-

2006
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
NOVOSIBIRSK STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

WORLD
INTEGRATION PROCESSES
AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Approved bu the Editorial publishing boord of NSTU as a textbook

NOVOSIBIRSK
2006

930.9
66.4()673
64
TEMPUS TACIS MP-JEP 23068-2002
Siberian Network of EU Studies Centres

. . , . .. (. 1, 46),
. . , . .. (. 13),
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64

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ISBN 5-7511-1863-4


.
.

.
930.9

66.4()673

ISBN 5-7511-1863-4

, 2006

, 2006

UDK 930.9
BBK 66.4()673
64
The work is implemented in the framework of the project
TEMPUS TACIS MP-JEP 23068-2002
Siberian Network of EU Studies Centres

Authors team:
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor E.Yu. Litsareva (chapters 1, 46)
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor L.V. Deriglazova (chapter 13)
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor C.N. Miroshnikov (chapter 2)
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor E.F. Troitsky (chapter 8)
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor S.M. Yun (chapter 3, 7, 11)
Dr. Sc. (History), Professor V.P. Zinoviev (chapter 12)
Cand. Sc. (History), Associate professor A.G. Timoshenko (chapter 9)
Dr. Sc. (Engineering), Professor E.B. Tsoy (chapter 9)
Associate professor Stephen Fritsch (chapter 10)
Dr.Sc., Professor Anselm Skuhra (chapter 10)
M 64

World Integration Processes and International Organizations:

textbook/edited by A.G. Timoshenko, E.B.Tsoy. Novosibirsk:
Publishing House of Novosibirsk State Technical University, 2006.
C. 256.
ISBN 5-7511-1863-4
The textbook covers mainstream integration processes in modern world, gives
characteristics of key government and non-government organizations and shows
their role in globalization processes of contemporary international relations.
The textbook is designed for students of International Relations and Regional
Studies specialities.

UDK 930.9
BBK 66.4()673

ISBN 5-7511-1863-4

Authors team, 2006

Novosibirsk State Technical
University, 2006

...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
7

1.

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
11
2.

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
30
3. :

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
45

4.
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
62
5. -
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
89
6.
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
111

7.

()
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
118
8. c
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
137

9.

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
152
10. 19492005:

(
.
)
.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
175
11.

.........................................................................................................
.........................................................................................................
198

12.

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
221
13.
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
237

...........................................................................................................................

..............................................................................................................
255

CONTENTS
Foreword
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
9
1. Integration processes in the modern world. Theoretical aspects
.............................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................
11

2. History of creation and development of international organizations

30
3. International governmental organizations: definition and general
characteristic
45
4. Economic
62
5. Integration

and

currency

89
6. Integration

processes

processes

111
7. United
118
8. Political
137
9. NATO

integration

in

in

the

in

Europe

Asian-Pacific

region

North

and

South

Nations

institutions

of

in

America

Organization

the

European

the

modern

Union

world

152
10.NATO from 19492005: an Example for Adaptive Security
Institutions
175
11. Regional

international

198
12.CIS

organizations

221
13.International

governmental

and

non-governmental

organizations

institutions

organizations

237
Afterword
...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................
255

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THE FOREWORD

fter the Second world war the international relations were enriched with
the new form of interaction between the states - integration. Modern
integration processes, beeing extended on all continents and regions, have
global character and are an integral part of the world political development.
In a certain degree they became a call for the international system, what
brings into a question such classical principles of its functioning as
independence and the sovereignty of the states, integrity of frontiers and the
control of authorities over them, domination of military-political aspects in
attitudes between the states, etc. Distribution and a deepening of integration
processes in the world puts a uneasy problem before foreign policy of
Russia: to develop the pragmatic approach to integration interaction with the
various countries and regions that corresponds to national interests.
The international integration is tightly connected with development of
the international organizations. The first international organizations of

12

modern type appeared in the beginning of XIX th century At a later time there
was a constant increase in their quantity and influence on the international
attitudes. The special place among them is held by the international
governmental organizations which rapid growth during the post-war period
promoted propagation of integration in the world. On the other hand,
spreading of the international organizations was consequence of expansion
of integration mentality in the world as the international governmental
organizations create necessary institutional frameworks for realization of
integration projects. Therefore complex study of the international
integration and the international organizations allows to get more authentic
view of both phenomena.
The international integration and organizations study is gradually taking
bigger part in the works of scientists of different specialties, among them
there are specialists in international relations.
The researchers from Western Europe made and are still making the
basic contribution to the development of general theoretic and applied
aspects of these themes.
In the Soviet science these questions were not paid great attention to.
Attention was paid to the exploration of the socialistic model of
international integration. The jurisprudential approach prevailed in research
of international organizations.
At present time, in Russia, the volume of research effort is arising
greatly, but the general level of fundamentals readiness hasnt still reached
the level of Western Europe countries.
The situation in Russian universities remains complicated with the
scientific and methodical support of teaching subjects on international
integration and international organizations.
For the last 15 years, a lot of universities, where specialists in
international relations are trained, have been appeared. But the appearance
of necessary textbooks is more an exception, than the rule.
To fill a gap in this field of knowledge is the main aim of this textbook.
This textbook is a result of cooperation between two Siberian
universities: Tomsk State University (TSU) and Novosibirsk State Technical
University (NSTU). The primary authors are the members of the world
politics chair of TSU. They prepare specialists in international relations. For
long years, the teacher staff of this chair has been studying questions

mentioned in this textbook. The result of this study is reflected in numerous

publications on this subject. The chair staff is experienced in teaching
subjects on these textbook themes. Also they give lectures on this subject to
the students of Faculty of Humanities of NSTU.
The textbook structure is determined by the specific character of the
subject of study. The first 3 chapters are introductory chapters and devoted
to the theoretical aspects of integration, the definition and general
characteristic of modern international governmental organizations. The next
3 chapters are devoted to the main questions of integration processes in
Europe, Asian-Pacific region and America. Five chapters of this textbook
contain the analysis of the most powerful international governmental
organizations. The last chapter is about the basic aspects of functioning of
non- governmental organizations.

