropy (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2002); T. Sakmyster,
“Miklós Horthy and the Jews of Hungary,” in Labyrinth of Nationalism, Complexities of Diplomacy
(essays in honor of Charles and Barbara Jelavich), ed. R. Frucht (Columbus: Slavica Publishers,
1992), 121–142.
before the Soviet-Finnish War, which began on November 30, 1939. He left for the
neighboring Norway, which at the time was a neutral state.96 Norway at the time
was on the verge of war with the USSR, it actively recruited volunteers and send
weapons to neighboring Finland, which was attacked by the USSR. Nonetheless,
a direct conflict did not erupt with the Soviet Union. In March, 1940, the Soviet-
Finnish War ended, and in April of the same year, Germany occupied Norway. As
a result, on June 15, 1940, the Soviet Union broke relations with Norway.97
According to Visitors Log in Stalin’s cabinet, Plotnikov saw Molotov and Sta-
lin on June 19, 1940.98 On June 25, 1940, TASS announced the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.99
The telegram which Molotov sent to Plotnikov on October 17, 1940, gives ma-
terial for reconstruction of Stalin’s instructions to Plotnikov prior to his departure
for Belgrade.100 In his telegram, Molotov reminded Plotnikov that he should do the
following: avoid openly supporting either the proponents of the Italian-German or
Anglo-American orientation; support political and economic independence of Yu-
goslavia, with all diplomatic and economic means available (including the sales of
armaments), while at the same time, negating rumors that Moscow is pursing Pan-
Slavic policies or that it is seeking to Sovietize Yugoslavia; stay clear of German
political and economic activities. These ambivalent recommendations resulted
from the Soviet course of trying to postpone the inevitable war with Germany.101
Within this context, it was important to avoid provoking German aggressive be-
havior, while trying to curtail Hitler’s growing strength.
Further developments in Yugoslavia, however, shattered the Soviet hope of
preserving Yugoslavia’s neutrality. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government
signed a pact with Germany, which guaranteed Yugoslavia’s firm neutrality, and
was relatively mild in its demands.102 In the meantime, the British government
initiated a putsch in Belgrade,103 even though it knew that the British aid would not
96
”Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i
asp.
97
W. R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin
Books, 1991); A. B. Shirokorad, Tri voiny “Velikoi Finliandii” (Moscow: Veche, 2007).
98
Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 303; Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941
god kn. 1, 15.
99
B. E. Shtein, and S. A. Lozovskii, eds., Vneshniaia politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov. Tom IV (1935 —
iiun’ 1941 g.) (Moscow: Vyssh. part. shkola pri TsK VKP (b). Kabinet sots.‑ekon. nauk., 1946), 514.
100
Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 2, 310–311.
101
L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Iugoslaviia v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny” in Iugoslaviia v XX veke: Ocherki polit-
icheskoi istorii, ed. K. V. Nikiforov (Moscow: Indrik, 2011).
102
Belov, Ia byl, 328; N. D. Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika fashistskoi Italii. Ocherk diplomaticheskoi
istorii (1936–1941) (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 241.
103
D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic
Review 3 (1977): 399–419; Smirnov, Balkanskaia, 241.
be forthcoming and in the best case scenario, it would have been only symbolic.104
It must be reminded that on the eve of the putsch — special “observers” arrived
to Belgrade — Mikhail Abramovich Mil’shtein, deputy head of the military in-
telligence service, and Mikhail Andreevich Alahverdov, former NKVD resident
agent in Afghanistan and Turkey.105 However, they were not likely to have been
involved in the putsch in any way.106 More likely, their arrival could have been
connected with subversive preparations for the upcoming war, as was the case
with Bill Donovan, the future chief of the American OSS or the second person in
SOE responsible for guerilla operations — Colin Gabins.107
The Yugoslav communists, who at the time loyally fulfilled all orders which
came from Moscow), confirm that Moscow was not involved in the putsch.108
S. Vukmanović-Tempo and Djilas recalled that the Serbian Republican Commit-
tee of the KPJ issued a brochure on March 27, 1941, which criticized Britain and
stated that the best guarantee against the German attack was a Mutual Assistance
Pact with the USSR. On March 29, 1941, Tito condemned the Anglophile provoca-
teurs that burned a German flag and demolished the German tourist bureau. All of
this fit into traditional Soviet negative attitude towards the British foreign policy
and its supporters.109
KPJ could not have issued such a concrete comment on such an important
issue without approval from Moscow.110 The IKKI instruction to KPJ to launch a
campaign propagating mutual assistance pact with the USSR arrived before the
coup d’état.111 Since Yugoslavia and Germany signed the pact, the USSR wanted
a similar alliance with Yugoslavia in order to counterbalance Berlin’s position in
the Balkans. In light of the domination of the Central and Southeastern Europe by
Germany and its allies, this pact could have only been a peaceful attempt to secure
104
Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia kn. 2, 76.
105
Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137.
106
P. A. Sudoplatov, the deputy head of the NKVD 1st Department, wrote about their possible involvement
in the coup. However, a detailed analysis of the Anglophile composition of the plotters who overthrew
the government as well as the putsch’s very nature (bloodless palace conspiracy) proves that the two
great experts in diversionary tactics, without the knowledge of local languages and customs, could not
have been involved in the SOE coup. Sudoplatov P. A. Spetsoperatsii, Lubianka i Kreml’ 1930–1950
gody (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1997); W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of S. O. E.: Special Operations
Executive 1940–1945 (London, 2000), 104–112.
107
P. Wilkinson and J. B. Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London: Leo Cooper 1993); A. C. Brown, Wild Bill
Donovan: The Last Hero, (New York: Times Book, 1982).
108
M. Đilas, Memories of a Revolutionary (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 369–373;
S. Vukmanović, Revolucija koja teče. Memoari knj. I, 156.
109
Stalin specified his attitude towards the exponents of the British policy in 1927: “English bourgeoisie
does not like to fight with its hands. It always liked to wage war with other people’s hands. And some-
times it truly succeeded in finding fools who would pull out their chestnuts out of the fire for her.”
I. Stalin, “Zametki na sovremennye temy,” in Polnoe sobranie.
110
Lebedev and Narinskii, Komintern T. 1, 518–520.
111
U. Vujošević., “Prepiska (radiogrami) CK KPJ — IKKI,” Vojno-istorijski glasnik 1 / 3, (1992).
Yugoslavia’s neutrality (the USSR could not have offered military assistance to
Yugoslavia, except by attacking Germany directly which was out of the question
considering Stalin’s general foreign policy).
After the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact attacked Yugoslavia, the Sovi-
et-Yugoslav Agreement could not have secured Yugoslavia’s neutrality, but it could
have turned into a casus belli between USSR and Germany. In fact, the situation
resembled the circumstances which drew Czarist Russian into the First World
War, when the adventurism of Serbia’s politicians dragged the Russian Imperial
Army into the war before the completion of its modernization drive. It turned out
that Stalin was more realistic (or cynical) than the deceased Nicholas II.
Stalin did not want the USSR to begin the seemingly inevitable war with Ger-
many a day earlier than it was necessary. This was especially the case in the unfa-
vorable circumstances of being the violator of the agreement with Germany, which
would have given credence to the accusations of Kremlin pursuing aggressively
Pan-Slavic and communist policies.112 Stalin did not sign the Mutual Assistance
Agreement with Yugoslavia, and on the day of the German attack on Yugoslavia,
he forbade Molotov from organizing a ceremony which celebrated the diminished
version of the pact, the so called Agreement of Friendship between USSR and
Yugoslavia.113Yugoslavia was destroyed by the lethal mistake made by its gener-
als and politicians who were motivated at least in part by British bribes,114 and
nobody was able to help it: not the English in Greece who organized the putsch in
order to force Hitler to send some of his armies to Yugoslavia and not the distant
USSR which did not want to and was unable to offer effective military assistance
to Yugoslavia. Major-General Samokhin’s role in informing the Yugoslav Army’s
decision to overthrow the government is unclear. In any case, it can be concluded
that Kremlin was satisfied with his work in Yugoslavia because he was promoted
to other positions after his return to the USSR.
For Victor Plotnikov, the consequences of the events in Yugoslavia in the spring of
1941 were less favorable. NKID seems to have viewed poorly Plotnikov’s assessment
of the social-political situation in Yugoslavia, as well as his influence in Belgrade.
Yugoslavia did not manage to preserve its neutrality vis-à-vis Berlin. Left-oriented but
non-communist parties, with which Plotnikov led negotiations, played a role in this
failure.115 The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs informed the Central Com-
112
Molotov issued these specific instructions to Plotnikov on October 17, 1940, Reshin and Naumov, eds.,
1941 god kn. 2, 310–311.
113
See the memoirs of Nikolai Novikov, the chief of the NKID head of the Balkan countries, N. V. No-
vikov, Vospominaniia diplomata: (Zapiski o 1938–1947 godakh) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 80.
114
The British intelligence agency regularly recorded the exact amount which it paid to pro-London Yugo-
slav politicians, Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–112.
115
About the role of the non-communist left in the coup d’état on March 27 see: B. Petranović and N. Žutić,
27. mart 1941.: tematska zbirka dokumenata (Belgrade: NICOM, 1990); D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and
mittee of the VKP (b) that it had no more use for Plotnikov.116 As a result, Plotnikov
was transferred to the Commissariat of Forestry on August 26, 1941.117
This was the end of a brilliant career. Plotnikov, who was only forty-three
years old and managed to prove himself in several important diplomatic positions,
was sent to a humble position with little perspective for growth. His son’s memoirs
corroborate that he was transferred to forestry from diplomacy. Plotnikov died
from tuberculosis in 1958, broken and forgotten.118
The assistants of the Soviet diplomatic and military representatives also de-
serve attention. Peter Mikhailovich Kovalenko was the assistant to A. G. Samokh-
in. Kovalenko was born on September 1, 1913, and he was a representative of the
first generation of the Soviet youth which was filled with enthusiasm. He was born
in city of Engels, near Saratov, where many Germans lived. Even though he was
Russian, he spoke German very well. After the Middle Technical School, Peter
Kovalenko joined the Red Army and he completed the Tank School for Officers,
after which he participated in the Soviet-Finnish War. He displayed bravery in the
war and was awarded with the Red Star (1939).119
In autumn of 1940, the young officer arrived to Belgrade as an Assistant to
the Soviet Military Attaché. After the bombing of Belgrade on April 6, 1941, part
of the Soviet Embassy had to leave the Yugoslav capital. Peter Kovalenko drove
some of the staff in a car through the narrow mountain passes under the threat of
German air bombardment. He was recognized by his colleagues for his skillful
and careful driving. During the war, Peter Kovalenko managed to obtain another
Red Star in 1943.120
At the end of 1943, Major Kovalenko was included in the Soviet Military Mis-
sion to NKOJ (The National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia). He was
appointed assistant to the head of the Military Mission. In the spring of 1944,
several Soviet liaison officers were sent to various Partisan headquarters. Major
Kovalenko was sent to Peko Dapčević’s Headquarters in Montenegro.121 Accord-
ing to the official report, Kovalenko passed through the enemy territory for several
British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic Review 3 (1977): 399–419;
Barker, British Policy, 78–108:; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–112. The Soviets also admitted
the connection between these politicians and the British government, Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137.
116
This occurred at the time that NKID had a shortage of experienced diplomats, Novikov, Vospominaniia,
88.
117
Nomenclature lichnoe delo Plotnikova V. A, from V. Orlov’s family archive.
118
According to his son Valerii Orlov (2004) and the photograph of the grave of the first Soviet ambas-
sador to Yugoslavia. Also see the memorial on the website Polpred Plotnikov, accessed September 16,
2012, http://polpred-plotnikov.40s-50s.info.
119
I. N. Shkadov eds., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza.
120
N. M. Rumiantsev, Liudi legendarnogo podviga (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1968).
121
V. V. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” in Pola veka od oslobođenja Srbije, eds.
Ž. Jovanović et al., (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1995), 27.
hundred kilometers until he reached his destination. During the offensives, he was
not in Staff Headquarters behind the frontlines. He participated in organization
and implementation of intelligence-diversionary operations in the enemy’s rear.
He especially proved himself during the Partisans’ crossing of Ibar and Kopaonik.
Together with Dapčević’s Montenegrin Partisans, Major Kovalenko participated
in the Belgrade Operation. “For bravery during the special tasks on the territory
of Yugoslavia,” Major Kovalenko received the prestigious Star of the Hero of the
USSR “for bravery during the special tasks on the territory of Yugoslavia,” as
well as the Yugoslav Partisan Star of the First Order.122 After the war, Kovalenko
completed The Military Tank Academy, but his health had suffered during the
war, and in 1958, and he was retired with the rank of the Lieutenant-Colonel. He
died at the age of forty-seven in 1960, in Moscow.
Viktor Zakharovich Lebedev was another member of the Soviet Representa-
tion. His life is most difficult to reconstruct, but it caused most discussion.123 Ger-
mans paid particular attention to him, since they confused him with the Russian
émigré Vladimir Aleksandrovich Lebedev, a doctor and active participant in the
pro-Soviet émigré organization Union of Soviet Patriots.
Viktor Lebedev was officially a diplomat. He completed Pedagogical Teach-
ers’ Faculty in Ryazan’ (1922), and later on, the Historical-Philological Faculty at
the University of Moscow (1925). According to the official version, 1929–1940,
he taught Marxism at the Academy of Food Industry Stalin. Suddenly, he was ac-
cepted into NKID in 1940, (which is quite unusual and raises doubts about his true
career), and he was appointed Advisor to the Representative of the USSR in Yu-
goslavia, the second most important person in the embassy.124 This is confirmed
by the fact that in March, 1941, Lebedev became the Chief of the Mission after
Plotnikov’s departure for Moscow.125 For several days while the Embassy still of-
ficially operated, he tried to established relations with General Dušan Simović.
Rumors spread in occupied Yugoslavia that Lebedev became the gray eminence
of the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia.126 Similar rumors forced the USSR to
formally announce that Lebedev was in Moscow, working in NKID apparatus
1941–1943.127 This announcement did not mean much, as it could have been made
even if Lebedev was not in the USSR.
122
I. N. Shkadov eds., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza.
123
M. Jovanović, “O jednoj zabuni u našoj istoriografiji ili ko je V. Lebedev?” Spomenica Radovana
Samardžića, (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1994).
124
A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984); Lebedev Viktor
Zakharovich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo
Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp.
125
Petranović ed., Odnosi,, 44.
126
AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. D-250, D-818; f. СП, d. IV-127 / 6.
127
A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984); Lebedev Viktor
Viktor Lebedev assumed a public position only on November 12, 1943, as the
Soviet ambassador to the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in exile. On
November 30, he also became “the ambassador of the USSR to the Allied govern-
ments in exile” (Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Norway).128 Later on, on
January 5, 1945, Viktor Lebedev became the Soviet ambassador in Poland, at the
time of Moscow’s integration of Poland into the emerging Soviet bloc. After a
lengthy stint in Poland (1951–1958), Lebedev became the Soviet ambassador in
Finland. Afterward, he headed the Higher Diplomatic School of MID USSR until
1965. Lebedev was pensioned in 1965 and he died in 1968.129 Even though Leb-
edev activities prior to his transfer to NKID as well as during 1941–1943 may not
be reconstructed, it is not clear whom he worked for.
Two out of four leading men in the Soviet Embassy in the Kingdom of Yugosla-
via worked for the military intelligence. Under the pseudonym Sofokle, Samokhin
wrote reports to General Golikov, the chief of the RKKA GRU General Staff.130
Later on, he was appointed the head of the 2nd (Informational) Department of the
RKKA GRU General Staff. “Sofokle” mentioned “Blok” in one of his reports,
whom the authors of 1941 god identified as Lebedev without any explanation.
Without the access to documents, it is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of
the authors’ claim. Nonetheless, Lebedev’s and Kovalenko’s careers before and
after 1940, make it more likely that Kovalenko was Blok.131 Kovalenko’s activities
in Yugoslavia, 1943–1944, make this more probable. Kovalenko actively partici-
pated in planning and implementing the intelligence-subversive operations behind
the German frontlines in 1944, when he was stationed with Dapčević’s units. It is
illustrative that the participant of the General Korneev’s mission, V. Zelen’in, dis-
cussed Kovalenko’s mission in Montenegro as similar to Patrahal’tsev’s mission,
who was also a RU RKKA agent.132
We did not find direct information about Plotnikov and Lebedev, but one of
them could have been an NKVD agent since the Soviet diplomatic missions al-
ways had resident agents from military as well as political special services.133 The
Zakharovich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo

Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp.
128
Ibid.
129
K. A. Zalesskii, Imperiia Stalina. Biograficheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Moscow: Veche, 2000);
A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984)
130
GRU GSh USSR Coordinated telegrams are inaccessible to researchers. The only available information
is from published documents. Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 1, 572, 736, kn. 2, 24; G. Goro-
detskii, Rokovoi samoobman: Stalin i napadenie Germanii na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: ROSSPEN,
2001), 169. (English edition G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
131
Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 2, 25, 636, 650.
132
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 27.
133
Moscow regularly appointed NKVD agents to Soviet diplomatic positions. For instance, D. P. Pohidaev
role of V. M. Sakharov remains unclear. He also worked in the Soviet embassy in

Yugoslavia 1940–1941, and he returned to Serbia in 1944, as Major and the Senior
Assistant to the Chief of the Soviet Mission.134
Evgenii Bukhnitskii, a student of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium in Bel-
grade, also left some information about the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.
In early 1941, a well-dressed man approached Bukhnitskii on one of Belgrade’s
central streets, asking him in proper Russian language to help him in buying some-
thing in a store because he did not speak Serbian well enough. Later on, it turned
out that this was an employee of the Soviet Embassy who began a conversation
with him and invited him to his car for a drive. At the time, a car was a symbol of
high social status, a technological wonder, which attracted the poor Russian refu-
gee. The youth entered the car. Later on, Bukhnitskii worked as a courier, moving
around sealed envelopes to Russian émigrés and Serbian officers, which were so
confidential that the Soviets did not trust the mail service. The youth noticed that
there were regular target practices with revolvers with silencers in the building
of the Soviet Embassy (which at the time was an advanced weapon of special
services),135 as well as a strange martial art practice similar to judo (most likely,
a complex martial art known as Military Sambo developed for NKVD needs).136
Bukhnitskii also noted a large and precise index of Russian émigré organizations
and individual informers used by the Soviet Mission.137
Many Soviet officials in the prewar Yugoslavia were loyal executioners of the
orders of the party and the state leadership. The hard work meant an opportunity
for further career advancement (Lebedev, Kovalenko), while minor mistakes, es-
pecially those caused by acting independently, were punished severely (Plotnikov,
Samokhin). The members of the Soviet Embassy were drastically more disciplined
and obedient than their Yugoslav counterparts in Moscow. Milan Gavrilović was
a good example of the Yugoslav representatives in the USSR.
Milan Gavrilović began his career as a secretary to Nikola Pašić and a member
of the Black Hand and later on White Hand. In 1921, when he was forty years old,
with the help of the all-powerful Pašić, he received a state pension as an advi-
was an NKVD agent in Paris in 1940, during the war he coordinated NKID and NKVD activities, while
later on he was an ambassador in numerous European and African countries. Similarly, S. V. Semenov
worked on NKVD assignments with diplomatic immunity in Lithuania 1939–1940, in Germany 1940–
1941 and in Sweden 1942–1945. Later on, he developed a successful diplomatic career and 1955–1978
he was the Deputy Minister in MID USSR, P. A. Sudoplatov, Raznye dni tainoi voiny i diplomatii. 1941
god (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2001).
134
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20; Popović K., Beleške uz ratovanje, Belgrade,
1988, 199.
135
See: A. N. Ardashev and S. L. Fedoseev, Oruzhie spetsial’noe, neobychnoe, ekzoticheskoe. Illiustriro-
vannyi spravochnik (Moscow: AST, 2003), 20–30.
136
See Volkov, Kurs samozashchity.
137
AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-76.
sor of the Embassy, and from then on, he was materially secure, and he devoted
himself entirely to politics. Gavrilović was a cofounder of the Agricultural Party,
and 1924–1930, he was director of Politika. The Agricultural Party consistently
pursued anti-German policies, and it relied on peasants and small businessmen.
With skillful political maneuvering and manipulating the anti-German attitudes,
present amongst many Serbs, the Agricultural Party managed to seize certain po-
sitions in the Yugoslav politics and to receive funding from the British govern-
ment. Even though most of the money went through Gavrilović’s party colleague
Miloš Tupanjanin, part of the British money went through Gavrilović. According
Hugh Dalton, SOE officer, in order to create the right mood in the country for the
putsch, the British Crown spent more than 100,000 British pounds.138 From Sep-
tember, 1940, according to the information from SOE archive, the Agricultural
Party received 4,000 British pounds per month. Gavrilović’s financial interests
coincided with his conviction that Yugoslavia ought to orient itself towards Brit-
ain and become her ally in the war against Germany. This view, of course, cor-
responded with the British intelligence officers’ support for the useful politicians
(from their perspective).139
Gavrilović, an independent politician, did not care about the views of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the government which sent him to Moscow. Gavrilović
had an interesting conversation with the German ambassador in Yugoslavia, von
Heren, in June 1940, before his departure for Moscow as an ambassador. At the
time, Yugoslavia was officially a neutral country. These circumstances did not
prevent Gavrilović from taking on an absolutely independent line with regards
to Germany, which was accompanied by an insolent tone. When Von Heren ex-
pressed his doubt that Gavrilović was heading to Moscow to ruin Soviet-German
relations, without much thinking, Gavrilović responded that his words were a
compliment to him, adding: “I love my country and I would give my life and life
of my children for her: I will defend my country’s interests until the end!”140
To this pathetic statement, we must insert a quote from Branko Lazarević,
a notable member of the Serbian elite, a reputable author and diplomat: “A coup
d’état was carried out. Radio speaks. King Peter II speaks. Later on it was proven
that King did not know anything until the night, and that a young Sub-lieutenant
was speaking. Milan Gavrilović’s son ran to our house…: ‘Death to the Pact! (Lat-
138
D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic
Review 3 (1977): 399–419; M. Janković and V. Lalić, Knez Pavle. Istina o 27. Martu (Belgrade: Una
Press, 2007), 62.
139
Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–105.
140
Documents on Milan Gavrilović are held at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Milan
Gavrilović papers, 1938–1979. We are citing this quote from the monograph Janković and Lalić, Knez
Pavle, 33–35. The same dialoge was mentioned in J. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934–1941 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 249.
er on he escaped, as well as his entire family, and today they are in emigration)…
our airplanes started flying above Belgrade. The Army started to walk on the
streets. Happiness to the point of delirium. In two days, I think on the thirtieth,
there was a long telephone conversation in the house of Dr. Milan Gavrilović…
with Ambassador Gavrilović, from Ankara it seems (he flew there from Moscow
on business), and immediately after that conversation, the entire family, together
with Tupanjaninć’s family, supposedly went for Bosnia, but they went to Istanbul
via Bulgaria.”141
In the autumn of 1940, Gavrilović developed a stormy diplomatic activity,
independent of his chief — the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Alek-
sandar Cincar-Marković. Gavrilović was diplomatically inexperienced, which he
tried to compensate with his political experiences in the Balkans. He was always
ready for the most varied combinations. During his first official visit to NKID,
Gavrilović said anything which would have attracted the sympathy of his Soviet
partners. According to a Soviet official, Gavrilović “went so far that he insisted on
creating a Balkan Union which would be led by Slavophile ideas, and in which the
Russian language would displace various Slavic dialects.”142 It is very symptom-
atic that Gavrilović refused to repeat his words or to say anything at the All-Slavic
Rally in Moscow, on August 10–11, 1941.143
In June 1940, Soviet diplomats sent information to the NKVD, which decided
to recruit the active and independent diplomat. Immediately after they succeeded
in this, the chief of the NKVD counter-intelligence department, P. V. Fedotov, and
deputy to the NKVD intelligence chief, P. A. Sudoplatov, were greatly disappoint-
ed: Gavrilović was firmly connected to their British counterparts and he regularly
visited Sir Staford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow. His close ties with
the British ran parallel with Gavrilović’s continued interest in the party politics in
Yugoslavia. He kept on sending to his party colleagues in Belgrade confidential
reports from Moscow through the British embassy.144 The enigma surrounding the
Yugoslav diplomat’s true masters began to grow. Gavrilović started suggesting to
Soviet officials that they should pay attention to a group of anti-German General
Staff officers in Belgrade, who were in opposition to the pro-German government.
In September, 1940, negotiations along these lines began in Paris, but they were
broken off when the Yugoslav Foreign Policy began to openly orient the country
141
B. Lazarević, “Dnevnik jednoga nikoga. (26) General Simović i avijatičari junaci dana,” Danas, Sep-
tember 10, 2008.
142
Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 167.
143
Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 259.
144
About Gavrilović’s loyalty to the English see Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137; R. Gašić “Beogradska
politička i vojna elita u svetlu nemačkih i britanskih izvora pred Drugi svetski rat, “ Istorija 20. Veka 1
(2006); Janković and Lalić, Knez Pavle, 72.
towards Germany and its satellites.145 However, negotiations did not succeed. The
ambassador of the British Crown to the USSR, Cripps offered his understanding of
the Yugoslav-Soviet relations to the British Foreign Minister A. Eden in the second
half of 1940.146 He wrote that the Soviet government broke off negotiation with Yu-
goslavia because Prince Paul was too anti-Soviet, a sentiment reinforced by Hitler’s
promise that Germany would undertake measures against the USSR.147
The Yugoslav Ambassador, in the fateful and extremely dangerous moment
of maneuvers above the abyss of war and the sea of blood, continued his non-
chalant political games. Even though Stalin and Molotov let him know that the
USSR was neither capable nor willing to enter the war, Gavrilović reported to
Belgrade this information in a watered-down form. He sent to Cincar-Marković
reports that the USSR was ready to enter the war and that “in any case it is against
neutral Yugoslavia.”148 Gavrilović went so far that he said that “Vishinskii told
me point blank that [the USSR — A. T.] will enter the war against Germany in
case of Britain opening a front in the Balkans. Soviet troops will head directly for
Bulgaria…”149 Andrei Vishinskii, who was a Russian Pole and former Menshe-
vik, managed to survive Stalin’s purges and reach the very top of the state. It is
completely unimaginable that Vishinksii could say something which ran counter
to Stalin’s attempts to postpone the conflict with Germany, especially to a foreign
diplomat whose loyalty was questionable.150 Gavrilović’s free interpretation of the
Soviet officials’ statement resulted in the Soviets trying to find out how correctly
Gavrilović was passing on the information to his superiors in Belgrade through
Plotnikov in Yugoslavia.151
The height of Gavrolivić’s independence was his dialog with the Yugoslav
Prime Minister Dušan Simović on the eve of the German attack on Yugoslavia.
145
146
L. F. Sotskov, comp., Pribaltika i geopolitika, 1935–1945 g.: rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby
vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2009), document 37.
147
Nonetheless, we disagree with the view that the Yugoslav “inquiries about the possibility of signing
a military agreement with the USSR,” was a mere ruse, N. Milovanović, Vojni puč i 27. mart 1941
(Belgrade: Sloboda, 1981), 346. It is more likely that Yugoslavia’s problem was the lack of a coher-
ent foreign policy vision which stemmed from the fact that various power centers within the country
pursued their own policies and visions. The wish by part of the Yugoslav elite (especially the military)
to sign an agreement with the USSR at the end of 1940 and early 1941, has been established in recent
monograph by an expert on the Yugoslav Royal Army, M. Bjelajac, Diplomatija i vojska: Srbija i Jugo-
slavija 1901–1999 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 181–203.
148
Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 288–290.
149
Janković and Lalić, Knez Pavle, 16, 31.
150
It is impossible that Vishinskyy would have promised a foreign diplomat that the USSR would un-
dertake military action in the Balkans at the time that Stalin was trying to avoid a conflict with Hitler.
About Vishinskii’s carefulness in negotiating with Gavrilović see Sudoplatov, Raznye dni, chapter “So-
bytiia na Balkanakh.”
151
D. Jovanović, Medaljoni Knj. III (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008), 379.
The Yugoslav government insisted on signing a military alliance with the USSR.
The Soviet government refused to add a clause about the military assistance, sug-
gesting instead an agreement of neutrality, which was meant to send a signal to
Hitler that Moscow would deem a German attack on Yugoslavia to be a hostile
step, but that it would not lead automatically to war. Simultaneously, the Yugoslav
government reported to German ambassador that the negotiations in Moscow were
“a result of short-term excitement after the rebellion, but that the entire cabinet is
opposed to them and that it wants to reach an understanding not with Moscow but
with Berlin.”152 At midnight, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, report-
ed that the German attack on Yugoslavia was imminent. Stalin ordered that the
agreement should still be signed. Around midnight, Gavrilović was at a reception
organized by the American ambassador, and the situation was explained to him.
However, Gavrilović said that there was no need for hurry and that the Yugoslav
government would send its response only in the morning. Nonetheless, Vishinksii
convinced Gavrilović to immediately call the Yugoslav Prime Minister Simović
and to obtain from him new instructions.153
“Sign what the Russians are offering to you,” Simović told him. ”I can’t, Gen-
eral. I know what my duty is and what my job is,” he responded. “You must sign.”
“I can’t, General. Have trust in me.” “Sign it, Gavrilović,” the Yugoslav Prime
Minister continued to insist. “I know what I am doing. I cannot sign that docu-
ment.” “Alright. If you want an order, then I am ordering you to sign it!” Simović
said. “I know what I am doing. Have trust in me.” After this, Gavrilović put the
telephone down.154 The authors who wrote about this incident refer to this dialog as
“strange and undiplomatic”155 and “surreal.”156 Vishinskii was obviously listening
to the international conversation between Gavrilović and Simović, and he imme-
diately called the former. “Are you coming? — asked (Vishinksii — A. T.). — No,
said Gavrilović. — What? — No, I said that I am not coming. — But you have an
order to sign; you must sign it! ’– I understand, but I will not sign it. I can’t — my
hand refuses to do it… — You must sign it. You must sign it now. You have an
order from your Prime Minister. — I don’t have to sign it. My Prime Minister can
fire me and replace me with somebody else, but while I am here, I will not sign it
as it is…“157 Stalin gave in and reformulated the agreement which was never rati-
fied and did not come into force.
152
Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178. Gordetskii cited this quote from the German Representative in
Belgrade on April 5, 1941.
153
Gorodetskii completely reconstructed the events of the night between April 5–6 according to secret
Soviet, English and American diplomatic archives, Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178.
154
155
Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 385–386.
156
157
Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 388.
It must be noted that the Soviet leadership knew that Hitler would imminently
attack Yugoslavia through their agent in Gestapo Willi Lehmann.158 The Soviet
leader was also aware of the poor chances which Yugoslavia had in case of war
with Germans. V. Miletić, a member of the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, had a
conversation with Stalin. Stalin “asked Colonel Savić how long would Yugoslav
army last in case of an attack. He answered: around three months. At this Stalin
addressed our military representative, who appeared to be better informed, and
he lowered this figure to a month. Stalin shook his head in disbelief and said: two
to three weeks.”159 In signing this agreement, Moscow’s intentions were not to
protect Yugoslavia, which could not have been saved after the putsch on March,
27, but because of a complicated diplomatic game which was being played out
between the USSR and Germany in the spring of 1941. After Germany attacked
an apparent Soviet ally, there were no longer any illusions that Germany would
respect Soviet interests.
Gavrilović’s insubordination and his approach to diplomatic relations were
indicative of the differences between Soviet elites and their Yugoslav counter-
parts. The free spirit of a Balkan politician remained intact even after the war
(Gavrilović wrote his memoirs with pride after the war). It shows that his actions
were not a result of stress under the threat of an unavoidable war, but a charac-
teristic approach to diplomatic questions. Obviously, Milan Gavrilović’s model
of behavior — independence and subordination — was drastically different from
its Soviet counterpart during Stalin’s reign. Invariably, this left a strong impres-
sion on mutual perceptions between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Gavrilović’s
behavior created a stereotype about the entire state organism of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia.
The course of negotiations after March 27, 1941, was not important because
they could not have prevented Germany from attacking and partitioning Yugosla-
via. In the worst or best scenario, depending on one’s perspective, the USSR could
have been dragged into the war three months earlier, which would have led to a
million or more dead Red Army soldiers. At the same time, the German-Italian
pressure on Britain would have diminished sooner. However, even if somehow
Yugoslavia obtained the coveted Soviet armored vehicles, it would not have deci-
sively influenced the course of the war. Yugoslavia was riddled with inter-ethnic
divisions,160 the political elite suffered from serious shortcomings, and no amount
158
T. Gladkov, Ego velichestvo agent (Moscow: Pechatnye traditsii, 2010).
159
A. Životić, “Jedno svedočanstvo o potpisivanju Sovjetsko-jugoslovenskog pakta 5 / 6. aprila 1941,”
Arhiv 11 (2010): 122–133; V. Miletić, “U Moskvi pre 20 godina,” Glas Kanadskih Srba (Toronto), April
4, 1961.
160
Apart from the Croatian question, there was a series of ethnic conflicts which were not resolved until
the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Z. Janjetović, Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne
manjine u Jugoslaviji. 1918–1941 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2005); V. Jovanović,
Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 215
of Soviet weapons could have saved it from destruction from the far more pow-
erful Germany. The Yugoslav army capitulated when its storages were full of
weapons, and part of the existing technology was not even used. According to
recent research on the April War, “armored units… did not achieve important
battle results. The First Tank Battalion did not even succeed to gather [and or-
ganize into a coherent unit — A. T.]. A Regiment in Zagreb surrendered without
fighting, tanks from the auxiliary regiments were destroyed during the bombing
of Belgrade, and the remaining tanks from a regiment in Sarajevo were made in-
operable by its crews. The Second Battalion, made up of experienced and trained
people, participated in heavy battles near Doboj but it was exposed to attacks by
the Ustaša fifth column…the general conclusion about the Yugoslav tank units
in the April War… cannot be separated from how the entire army carried itself,
which apart from individual cases of bravery and self-initiative, was filled with
defeatism, fifth column and was unused to battles with modern war technologies,
so it succeeded in offering only sporadic and short resistance.”161 On the fifth day
of the war, when German troops entered Zagreb, they were greeted with joys and
flowers by a larger part of the population.
Contacts between the government

in exile and JVuO with the USSR until
the autumn of 1944
The topic of JVuO has been much written about in recent Serbian historiog-
raphy. Numerous monographs, memoirs and photograph albums have somewhat
filled the gaps in earlier research on the anti-communist movement led by Draža
Mihailović. Studies written by M. Pavlović, K. Nikolić and B. Dimitrijević cor-
rectly view the events in Serbia 1941–1945 as a civil war between three belliger-
ents.162 The three-sided civil war raged between the pro-German, far-rightwing
supporters of M. Nedić and D. Ljotić, the pro-Soviet far-leftists Partisans led by
Tito and Mihailović’s Četniks who were moderately liberal and oriented towards
Britain and the USA. Each side in the Serbian civil war relied on an outside power,
Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini
SHS (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002).
161
D. Denda, “Jugoslovenski tenkisti u Aprilskom ratu,” Vojno-istorijski glasnik br. 2 (2009): 78–96.
162
Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović; M. Pavlović and B. Mladenović, Kosta Milovanović
Pećanac Biografija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 171.
which offered them support according to its needs and capabilities. This approach
can be used to view the civil war in Yugoslavia in general, and not just in Serbia.
In this way all of the citizens of pre-war Yugoslavia who took up weapons can be,
roughly and somewhat cynically, divided according to which foreign domination
they preferred: German (or Italian), British (or American) or Soviet.
Regardless of a researcher’s willingness to concede and consider the foreign
factor in the civil war in Yugoslavia, he or she cannot deny that the steadiness
and intensity of foreign assistance significantly influenced the clash between the
Partisans, Četniks and supporters of Nedić and Ljotić. However, the true tri-di-
mensional image of the civil war, which divided the population of Yugoslavia into
three warring camps, can be understood only if we also consider the ties which
bound the belligerents with each other and each other’s patrons. For instance, the
Partisans cultivated contacts with Germans to exchange prisoners of war, they at-
tempted to arrange an unofficial ceasefire with the occupational forces in case of
an Anglo-Saxon landing on the Adriatic coast and they cooperated with the Brit-
ish and American missions closely. There were also direct and indirect contacts
between Nedić and the Western Allies via the government in exile. Četnik sought
cooperation with the USSR, while contacts between the JVuO commanders with
Germans and Italians are well known.
In the context of this study, we cannot avoid the complex question surrounding
the relationship between the USSR and the government in exile in general, and the
contacts between the Soviets and JVuO in particular. These relations have been
examined in historiography before. Nikola Popović referred to the issues sur-
rounding the relations between the USSR and the government and exile and JVuO
as “delicate questions” during “the hot years.”163 After 1948, Belgrade claimed
that Soviet policies were meant to undermine the Yugoslav Revolution. The idea
that Moscow sought to sabotage Partisan efforts defined the Yugoslav historiogra-
phy until the fall of the one party system in Yugoslavia. Pera Morača most clearly
expressed this view.164 The Anglo-Saxon authors similarly wrote according to the
daily political needs (of causing strife between the USSR and SFRJ.165 In contrast,
Soviet authors sought to prove that the USSR was on the side of the Partisans from
the outset of the conflict. A shortcoming of the Soviet historiography was its poor
source-base, in light of restrictive archival policies in the Soviet Union. In addi-
163
Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 10–11.
164
P. Morača, Oslobodilački rat i revolucija naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945: kratak pregled (Belgrade:
Mladost, 1961); P. Morača, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: (kratak pregled) (Belgrade: Rad,
1966); P. Moraća, “Odnosi između Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i Kominterne od 1941. do 1943.
Godine,” Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 1–2 (1969).
165
Auty, Tito; F. Maclean, The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito (New York: Harper & Broth-
ers, 1957); J. C. Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York:
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1967).
tion, the Soviet scholarship wanted to conceal Moscow’s diplomatic wartime ma-
neuvering, the aim of which was to gain the trust of Britain and the USA, whose
military assistance and promises of the second front were exceptionally important
in the difficult years of 1941–1943.
Popović’s Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu greatly
enriched the historiography at the end of Yugoslavia’s existence. Popović exam-
ined closely the history of relations between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the
USSR, including Mihailović’s movement. His study was based on sources from
Arhiv Jugoslavije, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, correspondence between Tito and the
Comintern held at the time in the State Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Archive of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugosla-
via, numerous volumes of published documents and a series of domestic and for-
eign memoirs. Popović offered a detailed analysis of the USSR’s policies towards
the Yugoslav government in exile, concluding that from June 22, 1941, the USSR’s
policy of supporting people’s fronts meant that Moscow encouraged cooperation
between Partisans and Četniks. Soviet policies were concentrated on weaken-
ing the German pressure on the Eastern Front. The USSR advocated the people’s
fronts with particular ferocity during 1941–1942, when the communist regime
found itself on the edge of abyss. According to Popović, the policy changed only in
August 1942, when the USSR began a campaign against Mihailović’s movement
which did not cross into open recognition of NOP as an alternative to the Royal
government in London. The USSR gave open and complete support to Tito as the
new ruler of Yugoslavia only in September, 1944, when the Soviet troops were
in Central and Southeastern Europe. The Soviet diplomatic maneuvering never
meant that they repudiated NOP, however. During the last years of Soviet Union’s
existence, Iu. Girenko argued similarly that the relationship between the USSR
and the Yugoslav Partisans was very close during the entire Second World War,
regardless of the USSR’s diplomatic maneuvering.166
The reevaluation of the Second World War in Yugoslavia came about only as
a result of the disappearance of the USSR and SFRJ and the loss of communist
monopoly on history writing in the Eastern bloc. With the outbreak of the civil
war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Second World War could not have been viewed
solely as the struggle for brotherhood and unity, social justice and freedom from
foreign occupiers and their collaborators. Instead, it was viewed as a civil war
between various Yugoslav nations, as well as a civil war between Serbs. The wave
of émigré literature, which flooded the Serbian academia and public with real and
imagined facts (as is often the case in war memoirs), also added to this new histo-
riographical direction. In these circumstances, the majority of older topics which
166
Iu. S. Girenko, Stalin — Tito (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991).
were considered to have been closed in the Yugoslav and the Soviet historiogra-
phy received new importance. Scholars posed new questions about the role of the
foreign factor in the outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia and its intensification
which caused hundreds of thousands of deaths.
This is the reason why relations between the USSR and the Royal government
in exile, as well as relations between the USSR and JVuO, are again important.
We examined the relations between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the USSR
on the eve of the war in the previous chapter. Much has been written about the
activity of the Yugoslav government in exile. There are collections of documents
with voluminous articles and comments,167 and wide-ranging research.168 The
most exhaustive research in the recent Serbian historiography was conducted by
M. Terzić for his dissertation (which unfortunately has not been published yet)
and it offers a complete overview of the activities of the government in exile:
collection of information from Yugoslavia, radio contact with JVuO, missions to
JVuO, the government’s view of the situation in occupied Yugoslavia, its attempts
to interfere with the events on the ground, and the disappearance of the émigré
government.169 The émigré government which was formed after the putsch on
March 27, argued Terzić, relied mostly on the support of the Great Britain during
the Second World War.170
The British government did not value the Yugoslav government in exile highly.
Eden characterized its members as “pathetic political speculators.”171 Consequent-
ly, London forced the changes which resulted in a government much more to its
liking.172 The Yugoslav government only “spent the capital of its previous author-
ity… and in absence of practical reality, it only imagined politics… far away from
the implementation of policies. It followed events slowly which were developing
rapidly, it was left without initiative, so it could only register events and react to
them by commenting.”173 This government was on the verge of becoming a puppet
167
Published documents: B. Krizman ed., Jugoslovenske vlade u izbjeglištvu: 1941–1943: dokumenti (Za-
greb: Globus, 1981); B. Petranović, Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu: 1943–1945: dokumenti (Bel-
grade: Arhiv Jugoslavije); Lj. Boban, Hrvatska u arhivima izbjegličke vlade: 1941–1943: izvještaji
informatora o prilikama u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Globus, 1985); K. Pijevac and D. Jončić, Zapisnici sa
sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941–1945, (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, Arhiv
Srbije i Crne Gore, 2004).
168
V. Đuretić, Vlada na bespuću: internacionalizacija jugoslovenskih protivrječnosti: 1941–1944, (Bel-
grade, 1983; D. Šepić, Vlada Ivana Šubašića (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); M. Stefanovski, Srpska politička
emigracija o preuređenju Jugoslavije: 1941–1943 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988).
169
Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima.”
170
V. Glišić, “Izbeglička Jugoslovenska kraljevska Vlada i srpsko nacionalno pitanje,” in Drugi svetski
rat — 50 godina kasnije, ed. V. Strugar (Podgorica: CANU — SANU, 1995), 208.
171
M. Radojević, “Izbeglička Vlada kraljevine Jugoslavije i jugoslovenska državna ideja” in Drugi svetski
rat — 50 godina kasnije, 217.
172
Šepić, Vlada.
173
Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 854.
government.174 It would be interesting to assess the relationship between the gov-