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An Economic Analysis of the EU. Second Edition. London : The
McGraw Hill Companies, 1997.
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Global Marketing. Emphasizing Practical Problem Solving and DaytoDay Operating Details / R.L. Sandhusen. eds.1994.
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Lawrence R. Z. Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper / R. Z.
Integration Lawrence. The Brookings Institution.-Wash., 1996.
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Ravenhill J. pec and the construction of pacific rim regionalism /
J. Ravenhill. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
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Regions, Globalization and the Knowledge-Based Economy. Ed. By
H. Dunning.-Oxford Univ.Press, 2000.

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8. . . / . . . .,
2003.
9. Owen D. EMU in perspective understanding monetary union / D. Owen,
P. Cole // Financial Times. GB, 1999.
10. The euro-zone: A new Economic Entity? / A. Lamfalussy, L. D. Bernard,
A.J. Cabral, Bruxelles. 1999.
11. European Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Oxford Univ. Press, 2000.
12. Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford, 2000.
13. The Euro. Capital Market. Wiley, 2000.
14. Free trade agreements and customs unions. Experiences, challenges and
constraints. Co-published by the European Institute of Public Administration
Maastricht the Netherlands, 1997.
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P.Whyman. 2000.

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4. / . . - .
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5. . / . // Pro et Contra.
. 2002. 7, 2.
6. . .
- . / . .
. : - , 2004.
7. Ravenhill J. pec and the construction of pacific rim regionalism / J.
Ravenhill. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
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Dunning.-Oxford Univ.Press, 2000.
9. Scollay R., Gilbert J.P. New Regional Trading Arrangements in the Asia Pacific?
Institute for International Economics / R. Scollay, J. P. Gilbert. Wash., 2001.

1. -
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chapter 10
NATO
from
An
Example
Security Institutions?
Introduction

for

19492005:
Adaptive

A
fter its founding in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
quickly developed into one of the central institutions for transatlantic
security cooperation between the USA and Western Europe. For more
than 40 years the alliance represented the military bulwark of the West
against the Eastern bloc. The alliance not only played an important role
in the handling of external threats, it also proved central in overcoming
intra-European mistrust and fear, especially against a possibly
revisionist Germany. During the Cold War, but even more so after its
end, the alliance proved its surprising adaptability to changing
geostrategic and structural circumstances. During the 1990s, NATO
developed new strategic concepts, integrated new members, engaged in
out-of-area peace enforcement missions and tried to develop closer
institutionalized relations to countries like the Russian Federation or the
Ukraine. Despite its interesting historical record of institutional
adaptation, in recent years NATO has been increasingly hampered by
intensified intra-alliance struggles over its future purpose. Therefore,
academic opinions over its potential future role in international security
politics vary considerably. In order to cope with these questions, the
goal of this article is threefold. First it tries to provide a concise
overview of NATOs historical development during and after the Cold
War. Secondly, it tries to assess the current problems in transatlantic
relations and thirdly it highlights their implications for the alliances
future developments.
1. The origins of NATO
1.1. The creation of the alliance

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created by the

Washington Treaty signed on 4 April 19491. The formation of NATO
was the result of various political and security concerns in Europe as
well as globally. First, it was an US reaction to growing transatlantic
security concerns related to several events cementing the Western
perception of Soviet geostrategic policies as representing a direct threat
to Western Europe and the USA. Soviet sponsored communist coup
dtats in Eastern European countries, the Berlin crisis 1948 as well as
threats to the sovereignty of Greece, Norway and Turkey have often
been mentioned as driving incidents 2. Second, NATO represented the
military complementary to the Marshall Plan aiming at the economic
reconstruction of (Western) Europe. Finally, NATO became the
multilateral arena for German rearmament in 1955, after European
efforts to create a European Defence Community (EDC) had ultimately
failed due to a French parliamentary veto the previous year 3. With this in
mind, NATOs multidimensional strategic tasks have been summarized
so vividly by the often cited bonmot of its first Secretary General, Lord
Ismay, who once stated that NATOs task was to keep the Russians out,
the Americans in, and the Germans down. 4 Greece and Turkey joined
NATO in 1952, followed by Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In
1997 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became members.
Finally, in 2003 seven more countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) started accession talks and
entered the alliance5 in 20046.
1

2
3
4

5
6

The founding members being Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,

Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-lands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and
the USA.
Isaacs, Jeremy and Downing, Taylor: Cold War. 1945-1991. 1998, ch. 4.
Dinan, Desmond: Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration.
20053, p. 29.
Cited after Robertson, George: Why We Still Need NATO: Safety for the Next
Generation. Speech of the NATO Secretary General at the Chicago Council on
Foreign
Relations,
5
April
2000.
(URL:
http://www.nato.
int/docu/speech/2000/s000405a.htm). Accessed: 15 May 2006.
NATO: NATO Handbook 2006. 2006, p. 17.
The following countries have submitted an application for NATO membership:
Albania (1990, as first country of all Eastern Europe), Macedonia (1996),
Croatia (2001), Georgia (2004), and Ukraine (2005). The first three countries are
accepted for the formal status of aspirants and the Membership Action Plan
(MAP), while the latter two are participating at a lower level in the so-called
Intensified Dialogue on Membership Questions. However, a membership of the
latter two countries would pose relations to Russia to an endurance test, since it
considers them as belonging to its near neighbourhood and sphere of interest. It
is doubtful, whether a situation would be repeated, when a Russian government
(under president Yelcin at that time) agreed with the Baltic states as a former part