ernment in exile and the USSR, as well as the relationship between the USSR and
the allied governments in London, within the framework of ties between Britain
and the USSR.175 It is indicative that the NKVD viewed the governments in exile
in London as English agents, whose special services worked under the direct com-
mand of the British security structures.176
The relationship between the USSR and the Yugoslav government has been
investigated in Yugoslav historiography.177 Terzić examined in great detail the ac-
tivities of the exiled government’s representative in the USSR, which also boiled
down to already mentioned imagined politics which consisted of noting events
and then commenting on them.178 The diplomatic ties between the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and the USSR were renewed in July, 1941. It is symptomatic of the
Yugoslav government’s insignificance in the eyes of the Soviet policy makers that
when Molotov instructed the Soviet ambassador in London to let Eden know that
Moscow was ready to recognize the governments in exile, he mentioned by name
each leader of the government by name except the Yugoslav leader.179
Similarly, during the negotiations between Britain and the USSR in December,
1941, the Soviets offered the British to sign two agreements at the same time. The
first agreement was about mutual assistance between the state during the war and
after its completion (to expand the previous similar agreement from July 12, 1941).
The second agreement dealt with defining the postwar order in Europe. Among
others (after Czechoslovakia and Poland), the agreement predicted the postwar
reconstruction of Yugoslavia in expanded borders at the expense of Italy (Trieste,
Rijeka, Adriatic islands, and so on) and Bulgaria.180 The direct negotiations with
Britain about the postwar borders and status of Yugoslavia — without consulting
the government in exile — also reveal the Yugoslav government’s weak standing
amongst the Soviets.
The Yugoslav government’s first and basic demand was to place the Partisans
in Yugoslavia under Mihailović’s command. Later on, this demand turned into a
meek plea, which the émigré government unsuccessfully made with the British
174
C. L. McNeely, Constructing the nation-state: international organization and prescriptive action
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 61; J. R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 62–65.
175
In this context, the collection of documents compiled by contemporary Russian scholar Oleg
Rzheshevskii is very useful, Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill.
176
V. M. Chebrikov ed., Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti (Moscow: VSh KGB
SSSR, 1977), 405.
177
Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi.
178
179
Petranović ed., Odnosi, 74.
180
I. M. Maiskii, Vospominaniia sovetskogo diplomata, 1925–1945 gg. (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1980),
536–537; Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 38, 51.
and Soviet representatives. On November 15, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Ninčić, sent to his ambassador in Moscow, Simović, instructions to im-
mediately contact the Soviets to inquire about the Partisans. However, the Yugo-
slavs and the British received with great delay the same answer — the USSR does
not have contacts with the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia.181
Until the middle of 1942, Soviets asked representatives of the government
in exile to help them establish ties with JVuO. For example, on May 5, 1942, the
government in exile was informed that the Soviets were “inquiring about send-
ing an airplane to one of the airfields at Draža Mihailović’s disposal.”182 In its
response, the Yugoslav government asked that these types of negotiations should
go through London, which meant that it did not want to create such a relationship
independently and without the knowledge of the British government. It is ques-
tionable whether the Yugoslav government in exile could have facilitated contacts
between Mihailović and the USSR without the knowledge of the British, who
tended to control tightly the missions and radio connections. It is noticeable that
the hesitancy with regards to the JVuO was markedly different from Tito’s skillful
policy of communication with the British and the Germans.183
In the spring of 1942, the idea of the Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement emerged.
Officially, the Yugoslav side formulated this idea first, believing that in this way
it could “calm down the communist partisans.”184 The USSR at the time was in a
hurry to sign such an agreement, even more so than the Yugoslavs. However, the
Soviet wish to conclude such an agreement as soon as possible ran into an insur-
mountable obstacle in June and July, 1942, during Molotov’s visit to London. On
June 9, 1942, Eden told Molotov that the British government was against such an
agreement, supposedly because he wanted to avoid competition between Britain
and USSR in signing similar agreements with small countries. When Molotov
tried to convince Eden this was a mere continuation of a previous agreement,
Eden again categorically restated the British government’s opposition. The British
were particularly concerned that the agreement was to be in force until five years
after the end of the war.185
Several days after meeting Eden, Molotov had a discussion with Momčilo
Ninčić, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Yugoslav government in exile.186
The meeting took place on Ninčić’s request, who explained that despite the fact
181
AJ, Poslanstvo u Kujbiševu, f. 1, a. 230–231.
182
Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 265–266; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 190.
183
184
Krizman ed., Jugoslovenske vlade, 73..
185
“Zapis’ besedy Molotova s Idenom 9 iunia 1942 goda,” in Stalin i Cherchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 316–
317.
186
“Beseda Molotova s iugoslavskim ministrom inostrannykh del Ninchichem 10 iiunia 1942 goda,” in
Stalin i Cherchill, 339.
that the relationship with the USSR was excellent, the Yugoslav Royal Govern-
ment could not sign a friendship agreement with the USSR which would last for
five years after the war. Naturally, Ninčić did not mention the opposition to this
agreement from his British overlords. As a true diplomat, he explained that the
work on the text of the agreement was not finished because the Yugoslav govern-
ment had more pressing responsibilities at the moment: the Cairo Affair and the
threat of the King Peter and Prime Minister Jovanović of relocating to the USA
if Britain would not help them in this regard. According to Ninčić, the Yugoslav
government was additionally burdened by the infighting between Knežević and
Mirković, the love of the young King Peter for the Greek princess Aspasia, and her
mother’s wish for the young couple to marry immediately which was opposed by
Peter’s mother who wanted to postpone the wedding until after the war.187
To all of this, Molotov once again (and as it turned out, for the last time) made
his offer: “the Soviet government is ready to offer support to the Yugoslav govern-
ment and it wants to see Yugoslavia not only restored but expanded at the expense
of Italy. The support of the Soviet Union includes that the Yugoslav government
will have firm authority in the country and good relations with the USSR.”188
Ninčić thanked Molotov again, and added “that the Yugoslav government and
D. Mihailović as Minister of War of the government already have firm authority
in the country.” In his response, Molotov noted that “the Soviet government has
contradictory information about Draža Mihailović, but that this is in any case Yu-
goslavia’s internal affair, and the Soviet government has no intention of interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.” After hearing this, Ninčić bid farewell to
Molotov, telling him to pass on his “warm regards to Comrade Stalin.”189
Regardless of “the warm greetings,” “Comrade Stalin” likely did not have un-
derstanding for the difficulties which were tormenting the Yugoslav government
because a nineteen year old Peter II was in love with Princess Aspasia.190 The
Soviet side decided to break off negotiations considering that the Yugoslavs were
not sufficiently interested in continuing them. On July 4, 1942, Molotov wrote
to Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador in London, to tell Eden that the USSR was
in agreement with views expressed by Eden on June 9, and that he would not
187
Ibid., 338.
188
Ibid., 339.
189
Ibid., 339.
190
Stalin’s eldest son Iakov participated in battles as a commander of a howitzer battery and he died fight-
ing or in captivity. His middle son, Vasilii, a fighter pilot had several combat flights and he downed
two enemy airplanes. Artem Sergei, Stalin’s adopted son, participated in the war as a commander of a
howitzer company, he was taken prisoner and he escaped from captivity and reached the partisans, after
which he returned to the Red Army. The children of Stalin’s colleagues (A. A. Andreev, M. V. Frunze,
K. E. Voroshilov, A. S. Shcherbakov, A. I. Mikoian and N. M. Shvernik and others) also participated in
the war. They were between eighteen and thirty years old, A. Sergeev and E. Glushik, Besedy o Staline
(Moscow: Krymskii most-9D, 2006).
conclude agreements with “the smaller European countries” (as Eden expressed
himself).191
In the autumn of 1942, Soviets admitted to having contacts with the Yugoslav
Partisans, which they have denied since November, 1941. However, this admission
went hand in hand with the accusation that the General Mihailović was “cooperat-
ing with the occupiers.”192 In addition, in November 1942, Soviets announced that
they were convinced that the government in exile “does not have direct relations
with Draža.”193 This statement, repeated several times, most likely was meant to
challenge the government in exile to prove otherwise.
The Prime Minister Jovanović was consistent in his views — the Partisans
must first submit to Mihailović’s command, and only then could the question of
the Soviet liaison officers be considered.194 The demand for placing the Partisans
under Mihailović’s command was repeatedly made by the Yugoslav government
until 1943.195 Likewise, Jovanović’s personal initiative in October, 1942, to sign an
agreement with Czechoslovak and Polish leaders to prevent Soviet expansionism
westward after the war, did not improve ties with the Soviet Union.196 The Soviet
view of these negotiations could not have been positive especially because Mos-
cow already reacted coldly to a similar agreement between Greece and Yugosla-
via, signed on January 15, 1942.197 Already in early 1942, the Soviet intelligence
reported to Stalin, based on sources in the government in exile, “that official Yu-
goslav circles are wary of the growing strength of the USSR because an important
part of the Yugoslav population is under the influence of Russia.” According to
Soviet analysts, “the Greeks and the Yugoslavs have agreed to go along with the
Poles’ anti-Soviet machinations… and they signed the pact.” Signed in January,
1942, in London, the agreement between the Greek and the Yugoslav governments
in exile foresaw inclusion into the agreement of Romania and Bulgaria, with the
aim of forming future Balkans “according to the scheme [of the British — A. T.]
government… in order to prevent Soviet influence in southern Europe.”198
In autumn of 1943, between the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of
the USSR, Britain and the USA (October 19–30, 1943) and the Teheran Confer-
ence (November 28 — December 1, 1943), Britain and the USSR agreed that sup-
port must be offered to Tito’s movement. In Moscow, on October 30, 1943, Eden
191
G. Kynin, ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945.:
Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), T. 1, 254.
192
193
194
Ibid, 267.
195
Ibid, 267.
196
197
Ibid., 83–84.
198
L. F. Sotskov, comp., Pribaltika i geopolitika, Document 41, 43, 54.
mentioned Mihailović in a positive light for the last time in a conversation with
Molotov. He offered the Soviets to send their missions to Tito and Mihailović.
Molotov refused this offer. The time for negotiations had passed.199
The NKVD offered Stalin and Molotov insight into the background of the
British support for Mihailović. The NKVD received the report on the British view
of Draža Mihailović, which Eden sent to the British ambassador in Washington on
January 21, 1943. The letter stated that Mihailović did not actively fight against the
Germans, and that Britain was supporting him because “he and his organization
could prevent anarchy and Partisan chaos in Yugoslavia.”200 NKVD also obtained
the report which Eden sent to Churchill on October 15, 1943. This report described
in great detail the meeting between Eden and the Yugoslav King and his Prime
Minister. From the report it could be discerned that the British did not believe
that JVuO hindered the German occupational apparatus. According to Eden, “the
émigré government is mainly preoccupied with preserving the strength which
Mihailović has for period after the Germans are expelled from Yugoslavia.”201
Soviets diplomatically refused Eden’s suggestions to send a mission to
Mihailović, and it was agreed that Moscow would send an official mission only
to Tito.202 In the meantime, the British attitude towards Mihailović worsened. On
November 18, 1943, Armstrong and Bailey, the chief of missions to Mihailović,
sent a telegram to Cairo, stating that there was no use in continuing cooperation
with Mihailović since nothing could get him to actively fight against the Ger-
mans.203 In Teheran, in order to facilitate Soviet contact with the Partisans, the
British offered the Soviets air bases and the British no longer insisted on Moscow
sending missions to Mihailović.204 In further discussions, Churchill, Stalin and
Roosevelt did not mention Mihailović or Tito. They were interested in Operation
Overlord, Roosevelt’s suggestion about creating the United Nations after the war,
the postwar fate of Germany and the joint action against Japan.205 At the end of the
official part of the Teheran Conference, Churchill gave Stalin a map “which threw
light on the situation in Yugoslavia,” so that Stalin could compare the British
data with his information.206 On the same day, at Churchill’s birthday party in the
199
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–18; A. M, Sergienko, AGON — aviatsionnaia
gruppa osobogo naznacheniia (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1999), 18.
200
FSB RF, 2008), 472–474.
201
Ibid., 473.
202
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–18.
203
204
“Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Idenom i Gopkinsom vo vremia zavtraka v angliiskoi missii v Tegerane
30 noAJ, IABria 1943 goda,” in Stalin i Churchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 397.
205
Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 403–404
206
“Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Idenom i Gopkinsom vo vremia zavtraka v angliiskoi missii v Tegerane
30 noaibria 1943 goda”, in Stalin i Churchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 403.
British embassy, Churchill was in good mood, making a toast to the “proletarian
masses.” Stalin continued his courteous joke, making a toast “for the Conserva-
tive Party.”207
The ties between the USSR and the Yugoslav government in exile were defi-
nitely broken on December 14, 1943, when the Information Bureau of the NKID
USSR formally announced the Second AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National
Defense of Yugoslavia) Session, which selected Tito as head of NKOJ. The an-
nouncement provided the official Soviet comment on these events. “The govern-
ment of the USSR views these events, which already received positive reviews
from England and the USA, as positive facts which will contribute to the further
successful struggle of the people of Yugoslavia against the Hitlerite Germany.
They also testify to the serious success of the new leaders of Yugoslavia in uniting
all national forces in Yugoslavia. The USSR considers the activities of General
Mihailović from the same perspective, who according to available reports, has not
fought against the German occupier, and has even harmed the Yugoslav people’s
struggle against the German occupiers…believing that it was necessary to gather
detailed information about all events in Yugoslavia and partisan organizations,
the Soviet government has decided to send to Yugoslavia a Soviet Military Mis-
sion, as the British government has already done.”208 According to Zelenin’s mem-
oirs, the official Soviet Military Mission to Yugoslavia was already prepared in
late 1943.209 According to Nikolai Novikov’s memoirs, the Soviet ambassador in
Cairo, who dealt with relations with the exiled governments transferred to the
Middle East (Yugoslavia and Greece), the announcement on December 14, “did
not officially mark the recognition of NKOJ as government, but it was close to it,
which is known in the international law as de facto recognition. To Purić’s govern-
ment, this must have sounded as a dangerous signal…”210
This uncertain situation did not satisfy the émigré government, and despite
the hostile Soviet announcement, it addressed Moscow with an offer of a military
alliance. Pravda responded to the offer of alliance belatedly. “There is informa-
tion that in the middle of December of the last year, the chief of the Yugoslav
government in Cairo, Mr. Purić, addressed the government of the Soviet Union
with an offer to conclude a mutual assistance pact and postwar cooperation, based
on the model of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement. Mr. Purić’s offer had to
have caused doubts in Soviet circles, if we take into account the situation which
has emerged in Yugoslavia… the Soviet government responded that it could not
207
Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 406.
208
“Saopštenje TASS od 14. decembra 1943,” in Petranović ed., Odnosi, 345.
209
210
Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata, 203.
accept Mr. Purić’s offer because of the lack of clarity in Yugoslavia…”211 This
insulting rejection was followed by an ironic comment: “it would be interesting to
mention that the question of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact was already opened in the
spring of 1942. The idea of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact, then, was supported by the
Soviet side. However, the Yugoslav government which at the time was in London
was obviously not prepared to assess the pact as it does today.”212 When TASS car-
ried the announcement about the failed negotiations between the Yugoslav gov-
ernment in exile and the USSR in February, 1944, the official Soviet mission was
on their way to Yugoslavia, which it reached on February 23, 1944.213
After the debacle of direct negotiations, Purić’s government made a last at-
tempt to improve ties with the USSR. The Prime Minister of the Yugoslav govern-
ment personally addressed a letter to the Soviet ambassador which was signed by
a group of Soviet prisoners of war who escaped from German camps and found
shelter amongst the fighters of the General Mihailović. The authors of the letter
called Mihailović “the leader of the Serbian people,” and they sharply criticized
Tito. According to the later Pravda announcement, “the ambassador returned the
letter to Purić, while pointing out its obviously faulty content.”214 After the let-
ter was returned with negative comments, relations between Purić’s government
and the USSR were worse than cold. According to Novikov, Purić demonstrably
refused the invitation to the celebration of the day of the Red Army (February,
23),215 which was noted by the Soviet as well as other foreign ambassadors present
at the event.216
On March 6, 1944, Moscow publically announced that the Soviet delegation
had reached Tito’s Headquarters.217 The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, as well
as the Military Representative, announced their “change in loyalty” on March 10,
1944, and they placed themselves at Tito’s disposal.218 Soon, the USSR announced
the arrival to Moscow of the official NKOJ Military Mission.219
In the meantime, the British government suggested to King Peter “to imme-
diately dismiss Purić’s government and to organize a smaller government which
would be comprised of people who would not be too unpleasant to Marshal Tito.”220
211
Pravda, February 5, 1944; Petranović ed., Odnosi Јugoslaviјe i Rusiјe (SSSR) 1941–1945, 363.
212
Ibid., 363.
213
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–22.
214
“Neukliuzhie popytki reabilitatsii generala Mikhailovicha,” Pravda, February 6, 1944.
215
On that day the government held its regular meeting. K. Pijevac and D. Jončič, Zapisnici, 423–425.
216
Novikov, Vospominaniia, 204.
217
Petranović ed., Odnosi, 377.
218
Novikov, Vospominaniia, 205; Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 270–271; Petranović ed., Odnosi,
378–381.
219
Pravda April 13, 1944, Правда, 13 апреля, 1944; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 387.
220
G. Kynin ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia T. 2, 73.
The British implemented the changes in the Yugoslav government in exile with
consultation with the USSR,221 which advised that such a government should be
formed with Tito’s support.222
The King, Britain and Tito (with the help of the Soviet government), managed
to choose new and last prime minister of the government in exile who was very
suitable for NKOJ. Ivan Šubašić became the new prime minister, one of the more
notable Croatian pre-war HSS (The Croatian Peasant Party) politicians. During
the April War in 1941, Šubašić refused to release communists from prison and he
was an uncompromising anti-communist.223
The USSR’s informal relations with the King’s future Prime Minister, who
signed the Vis Agreement while renouncing D. Mihailović and thereby legalizing
the KPJ reign, have been discussed before. The relations date to early 1943, which
is proven by an IKKI telegram sent to Tito, which asked the Yugoslav leader
whether he believed it prudent for Šubašić to make a formal announcement about
the Partisans and what the content of the announcement should be. Tito’s response
to this telegram in January, 1943, can be found in his collected works.224 As Dim-
itrov stated on January 21, 1943, “the Yugoslav comrades view Šubašić positively
and they believe that his announcement to Croatian peasants is useful. As far as
the content of Šubašić’s announcement is concerned, it would be preferable if it
would: a) clearly and categorically support the Supreme Command of NOV and
AVNOJ… b) call upon unity of all the people of Yugoslavia in the struggle against
the occupier; c) condemn the Yugoslav assistants to collaborators and all those
who are against NOV and are breaking the united front of the people of Yugosla-
via; d) criticize Maček and his supporters in Croatia…”225
It surfaced only in 1994 that Šubašić established firm contacts with the Soviet
intelligence during 1942. Dimitrov summarized Tito’s views on Šubašić in a report
sent to Paul Fitin, the head of the 1st Department of the NKVD USSR.226 It became
clear from Dimitrov’s letter that the previous question addressed to Tito from the
IKKI originated in the 1st Department of the NKVD. The joint work of the USA and
Britain on deciphering the reports from the Soviet embassy in Washington came
to fruition in 1951. It turned out that the NKVD was able to recruit two important
agents in the ranks of the Yugoslav emigration in the USA: the Yugoslav ambassa-
dor in the USA, Sava Kosanović (codename Kolo) and the future last prime minister
221
This set the stage for the percentages agreement between Stalin and Churchill which divided the Soviet-
Britsh influence in Europe in October, 1944, Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 412–488.
222
G. Kynin ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia T. 2, 80.
223
Šepić, Vlada.
224
Tito, Djela, tom 13, 187.
225
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 311.
226
Ibid., 311.
of the Yugoslav government in exile Ivan Šubašić (codename Seres).227 These events
are confirmed in general terms by the website of the present-day Russian intelli-
gence agency, which claims that during the war NKVD had exceptionally useful
agents in the various governments in exile, including the Yugoslav.228
Later on, Šubašić and Kosanović participated in negotiations with KPJ lead-
ers on Vis, as representatives of King Peter II Karađorđević. They discussed the
future of Yugoslavia on this Croatian island with the members of the CK KPJ
Djilas and Kardelj. During the negotiations, Djilas recalled, Šubašić pulled him
aside and whispered to his ear “that he reported everything to Soviets.” Djilas
interpreted this gesture as Šubašić’s flirtation with the winners, and with disgust
he related this event to his comrades. When Tito learned about this, he nodded
smilingly, while Ranković laughed with satisfaction.229
The relationship between the USSR and JVuO, within the context of the Sec-
ond World War in Yugoslavia, has special importance. We must differentiate the
relations between the USSR and the Royal government in exile from the rela-
tions between the Soviets and JVuO. The Soviet government wanted to establish
contacts with resistance movements in Western Europe from the beginning of
war, because it sought to strengthen subversive activities of all types behind the
enemy’s frontlines. On July 7, 1941, IKKI, with Molotov’s preliminary agreement,
sent a directive to communist parties in all of occupied Europe to form united peo-
ple’s fronts, and to cooperate “with all forces, regardless of their political direction
and character, if they are against the fascist Germans.”230 The new Soviet policy
of cooperation with De Gaulle’s movement in France, Beneš in Czechoslovakia,
J. Nygaardsvold in Norway and the leaders of resistance in Benelux countries, did
not encounter the support from sponsors and protectors of these movements — the
British government.231 The British ambassador in the USSR, Cripps, suggested to
London to include French Communists in its negotiations with De Gaul. The Brit-
ish government rejected this suggestion.232
227
V. V. Pozdniakov, “Tainaia voina Iosifa Stalina: sovetskie razvedyvatel’nye sluzhby v Soedinennykh
Shtatakh nakanune i v nachale ‘kholodnoi voiny’ 1943–1953 gg. ”in Stalin i “kholodnaia voina”, ed.
A. O. Chubar’ian (Moscow: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1998); Venona: Soviet Espionage and
the American Response 1939–1957, edit. R. L. Benson and M. Warner, (Washington, D. C.: National
Security Agency: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996); Venona, KGB N. Y. to M. — 952 (21. 6. 1943);
KGB N. Y. to M. — 578 (28. 4. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 612 (3. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 617
(4. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 639 (6. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 695 (16. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y.
to M. — 960 (8. 7. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 1042 (25. 7. 1944).
228
Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September
16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / stage05.htm.
229
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 401.
230
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 109–114.
231
Ibid., 10.
232
Ibid.,11.
The Soviet attempts to obtain information about the existing European resis-
tance movements continued. In 1941, the largest such movement was in Serbia,
under Mihailović’s leadership. According to Vasilije Trbić, the first information
about existence of Colonel Mihailović’s movement reached Istanbul via Dragomir
Rakić, who arrived from Serbia at the end of July. Rakić received this information
from Alexander Mišić with whom he had a conversation in Belgrade. Accord-
ing to Trbić, Mišić’s message was “When you go to Istanbul, you will seek out
in every way possible and you will find Vasilije Trbić. He now lives in Istanbul.
Tell him that a number of Serbian officers did not want to surrender, and instead
they went into the forest and they recognized Colonel Draža Mihailović as their
leader. We will organize all of Serbia, and in a given moment, we will organize
all of it into an uprising. But we want to be connected with the English. We do not
want to have any negotiations with the government of Dušan Simić. We want to
work directly with the English and we ask Trbić to facilitate this contact.”233 Trbić
related all of the information to Colonel Bailey, who passed on the news to Jovan
Djonović, the Yugoslav government representative for the Middle and Near East.
Soon, a conference was organized which was attended by S. W. Bailey (the future
British liaison officer at the JVuO Supreme Command), captain N. J. Amery,234
J. Bennet (the future chief of the Yugoslav SOE department),235 J. Djonović and
V. Trbić. In addition, “a Russian, whose name was simply Nikolaev” attended the
meeting.236
Jovan Djonović pointed out his role in obtaining information about Mihailović’s
movement from the first hand. Djonović left out the text of Mišić’s message, and
his insistence that the movement should be directly connected with the English,
and not the Yugoslav government. He also claimed that Trbić did not bring Rakić
to him, but that Djonović addressed the English simply because they did not have
money, and he wanted to get 1,000,000 dinars from them and to send the money
immediately to Mihailović.237
233
V. Trbić, Memoari. Kazivanja i doživljaji vojvode veleškog (1912–1918, 1941–1946), knj. I i II (Bel-
grade: Kultura, 1996), Kn. II, 201..
234
Trbić did not mention J. Ameri by name, instead he described him as younger son of an English Min-
ister of Colonies whose elder son on daily bases called for peace between England and Germany via a
Berlin radio, Ibid., 198, 202.
235
About the former SOE officers see the recent scholarship based on accessible SOE reports: H. Wil-
liams, Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941–
1945, (London: Hurst, 2003).
236
The English participants of the meeting also mentioned the Russian Officer Nikolaev. According to
them, the possibility of the Soviet-British Mission was discussed August 4–31, while indirect negotia-
tions with Nikolaev were held September 5–7. Williams, Parachutes, 48–49.
237
The English version mentions Đonović’s plea for money, but does not specify whether Đonović or
Trbović first initiated the contact with SOE. At the same time, according to Bailey’s report, Đonović
suggested that the first mission to Mihailović should be formed with Soviet participation, Williams,
Parachutes, 48..
There is also a discrepancy in explanation of how the idea of coordinated mis-

sions emerged and why it failed. Djonović believed that because two resistance
movements were present in Yugoslavia, it was necessary to coordinate the Yugo-
slav, British and Soviet activities. “With the aim of coordinating action, in Istanbul
I spoke with the Colonel of the Soviet army Nikolaev… and Colonel Bailey, the
chief of the English service. Both consulted their governments, and after a brief
period of time, Nikolaev told me that Moscow would agree to cooperate in jointly
sending of officers… in the last moment, the English and Simović torpedoed this
action… soon after, a real civil war broke out between the communists and the
nationalists, precipitated by the communist attack on Mihailović’s forces.”238
Trbić further described the course of the Serbian-British-Russian confer-
ences. According to him, the initiative in leading the discussion was undertaken
by Colonel Bailey, not Djonović. Supposedly, Bailey told those gathered at the
conference that “he received orders from Churchill to immediately send finan-
cial assistance to Draža Mihailović, as a sign that the English accept him, and
to prepare a crew made up of three Serbs, while they would provide one English
officer, who would control the radio-station… the second crew, comprised of six
officers, all of whom should be aviators, need to go to Russia. This crew for Rus-
sia should be led by Dušan Radović, a General Staff and aviation Colonel… when
everything was agreed, the plan was sent to London. After several days, the plan
in its entirety was approved in London, as well as in Moscow. The Russians asked
that one of their representatives… goes to Draža Mihailović’s headquarters. The
following plan was definitely agreed upon: two Serbs, one Englishman and one
Russian were to go to Draža Mihailović immediately, while five aviation officers
and Dušan Radović would go to Russia. After several days, another order ar-
rived from London, that things must be verified again, because the government
in London claimed that Dragoljub Mihailović Colonel of the Yugoslav army and
former Military Representative in Bulgaria does not exist in Serbia… again sev-
eral days passed. Another telegram reached us from Churchill, that two Serbs and
one English radio-telegraph expert should travel to Mihailović, but that there must
not be one Russian in the group. As far as the other crew was concerned, which
had to go to Russia, the English were not interested in it.”239 After this, Bogoljub
Ilić, the Minister of War, personally forbid the implementation of the second part
of the agreed plan — to send the Yugoslav Royal Army officers to the USSR.240
As a result, “the Russians were extremely angry because the entire plan… was
ruined. Even though the plan was finally agreed upon in London and Moscow.
238
J. Đonović, Moje veze sa Dražom Mihajlovićem (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 84–
86.
239
Trbić, Memoari, Knj. II, 202–204.
240
This Trbić’s claim was confirmed by English reports, Williams, Parachutes, 54.
The Russian Nikolaev only tightened his teeth and cursed something in Russian
and I think that the curse was addressed to the Serbian-English coalition.”241 In ad-
dition, the English gave the Serbs one million dinars for Mihailović’s movement,
and they sent their first mission to Yugoslavia.242
Kosta Nikolić, the Serbian historian, called the failed mixed Anglo-Russian
mission to Mihailović “a Russian project.” His sources were Djonović’s memoirs
and Mark Wheeler’s lectures at the University of Belgrade, which the famous
historian of the British special services delivered on February 16, 1990. Wheeler
is a representative of the traditional Anglo-Saxon historiography which sought to
find traces of the Tito-Stalin break at an earliest time possible, and that is why he
viewed the Soviet wish to establish contacts with Mihailović as Moscow’s attempt
to punish and marginalize Tito.243 Nikolić quoted Robert Campbell report in the
middle of August, 1941, in order to show that the argument over the joint mission
was part of the British-Soviet power struggle “to take on the positions prior to
the division of spoils in the Balkans.”244 However, Campbell and Nikolić did not
understand the situation in which the Soviet Union found itself in the summer and
early autumn of 1941.
The German well-trained and disciplined armored machine destroyed several
Soviet divisions per day; hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war were taken or
were killed and large parts of the country were occupied. All of this was shock-
ing to the communist leaders, and their previous confidence in the strength of
the Red Army was lost. The German advance continued further — on October
8, Stalin approved the mining of most important buildings in Moscow, and on
October 12, Germans captured Kaluga (168km southwest of Moscow), on October
14, they took Kalinin (167km northwest of Moscow). The Soviet Union’s capital
city was partially surrounded. On October 15, the decision was made to move
the Soviet government, the Supreme Soviet and foreign missions to Kuibyshev (a
city 1,051 km southeast of Moscow). The Wehrmacht propaganda used the slogan
“Hitler — liberator” and claimed that the German troops did not come to fight
against the Russians, but against “the Bolshevik terror,” which encountered the
support amongst certain layers of the Soviet population. Nobody could have pre-
dicted that Hitler had the idea of completely destroying the Russian state, and that
several million Soviet prisoners of war would die in the unbearable conditions
(hunger and disease) and that Hitler would not want to use them to create anti-
241
Trbić, Memoari Knj. 2, 202–204.
242
At the end, after all the manipulations, only 900,000 dinars reached Mihailović out of 1,000,000 that he
was given by the British, Đonović, Moje veze, 85.
243
Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia.
244
Đonović, Moje veze, 20.
Bolshevik armies.245 Nobody suspected that Wehrmacht would not plan for the
winter, failing to prepare its armaments and soldiers for the Russian cold. Nobody
could have known that Siberian divisions would succeed in defending Moscow
and that Japan would not attack the USSR, which would have certainly sent the
USSR on the edge of the defeat. In these circumstances, it is obvious that during
July-December, 1941, the USSR could not have even thought about division of
spoils in the far-off Balkans. The Balkans were not important to Stalin even in his
prewar expansionist plans, which at maximum included Romania, Bulgaria and
part of European part of Russia, but never Yugoslavia, for which Moscow only
demanded neutrality.246
However, it could be seen from Trbić’s and Djonović’s memoirs, British re-
ports, as well as the confidential instructions which the Comintern sent to KPJ
that the USSR was in a critical situation and that the German victory seemed very
probable. In these circumstances, Stalin was prepared to use every opportunity
to weaken the Germans, even slightly.247 At this time (summer and autumn of
1941), only resistance movements actively fought against the German troops in
Europe. In majority of countries (France, the Protectorate, Norway and the Neth-
erlands), these movements existed mainly on paper, and they were direct SOE cre-
ations, which diminished the value and importance of having direct relations with
them.248 In the summer of 1941, another resistance movement emerged. It was not
clear to Britain and the USSR who stood behind this movement and how power-
ful it was. The Soviet interest in Yugoslavia was increased by Stalin’s skepticism
towards the Comintern — the majority of communist parties were destroyed or
were completely illegal, and majority of permanent members became passive. Co-
mintern was perhaps capable of organizing diversionary actions, but staging mas-
sive uprising seemed impossible.249 The idea of workers’ class solidarity turned
out to be a weaker than the idea of national unity propagated by the Nazi Germany
245
A. Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wrote to General-Field marshal Kei-
tel on February 28, 1942: “The destiny of prisoners in Germany has become a tragedy of great dimen-
sion. Out of 3,6 million prisoners, at present time, only several hundred thousand is completely capable
of working. Most of them died from hunger and cold. Thousands died from typhus. It is understood that
supplying with food such a great mass of prisoners has encountered great problems…” GARF, f. 7445,
o. 2, d. 139, 97–98.
246
Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 1, 310–311.
247
248
About the key SOE role in strengthening and survival of West European movement see D. Stafford,
Britain and the European Resistance 1940–1945: A Survey of SOE, with Documents (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1983); M. R. D. Foot, Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism
(London: Methuen, 1976); B. Moore, Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000).
249
N. S. Lebedeva and M. M. Narinskii, “Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (posle 22 iiunia 1941),” in Is-
toriia Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala 1919–1943. Dokumental’nye ocherki, ed. A. O. Chubar’ian
(Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 192–202.
and its allies. The only exception was Yugoslavia, where Partisans managed to
attract masses to their cause. However, the information from Yugoslavia arrived
from only one centre (from KPJ), which made the information highly subjective.
That is why there was a need for information which could help the Soviets formu-
late their policies towards Mihailović’s movement.
At the same time, the USSR’s weakness in the summer of 1941 was apparent,
and it made the Soviet Union less attractive as a partner. The problem was not that
the USSR did not take any steps to assist Yugoslavia in 1941, neither did Britain
which caused the putsch which led to Yugoslavia’s destruction. The problem was
deeper, and it was related to perception of the USSR and Russia by a part of the
Serbian elite — the same elite which played a crucial role in putsch on March
27, in the formation of the Royal government in exile and in the formation of the
Četnik movement in Serbia.
As was noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Serbian middle and educated
classes were culturally, politically and informally oriented towards the countries
of the former Entente, which was born out of the First World War alliance. These
feelings resulted in underestimating Russia, one of the members of Entente, which
due to the revolution was treated as a loser at Versailles.
This view was shared by a large part of representatives of the Serbian po-
litical elite in the 1930s. According to Trbić, on the eve of the German attack on
the USSR, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ninčić believed that “if it comes to
war between Russia and Germany, Russia will be overrun in a month at most,
and only later will Russians gather strength somewhere behind the Urals…” The
Prime Minister of the government in exile, General Simović, had similar views.
He responded to Ninčić: “This is true! Russia cannot last longer than a month.” 250
The employees of the Yugoslav Royal Embassy in the USSR in 1941, the ambassa-
dor Milan Gavrilović, his spokesman Kosta Krajmušović and the military attaché
Žarko Popović, believed likewise.251 In this context, we can mention the view ex-
pressed in a postwar essay by Russian emigrants in Bileć jail. A Russian emigrant
in Bileć jail wrote that the relations between members of Zbor and Russian ex-
iles were warm, pointing out mutual sympathies between Russian emigrants and
Četnik commanders from the territory outside of Serbia proper,252 a contention
which is supported by other sources.253 In contrast, the authors of the essay pointed
out that the relations between emigrants and the JVuO leadership from Serbia was
cold, not only due to political differences but also because of the prewar general
“antipathy towards the Russian emigrants.”
250
Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188.
251
Ibid., 188–189.
252
Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Elaborat UDB, (Bileća: s. n., 1953), 723–730.
253
N. Plećaš, Ratne godine (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 107.
Vasilije Trbić had an opportunity to hear about the first hand impressions from
the USSR from Milan Gavrilović and Kosta Krajšumović. According to Trbić,
“our entire delegation in Moscow was ill-disposed towards Russia and its regime.
All reports about Russian things Gavrilović received from Sir Strafford Cripps,
the English ambassador in Russia. Gavrilović saw Stalin only twice, at large re-
ception before the New Year’s and on the occasion when Russia and Yugoslavia
were signing a pact not to attack each other… about Russia’s military prepared-
ness, Krajmušović told me that it was high: that there is large army, but that it was
not capable of fighting. This was the view of all those who viewed the organiza-
tion of the Russian army, whether in Russia or they viewed it through numerous
publications, which discussed Russian army.” These views led to the following
events: “Kosta told me one ugly thing, which occurred on the Russian-Turkish
border. Žarko Popović, a General Staff Colonel and military representative, was
not well received in the circles where he had to represent the strength of his coun-
try because he openly expressed his disgust towards everything he saw and noted
in the life of the contemporary Russia… with such attitude, he closed all doors to
him in Moscow’s high military circles. But when they came to the Russo-Turkish
border, while the Russians who were seeing them [to the border — A. T.] were still
observing them, Colonel Žarko Popović and Secretary Božić, in front of all the
present Russians, demonstratively urinated on Russian land!”254
It is not likely that Draža Mihailović, whose natural tact was pointed out by
his numerous interlocutors, would have approved the behavior of his “inseparable
friend.”255 Nonetheless, in a plea which A. Mišić delivered to D. Raković, one
could detect the clear preference for Britain in foreign orientation. The cause for
Mihailović’s preference for the British was not rooted in hatred towards Russia
or the USSR. Instead, it was a typical view, which later on was picturesquely ex-
pressed by Živko Topalović. This characteristic attitude, Topalović imputed to an
anonymous Serbian peasant from Herzegovina: “Forever we fought with Russians
together, but they fought for their state and we for ours, they under their command,
and we under ours. Even then the life of the people was not the same. There, great
princes and sipahi lorded over the land and the peasants, but we evicted sipahi
from our country and gave the land to the peasant. Even then we were very dif-
ferent from the Russians, but that did not prevent us from supporting each other
in war and together to defeat the Turks, and after, each went his own way! That’s
how it is with Stalin. Let him help us liberate ourselves from the Germans but he
should not interfere in our state. We will not let him do this, just as our ancestors
did not let the Russian Czar write the Constitution and laws for us. Then, they
254
Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188–189.
255
B. Dimitrijević and K. Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović. Biografija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu isto-
riju, 2004), 94.
respected and supported Russian Czars, while they honestly helped us out.”256 Ac-
cording to Yugoslav tacticians, the USSR’s resistance could not have lasted more
than a month or two, and therefore, this meant that the Četnik movement should
orient itself exclusively towards the British. Naturally, this view was favored by
English politicians, who sought to limit Soviet contacts with the European move-
ments.257 The British had the opportunity to prevent such ties, since in the summer
and autumn of 1941, their submarines and airplanes were geographically closer to
Yugoslavia.
Nikolić viewed the failure of the joint Russian-British mission as something
unimportant. He based this conclusion on Wheeler’s statement that the joint mis-
sion to Mihailović failed as a result of an agreement between NKVD and SOE,
signed on September 30, 1941.258 Yet, the situation was significantly different. Due
to German occupation, the NKVD Balkan Department was not able to continue
its activities in the territories of most Balkan countries. Instead, the NKVD had
to work mainly through its Central European (German) Department, which began
working in the territory of the entire occupied Europe. In addition, the English-
American Department offered information about émigré governments. As a re-
sult, the Middle Eastern Department, which dealt with Turkey and other countries
in the Near East, became especially important. In the first year of the war, the
Soviet resident agent in Turkey was very important for Yugoslavia, because in
addition to collecting general information about the German-Turkish relations, it
also worked on creating illegal networks in “Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and
Greece, so it found in Turkey suitable agents and it sent them into the countries of
the occupied Balkans…”259
Who was the NKVD General Nikolaev who reacted so angrily to the failure of
the negotiations? It is apparent that he was not a general of the NKVD (at the time,
the NKVD did not have the official rank of the general), nor was his real name
Nikolaev. The person who partook in negotiations for the joint mission was Vasilii
Mikhailovich Zarubin, a man who began his career in Soviet security structures
in 1921. He worked in the intelligence service from 1924, and in 1925, he began
working for OGPU. He travelled abroad as the USSR’s legal representative, but
he also had a series of illegal missions: in 1927 in Denmark, in 1930 in France,
in 1933 in Germany and in 1937 in the USA. In February, 1941, Zarubin became
the deputy chief to the 1st Department of the NKGB USSR (later on in the same
256
Ž. Topalović, Srbija pod Dražom (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 184.
257
In this context, it should be mentioned that Bailey justified the idea of the Soviet-British Mission in
Yugoslavia by arguing that it would be a useful example of English-Russia cooperation, and at the same
time it would curtail possible Russian ambitions in the region, Williams, Parachutes, 49.
258
259
year the name reverted to NKVD).260 His high position did not prevent him from
working abroad in particularly sensitive cases. His last important assignment, be-
fore the Istanbul Conference, was in the spring of 1941. He managed the NKGB
relationship with the Soviet agent Walter Stennes, a German politician and advisor
to Chan Kai-shek who was tasked during the Second World War with preventing
the emergence of close ties between the Axis powers and Chan Kai-shek. Zarubin
continued his successful career after the Istanbul Conference — during the war,
he was the NKVD resident in the USA, and after the war he returned to the posi-
tion of the deputy head of the intelligence service of the state security. Later on,
he was pensioned but continued working on educating the new intelligence agents
for the KGB USSR.261
The very fact that Zarubin personally participated in the Yugoslav-British-So-
viet Conferences in Istanbul testifies to the fact that these negotiations were very
important for the Soviet Union. Also, the manner in which Zarubin was forced
out of negotiations does not seem to have been accidental. Wheeler maintained (as
reported by Kosta Nikolić) that the joint mission supposedly did not materialize
because of the agreement between the NKVD and the SOE. This was an obvious
attempt to masque the elegant way in which the English threw Zarubin out of ne-
gotiations. However, Zarubin participated in negotiations with Colonel Givens on
August 14–29, and the agreement between the NKVD and the SOE was already
signed, while the negotiations between ‘Nikolaev’ and Bailey were held Septem-
ber 5–7. Apart from the internal conflict of the Yugoslav participants in the ne-
gotiations, the disinterest of the British leadership in sending a joint mission was
probably the most important factor. According to Trbić, it was agreed that a purely
Yugoslav mission should be sent. Only twelve hours before their departure, the
SOE suddenly decided to include Captain Duane Hudson into the mission.262 This
was not the only instance of deception in the mostly unsuccessful cooperation
between the SOE and the NKVD, since only the urgent military threat facing both
Britain and Soviet Union compelled the two intelligence agencies to cooperate.263
B. Starkov, a Russian professor, caused a storm in the Serbian public in 1996
with his short essay “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii. Novye dokumen-
ty, noviye podhody” (Pan-Slavic idea in Soviet Russia. New Documents, new
approaches).264 Starkov tried to prove a very controversial thesis that the pre-war
260
Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow::
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 203–216, 385–399.
261
E. P. Sharapov, Naum Eitingon — karaiushchii mech Stalina (Sankt Peterburg: Neva, 2003); E. Stavin-
skii, Zarubiny: Semeinaia rezidentura (Moscow: Olma-press, 2003).
262
Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović, 200–201.
263
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 385–399; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 393–403.
264
Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii.”
USSR relied on Pan-Slavic ideology in its policies in Eastern Europe and the Bal-
kans. Unfortunately, his study had numerous faults. First, the title of the essay
was speculative. To claim that the Pan-Slavism was at the root of the IKKI and
the NKVD activities is non-scholarly. We cannot engage Starkov’s essay in great
detail, but the very fact that the Russians were a minority in these institutions re-
veals the weakness of his thesis. Second, the essay is filled with factual mistakes
which reveal that Starkov did not study the events well enough. Starkov obviously
confused Žarko Popović and Draža Mihailović (he referred to Mihailović as the
chief of the military intelligence agency), as well as Ivan Srebrenjak and Ivan
Krajačić (claiming that the latter was killed by Gestapo in 1943), which alone
raises serious questions about the validity of his study. One should not even speak
about the countless minor mistakes (such as his claim that Hudson was not major
but captain, and so on). It was obvious that Starkov managed to obtain previously
unknown documents, but unfortunately, none of them related to the topic of the
civil war in Serbia in 1941. In fact, the contribution of his study could be summa-
rized- in the sentence “in the prewar USSR, there were unrealized plans for using
the Pan-Slavic attitudes of the South Slavs.”265 Starkov did not cite any evidence
(sources) to show that the Soviet leadership went beyond this. His article would
have probably been unnoticed had it not had such an attractive title and topic,
which coincided with one of favorite myths of the Yugoslav historiography about
the Pan-Slavic banner of the Soviet foreign policy, as the direct inheritor of the
Imperial Russian policies.266
The situation was further complicated by the fact that Starkov’s essay was
published in Russian, which coincided with another myth (equally popular
amongst the Russians and the Serbs) that the Serbian and Russian languages are so
similar that professional translation is not necessary between the two. We should
note once again that the essay did not mention the fact that NKVD had some
265
It must be added that the prewar USSR was full of unrealized ideas how to build communism. These
ranged between the use of ‘supernatural’ means to spread the revolution and the scientific experiments
to pair up monkeys and humans to prove the Darwin’s theory and to produce “fighters without national-
ity for the rights of the proletariat.” A. I. Pervushin, Okkul’tnye voiny NKVD i SS: Spetssluzhby i Arma-
geddon KhKh v.: Sviatoi Graal’ Tret’ego reikha. NKVD protiv masonov. Gitler i Tibet. Magi Sovetskogo
Soiuza (Moscow: Iauza: EKSMO, 2003); A. Bushkov, NKVD. Voina s nevedomym (Moscow: OLMA
Media Grup, 2004); K. O. Rossiianov, “Opasnye sviazi: I. I. Ivanov i opyty skreshchivaniia cheloveka
s chelovekoobraznymi obez’ianami,” Voprosy Istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki 1, (2006).
266
To the degree that the ruling circles in the Czarist Russia in the 19th and early 20th Centuries had any trans-
national Slavic aspirations, they did not uphold Pan-Slavic but Slavophile ideas. The latter was premised
on a mixture of ethnic and religious ideas, however, the idea of Orthodoxy was central to this ideology.
The Pan-Slavic ideology which sought closer ties or a common state for all Slavs regardless of religion
was closer to the ideas of a Croat Juraj Križanić in the 17th Century and the Czech so called awakeners in
the 19th Century, and a part of the liberal Russians later on in the 19th Century. About the role of Orthodoxy
as an idealistic, but a firm ideological component of the ruling Russian elite’s worldview see A. Timofejev,
“Ideologija slavjanofila u radovima A. S. Homjakova,” Međunarodni naučni skup “Deligrad 1806–1876.
Od ustanka ka nezavisnosti,” (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007).
special ties with JVuO. Instead, it discussed the contacts between the Partisans
and Četniks which were well known in Yugoslav historiography.267 According to
Starkov, the change in the Soviet attitude towards the Balkans was influenced by
the information which arrived from Yugoslavia. According to Starkov, Moscow
decided that it was better to cooperate with a man who was accused of Left Devia-
tion, than with somebody who was accused of collaboration.268 Obviously, Starkov
was citing Tito’s report to Dimitrov about Draža Mihailović’s movement, which
the Comintern sent to Stalin, Malenkov, Beria and Shcherbakov.269
However, as we already said, Starkov had an opportunity to look over new
prewar documents. One of the documents shed light on V. T. Sukhorukov’s plans,
who was the Soviet military attaché in Bulgaria, to strengthen the ties between
Pan-Slavic and anti-German officers and generals of the Balkan countries (Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia), with the help of the Russian emigration. Sukhorukov tried
to gain the support of, among others, the Bulgarian General Vladimir Zaimov
and the Serbian Colonel Draža Mihailović.270 This thesis is supported by other
research, such as the list of military attachés by the NKID USSR.271 Sukhorukov,
Colonel of the Red Army, was the military attaché in Sofia, 1934–1937, and he
could have had informal relations with the General Vladimir Zaimov, who was
recruited in 1939 by Suhorukov’s successor, I. A. Venediktov. Zaimov worked
for RU RKKA in Bulgaria until 1942, when he was caught and executed (he was
awarded posthumously the Golden Star Hero of the USSR).272 V. T. Suhorukov was
in Sofia at the same time as Mihailović, who was the Yugoslav Military attaché
in Bulgaria, 1935–1936. K. Nikolić and B. Dimitrijević mentioned the possibility
of informal links between Mihailović and Bulgarian officers and Bulgarian op-
position, in their study Djeneral Mihailović. Biography.273 Unfortunately, Starkov
imprecisely cited the source of his information about the contacts between Sukho-
rukov and Mihailović as “Stalin’s Archive.” He probably had in mind the special
Stalin folders in GARF or parts of the Archive of the President of the Russian
Federation, which at the moment are mostly inaccessible to researchers.
267
Dedijer, Josip Broz, 326–330. See Minić’s memoirs, M. Minić, Zapisi i sećanja iz narodnooslobodilačke
borbe u čačanskom kraju (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1988); M. Minić, Oslobodilački ili
građanski rat u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945 (Novi Sad: Agencija MIR, Cvetnik, 1993).
268
It is interesting that already in 1941 the Comintern discovered and condemned the same mistakes made
by Tito (exchange of prisoners and temporary truce). Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia
mirovaia Chast II, 341–342. Girenko, Stalin — Tito, 152–157.
269
270
Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii”, 481.
271
Sukhorukov Vasilii Timofeevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kom-
272
Gorchakov, Ian Berzin.
273
Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović, 66–72.
As some other Red Army officers, Sukhorukov was arrested in 1937, and he
was definitively freed only in 1955, which prevented the further development of
his plans. However, far more interesting is another fact which Starkov cited about
Sukhorukov. In August, 1941, Suhorukov was transferred to Moscow to provide
additional details about his knowledge and contacts which he obtained in Sofia.
Vasilii Zarubin led most of the interviews with Sukhorukov.274 This is very impor-
tant because it confirms that the conversation between Bailey-Djonović-Zarubin
were not unimportant and accidental. They were obviously very important to the
Soviet leadership. This can also be inferred from the Soviet suggestion made dur-
ing the Istanbul negotiations to send four Yugoslav officers from the USSR “to
various areas of Yugoslavia, with the task of establishing contact with the rebels
and to connect them with the allies. Since Russian airplanes were not suited for
long-hauled flights, Russians agreed to burn the airplanes after they landed in
Yugoslavia.”275 According to Topalović, there were official attempts to send the
Soviet mission to Mihailović in 1942, but these plans did not come to fruition
because of the British opposition.276
However, British attempts to hinder the development of contacts between
Mihailović and the USSR did not prevent the Soviets from trying again. They
made another unsuccessful attempt to establish contacts with Četniks in the
August-September, 1942, via Fedor Makhin. V. Tesemnikov, who researched
Makhin, wrote that he had close contacts with the Soviet intelligence institutions.
He made his claims based on Dedijer’s article “F. E. Mkhin u redovima četničke
armije” (F. E. Mahin in the Ranks of the Četnik Army). Teseminkov claimed
that Makhin visited Četniks temporarily in 1941, but that he refused to return to
JVuO Supreme Command on Moscow’s orders.277 Dedijer wrote: “I think that
Tito knew that Makhin worked for the Soviet intelligence service. In any case,
on September 15, 1942, a strictly confidential message arrived for Tito from the
Comintern. The message said that Makhin must be sent to headquarters of Draža
Mihailović…Tito managed to hinder this attempt at establishing contacts with the
excuse that Makhin was too old and sick, and that his transfer to the headquarters
of D. Mihailović would be a very complicated task.”278
The examination of the CK KPJ and IKKI correspondence offers a similar
picture, with some additional details. Makhin’s name appeared for the first time
in the radio-communication between the CK KPJ and IK KI, on Tito’s initiative.
274
Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii,” 485–486.
275
Plećaš, Ratne godine, 107.
276
Ž. Topalović, Jugoslavija. Žrtvovani saveznik (London: Budućnost, 1970), 28.
277
V. A. Tesemnikov “Iugoslavskaia odisseia Fedora Makhina: period prebyvaniia polkovnika
General’nogo shtaba F. E. Makhina v Iugoslavii i ego uchastie vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine, “ Rodina 8
(2007).
278
V. Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, t. 3 (Belgrade: Rad, 1984), 154.
In report on August 31, 1942, Tito wrote: “from the very beginning of the Partisan
war, a Russian emigrant Colonel Feodor Makhin has been with us. At first he was
in Montenegro, and now he is in our headquarters and deals with publicity. In
Montenegro, he was taken prisoner by Četniks together with Professor Milošević,
but our units freed them. He maintains himself well, and now he intends to write
a book about the battles in Yugoslavia, about Draža Mihailović, and so on. We
implore you to ask for NKVD’s views about him and to report it to us.”279 It is
apparent that Tito wanted Moscow to ask for Makhin to send them another report
about Četniks.
The situation developed unexpectedly for Tito, since Moscow decided to get
something more than another critical report on Mihailović and glorification of
Tito. Moscow responded to Tito: “order the responsible comrade to talk with the
Russian emigrant Makhin and give him our neighbor’s password [Soviet intelli-
gence institutions — A. T.]: ‘Greeting from Comrade Pravdin. I came to continue
the work of Comrade Pravdin’. In conversation with Makhin, find out: 1. Does
he want to say something to Pravdin? 2. What position did he take when with
Mihailović and is there a possibility for him to obtain Mihailović’s trust again,
or from somebody from his immediate surrounding? 3. Could he go back to
Mihailović or stay on the occupied territory and work on the neighbor’s [the Soviet
intelligence institutions — A. T.] orders, maintaining contact from there. 4. What
are his suggestions for the neighbor? Report to us the results…”280
The next radiogram related to Makhin was sent to Moscow on September 19.
It contained Makhin’s letter to his NKVD contact Pravdin. “Comrade Pravdin.
Pursued by Germans and White Guards, on June 23 of last year, I hid in Monte-
negro where I participated in the Partisan movement from its very beginning and
I was sufficiently compromised in the eyes of Draža Mihailović’s Četniks. I was
their prisoner and Partisans freed me and did not let them hand me over to the
Italians. After the Italian-Četnik offensive in Montenegro, I withdrew with the
Partisans to Bosnia, where I joined the Supreme Command. From Mihailović’s
circle I know his assistant Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin well, former president of the
National Defense, I think that I already reported to you his characteristics. With
the aid of the Italians, Trifunović is now leading an offensive against the Partisans
near Split. I will try to connect with him with the help of the Partisan Supreme
Command, and if possible, I will arrange a meeting with him. I want to hear your
recommendations. It is not possible for now for me to go to the occupied territory
with Gestapo pursuing me. I will send detailed information these days about the
position of our struggle here. I am very happy because of the possibility to estab-
279
АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 191.
280
АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 204.
lish contact and to cooperate. Warm regards Makhin.”281 In this letter, which Tito
sent to Moscow on Makhin’s behalf, one can detect the continuation of Tito’s posi-
tion from his previous letter to Moscow on the subject of Makhin — to use him
as a witness of Četnik collaboration and prevent the establishment of ties between
Moscow and Mihailović.
In telegram on September 26, 1942, Tito once again criticized the Četnik
movement and he tried to prove the falseness of Radio London reports about
events in Yugoslavia. In the end, he asked why Slobodna Jugoslavija (the IKKI So-
viet propaganda radio station in the USSR) did not mention Draža Mihailović.282
On the next day, on September 27, the Partisan radio-station sent to Moscow the
promised report to “Comrade Pravdin” from Makhin.283 This report described
the Partisan victories over Četniks in Western Bosnia, it denied the possibility of
agreement with Mihailović and it provided the examples of collaboration of his
commanders with Italian troops. The report also stated that the legalization of the
Partisan movement by the government in exile was not possible (because it relied
on Mihailović). Makhin formulated another suggestion — the Allied (the USA
and the British) legalization of the Partisan movement was necessary for the Allies
and it could be realized through military lines, not diplomatic.284 Thus, Makhin
was not used as a potential link between JVuO and the USSR. Based on the exist-
ing sources, it is impossible to establish whether Makhin resisted such contacts or
whether he was under Tito’s pressure who wanted to remain the leader of the only
resistance movement in Moscow’s eyes in Yugoslavia.
Another potential source of Soviet information about the Četnik movement
could have been Dragiša Vasić, a notable Četnik leader and until 1943 the head of
the JVuO Propaganda Department. Before the war, Vasić had contacts with the
USSR’s intelligence network, according to Mirko Kosić, who was called to testify
to a German Commission which investigated the responsibility of individuals for
the putsch of March 27, 1941.285 Vladimir Dedijer agreed, believing that Vasić
“had for years maintained contacts with the Soviet Centre for Intelligence Service
in Prague. This was the so called fourth line of the Soviet military-intelligence
service for the three countries of the [Small — A. T.] Entente: Czechoslovakia, Yu-
goslavia and Romania. He did this out of convictions, and not money. He special-
ized in work with White Guard emigration in Belgrade… when Mustafa Golubić
came to Yugoslavia in 1940, he took over the position of the chief of the Soviet
281
АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 210.
282
АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 217.
283
АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 219.
284
Ibid.
285
Wüscht, J., “Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawis-
chen Beziehungen 1933–1945” (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969), 307.
intelligence service, and he was in close contact with Dragiša Vasić. He hid his
radio-station in Belgrade…”286 Admittedly, the well-known Serbian author and
politician annoyed the communists with the book Crvene magle (The Red Fog)
which came out in 1924. Similar criticism in the early 1920s, even participation in
the Civil War against the Bolsheviks, did not hinder the secret but firm coopera-
tion between F. Makhin with the communists and the USSR. A leading scholar of
the JVuO, K. Nikolić, also expressed doubts about Vasić’s links with the Soviet
intelligence services. 287
The Soviet agents were also able to obtain information from other sources.
Above all, the work of the Cambridge Five must be mentioned,288 as well as some
other Soviet agents in England. J. Cairncross was probably the most useful agent.
In 1942, he worked in the British service as a decoder. The Radio-contacts played
an especially important role in the Balkans, where the telephone and telegraph
networks were less important as a result of guerilla activities, the inapproachabil-
ity of the terrain and the weak prewar development of the networks. The English
managed to crack various German Air-Force code, the permanent radio contact
between Vienna and Athens, Strasburg and Thessaloniki, and several radio ex-
changes of local importance.289 They also could have obtained the general impres-
sion of events in the Balkans from the Berlin-Tokyo radio contact. It was also
useful that Soviets found out through Cairncross that the English had managed to
crack the relatively easy code between the IKKI and CK KPJ communication.290
From January, 1944, Cairncross, was transferred to another post in the MI-6
headquarters in London, where he was responsible for coordinating the British
intelligence services in Yugoslavia.291 The second member of the Cambridge Five,
286
V. Dedijer V. M. Ekmečić, I. Božić and S. Ćirković, Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972),
473.
287
288
O. Tsarev and N. West, The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (New
Haven: Yale Universtiy Press, 1999); S. J. Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald
Maclean, and Guy Burgess (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
289
F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: It’s Influence on Strategy and Opera-
tions Volume 3, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 501–503.
290
The Soviets were able to better protect their communication in the Balkans only in the summer of
1944 when the Soviet coders in General Korneev’s Mission reached Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership
was so suspicious of the radios that in particularly important circumstances during the war it used an
emissary, A. Korotkov, to exchange messages with Tito. V. S. Antonov, “Nelegal po familii Erdberg, on
zhe Aleksandr Korotkov,” Nezavisimaia gazeta — NVO, November 20, 2009; J. Cripps, “Mihailović
or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose,” in Action this day, ed. M. Smith and R. Er-
skine (London-New York: Bantman, 2001), 237–263; F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the
Second World War: It’s Influence on Strategy and Operations Volume 3, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), 850–851.
291
The post-1948 Soviet accusations of Velebit’s cooperation with the British could have also stemmed
from these sources. P. Milichevich, Opasno-revizionizm: Pis’ma Stalina i Molotova iugoslav. ruko-
voditeliam v 1948 g. ob opasnosti revizionizma (Moscow: s. n, 2001); Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki
G. Burgess, was the personal assistant to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs,
A. Eden. The third member, D. Maclean, during the war was the secretary in
the British embassy in Washington and he had access to confidential diplomatic
correspondence, including the information on the Balkans. Certain information
about the situation in the Balkans reached Moscow through other members of the
Cambridge Five — the British counterintelligence agency’s agents, K. Philby and
A. Blunt.292 The Soviets also benefited from the fact that J. Klugmann, a British
communist, worked for SOE in Cairo, which was responsible for Yugoslavia.293
This widespread network of information could have enabled the Soviets to get an
insight into British suspicions about Mihailović’s relationship with the Germans.
The British mistrust became pronounced at the end of the summer of 1942, when
the English received several reports about the coordination of activities by Četniks
and the occupational forces against the Partisans. In the second half of 1942, the
English intelligence service decided to establish contact with Tito because they
believed that “the Partisans had become a thorn in the German and Italian eyes,
and Mihailović had not.”294
In the beginning of the war, Soviets repeatedly sought to obtain informa-
tion about the civil war in Yugoslavia independently of KPJ. As a result, So-
viets infiltrated British missions which were sent to the JVuO Supreme Com-
mand. They recruited Veljko Dragičević, radio-telegrapher in a mission with
M. Lalatović Z. Ostojić and D. Hudson participated. According to Tito’s report to
IKIK on January 12, 1942, “the radio operator of the English mission, Dragičević,
joined our side and gave us a series of confidential telegrams from the English
government from which can be observed that the London’s orders are not aimed
at strengthening the national-liberation war. Walter.” The telegram was received
on January 15, and Dimitrov noted on it: ”we recommended to Walter to pass on
to us the text of the confidential telegrams…15. I. 42. Dimitrov.”295 Unusually,
however, Dimitrov did not insert a footnote to specify whether Dragičević’s ma-
terials were received. Documents of this type had to have been sent to Moscow,
after an express plea for them had been made. It is very likely that the docu-
v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / his-
tory / kernkross. htm.
292
The information which reached Kim Philby in Yugoslavia was exceptionally important. For instance,
when Tito asked the Soviet Mission in March, 1944, for assistance in Partisans’ coding, the NKGB
USSR sent a group of instructors. Philby told Moscow that the Britsih Mission learned from their
agents in Partisans’ ranks about the Soviet instructors prior to their arrival, Neglasnye voiny. Istoriia
spetsial’nykh sluzhb 1919–1945 T. 2 (Odessa: Druk, 2007)
293
R. Bailey “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann’s Recruitment and Retention,” Intelli-
gence and National Security 20 (2005): 72–97; D. Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s
Yugoslav Blunder (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990).
294
W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, 112–133.
295
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 182.
ments were not sent via the Comintern, but through other channels (RU RKKA
or NKVD).296 Veljko Dragičević, in addition to handing over to the Partisans the
confidential English telegrams, also worked as a radio operator for the Partisans.
He was highly trusted, and he was in charge of radio communications at the Su-
preme Command of the Supreme Staff, until he died during the German assault
on Drvar. This is significant considering that he was initially a radio-operator in
the mission engineered by the British intelligence service, which caused maximal
distrust amongst the Partisans.297
N. Plećaš wrote about the behavior of another JVuO radio-operator in his
memoirs.298 “The radio-telegrapher of the Centre was a professional Lieutenant in
the Navy, Simić… a serious and a very strange man, who always did something,
received messages and typed them. When that job was done in the morning, he
would temper with the wires and put together parts for the radio. Then, he made
his own radio-station. His family lived in Boka Kotorska and there were rumors
in the Headquarters that his wife was a communist. It seems that was the case,
and judging by Aćim Sliejpčević’s statement at his trial in Belgrade, Simić joined
the Partisans.”299
Plećaš cited a more apparent example of the infiltration of British missions by
the Soviet intelligence. During his stay in Cairo and his attendance of a special-
ized course in sabotage near Haifa, Plećaš met a British captain who introduced
himself as Charles Robertson. Robertson explained during their first meeting that
he was a Canadian. However, he spoke English with an accent, so he had to add
that he was born in Montreal, and that he spoke French better than English. Not
waiting for questions in French (which he also spoke with an accent), Robertson
explained that his mother was actually Serbian, which he proved with perfect Ser-
bian accent. Robertson was “a very tall man, lengthy figure, bony, with burnt face
and looked like our veritable mountaineer.” In the conversation, it became clear
that Robertson knew the Serbian language and traditions very well, so he easily
established friendly relations with Serbian officers who attended the parachute
course.300
Later on, to his great surprise, Plećaš saw Robertson as part of the British mis-
sion to Mihailović, next to D. Hudson. Robertson was transferred to JVuO Head-
quarters with his radio station, to help the English head of the mission to establish
296
Ibid.,183.
297
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 96–97.
298
Neđeljko Plećaš began the Second World War as an aviation lieutenant. He managed to escape from
the country after speedy conclusion to the April War, and after a brief English parachute course, he was
transferred to Montenegro’s Mihailović’s Headquarters as part of the British-Yugoslav Mission.
299
Plećaš, Ratne godine, 231.
300
Ibid.,150–155.
radio contact with Cairo.301 Plećaš was even more surprised when he learned in
a confidential conversation from Robertson that he was not Canadian, but a Serb
from Ub, who had to leave the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1920
because of the government’s persecution of communists. “He spent his entire life
in various European countries. He worked everywhere for the communist cause.
He lived longest in Paris, where he was the leader of a terrorist group. As soon as
the Civil War started in Spain, he joined the International Brigade and became a
battalion commander. At the very end of the Civil War, he left the International
Brigade and he joined the anarchists. After the Republican Front was broken,
he escaped to France, where he was interned. During the war, he was released
from the camp in France, and as a sailor on some ship, he arrived to Canada.
There, he joined the Canadian army and he arrived to Middle East as a Captain…”
Radivojević (Robertson’s real name) began propaganda campaign, advocating for
the unification of Partisan and Četnik movements. The magical transformation of
Charles Robertson, a British intelligence agent of Canadian origins, into Drago
Radivojević, a communist activist of Yugoslav origins, did not please the Brit-
ish mission.302 “Some said in the Headquarters that the English wanted to get rid
of Radivojević and that they advised Mihailović to liquidate him.” Radivojević’s
recommendations to unite JVuO and the Partisan movement were not approved,
and Robertson-Radivojević was killed.303
It is well known that the Soviet intelligence recruited former fighters from
International Brigades in Spain, who managed to become officers of the Allied
intelligence services. This is how Irving Goff was recruited. Goff was captain of
the International Brigades and he underwent partisan training in Spain. In 1941,
he joined the OSS, and as Captain of the American army he was sent to Italy.
Likewise, Alfred Tanc was sent to France by OSS. The NKGB agent in Washing-
ton managed to recruit a series of officers who worked on Yugoslavia. Two such
men are mentioned in documents from the NKGB resident agent in the USA —
major Linn Farish (pseudonym Atila) and Captain George Vučinić (pseudonym
Lid). This was not accidental. The NKGB agents had “interesting connections in
Cairo… and they had the possibility to infiltrate their agents into the American
intelligence service working on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,” and they were also
present amongst the ranks of the OSS analysts who worked on the information
from the Balkans.304
301
S. Rachev, Angliia i s’protivitelnoto dvizhenie na Balkanite 1940–1945 (Sofiia: BAN, 1978), 86, 88.
302
According to them, Radojević was an unemployed drunk and a left-wing adventurist, Mackenzie, The
Secret History, 112–133.
303
Plećaš, Ratne godine, 200–203.
304
“Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #1,
File 35112, Vol. 1, p. 383, 414; File 35112, Vol. 7, p. 494; White Notebook #3, File File 28734 v. 1
“Ruff” Franz Neumann, p. 20” “ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collec-
There were also numerous SOE leftist collaborators from the ranks of the
Yugoslav Diaspora in Canada. Their path to Yugoslavia began in early May, 1942,
when a Colonel of the British intelligence service visited the editors of a left-
ist Canadian newspaper Novosti, asking them to recommend several Yugoslavs
who would be willing to be sent to Yugoslavia on special operations. The English
wanted to send them to Yugoslavia to prepare the way for the departure of the first
British mission to Tito. The British intelligence agency directly asked for commu-
nists, even though the Communist Party was banned in Canada at the time. The
candidates completed training in diversionary and parachute courses by August,
1942.305 After some time, they were transferred to Yugoslavia. This situation was
particularly interesting because majority of these Red agents of the British Crown
decided to stay in Yugoslavia after 1945. For a state which built its repressive ap-
paratus along the lines of Stalin’s NKVD, these former SOE employees (transla-
tors and signalers) were not arrested or discriminated against. Instead, they had
successful careers in the state apparatus, which was not very different from the
manically suspicious Soviet model.306
In this context, we can find similar developments in the documents of the
NKGB agents in the USA, which were published in the 1990s. V. M. Zarubin,
after the end of his tenure as the head of the Soviet NKGB in the USA (January
4, 1942 — August, 24, 1944), wrote a detailed report addressed to V. N. Merku-
lov, the head of the NKGB USSR. In this report, he listed the tasks which he was
given before his departure to the USA. Out of the six tasks, only one (number
four) related to gathering information about the USA. Four tasks directly related
to gathering information on occupied European countries and sending the Soviet
agents there. According to Zarubin, there was almost no direct way to send Soviet
agents into Europe, “…the only way was to recruit American intelligence agents
which were about to be sent to Europe.” As a result, the NKGB officers in North
America started to “seek reliable people through the Communist Party, who al-
ready completed the training. Before their departure, they tried to recruit them.”
Furthermore, Zarubin cited the example of one such group which the OSS sent
to Yugoslavia, which was worked over by the NKGB before their departure, but
at the time that Zarubin left the USA, he had not yet succeeded in establishing
contact.307
tion: Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm;

Venona, KGB N. Y. to M. — 1397 (4. 10. 1944).
305
B. Prpić, Preko Atlantika u partizane (Zagreb: Epoha, 1965), 19–27, 132, 146–150.
306
R. McLaren, Canadians behind enemy lines, 1939–1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 151.
307
“Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #1, File
35112, Vol. 1, pp. 381–383“ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collection:
Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm.
The veracity of all this cannot be verified until Russia opens its NKVD and GRU
archives.308 At the same time, what we do know enables us to maintain that Moscow
received information about JVuO on the territory of Serbia, independently of KPJ,
by the end of 1942 at latest. The information about contacts between various JVuO
commanders with Italians, Nedić’s apparatus and to a lesser degree with Germans,
as well as the decline in intensity of Četniks’ attacks on the Germans could have
reached Moscow directly from their numerous informers in the British intelligence
services.309 According to SOE documents, the British first doubts about Mihailović’s
willingness to fight against the Germans, Italians and their allies appeared at the end
of the summer and early autumn of 1942, even though the British policy towards
Četniks changed only later on. Simultaneously, the British came to the idea of estab-
lishing contacts with the Partisans. In the autumn of 1942, SOE concluded that the
Partisans caused more problems for the Germans than Četniks.310
Finally, informal contacts were established between the USSR and JVuO,
through German prisoners whom they brought to the Balkans to fight against the
Partisans or to work in the mines.311 A large number of former prisoners, escaped
and joined JVuO units in Eastern Serbia in December, 1943, which caused great
disappointment amongst the ranks of the local Požarevac Partisan Detachment.312
According to M. Milunović, a member of the Četnik movement in Eastern Ser-
bia, a Russian JVuO unit was formed in Homolj at the end of 1943. This unit num-
bered 300 soldiers and officers, and it was made up of prisoners from the Bor mine
or deserters from the Russian Corps. According to M. Milunović, Marshal Konev’s
son was among the prisoners,313 while the unit was headed by Major Mikhail Abra-
mov (Avramov?).314 It should be noted that the deserters from the Russian Corps
were also Soviets. They ended up in the Corps as reinforcements from the territories
occupied by Romania. Velimir Piletić, a senior commanded in the Četnik Krajina
Corps, tried to incite desertion in ROK. In a propaganda flyer written in mixture of
Serbian and Russian, he distinguished between “the former Soviet” prisoners from
308
The relevant authorities will open the archive rather suddenly if they like one’s topic. For instance:
L. F. Sotskov, Pribaltika i geopolitika; L. F. Sotskov, comp., Sekrety pol’skoi politiki 1935–1945 g.:
rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: RIPOL klassik,
2009).
309
P. Knightley, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby (New York: Knopf, 1989); K. Filbi, Ia shel
svoim putem ed. T. A. Kudriavtseva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997).
310
311
I. Avakumović, Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentim (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju,
2004), 158.
312
A. Vitorović, Centralna Srbija (Belgrade: Nolit, 1967), 542; Zbornik NOR-a, t. I knj. 7, ed. F. Trgo
(Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1955), 26–29.
313
The Soviet Marshal Ivan Konev had only one son whose name was Gelii (1927–1991) and he was not
in Yugoslavia during the war.
314
M. Milunović, Od nemila do nedraga (Belgrade: M. Milunović, 1992), 36–37; V. Piletić, Sudbina
srpskog oficira (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2002), 98.
the “hardcore White Guard Russians.” He also strictly condemned “the centuries-
old enemies of Slavs — the Germans” and “their allies” the Russian emigrants.
Piletić recommended to former Soviet prisoners serving in Wehrmacht to escape
to “all-Slavic free forests” and to take with them as much armaments and bullets as
possible.315 Regardless of the linguistic problems, JVuO propaganda had an impact.
ROK fighters bitterly recalled “the treachery of their former comrades” and their es-
cape to “free all-Slavic forests.” On September 30, 1943, during their nightly patrol,
an entire former Red Army platoon deserted with all of their weapons.316
Živko Topalović stated that according to Major Rootham (the British SOE repre-
sentative to JVuO in Eastern Serbia) an entire detachment of “Soviet Russians” was
formed out of deserters, who were led by “Lieutenant Akimov.”317 Rootham recorded
that a group of deserters from the Russian Corps managed to establish contact with
Captain Vuknević, the local JVuO commander and that they were preparing to head
into the forest. It is interesting that the former Red Army soldiers were visibly influ-
enced by their friendship with White Emigrants. For instance, they would take off
their hats before eating, cross themselves and recite the Lord’s Prayer.318 According
to Rootham, this detachment had two Soviet officers, but he did not specify who the
commander was. Lieutenant Akimov was not a commander of the detachment, but
one of Russian prisoners who escaped in Macedonia.319 Rootham praised the mili-
tary bearing of these Soviet soldiers and their strong desire to avenge the German
misdeeds in the USSR, which the English paratrooper noted, was in contrast to the
more moderate local JVuO commander. The Soviets were not met warm-heartedly.
Their clothes were very old and they did not have any replacements. There were
problems with weapons (which the Četniks also lacked), and their Soviet origins led
to Soviet soldiers being ostracized. The English had to defend the former Red Army
soldiers from the attacks of the anti-communist individuals. It was obvious that this
encounter was different from the encounters between the escaped Soviet prisoners
and the Partisans.320
In some cases, however, Četniks’ behavior towards Russians stemmed from
more than their anti-communism. For example, Rootham noted that some Četnik
315
VA, k. 128, f. 13, d. 11, 179.
316
317
Topalović, Jugoslavija, 43.
318
Dž. Rootham, Pucanj u prazno (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 233.
319
This was an unusual situation since Macedonia was under Bulgarian occupation. Bulgaria was not in a
state of war with the USSR and the Bulgarian embassy continued working in Moscow during the war.
It could be either that Rootham made a mistake in determining the place from which Akimov’s soldiers
came or it was possible that Akimov did not come from a German prisoner of war camp at all.
320
V. N. Kazak, Pobratimy. Sovetskie liudi v antifashistskoi bor’be narodov balkanskikh stran (Mos-
cow: Mysl’, 1975), 14–74; TsAMO, 52 sd PO, d. 102 Kratkii ocherk istorii Russkogo partizanskogo
batal’ona, 7–12; T. S. Babuševa, “Sovetski graģani vo NOV na Jugoslavija,” Glasnik na Institutot za
nacionalna istorija (Skopje) 1 (1981).
officers “felt that the Czarist Russia betrayed them in the Balkan Wars and in the
First World War.”321 He also described a more sinister event: “…a large lunch was
organized in a village school, at which one of Petrović’s officers, Captain Jovan,
got very drunk… Jovan entered the school building, where there were about thirty
locals, and a Russian Akimov was sitting in the corner talking with me over a
glass of wine. Jovan came to the table, with a crazed look in his eyes, and taking
the knife from the table, he said menacingly: ‘I hate the communists, I hate the
Red Army. If I were to be ordered to go against it tomorrow, I would be happy’.
Akimov was unarmed (Jovan had guns… and a grenade) and he answered in a
calm and steady tone: ‘you have no right to speak this way. You are insulting
me…”322 Incidents recorded by Rootham were not isolated incidents against the
Red Army by Četniks.323 After Plećaš was parachuted into Yugoslavia, at lunch
with JVuO leaders over roast lamb and brandy, he made a toast: “with faith in our
final victory with the help of our great allies — England, America and the Soviet
Russia.”324 When Nikola Kalabić, the Commander of the King’s Guard, heard this,
he told… Joža Pevec, that Plećaš was ‘ripe for letter Z’.”325
Examples of such behavior by Četniks invariably reached the USSR through
various channels, which provided the Soviet leaders with enough material to take
a negative view of JVuO. The behavior of the exiled government, which main-
tained its position of a vassal vis-à-vis London (unlike their Czech or French
counterparts), must have left a certain impression on the Soviets. According to
present-day Russian historians who were allowed to look at the otherwise inac-
cessible archival documents, the NKVD had throughout the war “valuable agents
in exiled governments… including the Yugoslav [government — A. T.].”326 All of
the information which Moscow received about the government’s firm pro-British
orientation coincided with the pre-war stereotypes of the Soviet leadership. The
Comintern experts, who were influential in determining the Soviet geo-political
policies before the war, pointed out the anti-Soviet attitude of the Serbs and the
revolutionary mood of the Croats. These views became clear to the prewar Royal
Mission, 1940–1941: “the leading circles of Moscow society do not have a clear
understanding of Yugoslavia, viewing it as a violent creation of the Serbian dynas-
321
Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233.
322
Ibid., 290.
323
Ibid.,279–280, 291.
324
Plećaš, Ratne godine, 183–184.
325
Slobodan Jovanović and Živan Knežević claimed in June and August of 1942 that letter Z meant to slit
throat (zaklati). Maybe they exaggerated. “One thing is certain: being placed under the letter ‘Z’ meant
a judgment and according to Četnik interpretation the word was in the category of ‘traitor’.” Terzić,
“Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 772.
326
ty and the Serbian army.”327 A song “Night over Belgrade” from the film “Night
over Belgrade,” made in the USSR at the end of 1941, illustrates this stereotype
well. The song about Belgrade illegal political activists (without citing their ideol-
ogy, except patriotism and anti-German attitudes) does not mention Serbia and
Serbs. Instead, it mentions “Croatia’s sky…”328
The USSR, as all empires, had numerous experiences with smaller nations,
and therefore, it invariably had to classify (or at least compare) Četniks and Serbs
into a wider typological context. For example, British representatives placed
Mihailović’s movement in the same group as royalist movements in Burma and es-
pecially Ethiopia,329 where SOE launched successful operations against the Axis
with help of local Haile Selassie’s sympathizers.330 Likewise, the behavior of the
representatives of the Yugoslav mission, as well as the extreme anti-communism
of JVuO, inevitably reminded the Soviet leaders of the Poles and the Home Army.
In the summer of 1941, the Polish delegation made similar incidents during their
departure from the USSR.331 Also, the Home Army received weapons from Ger-
mans 1943–1945,332 even though it hated the Germans. The Home Army used
these weapons against the pro-communist People’s Army. The Polish government
in exile was more than just loyal to London, which London repaid with the same
reward which Mihailović’s organization received. Interestingly, sometimes the
same British operatives worked with JVuO and the Home Army.333 According
to Soviets, their tactics were the same: “when in the summer of 1944, the Home
Army started to ask for an armistice and announced that it was ready to join the
joint struggle against the Germans, partisans did not believe them and they held
327
Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 189.
328
N. Sadkovich (director), N. Bogoslovskii (composer), B. Laskin and I. Skliut (the authors), “Noch’ nad
Belgradom,” Boevoi kinosbornik 8, 1941 / 1942.
329
This can be seen in Đonović’, Plećaš’ and Topalović’s memoirs, and from almost every mentioning of
the Serbs in Rootham’s book.
330
We have in mind the project ‘The Gideon Force’, C. Mackenzie, Eastern Epic (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1951); D. Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits (London: Arms and Armour, 1994).
331
N. S. Lebedeva, Katyn’. Mart 1940 — sentiabr’ 2000. Rasstrel. Sud’by zhivykh. Ekho Katyni. (Doku-
menty) (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2001); Iu. I. Mukhin, Antirossiiskaia podlost’ (Moscow: Krymskii Most —
Forum, 2003).
332
The most obvious examples were the Home Army’s activities in Eastern Poland (Lithuania, Western
Belarus and Ukraine), as well as the actions of the Holy Cross Brigade. See K. P. Friedrich, “Col-
laboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation
Regime in Poland during World War II,” Slavic Review Vol. 64, No. 4 (2005); R. Zizas, “Armijos
krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944,” in Armija krajova Lietuvoje, (Vilnius: Vilnijos d-ja; Kaunas:
Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių s-ga, 1995); Brygada Swietokrzyska, accessed September 16,
2011, http://www.electronicmuseum.ca / Poland-WW2 / holy_cross_brigade / hcb. html.
333
For instance, Major T. D. Hudson arrived to Serbia in 1941 and for almost two and a half years he
worked with Četniks. On December 27, 1944, he went near the town of Częstochowa (Poland), with the
Colonel’s rank and as head of the Freston Mission to the Home Army, Mackenzie, The Secret History,
436–437, 508–509, 526;
that this was a military ruse… the intention of the Poles to stop the hostilities and
to work together with Belorussian partisans were confirmed in orders issued by
the emigrant government in London. In a telegram sent on July 4, 1944, it was
stated that with the approaching of the front, the commanders of the Home Army
must offer military cooperation to the Soviets… ’the blood-relatives and the great
Slavic nations’…still, the moment for negotiations has passed.”334
The natural tendency to analyze by making analogies led the NKVD leader-
ship to contemplate that followers of Bandera (the Ukrainian nationalists who were
rabidly anti-Russian) and members of the Home Army had organized contacts with
“the Serbian and Montenegrin Četniks”335 The idea of a special Russo-Serbian
friendship, which is so popular amongst important segments of Russian and Serbian
presentday societies, was barely present in the USSR (if at all). The idea of special
Slavic ties were rejected in the USSR throughout the communist ideological experi-
ments of the 1920s and the 1930s. The old historians and philologists who studied
these issues were repressed by the authorities.336 The revolution also swept away the
state apparatus’ familiarization with the various Slavic nations’ attitudes towards
the Russians. Unlike their British colleagues, the Soviet diplomats needed to acquire
the unofficial but very important experience in decision making. Nonetheless, the
first clash of the Comintern stereotypes and events in the Western Balkans came
about in the autumn of 1944, when Red Army units reached the Balkans.
Relations between the USSR and NOP
The question of relations between the USSR and Tito’s movement attracted a
lot of scholarly attention during the existence of communist Yugoslavia. Almost
every study which offered a complete overview of the Second World War in Yu-
334
L. Smilovitskii, Katastrofa evreev v Belorussii, 1941–1944 gg. (Tel’-Aviv: Biblioteka Matveia Cher-
nogo, 2000), 147.
335
FSB RF, 2008), 92–95.
336
The Faculty of History at the Moscow State University received a Department for the History of South
and Western Slavs in 1939. The Slavic Commission was created at the Academy of Sciences USSR
in 1942. The Department for Slavic Philology was created at the Faculty of Philology MDU in 1943.
The Institute for Slavic Studies AN USSR was created in 1947. E. P. Aksenova, Ocherki iz istorii
otechestvennogo slavianovedeniia. 1930‑e gody (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2000); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Slavi-
anskaia komissiia AN SSSR (1942–1946),” Slavianskii al’manakh 1996, ed. K. V. Nikiforov (Moscow:
Inslav RAN, 1997); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Kafedra slavianskoi filologii v MGU (1943–1948),” Slavianove-
denie 5 (2003); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Neizvestnye dokumenty po istorii sozdaniia Instituta slavianovedeniia
AN SSSR,” Slavianovedenie 6 (1996); K. V. Nikiforov, “K 60‑letiiu Instituta slavianovedeniia RAN:
V. K. Volkov o perspektivakh razvitiia slavistiki,” Slavianovedenie 2 (2007).
Relations between the USSR and NOP 251
goslavia had something to say on this topic. However, the Yugoslav historiography
produced only one exhaustive study of this topic — Nikola Popović’s monograph
published in 1988.337 Popović analyzed in detail various aspects of the Soviet as-
sistance to NOP during the Second World War. His book was a revolutionary re-
jection of the entrenched thesis in the Yugoslav historiography that Tito struggled
against occupiers “without anybody’s assistance.”338 In the past two decades since
his book was published, Popović’s thesis has been largely confirmed by the ap-
pearance of series of memoirs and archival documents. Nonetheless, some issues
require further clarification.
The most important of these questions relate to the USSR’s Military Mission
in Yugoslavia, which led to close contacts between the Soviet government on the
one hand, and NKOJ and NOVJ on the other. For diplomatic reasons, it was not
possible for Moscow to send its Mission before their British counterparts reached
Yugoslavia. Had this happened, nothing could have convinced Churchill that Tito
was independent of Moscow, which NKID ardently maintained. Moscow wanted
to uphold the line of the autonomy of the Yugoslav Partisans during the war in or-
der not to endanger the uncertain postwar future of the Yugoslav Communists and
raise troublesome questions about the degree of Moscow’s territorial and political
demands in postwar Europe.
This issue also could have raised foreign policy problems for the USSR:
from delaying the opening of the second front to ending the Lend-lease pro-
gram, and it could have even led the Western Allies to engage in separate ne-
gotiations with the Germans.339 The possibility of the separate Anglo-German
peace was seriously feared by Moscow. On January 17, 1944, Pravda, published
the following statement from its Cairo correspondent, without any comment or
explanation: “according to information from reliable sources, there was a secret
meeting between the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop with some
leading British officials in order to establish the conditions to sign a separate
peace treaty with Germany.”340 In these circumstances, suspicious Stalin tended
to be very careful.
Memoir literature mentions the existence of some unofficial couriers who reached
the occupied Yugoslavia from the USSR before 1944. In the summer of 1942, the
Comintern prepared several KPJ members to transfer them to Yugoslavia.341 Soviet
airplanes carried out several flights to Balkans (including Yugoslavia) before and after
337
Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi.
338
Dedijer, Josip Broz, 337–377.
339
I. M. Bondarenko, Krasnye pianisty (Moscow: Veche, 2008); V. Shellenberg, Memuary (Minsk: Rodi-
ola plius, 1998).
340
“Soobshchenie spetskorra TASS iz Kaira,” Pravda, January 17, 1944.
341
O. A. Rzheshevskii ed., Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual’nye problemy (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 72–75;
Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia chast II, 54,73,74.
November 1943. The first group of international instructors of diversionary tactics