172

1.2. Provisions of the Washington Treaty

NATO was created as a collective defence alliance in accordance to Art.
51 of the United Nations Charter, providing states the right for
individual or collective self defence in case of external aggression by
third parties1. Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that an armed
attack against one or more of them [the member states; the authors] in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each
of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 2 Art. 5 does not imply
automatic military assistance, meaning that member states are free to
decide on how best to live up to their duties. Art. 5, therefore, falls
behind the provisions of the original Brussels Pact creating the Western
European Union (WEU) in 1948, which in contrast to NATO contained
an automatic military assistance in case of an attack. Moreover, Art. 5
not only applies to external threats originating outside NATO. It may
also apply against a NATO member state attacking another member
state3. Therefore, NATO fulfils two functions, namely 1) defence from
external threats and 2) collective security among its member states.
Another interesting aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty relates to its
normative provisions, which go beyond that of a classical system of
collective security and defence. The treaty not only focuses on military,
but also includes political, social, economic and cultural cooperation
between the member states, thereby aiming at the defence of a way of
life4. The member states acknowledge the principle of liberal
democracy, although during the first decades this was more rhetoric than
real policy. Some of its members, notably Greece after the colonels
coup dtat 1967 (until 1974), Portugal until the carnation revolution in
1974 and Turkey during the temporary suspensions of democracy by the
military council (1960, 1971-72 and 1980-83), did not practice
democracy in the beginning or for certain time spans. E.g. fascist
Portugal under the Salazar regime was accepted for membership in 1949
1
2
3

of the Soviet Union joining NATO.

United Nations: Charter of the United Nations. 1945, Art. 51.
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty. Washington, D.C. 4 April 1949, Art. 5.
This might refer quite well to the bilateral relationship between Turkey and
Greece, which for historical reasons was tense until the late 1990s. Some
scholars state that NATO as a regional organisation was able to prevent even on
more than one occasions the outbreak of open hostility between these to member
states.
NATO: op. cit., 1949, preamble.

because of the Azores islands, considered of strategic importance as an

unsinkable aircraft carrier in the mid Atlantic (as an US senator put it)
at that time.
Since the new wave of democratization starting in 1974 democracy has
become a central prerequisite for membership. Despite those variations
in member states political systems, basic normative similarities relate to
1) the acceptance of a liberal market economy model combined with the
guarantee of private property, which was applicable to the member
states from the start, 2) the recognition of the rule of law as well as
international law, and 3) the recognition of the United Nations, also
always the case for all member countries 1. It became clear from NATOs
very beginning, that one of the alliances aims was the consolidation of
a liberal social order.
1.3. Institutional aspects
NATO is representing an international organisation, consisting of
independent sovereign states, which are building on intergovernmental
cooperation. There is no transfer of sovereignty on the alliance level.
NATO consists of a military as well as a political organisation. All
members are participating in the political organisation. France left the
military organisation under de Gaulle in 19662. The main reasons were a
reorientation of its defence policy according to national priorities and
efforts to establish more independent policies from hegemonic USA
especially towards Eastern Europe. The newly democratic Greece left
the military organisation between 1974 and 1980 due to certain
suspicions about a participation of some branches of the CIA in the
colonel's coup d'tat in 1967. Iceland has no own defence forces and
does not participate in the military organisation, but contributes to the
organisation by providing military facilities in Keflavik. A democratized
Spain joined the military organisation of NATO in 1982, although full
membership was suspended by the socialdemocratic government
between 1986 and 1999. In any case, Spain did not authorize the use of
nuclear weapons on Spanish soil in times of peace, as well as Norway
and Denmark did already in the 1950s.
The highest decision making body is the NATO-Council (North Atlantic
Council). The Council may meet at various levels (heads of government,
ministers of defence or foreign affairs, permanent representatives).
Decisions have to be taken unanimously. This means, that also smaller
1
2

Woyke, Wichard: NATO, in: Woyke, Wichard (ed.): Handwrterbuch

Internationale Politik. 20059, p. 371.
Although this is an example of a rather liberal handling of the Charter, since the
Treaty had not allowed for leaving before 25 years of membership, although
France left already after 17 years.

174

states have some influence in the decision making process. Issues

related to defence are dealt with in the Defence Planning Committee
(DPC), in which all member states participate except France. Since
1967, issues and problems relating to nuclear components are handled in
the Nuclear Planning Group, in which also all members participate
except France. The executive branch of NATO, the General Secretariat,
is headed by the Secretary General. The secretariat's staffs are
internationally composed. Furthermore, over the years, NATO has
developed extensive structures for multilateral cooperation among its
members in the civilian as well as the military sphere in form of
manifold divisions, committees, and various specialised agencies 1. The
military high command is always lead by an US general 2, whereas the
civil Secretary General always is a European 3. Thus, there is certainly
more participation in decision making of the allies in NATO (despite the
fact that the USA have a veto power de facto) than for comparison this
was the case in the Warsaw Pact dominated by the Soviet Union.
2. NATO during the Cold War
From the beginning of NATO the USA took over the role as liberal
hegemon, providing extensive security guarantees for its European allies
that were backed up by its nuclear umbrella 4. During the early phase
NATO basically was a unilateral security guarantee by the USA, []
reassuring Western Europe about American support against a Soviet
threat, and reassuring the countries that had recently fought Germany
against a revival of the German threat. 5 After the outbreak of the
Korean War (1950), the USA began to deploy troops to continental
Europe and NATO established a supreme command under US
leadership. During the Cold War, NATO never had to prove its
functioning and efficiency externally. Nevertheless, the alliance
underwent several development phases and a number of crises, which
1
2