from the NKVD Independent Special-Purpose Motorized Brigade (OMSBON) flew
to the Balkans from Crimea in the summer of 1941.342 Soviet airplanes appeared over
Yugoslavia again only after the Kursk Battle. The first Soviet flight was undertaken by
the crew of Lieutenant-Colonel B. I. Zhilin, who dropped several parachutists, suppos-
edly Bulgarian communists, from an airport near Kursk to Bugojno area.343 During an
anti-partisan operation in Srem, in October, 1943, von Pannwitz’s Cossack Division
caught several Soviet parachutist-diversionists.344
The situation changed in the spring of 1943, when Britain began preparing
its missions to Yugoslav Partisans. The Soviets then began inquiring about the
possibility of joint Soviet-British missions to Tito.345 London rejected this offer
and began to prepare for an independent mission. However, several preparatory
steps had to be first taken. First, a mission comprising of Yugoslavs serving in
the SOE was parachuted into NDH — P. Pavlović, P. Erdeljac and A. Simić. This
mission reached Lika on April 20–21, 1943, and it established contacts with the
Partisans, which the radio-operator of the mission, A. Simić, reported to Cairo.
Several days later, another SOE mission comprised of Yugoslavs (S. Serdar, Dj.
Diklić, M. Družić) reached Bosnia. This mission also confirmed to Cairo that
it had arrived and established contacts with the Partisans.346 On May 28, 1943,
a veritable British gentleman from SOE — Frederick William Deakin reached
Tito’s Headquarters. Deakin was an Oxford graduate who joined the British intel-
ligence service in the war’s earlier phases.347
In September, 1943, he returned from Yugoslavia with the best impressions of
Tito. Only after all of this, on September 18, 1943, the first British military mis-
sion reached Tito — four British signalers, a mighty radio-station and Brigadier-
General Sir Fitzroy Maclean, the Chief of the Mission.348
It is uncertain when the Soviets began preparing for their mission to Tito. The
participants of the Mission, its commander Nikolai Korneev and translator Vladi-
342
A. Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia. Vospominaniia glavnogo marshala aviatsii (Moscow:
Tsentropoligraf, 2008, 2007), 268,496; I. Vinarov, Boitsy tikhogo fronta: Vospominaniia razvedchika
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), 361–367; A. I. Zevelev ed., Nenavist’, spressovannaia v tol (Moscow:
Mysl’, 1991), 287.
343
Sergienko, AGON, 17–18; TsAMO, 18 VA, or. 11495, d. 10, 5.
344
Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 1, 14–15..
345
Barker, British Policy,, p. 163.
346
McLaren, Canadians behind enemy lines, 138–139.
347
Deakin F. W. D., The Embattled Mountain, Serbian version F. Dikin, Bojovna planina (Belgrade: Nolit,
1973); Mackenzie, The Secret History, 428–431.
348
Maclean came from an old Scottish family. Before the war he worked in the diplomatic British Rep-
resentation in Moscow. In the USSR he travelled illegally throughout the country, including areas re-
stricted to foreign diplomats. From 1939 he started working for the British SAS, and he participated in
military operations in Northern Africa.
mir Zelenin, who left their memories of the Mission, were not too descriptive in
discussing the planning phase and they tended to conceal accurate dates. Nonethe-
less, Zelenin claimed that the decision to send the Soviet Mission to Tito was made
before August-September, 1943.349 According to recollections of the Chief of the
Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, S. M. Shtemenko,
the General Staff was ordered to prepare for a military mission to Yugoslavia after
the Teheran Conference (November 28 — December 1, 1943).350
We can find more precise information about the question of when Soviet lead-
ers began preparing for a military mission to Tito in Stalin’s Visitors Journal.
According to the journal, on April 15, 1943, Molotov (head of the NKID), Beria
(the NKVD chief), Malenkov (member of the State Defense Committee in charge
of aviation) and Shcerbakov (chief of the military and civilian propaganda: head
of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, the chief of the Informational-
Propaganda Department of NKID and the head of the Department for Interna-
tional Information of the CK VKP (b) visited Stalin. They were regular visitors.
Two issues were discussed that day. The first related to aviation, since in Stalin’s
office at the same time were Novikov (Chief of the Air Staff of the Red Army),
Nikitin (head of the Main Directorate for Forming and Completing the units of the
Red Army) and Golovanov the chief of the Long Range Bombing Force (ADD).
After their departure, a second group visited Stalin, which stayed in his office
until the end of the working hours: Abakumov (chief of SMERSH), Golikov (the
head of the NKO Cadre Service), Il’ichev (head of the RU RKKA — his name was
recorded in the journal as Olichev), Kuznetsov (deputy head of the RU RKKA —
in the publication of the journal he was mistakenly identified as the head of the
Military Navy), Vavilov (deputy to the RU RKKA Chief, in the publication of the
journal he was mistakenly identified as a scientist of the same name), Vinogradov
(head of the Quartermaster Service), Evstigneev (head of the NKO Department
for Military Diplomacy), Kaminskii (NKGB USSR) and future chief of the mili-
tary mission to Tito, General Korneev.351
Naturally, numerous questions were discussed that day. The reason for simi-
larity in background of the visitors that day could have been the ongoing recon-
struction of the Soviet military and political special services, which began at the
time. However, the most important for us was the fact that this was the first and
final time that General Korneev visited Stalin prior to his departure for Yugosla-
via. General Korneev was never tasked with such important assignments which
349
V. V. Zelenin, “Operatsiia ‘Khod konem’,” Sovetskoe slavianovedenie 3 (1974); Zelenjin, “Sovjetska
vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17.
350
S. M. Shtemenko., General’nyi shtab v gody voiny, kn. 2 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), 291–292.
351
Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 404.
would require him to personally see Stalin. Therefore, we can make an educated
guess that the preparations for the Soviet mission began on April 15, 1943.
Nicholai Korneev’s biography offers an insight into the chronology and the
manner in which the mission was prepared. Genera Korneev was a highly educated
military intelligence officer. MacLean, the chief of the British mission believed that
Korneev did not have proletarian origins. MacLean also said that before the revo-
lution he was supposedly a professional officer in the Czarist Army.352 In reality,
Nicholai Korneev was born in 1900, into a peasant family in the village of Kamenka
in Tula Region. He joined the Red Army when he was eighteen, and in 1919 he was
one of the first graduates of the Military-Engineering School, after which he worked
in liaison service. He completed the Higher Military Liaison School in 1924, and
from 1926 he worked in RU RKKA. In 1929, Korneev finished the Eastern Faculty
of the Military Academy Frunze, and from then on, he advanced in the military-
intelligence profession. He reached the position of the Deputy Chief of the Intel-
ligence Department of the Leningrad Military District. Afterward, he worked as a
lecturer at the Red Army Genral Staff Academy. During the war, he was the Chief
of Staff of several armies. He began the war in the 20th Army, which fought in the
Smolensk Battle and Viazemskaia Operation, after which only the parts of the 20th
Army broke through the German encirclement. With the 24th Army, he participated
in the initial and the most difficult phase of the Stalingrad Battle, with the 11th Army
he participated in unsuccessful attempts to encircle the Germans near Demiansk. In
early April, 1943, as a result of heavy losses, the army was dissolved and Korneev
and other high-ranking officers were sent into the Supreme Command’s reserves.
This date corresponds to the meeting with Stalin, at which decisions were made
about the Soviet Mission to the Partisans. It is still difficult to know all the details
surrounding preparations, but likely the preparations were finished by October,
1943, because on October 3, Korneev was promoted to Lieutenant-General which
was usually done prior to the commencement of an important task.353
Apart from General Korneev, other qualified individuals were included in the
Mission. General-Major Anatolii Gorshkov served in the NKVD Border Guards
before the war. After the war broke out, he trained partisans in diversionary action
behind the enemy frontlines. Just prior to the Mission’s departure for Yugosla-
via, until September 1943, he was the Liaison Officer of the Central Staff of the
Partisan Movement in the Headquarters of the 1st Byelorussian Front.354 Colonel
352
F. Maklejn, Rat na Balkanu (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1980), chapter 11.
353
A. I. Kolpakidi and D. P. Prokhorov, Imperiia GRU. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi voennoi razvedki (Mos-
cow: Olma-Press, 1999); Spravochnik ‘Obshchevoiskovye armii and Spravochnik ‘Komandnyi sostav
RKKA i RKVMF v 1941–1945 godakh, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.soldat.ru / spravka / .
354
A. Gorshkov, “Narod beretsia za oruzhie, “ Oni zashchishchali Tulu. Vospominaniia i ocherki (Tula:
Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1965), 3–33; “Biograficheskii slovar’ — Gorshkov Anatolii Petrovich,
accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.bg-znanie.ru / article. php? nid=8563..
Nicholai Patrakhal’tsev was the third person in the Mission and his role was the
Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Mission.355 Patrakhal’tsev was an instructor
in guerilla tactics in Spain during the Civil War. Afterwards, he was the Deputy
Chief of the RU RKKA Diversionary Department A. during 1938–1940. On the
eve of the mission, he headed that institution. After the war, he was in charge of
the elite Spetsnatz units for several years.356 Other members of the Mission were
also highly qualified. Secretary of the Mission, Major G. S. Haritonenkov, like
Patrakhal’tsev, also participated in the Spanish Civil War. Major L. N. Dolgov was
the initial chief of the radio liaison. However, in the spring of 1944, when the radio
station became more active, several signalers arrived from Moscow, among them
the new Chief of the Liaison Service Major-General B. F. Dudakov. Dudakov also
had prewar experience in Spain, where he was decorated with the Order of the
Red Star.
The Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Mission, V. M. Sakharov, and the
Assistant to the Chief of the Mission, M. V. Kovalenko, worked in the Soviet
embassy in Yugoslavia during 1940–1941.357 Sakharov graduated from the State
University of Moscow and he started working in NKID in 1939. His biography
is particularly interesting. After the evacuation of the Soviet embassy in May,
1940, Sakharov returned to the USSR, where he served for about a year in front-
line units. He worked on intelligence issues with prisoners of war. However, his
knowledge of Serbo-Croatian was needed elsewhere and he was transferred to
London where he worked as the Second Secretary of the Soviet Diplomatic Repre-
sentation to the émigré governments until December, 1943, when he was adjoined
to the Mission.358
The Mission, however, did not only have representatives from the military
intelligence structures. NKGB also sent its agents to Yugoslavia, who formally
worked as advisors. G. S. Grigor’ev headed the NKGB residency, but officially he
was Assistant to the Chief of the Mission. In addition, V. A. Kvasov and several
assistants (coder Major N. S. Nikitin and signaler G. L. Likhov) worked for civil-
ian security agency. The NKGB residency was tasked with creating a network to
gather information on Germans, Četniks, and British and American Missions. In
March, 1944, Tito pleaded with the Soviets to strengthen his coding and intel-
ligence services. As a result, several more NKGB officers arrived to his head-
quarters: the advisor for the intelligence issues B. P. Odintsov; the advisor for
counter-intelligence A. V. Tishkov (who headed the NKGB residency in Yugosla-
via from its liberation until the autumn, 1946); expert coders P. E. Goroshin and
355
356
V. Lur’e and V. Kochik, GRU: dela i liudi (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2002).
357
358
Sergienko, AGON, 22.
Tito’s personal coder M. V. Zhukov.359 In addition, Lieutenant-Colonel Konstantin

Kvashnin, expert from the 4th Diversionary Department of the NKGB USSR ar-
rived to Yugoslavia. From the beginning of the war, he was tasked with training
the OMSBON units. Kvashnin was also responsible for maintaining contact with
the British Mission.360
Lieutenant-Colonel M. V. Tulenkov, the doctor of the Mission, also had a
rich war experience. The Mission also had translators: N. I. Vetrov (English),
E. A. Kul’kov (English) and V. V. Zelenin (German). The latter became an expert
on the history of Yugoslavia at the RAN Slavic Institute. Lieutenant I. S. Bezu-
glov was Korneev’s adjutant. The Mission also had its cook, Sergeant E. F. Shap-
kin, and driver, I. R. Lomtev.361
In May, 1944, Colonel Stepan Sokolov became the Deputy to the Chief of the
Mission on July 1, 1944. He was forty years old and he knew aviation well in the
mountainous terrain,362 therefore, he was appointed the Commander of the Soviet
airbase in Bari, Italy. According to his personal dossier, which he received upon
personal request on November 26, 1952, Colonel Sokolov worked his entire life
for RU RKKA. He began in the Caucuses in 1924 where he participated in the
suppression of an anti-Soviet rebellion. He studied at the Kachinskii School for
Military Pilots and the Zhukovskii Military Air Force Academy. He had prewar
experience of working abroad.
In Bari, the Soviet Mission received an airport, storages and communications.
From June, 1944, Sokolov had under his command Aviation Group for Special
Purposes which had two escadrilles: the military-cargo (twelve airplanes C-47)
and fighter (twelve airplanes Iak-9 which were modified for long-range flights).
The cargo airplanes transferred freight cargo according to the Mission’s needs —
armaments, munitions and medicine for NOVJ, they brought in officers and doc-
tors and evacuated the wounded. Pilots had to fly over the sea and the mountains
to get to Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia,
Albania and Greece. The fighter escadrille operations included providing protec-
tion to cargo airplanes and special missions in coordination with the Headquarter
of the Balkan Air Forces of the Allies in Italy. The garrison was subject to local
British command in Bari, while the airport support service was subordinated to
the US 15th Air Army. The Soviet radio service in Bari, which was controlled by
RU RKKA, utilized a special radio-network Groza-1 (Storm-1).363
359
Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.”
360
E. Potievskii, Partizany, documentary film 38 min. (Moscow: SVR RF, 1997); M. Boltunov, Koroli
diversii. Istoriia diversionnykh sluzhb Rossii (Moscow: Veche, 2001).
361
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20; Sergienko, AGON, 23.
362
Shtemenko., General’nyi shtab, 291–292.
363
Sobranie lichnykh dokumentov S. V. Sokolova, Chastnaia kollektsiia.
According to General Korneev, the Soviet government decided to send its mis-
sion to Yugoslavia at the end of 1943, which was after Churchill and Roosevelt
agreed to jointly support Tito at the Teheran Conference.364 The mission left
Moscow at seven in the morning on January, 17, 1944.365 The flights between
Moscow-Astrakhan-Baku-Baghdad-Cairo-Tripoli-Tunis-Bari were captained by
A. S. Shornikov and Major A. M. Lebedev.366 In Cairo, the Soviet Mission met
SOE officers, including F. Deakin, who had just returned from Yugoslavia. In
Cairo, the Mission met NOVJ officers — M. Popović and V. Dedijer. At the same
time, King Peter II and Purić, the Prime Minister of the government in exile, were
in Cairo. General Korneev categorically rejected the British offer to meet them.367
After its long journey, the Mission met the NOVJ representatives to the Allies —
V. Velebit and M. Milojević. The Major Lebedev’s airplane returned to Moscow,
while Captain Alexander Shornikov airplane and its crew remained at the Mis-
sion’s disposal. Captain Shornikov and his co-pilot Boris Kalinkin were real aces
with plenty of experience in flying behind enemy lines on various types of Soviet
airplanes, as well as the American B-24 and the British Albemarle Mk I. From
Cairo, the Soviet Mission flew to an improvised airport near the village of Medeno
Polje, 7km from Bosanski Petrovac. The Soviets were accompanied by three Brit-
ish Douglas airplanes, two heavy American cargo airplanes and twenty five Brit-
ish Spitfire fighters for protection. The Commander of the NOVJ 5th Corps, Slavko
Rodić, met the Mission in Medeno Polje, and transferred the Soviets on sledges to
Bosanski Petrovac. In Bosanski Petrovac’s House of Culture, a ceremonial dinner
was held, followed by a mass meeting with locals who wanted to see the Russians.
The next day, the Mission departed for Drvar, where another dinner was orga-
nized in the honor of the Mission at a wood processing plant, which was decorated
with Yugoslav, Soviet, American and British flags, and pictures of Roosevelt, Sta-
lin and Churchill.368
The Mission’s arrival was described in various ways in numerous memoirs, de-
pending on the author’s latter attitudes and views. General Velebit mockingly re-
membered that General Korneev was “well fed and therefore unprepared for the ath-
letic accomplishments [parachuting — A. T.], and because he was injured during the
war he lost the necessary firmness.”369 According to Dedijer, Tito was aware of the
pompous character of the meeting with the Soviet Mission but he pointed out its im-
364
N. V. Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR v Iugoslavii,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 201.
365
366
A. S. Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 214–215; Zelenjin, “Sov-
jetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20, 21.
367
368
369
V. Velebit, Sećanja (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 165.
portance for “strengthening NOP ties with the Allied countries.” Citing the speakers
at the ceremonial reception (MacLean, Korneev and Tito), Dedijer concluded that
the meeting amounted to the official recognition of Tito as the President of the Na-
tional Committee, almost equal in status to Churchill and Stalin.370 Djilas recalled
Korneev’s cautious attitude towards Tito.371 Korneev, Zelenin and Shornikov paid
most attention to their difficult thirty-nine day journey.372 Koča Popović painted
the picture of warm relations between NOVJ and the Soviet Mission in his mem-
oirs. “The Soviet military mission, headed by Lieutenant-General Korneev landed
on 23.II. in Drvar, on 24th at night, a dinner was prepared which was attended by
Marshal Tito, Lieutenant-General Korneev, Brigadier-General MacLean… Colonel
Terish, Major Churchill and about twenty high ranking and lower ranking officers
from the Soviet Mission. Tito, Korneev and MacLean spoke. The ceremonial Red
Army epaulets somewhat eased the necessity of addressing each other with ‘Sir
Major’ and ‘Sir Officers’. After the ceremony ended, only several Soviet officers
remained in the hall with us: we sang together, and nobody addressed anyone with
‘Sir’. During the dinner, to the left of me sat Churchill with his short sharp beard —
somehow tense, confused, as always when he was not warmed up (under the influ-
ence of alcohol — A. T.). He spoke English with me and Major Zakharov (probably
Major V. M. Sakharov, the Senior Assistant to the head of the mission — A. T.),373
who sat to the right of me. He asked me questions about many things which I was not
particularly happy to talk about in a purely ‘parachutist’s’ manner, penetratingly and
imposingly… he switched between French and English — because he concluded
that I completely understood English. Zakharov is a blond, lively young man, pleas-
ant, warm-hearted and direct. He told me that they all felt here as if they were at their
own home — and it could be seen that that is how they truly felt.”374 Members of the
mission soon relaxed and established very close ties with members of the NOVJ Su-
preme Headquarters. Djilas recalled that Tito “told [him] that General Korneev —
when one night they stayed alone — drunkenly kissed him and tenderly called him
‘Oska, Oska… ’ [Russian — Joshka, Joshka — A. T.]”375
The Mission’s activities were completely secret. It seemed to Korneev’s Brit-
ish colleague MacLean that the Russians filled the airplanes with only vodka and
caviar, that they did not know what they would do with the free time and that their
presence contributed only to the social life of the Allied missions.376 The only pur-
370
371
372
Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 201; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 21, 22,
Shornikov, “Nashi polity,” 214–215.
373
374
Popović K., Beleške uz ratovanje (Belgrade: BIGZ 1988), 199.
375
376
Maklejn, Rat, chapt. 11.
pose of the Soviet mission which until now has come to light was “to determine the
most immediate NOVJ needs and cooperation in organizing the necessary mili-
tary material.” The members of the Soviet Mission described the Soviet military
assistance as efficient, Velebit as considerable as the English military assistance,
while Dedijer pointed out that the Soviet aid was very limited (without comparing
it with the British and American assistance).377 Nikola Popović described the true
dimensions of the Soviet assistance to NOP, with analysis of its content.378
In order to determine the scope of the Soviet military and diplomatic assistance
to the Yugoslav Partisans, we must take into account NOVJ Mission to the USSR
which reached Moscow on April 12, 1944. The Yugoslav Mission was headed
by Velimir Terzić, while Milovan Djilas also played an important role.379 Stalin
received from the Yugoslavs an exhaustive list of things which NOVJ needed:
medicine, equipment and weapons. On May 8, 1944, Stalin approved the consider-
able assistance in the Stavka (The Main Command of the Armed Forces) Order
Number 5847 “About measures to offer aid to NOVJ.” Terzić and Djilas met Stalin
and Molotov on May 19, almost more than a month after consulting various Soviet
civil servants responsible for providing the assistance to NOVJ. Their meeting
lasted for a relatively long period of time — an hour and a half.380
The Soviet Mission and its auxiliary group in Bari (Italy) were also charged
with intelligence tasks. The USSR sought information about Balkan countries un-
der the German occupation and about the resistance movements independent of
the Comintern. As a result, missions comprising of several officers of the military
intelligence were sent from Bari throughout the Balkans. The first missions im-
mediately left for Slovenia (Patrahal’cev, Kul’kov and Likho) and Montenegro
(Kovalenko). After new officers arrived from the USSR, this method of studying
the Balkans expanded. With the arrival of AGON (Air Group for Special Op-
erations), the Soviet missions were sent to Greece (headed by Lieutenant Colo-
nel G. M. Popov and mission of V. A. Troian) and Albania (Major K. P. Ivanov and
radio-operator V. Churin). The missions in Yugoslav regions were also expanded.
Instructors and doctors requested by NOVJ were sent to Yugoslavia. Among oth-
ers, on July 9, the first Soviet film makers arrived, V. Muromcev and Eshurin, who
were tasked with making a documentary film about the Yugoslav Partisans.381
According to the history of the RU RKKA Radio Liaison Service, in May
1944, Korneev’s Mission relied on a network of radio stations comprising of
377
Dedijer, Josip Broz, 392; Velebit, Sećanja, 165; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,”
23.
378
379
Popović, Beleške, 193.
380
381
fourteen points: two radio-networks (one in the airbase base in Bari, while the
second followed Korneev in Bosnia, Vis and Romania) and twelve radio sta-
tions throughout Yugoslavia (in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Monte-
negro and Vojvodina), Greece and Albania. The only Balkan countries which
remained outside of this Soviet radio network were Turkey and Bulgaria, which
had diplomatic relations with Moscow. As a result, the Soviets collected the
intelligence on these two countries (and dispatched it to Moscow) through more
traditional and official channels.382 Korneev’s radio network, based in Drvar,
was codenamed Purga-1 (Snow Storm). It was extremely active. In total, Purga-1
emitted twelve to eighteen thousand five-number groups per day, which was
exceptionally high.383 Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that General Korn-
eev’s Mission was de facto the Soviet intelligence center for entire Balkans,
unlike the other Allied Missions to NOVJ whose aim was the exchange of infor-
mation. Each new flight brought in new officers and experts: from meteorology
expert A. I. Karakasha (for the airport), to experts for organization of the finan-
cial systems (on Tito’s behest, who wanted to prepare for organization of the
new state bank) the former Deputy of the People’s Commissariat for Finances
Colonel M. F. Bodrov and the former First Deputy to the President of the State
Bank of the USSR Colonel V. S. Gerashchenko. It is possible that the intense
activity of the Soviet Mission encouraged the Germans to stage their aerial as-
sault on Drvar. Korneev received information about the possible attack several
weeks prior to the assault, and he urged Tito to undertake steps to secure NOVJ
Headquarters and to prepare a plan for an unexpected German attack.384 None-
theless, the attack occurred afterward, when NOP and members of the Mission
relaxed their security measures. Tito, the Soviet and the British Missions barely
managed to escape the German encirclement.
The events which transpired in the next several days were described different-
ly by Soviet and British representatives to NOVJ. Even the beginning of the opera-
tion was described differently. Soviets (Korneev and Zelenin) suspected that the
British members of the Mission knew when the German assault would take place
based on the intelligence and the fact that MacLean and Churchill had suddenly
left Tito’s headquarters several days before the German attack.385 Their suspicion
382
L. P. Kostromin, “Nasha razvedka v Bolgarii,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 4
1941–1945 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999); O. I. Na-
zhestkin, “Vengerskie motvy na turektskoi zemle,” in ibid.
383
A. N. Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi Sovetskoi voennoi missii v Iugoslavii v gody Velikoi Otechest-
vennoi voiny” in V. A. Kirpichenko, ed., Pozyvnye voennoi razvedki.
384
Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 202; Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 386.
385
From the British surrounding, K. Kvashnin also got close with R. Churchill who established with the
British Prime Minister’s son warm ties, Sudoplatov, Raznye dni; V. Koval’chuk, “Liudi i sud’by,” Rod-
nik 83, Ocrober 18, 2002. Dienko, Razvedka.
increased when they found out after the war that the British managed to crack the
majority of German radio-communications in the Western Balkans. In contrast,
British historians claim that the British did not have accurate information about
the aerial assault, although they received separate and unconnected reports about
the possibility of the German attack.386 The Chief of the British Mission, MacLean,
described the German assault on Drvar based on the report which his deputy Ma-
jor Vivien wrote. According to MacLean, Vivien was in close contact with Tito
after the Yugoslav leader just managed to escape the German encirclement. Tito
called Vivien and asked him that he and his staff should be evacuated to Italy until
the situation enabled their return to Yugoslavia. Vivien sent a dépêche to Bari. On
the same day, a Royal Air-Force Douglas evacuated Tito, his dog Tiger, five or six
of his assistants, Vivien and the Soviet Mission. The pilot of the Douglas was a
Soviet officer, who received this assignment by pure chance.387
This version of events was available in the Serbian translation of MacLean’s
memoirs. We will present the Soviet version of the same events based on several
sources: Korneev’s, Zelenin’s and Shornikov’s memoirs (the pilot of the Douglas
which evacuated Tito and foreign missions from Bosnia) and archival documents
which became accessible after 1991 such as reports of the radio service and Alek-
sandr Shornikov’s report sent to Marshal Alexander Golovanov who headed the
ADD at the time.388
As soon as the German parachutes appeared above Drvar, the main radio-sta-
tion of the Soviet mission was destroyed on the orders of the Deputy Commander
of the Mission L. N. Dolgov, who was responsible for radio communication. The
Mission was only left with a small radio-station N-15 Sever, which was ordinarily
used tactically during minor diversionary actions on distances less than 400km.389
It was impossible to establish contact between Moscow and Sever radio-station, and
without special measures in the mountainous terrain, it was impossible to establish
contact with the Soviet base in Italy. According to the report written by the Service
for RU RKKA Radio Liaison, alarm was raised in Moscow and Bari when Purga-1
went suddenly quiet on May 25. Stalin was immediately informed, and according
to S. M. Shtemenko, he ordered the General Staff to “clarify the situation and if
necessary to offer the comrades required assistance.” For seven days, until June 2,
386
R. Bennett, “Knight’s Move at Drvar: Ultra and the Attempt on Tito’s Life, 25 May 1944,” Journal of
Contemporary History April (1987), 195–208.
387
Maklejn, Rat, chapter 12.
388
Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu,” 217–218; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 203–204; Ni-
kiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi”; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 25–26; Golo-
vanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova ot
Shornikova A. S. o deistviiakh aviagruppy v Iugoslavii, The Archive of A. E. Golovanov’s family.
389
I. N. Artem’ev, V efire — partizany (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971); S. P. Vyskubov, V efire „Severok“
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1986).
the intelligence service’s Centre for Radio Liaison tried to establish connection with
Purga-1 or to receive information from Groza-1. The contact was established on
June 2, when the Mission called Moscow from radio station codenamed Vega.390 It
turned out that Major Dolgov managed to increase the strength of the radio-station
and emit Korneev’s announcement. Dolgov sent the same announcement to the head
of the Soviet representative in Bari, S. V. Sokolov. In this message, the Soviets re-
quested an airplane for evacuation on June 3, at 22.00 hours. Since Dolgov’s techno-
logical innovation did not offer guarantees that the tactical radio-station would sent
a very important message to such great distance, Korneev decided to send the same
message through the British Mission’s radio-station.391
Apparently, there were radio exchanges between Major Vivien and his subor-
dinates because according to Shornikov’s report, Captain Preston from the British
Command in the Air-Force base in Bari reported that the airplane must come to
Bosnia during the night of June 4–5 (and not the night before). An earlier depar-
ture was forbidden. Sokolov was suspicious, which was ordinary for a person in
his field, and he feared that the British wanted to sabotage the evacuation. Sokolov
and Shornikov, unable to establish contact with Vega anymore, decide that the
flight had to be undertaken at any cost according to the date which they barely
intercepted from Vega signal.392
The American airplane Douglas, which was piloted by Shornikov (which the
USSR received through Land Lease) was made to weigh as less as possible. Arm-
chairs, tables and all equipment were removed from the airplane. Shornikov and
his co-pilot Boris Kalinkin announced their flight to the British personnel at the air
base as an ordinary reconnaissance flight. They successfully landed at Kupreško
Polje. Pavel Iakimov, Shornikov’s navigator who was with Korneev from very
beginning of the mission, chose the location for the airplane’s landing.
According to Shornikov’s memories, half an hour after the airplane landed,
Tito and the Mission’s personnel appeared at the airport.393 After a brief discus-
sion, it was decided that the following passengers should board the airplane:
Korneev, his assistant Sakharov, Coder Major Nikitin, the temporary Chief of the
British Mission Major Vivian Street, Marshal Tito, CK KPJ members E. Kardelj,
A. Ranković and I. Milutinović, NOVJ Chief of the Staff A. Jovanović, Tito’s
personal secretary, his doctor, his personal security team and his favorite shep-
pard dog. The dog, known as Tiger, refused to enter the airplane for a long time.
390
Part of the Soviet Mission established contact with Moscow somewhat earlier, Sergienko, AGO, 94–
96.
391
Shtemenko, General’nyi shtab, 200–201, 388–389; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 203; Nikiforov,
“Sistema radiosviazi.”
392
Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova;
Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 203.
393
Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova.
Shornikov repeated the flight that same night and he transferred to Bari General
Gorshkov and several NOVJ officers and members of the Soviet Mission. On this
occasion, Shornikov was followed by three American airplanes that also landed at
Kupreško Polje and assisted in evacuation of the personnel to Italy. In the morn-
ing, on June 4, German units reached Kupreško Polje.394
The majority of intelligence officers of the mission remained in Yugoslavia,
and they even received reinforcements throughout the summer of 1944.395 The
evacuated personnel, including Korneev, were with Tito in Italy and on the island
of Vis. The Soviet base in Italy was considerably expanded, and on July 15, 1944,
the Soviet mission received its own sector on the Allied base near Bari. The Soviet
group (AGON) under the command of Colonel Vasilii Shchelunov, consisted of
twelve American transport airplanes Douglas and twelve Soviet fighters Iak-9-
DD.396 Shchelkunov’s group aided the Partisan detachments in Yugoslavia, and it
continued to spread the network of Soviet instructors in Yugoslavia, Greece and
Albania.397 In July 1944, General Korneev departed for Moscow, and on August
17, he reported to Stalin his impressions.398
In early July, the decision was made to transfer the officers of the Main Staff
of Serbia to Serbia. They gathered in the base in Bari. Finally, on the orders of
K. Popović, Ljuba Djurić was ordered to conduct reconnaissance flight with the
Soviet crew above Radan Mountain in Southern Serbia. Since the state of the air-
field was unknown, N. A. Girenko, the head of the Soviet crew which was tasked
with transferring a group of Yugoslav and Soviet officers, suggested to Sokolov
that they should first parachute a Yugoslav reconnaissance to investigate the air-
port. Not wishing to risk the lives of high ranking Yugoslav officers, Sokolov ap-
proved this plan. Girenko transported a group of Partisan officers (Ljuba Djurić,
Milorad Konstantinović, Zdravko Oljača, Lazar Bajčetić, Ante Runić and Dobrivoje
Mihajlović) to the Radan-Mountain. At ten o’clock at night, on July 11, 1944, the
Soviet Douglas piloted by N. A. Girenko took off from the Bari Airport with several
important passengers: K. Popović, the Chief of Staff of Serbia, General Gorshkov,
the Deputy to the Chief of the Soviet Mission, and eleven Yugoslav and four Soviet
officers (B. P. Odintsov, V. V. Zelenin, K. I. Kozlov, M. A. Ivanov). The problem was
that the group of Soviet airplanes AGON had not yet arrived from USSR. There-
fore, the Allies’ assistance was necessary. After exhaustive convincing, the British
agreed to provide one of their Douglas airplanes to transfer the remainder of the Par-
394
Ibid.; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia”, 204; M. Dželebdžić and D. Otović, Titovi ratni letovi (Belgrade:
Književne novine, 1986), 37–45; Sergienko, AGON, 86.
395
Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi.”
396
Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 27; Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia,
515.
397
P. M. Mikhailov, Posle zakata — vzlet (Smolensk: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1988).
398
tisan leaders who were bound for Serbia. After the flight “which passed safely and
with rare enemy anti-aircraft fire,” the airplanes landed near Leskovac. R. Dugonjić
remembered: “when we exited, we waited to see the people. And the people were
wonderful. I saw some women who were crying when they saw an airplane with a
Red Star and from the crying they could not talk. Happiness could be seen on all the
faces, as well as the belief that from now on things would get better…”399
The Soviet mission did not view sympathetically the increasingly close relations
between Tito and his subordinates with the British military and political leaders.400
This relationship manifested itself through British officials’ frequent visits to Tito,
his lengthy stay on the British Destroyer Blackmore after which he was transferred
to the island of Vis, formally part of Yugoslavia but in reality the Western Allies’
base on the Dalmatian Coast.401 On September 10, the Soviet Military Mission flew
on Shornikov’s airplane from Vis to Craiova (Romania), where Tito was supposed
to arrive shortly with his colleagues. “Before the arrival of Marshal Tito with the
operational group of the Supreme Staff, all conditions for their tasks in directing the
troops, establishing contact with commands of Soviet Fronts and troops, with which
the Yugoslav units and Partisan detachments had to cooperate, were prepared.”402
The preparation for accommodating Tito began before this. In the second half of
August, 1944, an extensive list of individuals who would accompany him in Craiova
was prepared. The newly appointed head of the Soviet Mission, I. Starinov, was
included in this list. On September 8, 1944, a week after the Soviet tanks entered
Bucharest, Starinov and other members of the Mission arrived to Craiova and began
preparing for the arrival of Tito and the Soviet military Mission.403
It is difficult to determine whether Tito was truly in a hurry to leave Vis, or
whether Moscow was concerned about Tito’s close relationship with the British.
There could have been other reasons for Soviets to want to see Tito transferred to
Romania except to increase the control over the Yugoslav Communists. All Soviet
memoirs and reports which describe the Mission’s activities on Vis mention the
British attempts to slow down Soviet activities. It does not even matter whether
this was true or not. One thing was obvious — this subjective or objective feel-
ing of the British sabotage could have increased Moscow’s desire to transfer Tito
away from Vis.404 There was another reason in play here, the justifiable fear that
399
M. Marković, Rat i revolucija u Srbiji (Sećanja 1941–1945) (Belgrade: Belgradeski izdavačko-grafički
zavod, 1987), 176–178; Sergienko, AGON, 176–178.
400
Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 204.
401
Maclean provided a great description of Vis as an Allied base, Maklejn, Rat, gl. 13.
402
P. G. Rak, V glubokom tylu vraga,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye, 211.
403
Starinov, Miny.
404
Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu”, 217–218; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia”, 203–204; Nikifo-
rov, “Sistema radiosviazi”; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944, ” 25–26; Golovanov,
Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova.
the Germans could have tried to correct their failure in Drvar. Skorzeni, who
organized the aerial assault on Drvar, stated the following in his memoirs: “after-
wards, of course, we tried to locate Tito’s headquarters, which moved to the Adri-
atic coast, and later on to the island of Vis. We even began planning a lightening
operation to land on the island, but the events again passed us by.”405 Tito’s rapid
and unannounced departure from Vis played into Moscow’s hands. Djilas claimed
that the Soviet Mission insisted that Tito should go to Moscow and leave Vis.406
Vivien Street went to see Tito with a message from General Wilson, and he
determined that Tito left the island without a trace. “Questions about his where-
abouts were met with imprecise answers. That was the old story, so well known
from the Moscow days: he was sick, busy, he went for a walk. The more respon-
sible members of the Marshal’s entourage, apparently, also disappeared.”407 Djilas
also mentioned Tito’s secret departure from the island, accompanied by Korneev,
Ranković and Milutinović.408 The Soviet pilot P. M. Mikhailov, who flew Tito
from Vis, also provided an account of Tito’s departure. Late at night on Septem-
ber 18, Mikhailov and his co-pilot Pavlov received the order to depart from Vis for
the territory where the Russian troops were stationed. The departure was planned
for three in the morning. The pilots were ordered to take off at night, without the
airport’s approval. When Mikhailov entered the airplane, he was surprised to see
an unfamiliar passenger. After he queried about the unknown passenger, he felt
the touch of somebody’s hand on his back and a Colonel from the Soviet Mission
ordered him to mind his own business.409 On the same night, September 19, the
airplane safely flew over the enemy territory and landed at the Soviet airport in
Craiova.
When Tito landed in Craiova, he met Starinov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet
Mission: “Tito had Marshal’s uniform on. He appeared to be relatively young and
energetic, but he seemed to me to have been somehow dissatisfied… firmly shak-
ing my hand, Tito told me in Russian: ‘Finally, I personally see you, Rudolfo! (he
knew me under this pseudonym in Spain) — I hope that our joint work will be use-
ful. You can also get in touch with your friend Ivan Hariš.” Tito was situated in a
villa which belonged to an Antonescu’s civil servant. Tito’s residence was guarded
by troops from a special MGB USSR department which was in charge of protect-
ing Stalin and the highest Soviet leadership. The head of Tito’s security was the
deputy of Stalin’s personal security team. Nonetheless, according to Starinov, this
405
O. Skortseni, Sekretnye zadaniia RSKhA (Moscow: AST, 1999); Skorzeny O., Meine Kommandoun-
ternehmen: Krieg ohne Fronten (Wiesbaden-Munchen: Limes-Verlag. 1975).
406
407
Maklejn, Rat, chapter 16.
408
409
P. Mikhailov, “Polety k Iugoslavskim partizanam,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 221.
honor did not make Tito happy. The security hindered Tito’s independence and
ability to see his subordinates.410
At the end of September, Tito flew to Moscow for several days to see Stalin.
There are few verifiable facts about Tito’s visit to Stalin. It is obvious that Dedi-
jer’s account is filled with doubtful claims, such as that Stalin had two or three
meetings with Tito in his office and twice at his own home.411 This would have
meant that that Stalin met Tito more frequently than Churchill and Roosevelt at
Teheran or his Minister of Foreign Affairs during the first two weeks of Octo-
ber.412 It is difficult to imagine that something could have forced Stalin to meet
Tito so many times. It is more likely that Djilas was correct when he wrote that
Tito met Stalin twice, once in his cabinet and once at his dacha.413 According to
Djilas, Tito said that Stalin immediately agreed to send a tank corps to Yugoslav
Partisans in order to liberate Belgrade and the Eastern part of Yugoslavia. This
was not Tito’s first plea for assistance to Stalin. In Molotov’s documents there
is a report which indicated that Tito requested a Soviet parachute division on
April 29, 1944. At the time, Stalin deemed this request to be untimely.414 Stalin’s
promises of military aid must have heartened Tito, since NOP units at the time
were prepared to fight only against “the internal enemy” and alone “they could
not have liberated Belgrade at the time.”415 After a business conversation, the
Yugoslav leader visited Stalin’s villa near Kuntsevo.416 “Unaccustomed to drink-
ing, Tito went away to vomit… with Beria’s cynical objection: nothing, nothing,
it happens…”417
Incredibly, the visitor’s journal mentions Tito’s later visits to Stalin (on April
6, 1945, April 12, 1945, May 27, 1946 and June 10, 1946), but no more visits
were mentioned in 1944.418 It would be logical to suppose that Tito was received
by Stalin at the end of September, 1944, since the Yugoslav question must have
interested Stalin prior to Churchill’s visit to Moscow on October 9–18, 1944.419
Tito’s visit to Stalin was mentioned by a relatively reliable source. Marshal
Golovanov ran into Tito at Stalin’s office on September 27, 1944, a day be-
410
Starinov, Miny.
411
412
Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 303; Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill,
38, 51.
413
414
RGASPI, f. 82 “Fond V. M. Molotova “, o. 2, d. 1370, 17.
415
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 400; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 398.
416
A. N. Shefov, S. V. Deviatov, Iu. V. Iur’ev, Blizhniaia dacha Stalina. Opyt istoricheskogo putevoditelia
(Moscow: Kremlin Multimedia, 2004).
417
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 399–400.
418
419
Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 412–488.
fore the agreement between Tito and Stalin was announced.420 This date makes
sense chronologically considering that Tito-Stalin agreement, which announced
that NKOJ requested the temporary entry of Soviet troops to Yugoslavia, was
publicized on September 28. It is not clear, however, why the usually precise
Stalin’s visitors’ journal does not mention Tito amongst Stalin’s guests that
day. On that day, Stalin was visited by A. E. Golovanov, the Commander of the
Strategic Aviation, and other high ranking officers from ADD (A. A. Novikov,
M. M. Gromov, I. V. Markov), I. I. Zatevakhin, the Commander of the Parachute
Troops of the Red Army and several other high ranking General Staff officers
(S. M. Shtemenko, A. I. Antonov, I. D. Cherniakhovskii. According to the jour-
nal, unusually, a certain Timofeev was also present in Stalin’s cabinet (from
20.00 until 00.15),421 whom the publishers of the Journal identified as P. V. Timo-
feev (1902–1982) — a notable engineer of infrared equipment. This seems quite
questionable, however, if we remember the chronology of visitors to Stalin on
that day. At the beginning of the working day, Stalin was visited by Molotov,
and five minutes later “Timofeev” arrived. Obviously, the mysterious visitor
was not the infrared technology engineer (because he had nothing in common
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Stalin, Molotov and their secret visitor
talked for two hours when they were visited by Malenkov (at 21.40). At 22 hours,
Shtemenko, Antonov, Chernyakhovsky and Markov arrived to the cabinet, and
an hour later, at 23.00, Golovanov, Gromov, Novikov and Zatevakhin joined
them. Shcherbakov arrived at 22.30. Somewhat later (23.15–22.30), officers of
the Air-Force and the land forces left Stalin’s cabinet. The mysterious figure of
the day, Timofeev, Stalin and the highest USSR leadership remained in the So-
viet leader’s cabinet. After some time (at 00.10), they were joined by Beria and
Bulganin. At the end, all of them together left the cabinet, while “Timofeev” was
present until the very end of the visit.422 Nonetheless, it is unclear why the Visi-
tors’ Journal does not specify that Tito was present in Stalin’s office on that day.
Any attempts to answer this question, based on the existing accessible archival
sources, are bound to fail.423
In any case, Tito soon returned to Craiova, where he did not stay for too
long, and he moved to Vršac, which was liberated by the forces of Marshal Ma-
linovskii’s Second Ukrainian Front, whom Stalin ordered not to sleep and to ad-
420
Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 524.
421
Stalin’s working day with visitor began around eight or nine at night and ended late at night or in early
morning hours.
422
423
Transcripts of the conversation between Stalin and Tito in the autumn of 1944, according to the de-
ceased V. Volkov, the director of the RAN Institute for Slavic Studies, exists in the Presidential Archive
but it is still inaccessible to researchers.
vance, in Tito’s presence.424 Soon, the Yugoslav political elite relocated to Serbia:
on October 16, 1944, the Soviet airplanes from Vis and Bari transferred mem-
bers of NKOJ and officers of the Supreme Command, and on October 22, 1944,
the Premier of the government in exile, Šubašić and the Chief of the Yugoslav
Military Mission in Britain V. Velebit.425 In the meantime, General Zhdanov’s 4th
Mechanized Corps, which was promised to Tito in Moscow, liberated Belgrade
with Partisan divisions. Afterward, the Supreme Commander of the NOVJ began
to prepare for his departure for Belgrade, where he arrived on October 25, 1944.426
He was followed by members of the Soviet Military Mission. After the liberation
of Belgrade, the main radio-station of the Soviet Mission in Yugoslavia was based
in Pančevo. This was a new, large radio-station which changed its code name from
Purga-1 to Alfa. Alfa became the central radio-station of the widespread network
of Soviet stations in the Balkans. Afterwards, Alfa turned into a radio-station of
the Soviet embassy in Belgrade.
The Military Mission relocated to Villa Rosh, in Katić’s Street, near Slavija in
Belgrade. This luxurious house belonged to Swiss citizens before October, 1944,
who left Yugoslavia together with the Germans. First the members of Serbia’s Re-
gional Committee moved there, who found in the underground bunkers carpets,
hunting rifles, expensive porcelain service and paintings. After a certain period
of time, Mitar Bakić, Tito’s general secretary, told them “that Tito ordered the
Regional Committee to move out of the house because the Soviet Embassy will be
based there… Without any questions we left Villa Rosh, and we took with us only
a few small things.”427 Finally, at the end of November, 1944, AGON was trans-
ferred to Zemun airfield from Italy, and its fighters were returned to the Air Force.
At the same time, General Korneev was replaced with Major-General A. F. Kisele,
new head of the Soviet Military Mission.428
The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia
The entry of the Soviet troops into Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1944, led to
the ejection of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian occupational troops from the
country and the entrenchment of the communist totalitarian regime in Belgrade.
424
Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 400; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 415.
425
Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi.”
426
Marković, Rat i revolucija, 319.
427
Ibid.,314.
428
Sergienko, AGON, 411–413.
The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia 269
The Soviet troops’ liberating mission began to be questioned in Yugoslav histori-

ography for the first time during 1951–1953, at the height of the Yugoslav-Soviet
conflict over the Informbureau Resolution. Djilas also used the quotation marks
around the word liberation in his Razgovori sa Staljinom.429 Admittedly, the quo-
tation marks in these works were used to deny the Red Army’s central role in
liberation of Yugoslavia from the Germans in the autumn of 1944. The RKKA
role in the events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944 was thoroughly reevaluated
only when the one-party dictatorships were defeated. The awareness that JVuO
was also a resistance movement and the beginning of the discussion surrounding
the Partisan repressions during 1944–1945, forced the historians to take another
look at the role of the Red Army in Southeastern Europe, including Serbia. The re-
evaluation has not occurred in scholarship yet, although publicists have addressed
this topic,430 as well as parts of the academic elite in their pronouncements.
Professor of History at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bel-
grade,
Nikola Samardžić, said on B92 Radio on December 21, 2007, “that Serbia was
divided over the question whether the occupation began in 1941 or with the entry
of the southern wing of the Red Army in 1944. For some, this was much worse
type of occupation, because the consequences were much worse…”431 This new
historiographical trend is consistent with the modern tendency of the so called
Young European Historiography, which for twenty years has studied the occupa-
tional role of the Red Army in Poland, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia 1944–1945.432
Dr. Goran Nikolić, fellow at the Institute for European Studies even managed to
calculate that Serbia would “today have a minimum GDP of 29,000 Euros… and
not the current 7,000,”433 had Red Army not occupied Serbia. Some West Euro-
pean scholars support the Young European view of history. The leading German
expert on the history of Serbia believes that “the German troops in October, 1944,
429
M. Đilas, Razgovori sa Staljinom (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990.).
430
For example, in the first comprehensive biography of Tito in recent Serbian historiography, P Simić
qualified the entrance of the Soviet troops in Serbia in the autumn of 1944 as an “invasion”, P. Simić,
Tito. Tajna veka (Belgrade: Novosti, 2009), 175, 178. For the German author of a voluminous study
of Serbian history, Zundhauzen, “the German troops in October of 1944 withdrew from Serbia,” after
which “Belgrade was taken the Red Army and National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia units,” Zund-
hauzen, Istorija Srbije, 366–367.
431
S. Lukić and S. Vuković, Peščanik FM, кnj. 11 (Belgrade: Peščanik, 2008), 110–111.
432
Within the framework of this historiographical approach, it is necessary to take into account the attitude
of several East European countries towards the monuments dedicated to the Red Army. It is impossible
to negate the fact that the wave of removal of these monuments, which occurred in Poland and Hungary
in the 1990s, and is taking place in Estonia, Latvia and Western Ukraine right now, began in Yugoslavia
in the distant 1948. See O. Pintar, “’Široka strana moja rodnaja, ’ Spomenici sovjetskim vojnicima
podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954,” Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (2005), 134–145.
433
V. Miladinović and V. Lalić, “Istraživanje: Kako bi izgledala Srbija da je pobedio Draža?” Press, May
9, 2005.
withdrew from Serbia,” after which, “Belgrade was captured by the units of the
Red Army and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.”434
Objectively, the Red Army’s arrival to Yugoslavia cannot be viewed as a
simple one-dimensional process. The complexity of “the Red Army’s liberation”
becomes evident even for the conservative specialists at the Institute for the Mil-
itary History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Even they
admit that the Red Army had greater aims than to simply fight against German
Nazism. “Multifarious character of the Red Army’s activity… was determined
by the complexity of the tasks which it had to resolve and the specificity of the
military situation… in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria… it must be taken into
account that the Red Army, even in its very name, expressed not only its national-
state characteristic, but also its social-class purpose… the armed detachment of
the world proletariat.”435 The paradigm of “liberators” and “occupiers” cannot be
viewed outside of the context of the mutual perception of Soviet soldiers and the
inhabitants of Serbia (as Partisans, Četniks and civilians) who encountered each
other in the autumn of 1944. The behavior of Soviet soldiers in Serbia in the au-
tumn of 1944, and the attitude of the local population towards them defined to a
large degree the role of the Soviet Russia in the Civil War in Serbia as well as in
creation of the mutual stereotypes, which until the present day influence relations
between the Serbs and the Russians.
The Yugoslav and Soviet historians for a long time were in sort of a competi-
tion, seeking to prove that their respective side played a more decisive role in
liberating Yugoslavia. The difference in the Soviet and the Yugoslav approach
was that the former talked about “the offensive of the Soviet troops in Yugoslavia
and liberating eastern parts of the country and Belgrade”436 while the latter talked
about “penetration of the bulk of the NOVJ forces into Serbia and offensive of
the NOVJ 1st Army Group and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army to-
wards Belgrade.”437 According to the most recent data, based on exhaustive archi-
val research in the archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
300,000 Soviet troops participated directly in the Belgrade Operation (September
28 — October 20, 1944). The Third Ukrainian Front numbered 200,000, parts of
the Second Ukrainian Front in Northern Serbia numbered 93, 500, and the Dan-
ube Flotilla numbered 6, 500.438 Based on the Yugoslav archival sources, it has
434
Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 336–337.
435
N. V. Vasil’eva, “Rossiiskii voin na Balkanakh v dvukh mirovykh voinakh: istoricheskie tseli i realii
povedeniia. (Diskussionnye aspekty),“ in Chelovek na Balkanakh v epokhu krizisov i etnopoliticheskikh
stolknovenii XX veka, ed. R. P. Grishina (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2002), 144.
436
S. S. Biriuzov et al., “Nastuplenie Sovetskikh voisk v Iugoslavii i osvobozhdenie vostochnykh raionov
strany i Belgrada,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 54–80.
437
V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 knj. II, 274–331.
438
G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Rossiia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: Statisticheskoe issledovanie, (Moscow: Olma-
been determined that NOVJ deployed nine divisions in its penetration of Serbia
(twenty-six brigades, three brigades usually comprised one division in NOVJ)
and there were five divisions in Serbia already whose ranks were not filled.439
An average NOVJ brigade, according to most optimistic calculations, numbered
950 fighters.440 Regardless of the ongoing mobilization in Serbia, which somewhat
increased the numbers of Partisans, the relative size of NOVJ and the Red Army
is obvious.
With the disappearance of the USSR and SFRJ, this discourse was replaced
by the discourse of occupiers versus liberators. From the old Soviet-Yugoslav ap-
proach, the issue of Stalin’s request addressed to Tito to allow the Soviet army to
temporarily enter Yugoslavia has remained relevant.
On September 28, 1944, TASS announced an agreement between the Soviet
government and NKOJ. The statement stated: “several days ago, the Soviet com-
mand, having in view the development of the military operations against German
and Hungarian troops in Hungary — has addressed the National Committee for
the Liberation of Yugoslavia… with a plea to permit the temporary entry of the
Soviet troops on the Yugoslav territory, which borders with Hungary…”441
The Yugoslav historiography treated this document very seriously, as if the
Red Army truly needed Tito’s approval. In fact, this was a clever and formal way
of strengthening the authority of the Yugoslav Partisans as an independent actor
in international relations. Even the most objective Yugoslav researchers treated
“Tito’s invitation” seriously and they criticized parts of the TASS statement which
they deemed to have been insufficiently diplomatic.442 Nikola B. Popović offered
a more realistic interpretation of this issue in his study. Popović concluded that
Tito wished to have the announcement made in order to increase the authority of
NKOJ, not Stalin, and that Tito pleaded for RKKA units to enter Serbia. Also, the
text of the resolution was announced to the USA ambassador in Moscow, two days
before TASS publicized it. Molotov told Harriman: “the Soviet Supreme Com-
mand has addressed the Supreme Staff and the National Committee of Yugoslavia
with a request to permit part of Soviet troops, with the aim of developing opera-
tions against the German-Hungarian troops in Hungary, to temporary enter Yu-
goslavia near the border with Hungary, with the note that the Soviet troops would
press, 2001), 300.

439
M. Colić, Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut,
1988); M. Colić, “ Prodor strategijske grupacije NOVJ u Srbiju 1944., “ Pola veka od oslobođenja
Srbije, 151. I. Moshchanskii and A. L’vov, Na zemle Iugoslavii, Belgradskaia strategicheskaia
nastupatel’naia operatsiia (28 sentiabria –20 oktiabria 1944) (Moscow: BTV-kniga, 2005), 15–16.
440
“Brigade u NOR,” Vojna enciklopedija 2, 28.
441
“Soobshcheniia TASS,” Pravda, September 28, 1944.
442
B. Petranović, Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju,
1992), 630.
withdrew from Yugoslavia afterwards.” He added that the Yugoslavs “agreed to

the Soviet Supreme Command’s request, with the condition that the Yugoslav ci-
vilian administration will operate exclusively in the rear of the Soviet troops.”443
A present-day researcher cannot but doubt the significance of Tito’s “consent”
and “Stalin’s request,” for the Red Army to enter Yugoslavia. As Popović asserted,
this was an attempt to legalize NOP administration in parts of the country liber-
ated from Germans, and not about legalization of the presence of Soviet troops in
the Western Balkans. From the military-strategic point of view, the inevitability
of the Soviet troops’ entry into Yugoslavia became obvious before the night of
September 18–19, when Tito flew from Vis towards Romania, from where the
leader of the Yugoslav Partisans was transferred to Moscow, and especially before
September 27, “when upon the request of the Supreme Command of the Soviet
Union, an agreement was reached about the participation of the Red Army troops
in operations on part of the Yugoslav territory.”444
At the end of August, 1944, the German occupational apparatus in Serbia began
to prepare for evacuation.445 In early September, 1944, a reconnaissance group of
marines from the Danube Flotilla, among them several Yugoslav volunteers, under
the command of the experienced diversionist, Corvette Lieutenant Viktor Kalganov,
was actively “testing the terrain” around Danube in eastern Serbia.446 After Ro-
mania and Bulgaria switched sides in the war, the Soviet 17th Air Army, under the
command of the General-Colonel V. Sudets, began preparing actively in the middle
September for offensives in eastern Serbia.447 According to memories of a JVuO
fighter, on September 5, the Soviet reconnaissance unit crossed Danube and tested
the strength of the German defenses in the town of Kladovo. The Soviet katiusha
rocket launchers began shelling German positions in Serbian Tekija from Romania
on September 12.448 Lieutenant-General I. S. Anoshin, the former head of the Po-
litical Administration of the Third Ukrainian Front, recorded that “on September
20, the Third Ukrainian Front received the order… to implement a new operation,
which received the name Belgrade Operation.”449 On September 22, 1944, the units
443
Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 154–157; G. A. Arbatov, ed., Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosh-
eniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945: Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh (Mos-
cow: Politizdat, 1984), t. 2, 218.
444
B. Ilić and N. Bogoevski, eds., Hronologija revolucionarne delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita (Belgrade:
Export-Press, 1980), 90.
445
446
A. A. Chkheidze, Zapiski dunaiskogo razvedchika (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1984), 60; Iu. Strekh-
nin, Otriad Borody. Nevydumannye istorii (Cheboksary: Chuvashskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1969),
122.
447
V. A. Sudets, “Aviatsiia v boiakh za osvobozhdenie Iugoslavii,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 122;
TsAMO, 17 VA, Operotdel, Zhurnal boevykh deistvii za sentiabr 1944.
448
Milunović, Od nemila, 52–55; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 100–110.
449
I. S. Anoshin, Na pravyi boi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), 102.
of the 75th Riffle Corps of the 46th Army of the Second Ukrainian Front landed on the
Yugoslav side of Danube (near Turn-Severin-Brza Palanka), and engaged in battles
on the territory of eastern Serbia.450 The forces of the Third and Second Ukrainian
Fronts, from the moment of Romania’s abandonment of their German allies (Au-
gust 24, 1944) needed to safely occupy Romania, and apply pressure on Bulgaria.
Realistically, 300,000 Soviet fighters could not have appeared suddenly on Serbia’s
borders and they could not have crossed the border only twenty-four hours after
receiving an approval from the Yugoslav military and political leadership.
The first strategic preparations for the Red Army’s entry into the Danube
states began before the Yassy-Kishinev Operation (August 20–29, 1944). Within
the framework of these strategic operations, in April of 1944, a decision was made
to form a special Danube Military Flotilla. A. V. Sverdlov, the Chief of Staff of
the Danube Military Flotilla, recalled that the Danube Military Flotilla was tasked
“…to cooperate in offensive operations of the Soviet troops, which had come as
far as Dniester and had to move towards Danube, and afterward, to participate
in liberation of states through which Danube flowed.” In July, 1944, a brigade of
armed boats (twenty-two armored boats, ten semi-speedboats and ten ZIS boats)
and 4th Independent Brigade of River Boats (monitor Zhelezniakov, fourteen ar-
mored boats, twelve boats equipped with katiusha rocket launchers, twenty-two
minesweeper ships and fifteen semi-speedboats). The term river flotilla did not
mean that only vessels were part of the formation. There were also five land bat-
teries of great caliber, a special anti-aircraft squadron, a marine battalion and the
supporting services.451 Insignia “Danube Flotilla” appeared on hats of the sailors
and marines of this formation, leaving no doubt about the intentions of the Soviet
leaders to reach the Danube River delta. Even though the arrival of this flotilla
to Vienna was distant, the plans relating to lower and middle Danube were much
closer. If the Red Army commanders had only Romania and Bulgaria in mind,
which stretched-out along the Black Sea Coast, the unit with such a name would
not have been formed in the spring of 1944 when Tito was still in Drvar.
According to Popović, armies of great powers could have moved through small
countries without their consent. The insistence on the agreement to allow the troops
of superpowers to transfer through a territory, he maintained, represented “an
anachronism” which was not respected by the USA, Britain and the USSR in other
situations.452 The arrogant and self-confident approach towards the sovereignty of
450
I. T. Shlemin, “Voiska 46‑i armii v Bor’be za osvobozhdenie Iugoslavii,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily,
158; V. F. Tolubko and N. I. Baryshev, Ot Vidina do Belgrada. Istoriko-memoarnyi ocherk o boevykh
deistviiakh sovetskikh tankistov v Belgradskoi Operatsii, ed. V. F. Chizha (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 92;
TsAMO, 75 sk, Operotdel, Zhurnal boevykh deistvii za sentiabr’ 1944.
451
A. V. Sverdlov, Voploshchenie zamysla (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 90.
452
the smaller countries was expressed by Stalin, as well as the Red Army’s Political
Administration. The Red Army’s propagandists found a telling example of ‘the con-
sent for transfer’ from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 which they propagated
to the Soviet soldiers. “Romanians and a group of Russian officers sat in a carriage
on… a train. The discussion was about the daily events, about the war. Romanians
began to glorify the success of their army and one of them, addressing the Russians,
‘went too far’: ‘it is good that you are in alliance with us and that without obstacles
you reached the banks of Danube and now you are hitting the enemy, but what
would have you done had we not allowed you to enter [Romania — A. T.]? ’The Ro-
manian who made this statement laughed self-satisfied, and he looked proud, prob-
ably thinking that with this he forced the Russian officer into a corner. The answer
was lightning. One of the officers also smiled and said: ‘that would not have been a
great misfortune. First we would have defeated you, and then the Turks. ’453
The path of the Soviet troops from their landing near Negotin until the libera-
tion of Belgrade has been well reconstructed in Soviet and Yugoslav historiog-
raphies.454 The numerous Red Army units, equipped with modern heavy arma-
ments, broke the German resistance, enabling the penetration of Partisan units
into Serbia. At the same time, the penetration of Partisan detachments into Serbia
created a complicated situation for German communications and they helped en-
circle Belgrade, which was taken jointly by the soldiers of the two armies. The sig-
nificance of the technologically superior Soviet army in the frontal battles against
the Germans was considerable. We should recall that at the Srem Front where the
Yugoslavs entered frontal battles against the Germans mostly alone, the Yugoslav
casualties were high, while the progress was painstakingly slow.455
Although the military aspects of the Belgrade Operation have been well cov-
ered in historiography,456 an important battle was overlooked. In question is the
Batina Battle which by its characteristics was different from the typical Red Army
engagements during the Belgrade Operation, during which the average width of
the front was 400‑620km, depth of penetration 200km, and the average speed of
453
A. Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser za rubezhom (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo NKO SSSR, 1946), 20. Kri-
vitskii published these articles in 1945 during the war. He was a journalist in the main RKKA newspa-
per Krasnaia Zvezda A. Iu. Krivitskii, Ne zabudu vovek (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), 1.
454
Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily; I. Loktionov, Dunavska flotila u velikom otadžbinskom ratu: 1941–1945
(Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1966); I. I. Loktionov, Dunaiskaia flotiliia v Velikoi Otechestven-
noi voine (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), 1962; Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina; S. S. Birjuzov and
R. Hamović, Beogradska operacija (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod,, 1964); R. Šarenac and
D. Tmušić, eds., Beogradska operacija: učesnici govore / Okrugli sto, 18. oktobar 1984 (Belgrade:
Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1985); A. I. Babin, F. Trgo, P. Višnjić, U. Kostić, Beogradska operacija: [20
oktobar 1944] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1989).
455
Lj. Pajović, D. Uzelac and M. Dželebdžić, Sremski front: 1944–1945 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1979);
D. Tmušić and N. Anić, Sremski front: 23. X. 1944–13. IV. 1945 (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1987); M. Rajić,
“Sremski front: srpski martirologion,” Banatski vesnik br. 1 / 2 (1993), 16–18.
456
A. I. Babin, F. Trgo, P. Višnjić, U. Kostić, Beogradska operacija.
the offensive was around 8-9km per day.457 Batina Battle formally occurred be-
tween Belgrade and Budapest Operations, when the Soviets had to cross Danube
again on their way out of Serbia. The participants of these events called them the
most difficult battle for Soviet soldiers in Yugoslavia.458
Immediately after October 20, 1944, when Belgrade was freed from Germans,
KPJ began to adjust to being a governing party, while Red Army units continued
their movement westward towards the capital cities of the enemy — Budapest,
Vienna and Berlin. The Belgrade Strategic Offensive Operation was completed,
but the war continued with the full intensity.
Danube was in the way of the Red Army troops. It turned out that it was more
difficult for the Red Army to exit Serbia, than it was to enter it. The Germans
prepared well to keep the Red Army at this wide water barrier. In addition, there
were several more minor but also important factors: on the other side of the Dan-
ube, there were no longer any resistance movements and the local population was
hostile towards the Soviets.459 The soldiers who resisted the Red Army — the Ger-
mans, Hungarians and Croats — felt that they were defending their homes from
the eastern hordes. The number of those awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union,
the Soviet highest award testifies to the bloody nature of the Batina Battle.460 In
total, sixty-six fighters received title of the Hero of the USSR in Yugoslavia during
the Second World War. Twenty-three people received their recognition for general
contribution to the operations, fifteen of them pilots, mainly from the transport
and strategic aviation. According to this statistic, it can be seen that Germans
meekly defended the skies above Yugoslavia, so the Soviets used the aviation
mainly to maintain contact with the Partisans and to transfer people and goods
to them.
For individual deeds during the Belgrade offensive (from crossing of the Dan-
ube in eastern Serbia until the liberation of Belgrade), only four individuals were
awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union. Only one Red Army soldier was award-
ed this honor in the battle for Belgrade,461 in the village of Vinča, and two were
457
It can be compared with the Budapest Operation, where the average width of the front was 420km,
while the average rate of the offensive was two and a half to four kilometers, G. V. Krivosheev, ed.,
Rossiia Rossiia i SSSR, 300, 302.
458
B. Slutskii, “Zapiski o voine“, O drugikh i o sebe (Moscow: Vagrius, 2005), 79; N. M. Skomorokhov,
Boem zhivet istrebitel’ (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), 219–220.
459
TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 35, 283; d. 34, 162–165.
460
I. N. Shkadov ed., Geroi Sovetskogo t. 2.
461
Nikolai Kravtsov, Lieutenant in the Medical Service and Senior Military Technician of the 42nd Special
Brigade, was born in 1921. As a member of the shock group he was critically wounded in an attack on
the Post Office in Belgrade on October 15. With two other volunteers, he climbed the gutters to storm
the building through the windows. They attacked with anti-tank bombs and destroyed the German
defenses in the building — ten soldiers and a heavy machine gun. He died from the wounds on October
18. M. K. Kuz’min, Mediki — Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Meditsina, 1970); A. P. Kovalenko,
A. A. Sgibnev, Bessmertnye podvigi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980); I. N. Shkadov ed., Geroi Sovetskogo
awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union in the battles near the village of Ritopek
which occurred just after the Danube was crossed. In contrast, the number of med-
als after the Belgrade Operation came to an end, during the Red Army’s crossing
of Danube on its way out of Serbia, was much higher. For heroism during the forc-
ing of Danube near Vukovar, Apatin and Batina, seven, eleven and nineteen sol-
diers and sailors received the Hero of the Soviet Union respectively. In addition,
two individuals received the Star of the Hero of the USSR for the battle during the
breakout from the bridgehead after Danube was crossed near Apatin and Batina.
During the Battle for Batina, all of Marshal Tolbukhin’s aviation was deployed at
one place for the first and the last time in Yugoslavia.462
The Batina Battle, the largest military engagement in Yugoslavia during the
Second World War, had wider military-strategic importance: it brought the Soviet
troops into Pannonian Basin which enabled the attacks on Budapest and Vienna.
Nonetheless, Soviet and Yugoslav historians did not dwell too much on Batina
Battle. The Yugoslav historiography, from 1948 until the dissolution of SFRJ,
sought to prove the thesis of “self-liberation” of the country, which undermined
the role of the Red Army even when it came to liberation of Belgrade, and it
viewed the Batina Battle as part of Srem Front.463 Soviet historians neglected the
Batina Battle because for them it was part of the Budapest Strategic Offensive
which offered incomparably more grandiose battles than the Batina Battle.464
The Batina Battle was preceded by the transfer of the troops of the Sec-
ond Ukrainian Front from Vojvodina further north, to the territory of present
day Hungary, between Tisa and Danube rivers. Their positions were taken by
the units of the Third Ukrainian Front, which were supposed to advance in the
northwestern direction. At the time, the Soviet soldiers committed a feat com-
parable to accomplishment of Hauptsturmführer Fritz Klingenberg and his six
soldiers who captured deserted Belgrade on April 12, 1941.465 The reconnais-
sance group of marines from the Danube Flotilla, led by the experienced com-
mander Viktor Kalganov entered Novi Sad on October 22, 1944. At the time,
the last German units had already left the city. The following description of the
event is based on reminiscences of Arkadii Sverdlov, Captain of a military ship,
and the Chief of Staff of the Danube Flotilla. “With surprising ease we took the
Danube town of Novi Sad. There we landed a small reconnaissance group —
eight marines and five Yugoslav volunteers under the command of the Lieuten-
Soiuza t. 1.
462
N. M. Skomorokhovm N. N. Burliai and V. M. Guchok, 17‑ia vozdushnaia armiia v boiakh ot Stalin-
grada do Veny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), 178.
463
The only exception is the exhaustive book, N. Božić, Batinska bitka (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1990).
464
The best insight into these battles is offered by K. Ungváry, Battle for Budapest. 100 days in World War
II (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003).
465
C. D. Heaton, “Taking Belgrade by Bluff,” World War II 12 5 (1998): 30–36.
ant V. A. Kalganov. Together with the reconnaissance force, G. K. Chepizhin,

who worked in our Staff, also landed. When they became familiar with the situ-
ation, the reconnaissance team concluded that there were few Germans and that
they were mainly near the port. Marines decided to attack. The sudden assault
shocked the enemy. The surviving Germans hurried to their boats and they es-
caped. Leaving our Yugoslav comrades to look after the barges with the enemy
military equipment which the enemy had left behind, the marines entered the
city. Kalganov and Chepizhin addressed the gathered citizens and told them: the
city is free, fascists will no longer come here.”466 After this, the power in Novi
Sad was assumed by the Novi Sad Partisan Detachment, and on the next day the
regular NOVJ units (VII Vojvodina Shock Brigade) entered the city: “in order to
examine the situation in Novi Sad and the conditions for transferring the brigade
over Danube, the assistant to the brigade’s commissar, Dušan Sekić Šaca, and
the intelligence officer of the Vojvodina Main Staff, Radovan Nović Ciga, went
with a group of fighters to Novi Sad. Landing on the morning of October 24,
they unexpectedly found themselves surrounded by merry and thrilled citizens
of Novi Sad. Placing them in a horse carriage decorated with flowers, the citi-
zens of Novi Sad went after them hailing the freedom and our victory. On all
sides the red flags waved and there were columns of citizens. In the center of the
city we met with members of the Novi Sad Partisan Detachment Staff, which on
the previous day entered the abandoned Novi Sad.”467 The further advance of the
Red Army in Srem (as well as NOVJ units) was stopped for operational reasons,
since Germans, who evacuated eastern part of Yugoslavia, were preparing to
stop the Red Army’s advance at NDH borders.468
The units of the Third Ukrainian Front had to bypass the German line of
defense and to cross Danube again. Several places were chosen to cross Dan-
ube — near Vukovar, Apatin and Batina. The main attack was planned near Ba-
tina, which is on the right (Croatian) bank of Danube. On the riverbank there was a
widespread network of trenches, machine gun nests and artillery positions. Barbed
wires, mine fields and other obstacles strengthened the defenses. Above the vil-
lage of Batina, there was a second line of defense, while the third line ran along the
Beli Manastir cliffs. Particularly well fortified positions were on elevations 169,
205 and 206 and the Batina railway station. Danube is 500m wide in Batina, and a
further complication was that the left (Serbian) bank was low and swampy, which
hindered the movement of troops. During autumn rains, the movement of troops
beyond the main road which led to Sombor became very difficult to trespass. In
466
Sverdlov, Voploshchenie zamysla, 119.
467
N. Božić, Sedma vojvođanska NOU brigada (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1984), 228.
468
N. Živković,, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, 2003), 144–146.
addition, the road was within the range of the dominant heights on the right bank
of Danube and was used only at nighttime.469
If it was so difficult to approach Batina, why was it chosen for the main attack?
There are several answers to this question. First, the difficulty of the terrain was
also obvious to the Germans, which gave the element of surprise to the Red Army.
The Germans did not believe that the Soviets would attack Batina, and they did not
prepare reserve troops in the area. Second, Batina was on the border between the
Army Group South (under the Wehrmacht’s Supreme Command) and Southeast
(under the Supreme Command of Land Forces). This fact could have complicated
the arrival of the reserves. Third, and probably the most important reason is that
behind Beli Manastir’s cliffs there was a wide plain without any natural barriers
which could have hindered the advance of the Red Army’s armored units.
The following formations participated on the German side in Batina Battle:
the Brandenburg Division, the 13th SS Handzar (Bosniak) Division, the 31st SS
Division (Bačka Volksdeutsche from Kama Division), the 1st Mountain Division,
the 118th Infantry (Jäger) Division, the Division Group Shtefan (formed from Regi-
ment Fortress Belgrade), parts of the 44th Division Hoch und Deutschchmeister
(Austrian Germans), the 71st Infantry Division, the 117th Infantry Division, the
164th Infantry Division, the remnants of the 92nd Motorized Brigade, and a se-
ries of smaller German, Hungarian and Croatian units transferred from Hungary,
Croatia and Italy. In total, 60,000 Germans participated in the Battle (more than in
the defense of Belgrade), with about two hundred artillery pieces. The Soviets de-
ployed the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front, supported from the air by the
17th Air Army. In total, the Soviets had five infantry divisions (the 19th, 74th, 113th,
233rd and 236th), three Guards infantry divisions (the 20th, 73rd and 10th Parachute),
the 32nd Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 9th Artillery Shock Division and several
artillery, mortar, guards rocket launchers and engineering units, which were sup-
posed to increase the Soviet fire power while the Red Army crossed the Danube
and established itself on the other bank of the river.470 NOVJ units also partook in
the battle — the 12th and 51st Vojvodina Brigades, formed mostly out of the veteran
Partisans and mobilized Vojvodina Serbs, armed with Soviet weapons.471 On the
Danube’s left bank there were 90,000–100,000 soldiers, who enjoyed considerable
artillery superiority — around 1, 200 artillery pieces.472 This concentration of the
firepower in a relatively small area has remained ingrained in the memory of the
local population.473 It is very difficult to determine the number of armored vehicles
469
TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 406, 1–56.
470
TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 349, лл. 394–398.
471
Božić, Batinska bitka.
472
TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 406, 1–56.
473
M. Ordovskii, Batina. Kak eto bylo, documentary film 35 min. (Moscow: Rostik grupp, 2001); Vojni
at the disposal of either of the belligerents, since both Soviets and Germans de-
ployed numerous auxiliary units from other formations. However, according to
the participants’ recollections and photographs from Batina right after the battle
was completed, it can be concluded that considerable amount of armored vehicles
fought on both sides.
The Soviet operations were led by the commander of the 57th Army, Colonel-
General Mikhail Sharohin. Sharohin graduated from the General Staff Academy
and regardless of his relatively young age (46) he was well known as an expert in
forcing rivers, since he led his troops across Dnieper, Bug, Dniester and Danube.
M. N. Sharohin received the Hero of the USSR for “organization of forcing of riv-
ers and establishing bridgeheads.”474
The probing attempt to force Danube near Batina was undertaken in the murky
night of November 8, 1944. This action, undertaken with wooden rowing boats,
which could carry up to twelve people, was carried out by the 1st Company of
the 703rd Regiment of the 223rd Infantry Division. Germans discovered the Soviet
soldiers and they destroyed their vessels with artillery fire. After a pause, the 2nd
Company of the 703rd Regiment managed to cross the river unnoticed. However,
as soon as they landed, they were discovered and completely destroyed in a brief
fire fight (5–10 minutes). The following night, on November 9, the 3rd Company
of the 703rd Regiment, under the command of Captain Sergei Reshetov, set off to
cross Danube.475
“We gathered the remaining parts of our battalion — around one hundred peo-
ple. With ten boats we began forcing the river. In the middle of the river, the boats
ran into a strong current, and Germans launched flares and they started firing at
us. When there was literary 10–15 meters until the coast, one of the engineer row-
ers was killed, and the second — heavily wounded. I caught the paddle and started
rowing towards the coast. Only two rowers managed to reach the other shore…
together we hit the shore, jumped out and took cover. On this shore there was a
village, and in front of the village a bulwark, which defended it from floods. In
this bulwark, Germans dug ditches and made machine gun nests. When we took
cover we actually laid down on corpses: they were the corpses of our comrades,
which managed to land the previous night. All of them died… there was a feeling
that if we would stay here for a minute then the same destiny would befell us. With
mighty Russian curses, we got up together and fell into the ditch on the bulwark!
We took over several meters of the ditch and we began throwing bombs left and
right. The Germans did not realize how many of us landed… and we managed to
capture four more small houses behind the bulwark. When I finally managed to
muzej, Zbirka fotografija, Inv. 14759.
474
I. N. Shkadov, ed., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza t 2.
475
TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 33, 168–179.
count ours, it turned out that only sixteen of us landed… in the morning… near
the shore two more boats arrived… with seventeen Yugoslav Partisans… before
the sunrise, we dug in. Yugoslavs were real [comrades — A. T.] — they would
not abandon Russians! And for the entire day sixteen of ours and seventeen Yu-
goslavs… they held the defense at this small bridgehead… when our command
realized that we would keep the bridgehead, they offered us strong support — they
brought in the artillery, katiushas. And they fired directly above our heads… and
at night… forty more people landed with Captain Kniazhin. We immediately went
on the attack and we pushed the Germans sixty or seventy meters. It became jol-
lier. And when the night arrived, our troops made the pontoon bridge, and soon
our entire Regiment reached us, and parts of the division and two Yugoslav bri-
gades.” That is how Captain Sergein Reshetov remembered the beginning of the
Batina Battle, who was only twenty-one at the time.476
Batina at the time was defended by the 4th Hungarian Border Regiment, parts
of the 31st SS Division and NDH police units. These soldiers fought well because of
their discipline and they were also inspired by the Nazi propaganda and their origins
(Hungarians, Croats and Vojvodina Germans) to defend their homelands from ‘the
eastern hordes’ mainly Russians from the 233rd Division and Serbs from the 12th and
51st Vojvodina Brigades.477 The intelligence reports from the 68th Corps, which was
previously active in Serbia, never recorded a Serbian soldier as an enemy — not
even from Mihailović’s, Ljotić’s and Nedić’s units. Nonetheless, after the arrival of
the Red Army in areas inhabited by Croats, Ustaše and Croatian Home Guard began
appearing regularly in reports as enemies, alongside the German and Hungarian
troops. Authors of the Soviet informational reports recorded that “Croatian Home
Guard- continue to wage war because, as prisoners of war stated, they defended
their villages, houses and families because the majority of Croatian Home Guard
soldiers were born in these areas.”478 Out of curiosity it should be stated that along-
side Germans, Hungarians and Croats, a Tartar Battalion also participated in the
battle. Five Tartar soldiers fell into the hands of the Soviet soldiers.479
Germans immediately began to use armored vehicles and concentrated their
reserves in order to destroy the Soviet and Yugoslav bridgehead. For the first time
in Yugoslavia, Soviet soldiers experienced enemy aviation.480
After decisive action, Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers managed to capture Ba-
tina. Afterwards, the battles for heights which dominated the shoreline began.
476
Vospominaniia Sergeia Nikiticha Reshetova, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.pobeda-60.ru / main.
php? trid=6643.
477
R. Pencz, For the Homeland! The History of the 31st Waffen-SS Volunteer Grenadier Division. Danu-
bian-Swabian Grenadiers on the Danube and in Silesia (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2002).
478
TsAMO, f. 68 sk, d. 244, 261–290.
479
TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 37, 201.
480
TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 37, 201; f. 17 VA, d. 250, 2–29, d. 309, 1–117.
Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation 281
The best defended and the most important tactically was the so called Pyramid or
Bloody Height 169.481 At the same time (November 7–20, 1944) the 74th Infantry
Division made a small bridgehead near Apatin. The forces of the 75th and the 64th
Infantry Corps managed to push away the enemy forces and to connect Batina
and Apatin bridgeheads.482 In this way, the road towards Knežev Vinograd and
Beli Manastir was open. After capturing these two towns, the Red Army entered
positions from which it could advance towards Lake Balaton.
Nonetheless, Danube remained blocked because German and Croatian units
stubbornly defended approaches to Vukovar, while the artillery in the city pre-
vented the Danube Flotilla from advancing up the stream.483 Therefore, on De-
cember 8, 1944, the Soviet marines from the 315th Battalion, Artillerists from the
1st Guard Defensive District and fighters from the 5th Vojvodina Brigade tried, with
support of the Danube Flotilla’s firepower, to take Vukovar by surprise, like they
did Batina. However, the attack was not successful. The enemy concentrated ar-
mored vehicles and artillery in the surrounding areas and it operationally blocked
the bridgehead and began attacking it. Vukovar remained part of NDH until April,
1945, when the Croatian and German positions on Srem Front collapsed. Regard-
less, the Soviet units which advanced along the southern Hungarian and Austrian
borders were in close contact with NOVJ units further south, which were advanc-
ing through Slavonia and Slovenia. During these battles, the units of the 57th Army
fought against Germans and Pannwitz’s Cossacks. There were heavy frontal bat-
tles between the 233rd Division and the Cossacks near Pitomača in Slavonia, and
at the end of the war, the units of the 57th Army took Cossacks prisoners of war in
Slovenia and Austria.484
Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944:

the unsuccessful cooperation
In the context of determining the character of the Red Army’s entry into Ser-
bia — liberators or conquerors — it is very important to take into account the
relationship between the Soviet soldiers and Mihailović’s resistance movement.
For a long time, JVuO was treated in the Yugoslav historiography as the Serbian
481
Božić, Batinska bitka.
482
M. N. Sharokhin and V. S. Petrukhin, Put’ k Balatonu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966).
483
Loktionov, Dunaiskaia flotiliia.
484
TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 93, 267–269; f. 57 А, d. 477, 667.
equivalent of Ustaša movement in Croatia.485 With B. Petranović’s voluminous

study, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu, published in 1992, the Serbian academia
began viewing JVuO as a resistance movement, albeit an unsuccessful and a trag-
ic one. The Serbian parliament and government, a decade later, confirmed this
status with legislation which recognized Četniks as resisters to the occupiers.486
These changes made their way into Russian historiography slowly, which in this
regard, was not prepared to reexamine the Soviet historiographical tradition.487 In
any case, despite the law which recognized JVuO as a resistance movement, there
is a group of researchers who doubt the anti-occupational character of Četnik de-
tachments.488 The topic of JVuO activities is beyond the scope of our research, but
we cannot avoid the question of the Soviet-Četniks relationship.
The relationship between the Red Army and JVuO commanders represented
a sensitive topic in Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies. The Soviet historiogra-
phy generally avoided the topic, not wanting to reveal the Soviet involvement in
the Yugoslav civil war. The only exception to this generally negative relationship
towards Mihailović was the Soviet collection of documents from the Third Reich,
which included an essay written on November 7, 1943, by the Chief of the Op-
erations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, General A. Jodl. Jodl titled
his essay “Strategic position in the beginning of the fifth year of the war.” Jodl
described the situation in all areas where the Reich was fighting for its interests
against the external and internal enemy. In the part of the essay titled Southeast,
he wrote the following: “in the occupied parts of the Balkans, a small war is being
waged. It is waged against sometime very well armed bandits, supported by the
Anglo-Saxons, numbering between 140,000–150,000 people. All gangs are fight-
ing against the Germans, even though they are not united with each other….a) in
Croatia and Serbia there are communist partisans under the command of Tito,
and they number around 90,000 people; b) Četniks under the command of Draža
Mihailović, they number 30,000 people; c) in Greece — national gangs under the
command of Zervas numbering 10,000 people and around 15,000 communists.”489
485
Even the most learned scholars of General Mihailović’s movement were not able to overcome this
approach. J. Marjanović, Draža Mihajlović između Britanaca i Nemaca (Zagreb: Globus, Belgrade:
Narodna Knjiga, 1979).
486
On December 21, 2004, Serbia’s Parliament changed the law, whereby Četniks received the same rights
as the Partisans. In addition, the Parliament introduced the Commemorative Ravna Gora Medal analo-
gous to the Partisan Comemorative Medal.
487
An example of this academic orthodoxy is the newest collection of essays devoted to history of Yu-
goslavia, Vasil’eva N. V. et al., Balkanskii uzel, ili Rossiia i „iugoslavskii faktor“ v kontekste politiki
velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh v XX veke, (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2005).
488
Very typical in this sense are the publications by the Union of Antifascists of Serbia, the legal and
ideological descendent of the Society for Truth about the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War in Yugo-
slavia 1941–1945.
489
V. I. Dashichev, ed.,“Sovershenno sekretno! Tol’ko dlia komandovaniia! Strategiia Fashistkoi Germa-
nii v voine protiv SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 544.
In the footnotes or the comments there were no attempts to argue against Jodl’s
view of Mihailović as an anti-German fighter. Still, this was the only publica-
tion in the postwar Soviet Union which offered a positive comment on JVuO. In
general, the Soviet view of JVuO was based on the Yugoslav communist historio-
graphical view. At the same time, the Yugoslav historiography from Cominform
period depicted the relationship between Četnik and Soviet commanders in more
complex terms. The direct participants in these events remembered the “unfor-
tunate” contacts between Soviets and the King, concluding that the USSR even
wanted to impose monarchy on Yugoslavia.490
In later works, the official Yugoslav historiography was more careful in as-
sessing the relationship between Soviets and Četniks, which could have damaged
the false balance between Četniks and Ustaša, and to indirectly shed light on the
complete historiographical darkness in which the JVuO movement was cast. That
is why Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies came to an agreement. The decisive
moment in the Yugoslav historiography was Joža Tomašević’s study which ex-
pressed skepticism towards the possibility of any larger agreements between the
Soviets and JVuO, but he mentioned that Soviets tried to establish such a contact
through Colonel Velimir Piletić’s Krajina Corps. In addition, Tomašević mentioned
cooperation between the Red Army and Dragutin Keserović, the Commander of
Rasinsko-Topola Corps, as well as the active assistance of the 4th Shock Corps led
by Lieutenant-Colonel Rakić during the battles for Čačak.491 A lot more informa-
tion became known with the publication of the so called Četnik (XIV) volume
of Zbornik dokumenata NOP, which contained Keserović’s detailed report about
events in Kruševac and Rakić’s statement about his attempt to establish contact
with the Soviet troops and his cooperation with the Soviets against Germans near
Čačak.492 Contemporary Serbian historiography has proven the existence of con-
tacts between JVuO commanders with certain commanders of Red Army units in
eastern Serbia, as well as near Kruševac and Čačak.493
First such contact was in eastern Serbia, when on the orders of General
Mihailović (issued, according to Piletić, on August 30), Colonel Piletić tried to
establish contact with the Soviet command in Craiova. The participants in these
490
S. Maoduš, “Staljinsko-karaljevska družba. (Sa stranica ‘Službenih novina’ Jugoslovenske izbe-
gličke vlade),” Narodna armija, January 1, 1952; R. Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri. Zločinstva
crvenoarmeјaca u Јugoslaviјi (Sarajevo: Omladinska Riječ, 1953).
491
J. Tomašević, Četnici u Drugom svjetskom ratu 1941–1945 (Zagreb, 1979), 346–349.
492
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402, 403,
869–882.
493
Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta knj. 2; M. Samardžić, Borbe četnika protiv Nemaca i ustaša
1941–1945, 2 t. (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2006); G. Davidović and M. Timotijević, Zatamnjena
prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja, knj. 3 (Čačak: Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv; Kraljevo:
Narodni muzej, 2004), 132–166.
events have left their recollections.494 General Mihailović sent his representative
Milivoje Naumović to the area where Krajina Corps was active, with verbal in-
structions about leading the negotiations with the Soviets. Miodrag Ratković re-
called that the negotiations were led in order to resolve “three main questions…
to plead with the Soviet army to act as mediators with Partisans, for hostilities to
cease between us, and to liberate the country with joint forces from the occupier;
and after the liberation of the country, that our and Partisan forces should go to
the barracks and to remain there until completely free elections are held by a
temporary and neutral government, without our or partisan participation, under
the full control of Western Allies and the Soviets; not to punish the wrongdoings
and crimes committed on the territory of Yugoslavia during the occupation now,
but to leave this for regular courts after free elections.” This plan, which basi-
cally expected the Soviets to renounce their protégés by forcing them to disarm,
thereby giving up their own influence in postwar Yugoslavia, was unrealistic,
even to a professional soldier such M. Ratković. Naumović, however, as a pre-war
civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed his diplomatic cunning:
“the main thing is for Soviets to accept, and the Western Allies will press for this
to be implemented!” Thus, Četniks wanted to deceive the Soviets and to use the
British and the Americans to force them to make concessions. Apart from the fact
that there were not too many Western Allies in Serbia, the first problem was that
the British had already withdrawn their missions from JVuO, while the USA had
only an intelligence mission which was not allowed to support JVuO.495 Painful
encounter with reality was unavoidable.
Mihailović wanted to include following people in negotiations with the So-
viets: Lieutenant Colonel Piletić, Lieutenant Colonel Ljuba Jovanović-Patak,
Aleksandar Trifunac, a Belgrade lawyer who at the time was in Negotin, and
Milivoje Naumović, an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the time
of Naumović’s arrival, Trifunac already reached Romania. Piletić, as a member
of the JVuO Supreme Command, decided that Četnik mission should cross over
Danube and meet the representatives of the Red Army, even though Mihailović’s
order was that they should wait for the Soviets in Serbia. Ratković recalled that the
need for negotiation was urgent because the Partisans were increasing the pressure
on Četniks. They defeated the Combined Shock Corps and killed its commander
Major Bora Stanisavljević. Naumović, who did not himself believe in success of
the negotiations, according to Ratković, refused to cross the Danube but he gave
494
Milunović, Od nemila, 48; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 107–120.
495
NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004. Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS
from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of
strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army. 15 August 1944; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 428–
448.
detailed instructions how to conduct the negotiations. The mission was comprised
of Velimir Piletić, Miodrag Ratković, Aleksandar Trifunac, Mihailo Krstić with
thirty additional officers, 110 Četniks and 80 German prisoners of war, whom
Piletić was planning to hand over to the Soviets.
The mission crossed the Danube near Tajanova Tabla in the night of Septem-
ber 10–11.496 Romania at the time was already under the Soviet control. JvuO
fighters were partially disarmed by Romanian authorities immediately after they
crossed the frontier and they were transferred to Craiova. The order in which
Piletić made his official visits were interesting: first — Romanian commander
P. Antonescu (who was not willing to personally see him), second — American
Military Mission from where Piletić sent a brief radiogram to Stalin, third — the
British Mission, and finally — he established contact with Soviet officers. Piletić’s
main goal was to have Soviets appoint him a commander of an independent bri-
gade which would have been formed out of JVuO members in Serbia, and armed
with the weapons which the Red Army seized in Romania. Another option, which
Piletić stated several times, was for men under his command to be transferred to
another theatre of war so that they could fight against the Germans under the Brit-
ish or the American command. In informal conversations with the Soviet officers,
according to his memoirs, Piletić said that even if the communist regime was
established in Yugoslavia according to the wishes of the Serbian people, Piletić
would never be a communist. Awaiting the Soviet response, Piletić spent his time
in the company of British officers. Finally, amongst the JVuO negotiators, there
was a traitor — a student Ljuba Mirić, Piletić’s adjutant, who accused his com-
rades of being English spies. As a result, in late September and early October, the
SMERSH497 accused Piletić of being a British spy and arrested him.498
496
M. Ratković, “Organizacija istočne Srbije,” in Knjiga o Draži Sv. 2: 1944–1946 (Valjevo, Aleksandrija,
2005), 337–341; Karapandžić, Građanski rat, 351.
497
Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 117, 126; Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade:
Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 378.
498
Even though Britain and USSR were allies against Germany together, this did not prevent the Soviet
security organs from fighting against British agents. According to the NKVD USSR, as early as August,
1941, the British undertook a series of steps against the interests of the USSR. Between 1941 and 1945,
various intelligence agencies in the USSR uncovered and prevented several British attempts to infiltrate
and engage in intelligence work in the USSR and the territories controlled by Soviet troops. For more
on the Soviet directive against the activity of the British intelligence see “Direktiva NKVD SSSR
41 / 407 ob agenturno-operativnykh meropriiatiiakh po presecheniiu podryvnoi deiatel’nosti angliiskoi
razvedki na territorii SSSR ot 20 avgusta 1941,” in Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 1,
ed. N. P. Patrushev, (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 1995), 492–493; “Soobshchenie 1‑go upravleniia
NKVMF SSSR 54056‑SS v 3‑e upravlenie NKMVF SSSR o razvedyvatel’noi deiatel’nosti chlenov
angliiskoi voenno-morskoi missii i angliiskikh predstavitelei v SSSR ot 6 sentiabria 1941,” in Organy
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 2, ed. N. P. Patrushev, (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 2000),
27–30; O. B. Mazokhin, VChK — OGPU. Karaiushchii mech diktatury proletariat (Moscow: Iauza,
2004); S. Chertoprud, NKVD-NKGB v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006);
Angliiskaia razvedka (Moscow: n. p., 1963), 31–35.
It was tragic, but in the summer of 1944, Soviets as well as the British were
arresting Četnik emissaries. Živko Topalović experienced Piletić’s fate, but in
Italy, which was “liberated” by the British. General Mihailović sent Topalović to
establish contact with the British. “After one hour of flying through the night, we
landed in the sea of light, Bari airport. There, a long conference took place be-
tween General Armstrong and commander of Bari Airport about what happened
and what they should do with us. I believe that General Armstrong tried to take
us under his wing and that he felt grateful for everything which was done for him
and his officers in Serbia. But the commander of the airport had to act according
to the law. All foreigners who came to the British territory had to go through the
so called ‘Patriotic School’…that was a process controlled by the military-political
police, which had to question their patriotism in relation to the security of the Brit-
ish troops and loyalty towards the British government. An officer… drove us for
ten kilometers… to an old building… The building was guarded by fifty British
soldiers. They pitched the tents for themselves in the courtyard and the garden.
This was not a jail but a detention center, but from the inside, the process felt as
if it were a jail. Officer took us along the dark stone of wooden bunk beds. The
junior officer who soon arrived with a small candle and four blankets showed with
his hand that we could take either two bunk beds or two lower beds alongside each
other. There were several empty beds, while in other beds people slept. My wife
was turning around in amazement, saying, ‘so we are in jail.”499 It is obvious that
the Soviet and the British military tactics towards the “suspicious individuals”
were not too different.500
After Piletić was arrested, his detachment was interned. On October 8, an
airplane transferred the arrested Četniks to Moscow. Piletić spent five months in
Lubianka prison (at the time, the most important prisoners were held there) and
eight months in the main NKVD jail Lefortovo (where those of interest to the au-
thorities awaited their fate). On October 19, 1945, he was taken to a special camp
for officers in Krasnogorsk, where he stayed until November 8, 1945. This camp
was used for prisoners accused of collaboration but who expressed an interest in
cooperating with the Soviet security structures, such as the German anti-fascist
Committee headed by Marshal Paulus.501 Apart from the Germans willing to work
499
Topalović, Jugoslavija, 70–71.
500
“I knew about the English tactics: if somebody told the English that somebody else was suspicious, the
English would immediately lock him up and send him to one of their numerous concentration camps,
and he would be there until the end of the war, if he would stay alive. The English would give him a
little tea, jam and bread. But only to a degree so that he would not starve to death. I had a reason to be
afraid of this.” Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 180.
501
V. Adam, Trudnye resheniia: memuary polkovnika 6‑I german. Armii (Moscow: Progress, 1972),
chapter “Lager’ voennoplennykh v Krasnogorske;” M. I. Burtsev, Prozrenie (Moscow: Voenoizdat,
1981); V. A. Vsevolodov, “Tsentral’naia antifashistskaiia shkola dlia voennoplennykh v Krasnogorske
(1943–1950gg.),” Krasnogor’e: ist.‑kraeved Vyp. 9 (2005); V. A. Vsevolodov, Srok khraneniia — pos-
with the Soviets, there were numerous collaborationist prisoners from the armies
of the German satellites.502 After Krasnogorsk, Piletić managed to flee from the
NKVD under suspicious circumstances during his extradition to the new Yugo-
slav authorities and to join Četnik emigration in Western Europe. Several mem-
bers from his mission, who escaped under similar circumstances, managed to find
their way to Western Europe.503
Piletić’s arrival to Romania was the first real attempt by JVuO to establish for-
mal contacts with the Red Army. The attempt failed because of the Soviet leader-
ship’s negative attitude towards Mihailović, as well as the influence of the Partisan
emissaries. Piletić’s failure to obtain favor from Soviets only added fuel to the
fire. Another aspect of this episode must be mentioned. From Marko Milunović’s
memoires, who was close to Piletić, it can be concluded that the Soviets were put-
ting out feelers to Četniks even before Piletić crossed into Romania. On August
25, the JVuO Russian unit was delivered to Soviet officers on the Romanian side
of Danube. To the surprise of JVuO fighters, ‘the Soviet Četniks’ were not imme-
diately adjoined to the army, instead they were locked up in special barracks, after
which Serbian officers hurriedly withdrew to avoid similar fate. This was a typi-
cal Soviet treatment of former German prisoners of war, which involved detailed
questioning of individuals carried out by the counter-intelligence SMERSH of-
ficers. SMERSH sought to identify the German spies and deserters from the mass
of soldiers, and in addition, they sought to gain information about the situation
in the enemy’s ranks.504 In this way, SMERSH could receive direct information
about the views, behavior and military activities of Krajina Corps. Even half of
what Rootham recorded in his memoirs (and he certainly did not record every-
thing) could have damaged the Četnik image in eyes of the Soviet officers.505
Nonetheless, according to Milunović, in the beginning, the relationship between
JVuO and the Soviets was not too bad. The Soviet reconnaissance and Četniks even
cooperated. In early September, a smaller Soviet unit under Kuznetsov’s command
carried out a probing attack on Kladovo, on the Serbian side of Danube. After
this attack, Piletić went to Romania, resulting in his internment.506 Interestingly,
Milunović seems not to have been able to link the fact that Četniks delivered Soviet
soldiers to SMERSH with Soviet’s detailed knowledge of the situation in Eastern
toianno: kratkaia Istoriia lageria voennoplennykh i internirovannykh UPVI NKVD–MVD SSSR No. 27
(1942–1950gg) (Moscow Memorial’nyi muzei nemetskikh antifashistov, 2003).
502
Đ. Lončarević, Specijalna misija (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991), 84, 124; Piletić,
Sudbina srpskog oficira, 130–184.
503
Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 130–184.
504
Bezverkhnii, ed., SMERSH; A. Sever, “Smert’ shpionam!” Voennaia kontrrarazvedka SMERSH v gody
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Iauza, 2009).
505
Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233, 290.
506
Milunović, Od nemila, 49–55.
Serbia only ten days later.507 In view of the actions undertaken by Kuznetsov’s unit
on the Serbian side of Danube, we can guess that this was a reconnaissance unit
from the 75th Corps which crossed into Serbia on September 22, 1944. With the
crossing of these troops into Serbia, the idea of JVuO cooperation with RKKA defi-
nitely failed. The only offer which Četnik commanders received was to subject their
units to Partisans’ command, which was absolutely unacceptable to them.508
JVuO Supreme Command wanted to quickly establish ties with the USSR
and find common language with Moscow. General Mihailović issued an order
on November 8, 1944, to all commanders in territories where Soviet troops were
advancing “to continue to pursue military cooperation with the Russians as al-
lies in the struggle against the occupier… to show our resolve for battling the
occupier.”509 In this context, JVuO announcements and flyers with messages of
“Long live the King!” and “Long live the USSR!” make sense. Boris Slutskii, who
worked for the 57th Army’s Political Department, preserved evidence of this.510
This propaganda material had limited influence on the sizable and unstoppable
mass of the Soviet army. The pro-Soviet Četnik phraseology was not understood
by the Soviets as an expression of “Slavic brotherhood.” Instead, it was deemed to
have been a desperate attempt to switch sides in the war in the last moment, which
soldiers and officers of the Red Army began to get used to since their movement
through Romania and Bulgaria. This phenomenon only caused the Soviets to de-
spise the Germans and their satellites.511
The leadership of the Partisan movement knew quite well that in the neighbor-
ing Bulgaria and Romania, the communists had to enter the ranks of the regular
army, and that the regular army was placed under the direct Soviet command. The
Bulgarian example was particularly risky to the Partisans, which did not declare
war against the Soviet Union and where the Soviet diplomatic mission was active
throughout the entire war. The Bulgarian army, hostile towards the USSR and
507
Piletić even had an opportunity to find out through unofficial channels that the Soviets questioned ‘the
Russian Četniks. ’ However, he did not seem to understand that the Soviet intelligence officers received
information from the former prisoners which he contradicted some of his statements. When he was
confronted with these contradictions, Piletić said: “Everything which we did for the Soviet Union was
out of sense of debt.” At this, the Soviet officer thanked him for his honesty, Piletić, Sudbina srpskog
oficira, 117–118.
508
509
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402.
510
Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 64.
511
We should recall what the German Communist Gerhard Kegel said when he crossed over to the Soviets
but could not immediately convince them of his loyalty: “when I looked sideways a bit and talked with
prisoners who went with me… to judge by the words of the prisoners from our group, there were no
fascists in Hitler’s army. At least every other claimed that he was a communist, or that he was always
their sympathizer, or that he voted for them, and that he was at least a Social Democrat.” Gerhard
Kegel, V buriakh nashego veka: Zapiski razvedchika-antifashista (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), chapter
“Gitlerovskaia armiia”.
actively engaged in war against NOVJ, switched sides overnight and turned into
a Soviet ally. Therefore, the Partisans did not peacefully await the establishment
of allied ties between JVuO and RKKA and they did as much as possible to com-
promise Četniks.
“It could be noted that Partisan commanders tried to say as much filth as pos-
sible about Četniks — and especially their relationship towards Russia.”512 More-
over, the Yugoslav Partisans, unlike the Bulgarian and Romanian communists,
had the authority from the fact that they fought ceaselessly since 1941, while Ro-
manian and Bulgarian armies were much more decisive in their reorientation than
JvuO. The JVuO Supreme Command did not rely on Britain, instead, it relied on
completely imaginary support from the USA.513 This attitude did not always enjoy
the support of JVuO rank and file soldiers,514 instead, it stemmed from JVuO Su-
preme Command’s political recommendations. The JVuO leadership also hoped
for the Allies to land in the Balkans, based on the First World War experience.
As a result, it was very easy for the Partisans to compromise the Četniks in the
Soviet eyes.
The first documented episode of the Četnik-Soviet cooperation related to the
liberation of Kruševac. Kruševac was probably the largest city in Serbia which
the JVuO fighters, under the command of Dragutin Keserović, liberated from
the Germans. There are several versions of Kruševac’s liberation in the internal
documents and official publications. For example, this is what the official Soviet-
Yugoslav monograph states about this subject: “units of the 64th Rifle Corps of the
Red Army and the 2nd Proletariat Division of the NOVJ, after capturing Kruševac,
successfully advanced in western direction. “515 There was also a purely Partisan
version of the liberation of Kruševac, which was supposedly undertaken by the
4th Proletariat (Montenegrin) Brigade.516 There is also a report from Kesarović, in
which he claims that JVuO fighters liberated Kruševac.517 There is also a report
512
513
Serbian researchers had already pointed out that the Supreme Command’s hope for support from
Lieutenant-Colonel McDowell was baseless, Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović, 447–457.
The American documents also confirm that the American Mission to Mihailović was of purely infor-
mational character. OSS-а. NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004, Report on Parti-
san Intelligence — Effect of Mihailovich Intelligence Unit to Gen. Wm. J. Donovan from Col. E. C.
Huntington, 31 August 1944; Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt.
Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO
534, U. S. Army, 15 August 1944.
514
M. Mladenović, Lažni idoli i varljivi ideali (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 350.
515
S. S. Birjuzov and R. Hamović, Beogradska operacija, 262.
516
About the Partisan “liberation” of Kruševac see, J. Milojević, B. Ilić, D. Dimitrijević M. Tasić,
M. Veljković and V. Sekulović eds., Kruševac: Oslobođen grad (Kruševac: Odbor za proslavu
dvadesetgodišnjice oslobođenja Kruševca, 1966); B. Janković, Četvrta proleterska crnogorska brigada
(Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1975).
517
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882.
written by the American OSS agent Lieutenant Elefort Kramer, who wanted to
hurl the American flag above the liberated Kruševac.518 Finally, there is a series
of documents, recently opened for researchers in the Archive of the Ministry of
the Defense of the Russian Federation, which add to Keserović’s report, and at
the same time offer an opportunity to assess the veracity of the Partisan version
of events.
In short, this is what happened in Kruševac according to Soviet and Četnik
sources. On October 13, Keserović issued an ultimatum to the German Com-
mander of Kruševac, and on October 14, the Germans capitulated. At the time,
American Lieutenant Kramer was in Keserović’s Headquarters. During the nego-
tiations, Keserović posed as a representative of an American officer. The German
Commander wanted to capitulate to the Americans, instead of the Soviet army,
in order to prevent the entry of the Red Army and Partisans into the city. Accord-
ing to Kramer’s report, negotiations with the Germans began on September 22,
but they ended in failure.519 The Germans became interested in Keserović’s offer
only when the Soviet troops were in Kruševac’s vicinity. Bernhard von Shevaleri,
Colonel of the German General Staff, flew to Kruševac on a small airplane on Oc-
tober 14. He was taken prisoner by JVuO fighters. Later on, as a Soviet prisoner,
Shevaleri said that he was “not afraid of Četnik violence, because they worked
everywhere in contact with the Germans.”520 In Kruševac, Shevaleri met Kramer
518
Kramer’s report is published in M. Pavlović, “Očevidac Građanskog rata u Srbiji,” Istorija 20. Veka 1
(2007).
519
In addition to saving American pilots and learning about the situation in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant-Colonel
McDowell was tasked with, if possible, negotiating the surrender of “German, Bulgarian, Hungarian or
any other enemy or collaborationist groups.” NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004.
Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters
company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army. 15 August
1944.
520
Later on in the text Shevaleri explained in great detail his claim and explained that “Mihailović’s Četniks
never planned to fight against the Russians. Their aim was to use the Germans to get the bullets and
weapons. The treachery and their crossing over to the side of the Red Army for the German command
was a total surprise. The prisoners believed that Četniks went over to the Red Army in order to take
part in governing the state power in Serbia after the Germans’ departure.” TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242,
“Dopros voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polkovnika Genshtaba Berngarda fon
der Shevaleri,” 268. Other Germans also noted the Četnik unexpected reorientation, A. Polianskii, “My
i chetniki” and A. Politanskii, “Kovarstvo nashikh soiuznikov,” in Russkii Korpus, eds. Protopopov and
Ivanov. The fact that the Germans sent the Commander of Kruševac Major Kni and the Commander
of the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene Oberführer Kum to negotiate with Keserović indicates that they
did not fear the Četniks. It is unlikely that the two most senior officers in the garrison go together to
negotiate with a dangerous enemy. In case that something happened, the troops in Kruševac would
have become leaderless, O. Kumm, Vorwärts Prinz Eugen! Geschichte der 7. SS-Freiwilligen Gebirgs
Division “Prinz Eugen“ (Osnabrück: Munin, 1978). The complicated relationship between Germans
and JVuO near Kruševac prior to the arrival of the Red Army can be inferred from Kramer’s reports.
He described how on October 4, JVuO officers and twenty-five Četniks went to the town of Vrnjačka
Banja. The German patrols did not sanction this trip, so the Četniks justified themselves saying that they
were going “to attack Partisan patrols,” M. Pavlović, “Očevidac građanskog rata u Srbiji,” Istorija 20.
Veka 1 (2007): 176.
who explained to him that the ultimate goal was “to capture with Četnik detach-
ments a series of towns where the American flag would be raised and in this way
the entry of the Red Army would be prevented.”521
At the same time, on October 13, 1944, Kramer wrote a letter to Gener-
al L. M. Milaev, the Commander of the advancing 52nd Riffle Division, in which
he asked to meet the Soviet general. This letter was sent “when it was known that
the Russian troops had crossed the river V. Morava” (this was probably the 16th
Independent Shock Battalion near Varvarin). The letter was carried by JVuO Sub-
lieutenant Alexander Zlatković, who departed on October 13 in the evening and
delivered the letter on October 1 in the morning. Milaev immediately posed the
question whether the Četniks would fight against his forces. Surprised, Zlatković
answered negatively, arguing that RKKA and JVuO were allies. Hearing this,
Milaev said: “No, we are not allies.” General Milaev added that the JVuO units
would have to disarm Germans by October 14 at 16.00 hours, and then lay down
their and Germans’ weapons in front of the Red Army.522 This was the typical
Soviet approach when negotiating with the Germans and their allies.523 Obviously,
Milaev upheld the instructions which he received from the 57th Army’s Political
and Intelligence Departments, prior to their entry into Serbia. The Informational
Department defined Draža Mihailović’s Četniks as a “reactionary army… which
has fought on the side of the occupiers since 1941,” adding that “there were around
thirty thousand [Četniks — A. T.], majority of them in Serbia and Sandžak.”524
Even before Zlatković’s arrival, General Milaev ordered his units to advance
towards Kruševac.525 In his Battle Order No. 45, which his Division’s regiments
received on October 13, at 24.00, Milaev ordered his troops to follow the enemy
in its withdrawal in northwestern and western directions. On October 13, at 13.00,
Milaev forces entered Paraćin, and they took up positions around Striž, Donje
Vidovo, Stalać and Ćićevac. On the following day (October 14), Milaev planned
to continue the offensive and to take Kruševac. The division was at the far left
wing of Soviet units. To its left, the division did not have Soviet or allied troops,
while to its right were the forces of the 68th Riffle Corps. The Division’s main task
521
TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242, “Dopros voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polkovnika
Genshtaba Berngarda fon der Shevaleri,” 265.
522
523
“Disarm and catch your German superiors, surrender your weapons and afterward surrender your-
selves.” This was a typical demand during negotiations with the German allies. It was used by the 57th
Army in negotiations with the Turkestan Battalion in Romania in August 1944 and with the Honvéd
Company in Hungary, Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 24, 90. The same demand was made from other col-
laborationist units willing to abandon the Germans, S. I. Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 216.
524
TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242, 270–281, “Spravka o sostave i dislokatsii Iugoslavskoi armii, nemetskikh
voisk na Balkanakh na 19 sentiabria 1944 g. i reaktsionnykh voisk Pavelicha, Nedicha i Mikhailovicha
i Rupnika na 5 sentiabria 1944.”
525
TsAMO, 431 sp, d. 3, 116, “Boevoi prikaz No. 35. Shtadiva 52. 24.00 13. 10. 44.”
was to seize Kruševac by 14.00, and to cross on the other side of Morava. General
Milaev divided his forces. The 429th Riffle Regiment was to guard the positions
in Paraćin, Donje Vidovo, Gorin, Sikirica and Drenovac, until the arrival of units
of the 233rd Riffle Division. The latter was reinforced with the 523rd Mortar Regi-
ment and two squadrons of the 1028th Artillery Regiment. In this way, Milaev left
an important part of his artillery to defend the positions which his forces already
captured, which was justified in the view of the absence of friendly forces on
Milaev’s left flank. According to the plan, with the arrival of the units of the 233rd
Division, the 429th Regiment was supposed to join the main forces of the Division,
which at the time should have been in Kruševac. The Command Headquarters
was supposed to be placed in Sikirica. The 431st Riffle Regiment, with the sup-
port of the Independent Guard Artillery Regiment and the squadron of the 1028th
Artillery Regiment, was tasked with capturing Ćićevac and Stalać. After this, the
Command Headquarters of the 431st Regiment, one battalion of the 431st Regiment
were supposed to remain in Ćićevac, while two infantry and mortar battalions
were supposed to enter Kruševac by 14.00 from north and east and to remain in
the northern part of the city. Finally, the 439th Riffle Regiment, reinforced by the
418th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment was supposed to bypass Mojsinjska Moun-
tain from east and to enter Kruševac through Praskovče and Galgova from east
and southwest and to take the southern part of the city. The command of the 52nd
Division was in Striža on October 13, but it was supposed to transfer to Ćićevac
after its capture on October 14. The 16th Independent Shock Battalion of the Third
Ukrainian Front was tasked with entering Kruševac first. It was supposed to de-
part from Varvarin towards Kruševac at 9.00 on October 14, enter the city from
northwest (from Jasika) and to capture the northwestern part of the city. The re-
connaissance platoons were charged with preparing for the offensive, as they were
supposed to be at the forefront of the Soviet units when they were supposed to
depart during the night of October 13–14.
This report helps us clarify the situation in which Colonel Keserović sent his
delegate to General Milaev. It seems that the negotiations began too late, when
the Division was in the process of fulfilling its battle order. At the time that Sub-
lieutenant Zlatković began to reveal Keserović’s plans to surrender Kruševac to
Soviets, the Soviet forces were already advancing and were within Kruševac’s
vicinity.526
Milaev’s order to Keserović to hand over Kruševac to the Soviets before 16.00
hours has to be understood in this context. Keserović claimed later that Milaev’s
instructions were meant to be impossible to fulfill, but he was wrong. In reality,
various Soviet units (from armies to regiments), had to abide by firm schedules
526
ISU-122 was armed with A-19S cannons of 121.92mm caliber (direct aim 5km while howitzer 14.3km).
A. V. Karpenko, “Tiazhelye SAU,” Tankomaster, 4 (2001).
during offensives. Operative discipline dictated that units must move parallel to
each other during offensives. Major-General Milaev was not in a position to stop
or even delay the ongoing offensive of the Third Ukrainian Front because of ne-
gotiations with a JVuO sub-lieutenant, and in all probability, he did not want to
do this.
According to Kesarović’s report, Major Vesić together with a Russian Lieu-
tenant reached his Headquarters at 6.30. However, the situation on the ground in
Kruševac was rapidly developing on its own. Considering that this Soviet Lieuten-
ant relied on units which were advancing from the direction of Jasika, it can be
presumed that he was from the 16th Reconnaissance Platoon of the Independent
Shock Battalion. It is necessary to explain the role of the Third Ukrainian Front’s
16th Independent Shock Battalion. Its catchy appellation concealed that this was a
special officers’ punishment unit. Stalin’s Order Number 227, issued on July 28,
1942, introduced penal units into the Red Army.527 Shock battalions performed
similar roles, even though the term penal was deliberately left out of the name.
Shock battalions were created on the bases of Stalin’s Order Number Org-2-1348,
issued on August 1, 1943.528 In these units, only the commander of the battalion,
his deputy in charge of cadre questions, the Chief of Staff and company com-
manders were regular officers. Everybody else was from the so called special
officer contingent. These were the officers who found themselves on the occupied
territories during the German offensives 1941–1942, and did not try to cross the
frontlines and rejoin the Red Army. Instead, they hid and waited for the return
of the Soviet troops. Formally, they were not convicted and after filtration which
was carried out by the NKVD, the majority of them joined regular units as of-
ficers. Nonetheless, those officers whose behavior during the occupation was too
pacifist (around 36 % of all officers from this group),529 had to repay their debt to
the state. During their service in shock battalions, they temporarily held their
demoted rank, however, the time which they spent in the unit was calculated as
if they were regular officers and their families received officers’ compensation.
After two months spent on the frontlines, or when they were wounded or deco-
527
There were special units for privates and corporals (and former officers) convicted of military and
criminal violations, which they served in penal companies. The penal companies were used in particu-
larly dangerous operations, and that is why a stint in such a unit lasted only up to three months, and
yet it replaced a jail term of several years. If a soldier would be wounded or killed during his time in a
penal company, he would be released from service and have his name cleared. In these units, the officers
(from the platoon level and up) were volunteers who received higher rank and salary. There were other
penal units (Penal Battalions and Penal Platoons). N. K. Kolbasov and I. A. Tolstoi, Shtrafniki. Liudi v
kirasakh (Moscow: Patriot, 1990); Iu. V. Rubtsov, Shtrafniki Velikoi Otechestvennoi (Moscow: Veche,
2007).
528
V. M. Zolotarev, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia T. 15. Kurskaia bitva. Dokumenty i materialy 27 mar-
ta — 23 avgusta 1943 g. (Moscow: Terra, 1997), 70–71.
529
V. N. Zemskov, “Gulag (istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt),” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 6–7
(1991): 3–16.
rated, the members of the RKKA Shock Corps were assigned to regular RKKA
units according to their expertise and rank.530 Shock battalions were considered to
be particularly useful for entering smaller enemy towns. After several successful
battles, the commander of the division wrote the so called battle recommendation
(type of a reference letter) which was used to discharge them from the shock bat-
talions.531
Therefore, the Commander of the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 16th Shock
Battalion who met Major Vesić, and afterward Colonel Keserović, also belonged
to the group of punished officers. According to Keserović, the Soviet Lieutenant
stated that he was “empowered to regulate relations between our troops and Rus-
sian troops which were advancing towards Kruševac. He said that I would remain
commander of Kruševac, that our troops would be treated as allies, and that Parti-
sans would not be allowed to enter Kruševac and that if they would try attacking
us that they would be disarmed.” According to Major Vesić, other members of the
16th Shock Battalion displayed a friendly attitude towards the Četniks. Keserović
believed that he was in center of the allied attention since he was in the company
of American and Soviet officers. Keserović received a report about the advance of
the Soviet troops from the direction of Jasika and he decided to hasten the negotia-
tions with Germans and to issue them an ultimatum. At 8.00 o’clock on October
14, he received Oberführer Kum and Major Kni, to discuss the German surrender.
Major Kni, the Kruševac’s Commander, according to Kramer, was surprised and
“asked why Četniks were not defending it [Kruševac — A. T.], and Keserović
responded that he promised him to fight against the Partisans and communists but
not Russians because they were allies.”532 After these negotiations, with promise
of surrendering, the German officers freely went back.
However, only part of the Germans decided to fulfill their promise and to
surrender. Units of the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene called in tanks and with
their assistance they withdrew towards Kraljevo. According to Keserović, few of
the Germans managed to escape.533 Commander of the 7th SS Division, Kum, did
not remember the difficult withdrawal from Kruševac in his detailed memoir.534
Another JVuO fighter recorded that Germans withdrew in an organized fashion
from Stalać (where the Soviet units arrived), and that tanks, armored vehicles and
trucks with soldiers “rushed through the city without stopping and they liber-
ated their soldiers” without Četnik resistance “because one could not attack tanks
530
Zolotarev, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia T. 15, 70–71.
531
TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy”, 1–2.
532
Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 179.
533
534
Kumm, Vorwärts.
with bare hands.”535 Nonetheless, Četniks robbed German storages, taking a lot
of military equipment. In addition, JVuO fighters managed to capture a part of
Wehrmacht soldiers and troops from the Russian Defensive Corps which was sta-
tioned in Kruševac.
After the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene withdrew, the centre of Kruševac
was decorated with Yugoslav, American, British and Soviet flags, while the citi-
zens formed a committee to welcome the Soviets. In the meantime, the 16th Shock
Battalion reached the city. The commander of the battalion Lieutenant Colonel
Pronin arrived at the head of his Battalion which was moving on foot, although it
had several horses which pulled a battery of smaller anti-tank guns (45 mm), mor-
tars and anti-armor guns. Lieutenant Colonel was thrilled. He expected a difficult
battle, and instead, he received an enthusiastic welcome. His speech revealed what
the Sub-lieutenant from his reconnaissance platoon said. According to Kesarović,
Lieutenant Colonel Pronin said “that he was familiar with our battles from 1941,
that our army should be considered regular army, and that the Partisans would be
disarmed because they belonged to a group of Trotskyites.” Keserović, Kramer
and Pronin addressed the citizens from the balcony of Hotel Paris.536
Obviously, Lieutenant Colonel Pronin was confused. The part of his speech
about battles from 1941 testifies to the fact that officers from the 16th Shock Battal-
ion believed that they were dealing with Tito’s fighters, and not with Četniks. Pronin
and his soldiers could not have known about Četnik battles against the Germans in
1941, since the Soviet propaganda said very little about them, even during the sum-
mer of 1941. At the same time, Pronin definitely had an opportunity to read about
NOVJ in the army newspapers, which clearly stated that they fought against the
Germans since 1941.537 It must also be taken into account that Pronin and his bat-
talion reached the frontlines only on October 10, 1944, and that they participated in
battles in Serbia for the first time in the battle for Paraćin on October 13.538
As a result, Pronin simply could have been unaware of Soviet policies towards
JVuO. If Keserović and Vesić avoided the term “Četniks,” introducing themselves
instead as regular “Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland,” it would have been easy to
confuse them with the “National-Liberation Army of Yugoslavia,” as the Parti-
sans were formally called. Pronin’s statement that “the regular army — something
good, but partisans — something bad” must have seemed promising to Keserović.
There was nothing contradictory in this for a Soviet officer, since the regular army
perceived “partizanshchina” and even “partisans” (not their own, but enemy’s)
535
Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 346.
536
Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 179. There are also photographs of this scene, Samardžić, Borbe t. 2, 258.
537
“Iugoslaviia. Ekonomicheskii i politicheskii ocherk,” Zvezda Sovetov (Armeiskaia gazeta 57 A), Octo-
ber 4, 1944.
538
TsAMO, 52 sd, po, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy, 1–2.
with suspicion.539 Information which Pronin received from General Milaev must
have added to the confusion. According to Sub-lieutenant Zlatković, General Mi-
laev pointed out on a map that the Yugoslav communist Partisans were every-
where around Kruševac.540
It is obvious that Keserović did not comprehend (or did not want to compre-
hend) Pronin’s confusion, telling him that Partisans were Trotskyites. Finally,
Soviet internal reports never mentioned Trotskyism amongst the Yugoslav Parti-
sans, and only JVuO could have made this claim. Naturally, as soon as Keserović
mentioned it, Pronin automatically condemned this main communist heresy. In
addition to general conversation with Pronin, Keserović tried to find out whether
any additional troops were advancing towards Kruševac. To a direct question,
he received a negative answer. When additional Soviet units arrived later on,
Keserović was surprised.541 Partisans entered Kruševac with the second wave of
the Soviet troops.
When Milaev realized that there was an unsanctioned military cooperation, he
became “exceptionally cold and arrogant and he did not want to offer his hand to
Keserović’s assistant.” The Soviet soldiers were openly commenting on the Mon-
archist emblems on Četniks’ uniforms.542 Keserović heard the comment: “fuck
your monarchist mother, they need to be disarmed and [their throats — A. T.]
cut.”543 The meeting between Milaev and Keserović took place between Jasike and
Kruševac, and after they met, they returned to Kruševac and went to Hotel Paris.
Milaev there met the American Lieutenant Kramer, but he obviously could not
grasp Kramer’s argument that Kruševac surrendered to an allied army and that
the Soviet unit needed to withdraw. General Milaev expressed doubt in Kramer’s
identity, so he ordered him to be arrested.544 According to Kramer’s memoirs, on
539
The reasons for this were the variations in discipline and behavior amongst the Partisans, A Gogun and
A. Kentii, eds., Sozdavat’ nevynosimye usloviia dlia vraga i vsekh ego posobnikov… Krasnye partizany
Ukrainy, 1941–1944: maloizuchennye stranitsy istorii (Kiev: TsGAOO Ukrainy-Ukrainskii izdatel’skii
soiuz, 2006).
540
541
The fact that Keserović was surprised that an officer of the Red Army was not in a hurry to reveal the
battle plan (probably the most confidential information which a commander of a battalion could know)
to a man whom he saw for the first time in his life does not testify to Pronin’s cunningness, as Keserović
believed, but the latter’s misunderstanding of the term military secret.
542
543
To be precise, it must be said that that cursing one’s mother in the Russian language cannot be addressed
to a concrete phenomenon, as in Serbian. In addition, the verb “rezat’” (to slit throat) was rarely used
during the Second World War in the Red Army in the sense of liquidating political opponents (he could
have used the verb “perebit’” or “perestrel’iat’” — to kill a person by shooting). We can suppose that
Milaev’s companion yelled “Eb tvoiu mat’! Monarkhisty! Eto vse nuzhno razoruzhit’ i viazat’.” (“Fuck
your mother! Monarchists! They all need to be disarmed and tied up.”) This would have been less ag-
gressive, but not less tragic for Keserović, who expected to be embraced as an ally.
544
The report on Shevaleri’s interrogation states: “Četniks have handed over a colonel, his pilot and an
American officer to the command of the Red Army. The Soviets handed over Kramer to General Hall,
the following day (October 15), General Hall from the American mission in Sofia
was informed about this event, but the Soviets released Kramer only on October
17 after questioning him at length.545
Keserović understood what had happened. He went to the bathroom, and
through the backdoor, he left the hotel for his Headquarters which promptly with-
drew from the city.546 A tragedy was on the verge of taking place. During the
pointless negotiations between Milaev and Keserović’s representatives, the Red
Army soldiers and Partisans were disarming and arresting JVuO members, who
until few hours ago believed that they finally encountered their long-awaited al-
lies. Tens of Četniks were arrested, beaten and robbed. Even though Keserović
wrote that JVuO surrender was proud and peaceful, a battle erupted between the
failed allies.547 This battle in the evening hours was described by another partici-
pant in these events, M. Mladenović, who claimed that “as soon as the darkness
fell, firefights could be heard in the periphery of the city. The battle in Kruševac
and its periphery lasted throughout the entire night with greatest intensity. The
Russians and the Partisans took control of Kruševac. In the morning, the healthy
and lightly wounded reached us. The results of the battle for Kruševac are not
worth discussing. Anybody could conclude how it was when the Partisans pressed
us towards the city, while Tolbukhin’s Red Army troops waited for us in the city
and attacked us. We lost several hundred fighters in the clash and we had to cure
the inflicted wounds. What killed us the most was that the people saw us fighting
against the Russians. The news of the battle with Russians in Kruševac, assisted
by communist propaganda, had a defeating impact on the people and it demoral-
ized them. Again we were not defeated but halved. Many of our soldiers ran to
their homes…”548
It is difficult to ascertain the losses of JVuO and the regular units of the 52nd
Division (if there were such losses), but from the 16th Shock Battalion’s report it can
be concluded there were twelve wounded, one of whom was seriously wounded and
was evacuated.549 German armaments which were captured by JVuO were given
to the Partisans, as well as part of the German prisoners who were immediately
liquidated.550 This was done despite the order to forward the German armaments to
RKKA’s trophy units, and to send prisoners of war to the rear to be handed over to
TsAMO, 68 sk, RO, d. 242, “ Dopros o voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polk-
ovnika neshtaba Berngarda fon der Shevaleri.”
545
Pavlović, “Očevidac.”
546
547
TsAMO, 52 sd PO, d. 48, “Boevye doneseniia,” 67–70.
548
Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 347–350.
549
TsAMO, 16 oshsb sd, Alfavitnaiia kniga ofitserskogo sostava, p. 165 165, 260, 741, 744, 749, 897, 921,
926, 934, 946, 947, 950, 974.
550
Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 347–350.
the representatives of the new Yugoslav authorities.551 The bloody way in which the
Partisans dealt with “people’s enemies” was recorded by Mladenović, as well as the
Soviet military’s internal documents. The tragedy continued to play out until Octo-
ber 17, when the remaining JVuO fighters withdrew to mountains, while the Soviet
and Partisan troops departed towards Kraljevo.
Another tragic incident occurred on the way to Kraljevo, which was re-
corded by Peter Mikhin, at the time a Captain and the Commander of the 1st
Squadron of the 1028th Artillery Regiment 552 At the time, Mikhin was twenty-
three years old, but he was on the frontlines since 1941. In view of his youth
and extensive war experience, he was beaming with self-confidence. At the
time, the 52nd Division (to which the 1028th Artillery Regiment belonged) ad-
vanced towards Kraljevo. Makhin’s Squadron advanced along the northern
bank of Western Morava river, towards the village of Bogdanje, while the
other two regiments of the division were heading on the other side of Za-
padna Morava towards Trstenik, which was in Četnik hands.553 At one point,
the Squadron found itself about 500m meters up the stream from the railroad
bridge, near Trstenik. Suddenly, in the midst of a heavy firefight with the
Germans, Mikhin was approached by a “small, dark man in civilian clothes.”
He introduced himself as a Partisan, and he said that his detachment had only
twenty people. However, this would not be a problem “if Comrade Captain”
would assist in taking entire Trstenik. When Mikhin expressed skepticism
towards this adventure, the Partisan explained that only Četniks were in Trste-
nik and that they would get scared easily.554
Mikhin looked at Trstenik and he was surprised to see a peaceful town in front
of which there were some military positions and several heavy guns and machine-
guns. However, their crews did not seem to have been prepared for military en-
gagement. Instead, they took on a peaceful posture and did not even try to conceal
themselves, which was in contrast with the German behavior, who were in front of
the 431st Regiment. When Mikhin inquired about the reasons for such a peaceful
attitude, the Partisan explained that this was a special tactic used to lure the Parti-
sans into a trap. This answer satisfied Mikhin, who decided to assist the Partisans.
With a direct hit from less than 600meters, the entire position blew up together
with its crew. “The Yugoslav Partisans became jolly as children — they jumped,
screamed and shouted” when the outcome of Soviet use of artillery became appar-
551
TsAMO, 52 sd, po, d. 36, “Politicheskie doneseniia,” 61–62.
552
P. A. Mikhin, “Artilleristy, Stalin dal prikaz”! My umirali, chtoby pobedit’’ (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo,
2006), 319–324.
553
This veteran still kept the old definitions and that is why he cited that the city was “defended by local
fascists — Četniks of Draža Mihailović,” Mikhin, Artillersty, 319.
554
Mikhin, Artillersty, 320.
ent (black burnt dessert in place of the JVuO positions). Immediately afterwards,
white flags were raised on all of buildings in Trstenik. Captain Mikhin, five Soviet
soldiers and twenty Partisans went across the bridge to Trstenik. Mikhin ordered
the Četniks to surrender themselves. Afterward, Mikhin was approached by a
group of Četniks, including an older officer with a Browning handgun. Using his
hand, Mikhin showed the officer to hand him over the gun, which the officer did
without uttering a word. Afterward, Mikhin quickly withdrew to the other bank of
the river, while the units of the 52nd Division joined the city (again, the 16th Shock
Battalion was at its head).555 Mikhin remained convinced until the end of his life
that God protected him during his “heroic” “liberation” of Trstenik and disarming
the senior officers “of the enemy crew.”556
We will probably never find out how the Četnik commander of Trstenik felt
who received the following order from JvuO Supreme Command prior to his en-
counter with the Soviets: “to commander of the VI Battalion of the II Trstenik
Brigade. Immediately send… an order that tomorrow the people must go out with
flowers… to greet the allied Russian army and our King. The army will go on
the main road. Report to all conscripts they must go to their units tomorrow be-
cause probably in the name of God we will go to takeover our border with Italy,
Hungary and Germany. The allied Russian army entered Kruševac on 14th of this
month, and it was greeted as brothers by the army and the Serbian people, which
after lengthy slavery waited for them as liberators. All the streets were decorated
with ours and allies’ flags, there was no ending to kissing and hugging. Likewise,
tonight around 21.00 hour, Russian allies reached Stopanja where our forces could
not wait to engage the Germans, where six Germans were killed, and ours took
a great amount of weapons and… prisoners. With faith in God for King and the
Fatherland. Long live King Peter II. Long live Draža, long live the allies!”557
The tragedy of the encounter between JVuO and Soviets continued. It oc-
curred next in the zone of activity of the 93rd Division under the Command of
Colonel S. V. Salichev. The Information about this incident appeared in the 68th
Riffle Corps’ Intelligence Department report on October 19, 1944. “In area of
Čačak and Prijevor, a brigade of Četniks numbering 2, 200 crossed over to the side
of the Red Army and are fighting against the Germans. According to data from
Četniks in Kraljevo, there was a Ćetnik Corps numbering around 3,000 fighters
which is fighting against the German troops…”558 Similar information exists in
official JVuO announcements: “the Commander of the First and Second Ravna
Gora Corps Captain Raković was held up by the battles with Germans near Čačak
555
TsAMO, 52 sd, RO, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy,” 1–2.
556
Mikhin, Artillersty, 324–325.
557
VA, k. 110, f. 7, 12–13.
558
TsAMO, 68 sk, RO, d. 244, “Razvedskvodki korpusa s prilozheniem skhem,” 256.
and Kraljevo. When the Russian troops came, Captain Raković continued fight-
ing in cooperation with them,” “22. X. Raković around Čačak and under Russian
command is attacking Čačak.” 559
G. Davidović and M. Timotijević reconstructed these events objectively. “Im-
mediately upon the arrival of the Red Army, JVuO undertook military action
against Germans in desperate hope that this would secure the political future of
their movement.”560 Even though what happened to Colonel Keserović discour-
aged JVuO commanders, the valley of Zapadna Morava from Kruševac to Čačak
exploded with hostilities against the Germans.
Former member of the Russian Corps described the initial phases of JVuO
offensive: “in the autumn of 1944, the 3rd and 4th Regiments of the Corps together
with German units were engaged in operations against the ‘reds’ around Čačak.
At the same time, Četniks were also engaged in battles against the ‘reds’ who were
concentrated in the town of Užička Požega, which was located around thirty ki-
lometers from Čačak. Četniks coordinated their activities with our troops, main-
tained constant contact with the German command which directed the operations
and they received assistance in form of munitions and weapons multiple times,
as well as military units to support them.” In the middle of October, the German
Commander in Čačak received the emissaries from Užička Požega, “Četnik repre-
sentatives, who brought a strong plea from their Duke (Vojvoda, a military leader)
for aid. The Duke reported that large Partisan forces were approaching him, which
he was not in position to stop alone, and as a result, he was asking the Germans to
send him one detachment as reinforcement. Consequently, in the night of the 15th
and the 16th of October, a military detachment went towards Užička Požega which
comprised of two companies of the 3rd Regiment, a platoon of heavy machine-
gunners and mortars… not doubting anything, our detachment entered the city in
a marching column and stopped at the central square… but it found itself in a trap.
All exits from the square were taken up by masses of Četniks, armed with heavy
weapons and light machineguns…” The detachment surrendered its weapons, af-
ter which all valuables were taken from soldiers, watches, footwear, and they were
released back to Čačak…” A. Polianskii’s comrades had similar experiences with
Četniks in October, 1944.561
JVuO sporadically but frequently attacked the Germans until October 18,
but they failed to dislodge them from Čačak. Simultaneously, Captain Predrag
Raković, the Commander of the 1st Shock Corps, met the Soviet Lieutenant Colo-
559
Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402, 579.
560
Davidović and Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. knj. 3, 140–150.
561
These memoirs are relatively reliable because they were written for the Russian Corps’ internal journal
Nashi vesti. Polianskii, “My i chetniki” in Russki Korpus, eds., N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov and
A. Politanskii “Kovarstvo nashikh soiuznikov,” in ibid.
nel Belov, the Chief of Staff of the 93rd Riffle Division, as well as the commander
of the 129th Regiment of the same division.562 Belov acted as Colonel S. V. Sali-
chev’s representative, who was the Commander of the 93rd Division. An agreement
was reached that Raković’s soldiers would fight against the Germans in Čačak un-
der the higher command of M. Gadel’shin, the Commander of the 129th Regiment
of the 93rd Riffle Division.563 A very unusual cooperation began, but ultimately, it
was not successful as Čačak was not captured. The Wehrmacht’s position in West-
ern Serbia was defended by soldiers of the Turkestan Battalion which the Germans
formed out of Soviet prisoners of war from the so called Eastern nationalities.564
The Soviets viewed their cooperation with JVuO as unofficial and merely
tactical in local conditions. Even the operational maps of the 68th Riffle Corps
(to which the 93rd Division belonged) did not mark JVuO units, even though the
Division’s Intelligence Department announced such cooperation. However, on the
November 1, as a result of the slowing down of the 68th Riffle Corps advance,
the Soviet command (on the level of front or higher) concluded that it did not
make strategic sense to continue advancing in the southwestern direction. The
forces of the 57th Army instead concentrated to advance in the northwestern direc-
tion — towards the Hungarian border. In early November, attacks in the direction
of Čačak ceased, the Red Army took an operational pause, the Soviet units went
on the defensive and they prepared to hand over their positions to NOVJ. Its ranks
thinned in the battles, the 129th Regiment was withdrawn and sent to Lazeravac,
Obrenovac and Arandjelovac.565
The cessation of the Red Army offensive in Western Serbia was followed by
Soviet attempts to utilize their cooperation with JVuO in other ways. It is interest-
ing that at the time the 1st Yugoslav Brigade formed in USSR was sent to Čačak.566
The majority of this brigade was formed out of prisoners of war taken by the So-
viets: Croats of the 369th Strengthened Croatian Regiment, Slovenians recruited
into Wehrmacht from parts of Yugoslavia annexed by the Reich and Vojvodina
Serbs recruited into the Hungarian army. During the creation of the 1st Yugoslav
Brigade, the same approach was used as with the formation of General Svoboda’s
Czechoslovak Brigade and General Berling’s Polish Corps. Moscow formed the
Brigade to use it as a Soviet card in the Yugoslav game with its Western Allies.
The Yugoslav Brigade was formed on November 17, 1943, as a softer version of
562
Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta knj. 2, 294–296.
563
The Čačak Historical Archival has a very interesting letter which Raković wrote to the Soviet command
in which it mentions this agreement, Davidović and Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. knj. 3, 152.
564
TsAMO, 68 sk, RО, d. 244, 258.
565
TsAMO, 68 sk, ОО, d. 124, “Boevye resheniia s prilozheniem skhem,” 298.
566
About the Yugoslav units formed in the USSR see Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 240–248;
Bojna pot brigad, ustanovljenih v ZSSR, Maribor, 1984; Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane; Lončarević,
Specijalna misija.
the Yugoslav Partisan army. It is well known that initially, the Soviets planned
for this unit to wear monarchist caps (which were later replaced with Yugoslav
tricolor without the Partisan red star) and they kept the picture of King Peter in
the Brigade’s barracks, they used the ranks from the Royal Yugoslav Army and
the unit recognized religious holidays. The Soviet mentors even organized special
dinners for Orthodox Christmas and Easter holidays. After Djilas’ and Vlahović’s
pleas, the royalist hats and officer epaulets from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were
abolished, however, the unit’s official stamp kept the double-headed eagle but
without the crown. Senior officers addressed each other with ‘Sir’, when soldiers
gathered in one place the rank was greeted with: ‘God Helps, heroes! (Pomoz Bog,
junaci! ’), and each morning and night prayers were read.567 According to archival
materials and participants’ recollections, Orthodox Easter was an official holiday.
Orthodox holidays were celebrated more actively (even though the Serbs were a
minority in the unit) than their Catholic counterparts. The brigade took the mili-
tary oath on March 12, 1944, in four groups: Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim and the
smallest group — atheists.568 The institution of the military priests in the Yugoslav
Brigade was based on the example of the Czechoslovak and Polish units.569 It is
indicative that in the Brigade’s internal propaganda materials, the rhetoric against
Mihailović was either minimized or it did not exist at all, and he was left out of the
list of enemy of the people (which included Pavelić, Rupnik and Nedić).570
Upon arrival to Yugoslavia, the Brigade found itself under two sources of
pressure. On the one hand, the Croatian-Slovenian majority could not motivate
themselves to fight against their former allies and many deserted to Germans. At
the same time, the local Partisan leadership were skeptical of the unit’s abilities,
they criticized the Brigade’s leadership in front of Soviet commanders, and they
neglected the Brigade’s logistical requirements.571 After the Brigade was trans-
ferred to Čačak (until October 29, the Brigade was formally part of NOVJ 23rd
Division), Četnik officers were offered to merge with the 1st Yugoslav Brigade
and Raković’s Corps. However, this idea ran into insurmountable difficulties. The
gap was too large between Četniks and former Ustaša, Serbs and Croats, between
those who remained loyal to their oath for five years (Četniks) and those who al-
ready made three oaths (soldiers of the Yugoslav Brigade). The Yugoslav Brigade
was finally and definitely merged with the 23rd NOVJ Division on October 29,
when OZN-a took over the control from the NKVD. In the period from November
567
Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 123.
568
Ž. Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane 1941–1945 (Novi Sad: Istraživački i tehnološki centar, 1997), 86,
100; Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 85, 124–127.
569
S. G. Poplavskii, Tovarishchi v bor’be (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974).
570
Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 56; VA, k. 791, br. 37–3.
571
Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 72–73.
10–13, 1944, the commander of the brigade, M. Mesić, was replaced and the entire
cadre apparatus was dissolved. Thereafter, the brigade lost its uniqueness.572
In addition to the Četnik resistance to the idea of an alliance with former
Ustaše, KPJ also resisted Soviet ideas for expanding the Yugoslav Brigade by in-
cluding JVuO soldiers. Tito personally complained to Tolbukhin, and in addition,
there were sporadic attacks and murder of Četnik soldiers, despite the ceasefire
and the agreement between JVuO and officers of the 93rd Division. While Četniks
were handing over German prisoners to the Intelligence Department of the 93rd
Division and while they broke through the German encirclement, thereby saving
a Soviet battalion, Partisan commanders could not have imagined a compromise
with their domestic opponents.573
Soviet soldiers and officers witnessed tragic scenes. For example, Četniks were
guarding around three hundred German prisoners, when Partisans opened fire on
them. Četnik guards had to seek shelter, and Germans escaped. “Once when the
commander of the 93rd Division Colonel Salichev received two Četnik officers,
a Lieutenant Colonel and the Commander of the 23rd Partisan Division, who was
present, shot them directly in the face killing them without any explanation…”574
Miladin Ivanović, commander of the NOVJ 23rd Shock Division, remembered this
incident with pride, describing how he and Radivoje Jovanović, the Commander
of the XIV Corps, personally killed several Četnik youths and officers as soon as
they saw them in the company of the commander of the 93rd Division.575
Miladin Ivanović used the following words to describe his contribution to the
allied victory: “Here we are in Gornji Milanovac. Several days earlier, the 93rd
Guards Division arrived there. — Hello, Comrade [Soviet — A. T.] Colonel! —
Hello, murky, sour and arrogant, but still ‘hello’ [the Soviet Colonel muttered —
A. T.] through the teeth and not looking at us — You know, we have formed an
alliance with Četniks here to fight together against the Germans. — What alli-
ance? What’s wrong with you? Četniks, for the entire three years, together with
the Germans and Italians, have been fighting against us, and now you have an
alliance with them. We will not have it, by God! — You know, there are seven-
eight thousand of them here. We will be together with them for now, and when we
destroy the Germans, then we will deal with them easily — Let there be twenty-
eight thousand of them, and not seven or eight, we do not want to have any alliance
with them. We played with them for full three years, and instead of an alliance
572
Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 179.
573
574
Ibid.
575
K. Jončić, ed.,“Diskusija na naučnom skupu, “ in Borbe sa glavninom nemačke Grupe amrije “E“
na ibarsko-zapadnomoravskom pravcu u oslobađanju Zapadne Srbije 1944. godine: zbornik radova
naucčnog skupa održanog u Kraljevu 26–27. novembra 1986. godine (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut
JNA, 1990).
we also got the knife in the back…there can be no alliance with Četniks here.
And our 14th Brigade went to count those seven-eight thousand ‘Russian’ Četniks.
Around the village of Gornja Gorjevice the machineguns grew warm, riffles made
sound, and even a bomb could be heard. But very briefly, in several moments.
And here it is. The 14th Brigade is carrying seventy Četnik prisoners. The rest
escaped somewhere. The Četnik brigade counted six-seven hundred Četniks and
it dissolved.”576
In this instance, we can clearly see the Soviet opposition or at least lack of ap-
proval for the Partisans’ anti-Četnik measures. With time, the Soviet commanders
came to believe, which was confirmed by direct orders of the Front’s Military
Council, that the Partisans on the ground who engaged in murder implemented
their leadership’s policies.577 This line was clearly drawn by propagandists in the
newspaper of the 57th Army Zvezda Sovetov, which marked Četniks as “people’s
enemies.”578
While Eastern Europe was being carved into zones of influence, attempts
by JVuO to preserve its independence under the umbrella of the Anglo-Ameri-
can Allies were bound to fail. As Branko Petranović noted, the problem largely
stemmed from “Mihailović’s tragic misunderstanding of politics.”579 All attempts
by Piletić’s, Keserović’s and Raković’s Četniks were bound to fail since Churchill
and Stalin had already divided the Balkans. Perhaps it was not accidental that the
British Mission withdrew from the mountains of Eastern Serbian in April 1944,
just as the distant factories thousand kilometers to the east began producing navy
caps with insignia “Danube Military Flotilla.”
The division of the Balkans was respected by great powers regardless of the
ideology. The British upheld the divisions with greater decisiveness than the So-
viets. The Soviet military newspapers reported this briefly and without comment.
“The announcement by the commander of the English armed forces relates that
the situation in the town is mainly without changes. The new Partisan forces are
penetrating into areas and suburbs of Athens which the English troops are not yet
able to takeover. In the afternoon of December 10, a group of partisan units pre-
pared for an attack east of Athens were dispersed by the English bombers. Certain
losses were inflicted…”580 What happened was that on December 3, 1944, the Brit-
ish troops and units of the Greek government formed out of the former members
of the monarchist resistance movement (comparable to JVuO) and the forces of the
576
M. Ivanović, “Borbe za oslobodjenje Čačka 1944. godine. (Rusko-četnički savez. ‘Poslednje’ slovo
vojne nauke. ‘Bratsko’ i ‘borbeno’ sadejstvo. Podmukle i nečasne podvale,” Narodna armija, February
7, 1952.
577
578
“Narody-brat’ia vstretilis’,” Zvezda Sovetov (armeiskaia gazeta 57 A), October 22, 1944.
579
Petranović, Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu, 634.
580
“Soobshcheniia TASS,” Zvezda Sovetov (armeiskaia gazeta 57A), December 13, 1944.
Greek collaborators (comparable to the Serbian State Guard) dispersed the com-
munist demonstrations in the center of Athens. According to Churchill’s orders,
General Scobie, the head of the British troops in Greece, was supposed to behave
in Athens “as if he was in an occupied city where a local uprising broke out,” “to
open fire on every armed man in Athens who refused to surrender to the English
authority,” “and to give lectures with the help of his armored forces.” Only after
they used aviation, marines, and reinforcements sent from Italy, the British troops
managed to impose their authority in part of the Balkans assigned to them in the
Churchill-Stalin percentages agreement.581
The tragic fate of the JVuO commanders was determined by their failure to
understand this dimension of global politics and their conviction that the path of
the Romanian and Bulgarian royal armies was unacceptable for the first guerilla
movement in Europe. Predrag Raković died on December 15, 1944, in the village
of Mikovci near Čačak, in a house which was surrounded by the fighters of the 2nd
Proletariat Division. Dragutin Keserović was arrested and executed in Belgrade
on August 17, 1945. Velimir Piletić never again saw his native country and he died
in exile in France in 1972.
The last Soviet interference in the Civil War in Serbia was the capture of
smaller groups of members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps in the late autumn of
1944. These groups were withdrawn together with the German and Romanian
prisoners to labor in the USSR, where they remained after the war.582 The final
point in the history of relations between JVuO and the Soviet state concerned the
arrest of General Mihailović. It must be mentioned here, even though it is outside
of the chronological framework of this study.
Djordje Nešić (1924–1992), a notable UDB investigator, gave details about
the arrest of the JVuO commander.583 The interview largely corresponded to the
memoirs of another participant, Slobodan Borisavljević, which increases its ve-
racity.584 The leading biographers of the JVuO commander agree with Nešić’s
description of Mihailović’s arrest.585 Official history of the Soviet security institu-
581
Cherchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voina, t. 5, 488; S. Ia. Lavrenov and I. M. Popov, Sovetskii Soiuz v
lokal’nykh voinakh i konfliktakh (Moscow: AST, Astrel’, 2003); A. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black
Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry. 1943–1949 (New York: Basic
Books, 2004).
582
As a result of the closeness between the two Slavic languages, the relatively few Serbian prisoners
turned into prisoner of war camp elite which reigned in the camp with the support of Romanian pris-
oners, using corruption and various scams. In the summer of 1945, this led to a rebellion by West
European prisoners (Germans, but also Hungarians, Spaniards and Swedes) in the labor camp Pira near
Nizhnii Novgorod. Their slogan was: “Down with the Serbian-Romanian mafia!” K. Frittsshe, Tsel’ —
vyzhit’. Shest’ let za koliuchei provolkoi (Saratov: n. p., 2001)..
583
B. Krivokapić, Bes / konačni Tito (i Krležine “masne laži”) (Belgrade: Nolit, 2006).
584
ASANU, f. 14950, d. 3, Slobodan Borisavljević “Razgovori sa Dražom Mihailovićem,” zapisano 14.
Marta 2000.
585
tions (published for confidential use), cites that they actively helped Yugoslavia
by providing instructors (who usually took on the formal position of Soviet liai-
son officers or they were also called “Soviet NOVJ and POJ volunteers”). They
provided the Yugoslavs with necessary literature, lectures and training on the
topic of counter-intelligence work “in the battle with illegal nationalist and state
enemies.”586 M. Mondich, a SMERSH officer, recalled there were Yugoslavs pres-
ent in the frontline units of the military counterintelligence service. According to
him, in the period from February until April 1945, several “Tito’s interns,” who
were “gloomy Serbs with darker skin” could be found in officer cafeterias and
amongst the officers of the Second Department of the Fourth Ukrainian Front’s
SMERSH, which dealt with counterintelligence in the rear (struggle against en-
emy agents and parachutists, work with prisoners of war, ‘filtration’ of soldiers
from the captivity).”587 Upon the request of the Yugoslav government, twenty-
nine students were trained at the NKGB Higher School in Moscow. “Upon their
return to the fatherland in April, 1945, Ranković prepared a great celebration and
expressed to us great gratitude for useful cooperation.”588
It is obvious that Nešić’s description of the arrest of Draža Mihailović, execut-
ed by OZN, was very similar to the NKVD methods used against the Organiza-
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-UPA) during 1944–1945. The similarities in-
cluded recruitment of a leader of the rebellious movement after his arrest, creation
of a fake group of rebels from reliable state security officers and then sending
this group into the field. These were the so called conspiratorial-reconnaissance
groups, which were formed and used against the leaders of the Ukrainian anti-
communists, and later on in the Baltic Republics and Poland against the local anti-
communists.589 The scheme which was worked out by the NKVD USSR officers in
the autumn of 1944, V. Kashchev and B. Koriakov, was used against Mihailović at
the end of 1945 by Slobodan Penezić Krcun, the head of OZN for Serbia. In early
1946, N. Kalabić was arrested and recruited. A group of fake Četniks comprised
of reliable communist officers, including Kalabić, was sent to the terrain. Gen-
586
V. M. Chebrikov ed., Istoriia sovetskikh organov, 483–487; L. I. Vorob’ev “Na iugoslavskoi zemle,” in
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999); Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi miro-
voi voine.”
587
M. Mondich, SMERSH. (God v stane vraga) (Miunkhen: Grani, 1948), 56, 57.
588
Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine”; Bezverkhnil eds., SMERSH,
70.
589
O. Rossov, “Mif o ‘pereodetykh enkavedeshnikakh’: spetsgruppy NKVD v bor’be s bandformirovani-
iami v Zapadnoi Ukraine,” Velikaia obolgannaia voina-2. Nam ne za chto kaiats’ia!, ed. I. Pykhalov
(Moscow: Iauza, 2008); A. Iu. Popov, “Ispol’zovanie organami gosbezopasnosti opyta partizansko-
go dvizheniia v bor’be s natsionalisticheskim podpol’em,” Istoricheskie chteniia na Lubianke No. 5
(2002).
The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia 307
eral Dragoljub Mihailović was arrested quickly and he was taken by surprise.590
Mihailović’s arrest was followed with the Soviet-like justice: trial of the so called
people’s enemy in a staged process which utilized false promises and secret pres-
sures in order to obtain the cooperation of the accused. After the trial, according
to the best traditions of Stalinist justice, the accused was secretly killed and buried
in an unknown location.
The experience of the encounter: the Red