4
5

For an overview see NATOs homepage. (URL:

http://www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm#CS).
although the highest council, the Military Committee was chaired for quite long
time e.g. by military personnel from Germany, i.e. in the years 1961-64, 197174, 1985-89, 1996-99, and 2002-2005 so far. Germany is also the second largest
contributor to the budget with 122 mio. Euro, i.e. 18% in 2004.
From the 11 Secretary Generals so far, there were 3 British, 3 Dutch, 2 Belgian,
1 from Italy, 1 from Germany, and 1 from Spain, showing a certain diversity and
also that the candidates from the small Benelux states are elected quite often.
For the development of the USA and the USSR after 1945 see Kennedy, Paul:
The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. 1987, ch. 7.
Wallander, Celeste A./Keohane, Robert O.: Risk, Threat and Security
Institutions, in Keohane, Robert O.: Power and Governance in a Partially
Globalized World. 2002, p. 104.

repeatedly were overcome due to NATOs internal adaptation

capabilities as well as the still unifying external threat.
The implementation phase (1949-1955), which ended with
Germanys entrance, was followed by a consolidation phase which
reached its climax during the Berlin Crisis 1961 and the Cuba Crisis
1962. The Cuba Crisis also triggered a revision of the US nuclear
strategy. After intensive intra-alliance disputes, the Europeans accepted
the US-initiated strategy shift from massive retaliation, the
predominating nuclear doctrine since the Eisenhower administration, to
flexible response initiated under the Kennedy administration 1.
Whereas the massive retaliation doctrines strategy had built on the
principle that any aggression from the Warsaw Pact could be met with a
nuclear response, flexible response meant that if possible the enemy
should be met with appropriate and flexible means similar to those he
initially had employed. In 1967 flexible response was adopted as
NATO strategy. It resulted in a certain, fairly limited degree of
reinforcement of conventional defence by the European NATO
members2. These events also influenced the well-known burdensharing debate, since the USA constantly was demanding its reluctant
European allies for an increase of their defence budgets to cope with the
costs of flexible response3. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which
Great Britain and France tried to maintain their remaining colonial stock
against Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, however, both states
had to retreat due to intense pressure from the US and the international
public. The consolidation phase ended with Frances exit from the
military organisation in 1966 under de Gaulle 4. In the 1960s there was
also a persistent debate about nuclear codetermination of the Allies
(demands put forward by de Gaulle and Franz-Josef Strau in the FRG).
After long negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvres the US monopoly in
nuclear decision making remained unrestricted.
The third phase was marked by global dtente in East-West
relations. In 1967, NATO was asked by the Harmel report, which had
passed the NATO Council unanimously, to further European security by
1
2
3

Wheeler, Michael O.: NATO Nuclear Strategy, 1949-90, in: Schmidt, Gustav
(ed.): A History of NATO The First Fifty Years. Vol. III. 2001, p. 129ff.
Lundestad, Geir: East, West, North, South. Major Developments in International
Politics since 1945. 1999, p. 167.
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L.: The Atlantic Community. A Complex Imbalance. 1969,
pp. 45ff.
For a more detailed account of the French reasons for leaving the military
organisation as well as the persisting difficulties for a return there see Menon,
Arnand: The Paradoxes of National Independence: Domestic Constraints on
French NATO-Policy, in: Schmidt, Gustav (ed.): A History of NATO The First
Fifty Years. Vol. II. 2001, p. 252f.

176

military as well as by political steps in a two pillars model. The search

for a just and enduring peace order became the primary goal. The slogan
was security = defence plus dtente1.
The fourth development phase of NATO began around the middle
of the 1970s and was characterized by growing intra-alliance disputes
between West Europeans and the USA. 2 Increasing US-Soviet
bilateralism, US policies in Southeast Asia (the war in Vietnam had been
a source of constant tensions since the 1960s, where the USA finally had
to face a painful defeat), and the growing differences between Europe
and the USA over dtente or containment bore heavily on the
transatlantic relationship. Especially the disputes in wake of the dualtrack decision, which had not been supported by some NATO
governments and parts of the West European public, had been conflictridden. The dual track decision, taken in 1979, was a reaction to the
Soviet build-up of middle-range missiles (SS-20). It offered negotiations
to the Soviet side while simultaneously foreseeing in case of
unsuccessful negotiations until the end of 1983 the stationing of 108
Pershing II rockets as well as 464 cruise missiles in Western Europe.
Since the US-Soviet negotiations ultimately failed and despite huge
demonstrations in several countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany
and the Netherlands, the stationing was finally implemented according
to plan3.
The fifth phase covers a rather short period from the mid 1980s to
1991. It was mainly characterized by a fundamental reorientation of
Soviet foreign policy under the new Secretary General of the
Communist Party, Michail Gorbatschow, and his proposals for
disarmament. For NATO this new Soviet policy proved difficult to react
to, since no alliance wide consensus on adequate reactions could be
achieved, some remained suspicious and did not trust the changes.
Bearing the new developments in mind, the NATO communiqu from
May 1989 therefore turned out to be a compromise. It made
modernization of NATOs short range nuclear missile arsenal dependant
on future developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well
as on the results of negotiations about security and confidence building
measures within the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE).
Not so well known are the changes in this period due to a
restructuring of the US economy under the Reagan administration
transforming it into the most productive one again, and the military
1
2

Lundestad, Geir: op. cit., 1999, pp. 85ff.

For detailed discussions see Hahn, Walter F./Pfaltzgraff, Robert L (eds.):
Atlantic Community in Crisis. A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship.
1979.
Wheeler, Michael O.: op. cit., 2001, pp. 134f.

build-up, which in the medium run resulted in the militarily most

powerful position a hegemon ever had in history.
The fundamental transformations and mostly peaceful revolutions
in Eastern Europe as well as the end of real socialism deprived the
Warsaw Pact of its political basis, accelerated its break up and put
NATO into a completely new geostrategic situation. Finally, the
implosion of the Soviet Union, substantial progress in negotiations for
conventional arms reduction, ongoing processes of democratization in
Eastern European countries as well as the German unification in 1991
and thus the incorporation of former East Germany into NATO had
changed the European security landscape by 1991. This also marked the
beginning of the sixth phase1 in the alliances development.
3. The Transformation of NATO from 19911999
According to many realist and neorealist scholars the dissolution of the
adversarial Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union should have caused the end
for NATOs raison dtre and internal conflicts with a breakup of the
organisation itself after a while2. Nevertheless, the North Atlantic
alliance after 1990 effectively managed to avoid its dissolution, and
instead has been able to develop new instruments and policies in
reaction to the changed geostrategic circumstances. The need to adapt
and to continue the close cooperation had already been formulated by
the London Declaration of 6 July 1990:
As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new
century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This
Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one,
however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together,
to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet
our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the
structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability
with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the
individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.3
1
2

This and the following phases are dealt with in the following chapters.
See for example Mearsheimer, John J.: Back to the Future. Instability in Europe
after the Cold War, in: International Security, vol. 15, 1990, nr. 1, pp. 5-57; and
Waltz, Kenneth N.: The Emerging Structure of International Politics, in:
International Security, vol. 18, 1993, nr. 2, pp. 44-79.
NATO: Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the
Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council. London, 6 July 1990. (URL: http://www.nato.int/
docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm). Accessed: 25 May 2006.

178

In November 1991 NATO further reacted to the changed environment

by formulating a new strategic concept at the summit meeting in Rome.
The new strategic concept tried to answer the question of NATOs future
purpose in the completely changed international system. All member
states agreed that no major external threat compared to that of the Cold
War era existed for the moment. Nevertheless, as the new strategic
concept formulates:
[] the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature
and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.
NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe
and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks
can arise in various ways. Risks to Allied security are less likely to
result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but
rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from
the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in
central and eastern Europe.1
NATOs new concept therefore introduced a broader security approach,
comprising of political, economic, social, and not only military aspects. 2
NATO built its security policy on deterrence, but also on flexibility and
dialogue, the cooperation with other states, the United Nations (UN) and
the CSCE, maintaining a collective defence of its member states and an
active crisis management3. The element of dialogue was strengthened by
the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
followed by an invitation to the newly independent countries of Eastern
Europe and the then created Community of Independent States (CIS) for
cooperation. Several states of Eastern Europe signalled their interest for
NATO membership early on. This put NATO under significant pressure,
since future enlargement should not result in a political isolation of
Russia, a state, which had to cope with its new situation of having lost
the status of a superpower, but should not view this development as a
defeat by a triumphant NATO.
In January 1994 NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at a
summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Brussels. The
main aim of PfP was to increase the information flow between
participants, which were made up of all CSCE as well as all NACC
member states. Moreover, PfP offered the possibility for closer interstate
1

2
3

NATO: The Alliances Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Rome, 8
November
1991,
Art.
8-9.
(URL:
http://www.nato.int/docu/
basictxt/b911108a.htm). Accessed: 25 May 2006.
Ibid., Art. 16.
Ibid., Art. 30-34.

cooperation in military affairs, with common planning, training and

exercises to facilitate multilateral peace-keeping, crisis management,
and search and rescue activities in catastrophes. While maintaining its
core functions of collective defence, NATO was able to integrate new
elements of cooperative security policy and expanding its raison dtre 1.
In the long run, integration of new cooperative tasks also meant that
NATO had to take into consideration so called out-of-area missions.
Some scholars even were convinced that NATO must go out of area or
it will go out of business2. Its newly strengthened cooperative security
tasks were employed during NATOs UN-backed air campaign in
Bosnia (1994-95) and the build-up of the Implementation Force (IFOR),
following the Dayton Peace Agreement (21 November 1995) to end the
Bosnian war. The 60.000 strong force consisted of soldiers from the 16
NATO and 18 other states, proving the positive effects of NACC and
PfP for the first time 3. The more or less positive effects of NATOs
engagement in Bosnia lead to further institutional adaptations. At the
foreign ministers meeting of NATO states on 30 May 1997 in
Sintra/Portugal, NACC and PfP were replaced by the newly created
Euroatlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and a reformed
Partnership for Peace plus4. Both institutional innovations aimed at a
better cooperation between NATO and its cooperation partners on the
political as well as the military level. The range of activities within PfP
plus was extended and now also contained conflict prevention
measures, peace-keeping, peace-making or humanitarian operations. It
is a flexible system, where each state within PfP plus could determine its
level and extent of cooperation in the negotiations and could choose,
which stages of intensity it was aiming at, a rather unusual approach
compared to previous understandings of a military alliance 5. A certain
interoperability of defence forces was developed on the basis of their
national competencies.
Other central challenges of the alliance were the accession aspirations of
several Central and Eastern European countries. States like the Czech
Republic, Hungary or Poland regarded EAPC and PfP as preparatory
stages for final membership. At the January 1994 summit in Brussels,
1
2
3
4
5

Yost, David S.: The New NATO and Collective Security, in: Survival, vol. 40,
1998, nr. 2. pp. 150ff.
Asmus, Ronald D./Kugler, Richard D./Larrabee, Stephen F.: Building a New
NATO, in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, 1993, nr. 4, p. 31.
Bono, Giovanna: NATOs Peace Enforcement Tasks and Politics
Communities: 1990-1999. 2003, pp. 95ff.
NATO: op. cit., 2006, p.
Mttl, Kari: The Challenge of Collective Action: Security Management in
European and Regional Contexts, in: Grtner, Heinz/Hyde-Price, Adrian/Reiter,
Erich (eds.): Europes New Security Challenges. 2001, pp. 304ff.

180

NATO decided that any enlargement should become an incremental and

fully transparent process furthering stability in Europe. The NATO
Study on Enlargement formulated various prerequisites potential
applicants would have to fulfil in order to qualify for accession:
.1 Commitment and respect for OSCE norms and principles
including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external
territorial disputes with neighbouring states, including
irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means;
.2 Commitment to promoting stability and well-being by
economic liberty, social justice and environmental
responsibility;
.3 Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of
their defence force;
.4 Commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted
to achieving all other political and military obligations
connected to full NATO membership1.
It is interesting to note here that NATO requires the peaceful resolution
of ethnic minority/territorial disputes with neighbouring countries prior
to any accession to avoid the import of unresolved problems. Also it is
quite remarkable that only one of the four criteria is devoted to the
military level as such, and still in a rather vague form. On the other
hand, the civil control of the military according to the primacy of
politics reflects the civil and liberal understanding of military affairs.
Accession negotiations began in 1996. The Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland found a majority in the North Atlantic Council meeting in
Madrid on 8 July 1997. Detailed negotiations started in late 1997, with
ratifications in the old member states taking place throughout 1998.
Finally, on 4 April 1999, on NATOs 50 th anniversary the three new
member states were officially admitted. In order to diffuse Russian
concerns over its Eastern enlargement, NATO offered a special
relationship to Russia. In May 1997, after longer negotiations, NATO
and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. The act
declared that
NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They
share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and
competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The
present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give
concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable,
1

NATO: Study on Enlargement. September 1995. Ch. 5, Art. 72. (URL:

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm). Accessed: 25. May 2006.

peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its
peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks
the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and
Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest,
reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership. 1
To path the way for this new view of each other, Russia was also
admitted for membership in the Group of leading industrialized nations,
the G7, then called G8. In 2002 this was strengthened by a joint NATORussia Council, which was set up as a permanent consultation forum,
and Russia installed a permanent military mission at NATO.
Interestingly, a few weeks later NATO also signed a Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
and Ukraine at the Madrid summit which stated [] that an
independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for
ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a
whole.2
Besides the reorientation and restructuring of its external relations,
NATO also had to adapt internally. The number of regional commands
and command levels was reduced, as was the number of soldiers under
arms.3 The biggest modification was the concept of Combined Joint
Task Forces (CJTF), introduced in 1994. It provided the possibility for
individually created ad-hoc troops between member states for out-ofarea actions. These CJTF do not represent an instrument of defence, but
of collective security. Moreover, the concept offered the possibility of
furthering a specific European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)
within NATO, a process that since the EU Maastricht Treaty (1992) was
closely connected to the EUs growing efforts to create its own military
capabilities. The concept offered the Europeans the option to form crisis
reaction forces with NATO capabilities available to the organizations
European members for operation outside the NATO area in which the
United States chose not to participate.4
NATOs interventions in Bosnia (1994-95) and especially in Kosovo
(1999) clearly had shown the Europeans that despite their intensified
efforts to create a Common European Foreign and Security Policy
1

NATO: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between

NATO and the Russian Federation. Paris, 27 May 1997. (URL:
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm). Accessed: 26. May 2006.
NATO: Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation and Ukraine. Madrid, 9 July 1997, Ch. 1, Art. 1. (URL:
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm). Accessed: 26 May 2006.
Durell-Young, Thomas: Post-Cold War NATO Force Structure Planning and the
Vexatious Issue of Multinational Land Forces, in: Schmidt, Gustav (ed.): A
History of NATO The First Fifty Years. Vol. III. 2001, pp. 197-213.
Dinan, Desmond: op. cit., 2005, p. 596.

182

(CEFSP), their military power projection capabilities for peace keeping,

peace making and humanitarian missions of the 21 st century were still
insufficient. The sophistication and power of the US military operation
also showed how far the EU would have to go before having an
effective joint force1. Following the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty
(1997), the EU was accelerating the build-up of more independent crisis
reaction forces and the installation of its own military planning
facilities. A turning point for the EUs efforts was the Saint-Malo
summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President
Jacques Chirac in December 1998, when to the surprise of other EU
members and the USA Blair proposed developing an EU military
capability2. At the Cologne meeting in June 1999, at the end of the
Kosovo campaign, the European Council declared that in order to be
able to carry out the so called Petersberg tasks (conflict prevention and
crisis management) the EU [] must develop capacities for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces and the means
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so.3
Despite the USAs swung in the early 1990s from concern about the
emergence of a CESFP to support for an ESDI, Washington always
made clear that it would not accept developments that endanger the
transatlantic relationship within NATO. Shortly after the Saint-Malo
summit, US foreign minister Madeleine Albright expressed prevailing
US concerns about a rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship
referring to the famous three Ds describing the triple dangers of 1)
decoupling (of EU and NATO decision making), 2) duplication (of
defence resources), and 3) discrimination (from EUs side against nonEU states, although they are NATO members like e.g. Canada, Norway,
Turkey or the USA itself)4. As was observed by one scholar:
By early 2000, the EU was widely perceived to be moving ahead faster
than NATO towards the creation of a viable European security entity.
This role inversion lead some to believe that the NATO military
restructuring plan ESDI and the EUs new politico-military
ambitions set out in CESDP (Common European Security and Defence
1
2

Grtner, Heinz: Transatlantic Link and Crisis Management, in: Grtner,

Heinz/Hyde-Price, Adrian/Reiter, Erich (eds.): op. cit., 2001, p. 139f.
Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4
December 1998. Cited in Missiroli, Antonio: CFSP, Defence and Flexibility.
Institute for Security Studies. Western European Union. Chaillot Paper 38. 2000,
Annex C, p. 53.
European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy
on Security and Defence. Presidency Conclusions: Cologne European Council, 3
and 4 June 1999. Cited in Missiroli, Antonio: op. cit., 2000, Annex D, p. 54.
Albright, Madeleine: The Right Balance will Secure NATOs Future, in:
Financial Times, 7 December 1998.

Policy; the authors) were not only quite different processes and projects
but also potentially incompatible. In the fall of 1999 and the spring of
2000 many voices were raised claiming the CESDP would lead to the
marginalisation of ESDI and even to the collapse of NATO.1
The successful NATO intervention in Kosovo followed by the
implementation of a NATO-led peace keeping force (KFOR) could not
cover the growing intra-alliance tensions fuelled by the European
initiatives to develop independent military capabilities 2. It took long and
intense negotiations, until in 2003 agreement was reached that the
building of EU forces will avoid the three Ds, will enable the EU
further to use NATOs military capacities, however, also will give
NATO members (still) outside the EU a certain weight, as was seen
especially in the case of Turkey in the support of its application for EU
membership.
4. NATOs New Strategic Concept
Tensions also marked the negotiations for the new strategic concept
which was endorsed at a summit in Washington in April 1999,
celebrating NATOs 50th anniversary and taking place during the
difficult phase of the alliances air strike campaign over Kosovo. The
new strategic concept basically was a compromise. Three main points
were at issue: 1) Disagreement over the necessity of UN Security
Council mandates as a precondition for future NATO-missions, 2) the
core functions of NATO, and 3) the future role of nuclear weapons 3. The
concept stated that [] NATO's essential and enduring purpose [] is
to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and
military means. [] The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by
crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. 4
NATOs main future tasks comprise the following elements:
1. Security: To provide one of the foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic
security environment, based on the growth of democratic
institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes.
1

2
3
4

Howorth, Jolyon: European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?

Institute for Security Studies. Western European Union. Chaillot Paper 43. 2000,
p. 5.
For a detailed account see Menon, Anand: From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after
Iraq, in: International Affairs, vol. 80, 2004, nr. 4, pp. 631-648.
Wittmann, Klaus: NATOs New Strategic Concept, in: Schmidt, Gustav: op. cit.,
2001, pp. 226ff.
NATO: The Alliances Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Washington,
D.C.,
23-24
April
1999.
Art.
6.
(URL:
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/ p99-065e.htm). Accessed: 26 May 2006.

184

2. Consultation: To serve as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied

consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including
possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for
appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common
concern.
3. Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in
Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty1.
As a result, NATO has added crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic
region to its future core functions. The alliance therefore seeks closer
cooperation with other international organisations like the UN or the
OSCE in order to [] prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to
contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law,
including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis
response operations.2 Whereas the most likely future threat scenarios
have been clearly addressed by the concept, the sphere of potential
action remains vague. Although the concept repeatedly calls on the UN
Security Councils responsibility for international peace (for enlarging
the legitimacy of such future NATO-missions), it does not explicitly
subordinate NATO action to Security Council mandates.
With regard to its nuclear strategy, the concept without doubt maintains
its nuclear doctrine. Nuclear weapons continue to form a defensive
security background by providing additional defence options beyond
conventional means. Finally, the concept also strengthens the role of
NATOs European member states by allowing the use of NATO
resources for European led missions. All in all, the new concept offered
plenty of room for diverse interpretations. Despite NATOs new
concept, the future of NATO was unclear at the dawn of 21 st century.
Military capability asymmetries between the USA and Europeans,
apparent in Bosnia and Kosovo, European emancipation efforts as well
as growing differences in threat perception posed problems for the
transatlantic relationship. The Clinton administration with its
multilateral approach came to an end in 2000.
5. NATO after 2001
The coming into office of the Bush II administration marked a
remarkable shift in US foreign policy, by strongly focusing on
promoting the national interest3 and putting more emphasis on the
exceptional role and duties of the USA in the global system while
1
2
3

Ibid., Art. 10.

Ibid., Art. 31.
Rice, Condoleezza: Promoting the National Interest, in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 79,
2000, nr. 1, pp. 45-62.

referring to multilateralism only la carte 1. Growing US unilateralism in

matters of e.g. the National Missile Defence, the restructuring of US
military base system, an outright opposition to the Kyoto Treaty or the
International Criminal Court (ICC), trade disputes and the Iran question
had already led to considerable disagreement with European allies.
However, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington constituted
a clear case for the invocation of Art. 5, which was declared in less than
24 hours and unanimously. 9/11 proved two things: 1) The USA was
right in locating most future threats to the transatlantic security beyond
NATOs border. 2) NATO, despite its 1999 endorsed Defence
Capabilities Initiative (DCI), still was not ready to confront the new
security threats like terrorism. As has been noted by Stanley Sloan:
However, the differing perspectives among NATO members
concerning the best instruments to employ against disparate threats have
not disappeared. They are based on fundamentally different historical
experiences, political and military traditions, and available power and
military capabilities.2 It became clear, that NATO, especially its
European members, had not been ready for this new kind of NATO
deployment.3 NATO formally acknowledged this reality in December
2001, when allied defence ministers in a special statement observed that
[] efforts to improve NATOs ability to respond to terrorism must be
an integral, albeit urgent, part of the more general ongoing work to
improve Alliance military capabilities. [] We are especially concerned
about persistent long-standing deficiencies in areas such as
survivability; deployability; combat identification; and intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition. The full implementation of DCI is
essential if the Alliance is to be able to carry out its mission, taking into
account the threat posed by terrorism.4
Despite broad verbal support from European allies, the USA quickly
demonstrated its strong preference for more unilateral and unrestrained
military action in its war on terror and by forming coalitions of the
1

2
3

See for a more detailed discussion of unilateralism vs. multilateralism Nye,

Joseph S.: The Paradox of American Power. Why the Worlds Only Superpower
Cant Go It Alone. 2002, ch.5.
Sloan, Stanley R.: NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community.
The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered. 2003, p. 189.
Dunay, Pl/Lachowski, Zdzislaw: Euro-Atlantic Security and Institutions, in:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): SIPRI Yearbook
2005. 2005, pp. 55f.
NATO: North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session. Statement on
Combating Terrorism: Adapting the Alliances Defence Capabilities. NATO
Press Release 2001/173. 18 December 2001.

186

willing for its intervention in Afghanistan, also by establishing stronger

military links with some quite repressive Central Asian states 1. More
and more, NATO seemed to be transformed into a tool box, which
provided the resources for according ad-hoc coalitions led by the USA.
On the other hand, NATOs attractiveness for multilateral post-conflict
peace-keeping and nation building has grown remarkably. However,
European allies remained reluctant with regard to extensive post-war
engagement in Afghanistan.
Matters within NATO, but also EU came to a head during 2003, when
the USA intervened in Iraq and later occupied the country. Whereas
states like Great Britain, Italy, Spain, or several Eastern European
members supported the US intervention, others like France, Germany or
Belgium opposed a violent regime change. During the Iraq crisis []
rigid positions, unfortunate rhetoric and misguided diplomatic tactics on
both sides, however, unnecessarily exacerbated the crisis. 2 Despite
recent atmospheric rapprochement between the USA and (old)
Europe, transatlantic disagreement still persists over NATOs
engagement after the Iraq war.
6. Conclusion The Future of NATO
The current intra-alliance disagreement is nothing new in NATOs
history, which is characterized by almost regular crises such as the one
over Suez in 1956, the dispute about nuclear codetermination in the
1960s, the Vietnam war, the end of dtente and the rearmament with the
dual track decision at the end of the 1970s, and the change of the whole
structure after 1989. On the other hand, this is showing the problem
solving capacity and adaptability of the organisation due to its
democratic decision making processes and legitimacy, which after each
crisis remarkably was able to return back to normal so far. Still, it is
indicating also a structural change from an organisation according to the
Realist paradigm in the beginning to one more following the principles
of the neoinstitutionalist paradigm, especially since the end of the Cold
War.
The alliance still is representing the institutional backbone of
transatlantic security politics. Its development since 1949 has shown
remarkable adaptability. During the 1990s the alliance has transformed
1

In the beginning the Russian government declared full support in this war on
terror, although in the longer run Russia turned out to become suspicious about
this development in its sphere of influence according to the Realist paradigm. A
similar reaction can be observed concerning the situation in Georgia and the
Ukraine.
Moravcsik, Andrew: Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain, in: Foreign Affairs,
vol. 82, 2003, nr. 1, p. 79.

from an alliance primarily concerned with threats into a security

management organisation.1 Although the OSCE after 1990 has proven
its importance in preventive diplomacy with a more soft security
management (policing, monitoring) and the EU has stepped up its
efforts to develop independent military power projecting capabilities,
NATO still represents the central institution for EU-US cooperation.
Nevertheless, diverging threat perceptions and opinions regarding
appropriate future counter strategies and instruments have put the
alliance under pressure. The lack of external pressure has increased
chances of a drift apart. Although the development of ESDI has
repeatedly been supported by NATO communiqus, its evolution
represents an explosive charge. What remains unclear is, whether an
independent European security and defence identity or just a stronger
unit within NATO will be developed. In the first case, this would pose
the question of a fully transformed transatlantic security cooperation. In
the second case, a stronger European bloc within NATO would reduce
US influence. Therefore, NATO has become the victim of its post-Cold
War success. NATOs enlargement by 10 Central and Eastern European
countries has increased the threshold for consensus, a fact unlikely to
increase the alliances inner coherence. In the long run, only a new
external threat or challenge might lead to a fundamental revitalisation of
the Atlantic alliance. Future scenarios mention several possible
development paths2:
.1 The fight against international terrorism will become a
central NATO task. But it remains unclear what this exactly
means and the question arises, whether intra-alliance
consensus can be reached on these questions.
.2 NATO continues to take a central role in the transatlantic
relations as instrument of deterrence and dialogue, thereby
playing a stabilizing role in international relations.
.3 Going beyond the two previous points, NATO transforms
into a multi-purpose organisation by taking over a
stabilizing and democratizing function out-of-area, in
neighbouring regions and beyond.
.4 NATO loses its role as central arena for political, security
and military cooperation and develops into a phase out
model. In this sense, NATO would degenerate into a tool
box for future ad-hoc coalitions for various purposes.

1
2

Wallander, Celeste A./Keohane, Robert O.: op. cit., 2002, p. 108.

Pradetto, August: Die NATO im Geflecht internationaler Organisationen, in:
Knig, Helmut/Sicking, Manfred (eds.): Der Irak-Krieg und die Zukunft
Europas. 2004, pp. 91f.

188

A division of labour between NATO and the EU with the US on the lead
concerning military technology and capacity and the EU focusing on
soft security according to the present asymmetry is not considered a
viable way. In the medium to long run, Andrew Moravcsik is probably
right when analysing that the rearming of Europe is the alliances only
hope. [] A more pragmatic variant of remilitarization would be to
develop a European high-intensity power projection capability within
NATO.1 This could lead to a more balanced relationship between the
USA and its European allies with the US listening closer to their
concerns. Despite its many current problems no government of any
member state really is interested in NATOs ultimate break up. NATO
remains valuable because of the uncertainty that would result, if it
disappeared.
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Questions
1. What two basic functions does NATO fulfil for its member states?
2. Why and how has NATO developed from a defence alliance into a
security risk management organization?
3. Which role do normative aspects play for NATO (e.g. democracy)?
4. Should NATO strengthen its out-of-area duties? What would be the
chances and risks?
5. Is NATO still the main forum of the transatlantic security
relationship?
6. Which different periods of development and strategic orientation can
be named for NATO?
7. How are the relations between NATO and Russia to be characterized
over time?

192

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