Army and the population of Serbia
The analysis of the role of the ‘Red’ and ‘White’ Russians in the Civil War
in Serbia and Yugoslavia would be incomplete without a discussion of the issue
of mutual perceptions of the Red Army soldiers and the population of Serbia (ci-
vilians as well as those who took up arms and belonged to one of armed groups
operating in occupied Serbia). Special attention should be paid to this topic. The
importance of the mutual perceptions of the Red Army troops and the Yugoslavs
(above all, the Serbs) in the autumn of 1944 is obvious. For Red Army soldiers,
as representatives of the Soviet and above all the Russian population,591 this was
a first opportunity to form a picture about the Yugoslavs and the Serbs, lost in the
whirlwind of the extreme leftwing experiment (the Bolshevik revolution). The pic-
ture formed in the autumn of 1944 penetrated into the national masses, and with
minor corrections, has survived until the present day. It is also very important
that the image of the eastern superpower which the Serbs gained in the autumn
of 1944, in combination with the previous stereotypes of the Russians which mu-
tated somewhat during the postwar years, has also remained until the present day
amongst the Serbs.
It is necessary to examine who the Red Army soldiers were who came to
Serbia in the September and October of 1944. The people in the ranks of the Red
Army which reached the Balkans in the autumn of 1944 were different from the
“prerevolutionary Russians” who came en mass to this region during the Eastern
Crisis (1875–1876), as well as the refugees who arrived in several waves dur-
ing and after the Civil War (1917–1921). The Revolution, the Civil War, and the
590
591
Two thirds of Red Army soldiers (around 66 %) were ethnic Russians. This number would be greater
(around 75 %) if we take into account the Russians of Eastern Ukraine, northern coast of the Black Sea
and North-eastern Belarus which the official Soviet statistics classified as Ukrainians and Byelorus-
sians. G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Rossiia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka, 238.
establishment of a totalitarian regime with pretensions to messianic exclusivity

of the new ideology led to isolation and separation of Russians from the family
of European nations. The very term Russia, as a result of Lenin’s idea about the
global proletarian state, disappeared and the new appellation was invented — the
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.592 Due to the growing spy mania and the
curtailment of all contacts with foreigners, without direct control of the security
organs, as well as propaganda about the suffering of the working class in capital-
ism and the success of the socialist economy, at the end of the 1930s, a large part
of the Soviet population had very limited understanding of how the rest of Europe
lived. The USSR did not have colonies which it could exploit, and therefore, the
rapid industrialization was paid by the population. In this way, the fall in income
of the peasants and workers offered the Soviet state the necessary means to de-
velop heavy industry and armament production. On the eve of the First World
War, the Czarist Russia was forced to purchase armaments abroad.593 During the
1930s, Russia underwent a transformation from a semi-agricultural country into
an industrial giant which was able to produce more armaments than the lead-
ing industrial power of Europe Germany, which also relied on the industrial and
agricultural economy of the occupied Western and Central Europe. Soviet arma-
ments (tank T-34, airplanes Il-2 and La-5, SVT and PPSh rifles, Guards Mortar
bm-13 / katiusha and others) were effective, simple and technologically adequate.
The price of this “industrial wonder” was mainly paid by Russian and Ukrainian
peasants, as well as the entire population of the USSR, whose income dropped.
At the same time, the increased accessibility of the healthcare system, educational
and cultural institutions necessary for training the recruits for modern army were
also financed from the same sources.594
For many Red Army soldiers, the crossing of the Romanian-Soviet border was
the first opportunity to see Europe and to compare the life in capitalist countries
with achievements of the communist system.595 This contact worried the Soviet
leadership, which received detailed reports about the soldiers’ perceptions of Eu-
rope. Likewise, there was an attempt to improve the impression which the soldiers
left on the populations of Europe liberated from the Germans.
Soldiers and officers were relatively young. The notable youth of the Soviet
officers was a consequence of terrible losses in early years of the war, when the
592
For more on the question of the influence of the new ideology on Russians see the scholarly work:
A. I. Vdovin, Rossiiskaia natsiia: Natsional’no-politicheskie problemy XX veka i obshchenatsional’naia
rossiiskaia ideia (Moscow: Libris, 1995).
593
See the memories of the “father of the Russian automatic weapons” Vladimir Fedorov. V. G. Fedorov,
V poiskakh oruzhiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964).
594
A. Vishnevskii, Serp i rubl’. Konservativnaia modernizatsiia v SSSR (Moscow: OGI, 1998), 1998;
V. Kondrashin, “Golod 1932–1938: Tragediia rossiiskoi derevni,” (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008).
595
almost entire regular officer corps was wiped out. The officer cadre of the Red
Army — due to losses and fewer class barriers — was formed with the help of
quick officers’ courses. This was surprising to officers of the various militaries in
the Balkans, who never before saw lieutenant colonels commanding brigades, and
majors leading regiments. “All were young people, lieutenant colonel was twenty
years old, major was under thirty, and the other barely twenty-five.”596
The young officers were aware that their young age caused so much bewilder-
ment in the Balkans.597 Even though the officers’ rapid training was compensated
with extensive battle experience which they gained during the ceaseless and dif-
ficult fighting, they did not always acquire the habits and characteristics of profes-
sional officers.598
Their youth in combination with great military experience, increased the So-
viet soldiers’ and especially officers’ confidence. There was a certain underesti-
mation of their Balkan colleagues. The fact that the first Balkan army which the
Soviets encountered was Romanian also played a role in this. Underestimation
of the Romanian troops and especially the Romanian Royal Officer Corps was
typical for Soviets officers, even before their arrival to the Balkans.599 Thereafter,
Romania’s and Bulgaria’s rapid switching of sides in the war further diminished
their armies in eyes of the Soviet officers and soldiers. Even Soviet propaganda
did not try to conceal the real reasons for Romania’s abandonment of its German
allies by attributing to Romanians who overthrew their government progressive
motives. Instead, the Soviet propaganda conceded: “the Romanians have left Hit-
ler, Bulgarians renounced him, the Finns turned away from him — out attacks
were too mighty.”600 Romanian officers’ attempts to receive appropriate greetings
for their rank from the allied Soviet junior officers and soldiers frequently led to
unpleasant scenes: from fistfights to the use of weapons.601
This attitude invariably influenced how Soviet officers thought about their other
Balkan colleagues. Red Army officers were highly self-confident and even preten-
tious in contacts with their Bulgarian colleagues. “…he could be my father, but in
596
Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 109.
597
598
The Red Army Political Administration tried with great efforts to instill the Soviet officer corps with the
necessary manners and proper understanding of the world. Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser.
599
The Chief of Staff of the Third Ukrainian Front believed that “the fighting capabilities of Soviet and
Romanian soldiers could not be even compared,” S. P. Ivanov, Shtab Armeiskii, shtab frontovoi (Mos-
cow: Voenizdat,, 1990), 434. A Komsomol organizer from an Infantry Divisions of the Third Ukrainian
Front said that “Romanians gave themselves up in groups, in one night an entire Romanian regiment
was taken prisoner,” A. P. Romanskii, Glazami i serdtsem soldata (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), 108.
600
Soviet pilots of the 17th Air Army read this song in a military newspaper, after their arrival to Bulgaria,
Skomorokhov, Boem, 189.
601
TSAMO, 57 А, ОО, d. 16, 138; Pilot Maslov Leonid Zakharovich, accessed September 17, 2012,
http://iremember.ru / letchiki-istrebiteli / maslov-leonid-zakharovich. html.
reality, who is he? We came here from Moscow, and they did not even fight as it was
necessary. I am… an experienced officer of a mighty army, while he represents the
military of a third-rate little state, the Czar of which humiliatingly served Hitler” —
these thoughts, even though not stated, were shared by many Red Army soldiers.602
Officers and soldiers of the Red Army, apart from their youthfulness, had one
other shared characteristic — they were exhausted. Weak resistance in Roma-
nia and lack of any resistance in Bulgaria did not save the infantry from nightly
marches. The burden of physical exertion and the burden of responsibility pressed
heavily on the young officers and soldiers. Due to constant pressure, there were
tragic incidents. The commander of the 703rd Riffle Regiment of the 233rd Riffle
Division, D. T. Nesteruk, was criticized by the commander of the division with
regards to the behavior of his Regiment during their march through Romania. Due
to exhaustion and unbearable burden of responsibility, the young officer, who was
only twenty years old, shot himself by the road, where his body was found by the
soldiers of another unit who marched behind his Regiment.603 The majority of sol-
diers kept quiet, and even though the exhaustion was great, the dissatisfaction was
rarely voiced. The complaints were recorded by the units’ party organizers. Pri-
vate of the 572th Riffle Regiment, Ivan Nakonechnii, twenty years old, said: “they
force us forward like cattle… in the night… they take away the possibility for us
to sleep or to warm up, we walk through the dust, dirty, we eat while we move, we
go through populated areas at night….” Private Grigorii Zhuzher of the 703rd Rifle
Regiment said: “every day we walk. They do not let us rest as necessary. And the
commanders demand that we do not leave the column. When will there be an end
to this?”604 Physical and psychological exhaustion was great — from the first to
the last battle during the Second World War (February 28, 1942 — February 28,
1945), the soldiers of the 431st Riffle Regiment of the 52nd Riffle Division crossed
more than 7,000 kilometers, from Moscow suburbs to the center of Budapest.605
Unlike the kilometers, their battle stress, which resulted from the continuous bat-
tles, loss of friends, risk of death or disability, was immeasurable.
Soviet soldiers began to forget the word “hunger” only during 1943–1944.606
At this time, they stopped going hungry mainly because they started seizing food
from the local populations. It is possible to take glance into the kitchen of the
4th Guards Mechanized Corps. On the official menu in September, 1944, there
was: “breakfast semolina, lunch — cabbage soup with meat, dinner — tea; break-
fast — porridge, lunch — beans with meat and grits, dinner — tea; breakfast —
602
Mikhin, Artillersty, 370; Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 183.
603
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 93, 174.
604
Ibid., 163.
605
TsAMO, 431 sp, d. 1, 1, “Zhurnal boevykh deistvii 431 sp.”
606
porridge, lunch cabbage soup, dinner — tea; breakfast — kasha, lunch — cabbage
soup with noodles with meat, dinner — tea; breakfast — kasha, lunch — millet
soup, dinner — tea. Quantity of the soup — 1,000–1, 105 grams, weight of the
main dish — 300–329 grams. Caloric value — 1, 298 calories; lunch — 1, 422
calories; dinner (with bread) — 500 calories. But snack was usually left out.”607
According to the modern-day recommendations of Russia’s Ministry of Health,
men aged eighteen to twenty-nine who have a light physical job should consume
2, 800 calories per day. Somewhat less than this was the daily intake of the Red
Army soldier in the kitchen of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was the
Third Ukrainian Front’s main offensive unit in the spring of 1944. Such a situation
caused concerns among the Corps’ sanitary control: “The quality of the food is
low, tasteless and without the necessary vitamins. The caloric value of the food is
unsatisfactory… quantity of the soup is great because of the water, and not food,
which causes the dish to be tasteless…” Interestingly, asked whether they were
satisfied with food, soldiers did not express criticism except one young woman
who said: “there is enough of swill.”608 Occasionally, even officers who received
bigger portions were dissatisfied with the quality and the quantity of the food.609
The Red Army also had problems with supply of clothes and shoes. The Red
Army faced shortages of uniforms since its creation, and it was announced only in
1926 that the units were completely supplied with uniforms and footwear.610 How-
ever, after the outbreak of the war in 1941, with great losses of depots and industrial
capacity, on the one hand, and the increase in the number of soldiers in the army, on
the other, there was an acute shortage of uniforms and footwear. Numerous civil-
ian factories began producing military uniforms, which increased the variation of
the uniforms. Soldiers received uniforms from reserves which were the old RKKA
uniforms. An experienced observer could have noted the differences in uniforms
even at the famous Victory Parade in 1945, when the German banners were thrown
in front of the mausoleum. In frontline units, the uniforms were old, patched up and
dirty. The trophy uniforms helped. German belts were used en mass (sometimes
German emblems were not even removed from the belts), and sometimes wholes
were pierced in order to remove the hated swastika. Boots and overcoats were also
desirable trophies. There were also shortages of rank insignia, a series of weapons,
as well as elementary little stars which some cut from cans and placed on their mili-
tary caps. Another problem was the Soviet soldiers’ tendency to ignore and neglect
the personal property as result of the unpredictability of the war. In this way, it was
607
TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 377, “Meditsinskie doneseniia korpusnogo vracha,” 16.
608
Ibid.,, 15.
609
TsAMO, 52 sd, PО, d. 105, 218; 233 sd, ПО, d. 93, 182.
610
A. Shalito, I. Savchenkov, N. Roginskii and K. Tsyplenkov, Uniforma Krasnoi Armii (Moscow:
Vostochnyi gorizont, 2001), 9.
often socially acceptable to neglect personal equipment.611 In the winter of 1941, the
Guards General tanker Mikhail Katukov wore regular Red Army overcoat in which
the general’s stars were drawn with a pen.612
The ordinary phenomena in the Red Army were also widespread in the units
which reached the Balkans and Serbia. There were a lot of trophy clothes instead
of uniforms, a shortage of footwear, undergarments, and military bags and back-
packs so that many soldiers carried ammunition in pockets. These were the prob-
lems of the 233rd Infantry Division in Ukraine, Moldavia, and the situation did not
improve in the Balkans.613 The head of the 52nd Rifle Division recorded that “the
officers do not greet their superiors, their external appearance is not satisfactory…
the majority of officers are without belts, they have various caps… officers are
not shaved. Commanders of the units do not pay attention to the external appear-
ance of their soldiers or the military discipline… the officers are first to violate
discipline” and he insisted that at least officers must wear Red Army stars, belts
and epaulets. Individuals carried their riffles on ropes or telephone cables, instead
of on the appropriate belt. In November, the commander of the 52nd Division,
Miliaev, noted that the situation had not changed, and that instead of the regular
fur hats, officers (not to say anything about soldiers) were wearing the so called
Kuban Cossack fur hats, fur hats of unknown origins and German caps.614 Women
in the ranks of the Red Army experienced similar problems. Women in the Red
Army were also affected. “Women are poorly dressed, boots are too large, major-
ity of young women do not have civilian clothes or shoes, as well as the objects for
personal hygiene and cosmetics.”615
The auxiliary technical equipment also varied. For example, in General Zh-
danov’s Corps, 65 % of the non-combat mechanical vehicles were seized from the
enemy. In addition, there were Land Lease vehicles which added to the diversity.
In total, Zhdanov’s Corps had ninety-seven type of transport non-combat vehi-
cles: Tatra, Mercedes, Opels and Kubelvagens (future ‘Beatles’), Chevrolets and
Studeobakers, James and German Fords.616
There was even an acute shortage of paper so that significant part of Staff doc-
uments, including those which were strictly confidential, were typed on the blanks
parts of various German documents.. There was also a shortage of typewriters so
that there was a massive requisition of Bulgarian and Serbian typewriters. Howev-
611
Skomorokhov, Boem, 122, 183.
612
P. Lipatov, Uniforma Krasnoi Armii. Znaki razlichiia, obmundirovanie, snariazhenie sukhoputnykh
voisk Krasnoi Armii i voisk NKVD 1936–1945gg (Moscow: Tekhnika — molodezhi, 2001), 41–65.
613
TSAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34–35; d. 93, 163–164, 213.
614
TsAMO, 52 sd, PO d. 36, 2, 46, 49, 71, 77.
615
TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 482.
616
Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina, 20.
er, Serbian and Bulgarian alphabets are different from their Russian counterpart.
The traces of these machines were preserved in Staff documents where letter ‘lj’
replaced ‘ia’, ‘đ’ replaced the hard sign, ‘ć’ the soft sign, ‘nj’ i’. The traces of these
machines began to disappear in Hungary and Austria where the local craftsmen
Russified the “liberated” typewriters.617
Due to the difficult living conditions and the constant exhaustion and battle
stress, the soldiers and officers could not seek a respite through relaxation, in-
stead, they used alcohol as means to calm their spiritual and physical pains. Apart
from the battle portion (100ml vodka or 300ml of wine per day), the soldiers and
officers sought to find additional sources of alcohol. Drunkenness turned into one
of the most frequent and least punished violations.
Sometimes this led to tragedies. In Bulgaria, the Red Army had the most se-
rious non-combat losses. On September 14, 1944, near the city of Burgas, there
were depots with several barrels of alcohol. The commander of the regiment Ma-
jor Prihod’ko, together with political deputy commander, Risin, called the Senior
Lieutenant of the Medical Service D’iachenko and ordered him to carry out a
speedy analysis of the alcohol: “You are a doctor, have a drink and tell me what
this is?” D’iachenko refused to drink the alcohol, but he agreed to carry out the
regular analysis of the alcohol content. The guards appeared at the depot in the
morning of September 17, when it became clear that the alcohol in the barrel was
not for use. Nonetheless, on September 16–19, 190 people were poisoned with
methanol in the garrison in Burgas. In total, 153 soldiers and officers sought help,
120 people were hospitalized, six lost their sight and forty-two died.618 When a
large amount of alcohol was discovered by soldiers of an advancing unit, conse-
quences were unpredictable. Parts of the 31st Riffle Corps of the 46th Army of the
Second Ukrainian Front, crossed the Serbian-Romanian border in Banat on Sep-
tember 20, 1944.619 “While the units of the Red Army crossed through Jaša Tomić,
some locals took the soldiers to the factory of liquor ‘Keliko’, where they began
to celebrate together the liberation while drinking great quantities. They opened
large barrels of different type of alcohol with automatic rifles… the cement base-
ment was turned into a mixture of different types of drinks. The soldiers grabbed
the alcohol with anything they could reach: gasoline cans, buckets… since there
was a danger that such celebrations could ruin the plans of the military command,
one higher-ranking officer set the basement ablaze. In the huge flame, which in
the rainy night rose above the sky, the entire factory burnt down.”620 The party
617
A large number of documents from the Third Ukrainian Front’s corps’ and divisions in TsAMO.
618
TsAMO, f. 4 gvmk, d. 377, “Meditsinskie doneseniia korpusnogo vracha,” 17, 30.
619
TsAMO, f. 46 А, d. 435, 31.
620
M. Đukanov, Kratka monografija Jaša Tomića: 1334–1978 (Jaša Tomić: Mesna zajednica Jaša Tomić,
1980).
organizers called in to prevent the drunkenness also could not contain themselves
from getting drunk. Due to inebriety, there was a loss of self-control, which led to
most varied consequences: alcohol poisoning, drunken fights, driving in a drunk-
en state, not fulfilling orders and violence against women.621
The Political Department of the Red Army tried to solve the problem of the
exhausted but still young soldiers and officers by imposing celibacy. Unlike other
belligerents in the Second World War, the Red Army sought to completely curtail
sexual relations. Although pregnant women were punished mildly due to demo-
graphic crisis, soldiers and officers infected with STDs were more severely cen-
sured. However, according to reports of the medical services of individual divi-
sions of the Third Ukrainian Front, these cases were relatively rare. The number of
STDs increased among the Red Army only once they reached the Balkans,622 after
they crossed the Romanian border, to be more precise. The sanitary institutions of
the Red Army connected these phenomena with the large number of bordellos in
that country. After the soldiers entered larger cities, commanders played the role
of worried parents concerned with the morality of their youthful soldiers, ordering
“the prompt closing of bordellos and ban on the sale of alcohol.”623
According to the RKKA Political Department, one of the worst things which
could happen to officers abroad was to enter a relationship with a foreign citizen.
“Run away from local women as from some poison or be on guard and be afraid
of infections,” “who is a friend, and who is an enemy? This cannot be decided im-
mediately, and even an open and seemingly direct glance of the interlocutor can be
a mask which is concealing dark thoughts. Russian officer, if he firmly remembers
his debt, must always be on guard…,” “be wary of the women abroad” — these
and other recommendations offer a good view into the Political Department’s
view on the issue of close encounters between the Red Army soldiers and local
women.624 An example of this can be the written reprimand, which Zhukov, com-
mander of a Brigade of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, sent to Sterligov, the
head of the Medical Service of the Brigade: “Several times I reminded you, with
great patience, so that you would become more reasonable and not sully the high
prestige of an officer. But you, instead, turned to drunkenness and even worse —
you entered intimate relations with a Hungarian woman, who lives in village of
Komindin, which you visit almost every night in the sanitary vehicle from the
village of Pald. You, Soviet officer, with the rank of a Major! You fell in front of
an unknown woman, only because you lost the sense of the responsibility to the
621
TsAMO, f. 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 26, 101, 496, 516, 716; d. 377, 30, 83; 68 sk, ОО, d. 240; 233 sd, PO,
d. 93, 171, 174, 181, 182; d. 140, 182; 52 sd, PO, d. 35, 71, 92; d. 36, 26, 44.
622
TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 377, 32–146.
623
TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 642, 650.
624
Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser.
Fatherland and your personal integrity.”625 The attempts to forcefully “morally el-
evate” the troops and impose ideologically-based celibacy stood in stark contrast
to the official bordellos utilized by Wehrmacht and the Allies, and sometimes it
also contributed to criminal acts.
The cases of violence and robbery, as well as murder of those who wanted to
protect their honor or property, were rare. Nonetheless, these phenomena were
present. West European historiography almost maintains that it was an official
policy to support the soldiers’ violence against the civilians, as a form of revenge
or as an opportunity for the tormented soldiers to let off steam.626 Materials related
to the deviant behavior of the Soviet soldiers abroad are still categorized as the
most guarded secrets in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation.627 Soviet veterans were rarely open about the darker side of
the war.628
It must immediately be clear that the military command went through great
efforts to curtail the criminal deviation in the ranks of the RKKA. The Soviet
Supreme Command was aware of “the existence of certain immoral phenomena
in the military units, such as: drunkenness and fighting, murder of civilians by
our soldiers, rape of women, robbery — all of this leaves a negative impressions
on certain layers of the society,”629 and it decisively fought against such phenom-
ena. The struggle against the deviant behavior had preventive and punitive as-
pects. Party organs were mobilized to explain the dangers of such behavior for the
USSR’s image and honor of the individuals. The party propagandists stressed that
the soldiers should act as liberator and not like violent robbers. The preventive di-
mension also included steps which were undertaken by the military justice system
to announce and familiarize all soldiers and officers with the severe punishments
which awaited those who violated the laws. The punitive measures included un-
compromising activity in unearthing and punishing the perpetrators according
to the Soviet criminal code.630 The penalties included execution for more seri-
ous crimes (premeditated murder during robberies or rapes), as well as the worst
military violations (desertion and self-inflicted wounds), prison terms from one
to ten years for murder with mitigating circumstances, rape, theft and fighting. In
625
TSAMO, f. 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 102.
626
G. Beddeker, Gore pobezhdennym: Bezhentsy III Reikha, 1944–1945 (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006); Gof-
man, Stalinskaia voina; V. Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944. Was in Ostpreussen tatsachlich geschah
(Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997); M. Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1945 (London: Mac-
millan, 2004).
627
The Military Prosecutor’s materials are inaccessible to researchers but the duplicates can be found in
the numerous political reports.
628
N. N. Nikulin, Vospominaniia o voine (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha,
2008).
629
TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 416, 138.
630
Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR. Redaktsii 1926 goda (Moscow: Iurizdat, 1948).
case of civil, instead of military violations (murder with mitigating circumstances,

rape, robbery or theft), the convicted soldier could hope to replace the jail term
with time served in a penal unit where he would have to “wash with blood the
mud from his name,” to put it in the contemporary jargon. In case of more serious
violations or political crimes, the convicted soldier would lose awards and ranks
and he would be punished according to the criminal code.
The Red Army committed fewer crimes in Serbia and Yugoslavia than in
Hungary and especially Germany, which in the autumn of 1944 reached critical
levels.631 It is relatively difficult to ascertain the total number of such incidents
which the Red Army troops committed in Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, according to
a confidential report sent to Tito on the eve of Yugoslavia’s normalization of ties
with the USSR, the following assessment was made. According to this analysis,
officers and soldiers of the Red Army committed on the territory of FNRJ a series
of crimes: 1, 219 rapes, 359 attempted rapes, 111 murder-rapes, 248 rapes with
attempted murders and 1, 204 robberies with physical injuries.632 To prove the
veracity of these claims is momentarily impossible because the materials which
are connected with criminal acts committed by the Red Army troops are among
the most guarded secrets in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation.
Nonetheless, the political reports produced by divisions and armies are open
to researchers and they allow us to estimate that the cited data corresponds to
truth, even though an accurate statistical analysis is impossible. The total number
of serious crimes could be compared with the duration of Red Army’s stay (around
two months) in Yugoslavia and the number of Red Army soldiers (300,000 people)
on the territory of Yugoslavia. The average monthly indicator would be high even
if take into account that our sample involved the segment of population most prone
to criminal activity — men aged nineteen to thirty (to which the absolute major-
ity of the Red Army soldiers belonged). The criminality rate would be especially
high if we would compare it to today’s statistics. However, regardless of all cal-
culations, only a tiny fraction of Soviet soldiers engaged in criminal behavior,
only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops some of whom
sacrificed their lives to liberate Serbia from Germans.
The censure by the army collective of the criminals was one of the most im-
portant preventive factors (even though it was not 100 % effective) which discour-
aged the Red Army troops from engaging in criminal behavior. Officers and sol-
631
The present-day Russian researchers concede this. I. Petrov, “Nemmersdorf: Mezhdu pravdoi i propa-
gandoi,” in Velikaia obolgannaia voina-2, ed., ed. I. Pykhalov.
632
AJ, Arhiv J. B. Tita, Kabinet predsednika republike, I-3‑a (SSSR), k. 170, Poseta državno-partijske
delegacije SSSR-a na čelu sa N. S. Hruščovom 26. 5. — 3. 6. 1955, Informativno-politički materijal, l.
574.
diers frequently reported the behavior of their less consciences comrades, which
was not the case in Hungary and Austria.633 Therefore, it was not accidental that,
as a rule, violence and robbery erupted when the soldiers and officers with ten-
dency towards deviant behavior were separated from the collective and were free
of this moral break. There were definitely incidents of Soviet soldiers behaving
defiantly. JNA propaganda about the Soviet soldiers’ misconduct during the Tito-
Stalin conflict was probably based in reality. However, such behavior was the
exception and not the rule.634
Apart from these general characteristics of the soldiers of the Third Ukrainian
Front, it is important to analyze the Red Army soldiers’ impressions of Yugoslavia
and Serbia. The propaganda of the army’s political institutions was influential
in forming the soldiers’ views on this issue.635 Officers and soldiers who had an
opportunity to read newspapers or listen to agitators who related the content of
the military newspapers, received a short description of Yugoslavia’s geography,
including the enumeration of all Yugoslavia’s nations. The military newspapers
also provided an embellished biography of Josip Broz Tito. Also, KPJ’s role in or-
ganizing the partisan warfare was deemed “progressive and positive,” unlike the
work of “people’s enemies” (Nedić, Mihailović, Pavelić and Rupnik). The basic
idea which the reader could get from these texts is that since the very occupation
of Yugoslavia, Partisans under Tito’s command consistently fought against the
Germans and their allies.
Another very important idea which the authors of the informational-propa-
ganda texts wanted to get across was “the historical liberating role of the Russian
Army and its successor the Red Army in the Balkans.” Obviously, this motive
was used prior to the Soviet forces’ entry into Bulgaria. Nonetheless, unlike in
Bulgaria, in Yugoslavia the thesis of liberation had more resonance, even though
the exaggerated description of the population’s suffering under the Germans and
their allies was the favorite propaganda theme in depiction of the occupied ter-
ritories. To this general cliché was added the popular theme in the second half of
the war of the brotherhood of Slavic nations. This propaganda went so far that that
the fighters widely addressed each other with “Slavs” (Forward, Slavs!) instead of
the formal “comrades” or colloquial “guy.” Academia was mobilized to support
the propaganda effort. As a result, N. Derzhavin’s Vekovaia bor’ba slavian s nem-
etskimi zakhvatchikami (Centuries-long struggle of the Slavs with the German
Conquerors) was sprinted in tens of thousands of copies. In this work, the Serbs
633
634
Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 56.
635
“Ekonomicheskii i politicheskii ocherk. Iugoslaviia,” Zvezda Sovetov (gazeta 57 A), October 4, 1944;
“Marshal Iosip Broz-Tito,” ibid., October 8, 1944; “Narody-brat’ia vstretilis’” Ibid., October 22, 1944;
“Marshal Tito,” Vpered za Rodinu (gazeta 233 divizii), October 3, 1944.
had an entire chapter devoted to them entitled “The Bandit Attack of Austrian
Germans on the Serbian People in 1914.”636
The Red Army soldiers realized the importance of Slavic community after
the first contact with the population. The Russian soldiers welcomed the fact that
in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signs were written in the Cyrillic alphabet which was
understood by the Russian soldier. In order to understand the local population,
soldiers did not require a manual for conversation.637 Units did not receive such
manuals, unlike in Romania, Hungary and Germany. Certain Red Army soldiers
took offense at the Yugoslavs’ attempts to use translators in communication with
the Soviets.638
All of this created a positive image of Yugoslavia, which was the aim of the
official propaganda. The created image of Yugoslavia was more positive than the
image of surrounding countries. There was an obvious difference in the propa-
ganda material (carefully hidden during the existence of the Eastern bloc) and in
recommendations of the political leadership that the friendly nations should be
differentiated from the enemy nations on the path of the Third Ukrainian Front.
The Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians belonged to the group of friendly nations, with-
out differentiation in the official propaganda. The propaganda about Hungarians
and Austrians was less positive. Even though the liberation of these two nations
from Nazism was declared to be the official aim in propaganda, it seemed less
convincing in reality due to their fierce resistance which they offered to the Sovi-
ets. Romanians, the new allies, belonged somewhere between these two groups,
but their deeds during the occupation of Ukraine was never forgotten.639 The
various units’ political departments recommended to their soldiers to minimize
the contact with Hungarian and German population during their departure from
Yugoslavia.640 Once the Red Army reached Northern Vojvodina, the units were
directed to take into account the changing ethnic map of the civilian population,
since the troops were entering the territories of the enemy Hungary.641
Other reasons influenced the Soviet soldiers’ attitudes towards the population
of Yugoslavia. According to the memories of the participants in the war, Soviet
soldiers and civilians dramatically felt the isolation and loneliness of the USSR’s
struggle against the Germans and their allies. The official Soviet propaganda un-
636
N. Derzhavin, Vekovaia bor’ba slavian s nemetskimi zakhvatchikami (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1943), 76–81.
637
638
Mikhin, Artilleristy, 344.
639
Prior to the entrance into Romania, the title of a political report for the Soviet officers was illustrative:
“Zverstva rumynskikh zahvatchikov, chuvstvo nenavisti i mesti Krasnoi armii k rumynskim okkupan-
tam i nasha poitika po otnosheniiu k Rumynii,” TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 91, 181.
640
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34, 162–165; d. 35, 283.
641
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34, 219.
successfully tried to suppress these feelings. Therefore, those who fought against
the Germans on their own territory from 1941 were naturally viewed sympatheti-
cally by the Soviet soldiers.
It is difficult to ascertain the influence of the pro-Yugoslav propaganda from
1941–1942 (which included numerous articles in newspapers and a short film Night
above Belgrade) on the Soviet rank and file soldiers in the autumn of 1944. The ac-
cessibility and the influence of this information about the battles in Yugoslavia is
difficult to determine, but it is obvious that there were several barriers which pre-
vented the information from reaching the troops such as the lack of accessibility to
this propaganda by officers and soldiers on the frontline. The Soviet propaganda
carefully built up the myth of European resistance movement as an all-out peo-
ple’s phenomena, which diminished the level of trust or at least attention towards
individual events. Finally, among the mass of Red Army soldiers 1941–1943, the
geo-political questions could have hardly competed with existential issues.
The level of the Red Army soldier’s education about the Yugoslavs, prior to
RKKA arrival to the Balkans, was illustrated by a conversation between a Serbian
prisoner of war from a Hungarian labor battalion and his Soviet guard. “It was a
sunny day and the cold weather relented. I sat outside next to a building, sunbath-
ing not far from a younger guard. He asked me what nationality I was when I could
mumble in Russian. I answered him that I was a ‘Yugoslav’. I noticed by his facial
expression that he did not know who the Yugoslavs were. He repeated the ques-
tion: ‘what nationality is that? ’ I understood that he never heard of Yugoslavia, so
I expanded my answer: ‘Serb! ’ Again he did not know what that was, and already
nervous, I added: ‘Balkanite! ’ Now I see that he never heard of that part of the
earth and annoyed I said with a smile: ‘Fritz! ’ [the Russian colloquial expression
for subjects of the Third Reich — A. T.] ‘a Fritz! ’ he repeated and that’s how the
conversation came to an end.”642 In addition, the Red Army masses were pleas-
antly surprised to encounter in Yugoslavia soldiers with red stars on their hats and
that their resistance was continuous since 1941.643
Nonetheless, the Red Army displayed arrogance towards the Partisans in Yu-
goslavia, which was also typical of the RKKA attitude towards the Soviet Parti-
sans as well. These views were based on high opinion of themselves and the fact
642
Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane, 56.
643
It should be noted that the Red Stars were more popular amongst the Partisans than the Red Army.
For instance, the tankers from Zhdanov’s Corps did not have Red Stars but emblems from the family
kingdom: ‘rapid rabbits’ for the reconnaissance troops on motorcycles, ‘the durable dogs’ for mecha-
nized infantry, ‘agile martens’ on the smaller armored vehicles and finally ‘angry bears’ on T-34 tanks
which were the main offensive weapon of the Corps. Therefore, Zhdanov’s Corps was unofficially
known as Zhdanov’s Beasts. The Partisans largely drew Red Stars on their newly acquired tanks. It was
not unusual for the Red Army soldiers to wear military hats without any emblems but every Partisan
tended to have a Red Star, even on civilian hats, Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina; Vojni muzej, Zbirka
fotografija, Inv. 2226, 2285, 2283, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 13862, 13928, 19993.
that the partisans were deemed to be insufficiently disciplined.644 We will remind

the reader of the example of Mikhin’s patronizing view of the Partisans during the
shelling of Trstenik.645 The positive but condescending view of the Partisans by
the Red Army was illustrated by the fact that NOVJ units were frequently left out
of military maps or were cited at the very end. Nonetheless, after the first battles
there was growth of confidence in NOVJ soldiers.
The Partisans’ hatred towards the Germans was invariably appreciated by the
Red Army soldiers, even though this hatred sometimes went too far for the Soviet
officers. Soviet political departments unsuccessfully sought to end the mass and
prompt executions of the German soldiers and their collaborators (in which the
Partisans included all of their political enemies) for pragmatic reasons, mainly, the
enemy’s unwillingness to surrender in the future. As a result, the Soviet political
departments recommended to send the German prisoners of war to special camps
behind the frontlines.646 There were incidents which caused criticism from the
Soviet political institutions (but informal sympathy of the Red Army soldiers).
For instance, a poster appeared in Pančevo, several days after Partisans entered
the city: “German inhabitants of Pančevo poisoned with wine nine soldiers of
the Red Army. As an answer to this, 250 Germans were executed — citizens of
Pančevo…” Further, list of the executed Germans was provided, which began with
the president of Kulturbund, the mayor, former SS soldiers and so on. Eleventh
on the list was Gros, the café owner. His last name was followed by a laconic as-
sessment, “a great fascist,” and sixteen additional German last names with just
as many laconic characteristics. Finally, there were additional 223 Germans for
whom it was said that they were citizens of Pančevo. In the end the poster stated:
“We warn all Germans, that in the future for every poisoned Red Army soldier or
Partisan, not thirty people will be executed but a hundred.”647
Soon enough, informal ties between the Partisans and the Red Army troops
became closer, which sometimes led to collective drunkenness. This expression
of closeness was also present later on when the Soviet soldiers had an opportunity
to be in the company of NOVJ soldiers.648 The Soviet political institutions reacted
vehemently to such acts of friendship.649 The Commander of the 57th Army issued
a special order No. VS / 0497, on December 5, 1944, “About the contacts between
the soldiers of the divisions with the local population in Yugoslavia and about cat-
644
The reasons for this were derivations of Soviet partisans’ discipline. A. Gogun and A. Kentii, Krasnye
partizany Ukrainy.
645
646
647
Ibid., 65.
648
TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 716; Chkheidze, Zapiski, 89; Krasnoflotets Pakhomov Igor’ Nikolaevich,
accessed September 16, 2010, http://www.iremember.ru / content / view / 448 / 23 / lang, ru / .
649
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 35, 283.
egorical ban on personal contacts between the members of army with the popula-
tion of Romania and Yugoslavia.”650
Practically all the Soviet soldiers who were in Yugoslavia remembered the
hospitality of the local population, which helped in creating the positive impres-
sion about the Yugoslavs. The Soviet soldiers’ attitude towards the civilians in
Yugoslavia was based on the warm greeting which the Red Army soldiers encoun-
tered in almost every town. The encounter with the new environment imposed
the natural comparison of the standard of life of the local rural population with
the life in the USSR. Even though the standard was mostly higher in Serbia, it did
not cause hatred and envy, such as was the case with wealthy estates in Romania
where the high standard was deemed to be a consequence of war profiteering.651
Likewise, the bulk of the Serbian peasantry was better off than the majority of the
impoverished Romanian peasants, whose poverty stood in the stark contrast with
the luxury of the exploitative landowning class, which was absent in Serbia. The
contrast between well off and poor rural Romanians served as a good illustration
for the ideological construction of the injustices of the class society. Serbia mostly
reminded the soldiers of the NEP period in the Soviet Union when the toleration
of private property allowed the peasants to raise their living standard: “for several
hours of our stay in the house I managed to have lunch and to have a discussion on
various topics with the peasants. Everything there was like it was during the NEP
years: not rich life, but there was hope for improvement. And the peasant worries
were the same as my father’s 1924–1925.”652 The smarter Soviet soldiers kept their
views to themselves. Those who voiced their opinions were punished like Ser-
geant Nonts who told his comrades: “our collective farms have not proven them-
selves. Independent households are much better than collective farms. Collective
farm workers in our country live poorly.” SMERSH characterized this statement
as “anti-Soviet agitation.”653
The Soviet soldiers’ memoirs also reveal their positive view of Yugoslavia.
They described the Yugoslav landscape with enthusiasm (which was unusual for
Soviet military memoirs). “It was early in the morning. October in Yugoslavia
was like late August… it is not autumn yet but everywhere there is plenty of
green trees, flowers, it is warm and sunny… everywhere the nature smells. Un-
seen beauty! Transparent air, filled with aroma of the trees, flowers and grass
spreads throughout the body with every breath. ‘The people live like in heaven.”654
Or, “what names — they sound sweet and our juicy! Two thirds of the country is
650
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 140, 203.
651
652
Mikhin, Artillersty, 292, 313.
653
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO d. 93, 182.
654
mountains. And what mountains! You cannot be amazed by them enough. From
the heights in which we flew, they were indescribable — you have to see it.”655
The book by Orest Mal’tsev Iugoslavskaia tragediia (The Yugoslav Tragedy)
contained negative comments about Yugoslavia. This was a quasi-artistic work,
in reality it was a propaganda pamphlet from the period of the Yugoslav-Soviet
conflict, which contained everything negative and critical about the Yugoslav
communists which the Soviet analysts managed to dig about Yugoslavia. None-
theless, even in this work which was filled with true and false accusations, there
was not one case of a Soviet soldier encountering a negative experience in Yugo-
slavia.656 The positive impression of Yugoslavia remained not only in the collec-
tive consciousness of the Red Army soldiers of the Third Ukrainian Front, but also
among the soldiers who received informal information from the so called military
telegraph — rumors and conversations with comrades. Consequently, sometimes
soldiers who never served in Yugoslavia had positive things to say about it: “…
it was not easy for us. We felt for those who were in Budapest and near Berlin,
we envied in the positive sense those who were with enthusiasm greeted by the
Yugoslavs and Czechs.”657
Analyzing the Red Army soldiers’ perceptions, it cannot be determined pre-
cisely whether they differentiated between the Yugoslavs and the Serb, and wheth-
er there were any differences in how they perceived various Yugoslav nations. The
preliminary conclusion based on memoirs and archival materials would be that
the Soviet troops did not differentiate between Yugoslavia’s nations. Serbs were
almost never mentioned and the collective name Yugoslavs was almost always
used. However, it is very likely that informally the differentiation was made. The
manner in which the Red Army was greeted in Serbia, where even the supposed
German collaborators (JVuO) and the real collaborators (SDK) refused to fight the
Red Army, stood in stark contrast to the attitude towards the Red Army in Croatia,
where the Croatian units fought shoulder to shoulder with Germans. Interestingly,
Mal’tsev’s novel had positive characters from all the nations of Yugoslavia, but
the majority of the negative characters were of Croatian origins. This represented
an overturn of the old Comintern stereotype about repressive Serbs and freedom-
fighting Croats. It seems that the pro-Russian attitudes of the civilian Serbian pop-
ulation, which were rooted in Orthodoxy and which were noted by members of the
Political Apparatus of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, had an effect.658
655
656
O. Mal’tsev, Iugoslavskaia tragediia, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952.
657
Krasnoarmeets Kozhin Iurii Alekseevich, accessed September 17, 2012,
http://iremember.ru / pekhotintsi / kozhin-uriy-alekseevich. html.
658
The perception of the Red Army troops by the Yugoslav (Serbian) civilians
and soldiers was quite different. The initial attitude towards the Soviets was based
on ideas about Russia which were nurtured by large part of the masses and the
civil society from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These ideas were root-
ed in the historical consciousness of the Serbian nation which dated to the Middle
Ages.659 In addition, some Serbs were wary towards the policies of a great power
which pursued its own interests and did not heed much attention to the interests
of the smaller nations. DZ. Rootham noted this other side of the coin, mentioning
“the wall of skepticism… and memory which the Serbs had that the Russians be-
trayed them in the Balkan Wars and even in the First World War.”660 “The Russian
myth” was also undermined by the perceptions of the materially insecure Russian
refugees and by individuals who stood out morally from the traditions and the
views of the patriarchal Balkan environment.”661 The subsequent collaboration of
the Russian emigration with the Germans led to drop in the reputation of all Rus-
sians: “the Serbs nicknamed those Russians ‘We Are Also Occupiers’ and derided
them.”662
Also, the Partisans upheld the propagandist, simplified and caricaturist com-
munist ideology which led to the exaggerated image of the Red Army soldiers and
the Soviet everyday reality. The Partisan propaganda, based on the Soviet model,
rejected the possibility that there were any problems in the Soviet Union. To the
naïve understanding of the reality by the wider national masses, the communist
ideology was understood to mean better material conditions. The shock from the
encounter which shattered these illusions were recorded by the diplomats of the
Royal Yugoslavia, the ordinary people and the Yugoslav communists.663 The Ser-
bian society shared a series of Balkan traditional characteristics which influenced
the position of women and public moral in the society, the relationship toward
alcohol and so on. The Russian patriarchal village society had many traits which
resembled these traditions, however, the majority of Soviet soldiers and officers
who came to the Balkans in the ranks of the Red Army were young and maximally
de-traditionalized due to the ideological pressures in educational institutions and
during the years spent outside of the circle of their family and elders. The wide-
spread positive attitude towards the Soviets in anticipation of the Red Army’s ar-
659
See about this phenomenom which had its roots in the period of Saint Sava. Russkie v Iugoslavii:
Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 1.
660
Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233.
661
For more details about this see Јovanović, Ruska emigracija na Balkanu.
662
Milunović, Od nemila, 29.
663
Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188–189; Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 240. For the
impressions by Yugoslav students in the USSR right after the war see M. Perišić, Od Staljina ka Sartru:
formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958 (Belgrade: Institut za
noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008).
rival was the passionate desire to see the hated occupier leave (formulated as “let
the black Gypsy come, as long as he is not a German”), disbelief in the German
propaganda about the terrible consequences of the Soviet troops’ arrival, as well
the belief that the end of the war would bring an improvement in everyday life.
First impressions of the Red Army were influenced by the personal ideological
preferences of the individuals: some people welcomed enthusiastically the Sovi-
ets, others would have preferred to be liberated by the Western Allies while some
did not seek liberation at all. Since the last category was in absolute minority, the
first encounter with the Soviet troops usually led to jubilation. Particular joy was
caused by the considerable and mighty Soviet military technology whose quantity
was greater than anything displayed in Yugoslavia until then. During the occupa-
tion of Yugoslavia in 1941 and later on in battles against the Partisans, the Ger-
mans used smaller tanks Pz Kpfw I (weight 5,4 tons), Pz Kpfw II (weight: 7,2 tons),
as well as the inferior Czech, Italian, Hungarian and Polish armored vehicles. The
new generation of larger tanks such as Pz Kpfw III (weight: 22 tons) and Pz Kpfw
IV (weight: 24,6 tons), not to speak about the “great cats” (Tiger, Panther and
Royal Tiger) were a rarity in the mountainous terrain of Yugoslavia. Therefore,
the columns of countless T-34 (weight: 29.2 tons) and ISU-122 (weight: 45.5 tons)
invariably impressed the Yugoslavs. The ground shook while the dust rose from
the arriving tanks on the horizon. The vibrations from the firing of heavy caliber
cannons not only ripped eardrums but they broke windows from the surrounding
houses. “Around midnight we were woken up by muffled thumps. It came from
direction of Milić and for our dull hearing it became even stronger. Regardless of
who it could be, it could not surprise us in beds! The unknown danger speeded up
our sobering. Without stumbling I crawled to the barracks closest to the road and
I hid behind the corner to see the arrival of the liberating Red Army…from afar
it was clear that tanks were approaching us. They must at least weigh thirty tons,
that’s how much the earth shook. One after the other, with incredible noise, with
black smoke rising above them, they were roaring towards me, lightening the road
under the sharp angle…”664
The uniform and the external appearance of the Soviet soldiers gave an im-
pression of utter poverty and were in complete contrast to the external appearance
of the American-English allies, Germans and the prewar Royal army. The disap-
pointment in shabby appearance of the troops and the officers was recorded by
almost all Yugoslavs who came into contact with the Soviet army.665 M. Milunović
664
The Yugoslavs of various political persuasions were impressed with the Soviet tanks. See A. Bajt, Ber-
manov dosije (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2006), 1045–1048.
665
It is interesting that the ethnic Serbian communists who served in the Yugoslav Brigade were also
shocked after their first encounter with the Soviet reality. Lončarević, Specijalna misija; Paunić,
Sećanja na ratne dan.
and V. Piletić noted this disappointment most openly. “Several companies of So-
viet soldiers camped in Vinča. They left upon us a sad and very difficult impres-
sion. They were badly dressed. We could not see a tank anywhere nor any armored
vehicles. They had some horse carriages with small…horses. The fires burned
in courtyards and orchards were they cooked and roasted [the food — A. T.]. It
was easy to note that they did not have an organized commissariat and that every
ten soldiers cared for their own food. Throughout the villages one could hear the
poultry and pigs squeaking, which they were… hunting around yards and brought
them to their ‘kitchens’.” Milunović and Piletić also noted the youthfulness of the
soldiers and officers, as well as the informal relationship between them which was
obvious in physical fights between the officers and their younger subordinates.666
The youthfulness of the Soviet officers was obvious and unusual to JVuO fighters
and the civilians, but not for the Partisans whose leadership was also very young.
The Partisans, who joined the ranks voluntarily for ideological reasons, were most
surprised by the phenomenon of officers dealing with their subordinated physi-
cally. They associated this with the period of the so called class society.667 The
young Partisan army did not have room for such phenomena.
The Yugoslav civilians and soldiers after first contact with the Red Army be-
gan to appreciate the phrase “he drinks like a Russian,” which entered the Ser-
bian language during the Yugoslavs’ encounter with emigrants. Apart from the
national reasons, there were other factors, such as the stress of two large groups
of Russians with which the Serbs had contact in the twentieth century. Another
reason was the traditional manner in which the alcohol is consumed by the Serbs
and the Russians. The former, as a result of bountiful land and the presence of
ingredients necessary for alcohol production, consumed alcohol regularly but in
modest amounts. Every well off household had alcohol. In Russia, the state usu-
ally held monopoly on the industrial production of alcohol, the land was less boun-
tiful and there were less ingredients available for production of alcohol — cereals
(mostly wheat and rye) were used by the peasants to primarily feed their families
and alcohol was produced only after this was taken care of. This is how the sec-
ond — ‘Slavic’ model of consuming alcohol emerged, where the limited quantities
of alcohol were either purchased or prepared for special occasions and drank until
the supplies ran out. The Red Army’s arrival to a country with hospitable popula-
tion with plenty of cheap alcohol invariably led to unwanted consequences.
The alcohol consumption began to take on threatening dimensions. Lieuten-
ant Colonel of the Political Department of the 52nd Rifle Division justified himself
on October 21, that his orders were not carried out because the party leader was
666
Milunović, Od nemila, 51; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 108–109.
667
Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 37–38.
drunk. He received an angry reply from head of the Political Department of the
57th Army, Colonel Tsin’ev: “Comrade Kokarev! Can you issue orders to a drunk?
What shame! Party organizers are getting drunk! Your work with the party is
unsatisfactory. Improve your work with communists.”668 According to Slutskii,
who went to the Staff of the 1st NOVJ Proletariat Corps: “in Corps’ cafeteria where
drunkenness was strictly forbidden and punished, they regularly gave disgust-
ing brandy to the visiting Russian officers. The hosts viewed those who drank it
with pity.”669 Together with heavy drinking there were unfortunate consequences,
which admittedly, were not so rare.670
Robbery and violence were less prevalent than in Germany, but still suffi-
ciently irritating for an allied state. Dedijer’s and Djilas’ descriptions could seem
doubtful at first glance, but they are confirmed by materials produced by the Po-
litical Departments of the units which went through eastern part of Yugoslavia.
Even though the authors of the pamphlet “Crimes under the banner of Social-
ism” exaggerated the criminal conduct by some Red Army soldiers, the numerous
cases of the Military Prosecutor of the 57th Army indisputably confirm that the
Yugoslav Communists did not invent many of the criminal acts perpetrated by the
Red Army troops.
Here are several examples: on November 8, 1944, Private K. O. Avetisian and
Lance Sergeant K. I. Shpitsin illegally arrested a citizen of Tomaškova after which
they raped his wife K. Horvat. The military tribunal sentenced Avetisian to ten
years, and Shpitsin to nine years in labor camps, without the possibility of ex-
changing their sentence for a stint in the penal company. A drunk Red Army sol-
dier got into a fight on November 14, 1944, and he broke glass seriously injuring
a civilian. He was sentenced to ten years in a labor camp, without the possibility
of exchanging his sentence with service in the penal company. Sergeant Borisov
in a drunken state raped M. Ganić (eighty-one years old) in village of Deronja. He
was sentenced to ten years in a labor camp, without the possibility of serving his
sentence in a penal company.671
Deputy Commander of the 429th Rifle Regiment in charge of supplying the
unit, and the head of the Independent Liaison Platoon of the same Regiment,
stayed on the estate of Dragomir Mihailović in Boljeva during the night of Octo-
ber 10–11. During the night, they were visited by two young women from the same
unit. The young women left early in the morning and they carried some things
from the estate, according to one of the Soviet officers stationed in the neighbor-
ing house. After their departure, Mihailović determined that six wool dresses, one
668
TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 105, 191.
669
670
TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 36, 51, 60.
671
TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 140, 164, 193, 195.
overcoat and underpants which he could not count were missing from the ward-
robe. Mihailović told the division’s prosecutor that the wardrobe was not locked.
According to him, he “awaited the Red Army for a long time and he hoped that
everything would be in order and that sirs officers from the Red Army would not
allow anything to be taken.” As punishment, the officers lost their rank and they
were sent to a penal company, while the young women returned the stolen things
except the underwear which was useless because it was worn.672
The number of such crimes led the military newspapers to publicize and criti-
cize such incidents, despite the strict ban on distributing compromising informa-
tion (Order NKO No. 034).673 Mitra Mitrovic, one of the leading women of the
Partisan movement, the future Minister of Education, wife of powerful Milovan
Djilas, remembered with disgust the inappropriate behavior of the Red Army sol-
diers: “A tanker — a little fatso approached me and suggests to me: ‘Let’s go
dark-skinned.”674 Such incidents invariably caused the revolt of the KPJ leader-
ship because they undermined the authority of the USSR as well as the ideol-
ogy on which the new government in Yugoslavia was based. Sharp statements
by J. B. Tito, E. Kardelj, K. Popović, P. Dapčević and especially M. Djilas were
passed on to the head of the Soviet Mission, General Korneev, and the head of the
Soviet Garrison in Belgrade, General P. M. Verkholovich and later on personally
to Stalin.675 Djilas was particularly angry: “it added on gradually until it boiled
over…”676 Personally insulted, Djilas became very concerned that the Red Army’s
conduct would have a damaging effect on the masses.677
KPJ leadership also complained about the Red Army’s attitude towards the
Partisans and the NOVJ as an ally. The Yugoslav leadership pleaded several times
that the expression “liberation of Belgrade by the forces of the Red Army” be
replaced with “liberation of Belgrade by the forces of the Red Army and the Yu-
goslav troops,” that the Soviets should appropriately greet the Yugoslav officers,
and the Soviet soldiers’ and officers’ relationship towards the Yugoslav army “as
incapable and second-rate” needed to be changed.678 According to a Soviet propa-
gandist, this was very important for the Yugoslavs because the Belgrade’s middle
classes “often compared and contrasted its Russophilism with its anti-Titoism,
it derided his [Tito’s — A. T.] poor army, and sometimes it openly demonstrated
672
TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 105, 130.
673
Ibid.,196.
674
675
M. Đilas, Razgovori; Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 74.
676
677
Đilas’ concerns about the mood of the wider masses did not prevent him from “hastening the revolu-
tion” in Hercegovina and Montenegro in late 1941 and early 1942. V. Domazetović, Revolucija u Crnoj
Gori i njeni uzroci (Belgrade: Prosvetna zajednica A. D., 1944).
678
these feelings,”679 The Yugoslav communists were also displeased when their
sense of closeness and camaraderie with the Red Army was not reciprocated. In
direct contact with the officers of the Third Ukrainian Front, the KPJ members
soon felt that members of the VKP (b) held them to be second-rate communists.
The Soviets did not conceal their belief that the KPJ (as well as other communist
parties) was a “creation” and “reflection” of VKP (b).680 Almost all memoirists
who had an opportunity to meet the Soviet soldiers and officers commented on
their shock at being received coldly by the Soviets.
However, it would be completely wrong to claim that the overall Yugoslav and
especially Serbian perception of Soviet soldiers was only negative. Long-awaited
liberation and encounter with the Russians could not have been totally ruined by
incidents and the coldness of Soviet officers. The Soviet material and military aid
to NOVJ, the aid which the Soviet state offered in the last phase of the war, also
influenced the creation of a positive picture of the USSR even though this was not
free of confusion and misunderstandings.681
The combination of joy from the liberation, mixed with positive emotions to-
wards the Russians and not knowing the character of the communist regimes led
to touching scenes. This is how Juri Lobačev described the departure of Germans
and the arrival of the Red Army in his memoirs.682 With the talent of a painter and an
author, with good memory, Lobačev offered the picture of one of the first moments
of the encounter between the Soviets and the Serbian population in Belgrade: “All
night the columns of Germans and Četniks were passing us by, hurrying towards
the centre of the city. And a curious, unusual silence set in. Sunrise. The morning
cracked that Friday, October 15, 1944. The fresh, transparent autumn day. But
then, at the end of the today’s street of Maxim Gorky, along the wall of a destroyed
house, with riffle in hands, a shadows appeared, followed by a second, third. Gray,
dusty… overcoats. Red star on the helmet. ‘Comrades! ’ — from the basement of
the semi-destroyed house were jumping out men, women, children, embracing
the very young Soviet captain. There is more and more people. Among them me.
I approach the captain: ‘Comrade Captain, over there, above the boulevard is a
machinegun nest. Germans are there. But you can get across the ruins unnoticed.
Come, I will show you’. ‘Alright, show me! ’ And to the soldiers: ‘Follow me! ’…
679
Ibid., 75.
680
Ibid.,74.
681
For more details on this topic see Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 187–231.
682
Lobačev was a translator in the 57th Army. He was in Belgrade and Vienna. Unlike the majority of Rus-
sian authors of memoirs, Lobačev openly wrote about the numerous instances of robberies and rapes
which the Red Army committed in Europe. He did not generalize this behavior to all of the Red Army
troops, instead, he described them as negative phenomena which the numerous military, political and
security organs of the Red Army sought to curtail. Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu, 139, 144, 149,
157, 169.
Captain quietly says: ‘Kolya, come on! ’ Short broad shouldered man approaches
the window, spits in his hands, takes a grenade… second, third grenade. The road
is open. But know they need to go through the mass of the people, of whom there
were more and more. Flowers in hands, bottles. They hug the soldiers, invite them
to their homes as guests, they forget that the liberation of the city just began. And
that’s how it was everywhere: frequently, at one end of the street the battle was
going on, while at the other end, already liberated, the windows with broken glass
were decorated with carpets, previously prepared tricolored flags, red flags, and
joyful people are hugging the fighters-liberators.”683
On the bases of the existing materials, it can be concluded that the Yugoslavs,
and above all the Serbs, after the encounter with the Red Army experienced a
certain disappointment in the USSR including the Russians. Criminal or anti-
social behavior by individual Red Army soldiers had to have left bitter taste, de-
spite the great joy at being liberated from the German occupier. These feelings,
coupled with Yugoslav communists’ repressions immediately after their arrival
to Serbia,684 contributed to understanding the events of 1941–1945 as a civil war,
above all. These circumstances have contributed to the fact that in modern-day
Serbia the memories of the Second World War are neglected.685 It is unbelievable,
but this critical stance is in complete contrast to positive memories of the Soviet
soldiers about the population of Serbia and NOVJ. The positive image created at
the time in the consciousness of the Russian nation has outlived the communist
ideology, USSR and SFRJ, it aided in restoring the old traditional sympathies for-
gotten during the communist experiments of the 1920s and the 1930s, and offered
strong bases for a positive image of Serbs among the contemporary Russians.
683
Ibid., 123–124..
684
Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića.
685
The numerous Red Army monuments are in a state of decay, especially throughout Serbia’s interior,
even though these monuments were built at locations of mass deaths of Soviet soldiers such as in the
village of Riptek on the bank of Danube. O. Pintar Manojlović, “’Široka strana moja rodnaja’ Spomeni-
ci sovjetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954,” Tokovi istorije 1–2 (2005).
Conclusion
The Second World War in Yugoslavia was characterized by a heavy multi-

layered civil war. These events were above all caused by German expansionism.
Berlin at first sought to achieve its goals with peaceful methods,686 but when these
failed they went to war to conquer Southeastern Europe. The Germans were re-
sisted by two movements which relied on different foreign powers: the pro-British
and later on pro-American JVuO and the pro-Soviet NOP. Whereas the Western
Allies provided lukewarm support to Četniks until 1943, Moscow’s diplomatic,
propaganda and later on material support was much more decisive. During the
war, Hitler believed that the German primary enemy in the Balkans was “greater
Serbian ideology which is the only state-building element on the territory of South-
eastern Europe.”687 Consequently, the occupiers offered support to all the forces
which were opposed to a common South Slav state with the centre in Belgrade. In
this way, a conflict erupted between the nations which sought independence from
Belgrade (or at least autonomy) within the framework of Hitler’s New Europe and
their former fellow countrymen who remained loyal to the idea of a common state
(Serbs and individual Slovenians688 and Croats). In addition to German expansion-
ism, the occupation also brought Third Reich’s right wing ideology. Therefore,
the societies of individual occupied entities (regardless of the degree of statehood
which the occupier offered them) were divided politically into two broad groups:
the liberal camp (liberal left and extreme left wing) versus the anti-modern camp
(traditionalist and extreme right wing). This division divided the societies along
the lines of resistance movements.
686
Ristović, Nemački novi poredak, 248; Aleksić, Privreda Srbije.
687
N. Živković, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta, 54–55, 141.
688
Bajt, Bermanov dosije.
Conclusion 331
These complicated conditions of a civil war were not unique to Yugoslavia.

Similar situation developed in other European states where the communist and
non-communist resistance movements developed: in Greece, Albania, Italy and
France. A similar situation also emerged in Eastern Europe, where political con-
flicts went hand in hand with ethnic wars. Similarly, there were nations in Eastern
Europe whose existence did not fit into Nazi ideas about the postwar order. There-
fore, Russians and Poles did not get the slightest element of statehood while the
Third Reich was powerful and while there was any chance that they would remain
the occupying force in Eastern Europe for a long period of time. It is not accidental
that Germany offered support for Nedić’s and Vlasov’s plans only in 1944, when
Berlin was pressed on both fronts by the allies. In the USSR, as in Yugoslavia,
there was a conflict between the occupiers and their opponents of various ideolo-
gies, as well as an ethnic-based conflict. Therefore, the Russians whose political
ideal was a united Russia could not have become German allies, which could be
seen in Yugoslavia in the example of Mikhail Skorodumov and his colleagues in
1941. The so called Russian units which came to Southeastern Europe to fight
against the Partisans had in their ranks a large number of various separatists from
the Caucuses, Ukraine and Central Asia. Even those who viewed themselves as
Russians and who wanted to participate in an ideological civil war with the Bol-
sheviks had to declare themselves to be independent Cossacks.
There is no doubt that the division of the Balkans between Stalin and Churchill,
and later on the arrival of the Red Army into the Soviet sphere of interest sphere
in the Balkan Peninsula, marked a violent end to all civil wars. At the same time,
the Red Army established communist regimes which without the support from
Moscow would not have been able to overcome all of their internal and external
opponents.
In any case, the USSR had its forces in the Balkans and it was able to let
them carry out most of the dirty work. This is the work which the British had to
do alone in their struggle against the opponents of the percentage agreement.689
Nonetheless, we should not take this argument too far. In the autumn of 1944,
as a result of the Soviet and British assistance, the captured Italian arsenal after
Rome’s capitulation, skillful foreign policy and masterful internal strategy, the
Partisan movement was more powerful than JVuO according to Soviet, British,
German and Partisan estimates. The British tried to repress the communists in
Greece, who were less numerous than their Yugoslav counterparts, and full-blown
689
Britain managed to eliminate their political opponents in Greece with tanks, artillery and aviation, as
well as indirect support of their local Greek clients the National Guard. The latter was formed out of
“thugs and collaborators.” This view of the National Guard is provided by an internal American essay,
written in 1962. H. H. Gardner, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece. 1941–1945, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for use by the Special Warfare School, Spe-
cial Warfare Center, Fort Bragg (N. C.), Washington (D. C.), 1962, 202–213.
332 Conclusion
civil war broke out 1946–1949. After thousands were killed, tens of thousands
were wounded and hundreds of thousands became refugees, the present-day re-
searchers believe that the consequences of the civil war led to the decades-long
instability in Greece (the junta rule from 1967–1974, the 17th November terrorists
and so on).690 As a result of German attitude towards the Russians and the Serbs,
their struggle against the Germans in the Second World War was existential. Their
contributions to defeat of Germany was particularly vital before the middle of
1943 when the Nazi victory was still conceivable before Stalingrad and Kursk 691
Viewing the Second World War from this point of view, it must be said that the
Red Army not only fought under the proletariat banner but also enabled the res-
toration of a Serbian state with areas annexed by Bulgaria (Vranje, Niš and Pirot)
and Hungary (Vojvodina).
There was another dimension to events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944. There
were Red and White Russians in Yugoslavia 1941–1945. This can be best seen in
the fact that during the Belgrade Operation, the Russians died on both sides — in
the Red Army as well as the Cossack, White Guard, Turkestan and Ukrainian
units which fought on the German side. However, it is obvious that the Soviet
soldiers encountered in Serbia a far warmer encounter than the White Russians
or Soviet collaborators. The foreign policy orientation of various belligerents in
Serbian civil war did not boil down to one’s sympathy towards the Russians, the
Germans or the British. Interestingly, the civil war in Serbia which divided the
people, neighbors, friendships and families, also divided Russophilism. Russo-
philism characterized many Partisans,692 but also JVuO (especially in Yugosla-
via’s western parts). Within this context, it is interesting that even Milan Nedić ex-
pressed Russophile ideas,693 while Dimitrije Ljotić publically expressed sympathy
for Russians during the war.694 As a result of foreign and internal conditions, the
left-wing Russophilism triumphed in Serbia.
During the war, the Yugoslav government in exile and the JVuO Supreme
Command made a series of bad political calculations, while the Partisan lead-
ers proved themselves to be skillful tacticians and wise strategists who managed
to attract the support of the USSR and Great Britain, while at the most difficult
690
D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965); Close D., The Greek civil war, 1943–1950: studies of polarization (New York:
Routledge, 1993).
691
Judging by the number of Germans soldiers killed or taken prisoner.
692
But not all Partisans. For instance, Soviet officers from Korneev’s mission noted Kardelj’s anti-Russian
attitudes Vorob’ev “Na iugoslavskoi zemle,” 452.
693
Jovanović, Medaljoni Knj. III, 380–381.
694
N. Živković, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta, 147; D. Ljotić, “Pismo grofu Grabeu (29.01.1945),”
in Sabrana dela Volume XI, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003); Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji.
Policijski elaborat, 655, 725, 727.
Conclusion 333
moments they negotiated with the Germans.695 With Soviet strong backing, Tito
managed to win the civil war. After the establishment of the communist regime
in Belgrade, the Yugoslav communists began building a Stalinist state more reso-
lutely than their counterparts in Prague or Sofia. The repressions and degradation
of the civil society and the middle classes are being investigated by present-day
Serbian scholars. The ambivalent character of the liberation of Belgrade and Ser-
bia from the Germans in 1944 created a gulf between modern Russian and Serbian
memories of the Second World War. In Russia, the victory in the Second World
War represents a powerful cohesive factor of state and societal unity, which is
definitely not the case in Serbia. An unbridgeable gap exists in interpreting the
events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944. This led to difference in how the Soviet
soldiers perceived the Serbian population and how the Serbian soldiers and ci-
vilians viewed the Soviet troops in the autumn of 1944. The manipulations of
the Yugoslav and later on the Serbian historiographies also led to devaluation of
memories of the Second World War, including the manipulations connected with
the relative strength of NOP forces in Serbia in 1944 and the Red Army in the
autumn of 1944.
The degradation of the memory of the liberation of Serbia in the autumn of
1944 partially corresponds to historiographical trends in Eastern Europe. The ap-
proach which completely negates the Red Army’s liberating role during the Sec-
ond World War exists in all East European countries except in Belarus, Russia and
Eastern Ukraine. It is difficult to deny the obvious fact that the Soviet liberation
of these areas from German expansionism was followed by Soviet expansionism,
which separated these countries from Europe’s cultural and ideological space. At
the time that Europe is uniting into a common state which is dominated by demo-
cratic values, the destruction of European space and violent totalitarian ideol-
ogy cannot appear to have been something positive. Nonetheless, in this modern
European paradigm, a critical view towards the Soviet liberation should not lead
to renaissance of far-right ideology and it should not diminish the importance of
the struggle against the German Nazism. Contemporary Europe is based on joint
cultural heritage, but it is also based on liberal and democratic values which were
opposed to fascism, Nazism and their clones.
695
Velebit, Sećanja; M. Leković, Martovski pregovori 1943 (Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1985); Nemačka
obaveštajna služba. t. V, 577–591; B. Bakrač “Razmjena ratnih zarobljenika i uhapšenika na području
Pisarovine,” in Treća godina narodnooslobodilačkog rata na području Karlovca, Korduna, Like, Poku-
plja i Žumberka, (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv, 1977), 845–865; M. Basta and Đ. Labović, Partizani za
pregovarackim stolom (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1986); V. Kazimirović, Nemački general u Zagrebu (Kragu-
jevac: Prizma, 1996); J. Jareb., “Svjedočanstvo hrvatskog književnika Gabrijela Cvitana iz jeseni
1944” Časopis za suvremenu povijest br. 3 (2003).
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Compiled by the author.
The Soviet officers from the 75th Rifle Corps. Major Kalashnikov Ivan
Ivanovich, Lieutenant Shatalin Alexey Andreyevych and Narenyan Vagarshak
Hovrokovich — tortured and killed on September 27, 1944 by the German sol-
diers from The 2nd Regiment of the Brandenburg Division. Their remains were
found in a ravine near the village Mala Kamenica by Soviet soldiers and local
civilians. [For the names and circumstances of their deaths — Belgradskaia oper-
atsiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 97; I. S. Anoshin, Na pravyi boi (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1988),116.; Previously this photo was mistakenly identified as “victims
of Chetniks”.The photo — MM (S), Collection of photos, N. 24416.]
After the liberation of Belgrade. This photo reveals the feelings of Belgraders
and their liberators. A gloomy sergeant, a man cautiously looking at him, a young
girl dressed up. Curious people are peering over their shoulders. In the foreground
we can see a simple meal (bread, stewed meat), a mug with rakija and a cheerful
accordion player dressed in a military waterproof-cape. Perhaps, he caught that
girl’s fancy? [The photo — MM (S), the Collection of photos, Collection of photos,
the Album “Liberation of Belgrade”].
After the battle. Belgraders put up wooden crosses, and later on they erected
marble monuments, where they wrote what they had witnessed and engraved the
Orthodox cross. [The photo — MM (S), Collection of photos, the Album “Libera-
tion of Belgrade”].
Alexey Timofeev Алексей Тимофеев
Splintered wind: Расколотый ветер.

Russians and the Second Русские и Вторая мировая
World War in Yugoslavia война в Югославии
Translated Перевод на английский язык

by Vojin Majstorović Воина Майсторовича
Photos for publication. Provided by

the Military Museum (Serbia) — MM (S).
S E L E C TA
серия гуманитарных исследований
под редакцией М. А. Колерова
Издатель Модест Колеров

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XXI

Перевод на английский язык

978-5-905040-09-2 © А. Тимофеев, текст, 2013

I. ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN EMMIGRATION IN THE CIVIL WAR

II. SOVIET COLLABORATORS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR

IV. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and

However, without a proper understanding of the multifaceted nature of Russian

Timofeev’s study also illuminates numerous other issues, which could be of

Vojin Majstorović, University of Toronto.

For her I pray

Maximilian Voloshin, 1920

Из крови, пролитой в боях,

Я за неё за всю молюсь

Максимилиан Волошин, 1920

In the 20th Century, Russia experienced a sharp and an unexpected schism.

known as Četniks) and soldiers loyal to the collaborationist government of Gen-

1) International background to the war and causes of the war

The British and American,17 German,18 and Soviet19 historiographies formu-

endless.”36 Hence, it is possible to identify only the basic historiographical direc-

not produced any wide-ranging scholarship on society in Serbia and Yugoslavia

Вернусь-ли я к тебе? Увижу-ли и скоро-ль

Я вновь брожу по улицам знакомым

Какой размах у всех воспоминаний.

Сюда, дрожа, бежала на экзамен,

Мне улицы протягивают руки,

Я знаю: нет к прошедшему возврата,

Оно, как встарь, распахнуто. Навеки!

И старый парк, и церкви, и «Споменик» …

Я — не твоя! Повернута страница.

Нона Белавина, 1977

Will I return? Will I soon see

Again I am wondering in known streets,

What speed the memories have.

Trembling here I ran to an exam,

Streets offer their hands to me,

I know that there can be no return

It is, as formerly, open. Forever!

And old park, and church and “Monument”

I am not yours! The page has turned.

Nona Belavina, 1977

Role of the russian

The attitude of Russian refugees towards Germany was quite ambivalent.

Russian emigrant civil organizations

government expelled General Skorodumov to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats

would be transferred to the Eastern Front after it eliminated communism in Ser-

Drachenko (1876–194?) and Ivan Alekseevich Poliakov.68 As a result of active

Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan

It is difficult to force yourself as a friend on a man whom, it seems to me, is in-

leadership of NDH about the supposed historical similarities between Russian-

The anti-communist activity of civilian

istok, General Nedić’s Department of Propaganda and the contemporary press

Gestapo documents mention the leaders of SSP — F. Vistoropski, V. Lebedev,

The social life of Russian emigrants

debate, as well as free expression of critical views on local and international

1918, resulting in negative reaction amongst the conservative emigration. Russkii

sians in Serbia after the departure of Germans is a very controversial question.

The influence of the Russian Orthodox

Kreiter with whom there were no misunderstandings or clashes: he understood the

paper Tserkovnoe Obozrenie (1932–1944), which expressed harsh judgments on

German occupational authorities, however, banned ROCA from advertising their

Vladimir Moshin, Vikentii Fradinskii (secretary).322 The power transferred into

Institute for Armaments came to my tank army to familiarize themselves with

Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina.