Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
2006
annual theme:
Contents
:
THE LETTER OF THE LAW:
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BELONGING TO POLITY
I.
10
:
11
From the Editors Subjected to Citizenship: The Problem of Belonging
to the State in Empire and Nation
17
Myron J. Aronoff Forty Years as a Political Ethnographer
23
,
,
/Contents
, ,
XVIII .:
59
II.
HISTORY 100
versus
XVII . ( / ) 101
Natalia Yakovenko Life Space vs. Identity of the Rus Gentleman (the Case of Jan/
Joachim Erlich)
: -
(1860- .)
225
Mikhail Dolbilov The Tsars Faith: Mass Conversions of Catholics to Orthodoxy in the North-Western Region of the Russian Empire (ca. 1860s)
, :
XIX XX
301
Benno Gammerl Nation, State or Empire: Subjecthood and Citizenship in British
and Habsburg Empires at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
ARCHIVE 328
III.
,
329
:
347
George V. Vernadsky: I Think of Myself Both as a Ukrainian and a Russian
IV.
- ?
VII.
BOOK REVIEWS
Reviews 400
R-FORUM
IMPERIAL CITIES
/Contents
Richard Stites, Serfdom, Society, and the Arts in Imperial Russia: The
Pleasure and the Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
xii+586 pp. ISBN: 0-300-10889-3 (hardback edition).
Louise McReynolds
415
Lutz Hfner, Gesellschaft als lokale Veranstaltung. Die Wolgastdte
Kazan und Saratov (18701914) (Kln: Bhlau Verlag, 2004). 594 S.
(=Beitrge zur Geschichte Osteuropas; Bd. 35). ISBN: 3-412-11403-0;
Guido Hausmann (Hg.), Gesellschaft als lokale Veranstaltung. Selbstverwaltung, Assoziierung und Geselligkeit in den Stdten des ausgehenden Zarenreiches (Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).
485 S. (=Brgertum. Beitrge zur europischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte; Bd. 22). ISBN: 3-525-35687-0.
419
. . . (-
XIV XV .). : , 2006. 160 . , , , , ,
. ISBN: 5-9273-1017-6.
Charles Halperin
428
Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, Aleksandr Nevskij: Heiliger, Frst, Nationalheld; eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedchtnis
(12632000) (Kln: Bhlau Verlag, 2004). 548, [32] S. Ill. (=Beitraege
zur Geschichte Osteuropas; Bd. 36) Quellen- und Literaturverz. ISBN:
3-412-06904-3.
432
Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine,
Lithuania, Belarus, 15691999 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003). xv+367 pp. ISBN: 0-300-08480-3.
437
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 278 pp. Index.
ISBN: 0-19-516550-1.
453
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Susan P. McCaffray, Michael Melancon (Eds.), Russia in The European Context, 17891914: A Member of the Family (New York and
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 256 pp. Index. ISBN: 1-40396855-1.
464
Natalie Bayer
. . 19972002 .
: , 2004 (=: ). 816 c. .
ISBN: 5-86793-300-8.
Marina Peunova
469
/ ., ., , . .
. . . -:
-, 2003. 396 . ISBN: 5-94380024-7.
Alexander Ogden
476
Richard Kieckhefer, Theology in Stone: Church Architecture From
Byzantium to Berkeley (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press,
2004). 372 pp., ill. Index. ISBN: 0-19-515466-5.
481
ii. i i. -:
, 2003. 243 . ISBN: 5-94716-032-3.
490
Caroline Milow, Die Ukrainische Frage 19171923 im Spannungsfeld der europischen Diplomatie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag,
2002) (=Veroffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts Mnchen. Reihe:
Geschichte; Bd. 68). 572 S. ISBN: 3-447-04482-9.
503
. . . . - /
1968 . -: - , -, 2004. 252 c., . , ,
. ISBN: 5-98187-042-7.
509
/Contents
Rebecca Kay, Men in Contemporary Russia: The Fallen Heroes of
Post-Soviet Change? (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006). 246 pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 0-7546-4485-5.
516
Richard Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005). 300 pp. ISBN: 1-84331-165-8.
524
535
List of Contributors
538
Ab Imperio 2007
541
547
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ; ,
( ), ; ,
.
.
() ,
, , . Ab Imperio
11
. , ( )
, , .
,
.
, ( , ) XVIII . , XVIII ,
,
, , . , , ,
.
, , , . , Ab Imperio:
, , ,
,
.., , .
Kritik 2 3 2006 (Subjecthood and Citizenship)
. ,
12
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
(citizenship studies), , , . , . , . citizenship
studies , , -,
(,
,
).
,
.
, , ,
, ,
.
,
, ( )
.
, ancien rgime, (nationality)
13
(citizenship)
.
, ,
.
.
,
. , , XVII , , , .
18191820 . , . , (, ) ,
( ) ( ). ,
, ,
, ,
, .
( ,
)
. 14
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , , - . , , .
, .
,
- , . , ,
.
- .
, , .
, ,
, . , . , , . , 15
, , , .
Ab Imperio:
.
.
A.
M.
A.
16
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Myron J. ARONOFF
FORTY YEARS
AS A POLITICAL ETHNOGRAPHER*
An earlier draft was presented as the keynote address on October 26, 2006 at a workshop
on Political Ethnography: What Insider Perspectives Contribute to the Study of Power
held at the University of Toronto. All further references will be cited as op. cit., workshop
on Political Ethnography. I thank Edward Schatz for inviting me to give the address and
for his helpful comments on it. I am grateful to my fellow participants for a most
stimulating exchange of experiences and ideas. I am indebted to Marina Mogilner and
Alexander Semyonov for soliciting this essay for publication and for their probing
comments and questions.
1
Cited by Dvora Yanow. Reading as Method: Interpreting Interpretations // Op. cit.
Workshop on Political Ethnography.
23
24
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
processes I wanted to study and learn how they understood what was going
on.3 Nation building was the hot topic at the time for Africa. However, for
reasons beyond my control I was unable to do the fieldwork I had planned
in Africa. As an ABD (all but dissertation) I turned down an attractive, well
paid tenure-track job offer at a respected university in the United States in
order to accept a very poorly paid position on a research team from Manchester University (UK) directed by Professor Max Gluckman to conduct fieldwork in Israel. In other words, I chose the opportunity to conduct ethnographic fieldwork over my fascination with Africa and over a decent salary
and the promise of potential job security. I was bitten by the ethnographic
bug and have remained infected ever since. As I shall elaborate below, once
you have the opportunity to observe and interact with people who are engaged in the activities that fascinate you and that you are attempting to
understand, you realize that there is simply no better way to understand
what is going on, and no other way to understand what these events mean
to the participants themselves, than through participant observation.
Strangely enough there were no courses offered, nor was there any formal training in ethnographic methods in the department of social anthropology at Manchester University in 1965.4 We picked up informal tips from
gossip about famous anthropologists in the field and personal anecdotes in
the common room and in the pubs to which we retired after our seminars.
We learned by an almost Talmudic reading of classical ethnographic texts.
For example, we learned about extended-case analysis by reading the classic formulations by Max Gluckman and by J. Clyde Mitchell. 5 The
(in)famous Manchester seminars when classes were called off for intensive
critiques by professors and graduate students of the work of those just returning from the field was a baptism under fire through which we became
initiated in the Manchester school approach. Maxs only direct methodological advice to me as I set out for Israel was to keep your eyes and ears
3
I was asked on my oral comprehensive Ph.D. exam at UCLA: Is political science a
science or an art to which I immediately replied, If we are to succeed in understanding
people and politics, it must combine both.
4
One of my professors, A. L. Epstein edited: The Craft of Social Anthropology. London,
1967, when I was in the field in Israel.
5
Max Gluckman. Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (Rhodes Livingstone Papers # 28). Manchester, 1958 (republished by Manchester University Press, 1968);
J. Clyde Mitchell. The Kalela Dance (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers # 27). Manchester, 1956
(republished by Manchester University Press, 1968). See J. Van Velsen. The Extendedcase Method and Situational Analysis // A. L. Epstein. The Craft of Social Anthropology.
Pp. 129-149, for one of the earliest descriptive formulations of the approach.
25
26
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
it would be so personal. He pointed out a dissertation on local government
in Israel on his desk written by a political scientist which he thought was
the kind of work I was writing. He objected that my study was so personal
that publishing it would be like publishing an x-ray of his ample stomach.7
He was the son-in-law of the prime minister at the time and had higher
political ambitions. In fact, he eventually became finance minister.
I lived with my wife and infant daughter in town, participating in the
life of the community from October 1966 through the summer of 1968
(including the war of June 1967). Toward the end of my stay I conducted a
survey to test a hypothesis developed from my observations and to prove
not only that I was not a lazy sociologist, but that I was a competent political
scientist. After months of getting data that made no sense based on my
intimate knowledge of the population, I discovered that the magnetic tape
had broken and a piece of someone elses data had been accidentally spliced
into mine. Had I not known the population as well as I did, under the pressure to complete my dissertation, I might have been forced to attempt to
make an interpretation of spurious data. On the other hand, the multivariate
regressions I ran once the problem had been corrected corroborated the
central hypothesis of my analysis derived from the ethnography: the construction of a strong collective identity and sense of communal pride within
a remarkably short time was due primarily to the mobilization of the residents through competing local socio-political factions. Whereas I certainly
agree with Ed Schatz that one need not utilize multiple-methods in all research, there are definitely contexts when they are not only useful, but perhaps even essential.8
My analysis of Frontiertown was framed in the context of Victor Turners political phase development in which social situations were presented
as phases in an ongoing process of political strife over an extended period
of time.9 Each phase was analyzed using the method developed by the
7
I negotiated with him and agreed to delete a few of the most personal matters which
did not detract from my analysis. He finally consented to the publication of my dissertation. The town and its inhabitants were all given pseudonyms in the tradition of anthropology.
8
Edward Schatz. The Problem with the Toolbox Metaphor: Ethnography and the Limits
to Multiple-Methods Research. A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2006. A similar argument is
made by: Sanford F. Schram. Why I am not an Interpretivist // Op. cit. Workshop on
Political Ethnography.
9
Myron J. Aronoff. Frontiertown: the Politics of Community Building in Israel.
Manchester & Jerusalem, 1974; Victor Turner. Social Dramas and Ritual Metaphors //
27
28
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
my friend his name. He replied, Len Mars. The man asked if that was his
original name. Len replied that the family name was originally Margolis.
When I asked what had transpired, my professor gave a very literal interpretation. I then explained that the two strangers were simply establishing
their mutual Jewish identity which is exactly the point I had made about the
two in the encounter I had analyzed.
When I gave the same analysis at Tel Aviv University there were also
differing interpretations of my data. My Israeli Palestinian graduate research
assistant supported my interpretation. He stated that the meaning of habibi
varies contextually. He explained that when his fianc called him habibi it
meant exactly what Professor Peters suggested. When his buddy called him
habibi, it meant my friend. When his Jewish boss in the Histadrut labor
federation used the term my student considered it condescending and patronizing. He confirmed that in the context I described the term was clearly
as I had interpreted it. One essential contribution of ethnography is the
understanding of the meaning of words and actions in specific contexts
through deep immersion in the culture and mastery of the language. Even
verbatim stenographic minutes of the meeting (had they existed, which they
did not) would not have enabled the nuanced analysis of such an exchange
because the nonverbal communication and good-natured laughter of the
participants was essential for an accurate explanation of the significance of
the exchange.
My second major research project involved eight years of participant
observation of the national institutions and local branches of the Israel Labor party which dominated Israeli politics for nearly fifty years. This research was conducted during the period I taught at Tel Aviv University.
The book that resulted from this research, Power and Ritual in the Israel
Labor Party was first published in 1977.11 The book essentially anticipated
and explained the defeat of the party that year that was so shocking that it
was popularly known in Hebrew as the earthquake.
I utilized the conceptual repertoire of political science to explain the
politics of factionalism, the nomination of leaders, the analysis of representation on national party institutions, and the relationship between the party
center and the local branches. At the time there was much debate in political sociology and political science about non-decision making and non11
Myron J. Aronoff. Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party: A Study in Political
Anthropology. Assen, the Netherlands, 1977; revised and expanded edition published
by M. E. Sharpe (Armonk, NY, 1993).
29
The most accessible version of this classic essay was republished in Gluckmans
collected essays: Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa. London, 1963. Pp. 110-136.
13
Max Gluckman. Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa; Lucy P. Mair. An African
People in the Twentieth Century (Baganda). New York, 1934.
30
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
lyzed I would not have been able to make either this theoretical contribution or the successful prognosis. In 1993 I published a substantially expanded and updated edition of this book dealing with Labors years in opposition and eventual return to power.
My third major research project (which resulted in Israeli Visions and
Divisions) was even more unconventional since it was an ethnography of
Israeli society, culture, and politics in the period from 1977 to 1990, which
was a period of major cultural and political transformation and polarization.14 Based largely on fieldwork in Israel during 1982-1983 and 19871988, I utilized a wide range of methods. I engaged in participant observation of selected meetings of the Ministerial Committee on Symbols and
Ceremonies, the Knesset plenary, parliamentary committees, and the delegates dining room, the activities of several peace movements (particularly
Peace Now), the major settlers movement (Gush Emunim or Bloc of the
Faithful), academic conferences, theater performances, movies, television
programs, e.g., a documentary series on the 1981 election campaign, and
the first Palestinian uprising (intifada). I interviewed more than a hundred
political, religious, cultural, and educational leaders. I also examined an
archive of more than twenty years of meetings of the Ministerial Committee on Symbols and Ceremonies (housed in the Prime Ministers office),
from which I selected for analysis two major decisions that focused on the
manipulation of political culture.
The leader of the nationalist Likud party, Menachem Begin, became
prime minister in 1977 and set out to overcome the pariah image with which
Labor had stigmatized him and his movement. He attempted to eradicate
the last vestiges of Labors ideological legitimacy and to establish the Likuds
political dominance and ideological hegemony. Begin utilized state agencies to reinterpret Israeli history; to elevate his movements ideological
leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky, to the national political pantheon; to enshrine
as heroes the martyrs of the dissident underground movements particularly the one he commanded; and to establish the authority of their myths. The
Begin government made extensive use of ceremonies commemorating historical figures whose actions were used to attempt to lend legitimacy to
Begin, his movement, and his governments policies. The most elaborate of
these ceremonies was an official state funeral held on May 11, 1982, in the
Judean desert for the purported remains of the fighters and followers of
14
Myron J. Aronoff. Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict.
New Brunswick, NJ, 1989; 1991 (paperback edition).
31
32
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Bar Kochba revolt for contemporary political dilemmas facing Israel reflected deeply polarized ideological interpretations of the Zionist vision.
Yet, the fact that secular scholars and leading rabbinic figures engaged in
public debate with one another and with the prime minister and other leading
politicians over the implications of two thousand year-old events for contemporary problems implies the sharing of an underlying Zionist/Israeli
world view that made the debate over interpretations of this root cultural
paradigm both possible and significant. In the past two decades since then
Zionism has been seriously challenged from various internal and external
groups, which has loosened its hegemonic hold on the public, although it
still retains considerable salience for the majority of Israeli Jews. I have
analyzed the contested nature of Israeli identity in other publications since
the publication of this book most recently at a workshop in Antwerp in
October 2006.16
My most recent book, The Spy Novels of John le Carre: Balancing Ethics
and Politics, employs an ethnographic approach to the analysis of works of
fiction.17 Although not based on participant observation as were my previous
studies, it is based on what Jan Kubik calls ethnographic problematization
and framing.18 I reverse the trend of many post-modernist scholars who
interpret the words and actions of real people as literary texts. By contrast,
I interpret the plight of fictional characters in literary texts as representative
of real life situations and moral dilemmas. This approach is consistent with
the authors intent. As he told Melvyn Bragg, at the moment, when we
have no ideology, and our politics are in a complete shambles, I find it [the
espionage novel] a convenient microcosm to shuffle around in a secret world
and make that expressive of the overt world.19 I suggest that le Carre is the
ethnographer, having experienced the secret world personally and imaginatively recreated it in fiction. I then supplied an interpretation of the cen16
See, for example, Myron J. Aronoff. Temporal and Spatial Dimensions of Contested
Israeli Nationhood // Brigitta Benzing and Bernd Herrmann (Eds.). Exploitation and
Overexploitation in Societies Past and Present. Berlin and New Brunswick, 2003. Pp.
269-272.
17
Myron J. Aronoff. The Spy Novels of John le Carre: Balancing Ethics and Politics.
New York, 1999; 2001 (Palgrave paperback edition).
18
Jan Kubik. Ethnography after Post-Modern (De)construction: Is It Still Useful for
Political Science? // Op. cit. Workshop on Political Ethnography. Italics are in the original.
Kubik refers to: Roger Peterson. Resistance and Rebellion, Lessons from Eastern Europe.
Cambridge, UK, 2001, which uses an ethno-historical approach.
19
Melvyn Bragg. The Things a Spy Can Do John le Carre Talking // The Listener.
1976. 27 January. P. 90.
33
34
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
such as the limits to which democracies can go in using nondemocratic
means to protect democratic freedoms for example, in the war against
terrorism without undermining those very freedoms.21 Democracies,
unfortunately, sometimes violate the spirit of liberty and freedom in the
name of their defense especially under perceived threats to national security. The discussion of the implications of this has never been more salient
than it is today amidst the current war on terror. I suggest that the ethnographic reading of novels helps elucidate this by allowing the reader to
enter into the hearts, minds, and souls of individuals engaged in this activity
and exploring the personal, institutional, and national costs and implications of these ethical compromises. It thereby makes abstract Jeffersonian
principles concrete and more understandable in the present world context.
My approach weds an ethnographic spirit of inquiry with what political
scientists call a political theoretical (philosophical) analysis of ethical issues.22 The combination of ethnography with political philosophy explores
the broader moral public implications of private actions. This is done implicitly without invoking a broader academic discussion of the relevant
philosophical literature. I deliberately avoided such an academic discussion precisely because I wanted to address a broader audience than my
colleagues in academe who specialize in these issues. Moral dilemmas are
discussed without invoking contractual theory, natural rights, and notions
of sovereignty. The problems facing us are too important to be limited by
obfuscation by self-segregating academic jargon. Although this work may
not constitute a conventional ethnography, to me it is ethnographic in spirit
and it helps clarify dilemmas which date back to the Hebrew bible and
classical Greek philosophers, not to mention other cultural traditions.
My most recent major project in collaboration with my colleague Jan
Kubik, Anthropology and Political Science: Culture, Politics, Identity, and
Democratization,23 is near completion. In it we explore the ontological,
epistemological, methodological, and conceptual similarities and differences
between the two disciplines. A key observation is the paradox that as political scientists have become more interested in ethnography and the concept
21
Back book jacket of the hardbound edition of M. Aronoff. The Spy Novels of John Le
Carr. (1999).
22
My late colleague Carey McWilliams used to tease me about being a closet political
theorist. After reading the manuscript of this book he said: Mike, you have finally
come out of the closet as a theorist.
23
It is to be published in a series edited by William Beeman and David Kertzer by
Berghan Books.
35
Myron J. Aronoff. Political Culture // Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baites (Eds.-inchief). International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Kidlington, UK,
2002.
25
Myron J. Aronoff (Ed.). The Frailty of Authority; Political Anthropology. Vol. V. New
Brunswick, NJ, 1986. I am particularly proud of this edited volume.
36
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
approaches than strictly positivist ones. Kristen Monroe called the movement that has challenged the hegemony of positivism the raucous rebellion in political science in the subtitle of her edited volume.26 Among the
contributors to this volume Rogers M. Smith was one of the movements
main leaders, Jennifer Hochild was the first editor of the new journal Perspectives on Politics, Robert Jervis was one of the leaders of the new qualitative research section of the APSA, 27 Dvora Yanow and Peregrine
Schwartz-Shea, editors of the recently published Interpretation and Method
have been active in the organization of panels on ethnography and interpretation at APSA meetings in which many young scholars have participated.28
It is noteworthy that Bob Jervis and Susanne Rudolph are recent past presidents of APSA signifying the success of the perestroika movement and the
legitimization of the diversity of approaches it represents. Last, but certainly not least, a group of scholars gathered in Toronto in October 2006 thanks
to the efforts of Ed Schatz at a stimulating workshop on Political Ethnography: What Insider Perspectives Contribute to the Study of Power. It is
particularly gratifying to witness these positive developments and to feel
that I may have made a modest contribution to them. Jan Kubik and I
were asked to organize a new section on Political Anthropology for the
forthcoming annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. I am honored to share my thoughts on this subject with the readers of
Ab Imperio.
SUMMARY
,
, ,
. , ,
.. 26
37
38
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Sergei GLEBOV: Professor Sahlins, thank you for your interest in the
general questions we sought to discuss in the framework of our thematic
issue The Letter of the Law: the Institutionalization of Belonging to Polity and for your willingness to share your thoughts with our readers. Let
me begin by asserting that the narrative of Modernity is essentially a narrative of the nation: the revolutionary nation as the political body and the
eternal nation as the physical body of the society, united by a common
language, culture and memory. All contradictions and ruptures of Modernity are mysteriously brought together when viewed through the national
perspective: the inevitable monological form of narrative finds its ultimate
subject in the singularity and homogeneity of society as embodied by the
nation. The revolutionizing effect of forging the common narrative of the
nation (parallel to the forging of national identity itself) is well known, not
least thanks to your seminal studies.
What remains understudied yet is the functioning of societies that have
not fully experienced the integrating potential of nationalization. Old re*
39
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
gime polities, as well as contiguous empires of the nineteenth century (Russian but also Habsburg) did not overcome local particularities (in both a
regional and social sense) as rival sources of group identification, parallel
to the pan-imperial narratives of unity and loyalty. In the twentieth century,
the Soviet Union represented a modern post-revolutionary polity, yet it never
managed to become a proper nation state because a federalist model was
employed to accommodate deep cultural, economic and ethnic inequalities
concealed by the umbrella of political loyalty to the regime. Today we witness attempts to reshape Europe as a supranational community. What is
important in all those different cases is that the internal heterogeneity of
society goes far beyond a normal diversity, to the extent that it includes
the co-existence of different political subjects holding different degrees of
sovereignty, competing principles of social identification, and narratives of
memory. We believe that your interest and experience in studying the beginning of the synthesis of national narrative provide you with a unique
perspective on the world before and beyond the nation.
To begin our conversation, let me ask you how accurate is the very
perception of the national ideal as a monologue (even if established as a
result of disputes and conflicts)? A decade ago, James Lehning1 challenged
the perceived wisdom of Eugene Webers model of forging a nation through
institutional standardization, suggesting instead a more complicated vision
of national unity as a result of negotiations of mutual projections by social
actors. What is your attitude to Lehnings model, and does it change the
perception of the nation as a normative monologue?
Peter SAHLINS: It is worth beginning with Eugen Webers model of
the transformation of Peasants into Frenchmen,2 since, Id like to suggest,
Lehnings attempt to revise Webers formulation is still very much framed
by the same kind of oppositions that he purports to disrupt between the
traditional and modern on the one hand, and peasants and Frenchmen on
the other. What this suggests, to me at least, is the deep-seated nature of the
paradigm of cultural modernization and the difficulty, even within the
framework of cultural history, of disrupting it or dislodging it in some significant way. In my earlier work, on boundaries,3 and also in my work on
1
James Lehning. Peasant and French:Cultural Contact in Rural France During the
Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, MA & New York, 1995.
2
Eugen J. Weber. Peasants into Frenchmen:the Modernization of Rural France, 18701914. Stanford, 1976.
3
Peter Sahlins. Boundaries: the Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley,
1989.
40
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
peasant rebellion in the nineteenth century,4 I was very critical of Webers
model and by extension of Lehnings attempt to reformulate it, largely because of the implicit model of collective identity it contained. Specifically,
I would suggest that such models still imagine identity to be constructed as
a series of expanding concentric circles, in which identity and loyalty decrease in correlation with geographic distance from a specific social ego at
its center, such that a peasants attachments, in this schema, would be primarily to his or her family, and would be diluted in their extension to a kin
network, then to a neighborhood, then to the village community itself, then
perhaps to a valley, a region, and only distantly and weakly to the nation as
a whole. Implied here is also a paradigm of nation-building that assumes
that when nations are built from distant centers, they reverse the vectors of
loyalty and identification, effacing the embedded concentric circles, such
that a direct and unmediated identification between the peasant and the nation, in this case France, is achieved. This is what youve called the nation
as normative monologue. To my mind, deploying this model is not always
the most useful way of making sense of the regularities in the historical
record because to do so presupposes, including in Lehnings reformulation,
an original position occupied by peasants as outside of the discursive, institutional or political community called the nation. My own work included
an effort to re-imagine the peasantry as part of France, to write the history
of the peasantry, however marginalized and peripheralized with respect to a
distant political center, as nonetheless engaged, or at least articulated within the same historical processes. In doing so I tried to rethink the model
itself, abandoning the metaphor of circles for the notion of segments, which
I borrowed from a certain anthropology, and which was well known, at
least among the structural functionalists, through the work of Evans-Pritchard.5 In this segmentary model, identity is conceived in all of its possible iterations as an oppositional and contingent and relational quality, capable of collapsing lesser distinctions into more inclusive ones. In my work,
this meant that peasants might express their identities in village communities at the same time that they could consider themselves Frenchmen or
Spaniards, and this occurred in an historical context that we might consider
precocious, since the institutional mechanisms outlined by Weber that link
peasants and the nation roads and railroads, schools and military service
did not yet exist. Still, through segmentary oppositions, peasants could iden4
Idem. Forest Rites: the War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century France.
Cambridge, MA, 1994.
5
See Mary Douglas. Edward Evans-Pritchard. New York, 1981.
41
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
tify themselves as part of France, but only in opposition to an Other. In the
Pyrenean borderland in the Pyrenees, the Other was Spain, even if Spain
had just as ephemeral an institutional existence in the pre-modern world, at
least in terms of the homogeneous creation of national institutions. Nevertheless, discursively, the Spanish nation or Spain as a nation was an entity,
which became strategically deployed within peasant society in order to state
a set of claims about local and national identity. Key here were the ways in
which the national as a category became articulated with the local, in such
a manner that neither effaced or erased the other: a localizing of the national
and a nationalizing of the local. So I was most interested in my early work
in critiquing the expectation that nation-building involves the complete effacement of other kinds of identities and other kinds of differences. Not
that this wasnt, in fact, the political project, since it really was a goal of
statesmen and politicians (and educators and army officers) who built nations, but it was never a successful project, and not even in the most precocious and developed of the nation-states, England or France, or to a certain
extent Spain, did the effort ever come to approximate the lived experience
of peasants and others. All the more important, I think, turning to imperial
and post-imperial histories further east on the continent, to emphasize the
extent to which national-building agendas, agendas of nationalization, with
their integrating, homogenizing efforts, were never nearly as successful as
nation-builders imagined them to be.
SG: I wonder if I can interject a question at this point regarding something that you mentioned in your answer, namely, your reliance upon and
indebtedness to anthropological models. Could you elaborate on how important anthropology has been to your intellectual project, and, furthermore, what, in general, is your perception of the relationship between anthropology and history? Are we indebted to anthropologists and if so, what
kind of an intellectual debt do we owe to them? Is it methodology, analytical concepts, or a conceptualization of the language of social sciences?
PS: There are, obviously, two histories here that come together. There is
the history of the disciplines, but also a personal trajectory. My own exposure to anthropology took shape as a contingent and accidental development, namely my birth and education in a family which lived all over the
world, and in which anthropology and culture was the stuff of the dinner
table conversations. I was never trained in anthropology but I grew up in a
world in which the concepts and key categories of anthropological knowledge, at least of a certain moment, were part of an everyday language, so
42
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
generally speaking my training as an anthropologist comes from home.
More generally, I think that history as a discipline has developed and flourished during the last century through a process of cannibalizing, if you will,
collateral disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. One can point
to different decades in the twentieth century in which different auxiliary
disciplines, from economics to sociology to anthropology to literary theory
to geography, have been not just helpful but necessary for history as a discipline in its continuous self-re-invention. The anthropological moment of
historical inquiry has in some sense passed, meaning that the heyday of this
borrowing can be seen in the works of E. P. Thompson or Natalie Zemon
Davis or any of the so called new historians of the Anglo-Saxon world,
whose research agendas came out of an interest in social history and history
from below, beginning in the late 1960s. This was an especially creative
and fertile time for the marriage of anthropology and history, a moment
during which a single collateral discipline, in this case anthropology, really
allowed history to pose new questions about the collective logics of behavior, or invent new objects of inquiry (such as kinship, ritual, or other
symbolic practices). The marriage also provided historians with a vocabulary with which to investigate and to answer queries that, at least in their
most successful iterations, were never efforts to import wholesale the methods of anthropological inquiry onto history, which of course wouldnt work
in that the field is not the archive, and historians will always be bound to a
great extent and constrained by this silence of their informants Rather,
historians imported not the research methods of anthropology but its vocabulary, its questions, and certain of its intellectual concerns and agendas All this is not to say that this moment has definitely receded into the
mists of time, but there is an enduring legacy to be found in the ever
widening set of legitimate historical subjects, and there is still fruitful crossfertilization that can occur at this point in time, particularly around the
much studied question of identity. At the same time, it should be emphasized, that history as a discipline its central paradigms and informing
principles has already learned its lessons from anthropology and has moved
on to other disciplines, from which it takes equally in measure to think of
new sets of problems and ways of interpreting them. Similarly, when history
turned to literary theory in the 1980s, what was at stake was less a wholesale importation of methods even if there are historians who would argue
that history is a text and should be read in the same way as a literary creation but most practicing historians still work in archives and now understand that they are working with texts in an important, literary sense, and
43
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
that all of the aporia and explicit meanings of a text that need to be studied
as part of the way of making these texts speak to a particular intellectual
problem thats been posed. So I would not be a historian who continuously
waves the flag of anthropology feeling that this is in any way a definitive
solution or even the first steps down a particular path, but, rather, one of the
many tools in the rather capacious toolbox of the historian that can be used
to make sense of a changing and evolving set of problems that we will
continue to invent and give our best to answer.
SG: Despite some efforts to undo the boundary between the modern and
pre-modern forms of citizenship, historians still operate under the assumption that there occurred, at the time of the French revolution, a profound
break with citizenship based on privilege (or private law). To what extent
has your own work contributed to complicating that boundary? Has the
story of the passage from a foreigner to a subject altered our perception of
the roots of modern citizenship?
PS: Its harder to imagine in a French institutional context and historiography, but there have been a lot of efforts in English to de-center the
French Revolution itself as the origins of modernity, at least within the
accepted narrative of the development of modern citizenship. My own work,
and that of other historians of the eighteenth century, has helped us to demythologize, in some sense, the central place of the French Revolution in
the discipline itself, especially as its been developed in France and in Europe. This is not to say that we, historians, who are deeply attracted to the
mutations of the eighteenth century long before the French Revolution
necessarily see the Old Regime as inevitably containing all of the elements
of modernity that would come to maturity in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The problem, rather and this a theme that recurs in your questions lies in trying to imagine an Old Regime that is independent of its
outcome, or of what we see retrospectively as some kind of inevitable outcome, meaning 1789 and all that. Many historians using different approaches
and drawing on different methods, especially in intellectual and cultural
history, are finding possibilities to talk about the ways in which the discursive contributions and transformations of the eighteenth century find their
expression in the French Revolution but cannot be situated as a cause. We
are far beyond the conservative reactions during the revolutionary upheaval
itself that linked the rhetoric of Enlightenment and the revolutionary process: its Rousseaus fault, its Voltaires fault. So my work, in that
sense, like the work of Keith Baker, Roger Chartier, and younger scholars
like Michael Kwass and others, is very much part of this effort to move
44
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
back from the Revolution as some inevitable outcome of the Enlightenment or eighteenth century developments, and to think through the kinds of
modernity that took shape in the eighteenth century, but that were not structurally determined to produce, inevitably, a revolutionary outcome.
All this to preface my comments on citizenship itself. What struck me
and what got me started on the project that became my last book,6 Unnaturally French, was an initial surprise, and indeed astonishment, about the
vocabulary that I discovered when reading juridical texts in the seventeenth
and the eighteenth century. I never expected to find the word citizen,
citoyen, and indeed, to find it recurring frequently, albeit within a relatively
isolated linguistic domain, among lawyers. More, it was a bit of a revelation to read how the category was quite elaborated in jurisprudential terms.
That was the starting point for re-thinking what it would mean to actually
use a term we associate with certain characteristic features of modernity, in
particular with political participation, equality, and cultural homogeneity.
What do we mean when use such a term in which the referent had nothing
to do with the modern world? One possible response might simply end the
claim there and say well, the word is used but it had nothing to do with the
thing as we know it and as we practice it in the post-revolutionary world.
That was not my choice because I did believe that there was something
intrinsically important about the way in which the word was used, which
stood in some relation, but again, not easily predictable or inevitable one,
to the development of the modern notions of belonging, attachment, and
loyalty. And one of the ways of thinking about what that relationship might
be between the modern and the pre-modern forms of citizenship was to
explore, in some important sense, what the difference would result in not
using the word. Some of my critics have said, well, in fact, all youre talking about is subjecthood that happens to be called citizenship, or more
accurately, subjects who happen to be called citizens, but there is no
fundamental distinction. And that is actually a position that comes, among
others, from Rousseau himself at the moment of a great intellectual and
cultural mutations of the eighteenth century and the Revolution this idea
that all inherited linguistic categories were wrong and that the world can be
linguistically created anew. Rousseau himself was quite critical of what he
called the egregious error of the sixteenth century jurisconsult Jean Bodin,
who had relied heavily on the term citizen in his treatises. For Rousseau,
6
Peter Sahlins. Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After.
Ithaca, NY, 2004.
45
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
the citizen was unimaginable before the time that he himself could think it
up, in its modern iteration. In my own understanding, there is an important
and subtle distinction between subject and citizen in the Old Regime, in
both discursive terms and in their practical consequences. I think that the
subtle distinction has to do with the fact that although all citizens were
subjects, and although in fact most subjects were citizens, the distinction
made a difference, that is, it had had practical consequences to name someone a citizen. True, as Bodin himself had seen, the category of citizen
was heterogeneous and internally differentiated; citizens were by their nature unequal in obligations, in their privileges, in their liberties, in their
franchises, to use all the terms of the Old Regime. But despite this heterogeneity, there was in fact an underlying unity, and one with real life practical consequences, that emerged not from efforts to create homogeneity out
of difference, but that appeared by drawing distinctions between citizens
and foreigners, that is, those outside the boundaries of citizenship. Foreigners suffered any number of legal disabilities, including, most importantly,
the inability to deed and inherit property from natural-born Frenchmen and
women (the gendering is important here because unlike modern citizenship
in its initial iteration, Old Regime citizenship was a status to which women
as well as men could both aspire and acquire). That oppositional nature of
citizenship actually places the category of citizenship much closer to a notion that did not exist linguistically in the Old Regime, the category of
nationality. This is a tricky and complicated arena, because in so many
ways the notion of pre-modern citizenship leads not in some evolutionary
sense towards modern citizenship, but rather towards a modern conception
of nationality itself, at least in a juridical sense. So the confusion is doubled,
because on the one hand the term citizen doesnt seem to belong in the
eighteenth century, and on the other hand, when it does appear in the Old
Regime, its read better through the lens of nationality and nationality law,
then it is through citizenship as political participation, as a conditional equality, or as corresponding to a certain cultural homogeneity. And so my own
work in some sense has followed this slippage and contributed, hopefully,
with some productivity and fruitfulness to the confusion by stressing the
extent to which in examining the pre-modern citizen and pre-modern citizenship, what I am really after is the well, the French title of my Annales
article, Nationality avant la lettre,7 the history of nationality before the
word itself had come into being.
7
Peter Sahlins. Nationality avant la lettre: les pratiques de la naturalization sous lAncien
Rgime // Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 5. Pp. 1081-1108.
46
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
SG: Your complex vision of nationality avant la lettre in Ancien Rgime
France suggests a definition of the citizen as someone not subject to the
limitations imposed upon a foreigner; albeit, of course, citizens were not
equal before the law or to each other. Then to what extent does premodern or pre-revolutionary citizenship in France compare to, or help our
understanding of the phenomenon of subjecthood in composite imperial
states? To put it simply, does such citizenship equal subjecthood, given that
it was defined by obligations, privileges, and rights particular to ones social position?
PS: It is always a struggle, and frequently a productive one, to try to
make intellectual linkages between the pre-modern and the modern that are
not over-determined. Some sites and regions of the modern world would
seem to lend themselves more easily than others to certain kinds of comparisons. So, for example, in thinking about the modern experiences of
empire and nation among the sprawling polities of the nineteenth century
empires, that is, Russian but also Habsburg, an obvious point of reference
in the pre-modern world might be Spain and the Spanish Habsburg monarchy of the early modern period. The Spanish Habsburg empire, like most
states in the pre-modern period, has been usefully identified by John Elliot
among others as a composite monarchy, that is, one that is literally composed of distinctive polities. It is thus quite similar in structure to the nineteenth century Habsburg Empire as described by Benedict Anderson, who
points out in Imagined Communities how the emperor himself holds literally dozen of separate titles corresponding to the component polities of the
empire, from king of Bohemia to duke of Carinthia to Margrave of
Istria and so forth. Now, in the pre-modern world, what is important, and
this is in some sense a pertinent observation for the 19th century empires as
well, is that each of these polities that together compose the empire is
constituted not simply of subjects of a particular jurisdiction but also by
a legal framework of rights and disabilities that comes to approximate a
modern notion of nationality. So, for example, in the early modern Spanish
empire, each of the composite polities, that is, the Kingdom of Aragon, or
of Castile, or of Naples, had its own institutions, its own legal framework
of privileges and prerogatives and rights and obligations, but also of disabilities and exclusions political, professional, legal for those who were
not members of that particular group. In other words, I think we can speak,
with some caution and many caveats, of the existence of nationality law in
the pre-modern Spanish empire in the same way that we can make this
observation for the more politically homogeneous monarchies in the same
47
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
period, such as France. Now, whats interesting about Spain is that the
movement of political modernization, including the reforms of the Bourbon monarchy at the beginning of the eighteenth century, produced an institutional and legal framework of belonging that transcended the more
particularistic and heterogeneous framework of an early modern polity, and
was thus more modern in the sense that a broader, national set of institutions and laws came to displace, however slowly and incompletely, the
distinct privileges and franchises of the composite polities of the empire.
The Bourbon reforms of the early eighteenth century in Spain were already
anticipated and reflected in the so called Indies Laws, in these laws of the
Habsburgs, in which it is possible to tease out the notion of a Spanish
identity, and indeed, a Spanish nationality that transcended and displaced
the different legal frames of belonging within the composite monarchy.
Projecting this model onto the contiguous empires of the nineteenth century, its altogether possible to imagine how the movement toward a legal
idea of nationality as both a project of state building from above but also a
project of resistance to imperial structures was not dissimilar to processes
found in the pre-modern world. Im not saying that pre-modern states attempted the kind of nation-building that later empires undertook (without
much success), but I am suggesting that the conditions under which it became possible to develop a claim that was rhetorical but also institutional
about the separateness and identity of a component part in a monarchy was
not entirely dissimilar from the structures and processes of group membership as these took shape in the early modern world.
SG: Well, its an interesting perspective. I am curious, though, about
your use of the term nationality, especially when it is applied to pre-modern
and composite polities. Am I right in assuming that your reference is really
about an anthropological perspective of the sense of belonging to the polity
first of all?
PS: No, not quite. Im pulling the term much more into its juridical
framework, away from the more anthropological sense of homogeneous
cultural identity, which really accrues somewhat later and becomes ever
more important as the nineteenth century progresses. And its certainly true
that the term nationality appears in European languages with both meanings: the first literary uses of the term, say in Germaine de Stahls Corinne
and Italy in 1807, refer to an idea of belonging thats founded on some deep
cultural, we might today say, ethnic sense of collectivity; but the term nationality also makes a near simultaneous appearance in administrative dis48
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
course and then a little bit later in legal terms to describe a juridical notion
of belonging empty of a particular cultural content, that is, which doesnt
depend on a shared similarity of custom, language, culture, or even historical experience In short, it doesnt depend on the notion of shared culture,
but on a legal framework that identifies the formal rules of inclusion and
exclusion.
SG: To what extent did the revolutionary nation exist in a latent form
within the ancien rgime society, or did it emerge completely from scratch
under the impact of revolutionary experience and to be further developed
during the struggle with the remnants of the Old Regime and new challenges
of the moment? What part of the legacy of the ancien rgime was inherited
by the revolutionary nation, either positively or by negation of the old world?
Could we trace elements of the revolutionary discourse (in a literal sense,
as rhetorical devices and tropes) in the pre-revolutionary cultural milieu,
beyond usual references to the radical representatives of the Enlightenment?
Is it possible to imagine the French Enlightenment not resulting in the revolutionary outburst of the type that actually did take place in 1789?
PS: The hardest assignment I ever faced as a professor was teaching the
eighteenth century, for in this period all of the difficult and hoary questions
are brought to the surface history as outcome, history as origin, history
as condition for the possibility of other histories, and history as a framework for being able to account for modernity. In brief, its nearly impossible,
Ive found, to teach the eighteenth century without knowing and anticipating
the outcome, that is, without teaching the outcome. Its very hard to treat
the ancien rgime as a period in and of itself, without teaching that the
ancien rgime, at least in France, comes to an explosive end in a rather
abrupt and unexpected way. This presents enormous obstacles for trying to
make sense of the ancien rgime on its own terms starting with the nomenclature that we use to describe the eighteenth century. In calling something
the Old Regime, were obviously implicitly positioning a new regime
that succeeds it. In French, ancien rgime is perhaps better translated as
past regime as opposed to old regime, and the ancien rgime was invented by the revolutionaries themselves at the beginning of the revolution
in order to describe something that was quite new. Indeed, one could argue
that there were certain critical moments such as the decrees that came
out of the night of August 4th, 1789 in which the ancien rgime was
literally invented in order to be dismantled, and laws proposed at these
moments become a kind of systematic inventory of the institutions of the
49
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
Old Regime, described for the first time in their institutionalized, reified
form as old precisely in order to be dismantled. As historians, as teachers,
were confronted with this very deterministic and teleological reading of
the eighteenth century that requires us to at once make sense of the fact that
there is a revolutionary rupture at the end, and to avoid the argument that
revolution was in constant preparation in the course of the eighteenth century. So, to return to your question, yes, many historians have tried to rethink in many different kinds of ways the relation of eighteenth century
developments, especially intellectual ones, and the French Revolution. Some
have located a revolutionary discourse as a set of rhetorical devices or tropes
in a pre-revolutionary set of contexts. Consider the work of Keith Baker,
who isolates three different discursive strands that will appear in the Revolution but whose intellectual origins he locates at different points in the
eighteenth century. This is not to say that their utterance or their iteration
during the course of the eighteenth century was a cause of the French revolution; indeed, most intellectual and cultural history these days stresses conditions, not causes, trying to disengage Enlightenment and Revolution at
least from an over-determined relationship. But this can go too far as well.
The reductio ad absurdum of trying to disengage the Enlightenment from
the French Revolution in the work of Roger Chartier, for example, selfconsciously and almost perversely states that the Enlightenment did not
cause the French Revolution but the French revolution caused the Enlightenment, in the sense that it gave it coherence and identity and the
historical role that the Enlightenment or Enlightenment thought would not
have had had there not been a rupture with the Old Regime.
SG: Your work has played a very important role in applying anthropological methods to the study of group formation. In recent years, many
scholars questioned not just the concept of identity (I have in mind the
works by Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker) but also the usefulness
of operating with notions of groupness. For historians, however, the task
becomes increasingly complex because in our research we are constantly
in need of terms and concepts to describe groupness (e.g., nations, classes,
ethnic, confessional and linguistic groups). How can we reconcile an understanding of groups as constructed and invented with the need to write
readable and comprehensible histories taking into account how people described their own sense of belonging to a group?
PS: Right, well, this is a problem that periodically reappears throughout
the social sciences, not just in history, and its often framed as the classic
50
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
contrast between an emic and an etic approach. These are terms that come
from the linguistic anthropology of Kenneth Pike in the 1950s,8 who tried
to distinguish, without necessarily stating what the relationship was between the two, between approaches and categories of interpretation that
emerged from the lived experience of the subjects who are the objects of
study (the phonemic tools that the users of a language might have), and
contrasting that with the phonetic grammar that is the etic, rules and categories imposed by non-users (and indeed incomprehensible to users themselves). Its a classic opposition; never resolved, frequently invoked, and
debated in particular as concerns the relation between the two perspectives.
How do we reconcile, as you say, our use of these terms with more indigenous ways of formulating belonging and identification especially in the last
couple of decades as weve come to understand the problem of identity as a
construct or imagined category? I think that all of us who are sensitive to
the slippage, and probably anthropologists more than others, would note
that the last thing that an informant would be able to identify with is a claim
that his sense or her sense of belonging was invented. And in fact, in terms
of the patterns of collective behavior, so much of what we understand as
group belonging is so deeply kinetic and real and indeed violent and destructive that the very description of identity as invented or constructed
seems to do injustice to the very real nature of historical experience. I dont
think that there is a simple or universal solution, no magic bullet, and no
knife with which to cut this Gordian knot, at least none that is consistently
intelligible across disciplines and across cultures and across historical periods. I do think that in the historical work that Im reading more recently,
theres a tendency to move away from the term identity because of the
perception that its been overly contaminated by its use and abuse in other
disciplines and especially in linguistic theory and cultural studies, in which
the element of constructedness is really overplayed if not over-determined.
We thus need to continuously expand our conceptual vocabulary, to develop
a language that will allow us to think about collective belonging and affiliation in ways that communicate the sense in which these categories of belonging are simultaneously imposed as arbitrary, artificial constructions,
but also lived and experienced in their vernacular iterations as something
that is truly close to experience. Identity no longer does that, and the term
Im seeing more often now is identification, not used as much in an psycho8
For an introduction, see Thomas N. Headland, Kenneth L. Pike, Marvin Harris (Eds.).
Emics and Etics:The Insider/Outsider Debate. Newbury Park, CA, 1990.
51
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
analytic sense, where it has a very precise meaning, but in a social historical sense, as a term which can in fact move between an emic and an etic
perspective but also move between an official effort to classify and to categorize and to identify people and vernacular appropriations of these categories. The work of Gerard Noiriel, the historical sociologist in France, has
been valuable in thinking about identification in its official framework, but
whats equally interesting is how the initially arbitrary attempts to classify,
inventory and categorize people also become meaningful categories of collective belonging. Indeed, thats the great paradox and the great mystery,
how what initially appear as arbitrary, contingent and accidental, if politically powerful categories of belonging like the nation become real, and
how people in history often begin with very strategic and instrumental stances
when faced with such external identifications, but over time, these initially
quite arbitrary distinctions turn into meaningful categories of collective
action in that way. I think that its a very similar process to what happens
with boundaries themselves, which I discuss in my earlier work. It was a
problem that always somewhat baffled me, and I consider it one of the
great mysteries of historical inquiry itself: how boundaries, initially completely arbitrary, were very much constructed, accidental divisions of territorial arrangements, became over time meaningful structures that informed
and framed the way in which people collectively thought, acted, and behaved in the world.
SG: Thank you very much. Your answer suggests an interesting turn
that can, it seems to me, add to the discussion a line of inquiry into the
categories of practice and categories of analysis and the ways in which we
can avoid the trap of applying categories derived from everyday life experience to our analytical purposes. For example, we had a very interesting
exchange published in Ab Imperio that revealed difficulties which the French
society in general, and French intellectuals in particular have in applying
terms other than social, universally social, to the recent riots in France and
one of the questions we tried to pose to our French audience was can we
actually interpret these riots as the outcome of a new ethnic experience in
the making, and the response of course was quite negative No, you cannot do that, because this was a social experience, an experience derived
from unemployment, class, and social identity.
PS: Its very complicated in the case of the French riots of November
2005, in part because the social sciences in France are institutionalized within
a political culture that is rather different from your experience or mine, in
52
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
which certain terms like ethnicity are virtually taboo and are, in fact,
legally proscribed, such that French social science cannot actually measure
ethnicity because the French government in its census refuses to allow for
that category to exist, given the Republic model of civic integration. I myself have spent many a long evenings arguing with French social scientists,
whom I respect and whose work I think is wonderfully wise and important,
but who I find to be blocked on this very issue of how to think ethnicity in
France because they are so much the product of an institutional culture in
which even the act of thinking ethnicity is so deeply challenging to the
republican model of civic identity.
SG: Let me return for a moment to the historical conjuncture of the
ancien rgime and modern society. Did French society during the ancien
rgime have a vision and means to express itself in a self-descriptive
narrative (whether in visual symbolism, in music, or in text)? How can
historians write a narrative of the pre-national (non-national) polity? Should
we see the project of total history, in its Braudelian version as such, as an
attempt to write about multiple subjects and actors who are simultaneously
incorporated into a variety of hierarchies without direct correlation of status among them?
PS: Well, its a good question, its almost an impossible question because the project of total history is almost by its nature, despite Braudels
best effort, an impossible project. I dont think that we historians ever really aspire to write about everything, and a narrative of the pre-national or
non-national polity is certainly possible, but it would have to be framed by
historical questions that both limit and delimit a subject matter. In the case
of Old Regime France I might refer to the work of David Bell, who was
interested in the development of nationalism in the eighteenth century. Bell
argues, convincingly, that the discourse and literary efforts to express national sentiment in the eighteenth century can be found in a range of projects,
from the efforts to create canonical list of important Frenchmen, to the
political propaganda efforts during the Seven Years War, in which the nature of Frenchness is stated in opposition to the English. Such constructions
of national identity and national sentiment are nonetheless rather distinct
from the project of nationalism itself, which is much more a project born of
the republican moment in the French revolution, when there is a more resigned acceptance or a belief that the nation doesnt really exist but needs
to be constructed, needs to be built, needs to be imposed. In Bells argument, the model for doing this was actually the Catholic Church. To a great
53
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
extent the republican project took its cue, as well as its institutional resources from ecclesiastical domains, and in particular in the work of creating
a homogenous Catholic culture in a heterogeneous setting such as France.
So, thats one possible way of thinking about or of writing a narrative of the
movement from a pre-national to a national polity, from a society in which
there are certain indigenous expressions of a literary and symbolic character of national sentiment; these, however, are still not societies we could
characterize as being societies born of nationalism or societies that are
modern in the same sense of post-revolutionary or nineteenth century societies. But I think that more generally the answer is that we can write the
kinds of histories that best answer the kinds of questions that we ask. To
quote Lucien Febvre, to ask a question is the beginning and end of all
history. It depends what questions we ask of these pre-national polities
and in part, the answer is already contained in naming the thing, being that
the key word in that term pre-national polity is polity and it is the political framework which helps us to frame the unity of the narrative. This is
not to say that in the case of France, for example, were going back to a
king-centered narrative or a court-centered narrative of national history.
Politics or polity means much more than simply the exercise of sovereignty
by an individual empowered through the office of kingship. It means a set
of institutions; it means a set of competing discourses and contested discourses, in which part of our job as historians is to analyze, not so much the
individual utterances, but to sketch out the framework in which such utterances are meaningful.
SG: It might be a much more complex procedure in the case of empires
because just suggesting a political imperial framework for a historical narrative is a highly controversial statement, precisely because we live, at least
theoretically, in a post-imperial age, where national identities seem to be
well-established (at least they have established themselves in schools and
other institutions producing knowledge). Suggesting an imperial unity would
appear as an attack on these national identities.
PS: Well, I think thats right, but I do think that good history is really
capacious in the sense that it tries to incorporate different subject positions
and perspectives. There are certainly ways of framing an imperial history
in a cross-cutting fashion that would allow for the exploration of the relation between these different voices such that a history of a nineteenth century empire or of imperial Russia takes on the opposing distinction of official and vernacular expressions of identity. That might be one way of trying
54
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
to aggregate some of the vast diversity and heterogeneity of subject positions in a pre-national polity, to contrast efforts at the imperial or national
level to create what you call normative nationality, efforts to impose homogeneity, efforts to create linguistic and cultural unity and so on; and vernacular efforts not necessarily just responses but vernacular appropriations of these efforts too that contrast and oppose official frameworks.
This might be one way of trying to be broad and comprehensive in writing
a history of empire, but without the aspirations of doing total history.
SG: Much of our conversation revolved around the language and models
of social sciences. Let me then pose a question about the language and
models of social sciences head on. Scholars operate with the language and
models of social sciences born out of national state experience in the late
nineteenth century aimed at describing the realities of nation states. How
adequate are our attempts to apply those categories in describing and analyzing the under-nationalized societies of the ancien rgime or European
old regimes that survived until the Great War? Where do we look for alternatives or more suitable concepts and terms? If it was impossible to express the revolutionary experience, is it possible to express the pre-revolutionary world in its own terms, or at least not ascribe to it the post-revolutionary tropes of conservatism, tolerance, moderation, etc? In that
connection, how useful are qualified terms such as ancient, citizenship,
or imperial citizenship, which sometimes appear contradicting the universalizing modern meanings of the terms?
PS: This again is a very important and difficult question. It reminds me
of the many different kinds of debates that we have in European history
about the early modern period. The early modern period itself contains
within it the conundrum that you mentioned because, in characterizing it as
early modern we are trying to both assert the modernity and thus the tangibility of modern concepts into the slightly more recent past but also, at the
same time, emphasize its early features and therefore its distinguishing
qualities which make it not yet a modern society. There are debates that
have long droned on that address this conundrum, and simultaneously the
problem you raised earlier, about indigenous categories and those of social
analysis. The historiographical debate that began half a century ago about
the nature of social hierarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth century is a
good example: was early modern society organized by classes (in the
Marxian sense) or by orders (in a early modern corporatist sense)? This
was not simply a neutral intellectual debate, but one deeply engaged in
55
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
politics, including the way in which it was mapped institutionally. Thus
Marxists, including and especially the Soviet historians like Porchnev,9 insisted on the existence of class in the early modern period, against a monarchist and reactionary position of some French historians (like Roland Mousnier at the Sorbonne),10 who insisted that class was irrelevant and that we
could only accept the emic categories of the early modern period, which
were categories based on the concept of order, of a state and of the regulated
hierarchy that could be found in juridical texts. So, the question is not new,
and that debate is now quite old, but it will not be soon put to bed. I think
the important thing is that were much more attentive now than we ever
were about the relation between words and things, and that is what has been
beneficial about the so-called linguistic or post-structural turn in historical
studies. Our attention has been drawn, by literary critics especially, to the
very categories that we use to describe the past, and historians have become more self-conscious and more selective in the ways in which we make
sense of the past. This is a fairly abstract answer, but in practice it works
out, I think, rather nicely for historians, who, as students of any given period, have a pretty good intuitive sense of when a word or concept is being
used in a consistent and determined way that doesnt seem to fully describe
or doesnt adequately describe the regular patterns of history or of historical behavior; at that point, then, the language can be modified, it can be
jettisoned. Historians are, unlike many social scientists, basically inductive
thinkers and deep empiricists, and if words dont work, then maybe there
are problems with words, and maybe there is intellectual work to be done in
trying to explain why they dont work or in modifying them in ways that
allow them to be descriptive and interpretive of different historical periods.
Do I believe that one can qualify such universal and apparently monolithic
and homogenizing terms like citizenship by talking about its ancient or its
imperial iterations or its royal iterations or the problem of the subject-citizen? Absolutely. Do I believe that there are ways of talking about nationality even though the word doesnt yet exist, the obverse side of the same
9
56
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
problem? Absolutely. Language is, in this sense, so much a tool of our
understanding and shouldnt be held as the prison of it.
SG: Thank you very much. This was our last question and well end on
this very optimistic note, at least for historians.
SUMMARY
Ab Imperio , , . ,
, , ,
. , , ,
. - ,
Ancien Rgime . ,
, . - nationality nationalit
, , . ,
,
, , , , .
,
57
Interview with Peter Sahlins, Trying to Make Sense of the Old Regime...
, . , .
, , .
, , ,
, .
. ,
,
.
, ,
. . ,
,
, XVIXVII . , , , , .
58
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
XVIII .:
, ,
, , ,
, , , ,
,
, , , , , .
, , , , Ab Imperio, , ,
, , , . , ( )
, 1980- .
, , 59
. , , , ...
, ..,
. , - , , , -, , , , -, ,
. .
, ( ) . , ,
, .. , .
, , ,
. , , , , , ? ,
, ,
.
, ,
, . ,
, ,
.
, , ,
1721 .
II. , , , , , , 60
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.
, ,
, .
, , , .
.
-, ,
. -,
, ,
, , ,
-,
. -, , , . , -,
, , , , .1
,
. , : - XVI XVII ., XVIII .,
, , , ,
. , ,
1
. , ,
,
.
61
. , , , ...
, .2
,
: , ,
. ,
,
, ,
. XVIII .
, , . ,
, , , , ,
. (
)
- - :
, ,
, , .., ,
,
.
(
) , ,
16-17 2006 . XVIII.
. : . . .
XVII . , 2000; . . . XVIII
XIX . , 2001; . . .
- XVIII XIX . -, 2004; . . . :
II. , 2006. ,
.
2
62
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.3
,4 ,
,
.
,
, , ,
, , .
, , XVIII ., . , , , , , , , .
1:
, , , ,
.
,
, . : , ,
, , ,
?
.: http://www.dhi-moskau.de/TermineR20050603
-Dateien/Programm%20der%20Konferenz-rus.
4
XVIII . ,
.
3
63
. , , , ...
, , - . XXI ,
.
,
, XVIII . . . , . . . ,
, , , (IX )
, . , , , . , , , .
, ,
, . . , .5
1980- .,
. . . ,
, , .. , , , , .6 ,
XIV-XV . 1980- .
5
. : . . .
(IX-XII .). , 1998. . 165.
6
. . . : - . , 1980. . 31-32. . : . . , . . . . , 1988; . . . : ,
IX XIII . -, 1992.
64
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. . , . ,
, ,
, , XV-XVI .7
,
, . - , -
,
, ,
,
, ,
..8 , , , , ,
.
, ,
, ,
. , XV
XVI . ,
, .9
7
. : . . //
. , 1994. . 3. . :
. . The State // / . . . -, 2002. . 12-74.
8
.: . . . . , 1996; . . .
. , 1997.
9
, , , , ,
65
. , , , ...
,
. , , , 1721 ,
, XV XVI .,
XVI ., , . ,
10 .11 , , ,
.12
, ,
, . , ,
,
, ?13 , ?
, , ,
, , , , ,
- . , , .
10
. . : , ,
. , 1997.
11
, ,
,
, , . , - , ,
.
, - , , ,
.
12
. . . . . 2006. . 214.
66
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
.
, :
. . , , , , ,
. . . ,
,
, , , .14 , . , . . ,
, XIXII .15 , ,
, , , , .
, , : , ,
, . , , , , , , ,
, ,
., , , , . , ,
, . , ,
, .
14
. . . . , 1988. . I. . 339.
15
. . . . . 50.
13
67
. , , , ...
, . -,
, , , ,
, , stat, , , , .. ,
statuo , status , . -,
. .
1431 . , 1502 .,
. , , .. , .16 XI-XVII ., XVI ., , , . ,
,
.17
, .. .18
, XVI . , .19
16
. . . . , 1989. . 1. . 1. .
572.
17
XVI . , , , .
, , XVI .,
(. : . Kharkhordin. What is the State? The Russian Concept
of Gosudarstvo in the European Context // History and Theory. 2001. Vol. 40. P. 209).
, . , ,
, ;
, (. . . , 1973. . 91.).
18
XI-XVII . , 1977. . 4. . 109.
19
.. . .: . Kharkhordin. What is the
68
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , XVII .,
- , . ( , , , ) ,
, .
.20 , . . , , ,21 , ,
.22
, , () , , , , .23
,
, ,
, , XVII XVIII ., .. I, XVIII
1797 . ,
State? P. 206-240; . . ? // . . 152-217; . . . XVI
XVII . // . . , 2002. . 294310. , , . , XV .
,
, ,
(Kharkhordin. What is the State? P. 215).
20
.: - . . 3:
. , 1985. .43-49; XVI XVII . , 1986. . 135.
21
. . . . . 169.
22
, , .. .
23
. . ,
, XVI .
(. . . XVI .: // . . , 2005. . 293-294).
69
. , , , ...
. ,
,
, , .
. ,
, . .
. ,
, , , , , , .
, , ,
,
.24 ,
, , ,
25
,
, . , , , , , ,
. ( , )
. , , [ . ..] , , .26
: : .
, 2001. . 16-17.
25
:
,
, . , .
26
. . . : . , 2004. . 210.
24
70
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
- XI-XV .27 .
2: versus
1690 . ,
, :
, 28 [ .
..], ,
29
19 I ,
, ,
:
, , , , ,
,
!30
. , ,
,
27
. . . (XIXV .) // (XI-XX .). , 1994. . 6.
28
.
. . , XVIII . , ,
, , ,
, ,
household (. . . ,
XVIII : . . /
. . . -, 2006. . 5-6.).
29
. . . . : . , 2004. . 20.
30
. -, 1950. . 9.
. 1. 3252. . 226-227.
71
. , , , ...
. , ,
, , , ,
, . ,31 , , .
, , , , ,
. . ,
, , .32
, , , I . ,
,
, , . . ,
1690- 1700- . , ,
, , ,
. ,
, , , . . -,
, .33
,
, .. , .
, , , ,
, . , ,
,
, ,
: , , , ( .
3251. . 226).
32
. . . . . 59.
33
. . . XVII XVIII . // : . . I. , 1989. . 36, 35.
31
72
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1709 . , .
, .
, . . , , , -, , -,
.34 , , , , ,
, . . . , , , , ,
.35
1682 ., ,
, , , . . , ,36 . ,
, 1680 , .
, ,
1722 .,
,
.
. . . . , 1984.
. 26.
35
. . . . , 1964. . 474- 475.
36
. . . . . 153.
34
73
. , , , ...
. , .
.
. . , , .37
,38 . ,39
,
, . XVIII , ,
, . ,
, , .40
. . . . . 41.
. : XIXVII . // : . , 1991. .
56-84.
39
N. S. Kollmann. By Honor Bound. State and Society in Early Modern Russia. Ithaca
and London, 1999. : . . . : . , 2001.
40
.: . . . : XVIII . , 2006. . 170-176.
. II, 1765-1766 ., :
, , (. 360).
, ,
, .
, .
, . . :
, ,
(. : . . . 1767
( ) // . 1990. 1. . 68).
1785 . : , , , , (. 1).
37
38
74
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
. . XVIII .. ,
:
. , , . , ,
, ,
, . , , ,
.
, : .
3:
, , , . , , ,
. 1701 . I , 1702 .
, , II, 1786 .
.
75
. , , , ...
, .
. . , ,
, .41 XVIII .:
, XVIII . , , .
, I,
, , - XVII ., knecht lackey (, ).
. . ,
, . , ,
. , , , , ,
-
, .
, .42
. . . XVIII // . 2005. 5. . 6.
42
, , , , . , . , ,
:
? , ,
41
76
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, XVIII . , ,
.
. . , , . , ,
. . -, 1702 . , , ,
.
- , .
1702 . . ,
,
. , , . , , , .
? , ,
. , .
, (. : . . .
. -, 1997),
.
77
. , , , ...
.43 ,
,
.
-, ?
, ,
. . . , ,
, , .,44 ,
.
XVIII .,
, .
-,
. . : ,
, . , . ,
. ,
/ , , , . . ,
(. . . . , 1998).
44
XVIII . , , . .
1730
. 1730 . -
, .
. . , ,
1741 ., , (.: . . . : , 1725-1762 . , 2003; . . , 2006).
43
78
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, .
,
,
, ,
.
XVIII ., II
,
,
, . . , , , .
, . .
,
XVII .,
, .
,
() , .. , . , .45
, .
, . . ,
. ,
-:
.: . . . // . , 1988.
. 43; . .
Stadtburger ()
Staatsburger (), , .
45
79
. , , , ...
,
; , ;
, . ,
,
, .46
XVIII ., ,
, .47 . .
, 1770- .
- .
,
, , ,
, , 48
, ,
, , , ,
,
1) , , 2) 3) , .
. : . . . XVIII . //
. . 1972. . 31. 1. . 67-73.
47
., : . . .
XVIII ( ). , 1999.
48
. . 1289. . 1. . 517. . 12-13. . . . . .
46
80
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , ; ,
,.. ,
, , , ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
, , , , .
, ,
, , . , , , : -,
, ,
; , , , , ,
,
.49
,
,
, , ,
. ,
. , -, . , , , , , , ,
.
49
. . 33-34.
81
. , , , ...
4:
.
, ,
, , ,
XVII-XVIII ., . , .
, , ,
, , , ,
.50
. :
- , . .
1799 ., . . . , ,
,
, , (esprit nationale),
( ). ,
, ,
XIX . 1783 . . .
. , ,
,
, . . . . // .
. -. 1910. . 88. 2. . 4. . : . . .
XVIII // (XI-XX .) , 1994. . 39.
50
82
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, XVIII .
, . . .
. , , , XVIII .
.
, ,
, , , - .
. XVIII .
,
.51
, ,
,
.
. II: . . : . ,
.52
. . , (. . )
. , : ; , .53
: . ,
2005.
52
. II: . , 2006. .
11.
53
. . . // : 1725-1765 / . . .
. . . . . . , 1998. . 424.
51
83
. , , , ...
,
: nation,
, , .
: XVIII . , national,
? , , nation ,
,
XVIII ,
, .
5: . .
.
,
,54 , , ,
, // .
, , ,
, XVIII , - .
, . . ,
, .
. : . . ,
. . . : / WP6/2005/02. WP6 .
, 2005. . 46-48.
54
84
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,..
: ,
. , .55 , , , , ,
- , , ,
. -
.
, . . , , , , , ,
: , .56
, , , , ,
. . XVIII .. , ,
, , , .
, ,
, XVIII . , , . , 55
. . . .
, 2002. . 586-587.
56
. . 587.
85
. , , , ...
. , , , .
, . , .
( ),
,
, , , . ,
, .57
, ,
, , , [ . ..] .58 : ( , ,
) ,
, . . , .59
,
. , . . . . , , , .
58
. . . XVIII . , 1996. . 65.
59
. . . 608. , , , - .
57
86
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
-
,
1761 . ,
,
,
.
, , ,
, , , . ,
, , ,
,
.
, . . : XVIII . . , ,
, , . XVIII .
, , ;
;
, ; , . ,
, . . , , ,
, () . , .
. , . , . , . . , . , . . ,
, , ,
. , 87
. , , , ...
, , .
. . , , , , ,
. ,
XVIII . ()
, , , , .
, ,
.
, , ( ),
XVIII . / ,
- ? ,
( ,
), , , , . ( ) , ,
.60
, , , , XVIII ., . , .
, , 2-5, 6, ,
. ,
, , .
,
. . . . . 2: . . .
, 1986. . 52, 51.
60
88
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , ,
, , ,
. , ,
. . , XVIII XIX ., .. ,
, ,
. . , , -, , ,
,
, ,
, ,
.61
, ,
, . , . ,
, . . ,
, . ,
, , , :
, , , , , , , ; ,
, ,
. -. .62
. . . : . , 2004. . 137-138.
. . 1289. . 1. . 517. . 33-34. , .
61
62
89
. , , , ...
, , . , XVIII ., , , , .63
. . , ,
1749-1750 . , , , , ,
, .64 , ,
.
, , ,
. ,
, ? ,
?.
, , , , .65 , , ,
, , . , ,
,
. . , . . . : . . 2:
. -, 2006. . 535.
64
. . . : // : . . IX.
-, 1991. . 35.
65
.
63
90
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.66 , ,
,
, ,..
,..
. , , , ,
, ,
.67 , , , II , , , .68 , , . .
: , , , ,
, ,
.69
66
. 1861. . III. 17. . 515-517; . . .
. . 10. . 232.
67
. . 148-149; . . . .
-, 1870. . I. . 381. . :
, , .
, ,
, ,
, ( . ,
,
, - - ,
- . , 1789.
. 29-30). . :
. . . : // : . . IX. -, 1991. . 39-48. ,
(. . . : . , 2006). .
68
. . . II. II // . 1901. 12. . 761.
69
. . . . . . 140.
91
. , , , ...
, ,
XVIII . ,
( )
. ,
- , - , .
,
. , - .
, , . ,
, , . . .
,
, ,
, . , , .
, XVIII .,
,70
, , . ,
, , . , XVIII .
( )
.
70
92
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , .
, , ,
.
, , ,
, .
, , .
, Russian.
,
, , ,
,
, . . , , .
,
, . II. XVIII . ,
. , ,
, , .
, ,
, .71
.: . . . II . , 1996;
. II. -, 2000.
71
93
. , , , ...
. , , , ,
,
. , , , , ,
, .
, . , ( , ), , , , (
, ,
XVIII . ),
, , . ,
,
, .
6. :
, , , .
,
,
, , ,
. , -
XVIII . , . 1994 ., . . , . .
,
, , 94
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , .72 ,
, ,
.73 12
(.. ,
),
.
, ,
XVIII .
. , . . ( ), .
XI
XV ., , , ( )
.74
, , ,
, .75
, , ..
, .
, , , ,
.76 , XVIII ,
. ,
. . . //
(XI-XX .). , 1994.
. 16.
73
. . . . . 615; . . . // . . 31-37; . . . . . 38-50.
74
. . . . . 19.
75
. . 25.
76
. . . . . 35.
72
95
. , , , ...
,
XVIII , , , , , - , .77 , , XVII . - .
,
, . , XVIII ., , . , ,
, , ,
, ,
, .
. , ,
, XVII ., 1682 1689 .,
, ..
, ,
; , .
, , XVIII .
, -
. , ,
, , , .
* * *
, , 77
. . . . . 47.
96
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , XVIII ., , , , , ,
. ,
, , , , XVIII
, ,
. , ,
,
, ,
. , , -. , , (, ).78
II , XVIII . . , , , ( citizenship)
. ,
, , XVIII ., , . , , , . , ,
XVIII XIX .
. , ,
,
, . , , 1782 . . . :
, ,
? ,
,
. ,
. . ,
.
78
97
. , , , ...
, .
, , - . , , , , ,
XVIII . , ( )
,
, ,
. ,
, .
,
, , . , ,
, , .
SUMMARY
Aleksandr Kamenskii begins his article with the observation that the
growing field of empire studies (or in a more paradigmatic rendering, New
Imperial History) makes contemporary historians return to traditional questions of historical scholarship and cast them in a new light with the help of
innovative interpretative frames, such as microhistory, local history, a history of everyday life, and a history of mentalities. A by product of this
intersected historiographic development is the emergence of a line of inquiry that focuses on perception and languages of description of empire by
different political and social actors (not necessarily representing the privileged and educated layers of society). In his article, Kamenskii surveys
recent historical studies of the formative period of the Russian empire (from
the Petrine reforms to the reign of Catherine II), and suggests possible interpretative frames and research questions that concern the problem of how
former tsars subjects described, imagined, and related to a new political
98
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
entity: the Russian empire. Kamenskii notes the exploration of this process,
alongside with the inquiry into the historical semantics of employed concepts and categories, is even more important insofar as attempts to arrive at
an essentialist definition of the character of the pre-Petrine and post-Petrine polity (be it a state or an empire) yielded meager and confusing
results. In the first part of the article the author describes the development
of historic concepts of state (gosudarstvo) and Russian land (russkaia
zemlia), and notes that from the Time of Troubles through the first half of
the eighteenth century there appeared a new meaning of the state as an
abstract entity divorced from the persona of the ruler. This transformation
paved the way for the emergence of the concept of fatherland in the Petrine political language, and concomitantly the concept of patriotism. These
new concepts were a by product of the development of the Russian state
and the process of secularization of Russian society in the eighteenth century. Alongside an abstract concept of the state as fatherland there appeared a new individuating concept of the emperors subjects, whose main
duty was loyalty to the sovereign and love of fatherland. Kamenskii argues
that research on these semantic transformations should continue, taking into
account a peculiar feature of Russian political reforms and discourse in the
eighteenth century, namely the reception of Western European texts, concepts, and discourses, and their telescoped historical development. The latter peculiar feature is very important for the author for he sees in the Russian case the coexistence of modern concepts of sovereignty and subjecthood (which constituted a foundational setting for the modern national state
in Western Europe), and the belated formation of the modern state and
empire. Kamenskii then turns to the figure of Lomonosov and devises a
complex picture of the relationship between the national myth and the understanding of Russia in the imperial and Enlightenment framework which
would enter into conflict much later, and parallel the semantic differentiation of the concept of fatherland from that of the state. In his concluding
remarks Kamenskii infers the unavoidability of a historical approach to the
problem of patriotism that is overloaded with ideological connotations, and
remarks that the inquiry into the history of patriotic discourse must be supplemented with exploration of the changing categories of description of
imperial polity.
99
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
VERSUS
XVII .
( / )*
, , .
, , , .., , , .
, .
, ,
. , , ,
.
versus
XVII . ( / ),
: XVII .: , , /
. , . , 2005.
.
*
101
. , versus ...
, : 1) , ;
2) -,
.
- XVII . () : , ?. /, . - , ,
, () ,
- ,
. () (1) . ,
, , , , , , . , , , , , ,
, ,
.
,
. , (, ) . ,
1
, . ( ) , Ab Imperio ( ) .
102
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , /
. , ,
,
, .
( ) - .
, ;
, , , , . ,
, ..
,
.
, , , .
, .
, 1853 .,2 , XVII . , , ; ;
. , ,
2
J. Jerlicz. Latopisiec albo kroniczka rnych spraw i dziejw dawnych i teraniejszych
czasw / Wyd. K. W. Wjcicki. Petersburg, 1853.
103
. , versus ...
.
: , .
, , XVII ., ,
,
.
, ,3
. , 4
19 1598 . . (
) (
). , ,
, .
- .
, ,
, - . 1603 .
- , 1608 . ,
, . 1606 1621
, (
) . , : 1648 . , .
. , 17
(pod lat 17), 1615 , , .. ,
. . , , 3
. . // . . .
4. , 2004. . 135-188 ( . 160-176).
4
. . . 175-176.
104
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , -. : ,5 ,
1595 . - 1631 .
;6 , ( 1608 .
7).
, , , .
, ,
,8 ,
, .9
, ,
- [ . ..].
5
1602 . , : ,
[ ]. . 4. , 1859. . 38.
6
(I. ukaszewicz. Historia szk w Koronie i Wielkim Ksistwie Litewskim od
najdawniejszych czasw do roku 1794. T. 1. Pozna, 1846. S. 350; . . . . 1: . , 1886. .
146-147), : V V . , 1898. . 347-348.
7
/ . . . // . .
20: . , 2002. . 73 ( : . 61).
8
1643 .
: . [ ]. . 11. . 1. . 10.
. 294-295 .
9
.: . .
: ? (
V .) // . . . 1. , 2002. . 111144; . :
, ( V
V .) // .
70-. . 1. , 2004. . 320-357.
105
. , versus ...
, ,
, ,
, .. , .10
-,
, , .
, , ..
: ,
, -
, , , ,
.
.
, , , ( ). 1618 ,
-, , ,
.11 1618-1620 . , ,
.12 1621 . , , .
: od janczaryna z janczarki
, .
.: N. Jakovenko. Zur Frage der Wechselwirkung zwischen
Lateinischer und Kyrilischer Schrift in der Ukraine (Ende des 16.- I Hlfte des 17.
Jahrhundert) // Scrittura civilt. Vol. 8. Roma, 1984. p. 161-184; . V-V . // V . , 1989. .
277.
11
. : . . . // () .
(, , , ). 1569-1673.
, 2002. . 32-139. . : . . () 1569-1673 . . -, 2002.
12
. . () . . 182.
10
106
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , . , 10 , .
, 10 2-3,
, , 1620- .
-
,
. :
1620 1630- .
- - .13 : 1633 . , , , , . , - , : 1642 .
- , zbiegiem i
apostat.14
,
.
. 1635 . , . ,
1648 . 9 (
), . ,
-.
, , ,
. , , .
, .
: 1648 ,
, , ,
16 - . :
13
14
.: . . . 167-169.
. . 169.
107
. , versus ...
, ,
1647 . , ; ,
, ,
.
, : 1649 . ,
, ..
.
a do zmiowania Boego (, 1652 .15 ), . . , ,
. , 1660-70- .,
. ,
, 3 3 1674,16 / . , 1660 .
, , , .17
, , , . , , (1653, 1655 1662 .) ,
1658 .
.
1670 . .
, ,
.
* * *
, -, . , , 15
1650 . ( . . 174),
1651 ., 1651-1652 .,
1652 .
16
. . 175.
17
. . 163-164.
108
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
XVIII ., -- .18 ,
,19 , ,20
1944 . , , 1839 ,21 ,
,
20 dla rozdania familii.
,22 ,
, , . , , 1916 ., 8- -.23 . .
18 1922 .
, .24 , ,
H. Kozerska. Straty w zbiorze rkopisw Biblioteki Uniwersyteckiej w Warszawie w
czasie I i II wojny wiatowej. Warszawa, 1960. S. 113.
19
. . //
. . [ ]. . CLI. , 1931.
. 135.
20
: F. Puaski. Opis 815 rkopisw Biblioteki Ord.
Krasiskich. Warszawa, 1915. S. 406-408.
21
:
. . . . 187-188.
22
. .187.
23
. 1922 .: . [ 9 1922 . ..] VV ., .
1916 .
( -. . 8. . 2. . 200).
18
109
. , versus ...
.
25 , .26
,
Latopisiec abo kroyniczka,
. , silva rerum: , -, ,
, , , ..27
,
26 1620 ., ,
1621 . (. 41-60). , , .28 (Co
si te za wieku mego dziao, pod ktory czas i rok, . 60-62),
. 1617 . 1620 .,
: Od stworzenia
swiata wypisane od latopiscow greckich i aciskich kroynik (. 62-97).
1620-1640- .,
, . , 16 1648
18 1649 ., , -, , - (Nieszczsny pocztek rozboju
kozackiego, . 97-107). ,
28 1648 . (. 108-123). Wypisanie przodkow moich (. 108-123), 3 1648 ., .. . : . . . , 1843-1921.
. , 1993. . 171.
26
: , , .. snieg nieg, ktory ktry .
27
P. Borek. Szlakami dawnej Ukrainy. Studia staropolskie. Krakw, 2002. S. 86-87.
28
W. Czermak. Kilka sw o pamitnikach polskich XVII wieku // Eiusdem. Studia
historyczne. Krakw, 1901. S. 257.
24
110
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, 1659 .29
,
,
, , , , ,
. , ,
, , -,
(, , . 190-209; List
stryjowski do synowca, . 349-353; - , . 362-368 ..).
, , , . : , ,
.
?
: , , , ,
, , ,
.
(
/ ), , , ,
..
, , .. , , , .
.
, (123 225),30
. . . . 173, . 245.
, , , ,
1653 .
29
30
111
. , versus ...
102 ,
58. ,
,
: ,
(. 84); (.
140); (. 176);
, , (.
236). , , :
( (. 177);
(. 272) ..). : ,
, ,
, .
, , .
,31
, .
,
(do Polskiej za Wis, . 102; po
wszystkiej Polszcze poza Wis, c. 254)
. - : (w Litwie nad
Niemnem, . 71), (na Biaoru ku Smolesku, .
187; do kraju litewskiego... ku Mohylowu, . 274). () :
, , , , ,
, , , , , . .
, , ,
, , , ,
,
, , ..
31
112
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
( , , , , , , , , , , .), (,
, , ),
, .
:
o (. 266).
,
, . , ,
; , ; , .
, , ,32
, :
(c. 81); ... ,
, (c. 97); ... (c. 78);
(c. 82);
(c. 95) .
: , ,
, , . ,
1638 ., ,
(c. 81); , 1649 . ,
(c. 125);
( );
,
(. 137);
1649 . , (c.
138); , 1651 .
32
1642 1648 . : w cerkwi bratskiej murowanej (.84);
w cerkwi w monasteru bratskim (. 101).
113
. , versus ...
, (c. 150). 1651 . (. 151).
.
, : ,
(c. 68). 5 1651 .
, , (c. 151). ,
33
, ,
- ,
1620-1640- .
.34 , - , . ,
,
, , . , . :
Methodiusz doktor (. 62),35 36
33
, , -
-
,
: . . . - . // . . , . . ,
. . . . . 1:
. , 2004. . 312-313.
34
.: . . (1620-1640- ) // . .
V-V . , 2002. . 296-330.
35
, ,
( 311), ,
. .
36
Kronika polska Marcina Bielskiego nowo przez Joachima Bielskiego, syna jego,
wydana. Krakw, 1597. , , , 1580- .
114
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
( , Szleydar) 37
, , ,
(w Baroniuszu oswiadcza, c. 65). ,
, ,
.
,
. - ,
: ,
, (. 72).
, ,
: [ ]
,
, -
(. 87). , .. , : , 38 1649 . ... (. 129). , . , 1663 . , , (. 267), , .
:
, ( , ) .
, (. 297). , , , 37
, , , , , ,
: M. Kromer. O sprawach, dziejach i wszystkich innych
potocznociach koronnych polskich. Krakw, 1611 ( .: Nowy Korbut.
Pimiennictwo staropolskie. T. 2. Warszawa, 1964. S. 36-37).
38
, , ,
.. , .
115
. , versus ...
, . ,
(Ukraina dalsza, c. 76), (na Ukrainie za
Dnieprem, . 100) (na Ukrainie midzy
Korsuniem i Czerkasami, c. 97). , ,
: W roku 1638 na Ukrainie wszdzie
yto byo po miastach i miasteczkach, na targach okoo Kijowa i za Dnieprem
miarka po zotych 40 i dalej (. 81); 1660 . na Ukrain ku
Kijowu obrcio (. 243); 1661 .
na Ukrain ku Kijowu (. 251) ..
, .
? : , .
XVII .
- XVI-XVII .
. ,
, ,
. ,
- ,
:
, , XVI . , XVII .,
..., , . [] XIX . . , - , .39
, 39
. . -. . 1. , 1898 ( .
: , 1991. . 2).
116
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , . , ,
, XVII . - .40
,
XVI-XVII . , ,41 , / .
,
XV . , , .42
1569 ., ..
. , , (1550 .) . , ,
, . , , ,
.: T. Chynczewska-Hennel. wiadomo narodowa szlachty ukraiskiej i kozaczyzny
od schyku XVI do poowy XVII w. Warszawa, 1985. S. 35; F. E. Sysyn. Between
Poland and the Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600-1653. Cambridge, MA,
1985. Pp. xiii-xiv; A. Kappeler. Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine. Mnchen, 1994. S. 1721; P. Borek. Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach i pamitnikach. Bohaterowie, fortece,
tradycja. Krakw, 2001. S. 9-13; . . . // . . 2. , 2002. . 795-800.
41
. : . . . . , 1951.
. 7-31; P. Borek. Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach. S. 9-13; . . .
-- V . // Z dziejw kultury prawnej. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi
Bardachowi w dziewidziesiciolecie urodzin. Warszawa, 2004. S. 411-432.
42
. : Choice of Name
versus Choice of Path (The Names of Ukrainian Territory from the Late Sixteenth to the
Late Seventeenth Century) A Laboratory of Post-Modernity: Ukrainian
History and Historiography about Ukraine since 1991 ( ).
40
117
. , versus ...
, .43
, , 1558 .
, , , , [finitimarumque locorum].44
-, 1560- . Polonia et Hungaria
nuova tabula,
1562 . ,
, .45
1580 ., ,
. , , , ,
[panom i rycerstwu na Ukrainie ruskiej, kijowskiej,
woyskiej, podolskiej i bracawskiej mieszkajcym].46 ,
(,
), . ,
. , 1569 . , . 1569-1586 .
, 43
. : Studia i materiay do historii wojskowoci.
T. VI. z. 2. Warszawa, 1960. S. 343.
44
. . . , 2004. . 195.
45
. .
1562 . // . . , 1998. . 83.
46
, 1580 .: - ,
[ ]. . 3. . 1. . 12.
118
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.47 ,
,
. ,
. 1621 ., ,
, ,
, :
, , , .48
,
, , , , , ( . ). : , 1600 . ()
, .49
, / :
, . ,
.
-, , 1620-1630- . ,50 ..
. ,
.
1648 . ,
. . () . . 140, 154.
: , 8 1621 . // Archiwum
Gwne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Zamoyskich [ AGAD, AZ]. Rps 725. Nr. 67.
49
: , 7 V 1600 . //
AGAD, AZ. Rps 703. Nr 18.
50
W. Nekanda Trepka. Liber generationis plebeanorum (Liber Chamorum) / Oprac.
Rafa Leszczyski. Wyd. 2-ie. Wrocaw etc., 1995. S. 459 ( 2355).
47
48
119
. , versus ...
:
,
, , .51
,
,
.
, , - ( , 52 ),
, .53
, , :
, , ; , ,
; 54 .. , , ,
, .
1648 .,
. , ,
: , ;
[ . ..] , , , .55 , 1667 .: ,
.56
,
. ,
, 15 1648 .: . . 1. . 296.
.: . . . . . 2- . , 1971. . 131 ( 1607 .).
53
pod Balin, 5 XI 1653 p. // Jakuba Michaowskiego Ksiga
pamitnicza / Wyd. A. Z. Helcel. Warszawa, 1864. S. 678.
54
Verificatia niewinnoci
Obrona verificaciey ( 1621 .) Elenchus pism uszczypliwych (1622 .). .
: . . I. . 7. . 324, 376.
55
, 7 1648 . (. : . Szajnocha. Dwa lata dziejw naszych. 1646, 1648.
Opowiadanie i rda. T. 2: Polska w r. 1648. Lww, 1869. S. 337).
56
, 7 1667 .: . . II. . 2. . 211.
51
52
120
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , ,
.57 . , , , . , ,
.
, , ,
1595 . , .58 1621 .
:
, , ,
, 1569 . .59 1585 .
60 [Poddnieprska Ukraina]. , , . ,
1616 ., , . - :
5 1626 ., 6 V 1634 . // . . . . . -393 ( . ). . 20, 82-83.
58
. . 25. . 1. . 46. . 118 .
59
1993 . . : . .
CCXXV. . 325-327.
60
Epicedion 1585 .;
: . . . . , 1904. .
163-220.
57
121
. , versus ...
, : , .61
,
XVII . ,
. ,
, . 1669 1670 .:
, ,
[wojewctw ukraiskich]..., , .62
, ...
[ukraincw].63
XVII .
, ,
,
, ,
, .64
* * *
. , ? 70 , ,
, . ,
.: B. . , . . .
V . // . 1989. 2. C. 107-120; 1989. 5. C.
103-114. : . 109-113 (
2); . . 109 ( 3).
62
Diariusz sejmu koronnego 1669 r. / Oprac. Kazimierz Przybo i Marek Ferenc. Krakw,
2004. S. 34.
63
Diariusz sejmu nadzwyczajnego 1670 roku / Oprac. Kazimierz Przybo i Marek Ferenc.
Krakw, 2004. S. 49.
64
. : . Borek. Ukraina w staropolskich diariuszach i pamitnikach. S. 12.
61
122
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
, , ,
: ... (. 81);
(. 97); (.
243, 251, 268) ..
, , ,65
, .
,
.
( 33 ),
, . , - , . , , , Ukrain i
wszystkie ruskie powiaty i wojewodztwa (. 272).
, . , 1669 .
, , ,
, ,
: , (. 322).
, , , ..
,
, ,
.
. ,
65
1667 . na Ukrainie okoo
Humania, Bracawia i Winnicy (. 298). ,
, -. , .
123
. , versus ...
,
, : , , (. 73);
, , ,
(. 76); (. 254) .
. ,
,
. , ,
, . 1602 . ,
,
,
,66 .. .
1620-1630- . - , , ,
: Jan z Rusi, z Beresteczka; pod uckiem w Rusi; z Ostroga
w Rusi; z Dubna z Rusi; starosta kamieniecki [-] w Rusi; sotysi synkowie z Rusi, z bracawskiego udawal si by;
od Biaej Cerkwi z Rusi; za Winnic w Rusi67 ..
, 1648 .
, ,
, .68
, , , . , , ,
25 1647 .,
.
31 1602 . // . . 8. . 1. . 489.
W. Nekanda Trepka. Liber generationis plebeanorum. S. 94 ( 219), 111 ( 314),
126 ( 395), 191 ( 790), 211 ( 914), 346 ( 1734), 463 ( 2381).
68
, 29 1648 . // Jakuba Michowskiego. Ksiga pamitnicza.
S. 95.
66
67
124
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , 69 , () 1629 .,
, , . ,
,
1648 .,70 , , 1629 .
.71
,
, : Wszyscy greckiego naboestwa w Rusi; aden z
naboestwa greckiego w Rusi (. 91).
, .
, - , naboestwa greckiego, ..
. , (. 92).
, , , , . , .72 1629 .
. : F. E. Sysyn. Between Poland and the Ukraine. P. 117-128; . . . . VV . , 1989. . 148-156.
70
.: F. E. Sysyn. Between Poland and the Ukraine. P.
306 (. 71).
71
. : . .
( ). , 1883.
. 1. . 379-380.
72
XVII .
. ,
.
69
125
. , versus ...
(. 102); (. 254);
... (. 256) . , , .
.
, ..
, , , ..,
. 73 ,
, , 1635 .
, ,
1569 . ,
74 (,
,
). ,
,
.
() , - , .75 ,
,
- ,
, ..
, , : F. E. Sysyn. Regionalism and Political Thought
in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobilitys Grievances at the Diet of 1641 // Harvard
Ukrainian Studies. 1982. Vol. VI. No. 2. Pp. 167-171.
74
Ibid. P. 172.
75
Ibid. Pp. 172, 174-180.
73
126
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
. , , , ( , ,
- ,
, , 11
1649 . , . 137). , , 1620-1640- . ,
. ,
, .
, - .
, . ,
, , / - . , Wypisanie przodkow moich (. 108-123),
, ,
,
, Jwon Tymofiejewicz Pliszcz Jurow,
.76
,
, .
,
, , ,
, . ,
,
: 25 , 30 , 10 . ,
. . . . 137-160; (
, ): . 146-149.
76
127
. , versus ...
, :
wydana bya za pana Wojciecha Biechowskiego Prusaka (. 120);
wydano za pana Stanisawa Gurskiego z domu Firlijew ( ); wydano
w mastwo za p. Andrzeja Wayskiego Prusaka (. 121).
, / ,
. ,
,
, :
(. 80);
, (. 82); (c. 86) ..
, ,
... 77
, XVII . . , -, , ,
, , . ,
( ,
, , c. 130), . : 1641 . (
, , ,78 :
, , , 79),
, :
Tego roku [1641] m[iesi]ca novembris 15 dnia jego ms pan Jerzy
Niemirycz na podkomorstwo kijowskie przysiga przed wielo
24 1641 . , -; .: . Rulikowski.
Opis powiatu kijowskiego / Wyd. M. Dubiecki. Kijw-Warszawa, 1913. S. 160.
78
: [N]
. .
79
. . 1. . 6. . 772.
77
128
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
szlachty, czemu pan wojewoda Janusz Tyszkiewicz w gowach nieprzyjacielem by (c. 83).
129
. , versus ...
/ .
:
(.
, . 61-62), , , . , ,
, :
Nie stao onych ksit, ktre bywali wojewodami, senatorami,
stroami Korony Polskiej, nie cierpieli nikomu, zego karali... O,
ksita Ostroscy, Zbaracy, Zasawscy, Wiszniowieccy, Koreccy,
Sanguszkowie i inni ksita..., ktrych ju jedno pamitka zostawa!
Nie stao ju tych obrocow, filarow Korony Polskiej! Gdzie te podzieli si i ksita Suckie? Ustpili, niemasz ich, nie stao, jedno
pamitka tych woow kochanych ojczyzny pozostaa. Podobno was
ziemia, jako matka wszystkiego stworzenia, pobraa do siebie, zaczym niemasz ani potomkow po was nie zostaje. Teraz nam zle si dzieje po waszych gowach, i Pan Bg wie, co si jeszcze dalej z nami
bdzie dziao. Sprawiedliwoci ani prawdy nie pytaj, oslepa na obie
oczy, szalbierstwo szeci komi na gr cignie, zacinaj dalej gdzie
rwno, na co Ty sam Panie z nieba, do czasu folgujc kademu, czekasz!
(. 256-257).
, , ,
.
( )
, , , .81 XVII ., , , ,
,
.
,
(, ) / .: . . ( ) // .
. . 231-257.
81
130
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. . , : wszystkie ciare wojenne na sobie trzyma
i radzi okoo tego, a jako radzi, na tym ich mosci przestali pp. hetmani i
krolewicz im (. 40).
, , , 1620- ( 1630 .
, , ). , , , :
, , - (. 75-76).
,
, (1655-1657),
1664 . , 1665 . (
1665).82 ,
. ,
, , ,
, , ...,
..., , ,
(. 278-279). ,
,
, ( ).
, . , , , , , , : , ,
(. 76).
- . , Urzdnicy wojewdztw kijowskiego i czernihowskiego XV-XVIII wieku. Spisy /
Opracowali E. Janas i W. Kaczewski. Krnik, 2002. S. 261.
82
131
. , versus ...
83 (, XVII .
). ,
, ,
,
, , ,
, (. 76).
: 16361646 . ,84 1640 .
, , , (.
82). , ,85 ,
(. 99).
, :
(. 139-141).
(. 161), (. 239, 241), . ,
1667 . ,
,
(. 297).
, , , . (
, , ), 1588-1618, 1618-1620 .,
, , 1618-1632 1632-1646 . (Urzdnicy centralni
i nadworni Polski XIV-XVIII wieku. Spisy / Opracowali K. Chapowski, S. Ciara,
. Kdziela, T. Nowakowski, E. Opaliski, G. Rutkowska, T. Zieliska. Krnik, 1992.
S. 42-43, 46).
84
Ibid. S. 46.
85
19 1646
1651 . ( . . 43).
83
132
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , . ,
, , . , 1649 . ,
(. 130). ,
(
, , ), (
, , , ). : .
, , , , .
(-),
,
, .
* * *
() , , , ,86
, 1648 .
. (
: niecnotliwi psy, jako nie moe pod socem byd gorszego stworzenia
nad one, . 106) ,
.
XVI .
,
, : . Zajczkowski. Szlachta
polska. Kultura i struktura. Warszawa, 1993. S. 50-51.
86
133
. , versus ...
:87
, ..
, , .
, , ,
, . ,
,
(-) -
.
, ,
: , , ,
, , .
.
,
, .
,
() , , . ,
.
, , - ? .
( ,
, , ). , , 87
.: E. Opaliski. Kultura polityczna szlachty polskiej w latach
1597-1652. Warszawa, 1995. S. 29 passim.
134
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
XVI XVII . ,88
-
?
/
- (,
) . , , ,
, , ,
. ,
/ - ,
.89
( ) ,
. , XVII .
SUMMARY
The article by Natalya Yakovenko deciphers the complex of political,
national, state, and social estate (corporate) identity of the seventeenth century gentry man Jan (Joachim) Erlich, the author of a diary that has attracted
.
: D. A. Frick. Foolish Rus: On Polish Civilization, Ruthenian Self-Hatred,
and Kasian Sakovy // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 1994. Vol. XVIII. No. . Pp. 210248. : D. A. Frick. Meletij Smotryckyj.
Cambridge, MA, 1995. Pp. 227-245. : F. E. Sysyn. Between Poland and the Ukraine. Pp. 104-114. .: T. Chynczewska-Hennel.
wiadomo narodowa kozaczyzny i szlachty ukraiskiej. S. 36-146; F. E. Sysyn.
Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620-1690 // Harvard Ukrainian
Studies. 1986. Vol. X. No. 3-4. Pp. 393-423; . . . ( V V .). , 1998. . 5760; S. Plokhy. The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine. Oxford-New York,
2001. P. 145-162.
89
. . . . 231-269.
88
135
. , versus ...
historians attention since the nineteenth century. Yakovenko gives her interpretation of the political and social loyalties of Jan Erlich whose case, in
her view, contradicts the accepted views about macro-identities of Rzecz
Pospolita. She examines Erlichs sense of geography, his understanding of
ruska identity, and his confessional and state loyalties, especially vis-vis contemporary meanings of Ukraine. Five levels of analysis produce
five possible situational identities and loyalties: local; corporate; Kievan; Ukrainian (limited to the Kiev lands); and Russian Orthodox, which
is representative of the Rzecz Pospolitas szlachta. The later, in Yakovenkos view, is the least elaborated identity, because Erlichs macro-political
consciousness is very limited. Erlichs picture of the world does not provide grounds for constructing larger ideological loyalties and their corresponding entities (for example, historiographys rather popular Ruskii
people). For Yakovenko this indicates multiplicity of early modern identities and political loyalties, as she allows for a more ideologically motivated
feeling of groupness for more politically and publicly engaged noble men.
136
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
I.
. . , - XIX . ,
.
,
, - 1796-1797 .,
. , I ,
.
Ab Imperio
.
137
138
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
XIX , I I. ,
.
.
.
. , . .4
. , , ,
// . 1940.
. V. 1960- ., , . .:
XIX XX .
. , 1967. . 147-175.
.
, ., .:
. . / . . . . , 1960; . , . . , . . // . 1961. 2.
. . , . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 1. -, 1946; . II. , 1958; . 60 70 .
XIX ( 1861 ) // . 1966. . 79. . 139-175. . . . I. , 1998; . . . ( XVIII XIX .). , 2002.
. . .: . . . .
XIX . , 1995; . . . XIX // : . . , 2004. . 264-269.
4
. . . :
XIX . , 2002. . 5.
139
140
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.7 ,
. ,
, , ,
1819-1820 . 1307
,
,
.
, .8
I
:
, III
. ,
,
. ,
. I,
( ),
.
I . 1819 . . . - : , , . -, . : . -, 1911. . III. .
627.
8
XIX 24 : 1810 .;
1801, 1803, 1808, 1810, 1815, 1819 .; 1801 ., 1807 . 1813 .;
1826 ; 1808 ., 1809 ., 1817 .;
1808 ., 1815 ., 1826 ., 1828 .; 1802 ., 1808 ., 1826 .
1837 . . . IV. . 513-515.
7
141
142
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , .14 29 . :
.
. : , ,
, .... , . .
.
.
, .
:
?; ?;
?; ,
?...; ; ,
?...
, , , . , , -
. , 21 , ,
, , ; , . , . . . . . 1.
-, 1902. C. 80.
14
143
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. - ?
. -, , , , ?
, ? . ,
, , .15
ad hoc ( ).
I
, 1819 , : , . I ,
. 1819
, ,
,
,
.
, , . .
,
, .
, , 15
. . . , 1992. . 58.
145
146
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.17 . . .18 ,
1819-1820 .
,
,
. , , , . . .
. .19
, ,
.20
(1757-1820), , 1793 . . . . . . , 1923; . . .
. (1828-1862 .). , 1927; . 1828 1855 . , 1954; . . . // 1904-1905
3526, 3533, 3552, 3563, 3592, 3605, 3610, 3628, 3632.
18
. . . 1819 1820 // .
1892. 157; 160.
19
. . . ( XIX
) // . 1903. . . 481-514.
20
: -, ,
, , . , (-) (). .
.
() I 1799
1840 .
, . 40 1819 .
1822
, . . 2079 ( ) . . . .
17
147
148
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .24
.
-. 1812 , ,
. ,
, . ,
,
.
, . 4 1803 14 ,
. ,
. . .
, .25 , , , .
. . , - :
! , , , . ,
, ,
, , . ; ...
24
25
149
:
, , ,
, , , , . . . ,
. , - . ,
. ,
,
, , , .
26
. . 1-2.
150
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , . , - ,
. .
. , ,
. 30 1806 ,
,
, , .27
.
: 15 , . , , ,
, .
,
.
.
28 ,
1801 .29 1815
,
, , ,
.
, , 410 , . ,
-1. 22076.
. . 168. . 2. . 31. . 1-57.
29
.: . . . . . 236-245.
27
28
151
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, ,
- (. ).
, . . . , , status quo . .
- , .
, , ,
. .
. . - . . .
:
... , :
, . ,
,
, .30
. . , , , , .
30
. 1817. 26.
153
. . 1286. . 1. . 93. . 3.
. 1904. 11 .
154
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , :
... , , , , ...,
, , ,
, ... , , ...
...33
, , , .
,
. , , . . ...
,
. ( 30 1814 .).34 , ,
, - . . . 1815
,
.35
, , ,
, .
,36 ,
. . 168. . 2. . 45. . 5 .
. . 1. . 653. . 199 .
35
. . 2. . 45. . 1-7.
36
. . 1. . 835.
33
34
155
156
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1818 . .
(1766-1829)
, , .40 . . , , ,
, .41 ,
. , - ( 17561760 .), .
. 14 , 28
. 1797 -.
I 1803
.42 . 1807
, .
.
, ,
. .43 28-
. ,
.
, ,
, ,
. , .
. . . I // . 1878. 1. . 8-9.
41
. . // . 1867. . 4. . 114.
42
. . 350. . 2. . 15. . 124-125.
43
. . 3. I
(1801-1810). -, 1878. . 124-128.
40
157
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
8 1819 . .
.
:
, , . , . ,
, ,
, , .44
,
.
, ,
, . .45
. 16 1819
:
, ... , , , , , ,
, , .46
, .
.
. . . , . : . . . ( XIX ) // . 1903. . . 489.
45
. . 1263. . 1. . 185. . 14-115.
46
. -, 1912. . 48.
44
159
160
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.49 -, , . . , , .
(1765-1839)
(1770-1821) - () . 1815
,
, , ....50
. . , . (1804 .)
80 .51 ,
38 . . , , , . . , . .
. . . 1- 1787 1791 .,
. . . . 1799 .
, . 2 , .
. .
.
1800 . . I 1802 1804 . - . 1807 , 49
50
. . 3. -, 1911. . 632.
. . 1341. . 17. . 567. . 2.
161
162
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, . 19
, , ,
.55 , .
12 ,
.
, ,
. , , , .
,
.
, ,
. . .
. . : 1) , ?. :
. 2) ,
, , , , ,
?. ,
. 3) , , , , ? , .56 - , .
,
, ,
.
55
56
163
164
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
... , . ...58
22
. , ,
. . . , , , .
. . ,
, ,
, , , : , ,
-.59
1819 1820
, . , , , . 56
.
. , 10 ,
. . 1286. . 2. . 181. . 36.
. . . 1819 1820 // .
1892. 157.
58
59
165
166
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, 17
. :
,
,
,
,
.64
,
, . . ( XVIII XIX .).65 , . , , . .
.
. , , . ,
, . , , ,
.
,
, .
?
, 64
65
167
168
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
- ,
990 . , 1819 ., 355
. , ,
(205), (164), (99), (56) (62).68
, .
. ,
, . .
5 1818 . ,
.69 . ,
, . ,
, . 5 10 1803 . , , , . . ,
. 22 1820 .
.70 ,
. ( . . . . . 1.
. 451-452.
69
. . 1286. . 2. . 308. . 1-43.
70
. . 41-43.
68
169
. . 218. . 1-29.
. . 29.
170
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
, ,
, , ,
.
, .
, .
. , .
5 1820 . . . ,
. , 21 63- .
, ,
, .73 ,
. .
. ( , ) , , 14427
?
, .
1820 ,
,
.74 , 73
74
171
172
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .79
. . .
.
. , , . , , .
. 12 .
,
.80
.
, ,
.81
. . : , ,
, .82
, , I . . 1821 .
19 . 200 .
. .83
-1. 28167.
-1. 27716 ( ,
).
81
. . 1263. . 1. . 257. . 90-121.
82
. . . . , 1902. . 1. . 448.
83
. . 1263. . 1. . 286. . 87-96.
79
80
173
174
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
... , , , , , ,
,
.85
, .
,
,86
, 1822 ( ).87 ,
.
.
: , ,
,
,
-. , .
, . . -.88
, , .
.
. . 1286. . 2. . 308. . 172, 175.
. . 1263. . 1. . 289. . 358.
87
. 1263. . 1. . 289.
88
: ;
; , . . . . 168. . 1. . 635, 633, 636.
85
86
175
176
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
. , . . -,
. , -
:
.
,
, .
,
, . . ,
,
... . ,
, ,
, .92
15 1822
.93 .
. . , . . . , , , , .
.
, . ,
, . , , . , . . .
. 168. . 1. . 715. . 2-3.
92
. . 4.
93
. . 1263. . 1. . 289. . 350-413.
177
178
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
. .98
, ,
. ,
, , . , . ., ,
.
,
.
I - . . , . . 1801
. -
, .99 98
: ... 1819 1820 .
.
,
. , ! , ,
, ,
. . . 168. 1. . 1047.
99
, : ,
. ,
. ,
, ,
.
,
. ... // .
. . . . . 216. . 1324.
179
180
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, . , ,
, ,
.102
. .
.
.103
, . . 1827 . . .
. :
... ,
:
1) , , . 2) , ,
,
, , . : 3) ...104
.
. . 168. . 1. . 1018. . 4-6.
. . 797.
104
. . 1286. . 4. . 728. . 7.
102
103
181
182
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
, , 1819 . , , , . 1822
...
, 29 1811 ,
,
, ,
,
, , , , ,
, , .
, , , ,
. ,
, . ,
211 , ( 1820 1823 .) , ,
, . :
, .
. . . ,
, .
183
184
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, -
, ,
,
.
.112
- . . . (1831-1841.) .
, .113 , , .
.
.
. . . 1836
3
. .114
. , I
,
, , .
112
.
. 1820 , 9
, 15 ,
, , 2
.
. . . . . . 75.
113
. . 1263. . 1. . 1049, . . 522 21 1836 .
114
.
185
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Olga MAIOROVA
The Crimean War (1853-1856), initially called the Eastern War, began
as yet another round in the ongoing struggle between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Deploying a rich arsenal of patriotic idioms cultivated over
the preceding decades, wartime rhetoric focused not only on Russias centuries-old confrontation with the East, but also since England and France
joined forces with Turkey on her conflicted relationship with the West.1
Yet the war proved a losing one, ultimately discrediting the patriotic rhetoric it had elicited. It is widely acknowledged that the disastrous outcome of
the Crimean campaign compromised Russias geopolitical status, provoked
sharp criticism of the government, and paved the way for the Great Re*
I would like to thank reviewers of Ab Imperio for valuable insights and comments on
my work.
1
As the war unfolded, Austria also threatened to attack Russia and Prussia constituted at
best a latent hazard. On the Crimean War and the international situation which led to the
war and unfolded during the war see, David M. Goldfrank. The Origins of the Crimean
War. London and New York, 1994; John Shelton Curtiss. Russias Crimean War. Durham,
NC, 1979; E. V. Tarle. Krymskaia voina. 2nd ed., rev. and enl. Moscow-Leningrad, 1950.
187
Simon Franklin & Emma Widdis (Ed.). National Identity in Russian Culture: An
Introduction. New York, 2004; Christopher Ely. This Meager Nature: Landscape and
National Identity in Imperial Russia. De Kalb, 2002.
3
See A. G. Tartakovskii. 1812 god i russkaia memuaristika: Opyt istochnikovedcheskogo
izucheniia. Moscow, 1980; D. Rebekkini. Russkie istoricheskie romany 1830-kh godov
XIX veka (Bibliograficheskii ukazatel) // Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 1998. No. 34.
Pp. 416-433.
188
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
trating and supporting one another. Indeed, nothing so convincingly cast
the native landscape as proof of the peoples might and a repository of their
glorious memories as the story of the expulsion of Napoleons army which,
as the recurrent patriotic clich would have it, bogged down in 1812 in
Russias endless snowy fields. Reinterpretation of one symbol required that
of the other since both stemmed from a common national vision that defined the collective self by reference to historical achievements, nature, or
Providence. The loss of the Crimean War encouraged attempts to break out
of this conceptual framework because, as I argue below, the defeat had
brought about fundamental changes to patterns of national self-perception
and led to the crystallization of a whole new set of attitudes towards the
Russian community. This article seeks to capture what changed in the understanding of the Russian collective self over the 1850s and how national
symbolism reflected this shift.
This is not to say that the intelligentsia used only symbolic language
to express their new visions of the collective self. Thaw and glasnost
concepts first introduced into the political lexicon in the late 1850s and
the preparations for the Great Reforms themselves engaged public opinion and made it possible to openly venture new approaches to the nation.
Looking to the Western countries that had won the Crimean War, some
liberals even urged the Russian government to take steps towards introducing elements of civic nationalism. Although at the outset of the Reform era the regime seemed to have opened the floodgates for wider participation in decision making, it ultimately curtailed any possibility of
popular participation in political life. In an autocratic state with a sharply
limited public sphere and a lack of institutional space for articulating the
nation, symbolic language offered a fruitful indeed at times the only
avenue for rhetorically constructing an authentic collective self. Moreover, since national symbolism draws upon a shared heritage, metaphoric
expressions of collective self can function as the common denominator of
disparate constructs, even those inscribed within distinct ideological paradigms. Thus, tracing how intellectuals reinterpreted idioms of nation
can help us reveal a general shift across political divides, rather than the
differences between individual thinkers. This article explores how national symbolism evolved during the 1850s, beginning with a study of
wartime rhetoric, which played a two-fold role in the development of
Russian national discourse: it both exerted a measure of influence on intellectuals post-war attempts to redefine the self and constituted a point
of departure for many of them.
189
190
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
rhymes. When the war started, Tiutchev envisioned it as the recurrence of
1812, the victorious resolution of the thousand-year dispute of East and
West, and a portent of the triumphal fulfillment of Russias high destiny.7 These expectations proved prophetic only in anticipating the essential pattern that was to govern perceptions of the war through the prism of
1812.
At the outset of the Eastern campaign, many intellectuals conflated
memories of the Patriotic War with the history of the Crusades, in which
Russia had never participated. In his letter to M. P. Pogodin on Christmas
of 1853, S. P. Shevyrev, a famous partisan of official ideology, redirected
memory of the Patriotic War to solve the Eastern question: From all of
Russia there is sympathy for the war [] Its a crusade [] Everyone is
ready to sacrifice. The movements remind me of 1812.8 Pogodins articles
and G. Titovs book The Crusades and the Eastern Question (1854) forged
a still more explicit link between the Patriotic War and the centuries-long
struggle for the Christian Holy Land: only the country that had bested Napoleon could fulfill the high mission to which exhausted Western Europe
had proved itself unequal.9 The year 1853 marked exactly 400 years since
the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, and many viewed this anniversary as a symbolic threshold auguring the rebirth of an Orthodox
7
Literaturnoe nasledstvo. Fedor Ivanovich Tiutchev. Vol. 97. Book II. Moskow, 1989.
P. 257; I. S. Aksakov. Biografiia Fedora Ivanovicha Tiutcheva. Moscow, 1886. P. 234.
For a selection of testimony to societys mood, harmonizing with Tiutchevs, see Nikolai
Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy M. P. Pogodina. Vol. XIII. S-Petersburg, 1899. P. 6; N. M. Druzhinin. Moskva v gody Krymskoi voiny // N. M. Druzhinin and M. K. Rozhkovaia (Ed.).
Istoriia Moskvy. Vol. 3. Moscow, 1954. Ch. XVII. Pp. 728-783; Zapiski Aleksandra
Ivanovicha Kosheleva (1812-1884). Berlin, 1884. P. 81.
8
Letter from Shevyrev to Pogodin, December 25, 1853 // Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy
Pogodina. Vol. XIII. Pp. 18-19.
9
M. P. Pogodin. Nastoiashchaia voina v otnoshenii k russkoi istorii // M. P. Pogodin.
Istoriko-politicheskie pisma i zapiski v prodolzhenii Krymskoi voiny: 1853-1856. Moscow, 1874. P. 143. This article was written in June, 1854 and then circulated in manuscript; M. P. Pogodin. Chtenie poslednego manifesta po prikhodskim tserkvam v Moskve sego dekabria 25 chisla, 1854 goda // Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy Pogodina. Vol. XIII. P.
202; G. Titov. Krestovye pokhody i Vostochnyi vopros // Russkii invalid. 1854. No.
127. July 8; No. 128. July 9. Excerpts of the book were published in the newspaper
Russkii invalid and it was regularly advertised in the newspapers bibliographic section.
In the same year it appeared as a separate publication (G. Titov. Krestovye pokhody i
Vostochnyi vopros. St. Petersburg, 1854). The struggle for the right to control Jerusalems holy sites constituted one of the points of disagreement between France and Russia and became one of the pretexts of the war.
191
An expressive instance of appealing to the famous date is the poems written on this
theme by K. S. Aksakov Severnyi Orel (1453-1853) and by A. N. Maikov Pamiati
Derzhavina (A. N. Maikov. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. 7th ed. Vol. IV. St. Petersburg,
1901. P. 284), Klermonskii sobor (A. N. Maikov. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. 6th ed.
Vol. II. St. Petersburg, 1893. P. 32).
192
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
events of 1812!11 Nicholas was well aware, however, of the dangers
inherent in 1812 as a symbol of unconstrained popular movements potentially hostile to the regime. 12 To erase these implications of the 1812
memory, long before the Eastern campaign, official ideology presented
the Patriotic War as the peoples struggle not so much for their own freedom, as for legitimate order. Throughout Nicholas reign, this interpretation of Russias triumph over Napoleon was fostered by carefully crafted
public ceremonies and a historiography controlled by the tsar himself.13
As the official newspaper Russkii invalid shows, during the Crimean campaign parallels with the Patriotic War proved even more adaptable: they
encapsulated Nicholas vision of the Russian empire and the Russian nation.14
Many contributors to Russkii invalid promoted the memory of 1812 as
the apotheosis of the true Russian spirit, emerging visibly across divergent
regions of the state to unite them in time of war. Praising the bravery of
Odessas inhabitants when their town was under bombardment (1854), the
author of one account ecstatically observes that merry souls sang the native legends of the year twelve and in this fashion under the thunder of
11
Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy Pogodina. Vol. XIII. Pp. 40-41. On October 16, 1854, Nicholas I instructed Prince A. S. Menshikov, then in command of the Crimean army: It is
highly desirable that we prove in the eyes of our foreign enemies and even of Russia
itself, that we are still the same Russians of 1812 of Borodino and Paris! N. F. Dubrovin. Istoriia Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia. 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1900.
Vol. II. P. 114.
12
Nicholas insisted that parallels with the Patriotic War be used sparingly. On December
11, 1854, he wrote to Prince M. D. Gorchakov, the commander of the Crimean army: I
know that when the minute comes to call on Russia, it will become what it was in 1812,
but I need to husband this resource carefully and not exhaust our energies prematurely.
Dubrovin. Istoriia Krymskoi voiny. Vol. II. P. 385.
13
On public ceremonies see: Richard S. Wortman. Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. 2 vols. Princeton, 1995. Vol. 1. Pp. 316-321, 384-386. On
historiography see, Tartakovskii. 1812 god i russkaia memuaristika. Pp. 199-212.
14
For official nationalism during Nicholas reign, see Nicholas Riasanovsky. Nicholas I
and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967;
Wortman. Scenarios of Power. Vol. I. Pp. 297-332, 379-381; Nathaniel Knight. Ethnicity,
Nationality, and the Masses: Narodnost and Modernity in Imperial Russia // David L.
Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (Eds.). Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices. New
York, 2000. Pp. 54-60. For Nicholas concept of national empire, see Richard Wortman.
Simvoly imperii: Ekzoticheskie narody i tseremonii koronatsii rossiiskikh imperatorov //
I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovskii, M. Mogilner, A. Semenov (Eds.). Novaia
imperskaia istoriia post-sovetskogo prostranstva. Kazan, 2004, especially Pp. 414-421.
193
Ia. Psarev. Russkie-spartantsy // Russkii invalid. 1854. No. 150. July 8. Another
contributor wrote: now Odessa is our native land (Dm. B. Pismo iz Voronezhskoi
gubernii // Ibid. 1854. No. 155. July 14). For the same interpretation of how Odessa
acquired Russian spirit under fire see also P. A. Viazemskiis poem: Odessa // Ibid.
1854. No. 143.
16
Innokentii. Sermon while Visiting his Flock // Sochineniia Innokentiia, arkhiepiskopa
Khersonskogo i Tavricheskogo. St. Petersburg, 1908. Vol. II. Pp. 448-449. This sermon,
preached in Simferopols Alexander Nevskii Cathedral on September 14, 1854, first
appeared in Odesskii vestnik (1854. No. 118) and then in Russkii invalid, where all
Innokentiis wartime sermons were printed. Later it was included in N. F. Dubrovin
(Ed.). Materialy dlia istorii Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia. St. Petersburg, 1900.
Vol. III. Pp. 168-169. While at the beginning of military action Innokentii set in motion
a myth of the Tavrida peninsula as cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, as the campaign wore
on, he turned to the symbol of 1812.
17
Ely. This Meager Nature. Pp. 13-14
18
Nastavlenie nizhegorodskogo voennogo imama Zamiga Khatyba // Russkii invalid.
1854. No. 181. August 14.
194
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
and it was all the more important to do so, since some of the Crimean Tatars
had gone over to the enemys side.
The Patriotic War symbolized the Russian-centric focus of the entire
empire. Popular poetry published in Russkii invalid provides a good example of how literature, reiterating the poetic tradition of memorializing 1812,
provided a device for this symbols interpretation. Celebrating the Russian
victory over the Ottoman fleet in the battle of Sinop (1854), the poem On
the current war begins with conventional praise of late eighteenth century
triumphs on the Black Sea. In the second half of the text, however, the
poems conceptual center shifts to conflicts with the Western powers, focusing on the victory over Napoleon. Shifting from the naval victories of
the expanding empire, won at the periphery of the state, to the Patriotic
War, which took place in its historical heartland, the poem underscores the
ethno-national dimension of the event:
Ne dvenadtsatogo-l goda
Vy khotite, gospoda?
My gotovy. Rus rodnaia
I mogucha i silna.
[Gentlemen, do you seek
The year twelve?
We are ready. Native Rus
Is strong and potent.]19
Presenting the 1812 campaign as an achievement of Rus and setting it
atop the hierarchy of Russias victories, the poem symbolically enshrines
the ethnic core of the state as the defining spirit and the dominant force of
the diverse empire. To produce this effect the unknown author also applies
the word Russkoe to the Black Sea, while conventionally the sea was called
Rossiiskoe. With a final, hidden echo of To the Slanderers of Russia (1831),
the poem reiterates Pushkins use of 1812 in articulating his vision of the
relation between Russian nationality and the imperial polity:
Prikhodite zhe k nam v gosti!
Chestno vstretim my gostei.
I ulozhim vashi kosti,
Sred nechuzhdykh vam kostei!...
19
Petr G.o.v.e.n. Rampovanov. On the current war // Russkii invalid. 1854. No.116.
May 25. Petr Rampovanov is most likely the pseudonym of an unknown author.
This and further translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. O.M.
195
196
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
invalid one finds repeated references to this poem by Pushkin, to his vision
of 1812 and the empires national character.
During the Crimean War, official ideology also turned parallels with
1812 into a means of buttressing the dynastic conception of the nation. For
Nicholas, the triumph over Napoleon stood as a symbol of the dynasty and
the peoples common past, and helped to present the ruler as an embodiment of the nations will. In an imperial manifesto issued in December,
1854, the tsar referred to the upheavals of 1812: When necessary we all,
tsar and subjects to repeat the words of the Emperor Alexander spoken in
a time of trial similar to this stand before the ranks of our enemies with
sword in hand and the cross in our hearts to defend the most precious
blessings in this world: the safety and honor of the Fatherland (italics in
the original).21 Calling his subjects to battle, he missed no opportunity to
remind them that love for the tsar was a particularly Russian trait. This
manifesto is dated December 14, 1854 the same day as the Decembrist
uprising. Throughout Nicholas reign, official ideology presented the suppression of the uprising as a victory of national ideals over Western doctrines and a visible reassertion of the triumphal union of monarch and common people.22 In Nicholas era an annual prayer service commemorated
the imperial familys deliverance from danger on this date. The day the
manifesto was read from the pulpits December 25, 1854 was another
famous date. From 1812 onward, on the first day of Christmas, all of Russias churches held a thanksgiving service to commemorate the expulsion
of Napoleons army.23 The choice of both these dates the date the manifesto was signed and the date of its promulgation formed a chain of crucial historical events, each a high-water mark in the union of the monarchy
the imperial patriotism Pushkin expresses in these poems, see: A. L. Ospovat. Pushkin,
Tiutchev i Polskoe vosstanie 1830-1831 godov // Pushkinskie chteniia v Tartu. Tezisy
dokladov nauchnoi konferentsii. Tallinn, 1987. Pp. 49-52.
21
Cited from: Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy Pogodina. St. Petersburg, 1899. Vol. XIII. Pp.
197-198.
22
For the representation of the suppression of the Decembrist uprising during Nicholas
reign and the annual December 14 prayers, see Wortman. Scenarios of Power. Vol. 1.
Pp. 265-269, 275-278. On the prayer service of December 14, 1854, see A. F. Tiutcheva.
Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov / Transl. from the French by E. V. Gere, introd. essay and
notes by S. V. Bakhrushin. Moscow, 1928. Vol. 1. P. 121.
23
On the reading of the manifesto see M. P. Pogodin. Chtenie poslednego manifesta po
prikhodskim tserkvam v Moskve sego dekabria 25 chisla, 1854 goda // Barsukov. Zhizn
i trudy Pogodina. Vol. XIII. Pp. 202-203. During the war this article circulated in
manuscript.
197
Sochineniia Innokentiia. Vol. II. Pp. 448-449; Dubrovin (Ed.). Materialy dlia istorii
Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia. Vol. III. Pp. 168-169. Innokentii clearly had in
mind the landing of the allied forces of England and France between Evpatorii and
Kaptugai, which took place in 1854, on September 2 the day of Napoleons armys
entry into Moscow in 1812. It is worth mentioning that this was not the first landing of
the allied military forces onto Crimean territory, however, given the pull of significant
dates, it was this event that was surrounded by mythological associations. Pogodin also
wrote in Moskvitianin: ...it had to happen that the enemies landed on the Crimea on the
second of September, the day of the French entry into Moscow in 1812 (cited from:
Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy Pogodina. Vol. XIII. P. 139).
25
Sochineniia Innokentiia. Vol. II. P. 451.
26
O prizvanii k gosudartvennomu opolcheniiu (January 29, 1855) // Polnoe sobranie
zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii. Sobranie II. Otdel I. Vol. XXX. P. 85 (No. 28991). Within a
few months a brochure was published The general militia of Russia for faith, tsar, and
fatherland, or the Russian soldiers at the time of the Emperor Alexander and the currently
reigning Alexander II (Moscow, 1855), which contained the text of Alexander Is
manifestoes and the history of the militia of 1812. On this brochure see: Druzhinin.
Moskva v gody Krymskoi voiny. P. 758.
198
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
failure could be interpreted as a sign of Providences special design, as a
token of inevitable future success, and as testament to the constancy of
Russian virtues, since the Russian army of 1812 had also withstood many
losses.27 This is why Alexander II, upon his ascent to the throne, resorted to
the symbol of 1812 even more persistently than his father. On receiving
word of Sevastopols collapse, the young tsar encouraged Prince M. N. Gorchakov: Do not lose heart, but remember 1812 and trust in God. Two
years after the burning of Moscow, our triumphant troops entered Paris. We
are the same Russians and God is with us!28 Informing the Russian armies
and the navy of Sevastopols surrender, he compared its defense to the greatest feats of Russian arms, among them the Battle of Borodino.29 Even when
the government signed the humiliating Paris treaty (1856), in public ceremonies Alexander II visibly entwined the narratives of the two wars.30 His
coronation (1856), set to coincide with the anniversary of the battle of Borodino (August 26), was intended to symbolically overcome the painful loss of
the war and to reassert the deep bond between the monarch and his subjects.
Read through the scenario of the Patriotic War, the Crimean campaign
turned into a commemoration of 1812. By merging the events of the two
wars, won and lost, into a single narrative, official propaganda found a way
to highlight the stability of the Russian peoples nature and thus made it
possible to sustain the official vision of the empire and the nation. Yet public opinion, deeply traumatized by the course and outcome of the Crimean
War, turned the memory of 1812 in a far different direction.
27
In September of 1854, having given the order to sink the ships of the Black Sea fleet
to prevent an enemy raid, Vice-Admiral V. A. Kornilov encouraged the sailors: Moscow
burned, and Rus did not perish! On the contrary, it became stronger. God is merciful!
Even now He is preparing for His faithful Russian people a similar fate. (Dubrovin.
Istoriia Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia. Vol. I. P. 317).
28
M. I. Bogdanovich. Vostochnaia voina: 1853-1856 gody. 5 vols. St. Petersburg, 1876.
Vol. IV. P. 141. See also Dubrovin. Istoriia Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia. Vol.
III. Pp. 427-428.
29
Bogdanovich. Vostochnaia voina. Vol. IV. P. 141. Alexander II issued this order to the
army on his name day, August 30, 1855. Seconding the tsars words in his orders to the
army, Gorchakov portrayed surrendered Sevastopol by analogy with Moscow
abandoned in 1812 as a redeeming sacrifice, portent of the resurrection of Russia
(Ibid. P. 141)
30
His official visit to Moscow following the surrender of Sevastopol was staged as a
repeat performance of Alexander Is dramatic appearance after Napoleons invasion.
(Wortman. Scenarios of Power. Vol. 2. P. 25).
199
200
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
call and raise up all the land.34 The diary of V. S. Aksakova, sister of
two famous Slavophiles, records how the growing oppositional mood among
Moscow intellectuals coalesced around the memory of the Patriotic War as
a peoples war. She compared the militias of 1812 and 1855 to reveal, on
the one hand, the governments underlying fear of popular participation in
military action and, on the other, the peoples boundless potential and capacity for deciding the fate of Russia. After the noble assemblies of several
Russian provinces elected the disgraced Ermolov, a hero of the Patriotic
War, to head the militia, he took on in the eyes of society the aura of a national leader and even a rival to the tsar. Regularly compared with M. I. Kutuzov,
the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army of 1812 (and who had also
been little loved by the court), Ermolov came to represent the nation as
distinct from the absolutist state.35
Both major intellectual trends of the time, Slavophilism and Westernism,
subscribed to the vision of 1812 as evidence of the peoples viability and
strength. In the first volume of My Past and Thoughts, as in many other
works of his written during and immediately after the Crimean War, Herzen
utilizes the memory of the Russian triumph over Napoleon as a means of
revealing the nation, otherwise obscured by Nicholas regime. Of course,
the mission assigned the Russian people by the famous Westernizer differed substantially from that envisioned by the Slavophiles and Panslavists.
The moral superiority of the Russian people over Western civilizations,
their immunity to bourgeois corruption and their ability to bring socialism to Europe, thus once again liberating the Europeans (this time from the
tyranny of bourgeois values, rather than from Napoleon) all these constructs Herzen demonstrated through references to and comparison with
the glory of 1812 that was understood as a military accomplishment of the
common folk.36 Although, like the Slavophiles, Herzen takes the memory
of 1812 as a token of national superiority, unlike them he weaves the victory over Napoleon into a history of the revolutionary movement in Russia,
thus even more dramatically contrasting the people and the government. In
34
Ibid. P. 78. This article passed from hand to hand and was read in the Winter Palace.
V. S. Aksakova. Dnevnik (1854-1855). St. Petersburg, 1913. Pp. 102-103, 126 (entries
of April 10 and September 3, 1855). M. O. Bodianskiis diary also records testimony to
the fact that at the time of the Crimean campaign the memory of M. I. Kutuzov was
cultivated as a symbol of popular war (Bodianskii. Vyderzhki iz dnevnika. P. 114; entry
of May 21, 1853).
36
Sh. M. Levin. Gertsen i Krymskaia voina // Istoricheskie zapiski / Edited by B. D. Grekov. Moscow, 1949. Vol. 29. Pp. 164-199.
35
201
202
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
relations between society and the regime. In this context it is significant
that both of Dostoevskiis characters, Ivolgin and Lebedev, recount the events
of 1812 differently, partly because they gravitate to different social and
ideological groups. While the mad general sees himself as an inheritor of
the noble tradition and articulates the tenets of official nationalism, Lebedev
is a raznochinets (a person of humble origins) and a friend of nihilists, who
openly debunked patriotic symbols.
Though, as the novel shows, the Patriotic War persisted into the 1860s
as a highly contested symbol and an indicator of ideological divisions,
Dostoevskii was moved to caricature the struggle because by the end of the
Crimean War 1812 had taken on new connotations within the national discourse. For intellectuals, 1812 became not so much a scenario of popular
war and a means of finding the nation apart from the state, as it had become
a symbol that could be used to criticize both the government and the people. On learning of the surrender of Sevastopol, Dmitrii Obolenskii disputed
the official equation (we are the same, of Borodino and Paris): Now,
in consolation over the fall of Sevastopol, many say: Its nothing. The
enemy was also in Moscow. I dont know if 1812 can serve as a guarantor
of the current wars being concluded successfully not only were the
character and purpose of that war, undertaken by a single conqueror, completely different, but Russian society was also incomparably more whole,
more moral, and the government more reasonable.39 As though challenging
both Innokentiis sermons and the imperial manifestoes, Elena Shtakenshneider likewise opposed the government line, recording in her memoirs the
opinion of the Petersburg liberal circle to which she belonged: Without
railroads, without telegraphs, what made Russia so frightening? Surely not
just its size and unfamiliarity? Or was it still 1812 and the glory of 1814?
We had grown so used to appearing strong that we came to believe in our
own strength, although we should have known very well what strength a
decaying organism possesses.40 In postwar rhetorical practice two series
of metaphors that reflected the need for reforms gained extremely wide
currency. The end of the Crimean campaign saw the proliferation of metaphors of spoilage, sickness, injury, decay, torpor, and the sleep of a great
nation. Meanwhile, with Alexander IIs ascent to the throne and the awakening of hopes for an increase of freedom, metaphors of rebirth, recovery,
39
203
Filaret (V. M. Drozdov). Beseda v den pamiati sviatitelia Aleksiia (12 fevralia 1855) //
Sochineniia Filareta, mitropolita moskovskogo: Slova i rechi. 5 vols. Moscow, 1885.
Vol. V. Pp. 302-303.
42
B. N. Chicherin, Vostochnaia voina s russkoi tochki zreniia // Blagonamerennyi. 1862.
No. 12. In 1855, this tract circulated in manuscript. (Cited from: Sh. M. Levin. Ocherki
po istorii russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli. Vtoraia polovina XIX nachalo XX veka.
Leningrad, 1974. Pp. 338-339).
43
P. A. Valuev. Duma russkogo vo vtoroi polovine 1855 goda // Russkaia starina. 1893.
Vol. 79. Pp. 512-513.
204
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Military failure had destabilized the official image of the nation. It similarly undermined the concept of the national empire. Even those critics of
the regime who supported the idea of a dominant homogeneous Russian
mass within the empire (that is, did not distinguish between Ukrainians,
Belorussians, and Great Russians) admitted that Russians did not assimilate subject non-Russian populations, but rather alienated them with forced
Russification. Germans are the same in Alsace and in the towns and castles of Ostsee; why is it that French Germans think of themselves as French,
while ours are still German? asked N. A. Melgunov, the author of a pamphlet exposing Nicholas Russia (1856). Subscribing to the recurrent patriotic clich, he claimed that Russian people are distinguished by their uncommon ability to live alongside other nationalities and succeed in turning them into Russians only under conditions of moral union and respect for other nationalities.44 In Mikhail Katkovs article, Pushkin
(1856), which he placed in the first issues of the newly permitted journal
Russkii vestnik, the national empire is also articulated as a thing to be made,
not a given: The multiplicity of various tribes which occupy our homeland
must consciously and morally submit to the Russian nationality, just as
they now submit to the Russian government. Not the regime with its mechanisms of compulsion, but the universal power of the Russian word and
the great potential of the Russian people, Katkov asserted, would be the
instrument of consolidation of the empire.45
Defeat in the Crimean war brought about fundamental changes in the
national self-image. While explicitly criticizing official nationalism, intellectuals began to search for new strategies for defining the collective self.
Attempting as before to locate the nation apart from the state, independent
thinkers now, rather than claiming the immutability of the Russian people
or defining them by reference to their heroic past or unique natural environment, tended instead to use historical symbols to measure how far the
people had deviated, how the state had damaged them, and what might be
done to improve national life. The idea of the nation as an evolving entity
and an object of care now entered the political discourse. The Patriotic War
came to represent both an instrument for measuring degradation and a lost
ideal that should have been realized. These changes in approaching the
44
205
206
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
In 1854 Pogodin even claimed that the heroes of the current war had
surpassed the Iliad. The source of their superiority over other nations
was, of course, Russian Orthodoxy with its spirit of humility and its readiness to submit to blows, to be wounded for tsar and fatherland.50 This
conflation of bellicosity with self-sacrifice and of Homeric heroes with the
Russian Christ-figure constituted common ground for both official rhetoric
and wartime literary representations of national character, often the product of opposition-minded intellectuals. Although at that time interpretation
of 1812 served as an indicator of ideological divisions, visions of Russias
distinctive spirit functioned similarly at both ends of the political spectrum.
As always in times of crisis, official ideology aggressively solicited support from literature.51 The noble literary elite, in turn, eagerly allied itself
with the government, arrogating to itself the role of enlightened counselor,
capable, as P. A. Viazemskii had foreseen back in the 1830s, of synthesizing
European culture and narodnost.52 In his own literary practice this program engendered a combination of official patriotic rhetoric and a definition of the collective self through folklore, nature, and the customs of the
common people. Far from unique, this combination characterizes a wide
circle of writers of the Crimean War period, including the provincial poetautodidact I. S. Nikitin, plucked from obscurity by the intelligentsia to serve
as true voice of the people. In 1854, Russkii invalid published his missive
To the Don Cossacks (Dontsam), where the constant motifs of official
propaganda all figure: the dominance of the Russian spirit over the entire
imperial geography and the concomitant identification of Russia with Rus;
harsh nature and the endless steppe as our natural defenses; and military
feats as the redeeming sacrifice of the Christ-like Russian warrior.53 One
50
M. P. Pogodin. Neskolko myslei po prochtenii solovetskogo doneseniia // Russkii invalid. 1854. No. 195. September 1; Barsukov. Zhizn i trudy Pogodina. Vol. XIII. P. 199.
51
The newspaper Russkii invalid praised I. S. Turgenevs A Hunters Sketches (although its author had not long before been under arrest) and N. V. Gogols The Inspector-General, and widely quoted Pushkin (particularly To the Slanderers of Russia
and The Anniversary of Borodino). See, for example, Feleton. Smes // Russkii invalid. 1854. No. 186. August 20; Pismo grafa V. A. Sologuba k redaktory Journal de St.
Peterburg // Ibid. 1854. No. 165. July 25.
52
On this position of Viazemskiis, see: E. A. Toldes. O mirovozzrenii P. A. Viazemskogo posle 1825 goda // Pushkinskii sbornik. Issue 2. Riga, 1974. Pp. 123-166.
53
I. N. [I. S. Nikitin] Dontsam // Russkii invalid. 1854. No. 181. August 14. Collections
of I. S. Nikitins verse erroneously indicate that this missive was first published in 1912
(see I. S. Nikitin. Polnoe sobranie stikhotvorenii. Moscow-Leningrad, 1965. Pp. 166168, 580). In fact it appeared initially in Russkii invalid, though the newspaper version
differs substantially from the authors version, due to the censors interference. On how
207
208
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
tues.56 In the sketch, Sevastopol in December (1855), written immediately after The Woodfelling, Tolstoy more explicitly excludes the theme
of oppression from his picture of the army, claiming that neither the hope of
reward nor the fear of authority could inspire such feats as the defenders of
Sevastopol had accomplished.57
One idealized national trait begets another. The unbreakable union of
humility and heroism constitutes the underlying motif of Sevastopol in
December and fits tidily into official war rhetoric. Moreover, by accentuating the epic strength of the Russian warrior, the writer clothes him in
antique dress, and in this way again echoes official propaganda. In the same
kind of conventional spirit that he will subsequently deride in War and
Peace, Tolstoy calls Kornilov a hero worthy of ancient Greece.58 If the
author of War and Peace makes it his aim to reveal the truth hidden behind
the mythical accretions, then in this Sevastopol sketch he, on the contrary,
portrays the ongoing military action as the embodiment of a glorious historical legend.59
In Tolstoys military prose of the 1850s one finds a number of other
thematic echoes of official propaganda. As in Innokentiis sermons, the
author symbolically annexes the Crimean peninsula to the Russian spirit.
While depicting southern nature as markedly exotic, he at the same time
asserts that the fearlessness of Sevastopols inhabitants gives the town a
thoroughly Russian character.60 The motifs of unique Russian bravery (in
56
Tolstoy, however, admits in this story that he also knows those who command badly.
L. N. Tolstoy. Rubka lesa // Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 90 tomakh. Vol. III.
Pp. 309-311.
57
Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. IV. P. 16.
58
Ibid. P. 16. These lines are in direct contrast with the episode in War and Peace where
the author through Nikolai Rostov ridicules the comparison of Raevskiis triumph to the
legendary heroism of the Greeks at Thermopylae.
59
Ibid. P. 16.
60
In besieged Sevastopol, every soldier goes about his work calmly, assuredly, coolly,
as though all this were happening somewhere in Tula or Saransk (Ibid. P. 5). The author
mentions towns in Russias heartland not only because their inhabitants are far from
danger. Apart from this obvious reason, the comparison also asserts the unchanging
ethos of Russians in any corner of the empire. It is characteristic that the sketch should
conclude with the assertion that not only will Sevastopol not be taken by the enemy, but
it is impossible to shake the power of the Russian people, wherever they may be (Ibid.
P. 16; italics mine O.M.) In the sketch Sevastopol in May Tolstoy again emphasizes
the unified nature of people throughout Russia in Saratov, in Mamadysh, in Vinnitsa
(Ibid. P. 23). He enumerates here cities populated by various ethnic groups of the empire
(Great Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians, and Jews).
209
61
210
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Tolstoys The Cossacks and the Postwar Shift in the Vision of the Nation
In the years immediately following his return from Sevastopol, Tolstoys attitude toward wartime rhetoric took a sharply skeptical turn, due in
part to the influence of the liberal intelligentsia and the opposition-minded
circle around the journal Sovremennik, where all his first writings appeared.
By the beginning of the 1860s, however, he developed a no less critical
view of the liberal movement, with its Westernism, progressivism, propagandizing for womens emancipation, advocacy of modernization of Russian institutions, and reliance on the bureaucratic state as a major agency of
the impending reforms. In The Decembrists (1860-1861) an unfinished
novel that laid the groundwork for War and Peace, but was set in the
1850s he finds a way to target both wartime patriotic language and the
intelligentsias post-war exaltation at the prospect of fundamental change.
Tolstoy here retells his own Sevastopol sketches in parodic fashion, while
at the same time highlighting the absurdity of the triumphal spirit that prevailed in educated society as the defeat was being absorbed: ...the victorious Russian troops returned from surrendering Sevastopol to the enemy...
Russia celebrated the destruction of the Black Sea fleet, and Moscow of the
White Stones met and congratulated the remainder of the fleets crews on
these happy events.66
If The Decembrists reveals the writers tendency to debunk the ideological trends of the 1850s, then the novella The Cossacks (1853-1863) represents his attempt to provide new communal definitions and goals. Like the
literature of the preceding decades, The Cossacks approached the question
of the authentic Russian self by juxtaposing the Europeanized cultural elite
with the simple folk, taken as the incarnation of the national spirit. The
aristocrat Olenin, the authors alter ego, finds his ideal in a Cossack village,
but his desire to fit into it proves unsuccessful. There is nothing new in the
conflict itself, except, perhaps, the piercing sense of personal tragedy Olenin experiences over his estrangement from the Cossacks. What is new is
that the novella signaled a move away from simple worship of the common
people as the repository of true Russian virtues. Though Tolstoy elevates
the Cossack community to epic heights,67 through this celebration he ad66
Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. XVII. P. 8. On Tolstoys shift towards liberalism after his return from Sevastopol and his subsequent rejection of liberal ideas, see
Kathryn B. Feuer. Tolstoy and the Genesis of War and Peace. Ithaca, 1996. Pp. 135-167.
67
While working on the story, Tolstoy several times compares the Cossack world with
Homers epic and Biblical legends (Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. XLVII.
P. 146).
211
212
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
village to an enemy army in captured territory.69 Indeed, the Greben Cossacks often react to the Russian troops as enemies. Tolstoy places at the
center of the story a symbolic scene where the daring Lukashka, one of the
central characters and the embodiment of the Cossack spirit, intentionally
refuses to give way to soldiers marching towards him, thereby seeking an
altercation.70 The Greben community becomes neither the object of systematic oppression on the part of the regime (like the mass of Russian peasants) nor the subject of state coercion (like the regular army).
Tolstoy not only plucks the Greben community from the shadow of the
state, but also highlights how different its members are from the rest of
Russian ethnicity, thus calling into question Russians homogeneity as an
ethnic group. While the soldiers ridicule the Cossacks language and customs and do not recognize them as Russians, for the Greben community
the Russian muzhik is something strange, a wild and contemptible creature.71 Mutual alienation, according to Tolstoy, divides not only the army
and civilians, not only the cultural elite and the simple folk, but also the
Russian common people among themselves. At the same time that Tolstoy
raises high cultural and linguistic barriers between different groups of the
empires ethnic core, he blurs the lines between the Cossacks and their
Muslim counterparts. Due to their centuries-long contacts and intermarriages, the exiles of the Greben show some similarities to the Chechens: a
common ethos with respect to war; the cult of the horse, bravery, highwaymen, weapons, friendship (kunaki), and freedom;72 and the dominant position of women in domestic life.73 If in The Woodfelling (1855) Tolstoy
tends to attribute true courage only to Russians, contrasting them with peoples of the East,74 he is now inclined to liken the Greben community to the
Chechens, with their martial spirit constituting the point of commonality. It
is possible to identify two converging, though seemingly contradictory, tendencies in this works depiction of the Cossacks. On the one hand, Tolstoy
69
Ibid. Vol. VI. P. 16, 51. The draft is published in L. N. Tolstoy. Kazaki. Moscow, 1961.
Pp. 163-167.
70
Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. VI. Pp. 51-52.
71
Ibid. P. 16.
72
Susan Layton. Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin
to Tolstoy. Cambridge; New York, NY, 1994. Pp. 236, 245.
73
Tolstoy. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Vol. VI. P. 16. In this instance Tolstoy is of course
breaking stereotypes about both the Muslim world and Russian traditions and confronts
the liberal intelligentsia, with its advocacy of womens emancipation
74
Eastern courage, the writer asserts, unlike Russian courage, is based on a quickly
flaring and quickly cooling enthusiasm.
213
214
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
an order, but using ones head!78 The sentence ends not with a question
mark but an exclamation point. For many thinkers, the defeat had provided
a dismal answer.
The passivity of the common people came to occupy the central place in
political tracts circulated in manuscript or published abroad at the end of
the war and immediately thereafter. The Westernizers B. N. Chicherin and
K. D. Kavelin saw the Russian muzhik as a miserable sufferer not yet
awakened to independent and rational action.79 Even the Slavophile Iu.
F. Samarin included in his list of blatant Russian maladies the nations mental somnolence and the stagnation of its creative forces. 80 N. A. Melgunov,
who occupied an intermediate position between the Slavophiles and Westernizers, surpassed them all, calling the lack of inventiveness and capacity for initiative Russias original sin.81 Criticism of the national character seeped into literature. I. S. Turgenev focused on passivity among the
educated segments of society. Elena, the main character of his novel On the
Eve (1859), falls in love with the energetic Bulgarian Insarov, rejecting the
attentions of her compatriots because of their lack of convictions and purpose. For Turgenev, the erotic, matrimonial, and ultimately creative debacle of Insarovs Russian rivals resulted not so much from their own personal weaknesses as from the suffocating political system which had deprived
them of initiative. Lingering oppression damaged all levels of society, submerging it in lethargy on this point intellectuals from across the political
spectrum could agree.82
Although, unlike the liberals, Tolstoy saw the Crimean war and the defense of Sevastopol as confirmations of the might of the Russian people,
for him the bureaucracy in general and Nicholas regime in particular had
weakened and suppressed the nation. Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, however, he expressed this thought not by negative means that is,
by pointing out what was lacking; but positively by celebrating the spirit
of independence and creativity that still survived, if only in a community
78
215
216
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
folklore does in fact include a legend about negotiating rights with Ivan the
Terrible, in the sixteenth century the Caucasian exiles could not have been
considered Old Believers, since the church schism occurred some one hundred years after Ivans death. As a second distinctive feature, Tolstoy infuses
the story about the Old Believers with the literary topoi of the Cossack myth.
In Pushkins The Captains Daughter and Gogols Taras Bulba, as in
Tolstoys novella, Cossacks also live at the border of alien worlds temporal, spatial, and cultural at times belonging simultaneously to all, at times
to neither. Within the literary tradition Cossacks also embody a primordial
freedom bordering on amorality, and symbolize, though less explicitly than
in Tolstoys story, Russias ambivalent relation to the East.87 Utilizing these
topoi of the Cossack myth, Tolstoy imbued the Cossacks dual nature with
a sharper political meaning than had his predecessors. If the Greben community represents Russias self, it is not foreign enemies or alien cultures
that serve as Russias other, but the coercive bureaucratic state. Tolstoys
anarchistic views made it possible for him to introduce this innovation into
the Cossack myth and thus radically pluck the Russian people from the
shadow of the state.
What also drew a sharp line between Tolstoy and literary tradition is
that he chose not to locate the Greben community in the historical past (as
does Pushkin) or the mythic past (as in Gogol). The Cossacks subtitle, A
Caucasian story of 1852, localizes the action to a point in time on the eve
of the Crimean War. To understand Tolstoys decision one should take into
consideration that the Russian armys victory in the Caucasus, the only
truly successful theater of the Crimean campaign, led to the regions final
subjection to the Russian empire. While The Cossacks appeared in 1863,
by which time the Caucasus had been declared finally subdued, the subtitle indicates that its characters live in a pre-war as-yet-undefeated Caucasus. This means that the Greben community still sits on a dangerous frontier, has not yet been absorbed into the body of the Russian Empire, and can
symbolize a sense of independence. This is not to say that Tolstoy subscribed to anti-imperialistic ideas at that time. His primary concern was to
re-define the Russian nation, and the pre-war period made it possible for
him to construct the Greben community an embodiment of Russias true
self by juxtaposing it with the Chechen one.
The narrative sharply distinguishes between two types of violence, depicting them in very different ways. At the outset of the story, Lukashka,
87
217
For a different interpretation of the morality of the killing, see Donna Tussing Orwin.
Tolstoys Art and Thought, 1847-1880. Princeton, NJ, 1993. Pp. 86-93.
218
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
my, and both possessed the qualities of leadership. Tolstoy also emphasizes each mans physical beauty and uses their racial differences (the
Chechens brown body and Lukashkas white one) as a backdrop against
which to reveal their similarities (strong, muscular, beautiful bodies). 89 By
setting the narrative in 1852, Tolstoy puts the Cossacks in the same position
of fighting for their independence and their communities as the Chechens.
Since the Greben settlers epitomize the nations true self, their equation
with the Chechens symbolically resolved one of the central conundrums of
Russian national consciousness.
In On the Eve Turgenev argues that Russians do not know the meaning
of love of country and have lost all sense of national identity. Resurgent
Bulgaria and still-uniting Italy represent two different scenarios of struggle
for national rebirth, equally attractive to the author and equally inapplicable to his own country, since the struggle for the Russian nation inevitably
entailed struggle on behalf of the regime that had enslaved and oppressed
the nation. The action of the novel begins in the summer of 1853. The work
shows how movements for the independence of the Balkan nations began
to emerge with the Russian armys successes on the Danube at the very
beginning of the Crimean War. The war brought the Bulgarians hope of
emancipation from the Ottoman yoke, but demands by the Russian people
only increased humility.90 This vicious circle tormented Turgenev and, to
be sure, not only him.91 The Cossacks symbolically breaks the circle, dramatizing an ideal scenario where Russians fight for their own community.
A note made while Tolstoy was at work on the novella concisely encapsulates the authors intent: The future of Russia lies in Cossackdom (kazachestvo): freedom, equality, and compulsory military service for all.92
Lukashka at war with the Chechens is the prototype of the citizen-volunteer defending his community, the antithesis both of the standing army which
lost the Crimean war and of the slave-recruit who fulfills a punitive function with respect to his own people. Still, while Tolstoy believes the Greben
89
219
A. V. Nikitenko. Dnevnik v trekh tomakh. Moscow, 1955. Vol. 1. P. 423 (diary entry
of October 16, 1855).
94
Zapiski Sergeia Mikhailovicha Soloveva. P. 158.
95
Iu. F. Samarin. Uprazdnenie krepostnogo prava i ustroistvo otnoshenii mezhdu
pomeshchikami i krestianami v Prussii // Iu. F. Samarin. Sochineniia. Vol. 2. This work
was originally published in the journal Selskoe blagoustroistvo (1857). Samarin focuses
on the activities of Freiger von Stein, whom he considered the main inspirer of reform
after Prussias defeat by Napoleons troops in 1807.
220
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
forming the national community is very characteristic of post-war rhetoric.
All these quotations signal a major change in approaches to the nation: it is
no longer taken for granted, but often understood as a thing to be made or
(re)built.
David Bell identifies the awareness of a need to recreate the nation as
the distinctive feature of nationalist ideologies, and traces how, propelled
by institutional crisis, this idea emerged with particular strength in late eighteenth century France.96 Though, unlike in France, the political concept of
nation remained underdeveloped in Russia, the post-Crimean War era witnessed a similar tendency to subject the national character to fundamental
criticism and thus to foster a vision of the nation as a damaged entity in
need of reconstruction. The weakening of censorship made it possible to
publicly articulate plans for improvement. The fortunate coincidence of
these two fundamental shifts reappraisal of the national character and the
beginning of a thaw allowed the idea of the nation as a thing to be made to
enter public discourse.
Tolstoys note cited above (freedom, equality, and compulsory military service for all) brings together the motto of the French revolution
with a plan for universal military service. A spiritual heir of the Enlightenment well acquainted with Western instruments of national consolidation,
Tolstoy never applied them directly to Russian soil. As an opponent of
Westernization, modernization, and political efforts to change social life,
he looked to Russias rich ethnic history for authentic ways to address urgent national issues. Like many European intellectuals, he saw in the extension of military duties to the entire populace a means of forging the
nation. Like many Russian intellectuals, he inscribed his vision of the nations transformations even those developed under the obvious influence
of West European blueprints within the authentic historical patrimony (in
this case, the Cossack institution). This approach to vernacular symbolism
marked a major innovation in the national discourse after the war. Intellectuals rediscovered or manufactured historical distinctiveness not only to
celebrate the nation or to foster a belief in its uniqueness, but also to suggest authentic ways of transforming it. National self-image expressed through
cultural myths served as a means for reviving a true national identity.
Although various ideological groups envisioned the development of the
nation in different ways, after the humiliating defeat even right-wing intel96
David Bell. The Unbearable Lightness of Being French: Law, Republicanism, and
National Identity at the End of the Old Regime // The American Historical Review.
2001. Vol. 106. No. 4. Pp. 1215-1235.
221
222
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
tional physical environment, for Shchedrin the traditional national landscape is treacherous and full of peril not for the invading enemy, but for
Russians themselves. In Provincial Sketches (1856-1857), he first paints a
magnificent image of fields as far as the eye can see which represents the
antithesis of the empty life of bureaucrats the authors main target. But
then the peaceful village idyll morphs into endless sleep, the poetic peasant
becomes an obtuse slave, and the boundless expanse turns bloodthirsty: you
drown in the swamp of provincial life, which on the surface is so green that
from a distance you could, perhaps, imagine it to be a lush meadow.98 Recasting the celebration of conventional Russian nature as a funeral for its
inhabitants, Saltykov-Shchedrin pointed to the path many writers would
later take.99 Melgunov proposed the most radical reinterpretation of the
metaphor by refusing to acknowledge Russias expansive territory at all.
Without proper means of communication, he wrote, the Russian expanses
are a fiction, because a person cannot comprehend them. As this last example shows, attempts to undermine the traditional understanding of national
space stemmed from the sense that the nation needed to be reconstructed,
not praised. An advocate of the development of railroads, Melgunov compared them to the blood vessels of an organism, asserting that Russia would
remain fragmented until she was united by modern means of communication.100
This shift in the function of a stable national symbol reflected a new
approach to the collective self. Before the Crimean War, intellectuals defined the nation by reference to something pre-existing something eternal or long since established, be it the physical environment, divine ordinance, historical achievement, or folk heritage. Within this conceptual framework, the nation was given and the agent of its fate was understood to be
something independent of human will. After the war Russians looked at
themselves through a new lens. They came to see the national community
as an evolving entity that might deviate or be resurrected as a result of the
peoples activity, and that therefore should be treated as an object of care
and construction. Where the former approach fell entirely within the paradigm of romantic nationalism, with its tendency to extrapolate a countrys
98
223
SUMMARY
,
(1853-1856).
1812 ,
, 1850- . ,
,
. ,
, , . ,
, . 1850- , ,
. , 1860- ,
.
224
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
:
-
(1860- .)*
,
. , , .1 *
Gerda Henkel
Stiftung () , , ,
AZ 05/SR/03. Ab Imperio .
1
., .: Michael Khodarkovsky. Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects:
Constructing Non-Christian Identities in Early Modern Russia // Daniel Brower, Edward
Lazzerini (Eds). Russias Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917.
Bloomington&Indianopolis, 1997. Pp. 9-26; Nicholas Breyfogle. Heretics and Colonizers:
Religious Dissent and Russian Colonization of Transcaucasia. 1830-1890 / Ph.D.
Dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1998. Pp. 335-341; Austin Jersild. Orientalism
225
. , ...
( ), , , .
1863 .
- ( -) . 1864-1867 . , , 70 . -, , , .2
and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 18451917.
Montreal, 2002. p. 38-58; . -. . 18271914. , 2003. . 118-137; Eugene Avrutin. The Jewish Intelligentsia, State Administration, and the Myth of Conversion in Tsarist Russia // F. Bjrling, A. PereswetoffMorath (Eds.). Words, Deeds and Values: The Intelligentsias in Russia and Poland during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Lund, 2005 (Slavica Lundensia, 22). Pp.
99-118; Tomohiko Uyama. A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia // T. Uyama (Ed.). Empire, Islam and
Politics in Central Eurasia. Sapporo, 2007 (forthcoming).
2
.: .
60- XIX
// Lietuvi katalik mokslo akademijos metratis. Vol. XXVI. Vilnius, 2005.
. 309-310. (. , 1863),
. , , 2900 .; 444 .
,
1860- . , ( ,
), , . , ,
,
1860- . . (, , ) , ,
, 1864 . 1100 . .: (). . 384. . 12. . 360. . 45.
226
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, 100 .
1840- .
1875 .
- . 1840- .
, .
, , , , , , - ,
. 1830- .
, .3 1861 . , ,
(, , ) , .4
, , . .
.
.
, ( ) :
, -3
Paul Werth. At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional
Politics in Russias VolgaKama Region, 1827-1905. Ithaca, NY, 2002. Pp. 140-146.
4
. . II. . 36. . 2. 37709.
227
. , ...
, ,
, .5
, , ,
,
, , - . , ,
,
, ,
.6
1860- . - . , , . ,
:
, , , -.7
, , ,
Robert Geraci. Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist
Russia. Ithaca, NY, 2001. Pp. 114-115.
6
P. Werth. At the Margins of Orthodoxy. P. 94.
7
. . . . 307-346, . 312, 344.
. .
, , . .: . . .
- . , 2005. . 185-191, 282-283, 317.
5
228
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, . ,
( ) - 1839 ., .
.
, , , , ,
. 8 ,
.9 , , , 1830- .
, , .10 -
,
, ,
11
8
: M. Dolbilov. The Russifying Bureaucrats Vision of Catholicism: the
Case of Northwestern krai after 1863 // Andrzej Nowak (Ed.). Russia and Eastern Europe:
Applied Imperiology/ Rosja i Europa Wschodnia: imperiologia stosowana. Krakw,
2006. Pp. 197-221.
9
Robert Crews. Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in
Nineteenth-Century Russia // American Historical Review. 2003. Vol. 108. No. 1. Pp.
50-83.
10
Jonathan Sperber. Popular Catholicism in 19th century Germany. Princeton, NJ, 1984;
David Blackbourn. Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth-Century
Germany. New York, 1994; .
11
, . , ,
229
. , ...
,
.
, , ,
,
.
, ,
, .
: , , . , ,
,
, .
.
,
- .
- ,
.
. , , (
) . .:
Gregory L. Freeze. Institutionalizing Piety: The Church and Popular Religion, 17501850 // J. Burbank, D. Ransel (Eds.). Imperial Russia. New Histories for the Empire.
Bloomington, 1998. Pp. 215-231; . . . .
1700-1740 . , 2000; Vera Shevzov. Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution.
Oxford, 2004. Pp. 122-123, 171-213; . .
230
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. . :
1860- . -
.
.
1863 . ( 1830- .
) . . ,
, .
:
- -,
. []
12
, ,
. ,
,
.
.
, 1850- . . . , .13
, 1839 .
, 1840- . , ,14 Lietuvos valstybs istorijos archyvas ( . ;
LVIA). F. 378. PS. 1863. B. 1080. Ll. 5-5 ap. ( .
26 1863 .).
13
P. Werth. At the Margins of Orthodoxy. P. 144.
14
. : . . , . . : (1865-1866 .) //
. 2005. 5. . 6-11.
12
231
. , ...
, . 1864 . .15
.
. , ,
, , ,
:
, ,
, , , ,
. ,
,
.16
, , ,
, .17
. - .18 .19 , , -
. 1865 . -
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1461. Ll. 3-11 ., L. 7.
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1461. Ll. 8 ., 9-9 .
17
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1461. Ll. 10-11.
18
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1461. L. 2.
19
. . . . 315; . . . - . . 187.
15
16
232
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.. ( ) , . .
1839 . ,
I 1842 .,
.
, ,
.
,
1798 . ( ),
, . . II . 1860 .
, 1839 . . , , .20
. 1863 ., , . ,
1850- .
. 1865 .
. . . . , , ,
. . 821. . 1. . 613. . 3-10, 22 (
, 1859 . 1860 .); [ ]. ,
. . , 1883. . II. . 626-630, 650-655 .
20
233
. , ...
,
. ,
, , , ..
, - .21
1860- . . , ,
1832 .,
()
. 1865 . . . , , , - . ,
( ) , , 1863 .
- . ,
, .22 , ,
, ,
. .
, , , ( , ),
.23
1865 . . . , , -, ,
. .: LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1651. Ll. 1-4 ap. ( 21 1865 .); F. 439. Ap. 1. B. 64. Ll. 1-2 ( 24 1865 .).
22
P. Werth. Of Sacrament, Law, and Imperial Politics: The Legal Regulation of Mixed
Marriage in Russia (. ); . . .
: (XIX XX .). ,
1999. . 82-83, 90.
23
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1651. Ll. 6-6 ap. ( . 20 1865 .).
21
234
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,24 , .
10 . 1867 . ( . ).25
, ,
.26 , 1864 . ( ) 230 , . , , :
[ ] ,
, ,
, 27
,
,28 (). ( )
, ,
.
, , 1867 ., , . . , . (LVIA.
F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1651. Ll. 10-11).
25
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1152.
26
. 1865 .:
. 1902. 6. . 503.
27
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1507. Ll. 12 .-13.
28
.: Lewis R. Rambo. Anthropology and the Study of Conversion // Andrew Buckser,
Stephen D. Glazier. (Eds.). The Anthropology of Religious Conversion. New York, 2003.
Pp. 213-214.
24
235
. , ...
.29
. . 1865 .
. , ,
, .
, ,
30 .
1865 .
. . . . 7 ,
. ,
:
,
,
, ,
.
:
, , , .31
.
, .: / . . , . .
, 2006. . 210; . . -
. . 172.
31
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1331. Ll. 232-233 ap. ( 7
1865 .).
30
236
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , , , ,
:
, -,
[] , 32
, . :
, , []: , . , ,
, - , ;
.33
,
. , . , -
,
- .
.
() 1865 .
. , ,
32
LVIA. F.378. BS, 1864. B. 1331. Ll. 230-231 (
18 1865 .).
33
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1331. Ll. 230-230 . ( 15 1865 .).
237
. , ...
, . , , .
, . . . , ,
. .
.34 , - . . : ,
. , , ,
. . , 5 1865 . 638 .
, 23 , ,
.35
, ,
, , . . , . , . , 638
,
, 1700 (!)
, , .36
34
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1601. Ll. 3-3 . ( 13
1865 .).
35
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1601. Ll. 4-5 ap. ( 23
13 1865 .).
36
. - ( 1866 .). .: . . 908. . 1. . 271. . 16 .
238
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, - . . :
[ ]
- , [. ..]
- ,
, [] ,
, III .37 , , ,
: - .
() , . 1866 . .38
,
: 1400 3800 .
, - :
, ,
,
, , ,
,
, - : , , [] ,
, .39
(). . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 . . 82. . 28
.-29, 31 ( III . . 25
1866 .).
38
. . 797. . 36. . 4. . 56. . 4-4 . ( . . . . 24 1866 .).
39
. . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 . . 82. . 32.
37
239
. , ...
, , . . 1866 . . . :
, , ... , . , ,
, 40
. . . , 300 . .,
. - , 400 .
1000 . ,
, (, , ).
300 . . .41
, .
-
. , , . 1866 .
III
:
.
, , 40
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1208. L. 1 ap. ( 29
1866 .).
41
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1137. L. 16 ( 29
1866 .); . . 797. . 36. . 4. . 56. . 18-18 ., 20-22 ( 14 1866 . .
1867 .).
240
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
; , , , . - , . .
, ,
:
[ ] , , , , , , , , 5 . .
. . .
, , . , ., , ;
42
?
XVIII XIX . , ,
,43 . , 1833-1834 . (),
120 . , ,
, .44 , 1860- .
, . , ,
, . . . 908. . 1. . 271. . 18 ., 18.
., .: P. Werth. Coercion and Conversion: Violence and the Mass Baptism of
the Volga Peoples, 1740-1755 // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History.
2003. Vol. 4. No. 3. P. 543-569.
44
. . . (1833-1839 .). . , 1910. . 101-103.
42
43
241
. , ...
, .
, . - . ,
, . . : ,
, , , ,
( , !).
, ,
. -
: 1860- .
. ,
. , , , , , .
:
. ,
-
, , . . , . . , . . .
7 1865 .,45
45
242
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
II
.46
3 1866 ., - , -
.47 4 1866 ., , .48 1866 .
,
1847 .,49 .
, ,
, :
. - steeple-chase: ,
, , . . , 1868-1869 .50
, , .
, . . 213-214; . .
- . . 178-183.
47
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1443. Ll. 7-7 ap. . : . . . . 332-333.
48
, .
49
. . . // XIX XX . . , 2003. . 46-47.
50
. . . - .
// . 1885.
10. . 101; ( ). .
856. 5. . 329.
46
243
. , ...
,
.
.
- , 1866 . ,
:
[. ..],
, , ,.. ,
, . , ,
: ,
: , .51
. . , , . . , -
:
, , .
, .
, , .52
. :
, ,
, : ?
. . 821. . 150. . 584. . 55 .-56 ( . . ).
52
. . 523. 66. . 145 . (
5 1867 .).
51
244
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
: ;
. , : ; : ,
; .
, , , , , -.53
/ , () XIX .54
, , ,
.
.
, .
,
,
. 1864 . , , ,
, .
, -, . , , .
, , , 1842 . ( -
1870 .),55 - . . . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 . . 82. . 20 .-21.
Jeffrey Brooks. When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 18611917. Princeton, 1985. P. 215-222.
55
. . . ( 1860-1870- ). , 1999. . 384-389.
53
54
245
. , ...
, , , , .56
, , , . ,
,
,
.57
,
.
,
, , . ,
, .
, . . :
, , , ,
,
.58
-
. 1866-1868 .
, . , ,
.: G. Freeze. The Parish Clergy in NineteenthCentury Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform. Princeton, 1983. Part 2, oco. Pp.
249-319; . . .
( 1850- 1870- .). , 2006; .
57
., .: . .. // . 1864. 29. 18
. . 16-19; LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1354. Ll. 9-9 ap., 64 ap.-65.
58
. . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 . . 82. . 30 .
56
246
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
:
.59 , :
, ,
, .60
III , .. ( 540 ).61 , ,
,
.
,62
()
.
,
( ),
, .
. . 109. 1- . . 41, 1866 . . 5, . 5. . 16 ., 18-18 . (
16 1866 .); . 38, 1863 . . 201. . 48 ., 66-66 . (
. . 5 1868 . .
25 1868 .). .
( )
, . ( XIX : ii
. i i i / . . i. i, 2003).
60
. . 109. 1- . . 41, 1866 . . 5, . 5. . 60 (
30 1866 .); . 38, 1863 . . 201. . 49
.-50 ( . . 5 1868 .).
61
. . 109. 1- . . 38, 1863 . . 201. . 47 . (
5 1868 .); . 41, 1866 . . 5, . 5. . 60-60 .
62
. : . . .
(1596-1839 .). , 2001.
59
247
. , ...
1866 . 2000 .
, ,
.63 , . .
, ,
( 1450 ).64 .
, -:
, ... ,
, . .65
- , , , .
,
. ,
. , ,
,
.
, , LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1301. Ll. 1-2 ( - 9 1866 .), 3 . (
19 1866 .).
64
[. .] . . . ,
1867. . 7, 8.
65
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1301. Ll. 22-23 ( - 25 1867 .); . . 970. . 1. . 1043. . 1-5 (
. . - 15 1867 .).
63
248
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, - ,
, ,
.66 - ,
, , ,
. - ( ) , :
! . . ,
(-) ,
:
: , ,
, . , .67
66
, 1867 . . .
- , , . , , (
). : ,
, ,
, . (LVIA.
F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1380. Ll. 1-2, 3 19
1867 . ).
67
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1331a. Ll. 64-64 . ( 30
1867 .).
249
. , ...
* * *
. , 1863 ., ,
. 1867 .,
III , ,
, ,
. , ,
, :
,
, . . . .
31 : ,
, , .68
, .
-. , .69
:
[ .
..] ,
. , , LVIA. F. 378. PS, 1867. B. 500. Ll. 7-8 ap. ( . . 19 1867 .). . : . .
. . 328.
69
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1865. B. 1601. L. 4 ap.
68
250
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. .70
, ( , , .) , ,
.
, ,
, . , , , , , . 1864 . , .71
( ) 1866 .,
. , , ,
. ,
, , ,
.72
,
, . , .73
- . .
1872 . (
), , , .74 ,
. . 908. . 1. . 279. . 336 .-337 . (
, 1867 .).
71
. . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 . . 82. . 4-5 .
72
LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 219. B. 125. Ll. 35-36 (
3 1867 .).
73
. . . . 329, . 101.
74
LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 216. B. 354. L. 2.
70
251
. , ...
1050 .
. ,
, , 250 -, , 1093 ,
.75
?
1866 .
.
,
. ,
. , .
, , , , . , , ,
- , .
,
. . 1866 . , ,
III , .76
-
, LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 219. B. 125. Ll. 34, 36.
III . . .: . . . . 201-211.
75
76
252
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
, , , ,
, . , .
. . - 28
15 1866 .,
III , .
,
. , , ,
. (13
1866 .) II
. . . , ,
, ,
- .
,
, .
:
, ,
, . , , , , , , , , . , ;
253
. , ...
, , , , . , , , .77
. . . , , , . . ,
. ,
, :
,
?78
, , ,
.
, ,
, .
1866 .
. , ( ) , -
, . . . 908. . 1. . 271. . 25, 17 .; . . 109. 1- . . 39, 1864 .
. 82. . 81-81 . . : . , . . . . 2224;
.: . . . . 18641917 . , 2001.
. 57, 63; .: . 1866. 99.
78
. . . . 1866
. , 1897. . 296, 297-298 ( 10 ).
77
254
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
, .
-
.
, :
[ ] , , .
, , , ,
, , ... ,
. , , , , , ,
, 9 . , , , ,
, , .79
, , .
,
, , , .
, ,
, , .80
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1291. Ll. 9-10 . ( 11 1866 .).
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1291. Ll. 3-3 . (
. . 18 1866 .).
79
80
255
. , ...
81
.
, .82 :
.
, 1866 . . . , ,
.
, II , ,
, , , , .83
(
) , ,
81
, . , , . . : :
500 . , . , ,
, , ( . . 377.
445. . 4 .).
82
. 1866. 175. 20 . . . ,
, .: . . 120. . 24. 1. . 105 .
83
1866 . : , ! III
, 400 1000 ., 2 . 50 . . (. . 109. . . 2. . 700. .
3-3 .).
256
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .84
1866 ., , -
, - ,
. , ,
. :
Matka Boska,
Jesus Christus, , [! ..] ,
, .
? . , , , . - : , , , ,
85 ( .)
, , .
.
1867 . , , . ,
, . , ,
, , (
( ). . 76. 266.
. 1 . ( . . . . 23 1867 . ,
- ).
85
. . 76. 266. . 9-10.
84
257
. , ...
). ,
,
. ,
, : ,
, - 86 :
,
.87
.
,
.
, , , ,
.
XIX .88 ,
, , .89
.
LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 216. B. 308. Ll. 62-63 ap.
LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 216. B. 308. Ll. 64 ., 62 .-63.
88
. Anderson. Piety and Politics: Recent Works on German Catholicism // Journal of
Modern History. 1991. Vol. 63. No. 4. Pp. 694-695.
1850- . - , ; .: Vytautas Merkys. Bishop Motiejus Valanius, Catholic
Universalism and Nationalism // Lithuanian Historical Studies. 2001. Vol. 6. Pp. 69-88.
89
,
. J. Sperber. Popular Catholicism. Pp. 73-80.
86
87
258
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1863 ., , , , , - .90 ,
, .
, ,
, , . , ,
,
,91 . ,
,
,
,
.92 , , , . , 18651866 ., , . - . . , , : , , .93
M. Dolbilov. The Russifying Bureuacrats Vision of Catholicism. Pp. 203-206.
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 2516. L. 158 ap.
92
- // . 1867. 80. 21 .
.: : / . . . . . , 2004. C. 286-288;
M. Zowczak. Biblia ludowa. Interpretacje watkw biblijnych w kulturze ludowej.
Wrocaw, 2000. S. 191. ,
77 ,
(.: P. Werth. At the Margins
of Orthodoxy. Pp. 166-167).
93
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1866. B. 1152. Ll. 83-88 . ( . .
23 1867 .).
90
91
259
. , ...
,
( )
.94 ,
, . , , . , , ,
.
, .
.
, .
1867 . , , . ( ),95
. , . , 1867 .
.
. , , .
94
, 1860- . , . : P.
Werth. At the Margins of Orthodoxy. Pp. 171-176.
95
.: . . , 1902. . 1. . 453-482; . .
:
XIX // Ab Imperio. 2006. 3. . 48, 50-51.
260
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
- ,
. 1867 .
, ,
( )
, .96 1867 . ,
. , , 2500
.97
.
,
. , .
, ,
. :
. .
,
. ,
!.. . .
, ! ,
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1327. L. 1.
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1157. L. 34; PS, 1867. B. 500. Ll. 1-2. , ,
.
96
97
261
. , ...
.-. .
.98
, ,
.
-:
[
. ..], , , ,
.99
. . , , ,
, .100 , ,
, - .
,
98
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1380. Ll. 14 .-15 . ( 10
1867 .). , .. , ( ) , , . (. .
: 1978-2003 . , 2003. . 174-178).
. , , ,
.
99
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1331a. L. 64 (
17 1867 . 30 1867 .).
100
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1157. L. 40 ( 14 1867 .).
262
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , , ,
, , .101
. ( )
:
,
, . ,
,
[. ..],
[sic! ..]
1868 . , 1128
.102 ,
.
, , . , . 10 1867 . :
,
. crescendo crescendo. (165
) , , []
. .
30 1867 . :
., .: LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1380. Ll. 1-1 ap. (
1867 .).
102
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1864. B. 1331a. Ll. 81-81 ., 79 ( .. [ 1868 .] 6 1868 .).
101
263
. , ...
. -
. ; , ,
, ,
. .103
, . , , - - . - .
(
).
, , , , . , . , , , . , . . ,
, :
,
- ,
104
, 1867 . . . .
,
.
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1380. L. 14 ap.; 1864. B. 1331a. Ll. 57-57 ap., 58; 1867.
B. 1157. L. 56 ap.
104
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1867. B. 1380. L. 16 ( 29
1867 .).
103
264
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
:
, .
-
.105
,
, , , . ,
,
.
, , . , , :
. ,
,
, . , , ,
, .106
:
( ) ,
,
? , 1866 . . . :
,
- ,
[. ..] 105
106
265
. , ...
,
.107
,
* * *
1860- . ,
,
, , . 1869 . () - , 1865-1866 .
. 370
850 ,
500 700, 300 600
30 .. :
[] , , .108 , ,
. . . , 1879 .
10500 ,
. . , 1865-7
.109
, , .
,
, . , 1867
1868 . , . . 821. . 125. . 294. . 7.
LVIA. F. 378. BS, 1869. B. 979. L. 20 ap.-21 ap. ( .
6 1869 .); F. 378. Ap. 121. B. 625. L. 34.
109
. . 821. . 125. . 301. . 14-14 ., 37; . 289. . 178-178 .
107
108
266
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
. . . . , : ,
.110 ( : .111)
, , ,
. , 1866 .
, . . . .
,
, . . , .112 ( , ?)
( ), . , , ,
- ,
. . 908. . 1. . 279. . 484 ( 1867 ., , ); *** [. . ?]. // . 1868. 27.
4 .
111
. . . . . . 30 . , 1973. . 8. . 450-451.
(. . 4, VII.). ,
-, .
112
. . 821. . 150. . 584. . 77-77 ., 56 .-57.
110
267
. , ...
.113 ?
, , ,
, .114 , , - .
,
. , . ,
, ,
. , .
, ,
( ), :
, ,
. , ,
.
. . 821. . 150. . 584. . 57 .
, . .
- ( 18671882 .),
, , . ,
, , , , ,
. .: D. Brower. Islam and Ethnicity:
Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan // Russias Orient. Pp. 113-135; Adeeb Khalid.
The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley, 1998. Pp.
50-61; . . . (1865-1917):
. , 1998.
113
114
268
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, 1868 . . , - . . , , , ,
, .115
. ,
,
, 1869 .
.116 , ,
,
.117 ,
, , . 1864-1867 . - : , ,
, ;
.
, , . , , , , , . .: . . . . 334.
116
, ,
, . .: LVIA. F. 378. BS,
1869. B. 979. Ll. 7-11 ( 17 1869 ., ).
117
LVIA. F. 378. Ap. 216. B. 354. Ll. 3-4.
115
269
. , ...
,
,
( 17 1905 .).118
SUMMARY
Mikhail Dolbilov explores the broad state-led campaign of conversion
to Orthodoxy in the Western borderlands after the January uprising of 1863.
The author situates his research in the context of recent studies of religion
and confession in the Russian empire that highlight the secular and etatist
approach of the imperial government to the Orthodox Church and conversion to Orthodoxy. Focusing on middle-rank bureaucrats who were in charge
of confessional policy in the Western borderlands, Dolbilov argues that the
development of popular Catholicism (as a pan-European phenomenon of
moving toward a more visceral and mystical mode of religiosity) brought
about a perception of Catholicism as ill-suited for the collective identification of subjects with the sovereign. The author analyzes in detail the growing desire of middle and high ranking functionaries to engage in an interventionist policy by way of using police and administrative coercion in the
process of converting of the local Catholic population to Orthodoxy. The
author further analyzes the details of the conversion campaign with accompanying misdemeanors, violence, and fraud. He notes that this large scale
social engineering effort to link political allegiance with confessional status brought about unexpected consequences. It exacerbated conflicts between local functionaries and high-ranked bureaucrats, as well as those
between the Orthodox community in the Western borderlands and newly
converted Orthodox lay people. The article concludes with an analysis of
the failure of the state-led conversion campaign, the key to which was the
growing concern with the spread of atheist ideas and concomitant rise of
political radicalism. The author infers that the Western borderlands campaign demonstrated the limits of mass proselytizing and interventionist policy
in a confessional state and suggests that it ushered imperial bureaucrats
toward the path that ultimately resulted in the acceptance of freedom of
conscience in 1905.
. . 373-375; . .
:
1905 . // Lietuvi katalik mokslo akademijos metratis. Vol. XXVI. Vilnius, 2005. .
447-475.
118
270
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Liliana RIGA
James KENNEDY
271
Wilsons Fourteen Points speech was drafted by the Inquiry (Walter Lippman, Sidney
Mezes, and David Hunter Miller). The term league was the Inquirys substitution for
association. Lawrence E. Gelfand. The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace,
1917-1919. New Haven, 1963.
2
On the American desire to use it to counter rightism in East Central Europe, see Klaus
Schwabe. Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany and Peacemaking 1918-1919.
Chapel Hill, 1985. Pp. 17-19. A few years later it would also be seen as an effective
ideological response to Bolshevism.
272
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
ments reflected where their judgments were overruled or, as they put it,
where realpolitik had prevailed. Nevertheless, even when boundary decisions did not go their way, the American Inquirys extensive and meticulous research formed the ethnographic basis of the newly constructed nation-states. The aims of this article, then, are to retrieve the social and intellectual sources of the constructions of national self-determination in 1919
in the mapping of East Central Europe, and to explore the degree to which
American elites universalized particular and new constructions of ethnicity, nationalism, and more pointedly, liberal assimilation. It elaborates,
in other words, Middle American understandings of Mitteleuropean nationalities.
The Inquiry
President Wilson had committed the United States to the War late, indeed intentionally at a point when it was clear that the United States entry
would be determinative in the outcome and so could decisively shape the
post-war peace settlements. In early September 1917 Wilson was cognizant of rumors of an immanent peace and well aware that the Allied Powers
were preparing their cases for the peace conference. He therefore asked his
closest advisor, Colonel Edward House, to quietly gather a group of
academic specialists to collect data on the political, economic, social, and
ethnic requirements for working out an American position on what the postwar peace should look like. This effectively created the Inquiry, the United
States first think tank. It was independent of the electoral process and
worked in relative isolation, but it drew on information from the United
States State Department and Military Intelligence units, and the Central
Powers census data and maps; and because of its very specific mandate
and close proximity to House, it became highly influential at the highest
level of policymaking. Indeed its work was funded by a special reserve
available only to the President. For the fourteen months of its existence the
Inquiry was instructed not only to gather data in the form of ethnographies,
statistics, personality sketches, histories, and economic conditions about the
Central Powers, but they were also mandated to formulate the United States
recommendations for mapping East Central Europes new boundaries.3
3
Gelfand. Op. Cit.; Lawrence E. Gelfand. The American Commission to negotiate the
Peace: An Historian Looks Back // M. F. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman, E. Glaser (Eds.).
The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years. Cambridge, 1998. We draw
on this classic work through this section.
273
These are Harold Nicholsons words (Peacemaking, 1919. London, 1933. Pp. 128129), though he noted that they were not selected with the full implications in mind at
the time; Charles Seymour. Letters from the Paris Peace Conference. New Haven, 1965.
Pp. xxx-xxxi; an American geographer (likely Bowman) also served as an unofficial
274
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
influence in the Supreme Council at Versailles, in their roles as specialists in
negotiations, their volumes of data, and in their boundary recommendations.5
In the ranks of the Inquiry were specialists and experts of all kinds
some relevant, such as historians or economists of Poland or Austria-Hungary, while other specialists strained credulity, such as archeologists and
scholars of Greek antiquity. Many years of American isolationism had left
their legacy: there were very few qualified experts or area specialists, academic or otherwise, knowledgeable of world or diplomatic history. The
Inquiry also included Central European and Russian migrs, with the number of academics who had studied geography and history in Imperial Germany particularly noteworthy. Their roles in the Inquirys preparations were
influential beyond their numbers both because of their unique ability to
reflect back on policy and because of their linguistic skills. Yet this was a
group of men (and a few women) noticeable by their general lack of expertise or experience in international politics or policymaking. Significantly,
there was not a single specialist on Germany among the 150 members of
the Inquiry.6 In fact Germany was not included among the fifteen subdivisions of the Inquiry assembled to prepare the European settlements.
Of the 150 members of the Inquiry, 65 percent had obtained their terminal degrees from Columbia, Chicago, Harvard, and Yale, and more than
half were recruited from five institutions: Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, and the American Geographical Society. Most were recruited through
social and professional networks of acquaintances, colleagues, and friends,
rather than on the basis of academic qualification. For the most part, it was
their general capacity and scholarship that was sought. In fourteen months
the Inquiry produced hundreds of reports, census summaries, maps, and
proposals. The judgments that created the postwar map of East Central
Europe were primarily formed on the basis of the Americans empirical
research and their interpretation of the ethnographic data.
representative of the United States on the Commission of Delimitation for the CzechPolish frontier, at the request of both the Polish and Czech governments, see Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923. Vol. I. New York,
1924. P. liii; Schwabe. Op. Cit.; Charles Haskins, Robert Lord. Some Problems of the
Peace Conference. Cambridge, MA, 1920; Isaiah Bowmans piecemeal recollections
are found in Geography Vs. Geopolitics. New York, 1942, and The Strategy of Territorial Decisions. New York, 1946.
5
There was far from unanimity among the Americans, best epitomized by Robert Lansings account. Robert Lansing. The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative. Boston,
1921. Especially Pp. 4-5.
6
Schwabe excellently draws out its implications of this absence for the final treaties:
Schwabe. Op. Cit.
275
276
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
ideas. Progressive reformist elites like Wilsons cabinet and the academics
of the Inquiry, were not responding to economic dislocation theirs or
others but to changes in power relationships from which they were benefiting, particularly in the rise of academic self-consciousness and influence.8
In short, this was a prosperous and stable era particularly when compared to the massive upheavals of the industrialization of the Gilded Age
that had preceded it, and the conservative reaction and social and economic
volatility that followed in the 1920s and 1930s. 9 Progressive intellectuals
stood in contrast to both the Populists before them and the New Dealers
after them, the latter responding to economic depression and social dislocation.10 Increasing wealth and suburbanization, and growing ideological and
political influence in a time of relative prosperity, meant that intellectuals
could turn their ideological worries to moral character, social conscience,
civic duties, and to the morally corrosive effects of the new wealth.11
Moreover, Progressivism was the social reformist ideology of the upper
and middle classes, north and south, urban and rural. It attracted support
from two key ideological groups: the professoriat and the Protestant clergy.
Its Protestant underpinnings gave it a pragmatic morality, and academics
and intellectuals gave it social content and leadership.12 This was reflected
in their adjectives of concern: morality, civic duty, citizenship, service, patriotism, character and conscience.13 Progressivism aimed not only at reordering society, but also at personal transformation. In its coercive intrusion
8
Although there is still much debate about this among historians, we follow Hofstadters
early work, which still offers the most lucid and persuasive historical sociology of the
progressives social and intellectual world: Richard Hofstadter. The Age of Reform.
New York, 1955.
9
Ibid.
10
Robert Putnam interprets Progressivism as communitarian and the Gilded Age as
individualist: Robert D. Putnam. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American
Community. New York, 2000. Ch. 23.
11
See Walter E. Weyl. The New Democracy. New York,1918. with concerns about the
different kinds of wealth in American cities; and Thorstein Veblen. The Theory of the
Leisure Class. New York, 1899.
12
Hofstadter. Op. Cit. Pp. 149, 153; According to Hofstadter progressivism can be
considered a phase in the history of the Protestant conscience. Hofstadter. Op. Cit. P.
152; see also Fox. Op. Cit.; Thelen. Op. Cit.; Link. Op. Cit.; Clubb and Allen. Op. Cit.
13
Hofstadter. Op. Cit. P. 320. Hofstadter suggested, following Weber, that like other
solitary intellectuals of the left in moments of status re-definition, they were attracted to
an ideology seeking to go closer to the people, and ended up sentimentalizing the
common man and absolutizing their particular morality. Hofstadter. Op. Cit. P.19.
277
Like socialism, Progressivism also suffered from moral exhaustion or crusade-weariness in the 1920s. The moral pitch of the Progressive reformism was arguably so intense
that the conservative reaction of the 1920s, the failure to ratify Wilsons League of
Nations, the defection of many of its key intellectual and urban middle class adherents
(e.g., Lippmann and John Dewey), and the string of anti-immigration policies of the
early 1920s, could all be read as a kind of revolutionary exhaustion, a reaction to the
intensity of the decades of social crusade. The totality of this disillusionment would also
animate, in the 1920s and beyond, the Inquirys and American Commissions analyses
of Versailles and of the boundary changes that had been recommended.
15
See the classic John Higham. Strangers in the Land. New Brunswick, NJ, 1955; George
Creel. The Hopes of the Hyphenated // The Century Magazine. 1915/1916. Vol. XCI.
Pp. 350-363; Michael McGeer. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America. Oxford, 2003. Ch. 6.
16
US Immigration Commission. Washington, DC, 1910. They were reported to have
had low levels of English literacy, submitted few applications for citizenship, and had
high return rates to Europe all proof of their assimilation-resistance.
17
The melting pot was first described by the Frenchman St. Jean de Crvecoeur in
1782; the term gained popularity in Israel Zangwills play of that title in 1908. Desmond
King. Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy. Cambridge, MA, 2000. P. 15.
278
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
the Progressives Americanization Movement, an official and non-official drive to remake the unassimilated immigrant into an American.18 Both
these responses influenced the assumptions underpinning the Inquirys ethnographic research. By 1918, most educated society viewed new immigrant ethnics not of color in terms of their cultural and racial traits,
occasionally fueled by the popularity of eugenicist thought. The social problems associated with urbanization, and the concomitant loss of Americas
rural values, were seen as virtually identical to the problems of the overcrowded ethnic enclaves characterized by familial loyalties, community
insularity, and the proliferation of ethnic newspapers, associations, and
schools.19
Most of the theorizing concerned the modalities of value inculcation
and cultural assimilation. Upper middle class Progressive elites, particularly of the urban northeast, were themselves products of successful social
and political mobility, and so could only with difficulty separate class assimilation from value or cultural assimilation. They directed their efforts at
diffusing the cultural diversity below them by remaking the foreignborn into their own class image.20 They sought to transform the hyphenated by Anglo-Saxonizing their values, so that they might look more familiarly middle class. Analyses regularly conflated class and ethnicity
by imputing economic liabilities to cultural values and traditions.21
At the back of these analyses lay the assumption that by embracing liberal democratic principles people could be remade or culturally transformed.22 The baseline definition of Americanness was generally understood not least by Wilson himself to be that which was created at the
18
Creel saw it as the responsibility of the Federal government to Americanize its hyphenated, and he took Americanization to be emancipatory. Creel. Op. Cit.; for the
difficulties with Americanization see Peter A. Speek. The Meaning of Nationality and
Americanization // American Journal of Sociology. 1926. Vol. 32. Pp. 237-249.
19
In fact, according to the sociologist Robert Park, there were more non-English radical
publications than English ones in the United States in 1922: King. Op. Cit. Table 3.1, P.
55.
20
This idea would later be formally systematized by Milton Gordon who argued that
people of the same class tend to act alike and have the same values even if they have
different ethnic backgrounds: Milton Gordon. Assimilation in American Life. Oxford,
1964.
21
King. Op. Cit. Pp. 60-63.
22
There were exceptions: the philosopher and Progressive reformer John Dewey saw
the hyphenated as simply adding to social pluralism, which he embraced. Jane Addams, too, was an exception.
279
280
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
policies. 29 The work of the Chicago sociologists Park, Thomas and
Znaniecki not only contributed to these social debates, but their studies
were either commissioned by the Inquiry,30 or were drawn upon by other
Inquiry academics to assess modalities of assimilation and ethnic and cultural adaptation. Their studies contributed analyses comparing the conditions under which assimilation was fostered or resisted by Poles living under Russian or Prussian rule, and the conditions under which Polish immigrants (among others) adapted or modified their ethnic practices in the United
States.
While Parks work assumed that assimilation, along the lines of the
Americanizers, would be an inevitable outcome, Thomas and Znaniecki
were more pluralist, with an implied theory of nationalism: they maintained
that Poles had been loyal to the Prussian state when it treated them without
discrimination, but that the Prussian state raised the devil [of Polish nationalism] with their Germanization policies.31 Thomas was a Progressive and believed that political solutions were indeed to be found to the
problem of cultural assimilation. However, he located the solutions in a
29
This included Wilson as political scientist. In his History of the American People
(1902) he revealed his uneasiness with the immigrants from Southern and Eastern
Europe: men of the meaner sort were coming out of Hungary and Poland, men out of
the ranks where there was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence. King. Op. Cit. P. 51. Ambrosius argued that Wilson had an historicist understanding of nationalism, based on his reading of the United States nation-building during
the Civil War; he preferred historical boundaries, and his attitude toward the rights of
minorities was an expression of an US-style assimilationist understanding of nationalism.
Ambrosius. Op. Cit. [2002]. Ch. 9.
30
For example Florian Znaniecki. Considerations Which Would Tend to Draw Poland
Toward or Repel Her From Germany, Russia, Austria, in Connection with Her Aspirations for Independence and Cultural Development. January 29, 1918. Inquiry Document
632; Florian Znaniecki. Restrictions and Restraints Imposed on the Cultural Development of Poland by Germany, Russia, and Austria. January 29, 1918. Inquiry Document
634; Znaniecki. The Organization of Polish Society for Cultural Productivity. January
29, 1918. Inquiry Document 633 // National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park MD [NARA]. Research Group [RG] 256. Records of The Inquiry [RI],
Special Reports and Studies 1917-18 (Entry-3) [SRS(E-3)].
31
W. I. Thomas. The Prussian Polish Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation // American Sociological Association. 1913. Vol. VIII. Pp. 86-87 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E3). Inquiry Doc 559. Znaniecki, a Polish nationalist who was ineligible for an academic
post in Tsarist Poland because of his nationalist activities, had accepted a position as
Director of The Emigrants Protective Association in Poland. Thomas brought him to
Chicago. See Eli Zaretskys introduction to W. I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki. The Polish
Peasant in Europe and America. Urbana, IL, 1984. Pp. 3, 11-12.
281
Thomas wrote to Shotwell regarding the Polish-German ethnic frontier: The whole
world should be fluid in this [ethnic] respect, as men are fluid in seeking the realization
of their wishes. We want a diverse, not a uniform civilization, the free circulation of
values and nationalities should be free to choose their alliances as individuals are. I do
not think that the liberty to do this would lead to whimsical behavior any more than it
does in individual or familial business. Letter from W. I. Thomas to J. T. Shotwell.
January 15, 1917 // NARA. RG 256. RI. General Correspondence (Entry-1) [GC(E-1)].
Box 14.
33
Those used in the US (cephalic index, height, etc) closely paralleled those constructed
by Inquiry maps. King. Op. Cit. P. 68, Table 3.2; Maps of Balkan Division, 1917-19 //
NARA. RG 256. RI. Maps 1916-18 (Entry-5).
282
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
these against Mitteleuropas two great geopolitical imperatives: balancing
future German expansion and containing the existing Bolshevik-communist threat. Influential in the interpretation of their data were immigrant
groups in the United States and East European nationalists. The Inquiry
was particularly reliant on immigrants, migrs, and nationalists for accounts of the ethnographic facts on the ground and for their linguistic
abilities. Their influences were not unbiased: when Wilson called together
his academic experts on the George Washington as they sailed to Paris, he
famously asked to be briefed on their final recommendations. When told
that there were more than three million Germans in Bohemia, his response
was one of shock but Masaryk never told me that!34
IMMIGRANTS, MIGRS, AND EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN NATIONALISTS
Wilson, House, and the Inquiry often solicited the advice and recommendations of immigrants and nationalist exiles. 35 The organized influence of East European immigrants began during the war and continued
through the Inquirys work and during the conference. Czech immigrants
formed a Bohemian National Alliance in Cleveland through which Masaryk
successfully lobbied Wilson, House, and the Inquiry, and from which the
Cleveland Pact emerged, a joint Czech-Slovak call for an independent
Czech-Slovak state; a Yugoslav National Council was set up in Washington; the Polish pianist-turned-politician Ignacy Paderewski struck up a friendship with House, and through him gained Wilsons adherence to an independent Poland, driving the effort to find scientific justification for a
Polish corridor; the American Jews, Brandeis and Morgenthau, were successful emissaries to Wilson, House, and the Inquirys Miller in calls for
minority protection treaties and an independent Jewish homeland; a Montenegrin Committee for National Unification was set up; and the CarpathoRuthenians, a nationality not well known in the United States, met in Homestead, Pennsylvania, created the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins,
and eventually their leader, Zatkovich, organized a plebiscite among Ruthenians in the United States around the idea of joining a Czechoslovak
state headed by Masaryk without ever consulting Ruthenians in Europe.
34
Charles Seymour. Geography, Justice, and Politics at the Paris Peace Conference of
1919. New York, 1951. P. 9.
35
Austria-Hungary, Attitude of migrs from the Trentino Now Working in Mines of
the United States. Submitted by Charles Seymour. May 25, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI.
SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 505.
283
284
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
provided in some detail with a discussion of the nationalist school in German philosophy.41 Masaryk was also a key figure in the creation appropriately in Independence Hall, Philadelphia of a new liberal and pluralist
Mid-European Union, which included also Uhro-Rusians, Albanians,
and Zionists. Masaryks liberal declaration in Philadelphia stated that this
Union of nationalities would abandon the old militaristic attitude and ways,
denounce all attempts and practices of forcible denationalization, espouse
liberty and equal rights for all minorities, repudiate pan-Germanism, the
use of unreliable official statistics and census figures for nationalities,
and promised that schools of the liberated nations would inculcate patriotism and fight autocracy.42 In 1918 Masaryk presented the Declaration of
Czechoslovak Independence. Although Wilson was slow to respond, the
impression created was the moving story of two liberal professors seeking
democracy and self-determination and defeating the autocratic forces of
the corrupt Austro-Hungarian Empire.43
Bene also contributed a number of proposals and recommendations to
the Inquiry and to British and American policy elites, noting the need for a
strong frontier on the Danube and the Bohemian Germans vital economic
interests in staying with the new Czechoslovak state.44 In his capacity as
Professor of Sociology in Prague he contributed analyses of the Czech peoples ethnic capacity (our term): they are highly intelligent, exceptionally
well-organized, inspired by an intense national spirit and economically
independent, possessing great natural wealth. [The Czechs] were not a weak
and inexperienced people with whom self-government would be an experiment, but were ready from tomorrow to lead an independent life; he argued that the Slovaks now wanted union with Bohemia, recognizing their
mutual dependence, and because some of the greatest of the Bohemian
leaders were Slovak.45 Bene maintained that the economic position of a
new Czechoslovak state surrounded by unfriendly Teuton and Magyar territory would be especially strong in that it was rich in mines, raw materi41
285
286
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
the Appeal to the World for a Just Solution of the Macedonian Question,
which offered their own construction of ethnic Macedonians in appeals
in Wilsons language.50
The pianist Ignacy Paderewski became the most visible spokesman for
Polish-Americans. Even more than Masaryk, he cultivated a close and intimate friendship with House, and in turn House kept Wilsons mind firmly
focused on the importance of the Polish cause, both for geo-strategic reasons and in line with his principle of national self-determination. In fact
Poland was the only country singled out as deserving self-determination as
early as the Fourteen Points speech.51 By the time of the Peace Conference,
the Inquiry had overcome initial uncertainties about the Polish nationalists
territorial claims and strongly supported them.52 The influence of Robert
Lord, the Inquirys Polish specialist, and two Polish collaborators, Professors Zowski and Arctowski, on Polands postwar boundary was enormous.53
In fact, Zowski and Arctowski discreetly supplied Paderewski and Dmowski
with information on the Inquirys research: they alerted the Polish National
Council in Chicago that nothing had been researched on the Polish corridor
and Danzig, this in turn led Paderewski to nudge House, and a report was
forthcoming.54
Jewish-Americans, led by highly assimilated American Jews of German descent, were the most unwavering supporters of the Versailles settlement, especially in its treaty provisions for minority rights. The Zionist
Organization of America was a large, mass movement which included Suof Corfu. Published by the South Slav National Council. Washington DC, 1917. Inquiry
Doc 801; The Macedonian Question: A Possible Solution. Copy of a Memorandum
prepared for the British War Office by Captain W. B. Beard, in March, 1917. June 1918.
Inquiry Doc 281; D. W. Johnson. Extract From Memorandum of a Conversation Between
and a Serbian Authority Well Acquainted With Macedonia. Prepared for the British War
Office. [original title] June 1918. Inquiry Doc 282 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). The
latter two documents arrived at the Inquiry through the British War Office.
50
Macedono-Bulgarian National Organization (Cleveland Ohio). An Appeal to the World
for a Just Solution of the Macedonian Question. February 3, March 19, April 3, 1918 //
NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 15.
51
See Christopher G. Salisbury. For Your Freedom and Ours: The Polish Question in
Wilsons Peace Initiatives, 1916-1917 // Australian Journal of Politics and History. 2003.
Vol. 49. Pp. 481-500.
52
Louis L. Gerson. The Poles // OGrady. Op. Cit. P. 283.
53
This did not prevent Pilsudski from dominating the eventual postwar settlement;
Paderewski, whom both he and the Americans thought would lead Poland, retreated in
emigration.
54
Gerson. Op. Cit. Pp. 282-283.
287
The Inquiry, and Wilson personally, also received appeals for League and treaty protections because of the maltreatment of Jews across Eastern Europe from, among others, Benno Straucher. Letter from Benno Straucher to Woodrow Wilson. December 24,
1918 // NARA. RG 256. Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace
[RACNP]. Daily, Weekly Intelligence Bulletins (Entry 29). Box 2.
56
Arthur Walworth. Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris
Peace Conference, 1919. New York, 1986. Pp. 473-474.
57
Carole Fink. The Minorities Question at the Paris Peace Conference: The Polish Minority Treaty, June 28, 1919 // Boemeke, Feldman, Glaser. Op. Cit. P. 267 and passim.
58
The Jews in Poland: Official Reports of The American and British Investigating Missions. Chicago, 1920. P. 9. The Report was co-commissioned by the National Polish
Committee of America.
288
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
the post-World War I package,59 but American insistence on minority treaties with provisions for the liberal accommodation of minorities was.
The final minority protection treaties were, at their core, Wilsonian and
American, with the first eight articles echoing the language of the United
States Constitution in its protection of civil and religious liberties without
distinction to birth, language, or race, and the free exercise of religion.60
But they stopped short of allowing aggrieved minorities from petitioning
the League directly: Wilson did not want to interfere in Polands self-determination, and Lloyd George did not want to create an open door to
continuous grievance.61 And yet despite its lack of effective sanction, the
minority rights treaties were an American idea, derived from the work of
the Inquiry on historical (territorial) grievances and assimilation potentials.62
The Inquirys research suggested the need for civil rights in a remapped
East Central Europe,63 and the final treaties attempted an American-constitutionalist accommodation for those minorities in the new states that could
not be culturally assimilated.
MAPS WERE EVERYWHERE64
The Inquiry produced or collected more than 2,500 pieces of documentation and over 1,200 maps nearly all the material from non-classified
sources. The documentation consisted of specialist area reports, maps, summaries of population distributions, demographic and fertility studies, ethnographic, religious and linguistics statistics, and studies of natural resources
and economic infrastructures. The reports on the various nationality claims
59
Although there were some. Herbert Hoover was instrumental in organizing American
humanitarian aid to Poland, as a monument of gratitude to the United States was unveiled in Hoover Square, Warsaw in October 1922. Herbert Hoover Collection // Hoover
Institution Library and Archives, CA.
60
Fink. Op. Cit. Pp. 269-270.
61
Ambrosius. Op. Cit. [2002] P. 133; Fink. Op. Cit. P. 272, Fn. 89.
62
Haskins, Lord. Op. Cit. P. 15; R. J. Kerner. Resum of the Political Movements of the
Czecho-Slovaks Tending Toward The Federalization Or Dismemberment of AustriaHungary. May 17, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 316; R. J. Kerner. Minorities in Austria-Hungary. May 16, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RACNP. General
Records of the American Commission To Negotiate Peace. Economic Division (Entry24). Box 113. Peace Conference Doc 1181.
63
Walworth. Op. Cit. P. 473.
64
From Charles Seymour. Geography, Justice, and Politics at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. New York, 1951. P. 10. He describes the centrality of maps at Versailles,
and Wilson down on all fours.
289
For an early statement, see Oscar I. Janowsky. Nationalities and National Minorities.
New York, 1945. Ch. 2; see also Nicholson. Op. Cit. P. 130; Seymour. Op. Cit. [1951] P. 21.
66
Among others, Russian-Polish statistical collections and atlases were used (Polska
etnograficina. Petrograd 1916); also Romers World Atlas, Petermanns Mitteillungen,
the French Encyclopdie Polonaise, Rumanian Army Staff maps, and Russian 1910
statistics regarding landownership in the Empires western provinces. Letter from Zowski
to Jackinowicz. No Date. Box 16; Letter from Inquiry cartographer, Mark Jefferson.
Oct. 2, 1918. Box 16; Letter from Arctowski to Lippmann. July 3, 1918. Box 1 // NARA.
RG 256. RI. GC(E-1).
67
For instance, it was recognized that Professor Zowski was a nationalist with close
contacts to the Polish National Department in the United States. He wrote for a PolishAmerican newspaper in Milwakee, raising the question of his academic impartiality in
his Inquiry work. Letter from Lord to Bowman. September 16, 1918 // NARA. RG 256.
RI. GC(E-1). Box 9. Zowski was a professor in Mechanical Engineering, and he came
with a letter from the President of Michigan where he taught, testifying that Zowski was
a loyal American, patriotic to the core and friendly with many Polish leaders. Letter.
January 3, 1918 // NARA, RG 256, RI. GC(E-1). Box 16.
290
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
biases, and the anti-Semitism, inherent in German geography and cartography, as well as the thinking of the lead American geographer, the Germantrained Isaiah Bowman, who had enormous power and influence.68
They were aware of the inherent problems of the census data and of the
maps that drew on it.69 The 1910 United States census had categorized its
immigrants in terms of constructed races (e.g., Northern Italians, Southern
Italians) and by the administrative units from which they came in Europe
(Moravians and Bohemians not Czechs).70 In fact, the United States
had never used language as a criterion for ethnicity or race in their domestic statistical counting. The Inquiry moved away from this practice since
they were using Prussian, Austrian, and Russian census data and maps, all
of which used some form of linguistic criteria as ethnographic or nationality indicators.71 They also discarded the formal use of race (although
they used it regularly in their reports) on the grounds that it was inapplicable
68
Though this was something they tried explicitly to guard against. Lansing wrote the
Director of the Inquiry that the one thing that we must guard against is pre-conceived
ideas or theories which will affect the unbiased treatment of the various subjects, Letter from Robert Lansing to Sidney Mezes. June 7, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI. GC(E-1).
Box 16. On the geographers biases: Seymour. Op. Cit. [1951]. Pp. 5-6, 20-21; Neil
Smith. American Empire: Roosevelts Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization.
Berkeley. 2003. Ch. 6; Kost. Op. Cit.
69
For example, Statistical Data on Bukowina. July 31, 1918. Inquiry Doc 26; Statistical
Studies On South Slav Questions. April 23, 1918. Inquiry Doc 517 // NARA. RG 256.
RI. SRS(E-3). Arctowski wrote Bowman: it will be impossible to obtain perfect homogeneity in the treatment of the subjects for different countries. Even in the case of Prussian, Russian and Austrian data, the differences between the available sources of information are so great in some cases it is absolutely impossible to obtain figures of a similar character. I think that it is altogether too easy to theorize about what should be
obtained without finding out first what really can be obtained. It is impossible to make a
general program applied indifferently to any country. March 20, 1919 // NARA. RG
256. RI. GC(E-1). Box 1.
70
Thirteenth Census of the United States and Dictionary of Races and Peoples. Cited in
King. Op. Cit. Ch. 1 and 2.
71
On the Russian/Tsarist 1897 census see Juliette Cadiot. Searching for Nationality:
Statistics and National Categories at the End of the Russian Empire (1897-1917) // The
Russian Review. 2005. Vol. 64. Pp. 440-455; Roth. 1991; on Austrian data: Emile Brix.
Die Umgangssprachen in Altsterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation. Die
Sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen Volkzhlungen. Wien, Kln & Graz, 1982;
Mark Cornwall. The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940 //
English Historical Review. 1994. Vol. 109. Pp. 914-951; Dominique Arel. Language
Categories in Censuses: backward- or forward-looking? // D. Kertzer, D. Arel (Eds.).
Census and Identity. Cambridge, 2002.
291
Haskins, Lord. Op. Cit. Pp. 15-16. There were, however, studies of fertility rates
among some ethnic groups. Letter from Lippman to Seymour. June 7, 1918 // NARA.
RG 256. RI. GC(E-1). Box 13; see Fn. 33 above.
73
Haskins, Lord. Op. Cit. Pp. 17-18; see also Carl Darling Buck. Language and the
Sentiment of Nationality // American Political Science Review. 1916. Vol. 10. Pp. 4469.
74
Ibid. Pp. 157-170.
75
Ibid. Pp. 173-174.
76
Henryk Arctowski. Preliminary Report on Poland. January 31, 1918 // NARA. RG
256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 23. P. 22.
77
M. S. Handman. Magyar and Roumanian in Hungary: A Preliminary Study. April 29,
1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 204. Pp. 7-13.
292
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
graphical Society were likewise treated with skepticism.78 Kerner and
Seymour, the Inquirys Habsburg specialists, criticized British government
Racial Contour maps of Austria-Hungary on the grounds that they harshly undercounted Germans and Slovenes and showed political bias in translating Austrian census data; they were also accused of favoring the Italians
over the Yugoslavs due to the impressions created by their choice of map
colors.79 Bene criticized the ethnographic maps of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary produced for the Inquirys Territorial Commission by Jovan
Cvijic, a Serbian professor of Geography in Belgrade, because they were
not based on appropriate baseline figures.80 Although Cvijics credentials
were impeccably conscientious and scientific,81 there was some contention about the fact that Cvijic thought the Hungarian census-based maps
were essentially correct if supplemented by the Patriarchal census of the
Banat82 all of which were contested by Seton-Watson, among others.83
As a rule, ethnographic ambiguities in delineating new boundaries were
resolved in favor of Polish and Czechoslovak interests and against German
interests. For instance, Inquiry-derived recommendations gave key Ukrainian-Ruthenian territories to Poland (in territories where Ukrainians outnumbered Poles 2-to-1 ultimate status would be subject to a later plebiscite) because Poland had a high culture and lived by industry and com78
This was especially true of the Balkan ethnographic maps produced in Germany.
Petermanns Mitteilungen and Romers maps were the most widely used map-makers,
see Will S. Munroe. Balkan Peninsula; Macedonia: Population. March 23, 1918. Inquiry Document 401; Henryck Arctowski. Statistical Data on Poland, Section 1: Demography. April 20, 1918. Inquiry Document 27 // NARA. RG 256. Special Reports and
Studies 1917-18 (Entry 3). Czech maps were also similarly scrutinized, Will S. Monroe.
Memorandum on Balkan Ethnographic Sources. May 22, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI.
SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 414.
79
R. J. Kerner, Charles Seymour. General Criticism of the British Government Racial
Contour Map of Austria-Hungary. June 5, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry Doc 319.
80
D. W. Johnson. Memorandum on Conversation with Edward Bene, in Which He
Expressed Opinions on Cvijics Map of Nationalities and on the Future Frontiers of the
Czecho-Solvak State. August 8, 1918. Inquiry Document 283; Jovan Cvijic. The Geographical Distribution of the Balkan Peoples. No Date. Inquiry Document 105 // NARA.
RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3).
81
D. W. Johnson. Memorandum on a Conference with Professor Jovan Cvijic, May 26,
at Hotel International, Paris. August 8, 1918 // NARA. RG 256. RI. SRS(E-3). Inquiry
Doc 277.
82
Ibid.
83
Seton-Watson argued that Slovaks, pace the Hungarian census, formed a distinct ethnic nation. R. W. Seton-Watson. Racial Problems in Hungary. London, 1908.
293
294
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
[G]rave risks [are] involved in constituting a variable river as a boundary line. It is thus that the frontier between Mexico and Texas follows
the Rio Grande, a river with numerous bends; one of these bends closing up into a circle has created an American enclosure within Mexican territory which is a meeting place for all the bandits in the region.
The US and Mexico were obliged to make a convention to put an end
to this intolerable situation. If one would avoid the inconvenience of
the administrative frontier the administrative frontier is that of the
former riverbed of the Drava. In changing this to coincide with the
present riverbed we will only be substituting present riverbeds for the
former ones and at the next shifting of its course we will have one
more artificial frontier. Briefly, we have a choice between a natural
movable frontier and a fixed frontier. A consideration of economic
nature has been added to those of geographic order which led the
American Delegation to the application of a new principle: the maintenance of an administrative frontier so that economic inconveniences
are equal for both Serbo-Croatian and Hungarians. This would compel the two states to come to an understanding [as did the United States
and Mexico].89
Report Sent to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Roumanian and YugoSlav Affairs. December 1, 1919 // NARA. RG 256. RACNP. Minutes, Reports and
Documents of Commissions and Committees (Entry-28) [MRDCC(E-28)]. Box 1. Yugoslav and Roumanian Commission Folder. Annex to Minutes of Meeting Number 34.
Annex II. Pp. 4, 4a, 5.
90
Report Addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission of Yugo-Slav and Rumanian Affairs. December 8, 1919 // NARA. RG 256. RACNP. MRDCC(E-28). Box 1.
Yugoslav and Roumanian Commission Folder. Annex to Minutes of Meeting Number
35. Annex I.
91
Schwabe. Op. Cit. makes this point.
295
296
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Here Progressive Americas domestic and international policies are usually seen as linked, though the precise causal relationship is debated.94 The
absence of realism in Wilsons moral, idealist internationalism is often
noted;95 and scholars have tied the roots of both its moral universalism and
its pragmatism to an historic sense of American exceptionalism.96 It is true
that some of the Inquirys key members, including Lippmann, Isaiah Bowman, and James Shotwell were liberal internationalists, and the ideas of
other liberal internationalist publicists were solicited by the Inquiry.97 They
often explicitly related the United States peaceful ethnic diversity to a belief that it could be universalized through the extension of American liberal
principles abroad.98 If instilling liberalism through Americanization policies could remake the foreign-born at home, then the application of its principles could also do so abroad.
But inside the core of this liberal internationalism or what has come to
be generically known as Wilsonianism sat the same coercive illiberalism
evident in their domestic social reforms: the belief that personal, private
(cultural) identities could, and should, be reformed by the inculcation of
94
Elihu Root. A Requisite for the Success of Popular Democracy. Foreign Affairs. 1922.
Vol. 1. Pp. 3-10; William E. Leuchtenburg. Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916 // Mississippi Valley Historical Review. 1952. Vol. 39. Pp. 483-504; Walter Trattner. Progressivism and World
War I: A Reappraisal // Mid-America. 1962. Vol. 44. Pp. 131-145; John Milton Cooper.
Progressivism and American Foreign Policy: A Reconsideration // Mid-America. 1969.
Vol. 51. Pp. 260-277; J. A. Thompson. American Progressive Publicists and the First
World War, 1914-1917 // Journal of American History. 1971. Vol. 58. Pp. 364-383.
Debates did not resolve whether progressivism was a source of isolationism and anti-imperialism (Arthur S. Link. What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920s? //
American Historical Review. 1959. Vol. 64. Pp. 833-851), or whether it was neither
anti-war nor anti-imperialist (Hofstadter. Op. Cit. following Leuchtenburg. Op. Cit.).
95
Lloyd E. Ambrosius. Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition. Cambridge, 1987; Lloyd E. Ambrosius. Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal
Internationalism during World War. Wilmington, DE, 1991. Ch. 5; Ambrosius. Op. Cit.
[2002]. Ch. 3; Nicholson. Op. Cit. Ch. 8; Schwabe. Op. Cit.; Margaret Macmillan. Paris
1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York, 2002.
96
Walter Lippmann. The World Conflict And Its Relation to American Democracy //
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1917. Vol. LXXII.
Pp. 1-10; Thompson. Op. Cit. P. 373; James Chase. The Consequences of the Peace: the
New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy. Oxford, 1992. Ch. 15.
97
For example Norman Angell, Herbert Croly, and Walter Weyl.
98
Lippman. Op. Cit.; Harold Josephson. James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America. Rutherford, NJ, 1975; Ronald Steel. Walter Lippman and the American Century. New Brunswick, NJ, 1999; Smith. Op. Cit.
297
298
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
norities.101 The American assumption of eventual Jewish assimilation, together with a persistent anti-German geopolitical bias a bias reinforced
by the French and British delegations controlled not only the collection
of data, but also the analysis and policy recommendations drawn from it.
They were not indifferent to this in their retrospective accounts, published in the 1920s and beyond. Key Inquiry figures defended the boundary
decisions made at Versailles, particularly in response to Keynes attacks,
either through a recognition that no perfect boundary would have been possible given the complex ethnic stratifications of East Central Europe,102 or
because the greater salience of the rise of economic autarchy,103 or because
of the working assumption of the Americans at Versailles that geo-strategic
concerns were considered less important since the new order was to be a
liberal League of Nations world and not a return to the old balance of power,
militarist world of European alliances.104
However, by then the core of what constituted Americanness was
changing. Americanizers and Progressives ethnicized conception before
WWI feared immigrants failure to assimilate, but by mid-century, pluralists like Thomas were proven right: assimilation did take place, albeit with
certain ethnic identity retention, giving way to a more universalistic construction of Americanness. By contrast, the rise of interwar nationalizing
states in Central Europe, Nazism, and the inability of the League to protect
minorities, all evidenced the failure of Versailles liberal engineering of
historic animosities and the remaking of cultural identities. The American
delegates analyses, drawn from the Progressives analyses of the United
States immigrant experience, held that cultural or values assimilation and
transformation would lead to economic prosperity and political stability.
By the post-World War II settlements under Roosevelt and Truman, American analysis, reflecting the intervening changes in both American society
and in East Central Europe,105 reversed the sociological relationship: economic prosperity and political stability would, without state intrusion into
private identities, lead to liberal cultural assimilation.
101
299
300
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, :
XIX XX *
, ,1 , , .
. , , .2 , ,
. . .
(. Staatangehrigkeit)
(. Angehrige eines Staats, Staatangehrige) -
, (. Staatbrgerschaft) (. Staatsbrger, Brger) -
,
, .: Dieter Gosewinkel. Staatsbrgerschaft und Staatsangehrigkeit //
Geschichte und Gesellschaft. 1995. Jg. 21. S. 533-556.
2
Dieter Gosewinkel. Citizenship, Subjecthood, Nationality. Concepts of Belonging in
the Age of Modern Nation States // Klaus Eder, Bernhard Giesen (Eds.). European
Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects. Oxford, 2001. Pp.1735.
*
1
301
. , , ...
?
?
?
?3 , .
,
4 , , , .5
.
,
, . ,
,
.
, .
, , , . , ,
AI . , , , , .
, . ,
.
4
Rogers Brubaker. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. London, 1992.
, .. , , .. , ..
,
.
5
Dieter Gosewinkel. Einbrgern und Ausschlieen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehrigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Gttingen, 2001.
3
302
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.6 ,
.7
.8
, ,
, ,
, , . . .
. . , , . .
(
1945 .) , .
R. Weight et al. (Eds.). The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain,
1930-1960. London, 1998; Kathleen Paul. Whitewashing Britain. Race and Citizenship
in the Postwar Era. London, 1997; David Cesarani. The Changing Character of Citizenship
and Nationality in Britain // Idem et al. (Eds.). Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in
Europe. London, 1996. Pp. 57-73.
7
Ann Dummett, Andrew Nicol. Subjects, Aliens, Citizens and Others. Nationality and
Immigration Law. London, 1990.
8
Rieko Karatani. Defining British Citizenship. Empire, Commonwealth and Modern
Britain. London, 2003.
6
303
. , , ...
,
. , , . , (citizen) ,
(subject). , , , ,
(common law) .
(citizenship),9 (allegiance),
, , . ,
, . , . ius soli,10 , , ,
.11
,
9
, , , XX
, . (.
AI) , , .
10
. . .
11
John W. Salmond. Citizenship and Allegiance // The Law Quarterly Review. 1902.
N. 69. . 49-63. . H. Henriques. The Law of Aliens and Naturalization.
London, 1906; Edward L. De Hart. The English Law of Nationality and Naturalisation //
Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation. 1900. No. 1. . 11-26;
, ,
, .
304
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , 1811 ,
1879 ius
sanguinis,12 ,
(
).13 -
.14 , . 1811
II, .
. 1867-1868
.
,
.
XX
,
XIX .
, , , .
,
ius soli
, . .
Emanuel Milner. Die sterreichische Staatsbrgerschaft und der Gesetzesartikel L
1879 ber den Erwerb und Verlust der ungarischen Staatsbrgerschaft. Tbingen, 1880;
Hans-Joachim Seeler. Das Staatsangehrigkeitsrecht sterreichs. Frankfurt a. M., 1966.
Ludwig Szlezak. Das Staatsangehrigkeitsrecht von Ungarn. Frankfurt a. M., 1959.
14
1908
, . . Ferdinand
Schmid. Bosnien und die Herzegowina unter der Verwaltung sterreich-Ungarns.
Leipzig, 1914. Hans-Joachim Seeler. Das Staatsangehrigkeitsrecht. S. 18.
12
13
305
. , , ...
, ius sanguinis .
, ,
. 1879
.15 . ,
.16
,
.17
. , , ,
, , -,18 . , , , , . ,
L 1879 , 32.
() 1870 , .: Emanuel Milner. Die sterreichische
Staatsbrgerschaft. S. 3. Alexander Bernyi. Der Erwerb und der Verlust der ungarischen
Staatsbrgerschaft. Leipzig, 1906.
,
. Dieter Gosewinkel. Citizenship, Subjecthood, Nationality
16
, , ,
.: Pester Lloyd. 1879. 29 ; 4 .
17
,
,
1848-49 .
18
// Pester Lloyd. 1879. 29 ; 5 .
15
306
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
; , .19 ,
, .20 , - [ ], - .21
, .
-, 1886
-,
-.
.22 (
). , ,
-. -,
1909 .23
,
, .24
. , , // Pester Lloyd. 1879. 5 ( ).
,
; - ; .
21
Alexander Bernyi. Der Erwerb. S. 109.
22
IV 1886 . .: Alexander Bernyi. Der Erwerb. S. 66.
23
II 1909 . 1903 .
24
// Pester Lloyd. 1908. 14 .
19
20
307
. , , ...
.25 .
ius sanguinis :
.26
. , .
. . ,
,
.
. , ius soli , .27 ,
. , [] .
(
)
.28
., , . Pester Lloyd. 1908.
13 14 .
26
, 1867
, . , 1811
1918 . . Hans-Joachim Seeler. Das Staatsangehrigkeitsrecht.
S. 104; Hannelore Burger. Passwesen und Staatsbrgerschaft // Waltraud Heindl u.a. (Hrsg.).
Grenze und Staat. Passwesen, Staatsbrgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremdengesetzgebung in der sterreichischen Monarchie 1750-1867. Wien, 2000. S. 168.
27
Albert Groedel. Die Ersitzung der Staatsangehrigkeit. Greifswald, 1894. S. 44 .
28
Leopold Caro. Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik in sterreich. Leipzig, 1909.
S. 217. ,
(Ibid. S. 5). : (Ibid. S. 225).
25
308
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.29
- , .30 - , . :
, .31 - ,
,
, .
, - , .32 - . , , , . , , . ,
, .33 ,
29
1904 ,
1911 ,
. . Traude Horvath, Gerda Neyer (Hrsg.). Auswanderungen aus
sterreich. Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Gegenwart. Wien, 1996.
30
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarschiv Wien ( HHStA). Admin. Reg. F 15. Ktn. 7. I/40.
Memorandum ber Auswanderungsfragen. Mai 1901.
31
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 15. Ktn. 10. I/90. Brief der sterreichisch-ungarischen Kolonialgesellschaft an das k.u.k. Auenministerium vom 16.1.1914 (Prot. Nr. 4161/8a).
32
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 15. Ktn. 10. I/90. Brief der sterreichisch-ungarischen Kolonialgesellschaft an das k.u.k. Auenministerium vom 28.3.1914 (Prot. Nr. 24768/17).
33
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 15. Ktn. 31. Gesetze 1/3: Brief des k.u.k. Kriegsministeriums
an das k.u.k. Handelsministerium vom 11.3.1913 (Prot. Nr. 18118/8a).
309
. , , ...
. . 1913
. , , [] , .34 ,
. ,
pro et contra
,
. -,
(-
), (
).
1870
, .. ( ) .
.
ius soli ,
,
. XVIII , ,
,
.
34
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 15. Ktn. 31. Gesetze 1/3: 7 der Fassung des Gesetzentwurfs
vom 7.10.1913 (Prot. Nr. 75669/8a). - 7.10.1913, ,
(
). . . Prot. Nr. 72264/8a.
310
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1901 .
, .35 :
, .
.36 1891 ,
, , , , ,
, ,
. .
, , , .37 .
, . Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee to Consider the Doubts and Difficulties
Which Have Arisen in Connection with the Interpretation and Administration of the
Acts Relating to Naturalization. London, 1901. . 7.
36
. 10.11.1904 // India Office Records ( IOR). L/
PJ/6/702. File 2977.
37
10.11.1904 // IOR. L/PJ/6/702. File 2977, .
27.7.1905 // IOR.
L/PJ/6/731. File 2469.
35
311
. , , ...
,
.
,
, ,
.38 , .
. , , ,
.
.39
, .
,
, , ,
. ,
,
.
,
,40 /
. ,
:
,
. , , , , ,
.41
38
1.9.1898 ( : IOR. L/PJ/6/500. File 101).
39
16.03.1905 //
IOR. L/PJ/6/714. File 923.
40
Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907. Cd. 3524. Command Papers.
1907. Vol. 55. . 61-690. . Maurice Ollivier. The Colonial and Imperial
Conferences. From 1887 to 1937. Ottawa, 1954.
41
IOR. L/PJ/6/500. File 101.
312
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.
,
. , ,
; , ,
.42 1914 (British Nationality and Status
of Aliens Act) .
,
, .43
,
. ,
, . . ,
, 7.12.1903. IOR. L/PJ/6/679. File 1155.
4&5 Geo. 5. ch. 17: I.1.1. und III.26.1.
.
, AI
Ancien Rgime.
, XVIII .
42
43
313
. , , ...
, -. , . , , , . . 1886
. : , 1886 ,
? .
1896 , , (),
, .
.
- . ,
,
.
, ,
.44 , . , . - , 1896 , , , , .
,
, ,
. . -,
,
Public Record Office, London ( PRO). Foreign Office ( FO). 881/7550:
Summary of Published Documents (18961900).
44
314
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, 1886 . -, , ,
,
, .
, ,
, ,
, .45 1899 , , 1
1886 .
, .46 ,
. , ,
, . , ,
. , . , -, - ,
, -, (headmen),
.
, .47
PRO. FO. 881/6944: Summary of Published Documents (1892-1897).
, ,
. , , , ,
.
46
PRO. FO. 881/8295. Further Correspondence Respecting Registration of British
Subjects in Siam, 1901.
47
(Beckett) (Archer). 20 1900 23
1901 . // PRO. FO. 881/8295.
45
315
. , , ...
.48
- ?
, ,
? . , , .
, . , .
, .
.
1880 ,
,
. ,
. , () , .49 1911
- . 48
(Crosby) -
(Stringer). 4 1907 // PRO. FO. 821/80.
49
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 61. Bosnien und Herzegowina. Ktn 20. K.u.k. Gesandtschaft
in Sofia an k.u.k. Auenministerium am 24.1.1884 (Prot. Nr. 2730/7) und k.u.k. Finanzministerium, Abteilung fr Bosnien und Herzegowina an k.u.k. Auenministerium am
18.2.1884 (Prot. Nr. 4295/7); . Prot. Nr. 29430/7 von 1885 und 1228/7 von
1886.
316
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .50 1911
, ,
, , .51
, -. ,
,
, ,
.52 , , , , . .
. , .
,
.53 HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 57. Schutzgenossenschaft, Bulgarien I/1. Ktn. 42. Brief des
k.k. Innenministeriums an das k.u.k. Auenministerium vom 19. 9.1911 (Prot. Nr. 60789/
7).
51
Beilage zum Bericht No. 1182/A der k.u.k. Botschaft in Konstantinopel vom 16.
3.1918 // HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 57. Schutzerteilung. Bulgarien 2. Ktn. 42. (Landesangehrigkeit) , 60 .
. ,
,
(. k.u.k. Botschaft in Kairo k.u.k. Auenministerium
am 5.12.1880 // HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 61. Bosnien und Herzegowina. Ktn 20: Prot.
Nr. 23287/7).
52
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 8. Jerusalem. Ktn. 140, 141 und 146.
53
Bericht des Konsuls aus Jerusalem vom 25.7.1910 und Antwort des k.u.k.
Auenministeriums vom 7.12.1910 // HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 8. Jerusalem, Ktn. 140.
50
317
. , , ...
, , .
1904 . ,
, . , ,
, , .54
-. , , , .
,
, , .55
, .
1911 ,
. ,
, .56.
, . . , , , . ,
.
, ,
:
54
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 8. Nordamerika 1/12. Ktn. 267. Prot. Nr. 74360/10 von 1904.
HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 15. Auswanderung. Ktn. 31. Prot. Nr. 68229/8a von 1910;
.
56
Protokoll der Konferenz von 1911 // HHStA. Admin. Reg. F 8. Nordamerika I/13.
Ktn. 268.
55
318
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, . , ,
. ,
- ,
. . ,
.
- . ,
. . ( )
. , , - .
, .
, .
. ,
,
.57 ,
Hugh Lusk. Social Welfare in New Zealand. The Result of Twenty Years of Progressive
Social Legislation and its Significance for the United States and Other Countries. London,
1913.
57
319
. , , ...
. . .
, , . , .58
,
, .
, . , ,
, , ,
.
. . , . , .59
1892
.
universality of citizenship60 . , , , , , , , , , .
, , , ,
. ,
, ,
Richard Jebb. Studies in Colonial Nationalism. London, 1905; Idem. The Imperial
Problem of Asiatic Immigration // IOR. L/PJ/6/861. ile 1303.
59
J. R. Seeley. The Expansion of England. Leipzig, 1884.
60
.
58
320
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.61
. , , .62
, ,
. ,
. , British
subject63 ,
. , .
( ) ,
. , , ,
.64
, ,
. Albert Shaw. An American View of Home Rule and Federation // The Contemporary
Review. 1892. Vol. 62. September. . 305-318. . . . ,
(isopolity)
. A. V. Dicey. A Common Citizenship for the English Race // The Contemporary
Review. 1897. Vol. 71. Pp. 457-476.
62
Ann Dummett. The Acquisition of British Citizenship: From Imperial Traditions to
National Definitions // Rainer Baubck (Ed.). From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the
Status of Citizenship in Europe. Avebury, 1994. Pp. 75-84.
63
.
64
- ( vs. ). Thomas R. Metcalf. Ideologies
of the Raj // The New Cambridge History of India. Vol. III, 4. Cambridge,1994.
61
321
. , , ...
, .65 1910 ,
, : -, , , ? -,
, , ,
? , -, ?.66 , ,
, XX .
, ,
1867 .67 19 .68 .69 XIX
Ibid. Pp. 215 . Robert G. Gregory. Quest for Equality. Asian Politics in East
Africa, 1900-1967. Hyderabad, 1993.
66
Proceedings of the Council of the Governor General of India, Assembled for the
Purpose of Making Laws and Regulations, from April 1909 to March 1910. Vol. 48.
Calcutta, 1910. . 239. 25. 2. 1910.
67
, (. .
AI)
,
. ,
.
68
,
.
, .
69
Victor Russ. Der Sprachenstreit in sterreich. Ein Beitrag zur sprachlichen Ordnung
in der Verwaltung. Wien, 1884; Dietmar Baier. Sprache und Recht im alten sterreich.
Art. 19 des Staatsgrundgesetzes vom 21. Dezember 1867, seine Stellung im System der
Grundrechte und seine Ausgestaltung durch die oberstgerichtliche Rechtssprechung.
Mnchen, Wien, 1983; Gerald Stourzh. Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitten in
65
322
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
XX
,
- , .70
1890 , 1905 1910 .71
: .
.72 ,
, . -
, 1890
. , . , , .73
. ,
,
. ,
der Verfassung und Verwaltung sterreichs 1848-1918. Wien, 1985; Hannelore Burger.
Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit im sterreichischen Unterrichtswesen 18671918. Wien, 1995.
70
Gerald Stourzh. The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial
Austria // Austrian History Yearbook. 1992. Vol. 23. Pp. 1-22.
71
Alfred Freiherr von Skene. Der nationale Ausgleich in Mhren 1905. Wien, 1910;
R. Herrmann von Herrnritt. Die Ausgestaltung des sterreichischen Nationalittenrechts
durch den Ausgleich in Mhren und in der Bukowina // sterreichische Zeitschrift fr
ffentliches Recht. 1914. Bd. 1. S. 583ff.
72
Aurel C. Popovici. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gro-sterreich. Leipzig, 1905;
A. Fischhof. sterreich und die Brgschaften seines Bestandes. Wien, 1869.
73
Edmund Bernatzik. ber nationale Matriken. Wien, 1910; Gerald Stourzh. Ethnic
Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good Intentions, Evil Consequences // Ritchie
Robertson, Edward Timmes (Eds.). The Habsburg Legacy. National Identity in Historical Perspective / Austrian Studies. Vol. 5. Edinburgh 1994. Pp. 67-83.
323
. , , ...
-, -
. , ,
.74
:
- . , , ,
.75
1908 ,
.
,
. ,
, ,
.
. :
, ,
, . , , , . ,
74
Rudolf Springer [=Karl Renner]. Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der sterreichischungarischen Monarchie. Wien, 1906. S. 208; Idem. Der Kampf der sterreichischen
Nationen um den Staat. Erster Theil: Das nationale Problem als Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsfrage. Leipzig, 1902.
75
Viktor Adler. Das allgemeine, gleiche und direkte Wahlrecht und das Wahlunrecht in
sterreich. Wien, 1893. S. 48.
324
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.76 , ,
.
: , , , ,
.77
. , ,
,
. ,
, , , , , . ,
. ,
.
,
.
Pester Lloyd. 1908. 11 . ,
:
, . . Viktor Kardy. Egyenltlen elmagyarosods, avagy hogyan
vlt Magyarorszg magyar nyelv orszgg. Trtnelmi-szociolgiai vzlat // Szzadvg.
1990. Vol. 6. No. 2. S. 5-37 .
77
Paul Balogh. Die Wahlbezirke und die Nationalitten // Pester Lloyd. 1908. 8 .
Morgenausgabe. S. 2.
76
325
. , , ...
, , .
,
, ,
. , , , -,
, - - .
. ,
, . , , , . ,
, , ,
, . , ,
,
. ,
, ,
- . ,
,
.
,
, . ,
;
.
326
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
SUMMARY
Benno Gammerl explores the overlapping and contradictory meanings
of subjecthood and citizenship in this comparative study of how the British
and the Hapsburg Empires dealt with their subjects residing outside of the
imperial domains. Based on archival sources from Hapsburg and British
consulates and central institutions, Gammerls study problematizes the notion of an archaic Central Europe and modern West. According to Gammerls research, in the British Empire, where traditionally belonging to the
polity did not presuppose automatic entitlement to citizenship rights, subjecthood survived until the twentieth century in a new racial form. For nonEuropean subjects of the British Empire the maintenance or acquisition of
British subjecthood was made more difficult than for the European subjects. In the case of the Danube Monarchy, Gammerl sees two additional
distinct patterns. In the Austrian case, the imperial authorities treated their
subjects without regard to their ethnic background, and instead promoted
the interests of the state as such, particularly in the military sphere. In the
Hungarian case, the authorities started out with a similar attitude, but as
Hungary turned into a nationalizing state its policies with respect to subjecthood tended to privilege the Magyars. Gammerl typologizes the three
cases as imperialist, statist, and ethno-nationalist. By exploring these
three cases, the author suggests expanding the field of citizenship studies
by including cases of large and multiethnic imperial polities.
327
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
*
Ab Imperio
, , .. ,
,
, , , . Ab Imperio , , ,
*
.
.
(Fulbright Scholarship
Program). This publication became possible thanks to a Fulbright Scholarship Program
grant and a kind permission of the Bakhmeteff Archive.
.
329
. , ...
.1 ,
,
, , , .
, ( /) (, ,
) . ( 1860 1880- .
, ) (, ,
),
().
, (, . ), ,
(. ).2 , , . , . 1989 .
(
) , , ,
.3
.: . . :
, - , ... // Ab Imperio.
2006. 1. . 353-358; . , . . , : // . . 359-365.
2
.: . , . . .: , , // .
. . 34. , 1999. . 231-268.
3
: . . . :
. , 1995; . . .
1
330
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,4 5 , .
6 . ,
. -
/; ( -); ; (,
); / (,7 ).
( ).
, (, , ) . , 1994; . . . (1888
1894 .) / . , , ., . . , 1997; . . . . , 1996; . . . (1874 1885). 2 . , 1994-1995; . . . . . , 1989; . . (1861
1907). , 2003; . . . 2 . , 2004.
4
. : . . 1841 1994. , 2001.
5
: . . : ( . 30- . .). ,
2004; . . . : - . , 1993; . . . : . , 2000; . . , , : . 2- . , 2001;
. . . 60 80- :
. , 1999;
/ . . . . 3 . , 2004; ( .) / . . . . .
3 . , 1999.
6
, 50- . (
);
. ( 35 , ).
7
, 1917 ., , , ..
.: . . . ( .). -, 2000. . 37.
331
. , ...
, ,
, , ,
(, ) , .
, .
., ,
.
, , VIII .
. .8 VIII . , ,
,
. , ,
( ,
,
1917 .). ,
. ( )
( . 9 ), 1812 .
.
. ,
(, , .), , ,
. . . . 356.
. . . , 1791 . . . // . . 1. , 1992. . 220-260.
8
9
332
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, . 1917 .
. ( , ),
, .
,
.
, , (. . ). - ( . . , . , . . ). ,
, (
) , , ,
( -).
. . . .
, ,
, .
,
( )
, - modus vivendi
. / ,
(, ) ,
, .
,
, , , . ,
. ,
, , , ,
333
. , ...
,
. ,
.
a la , . . , ,
.
- (
,
), . . . ,
, (. ,
, . ) . , ,
, :
. .
() .
, . , , , , () , . , , . ,
. 10 , . ,11
.: . . . . : // . 2004. 235. . 216-240.
11
S. Heumann. Kistiakovsky. The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the
Last Years of Tsarism. Cambridge, MA, 1998.
10
334
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. 12 , , . , - . .
, ,
. ,
13 (
, ), , , : , ,
.14 ( ) . ,15
. ,
1880- 1890- . ( ,
)
. , . 1891 .
. ( ): , , ,
.16
, ,
, , , . . .
, , 12
. : . . (15 19 1918 .): . , 1995.
13
. . . . 355.
14
. , . . , . . 360.
15
. . . // . 1998. 5. . 28-37; .
.
16
, , ,
. . . . 10 . ,
1965. . 9. . 63. . : . . (, , ). , 2003. . 216.
335
. , ...
, , ,
. . , ,
, ,
.
/ , , ,
, , : / [
. ..] ,
,
[ 1917 . ..] .17
? ? ? ?
, (1887-1973),
, , .18
17
. , . . , . . 360. . 17 1917 . (. . . .358). IV
, 25 1918 . ( 22 ). .: I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky. The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological
Antecedents // I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky. Essays in Modern Ukrainian History. Edmonton,
1987. Pp. 389-416.
18
. .
: Ch. Halperin. Russia
and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism // Forschungen zur Osteuropischen
Geschichte. 1985. Bd. 36. Pp. 55-194; . . .
. . (1887-1973) // SRC Occasional Papers. 2002. No. 82.
, .: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/82/82-contents.html
( 27 2006 .); . . . (. . , . . , . . )
. , 2005. . . : . . . . , 1998;
336
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , , , , (Butler Library) -.19 ,
(. . ). ( )
.
. The Kievan
and Kozak Period in Ukrainian History.
, The Kievan... , .
,
(Clarence A. Manning) 1941 . (.
box () 164). . ..., ,
.20 (),
1939 . ( ), 1938 .,
, .
,
. . 1938 .: . . (, , . . . //
: . , 2000. . 330-347.
19
.
., , : . . .
: . . // Ab Imperio. 2002.
1. 373-411; . . . . . :
: / . . // . ., 2004. . 6. . 620-693.
20
. . . // . 1927. .
5. . 165-184; . . . . . // .
1928. . 10. . 51-59. : . . . . . .
, 1995. . . , In Search of Cultural
Wholeness: Slavdom, Turan, and Eurasia. .: S. Glebov. The Challenge of the Modern:
The Eurasianist Ideology and Movement, 1920 1929. / Ph.D. Dissertation; Rutgers
University, 2004. Pp. 172-178.
337
. , ...
, ).
.
.
.
, , 1968 1972 .
, -
, . , . 13 1940 . . :
, ,
,
(
, ,
, ).
.
(-) .
, . ,
( . 21), , .22 21
. . . . 1917 1921. 1917 1920. ,
1994; . . 1917 1921. 1920 1921. , 1997; .
. 1921 1925. , 1998; . . 1926 1934.
, 2001; . . 1935 1941. 2 . , 2006.
22
. .: . . . ( 1917-1921 ) // Mappa
Mundi. 70. ---, 1996.; . -. // . 1997. 1; .-. .
// .
1997. 10; . . // . 1999. 2; . . . I. : // .
338
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
, . , 5 1924 .: .23 ,
. :
,
.24
, .
, (1898 1986),
,
, . .25 , . ,
. 1927 . ,
.26 . ,27 ,
, .
. . ,
, , .
. , . ,
, .
, , ,
.
. , , 2000. 6.; . . . .... - . . . -, 2000.
23
. . . . 1921 1925. , 1998. . 176.
24
. : . . . (
). , 2003. . 59.
25
. . . . 1921 1925. . 27.
26
. : . . . .1926 1934. , 2001. . 383.
339
. , ...
,
, , .
, ( , ) . , , , ,
.
. ,
. -, . ,
, .
, ,
, :
,
. ... -
( ).
.28
. 29 ,
.
.
, -
, ,
. , . , , , . (the
27
A List of the George Vernadsky Collection. Hokkaido University Library. Russia and
Eastern Europe. Sapporo, 1982.
28
. 27 1933 . . : ...: ( . ) // . 1999. 1. . 49.
29
: . .
. -, 1996; . . -, 1996;
. . -, 1997; . . , 1997; . . 2 . -, 1997.
340
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
scion of the Russian imperial historiographic school),30
, , , -, , - .
, ,
. . , , () ( ) - ( )
.31
, , , .
. , , , . . ,
.
, .
, ,32
,33 .34 , .
. , ,35
S. Plokhy. Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of
Ukrainian History. Toronto, 2005. P. 151.
31
: . . . , 1964.
: N. Polonska-Vasylenko. Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and
Russia. London, 1968.
32
G. Vernadsky. Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine. New Haven, 1941.
33
G. Vernadsky. Preface // M. Hrushevsky. A History of Ukraine / Ed. by O. J. Fredericksen. New Haven, 1941. Pp. V-XIV.
34
. , . , . , . . . ,
-,
. . : . . . . , 1998.
35
. . //
. 1915. 3. . 5-17. . -
30
341
. , ...
, ()
. 1930- 1940- .
, , .
. . (. box 164).
. ,
1654 . , .
,
. . .
(1941 .), ,
. , ,
( ),
, , .36
.
(, ) . 12 1941 . (
). :
.
. , , . , , . C.: . , . , . . . , 2003.
36
- . . . , : American Historical Review. 1943. Vol. 48. No. 2.
Pp. 316-317.
, , : , .
342
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , .
. 1938 1941 .,
1916 . .37 , -
.
, .
. ,
. - , ? , , , -? ,
, , , , ( , -) . 1926 .
, 1920- ., 1932 1933 .
1938 1939 .?
. , ,
( -), , , .
, , ,
. ,
, , , , ,
. . , (. box 164). , .
37
. . . // . . , 1995. . 212-222.
343
. , ...
1940 . ,
( ),
. ( ).
, , (Yale University Press).38
The Hour .39 The Hour (1939 1943 .) ,40 ,
, (Albert E. Kahn).41
,
.
- The Hour , , 1942 . ( ),
.42 , . , , , , . The Hour . box 50 . . : . Prymak.
General Histories of Ukraine Published in English During the Second World War // Ab
Imperio. 2003. No. 2. Pp. 463-466.
39
Yale University Press and Nazi Propaganda // The Hour. 1941. No. 118. November 1.
Pp. 1-2.
40
1970 . The Hour , .:
The Hour / Issued by the American Council against Nazi Propaganda. Westport, CT,
1970.
41
, : . , . . / . .
, 1947.
42
FBI Raids Svoboda // The Hour. 1942. No. 123. January 10. P. 4.
38
344
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Yale University Press
.
. ,
. (. box 164),
, . ,43 . .
. The Hour
, .44 ,
, - (,
).
. , . , . (234 , 80 . ) (, , ) -
. , , , .
.
. . . , ,
(,
) .45 , ,
() ? , , ?
, , .
., . box 164.
Professor Vernadsky of Yale Lauds UNA // The Hour. 1941. No. 122. December 30. P.
2. UNA Ukrainian National Association (
).
45
1908 1909 . //
. 1912. . . .1. . 121.
43
44
345
. , ...
. . . , , .
SUMMARY
The article by Ernest Gyidel is conceived as the introduction to the commentated publication of the archival documents by George Vernadsky pertaining to his Ukrainian identity vis--vis Russian culture and the tradition
of Russian imperial statehood.
Gyidel revisits the discussion between R. Vulpius, D. Stalunas, and
M. Dolbilov (Ab Imperio 1/2006) about the historical meaning of the term
rusofile, and suggests possible genealogies of such terms as rusofile,
ukrainofile, maloross, and Ukrainian. It is against this background
that Gyidel introduces the concept of Ukrainians of the Russian culture
as a very late imperial phenomenon, and presents George Vernadsky as
representative of this category. A complicated dialectic of recognition of
Ukrainian people-hood and Ukrainian language yet under the Russian
political and (high) cultural umbrella is explicated by Gyidel with the help
of a few previously unpublished texts from Vernadskys collection in Columbia Universitys (New York) Bakhmeteff Archive. There are two articles (A Short Exposition of the Eurasian Point of View on Russian History
and Prince Trubetskoi and the Ukrainian Question), one lecture (The
Kievan and Kozak Period in Ukrainian History) and two letters (to L. Myshuga and P. Ignatev). As a way to provide context for their discussion,
Gyidel examines Vernadskys published works where different aspects of
Ukrainian history are analyzed, including his contacts with Ukrainian emigration. He suggests that if approached within such a context, Vernadskys
collection can be an invaluable source to study his complex political and
cultural loyalties. The main question that he addresses is not Vernadskys
understanding of Ukrainianness. Instead the question is: what meaning
he and his fellow Russian Ukrainians invested in the category Russian?
What kind of loyalty cultural, political, imperial or their combination
did they attach to this subjective Russianness?
346
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1.
.
I.
.
;
, .
, , ,
,
,
,
.
,
, .
,
, , .
347
, , ; , . ; , .
, , .. ,
.
. , . , . , ,
, , -, .
, ,
, .
, , , .
.
, , , . . . , .
. .
- . . .
, . , , : , .
, , .
.
, . . . , - .
348
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
( ) . , , , ,
, , , .
, .
.. .1 .
.
, .. . , .. , .
: 1) ()
, ( )
; 2) () XVIXVII .;
; 3) , XVIII .
.
1.
, ,
,
. . .
(XIVXVI .)
: .
1
. .. (
, . 54-94). (. ).
349
( )
. , XVII . ,
. .
2.
XVI-XVII
- , , . .
,
,
,
1669 .
XVII ; , XVII ,
, , , , .
3.
, .
.
.
, .
.
, , .. .
350
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
. .
, ,
1876 .
, -.
- , ,
, . - , , . . ,
, ...
... .
,
.
. . , , , , , , . .
. .
XV, XVI XVII , ,2 , XVII .
1654
. . , .
,
.3
2
. , , V (1927),
. 165 . (. ).
3
, , . 166 (. ).
351
, ,
, ,
.
. . .
. XVII
- . XVIII
XVII .
. .
, , , . ,
, ; ,
, , , .4
. XVIIIXIX .
XVII XVIII .,
. ,
, , .. , ( ) ,
. ,
, .. , .
4
, , . 167 (. ).
352
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
;
, ,
. . ().
,
. ,
, , .
III.
, , . .
. , ,
.. .
, . . -, . , , .
, , .
.
.
.
.
.
. , , . ,
.
, , , . , (
). , ,
.
353
.
- ,
, . ,
- ,
, - . , ,
,
. , , , ,
, , ,
1876 ., , .
, . , ,
, . ,
. , ,
- . , ,
. , . ,
?
, , . ,
, : , ,
. :
. , - , , , .
, .
354
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
IV.
. , . . , ( 1914 .) . - 1918 .
, - .
1918 . , ,
. , , , .
, ,
1919 ., 1938 .,
,
, , .
, , .
?
, ,
, .
. -
, , , ,
, , ,
.
, , , -
. - 1918
.
355
( ).
, , . (1863) , , ( ), (
1870- .) 1890 . . (, ) - , .
, - , , ; . 5
-
. ,
. 1914 . .
, , ,
, .
.
,
. ,
.
.
. , , 6
,
, .7
Bakhmeteff Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia University ( BAR), George Vernadsky Collection, Box 96.
. .
.
.
7
( 1938 .?).
5
6
356
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
2.
The Kievan and Kozak Period in Ukrainian History
by George Vernadsky
, ...
? ?8
Everything is moving on, everything is passing
away, and there is no end to it
Whither did things go? Where did they come from?
Shevchenko
(1842 .) . .
357
Kozak period. Ukrainian steppes are but the beginning or the end if you
look from a different side of the vast zone of Eurasian steppes stretching
as they are way east to Mongolia. Through ages Ukraine was a battlefield
between East and West, North and South. In spite of this, the people tried
through ages to keep their territory, although at times the eastern nomads
pushed them northward from the steppes.
Aboriginal Slavic tribes lived in the territory of modern Ukraine from
time immemorial. In the 6th century A.D. the strongest of these tribes were
known as Antae. They may be considered as the forbears of the modern
Bulgarians, the Ukrainians, and the southeast Russians. The ruling clans of
the Antae were of Iranian stock, and one of them was known as the RokhsAs (the Light Antae). It is probably from the name of this clan that the
name, Rus derived. In any case the name, Rus originated in the South long
before the coming of the Varangian princes who subsequently assumed it
as their own. The Varangian princes of Kiev established their rule on the
foundations of statehood of the Khazar period, and it is characteristic that
both Vladimir and Yaroslav used the Khazar title of Khagan. The Kievan
state was a federation of the Rus and other East Slavic tribes, and gradually
the name, Rus, spread over the whole country. The Greek Orthodox church
and the Church Slavonic language, as the literary vehicle, were the unifying factors in Kievan civilization. By the 12th century there started the process of formation, out of so many tribal dialects, of national languages, the
Ukrainian and the Great Russian. The White Russian language began consolidating itself about a century later. Both agriculture and craftsmanship
made considerable progress during the Kievan period and in the 11th century
the first Code of Law of the Rus was compiled, many features of which
were later on incorporated into so-called Lithuanian Statute of the 16th century.
It was unfortunate that due to the lack of unity between the princes,
descendants of Yaroslav, they were not able to keep the Turkish nomads9 in
check, and the latter gradually cut the Rus from the sea shores. Thus, the
territorial background of the Kievan state was constantly shrinking and the
population had to move northward. The Mongol invasion of 1240 was only
the final blow in that respect. Even after the breaking of the Mongol Empire into several Hordes, the Khanate of Crimea kept dominating the Ukrainian steppes and harassing both Poland and Moscovy with constant raids
after each of which droves of captives were sent to the Black Sea ports to
9
, nomads.
358
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
be sold as slaves to Levantine or Italian merchants. Since the governments
of neither Poland nor Moscovy were able to give full protection to the population of their respective border lands, the latter had to depend on their
own power of resistance, and it was in such way that the Kozak Hosts of
Zaporozhie and of Don came into being. The term, Kozak, is supposed to
have derived from the Turkish word, kazak which means free warrior.
Incidentally, the spelling Kozak, being as it is a correct transliteration of
the Ukrainian term, has to be preferred to the traditional English spelling,
Cossack.
The attitude of the Polish government to the Kozaks wavered between
the desire to have the benefit of their fighting strength, and the fear of their
becoming a danger for the Poles themselves. The Kozaks were at that time
the only independent group of the Ukrainian nation; the bulk of the people
were serfs of the Polish or Polonized landowners. They were oppressed
both socially and religiously, since the Polish Government tried to curb the
activities of the Greek Orthodox Church. In view of the circumstances it
was but natural that the initiative in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1648 belonged to the Kozaks. The Ukrainian Revolution of that year was an event
of primary importance not only for Ukraine itself but for Europe at large.
Its significance was that of international scope. It was one of the major
events of the 17th century, to be compared with the Thirty Years War and
the English Revolution of 1640-49. Parallels might be drawn between the
policies of Oliver Cromwell and those of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, and there
was even an attempt of establishing a contact between the English and
Ukrainian diplomacy through Sweden and Transylvania.
The causes of the Ukrainian Revolution were manifold. From political
angle, the attempt of the Polish government to curt all the rights and privileges of the Kozak Host proved to be disastrous to Poland; the oppression
of Ukrainian peasants by their landlords brought about social unrest; and
the denial of freedom and equality to the Greek Orthodox Church made the
things even more complicated. Accordingly, the main objectives of the
Revolution were threefold, to wit: 1) religious freedom; 2) social equality;
and 3) political rights.
I have no time to discuss the course of events of war and revolution in
details. Suffice it to say that after his first successes over the Poles, Hetman
Bohdan Khmelnitsky was ready to compromise with the King of Poland,
provided the latter would satisfy the basic demands of the Ukrainians. The
Poles, however, were not ready to grant any far-reaching autonomy to
Ukraine, and the owners of the large estates especially were not willing to
359
give up their privileges. Thus, the struggle continued, and in 1651 Bohdan,
because of the defection of his allies, the Crimean Tatars, was defeated by
the Poles. He then was compelled to turn to the Tsar of Moscow for protection. The Kozaks took an oath of allegiance to the Tsar in Pereyaslav on
January 18, 1654, and two months later the instrument of the union was
signed in Moscow. Complete autonomy of Ukraine was guarantied, and
according to the provisions of the treaty, the Hetman reserved for himself
the right of maintaining diplomatic relations with foreign powers. Preliminary of any negociations10 with Poland and Turkey he had to ask authorization of the Tsar, however. Bohdan took advantage of the provisions of the
union to negotiate, not long before his death, an alliance with Sweden which,
he hoped, would greatly strengthen the position of Ukraine. Bohdan was
taken by death in the midst of a war with Poland and before the autonomy
of Ukraine had sufficient time to strike root (1657). His life work was thus
not completed, but even so his achievements were of tremendous importance. Bohdan may be considered the greatest leader Ukraine had in the
Kozak period, perhaps even in the whole modern period at large. He certainly was one of the outstanding men of his age and would stand comparison with contemporary statesmen of Europe. The Polish historian, L. Kubala, called him aptly the Cromwell of Ukraine.11 Bohdan received good
education in the Jesuit College of Yaroslav; he knew several languages
Latin, Polish, Turkish, and according to some, even French. In his ways
and habits he was a typical Kozak, capable of great exertion during campaigns and taking it easy in peace time. Physically, he was powerfully built,
although not very tall. Women played an important role in his life, especially his second wife, Helen, whom some classically minded historians called
Helen of Troy since Bohdans jealousy of her was one of the contributing
motives in his revolt against the Poles. While Bohdan was at his best in
diplomacy, he was also a strong military leader and an able ruler. He took
great pains in organizing both the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian administration and succeeded in both fields in an amazingly short period. Due
to the circumstances, administrative branch was closely connected with the
army. The country was divided into seventeen regiments according to the
number of military districts. Thus, the basic feature of Ukrainian administration for the whole Hetmanschina period were laid.
, negotiations.
, , Wojna Mosk
(1910) pp. 7-8. , : L. Kubala. Wojna moskiewska, r.
1654-1655. Warszawa, 1910.
10
11
360
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
In view of the subsequent curtailment and the graduate extinction of
Ukrainian autonomy in the first half of the 18th century, one may be inclined to question the validity of Bohdans life work and the soundness of
his policy. However, he hardly may be made responsible for the mistakes
of his successors who neglected at least two of the main rules of his policy
to wit: keeping aloof from Poland and maintaining of the unity of the Ukrainian people. Ivan Vyhovskys agreement with Poland (1658) which was
upheld by part of the starshyna but opposed by the rank and file Kozak
resulted in a civil war which was furthermore aggravated by foreign intervention. During this period of the so called Ruina (the ruination) Ukraine
broke into three parts each under its own Hetman, and it was but natural
that that portion of Ukraine which remained under the Tsars protection
was at a disadvantage with regard to keeping intact its autonomy. Moreover, the new Ukrainian ruling class the starshyna was interested in building up its social and economic privileges to the expense of the rights of
the Kozak plebs, and their social aspirations in many cases interfered
with national trends in their policies. This was particularly obvious in
their attitude towards the Don Kozak Host the constitution of which was
similar to that of the Zaporozhie Host but retained original democracy
intact.
In 1670 the Don Kozak Ataman, Stepan Razin started an uprising against
the Moscow boyars which resulted in a peasant revolution all over the south
east of the Muscovite Tsardom. Razins movement had many of the features in common with the Ukrainian revolution of 1648, and had Bohdan
Khmelnitsky been still alive in 1670 he probably would have taken advantage of Razins revolt to improve and strengthen the status of Ukraine. The
whole course of history might have been changed by a joint action of Ukraine
and Don. Actually, only one of the three rival Hetmans of Razins time,
Petro Doroshenko, the vassal of the Sultan, showed some interest in Razins
movement. The Left Bank Ukraine remained loyal to the Tsar, and the latters troops finally defeated Razin. Thus, first rate12 opportunity was lost.
The situation repeated itself in 1707, during the Russo-Swedish war, when
the Don Kozaks revolted again under the leadership of the Ataman, Kondrati Bulavin. Bulavin sent his emissaries to the Zaporozhie Sich asking for
assistance. The koshevoi, while personally sympathetic, was afraid to break
with the Tsar, especially since no hint was given him on the part of Hetman
, , rare. . thus,
the second.
12
361
Mazepa. A small group of Zaporozhie Kozak youth left for the Don on
their own risk. It is hard to understand Mazepas attitude towards the matter
since he himself was at that time preparing the ground for his break with
Russia and was already engaged in secret negotiations with Sweden. It was
obviously in his interest to join forces with Bulavin. The reason why he did
not do it was probably his fear of the radical tendencies of Bulavins movement. As a result, both Bulavin and Mazepa failed. Thus, the second opportunity for a union between Ukraine and the Don was lost. There was no
third one, since after 1708 the rights of both Ukraine and the Don were
curtailed.
Let us now leave behind the political aspects of the Kozak period and
conclude by a glance on its cultural aspects. The Revolution of 1648 was
followed by rapid cultural progress. The Kievan Ecclesiastical Academy13
which was founded in 163114 five years before Harvard and seventy years
before Yale played a leading role in promoting Ukrainian culture. Numerous schools were established in Bohdans time all over the country. The
Deacon, Paul of Aleppo, who traveled in Ukraine in 1654, was much impressed by the progress of education. Such was the innate vitality of Ukrainian nation, that, in spite of the devastation of the Ruina period, by the
beginning of the 18th century Ukraines economics and cultural life15 showed
much progress, and in the first half of the 18th century Ukraine was perhaps
leading the16 ahead of other Slavic nations in the field of learning and education.
BAR, George Vernadsky Collection, Box 96. . .
362
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
3.
17
. . ( 1887 )
,
- - .
, . . ( 1895 .).
, , -, , - ..,
.
. .
. . . .
, .
(., , , ),
, () .
. . ( . .
), ,
.
XVI
,
. , - ,
.
[]. Sep 28 1937. , . . (1900 1982), ,
, -
. . : A. G. Mazour. An Outline of Modern Russian
Historiography. Berkeley, 1938. . , :
Modern Russian Historiography. Westport, Conn., 1975.
17
363
.
.
,18
.
, - .
.
, , , , . ,
, , .
. . (), .
-
() ,
.
- () (
),
( ) .
, ,
- () (, , )
.
. .
,
18
364
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. . .
, . . .
. .
,
, (
) .
,
.
. . , .
West Wardsboro, Vermont . .
30 1937 .
,
:
. . ,
, estina svta
. . , (-,
1927)
, A History of Russia (New Haven, 1929)
, (, 1934)
, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston,
1936)
, , . , ( )
D. S. Mirsky, Russia: Social History (London, 1931)
. :
. . . , (,
1927)
. . , (, 1931)
. . , (, 1931)
BAR, George Vernadsky Collection, Box 96. . .
365
4.
George Vernadsky
440 Edgewood Ave
New Haven, Conn.
Tel. 8-6594
. .
13 , 1940
,
10 . . , ,
,
.
. .
Let me now shift to English, since my Ukrainian has lately become rather
rusty. I appreciate greatly the late Hrushevskys historical work and should
consider it a privilege to write a preface to the American edition of this
book, but in the same time I cannot fully accept his general approach and in
case you would like me to write the preface I would have to make some
reservations and mention my own attitude to the main problem of Ukrainian history. I wonder whether this would be acceptable to you.
I take this opportunity to ask your advice in the following matter. I have
written a brief biography of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. My manuscript is in
English and contains 184 typewritten pages. I offered it to several American publishers for their consideration, but while they liked it, they were
doubtful about possible sales, and so none of them accepted my manuscript
for publication. It occurred to me that you may know some publisher who
would be interested in Ukrainian subjects and so would consider my manuscript for publication.
,
P.S. , .
BAR, George Vernadsky Collection, Box 50. . .
366
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
5.
12 1941
.19 []
20
. , , , .
, . ,
,
, ,
- ,
.
, ,
, .
, , , .
, , ,
, ..
. ,
( , ), , . ,
(
,
, ).
. ,
(1870-1945) (19071908), (1915-1916).
20
, .
19
367
,
, . - ,
,
. - ,
, ( , , ). . ; 1917 . ;
( , , ). , , , ,
. ,
.
.
,
. , , ,
, .. . ,
.
,
. , , , ,
. , ..
. , . , , ,
. . , . , , , ,
368
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, 21
.
, .. .
,
, .
,
. ,
, , - .
, , ,
, , 1)
, .. , ; 2) ( - ). , , -
, , , . ,
.
,
, . , .
BAR, George Vernadsky Collection, Box 164. . .
(1832 1908), ,
, .
21
369
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Rebecca CHAMBERLAIN-CREANG
Introduction
It was a sub-zero, snowy winter afternoon in Rybnitsa. For twenty
minutes I was waiting next to the bustling Transnistrian border crossing
for the number-eleven international marshrutka (mini-bus) to neighbouring Rezina. As I paced in circles to keep warm, I ran into Natalia
*
371
372
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
de facto independent state,4 eager for international recognition. Since its
declaration of independence in 1990, and its war with Moldova in 19911992, the TMR has been busy at the work of national-identity and statehood building. Authorities insist we have all the attributes of a normal
state5 and possess a distinct Transnistrian identity and citizen spirit. The
pridnestrovskii narod (Transnistrian people) are characterized as industrious, proud and loyal to the gosudarstvo (state), traits opposite of those
projected onto the Moldovans across the Nistru River.6 A number of
scholars in Moldova and Euro-America corroborate the existence of a discrete Transnistrian people group.7 Even the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, one of the five mediators in the Transnistrian stalemate, believes there is a distinct feeling of Transdniestrian identity
going beyond ethnic lines, justifying a special status for the area.8 However, the TMRs history is marked by events that suggest not all people feel
enduringly Transnistrian and consent to the TMRs authority.9 During
4
This is largely owing to Transnistrias rich industrial resources, thriving black market
and powerful Russian military presence, combined with conscious nation and statehood
building.
5
In Anne Nivat. We have all the Attributes of a Normal State: Interview with Vice
President of the Dniester Moldovan Republic, Aleksandr Karaman // Transition. 1996.
Vol. 2. No. 17. P. 29.
6
My informants in Transnistria, both ethnic Moldovans and Slavs, frequently stereotyped
right-bank Moldovans as lazy, corrupt, greedy, and jealous in comparison with
Transnistrias hardworking people. Surprisingly, right-bank ethnic Moldovans
occasionally used similar stereotypes to describe their own people.
7
Stefan Troebst. We are Transnistrians!: Post-Soviet Identity Management in the
Dniester Valley; Pl Kolst and Andrei Malgin. The Transnistrian Republic: a Case of
Politicized Regionalism // Nationalities Papers. 1998. Vol. 26. No. 1. Pp. 103-127;
OLoughlin et al. National Construction, Territorial Separtism, and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic // Post-Soviet Geography and Economics.
1998. Vol. 39. No. 6. Pp. 332-358; Alla Skvortsova. Transnistrian People An Identity
of Its Own // Moldova Academic Review. 2002. Vol. 1. No. 1. See also David Laitin.
Identity in Formation: the Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca,
1998, who hypothesizes that Russians in the near abroad, like in the TMR, will evolve
into a new national grouping, different from Russians in Russia. As my paper discusses,
I recognize that new national identities are forming among Russians in the near abroad,
but I question the durability of such identities, especially amid ongoing socio-economic
change and growing emigration and migration.
8
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Conflict Prevention Centre.
Transdniestrian conflict: origins and issues. Accessed online: http://www.osce.org/
documents/mm/1994/06/455_en.pdf. Last time consulted 30 November, 2006. P. 6.
9
For example, consider the Moldovan school-closure crisis in Michael Shafir. Moldovan Lyceum Teachers, Students Barricade Themselves to Prevent School Closure [] //
373
374
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Citizenship belonging and the state
Citizenship at its heart is about the relationship between persons and the
state.13 Scholars agree that this relationship is not just juridical, about static
rights and responsibilities, but a dynamic process about loyalty and belonging.14 It is a relationship constituted through peoples changing experiences and ideologies of the state,15 in relation to everyday material entitlements (e.g., civic, political, social, cultural) and learned obligations.16
Citizenship studies devote considerable attention to the tension between
citizenship as belonging and exclusion,17 deriving from the paradox that
13
For clarification, I define citizenship both as a legal category and as a changing social
imaginary. In the latter sense, citizenship can be understood as peoples feelings of loyalty
to, or identification with the state, as indexed by social actors changing participation in
and narratives about institutions and ideologies of the state (following John Borneman.
Belonging in the Two Berlins). This paper is concerned with exploring this aspect of
citizenship.
14
See Rachel Sieder. Rethinking Citizenship: Reforming the Law in Postwar Guatemala // Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Eds.). States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Durham, NC, 2001. Pp. 203-220. Also
Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis & Manuel Hassassian (Eds.). Citizenship and the State in
the Middle East: Approaches and Applications. Syracuse, 2000; and Will Kymlicka and
Wayne Norman. Return of the Citizen: Recent Work on Citizenship Theory // Ethics.
1994. Vol. 104. Pp. 352-381.
15
See David Nugent. Building the State, Making the Nation: the Bases and Limits of
State Centralization // American Anthropologist. 1994. Vol. 96. No. 2. Pp. 333-369.
16
Consult Amy Caiazza. Mothers and Soldiers: Gender, Citizenship, and Civil Society
in Contemporary Russia. New York, 2002. Katherine Verdery captures these qualities of
citizenship in defining it as follows: Citizenship is a membership category, a mechanism
for allocating persons to states and thus as something that creates belonging (Katherine
Verdery. Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern Europe since
1989 // American Ethnologist. 1998. Vol. 25. No. 2. Pp. 293.) She goes on to explain
how the category of citizenship distinguishes belongers from excluded, often on the
basis of ethnicity in post-socialist countries, as well as ties belongers to the state as the
guarantor of their rights, integrating them as subjects (Ibid. P. 293). This research,
however, focuses on citizenship less as a state-produced membership category and more
as a social imaginary among ordinary people.
17
The paper is aware that citizenship, as a juridical, legal status, does not always equal
attachment. In unrecognised Transnistria people often hold up to three passports and
three citizenships (e.g. Transnistrian, Moldovan and Ukrainian), feeling more loyalty to
some than others. Most people I know in Transnistria hold a TMR and Moldovan passport, obtaining the latter for financial and utilitarian reasons to travel abroad (CIS countries no longer recognize the TMR passport as before). A Russian passport is considered
the most desirable in the TMR; however, it is deemed expensive, whereas a Moldovan
passport is discounted for TMR residents (unlike for right-bank residents). This aside,
375
376
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
of civic-state and ethnic-national identities.23 While all valid points, I
believe none invalidate the relevance of the state to citizenship, especially in contexts where the state once carried heavy ideological weight, as in
the former Soviet Union,24 and in contemporary places where the sovereign state is almost a fetish and nationality is about state loyalty, as in
the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.25
Even when the state does figure strongly in writings on citizenship,26
the state is often depicted as a Hobbesian, top-down architect of citizenship, when in reality the state and citizenship are also constituted from the
ground up.27 In other cases, the state assumes an unproblematic, loosely
defined place, when in fact the state is a complex and loaded concept.28 It
is either described as a unitary thing separate from society,29 or it coexists uncomfortably alongside Foucauldian non-state notions like governSteinmetz (Ed.). State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca, 1999).
While I agree that we should be careful not to thing-ify the state, I do not think the
term state needs to be abandoned, only carefully historicized in cultural context. For
similar scholars see Akhil Gupta. Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of Corruption, the
Culture of Politics and the Imagined State // American Ethnologist. 1995. Vol. 22. No. 2.
Pp. 375-402.
23
Cf: The relationship of nationality and citizenship is a blurred one (Veronique Bn.
Introduction: Education and Citizenship in a Comparative Perspective. P. 13). Bn
explains how the civic and ethnic, national collapse into one another and are often
mutually constitutive of each other (Pp. 13-16).
24
William Rosenberg. Social Mediation and State Construction(s) in Revolutionary
Russia // Social History. 1994. Vol. 19. No. 2. Pp. 168-188.
25
Loyalty to the state is one of the chief hallmarks of Transnistrian national identity, if
such an identity can be said to exist. The government-sponsored newspaper Novosti
depicts this in its description of pridnestrovskii narod: an industrious, kind, fair and
proud people, building their own state and defending it [my emphasis] (PMR 15 let!
C prazdnikom! // Novosti. 2005. 3 September. P. 1.)
26
See the well-known study by T. H. Marshall. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge,
1992.
27
Nugent demonstrates how ordinary people actively bring the state and citizen belonging
into being (David Nugent. Building the State, Making the Nation: the Bases and Limits
of State Centralization). I thank Deborah James for this point.
28
Philip Abrams. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State // Journal of Historical
Sociology. 1988. Vol. 1. No. 1. Pp. 58-89.
29
Cf. on post-Soviet context Vesna Popovski. National Minorities and Citizenship Rights
in Lithuania, 1988-93. London, 2000. Also Elizabeth Teague. Citizenship, Borders, and
National Identity // Alexander Motyl, Blair Ruble and Lilia Shevtsova (Eds.). Russias
Engagement with the West: Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-first Century.
New York, 2005.
377
378
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
texts.33 These languages are meant to help the ethnographer see how the
state appears in everyday, localized forms, and how the state tries to make
itself real and tangible, while remaining mythical and sacrosanct.34
To paraphrase Hansen and Stepputats model of stateness,35 the three
languages of governance a modern state invokes are: (1) territorial sovereignty by monopolization of violence, through visible military and police
force, (2) knowledge of the population of the territory (e.g., census), and
(3) resources that ensure the reproduction and well-being of the population.36
These practical languages reproduce the idea that the state exists in a set of
localized institutions. The three languages of authority a state invokes are:
(1) law and legal discourse; (2) embodiment of the state in buildings, road
signs, monuments, uniforms, rituals, etcetera; and (3) nationalisation of
property and institutions (e.g., schools, factories) and the dissemination of
a shared history and community. These symbolic languages reproduce the
idea that the state is at the center of society, a distant but powerful regulator
of social life. Hansen and Stepputat end by stressing: The essential thing
is, however, that a state exists only when these languages of governance
and authority combine and co-exist.37
33
While Hansen and Stepputat focus on postcolonial states (Thomas B. Hansen and
Finn Stepputat (Eds.). States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State), I believe their languages of stateness can be analyzed in the post-Soviet
context, so long as careful attention is given to the historical background and contemporary state-society relations, specific to the latter.
34
Ibid. Pp. 5-8. In other words, they enable us to subject the interlocked materialism and
abstractness of the state to empirical scrutiny. For more on how the abstractness and
materiality of the state are inter-related, see Timothy Mitchell. Society, Economy and
the State Effect. P. 77
35
Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Eds.). States of Imagination: Ethnographic
Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Pp. 7-8.
36
For example, pensions, welfare benefits and tax revenue/collection fall under this
category. This aspect of stateness is most examined in the paper.
37
Ibid. P. 8. In other words, a states legitimacy is not just predicated on meeting
traditional Weberian conditions, but also on fulfilling important symbolic, ideological
functions. A legitimate modern state is usually considered: An impersonal constitutional order, identified with and controlling a given territory. A public power, separate
from ruler and ruled, with supreme political jurisdiction within defined boundaries, backed
by a monopoly of coercive power, enjoying a minimum of support from citizens (David
Held. The Development of the Modern State // Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (Eds.).
Formations of Modernity. Oxford, 1992. Pp. 71-126.) While not discounting this definition, this paper aims to move beyond a simply Hobbesian and Weberian conceptualization of the state, as ethnography illustrates that people have other important ideas about
the state (see David Nugent. Building the State, Making the Nation).
379
On Transnistrian nation building, see Stefan Troebst. We are Transnistrians!: PostSoviet Identity Management in the Dniester Valley; and Alla Skvortsova. Transnistrian
People An Identity of Its Own. Also Vladimir Solonari. Creating a People: A Case
Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian
History. 2003. Vol. 4. No. 2. Pp. 411-438.
39
Katherine Verdery. Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property. Pp. 23233. I recognize that there are differences between the Romanian and Soviet socialist
experience. Whereas in Romania the nation (read: Romanian) became intimately bound
up with the party-state (cf. K. Verdery. National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and
Cultural Politics in Ceausescus Romania. Berkeley, 1991), the relationship between
state and nation was arguably more ambiguous and contested in the larger, more ethnically diverse Soviet Union, as reflected in Soviet arguments over how best to define
the nation (as something multi or supra-national [read Soviet] or as something uneasily or unavoidably Russian: see Yitzhak Brudny. Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991. Cambridge, MA, 1998) and in longstanding
debates over the nationality question (natsionalnyi vopros) (see, for example, Francine Hirsch. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet
Union. Ithaca, 2005.) Ambiguity over the nation led some Soviet political theorists to
380
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
needs that the the Benevolent Father Party-State could satisfy.40 So long
as the communist state generally fulfilled these needs in handing out social
entitlements, it secured popular, mass support (Verdery calls this socialist
paternalism).41
History has shown that socialist paternalism only won a partial positive backing. Still, it left an indelible mark on individuals.42 In post-socialist
Russia, David Anderson shows how people associate social entitlements
with words like grazhdanin (citizen) and kultura (culture, civilization),43
evincing an important link between social rights and citizenship. The people
of ex-socialist countries learned to imagine citizenship through social entitlements, probably because citizenship under communism only really conferred social rights (e.g., the right to work, education and health care versus
contentious political and civil rights).44 However, social entitlements were
not given out equally to all people.
Both Anderson and Caiazza point out that in the Soviet Union a person
received a different set of social entitlements and had a different obligation
emphasize the state as an ideal, in lieu of the nation (see Rosenberg. Social Mediation
and State Construction(s) in Revolutionary Russia). However, the state ideal may have
been undermined in the everyday practice of entitlement giving. Although Soviet authorities taught loyalty to the state over separate nations, the way in which people
received entitlements, and the sorts of entitlements received, often depended on each
persons natsionalnost (national or ethnic identity). This substantiates the opinion that
natsionalnost, instead of withering under socialism, was in fact institutionalized, gradually becoming increasingly intertwined with civic ideas like citizenship (see Yuri Slezkine. The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic
Particularism // Slavic Review. 1994. Vol. 53. No. 2. Pp. 414-452).
40
I believe this is an example of the socially constructed nature of citizenship, whereby
persons are taught certain obligations to the state (e.g., the responsibility to turn over to
the party-state all personal means of production, from property to pigs) in exchange for
entitlements they learn to expect.
41
Katherine Verdery. Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property. Pp. 24-26.
42
Interestingly, during my field research I found that peoples nostalgia for socialism
frequently centered on nostalgia for a paternalistic state, remembering only its morality
(e.g., social entitlements linked with the state), and not its profanity (e.g., deportations
and political imprisonment associated with a particular regime).
43
Anderson gives the example of a social entitlement, subsidized passenger airline transport (grazhdanskaia aviatsiia), which in Russian has the adjective of citizen (grazhdanin) in its wording. Cf. David Anderson. Bringing Civil Society to an Uncivilised Place:
Citizenship Regimes in Russias Artic Frontier // Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (Eds.).
Civil Society: Challenging Western Models. London, 1996. Pp. 103-104.
44
This is because the nature of the communist system did not allow for the existence of
political and civil rights. Cf. Vesna Popovski. National Minorities and Citizenship Rights
in Lithuania, 1988-93. P. 6.
381
For an example of how this played out in everyday life in Siberia, see David Anderson.
Bringing Civil Society to an Uncivilised Place: Citizenship Regimes in Russias Artic
Frontier. Pp. 109-110. Amy Caiazza. Mothers and Soldiers: Gender, Citizenship, and
Civil Society in Contemporary Russia.
46
This suggests that multiple identities of a non-civic nature (e.g., ethnic, kin, gender)
do play a role in mediating the relationship between state and subjects (see Suad Joseph.
Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East; and Deborah James. Gaining Ground? Rights
and Property in South African Land Reform. London, 2006), and in conditioning
degrees of citizen belonging (cf. Aihwa Ong. Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making:
Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States. P. 737).
47
This point may not be new for citizenship studies in the post-socialist context, which
focus mostly on the ways in which citizenship is becoming increasingly ethnicized, as
newly independent states use national/ethnic identity to define belonging and exclusion
(on Yugoslav successor states see Robert Hayden. Blueprints for a House Divided; Idem.
Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics // Slavic Review. 1992.
Vol. 51. Pp. 654-673; on Romania: Katherine Verdery. Transnationalism, Nationalism,
Citizenship, and Property), and use citizenship for nation-state building purposes (on
Lithuania: Vesna Popovski. National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania,
1988-93.).
48
I also lived five months in right-bank Moldova. Social-cultural anthropologists rely
on such lengthy periods of fieldwork, participating in the lives of informants and engaging
local institutions, in order to uncover the social practices, contradictions and voids that
constitute culture.
382
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
represents only a small portion of the wider study. Most of my fieldwork in
Transnistria took place in Rybnitsa/Rbnia, the TMRs most industrialized
city, with regular visits to villages in the Rybnitsa raion (district). Many
local people refer to Rybnitsa (population 32,000) as a ruskii gorod or oraul
rus (Russian city). Almost one-third of the population, though, is ethnic
Moldovan. The majority of villages in the raion are ethnic Moldovan while
others are Ukrainian.49 This makes Rybnitsa and the raion representative
of other industrialized, ethnically mixed regions, such as Tiraspol and
Bendery. I chose Rybnitsa (approximately 150 kilometers from Tiraspol), a
less known city, to test how TMR stateness is felt and citizenship belonging
is created away from the TMRs charismatic capital, Tiraspol.50
URBAN ENCOUNTERS OF THE STATE FROM THE SPECTACULAR TO MUNDANE
Happy birthday, my republic (S dnm rozhdeniia, moia respublika)
reads a fire red, Soviet-like banner strung across the roadway into Rybnitsa.
It is 2 September 2005. Towns all over Transnistria celebrate fifteen years
of TMR statehood. An overcast, cool morning in Rybnitsa, people turned
out in throngs to watch the independence-day parade in Victory Square. I
myself arrived one hour early only to be relegated to a mediocre viewing
position. Eager crowds waited patiently, listening to ballads of Our Transnistria blaring over loudspeakers. The parade started promptly at ten with
a lengthy military demonstration. Afterwards the mayor, standing on a raised
plinth with state dignitaries, made a speech boasting of Rybnitsas economic
success and sacrifice to the TMR. Youth dances followed. Then suddenly
the celebratory mood changed with the sound of machine guns and bomb
blasts. The noise was part of a well-choreographed interpretative dance
depicting Transnistrias 1992 war with Moldova. A moment of silence was
commemorated while a solemn procession of thirty-some people carried
large framed photos of loved ones lost in the conflict. I glimpsed one spectator
49
383
Achille Mbembe. Provisional Notes on the Postcolony // Africa. 1992. Vol. 62. Pp. 337.
384
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
snistrian cheese), and in the Rybnitsa Pump Plant (Rybnitskii nasosnyi
zavod) it was a patriotic Transnistrian war memorial.52 Such images implant the Transnistrian state in workers lives and re-generate a state-citizen link, which happens to be strongest among the predominantly Russian
and Ukrainian, well-paid aristocracy of labor.53
METAL, MYSTIQUE AND STATEHOOD
The MMZ Steel Plant (or Metallurg, as locals call it), located on the
tallest point in Rybnitsa, is the most famous factory in Transnistria. Its
employees receive the highest salaries in the region.54 The successful, stateof-the-art plant exports steel products to North America and other Western
destinations.55 It is the TMRs kommercheskaya taina (commercial secret
or mystery). Its high profits are represented by media and the rybnichany I
know as moral, communal and sacrificial, as the plant dutifully pays
taxes and monies to the TMR state budget (21 million dollars in 2005),
proudly ensuring the states timely payment of pensions to pensioners [and] other social protections, according to the MMZ economic director.56 The plant is also known for providing social assistance to veterans
of the Second World War and to families of deceased [1992 war] defenders
of Transnistria. The whole of Rybnitsa is in some way linked to the plant,
whether via kin networks, business clientele, or commercial job contracts.57
52
This paper does not go into detail about the role of TMR war memories. On how the
state uses a factorys built environment to mould national behaviour, read Catherine
Alexander. The Factory: Fabricating the State // Journal of Material Culture. 2000. Vol.
5. No. 2. Pp. 177-195.
53
I use this term to describe MMZ steelworkers, given that work at the Metallurg is
considered the most prestigious and well paid in the area: Rabota na Moldavskom
Metallurgicheskom zavode v Rybnitse prochno schitaetsya camoi prestizhnoi (Kommercheskaya taina // Dobryi Den. 2005. 20 January. P. 7).
54
MMZ employs over two thousand workers (exact figure unknown), nine hundred of
whom work in the main steel-melting shop, while the rest work in the steel forge shop.
55
Andrei Brezianu. Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Moldova. Lanham, MD,
2000. Pp. 165-66. MMZ is supposedly the worlds leading producer of black steel
(chernyi prokat).
56
See interview with MMZs economic director in Kak Rybnitsa porabotala s biudzhetom rasschitalis // Dobryi Den. 2005. No. 7. 9 February. P. 1.
57
For example, my informant, Maxim, worked for years as a foreman for a thriving
private construction firm in Rybnitsa. Most of his jobs involved the Metallurg, like
remodeling the factorys sanatorium sauna or building the directors weekend home.
His firm was forced out of business, however, when border-customs tightened and the
MMZ experienced economic hardship in March 2006. Other Rybnitsa factories are also
385
386
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
the MMZ is able to gain a world hearing, advocating through its production and sales that quality goods come from a quality country, deserving
international recognition.
MMZ employees are key to manufacturing both goods and state legitimacy. These heroes of labour turned heroes of the state blockaded bridges
and railways in Rybnitsa in 1992,63 defending nasha rodina (our homeland) from what was perceived as Moldovan nationalist aggression. Such
russophones had everything to lose in an indigenous-run Moldova, and
everything to gain in a russophonic self-styled state. For them, an independent state symbolized the preservation of Russian language rights and continuity with a Soviet-style way of life. It is not surprising that in my encounters with industrial workers of Russian and Ukrainian origin, I find
they and their kin most frequently refer to nashe gosudarstvo (our state)
and nash narod (our [Transnistrian] people).64
However, this seemingly durable, loyal relationship between the state
and aristocracy of labor is in fact fickle and fragile. For there is an upshot to
MMZ employees imagining their labor as statecraft duty, and their factory as upholding a paternalist state. Firstly, I believe there is great pressure on the factory and regime (i.e., Smirnov) to fulfill an ideology of paternalism, on which bottom-up state legitimacy rests. Secondly, employees
fulfilling their obligation to labor for the state expect something tangible in
return from the state. A touchable state is expected to redistribute MMZ
taxes as welfare to wider society, as well as to maintain real authority over
its borders and customs control and influence over neighboring states pogranichniki (frontier guards), ensuring the swift export and sale of steel.
When the state fails to do this (note that the regime is not blamed), the
state-factory-person relationship is breached. I believe this is what happened from March through June 2006, when the MMZ laid-off workers
and decreased salaries amid serious production stoppages and halted sales
(due to not being registered with right-bank Moldovan customs authorities
63
Tvoi geroi, Pridnestrove! Nam bylo chto zashchishchat // Novosti. 2005. 3 September. P. 4. For the blockade, see Nicolae Proca. Promotorul diplomaiei populare // Cuvntul. 2005. No. 28. 15 July. P. 3.
64
I found that ethnic Ukrainians in the TMR are highly russified and normally side with a
pro-Russian, ruling Slav elite (see Charles King. The Moldovans. Stanford, CA, 1999).
To illustrate, during the contested Ukrainian Presidential run-off between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko in December 2004, the Ukrainian cultural centre in Rybnitsa was plastered with posters in support of the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych.
Most TMR media denigrated Yuschchenko and the Orange Revolution.
387
388
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Sasha, whose family roots are on the right-bank, swears: Im not interested
at all [de loc] in Moldova.
Sasha and Sergeis conviction that their quality of life is better plays an
important role in how they constitute a sense of difference in statehood and
citizenship between two congruent lands.69 For them, the Transnistrian
state is a real, tangible entity embodied in visible roads and welfare checks,
as well as a powerful, regulating authority to which they attribute a
better quality of life. Recalling Hansen and Stepputat, a state has little
chance for survival without perceived authority and tangibility.70 The Republic of Moldova is imagined as everything Transnistria is not: unorganized, underdeveloped and lacking stateness. Rybnitsa folk, in the ordinary practice of driving on and talking about good Transnistrian roads
(or bad Moldovan roads), are in a way constituting a sense of citizenship a social bond with the TMR and simultaneously reinforcing the
material reality of the Transnistrian state. However, not all urban folk
feel the same.
Even within families there exist differences of opinion about Transnistria. Sashas mother, Valeria, describes Transnistrian statehood with a mix
of cynicism and excitement. On some days the state is superficial, while
other days almost personal.71 Around the time of Transnistrias fifteenth
anniversary, referring to all of the festive decorations and road repairs, Valeria
remarked coldly, this is only at the surface (numai de suprafa). She
went on to describe the poor conditions of the Russian public kindergarten
where she works as a cook. Not only does she get paid irregularly (a salary
of forty dollars per month), but also, as of late, she has had to provide her
own washing soap and kitchen gear. According to Valeria, the problem is
was not the school, but statul (the state).72 I toured Valerias school and had
69
Whether or not Transnistrian living standards are really better than Moldovas is not
my concern. I am interested in how peoples ideas create a worldview that is reality to
them.
70
Cf. Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Eds.). States of Imagination: Ethnographic
Explorations of the Postcolonial State. P. 8.
71
Herzfeld may explain this contradiction in opinion with the notion of cultural intimacy. However, I am not convinced that this notion applies to a newly independent state
like the TMR, which does not have the same long history of state and nation building as
countries like Greece and the United States, from where Herzfeld develops his notion.
See Michael Herzfeld. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. New York,
London, 1997.
72
Valeria often shifted between Moldovan and Russian words for state. This mix of
languages was normal in our conversations.
389
The election of deputies to the TMR Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyi Sovet Pridnestrovskoi
Moldavskoi Respubliki). In the run-up to the elections, TMR radio stations, both private
and state-run, regularly broadcasted advertisements encouraging people to vote to build
your state.
74
See Sian Lazar. Education for Credit. Development as Citizenship Project in Bolivia //
Critique of Anthropology. 2004. Vol. 24. No. 3. Pp. 301-319, who describes a similar
situation in Bolivia.
75
During my period of fieldwork I experienced two TMR elections. Interestingly, I
noticed a trend whereby ordinary people (mostly urban but sometimes also rural folk)
become exceptionally excited about the TMR, absorbing its propaganda and pre-election
fanfare. The more important the election (e.g., parliamentary over municipal), the more
public advertisement and more excited people were. Speaking to an acquaintance about
the eminent TMR Presidential elections on 10 December 2006, he spoke knowledgably
about the Presidential candidates and the importance of the elections for nasha strana /
ara noastr (our country, meaning TMR), suggesting that the elections are a way of
enacting and legitimating TMR stateness. However, just this past summer, when Transnistria was experiencing economic difficulties, this same person, apparently a patriot
now, considered abandoning the TMR and moving to right-bank Moldova for more
stable work conditions.
390
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
and state.76 Since 1989 a Romanian-language school for Moldovans has
operated in Rybnitsa. The 480-student lyceum operates in the Latin script
(considered contentious in the TMR), and is subordinate to Moldovas Ministry of Education (not Transnistrias). Refusing to submit to Tiraspols authority, in August 2004 the lyceum was briefly shut down by force, and
teachers and parents arrested by TMR militia. In the face of opposition, the
director tells me she sustains the school out of simmnt (a feeling) of
belonging to the Romanian people and culture. Parents tell me they send
their children to the school to be oriented toward a better future, as perceived to be in Chiinu, Romania or westwards. Of all the people I met in
Rybnitsa, the Moldovans of the Eurika Lyceum identify least with being
Transnistrian and are the most critical of TMR authority.
RURAL ENCOUNTERS OF THE STATE
It was a sunny, brisk day in Krasnoe and Slobodka,77 two adjoining
ethnic Moldovan villages alongside the left bank of the Nistru River. It was
Orthodox Christmas. I stayed the long weekend with acquaintances. Christmas day was spent in traditional Moldovan fashion going from door to
door of the homes of kin and friends singing colinde (carols) and enjoying
a customary mas (meal). That day I visited five homes, traveling by horsedrawn cart from one end of Krasnoe to the other end of Slobodka. The
home visits were a good opportunity to get to know the lives of villagers.
Sometimes over a dozen people would be gathered around a table. Normal
topics of conversation among steni (villagers) ranged from shopping at
markets to planting walnut trees. I was told village-folk do not talk politics,
unless in the safety of their homes or in the company of trusted compatriots. So I made a point in not instigating sensitive topics. To my surprise,
though, my informants spoke with gust about political matters, as if no one
had ever before listened to them.
In every home, people brought up recurring themes related to work and
state. Lena tells me life is tough in the village. Most able-bodied men and
women in Krasnoe and Slobodka work on the state-run kolkhoz (collective
farm). Villagers labor from sunrise to sunset in the summer. In the winter
there is no work and little income. [Life] is about survival, Igor exclaims,
with three people next to him nodding in agreement. Lena angrily recounts
76
For more on schools as privileged sites for nation-building, see Veronique Bn.
Introduction: Education and Citizenship in a Comparative Perspective.
77
Russian pseudonyms are chosen for Moldovan villages as many TMR villages have
such names.
391
Villagers angrily tell me the wealthy Smirnov family is buying up village farmland. I
have no way of substantiating this.
79
Mainly Moscow and St. Petersburg.
80
Many Moldovan youth from Transnistria choose Chiinu over Tiraspol for university
because they do not know fluent Russian. However, there are Russian-speaking
Moldovans who still choose Chiinu, because they believe the Moldovan capital offers
them more opportunities.
392
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
the Ukrainian border, sits the Moldovan village of Komarova. There is no
sign of the Transnistrian state anywhere no kolkhoz, no mayoralty, no
school, no post office, no cultural house. It is a place where villagers and
livestock daily traverse unmarked state boundaries. Ideas of state borders
and republican fidelity are intrusive and unwanted. Pointing to Komarovas little two-track road, I asked Dima, my informants father, if state agents
ever visit his remote village, or plan to invest in it. His response was: Nobodys been here to visit us since Hitler. He paused, adding, and I dont
want to see them (Nici nu vreau s-i vd). Its peaceful here without
them. Dima had unpleasant encounters with TMR state officials. He recently abandoned the neighboring-village kolkhoz after not being paid for
three years. Dima is an example of TMR languages of stateness failing to
penetrate and win-over those at its margins.
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND BELONGING TO THE STATE
It is clear from my conversations with villagers and urbanites that the
Transnistrian state has become implicated in their everyday lives. My interlocutors frequently talk about gosudarstvo and statul (the state) in public
and private, and freely offer opinions of it.81 Their range of sentiments
toward statul bears witness to different state imaginings and intensities of
belonging: there are diehard patriots, enthusiasts, partial cynics, apathetics,
outright nonbelievers and even deserters. The works of Akhil Gupta and
Aihwa Ong remind us that how people reckon the state and citizenship,
respectively, depends on their social-economic position within the nationstate. As Gupta explains: Constructions of the state clearly vary according
to the manner in which different actors are positioned.82
In Soviet Moldova, society was generally stratified according to ethnicity, profession and residency with Russians at the geographical, political
81
I found ordinary people and mass media (e.g., radio broadcasts, newspapers) in the
TMR refer constantly to the state (gosudarstvo / statul), frequently to our people
(nash narod / poporul nostru) and the homeland (rodina / patria) (substantiating in
part in Vladimir Solonari. Creating a People: A Case Study in Post-Soviet HistoryWriting // Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 2003. Vol. 4. No. 2.
Pp. 411-448, which discusses national identity being linked to territory), and occasionally
to the republic (respublika / republica), but seldom to the government (pravitelstvo /
guvernul). Such discourse fixes the state (versus government) at the imagined centre of
society. My doctoral research discusses the construction and transformation of
homeland in Transnistria and right-bank Moldova.
82
Akhil Gupta. Blurred Boundaries: the Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics
and the Imagined State. P. 392.
393
394
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
proportion of lower status Moldovan women who have married hypergamously with mid-status Ukrainian men is sizeable, but marriages with highstatus Russian men are rare. Given that ethnicity is generally passed on to
offspring via the father86 and that the male is often either of lower, or only
slightly higher status than the female inter-marriage does not seem to
allow for considerable upward mobility among offspring. As such, intermarriage in the TMR does not permit future generations of ethnic Moldovans and Slavs easily to transcend well-established ethnic boundaries and
hierarchies.87
Reviewing patterns of social stratification in Transnistria, it may be no
coincidence that the most zealous Transnistrian patriots and enthusiasts are Slavs, and a small number of privileged, russified Moldovans, like
my informant Sasha, who are incorporated into the state industrial-bureaucratic apparatus. Partial cynics tend to be lowly paid Moldovans and Slavs,
like the staff at Valerias kindergarten; while apathetics and outright nonbelievers are usually marginalized, rural Moldovans, as in Komarova, or
ethnic nonconformists, like at Eurika Lyceum. Deserters tend to be privileged Slav specialists seeking greener pastures.
The degree to which a person identifies with Transnistria, it seems is
contingent upon his or her ethnicity, line of work, and urban or rural locale.88
86
During my fieldwork, I found that peoples self-appropriation of ethnicity usually
matched their parents civic documentation of their ethnicity. However, there can be
exceptions to this practice. For example, see David Laitin. Identity in Formation: the
Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. P. 109.
87
These conclusions are based on the analysis of eighty-two birth certifications from a
range of Rybnitsa inhabitants, many of whom I knew. They are also based on local folk
ideologies of who makes a desirable bride and groom. According to an ethnic Moldovan
informant: A Russian wife is the best, then a Ukrainian woman, then Moldovan.
He adds: Romanian women are less beautiful and less desirable than Moldovan women.
I heard female informants echo the same ethnic ranking of desirable spouses (in order
from best to least): Russian, Ukrainian, Moldovan. I use this folk understanding to rank
whether an inter-ethnic marriage union is hypogamous or hypergamous, the former
denoting the union of a female with a male of lower status, and the latter denoting the
union of a female with a male of higher status.
88
This statement should not be interpreted to mean that ethnicity is of primary importance to people in the TMR. I do not believe local people categorize and rank themselves only according to ethnicity, but also according to cultural styles (see James
Ferguson. Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings o Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt. Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1999), which encompass overlapping, multiple identifications (e.g., ethnic, labor, rural or urban). Furthermore, peoples ethnicity is
often more of a semi-conscious, rather than conscious reality to them, even though their
ethnicity plays a role in ordering their social lives (e.g., where they live and work).
395
I do think peoples loyalty to the Transnistrian state is won partly through social
entitlements, as happened under state socialism region-wide (on socialist-era paternalistic
redistribution see Katherine Verdery. What Was Socialism? What Comes Next? Princeton,
1996. Pp. 24-26).
90
Additionally, I would argue that TMR national history-writing, as discussed by Vladimir
Solonari, has not touched rural Moldovan-language schools and village dwellers in the
same way it has Russian-speaking schools and city residents. Vladimir Solonari. Creating
a People: A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing.
91
Writing on Lithuania, Popovski echoes this in relation to citizenship, saying that
citizen entitlements have little legitimacy if all persons are not able to benefit from them
comprehensively (Vesna Popovski. National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in
Lithuania, 1988-93. P. 6).
396
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
and rural folk reveal, different people of differing identifications and statuses experience TMR stateness differently. A high-salaried, urban Russian
steelworker and an unpaid Moldovan kolkhoz farmer encounter the states
governance and authority in unequal ways. Their dissimilar experiences, I
believe, account for their different imaginings of the state as provider or
lawless. Their different state imaginings also explain their varied degrees
of loyalty and attachment to the state. I believe these findings have two
important implications: one, for the study of citizenship; and two, for understanding Transnistrian identity.
First, the findings suggest social actors perceptions of the state matter
in the construction of their citizenship. Or put differently, citizenship is
fundamentally connected to a persons imagination of the state. Thus, citizenship can be fruitfully studied by making empirical stateness the starting
point.92 It is for this reason, I would argue, we need to bring the state, in
all of its lived complexity, back into citizenship studies.93
As for Transnistrian identity, different reckonings of the state and citizenship have a bearing on the TMRs aim of making a unitary nationalpolitical community. There are scholars and inter-governmental organizations that believe a Transnistrian demos exists.94 They are right for a segment of the population, mainly the aristocracy of labor like Natalia Pavlovna, the secretary from the factory in Rybnitsa but not for all people.95
To speak of a homogenous Transnistrian identity ignores hierarchical
schemes of cultural difference inherent in society. It discounts internal labor, ethnic, and rural and urban stratifications that impinge on nationalpolitical belonging. It overlooks the way in which state ideologies (or master
state narratives, as Borneman 1997 prefers) only loosely hold together a
diverse populace and struggle to make coherent peoples differential experiences of citizen belonging. In light of increasing international pressure,
growing emigration and migration, and a changing, hard-pressed economy
92
Cf. Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Eds.). States of Imagination. Pp. 7-8.
What I am arguing for here is more bottom-up, empirical based studies examining
how ordinary people view the state, which is different from many other citizenship
studies dealing with the state in the post-Soviet context (e.g. Vesna Popovski. National
Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988-93; Elizabeth Teague. Citizenship,
Borders, and National Identity).
94
For example, OSCE 1994 and Stefan Troebst. We are Transnistrians!: Post-Soviet
Identity Management in the Dniester Valley.
95
However, we have to remember that identities and loyalties are fluid and always
changing, and even the most hardened of hearts toward the state can be changed under
the right conditions.
93
397
SUMMARY
, -, ,
,
. ,
96
Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer. The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution. Oxford and New York, 1985. Pp. 4-5. Some scholars may point to the 17
September 2006 TMR referendum results to argue for a growing homogeneity amongst
peoples in Transnistria. (97.1 percent of voters backed continued independence from
right-bank Moldova and free association with Russia, meaning protectorate status or
possible unification. 78.6 percent of inhabitants allegedly turned out to vote.) While the
results demonstrate a common mistrust for the Republic of Moldovan authorities and a
strong sense of USSR/big-state nostalgia, many right-bank Moldovans hold these same
opinions. Therefore, I do not think the referendum results necessarily substantiate the
existence of a separate Transnistrian people, but rather illustrate peoples increasing
anxiety over their ambiguous identities (e.g., Russian? Transnistrian?), and anxiety over
their future lives in an unrecognized state. Peoples feelings of insecurity surfaced most
visibly in 2006 during growing economic and political pressure from neighboring Ukraine,
Moldova and the European Union. Only starshii brat (big brother) Russia is considered
strong enough to counter Euro-American pressure on the TMR, which probably explains
why Russia ended up on the TMR referendum, and why voters supported an association
with Russia. For clarification, I do not preclude the possibility of a Transnistrian national
group developing; however, it requires that a TMR master state-national narrative better
incorporate those at its margins who currently do not identify with TMR nationness. As
Alexander Motyl and Gupta and Ferguson point out, a successful identity project must
resonate with the lifeworld of its subjects arguably both urban and rural. See Alexander
Motyl. Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity Formation // Ronald Grigor
Suny and Michael Kennedy (Eds.). Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation. Ann
Arbor, 2001; Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (Eds.). Culture, Power, Place: Explorations
in Critical Anthropology. Durham, NC, 1997. For a discussion on the problematics of
right-bank Moldovan national identity, see Jennifer Cash. Memories of States Past:
Identity Salience and the Challenges of Citizenship // Monica Heintz (Ed.). The Republic
of Moldova: Weak State, Uncertain Citizenship. Bucharest, forthcoming.
398
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ( )
.
, , / / . .
399
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
R-FORUM
IMPERIAL CITIES
Felix Driver and David Gilbert
(Eds.), Imperial Cities: Landscape,
Display and Identity (Manchester
and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003). 272 pp. (=Studies
in Imperialism). Index. ISBN: 0719-0 6497-X (paperback edition);
Julie A. Buckler, Mapping St.
Petersburg: Imperial Text and Cityshape (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). 320
pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 0691-11349-1.
C . ,
-
, .
. , , ,1
, I ,
.
, , , , , . -
1
., : E. Badian. Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic. Ithaca, 1968;
H. R. Schmidt. Reichsstdte, Reich und Reformation. Stuttgart, 1986.
401
/Reviews
,
: , , , ,
,
.2
, , ,
, / , , , .
, ,
,
, -
.3 , (1994) ,
,4
.
, ,
.
,
. ,
2
C.: J. Jacobs. Edge of the Empire: Postcolonialism and the City. London, 1996; .Yeoh.
Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment. Singapore, 2003; G. Prakash. Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World:
Perspectives from Indian Historiography // Comparative Studies in Society and History.
1990. Vol. 32. Pp. 383-408; B. Schwarz. Black Metropolis, White England // M. Nava
and A. OShea (Eds.). Modern Times: Reflections on a Century of English Modernity.
London and New York, 1996. Pp. 176-207.
3
.: H. K. Bhabha. The Location of Culture. London and New York, 1994; R. Young.
Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race. London, 1995.
4
E. Said. Culture and Imperialism. London, 1994.
402
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.
, , , ,
, , ,
.
(Driver and Gilbert, P.
4),
,
, 1997
, .
, , . ( )
.
(Tori Smith), (
, - II) (David Atkinson, Denis
/Reviews
,
,
(Christopher Breward)
I
,
,
- ,
(Jonathan
Schneer)
.
,
,
, .
. (Julie A.
Buckler) - - ,
:
,
.
.
(
,
, ).
1830 1890-.
, - -. ,
, ( ), ,
.5
(Buckler, P. 25),
( 1 2),
, ( 3),
, ,
,
, . : . , 2002. ( ) .
5
404
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
, (
4), ,
( 5), ,
, -, ( 6), ,
( 7).
,
, ,
,
, mapping ( ).
,
, , ,
(re-mapping, crossmapping, counter-mapping) .
(
, , ). , ,
. ,
,
, ( ).
Mapping
,
,
, -, ,
, -, (, ) .
,
, ,
, ,
,
( ),
, -, .
405
/Reviews
Imperial
Cities , , :
,
? (Driver and
Gilbert, P. 6).
.
, .
,
-,
.
, ( , )
(,
, ),
, .
.
, -
.
,
, .
.
,
, .6 , ,
, ,
,
(Buckler, Pp. 4-5). , (P. 1), -
6
.: . . , . . , . . .
XX // 1- ..
XX . , 1975. C. 129-135.
.: . . . // . - , 1984.
406
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
, , ,
, , . ,
,
- ( , ).7
,
,
,
, , ,
, ,
, , (P. 6),
,
.
. (. )
:
,
.
,
, , , .
,
,
. ,
(1932 .),
, : !. :
, .. -
C. . . 4. ? / .
. . , . . -, 2005.
(. 24-39).
407
/Reviews
: , (Driver and Gilbert, P.
3), , ,
, .
,
- I ,
.
,
,
, ,
(Buckler, P. 95).
,
I -
. , ,
,8 , , , ,
, ,
.
, , , ,
1922
(Driver and Gilbert, P. 143).
,
,
,
,
,
, ,
I
. , ,
, , -
8
,
(.: Timothy Mitchell. Orientalism and the Exhibitionary
Order // Nicholas Dirks (Ed.). Colonialism and Culture. Ann Arbor, 1992. Pp. 289-300).
408
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
,
- .
, ,
.
, , , .
,
, - , .
,
, ,
(Bill Schwarz,
Afterword. Postcolonial Times:
The Visible and the Invisible), ,
(P. 271). -
, ,
: .
, ,
, I , , , .
,
,
? , ,
,
, , ?
,
, ,
. . , ,
, ,
:
409
/Reviews
, (. . ). , ,
, ,
,
, . ,
,
,
.
. ,
, ,
, , .
,
.
, ,
.
410
Elena Hellberg-Hirn, Imperial
Imprints: Post-Soviet St.-Petersburg
(Helsinki: SKS / Finnish Literature
Society, 2003). 446 pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 951-746-491-6
(hardback edition).
, , , .
.
.
,
.
,
.
,
, . ,
.
cultural
studies.
/Reviews
, (. . ). , ,
, ,
,
, . ,
,
,
.
. ,
, ,
, , .
,
.
, ,
.
410
Elena Hellberg-Hirn, Imperial
Imprints: Post-Soviet St.-Petersburg
(Helsinki: SKS / Finnish Literature
Society, 2003). 446 pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 951-746-491-6
(hardback edition).
, , , .
.
.
,
.
,
.
,
, . ,
.
cultural
studies.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , ,
, ,
-, , , . .
, ,
cultural studies. ,
, ,
. cultural studies,
, .
,
-, (Renvall
Institute) , .
, . ,
(, )
.
, -,
-, .
, ,
.
, ,
,
: ,
,
.
,
.
,
, , ,
.
2003
,
,
- .
,
,
,
, . ,
, ,
.
, 411
/Reviews
,
. ,
,
,
. , ,
. ,
, ...
,
-,
,
, ,
. : ,
, .
1998 .
I :
,
, , ,
27 .
412
, ,
,
. .
. ,
, , ,
.
. ,
, ,
.
, ,
: ,
,
, . ,
-
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
,
,
.
, , .
,
. ,
,
, . .
, ,
,
.
, , ,
(stories),
-
.
stories,
,
.
,
: , , , ,
, -,
.
, ,
.
,
.
. ,
. ,
, (
413
/Reviews
, , , , ). ,
, ,
.
,
.
,
.
,
(
, ,
, ),
.
, ( ).
, ,
, .
414
.
,
,
,
.
, ,
,
,
, . ,
, - ,
,
.
,
, ,
,
,
,
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. (, ) .
. ,
?
stranger, , , , ,
.
. , .
, . , ,
...
.
, . .
.
-
,
, ,
.
.
, , urban studies,
-
.
,
,
.
Louise McREYNOLDS
Richard Stites, Serfdom, Society,
and the Arts in Imperial Russia: The
Pleasure and the Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
xii+586 pp. ISBN: 0-300-10889-3
(hardback edition).
Already so well known for his
work in Soviet popular culture, Richard Stites brings his massive erudition, sensitive ear for the good story, and the light touch of his narrative skills to this study of Russian
culture in the first half of the nineteenth century. Framing his study
between the westernization that
415
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. (, ) .
. ,
?
stranger, , , , ,
.
. , .
, . , ,
...
.
, . .
.
-
,
, ,
.
.
, , urban studies,
-
.
,
,
.
Louise McREYNOLDS
Richard Stites, Serfdom, Society,
and the Arts in Imperial Russia: The
Pleasure and the Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
xii+586 pp. ISBN: 0-300-10889-3
(hardback edition).
Already so well known for his
work in Soviet popular culture, Richard Stites brings his massive erudition, sensitive ear for the good story, and the light touch of his narrative skills to this study of Russian
culture in the first half of the nineteenth century. Framing his study
between the westernization that
415
/Reviews
came with the eighteenth century
and the emancipation of the serfs in
1861, Stites uses the pivotal importance of these events to explore their
combined influences on the formative years of the Russian arts that
would themselves be exported into
in the second half of the century. He
might have subtitled his book the
pleasure and the pain, given his attention to the distresses, physical as
well as mental and emotional, that
those who aspired to produce culture suffered at the hands the repressive government and abusive serf
owners. Yet these years included the
Golden Age of Russian culture,
and the story Stites tells is not a rehash of accomplishments despite
oppression. The originality of
Stitess thesis is that he considers
westernization, the autocracy, and
serfdom as a complex of forces that
shaped culture, without a qualification of despite that has been invoked against all of these influences
at one time or another. Because of
this, his work will be of interest to
cultural historians in general. Russianists, though, will take special delight in the plethora of vivid vignettes.
Stites positions his stories around
the argument that the history of Russian culture in first half of the century, with the exception of the canonical authors from the golden age,
has been dismissed as uninspiring or
static primarily because of how it
416
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Spheres; Empire of Performance;
Pictures at an Exhibition; and Finale and Overture. The first and last
are significantly shorter than those
in between, as appropriate for an
introduction and conclusion. Although the most significant geographical focus is on life in the two
capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg,
Stites pays special attention to the
provinces, which like the era itself
remain culturally neglected. This is
also noteworthy because of the importance of amateurs, given that society was not yet wealthy enough to
support an extensive commercial
performative culture, especially on
the provincial estates. His source
base is encyclopedic if not exhaustive; he has worked in numerous archives and mastered the secondary
literature, and all within a framework that keeps Russian accomplishments within the comparative
context of analogous developments
in western countries.
What made Russia especially
unique, however, was the persistence
of serfdom. The Russian serf here
receives the opportunity to play center stage. As fictional characters
written for the stage, serfs were unidimensional foils whose function
was to show off their masters, who,
for sometimes better and at other
times worse, remained the subject of
the play. Serfs themselves come to
life here, on the stages built for them
by owner-magnates such as the
/Reviews
the performing arts. If critics might
cavil at my use of the adjective articulate, one advantage of Stitess
approach is to focus on the popular
rather than what became the classical. Russian victories against Napoleon provided considerable inspiration to look back to the past for more
subjects appropriate for the stage.
Nestor Kukolniks The Hand of the
Almighty Has Saved the Fatherland
(1834) did for drama what Mikhail
Glinkas Ivan Susanin (A Life for
the Tsar) (1836) did for opera. On
canvas in the 1830s, in another departure from the academic styles that
had predated them, Grigory Chernetsov and Vasily Raev, a serf, painted panoramas featuring thousands of
soldiers, Russia in all its military
glory.
The most interesting parts of this
book, though, are about power, but
rather about pleasure. More modest
lithographs of street scenes depict
the interactions of various social
groups. As Stites reminds us, serfs
could in fact enroll in the universities if they had the qualifications;
and although so few of them did, the
point here is that in the arts, one can
witness Russians crossing social
lines with greater alacrity than is
generally found in the histories. Geographical mobility between the two
capitals and the provinces, in both
directions, was also considerable.
The Volga River provided a circuit
for actors, not just trading barges.
418
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
not just builders. The two capitals
dominated the provinces in terms of
public art, that is, museums, although the Hermitage was not
opened to common viewers until
1840. The provincial cities also rarely found themselves on canvases, in
sharp distinction from Moscow and
especially the extremely photogenic
St. Petersburg. But the residents, the
local nobility and merchants, sat eagerly for portrait painters, leaving
behind a visual history. Stites argues
that G. A. Krylovs Portrait of a
Rzhevsk Merchant (1830s) captured this groups increasingly ambivalent self-image (P. 360), mercantile in beard and haircut, but
with his elbow resting beside two
expensively bound books. The
search for a cultural identity in the
years leading up to the debacle in
the Crimea, when Russians finally
felt themselves equal to other Europeans because of their defeat of Napoleon, was profound.
Like many of Stitess previous
monographs, Serfdom, Society, and
the Arts in Imperial Russia promises to become a standard reference.
Its stature as a reference book also
has the unhappy attribute of being
the volumes biggest problem. The
degree of detail is wonderful for the
specialist, and even the highly interested casual reader, but it increases
the number of pages and the price,
restricting the book from classroom
use. Nonetheless, the volume offers
Lutz Hfner, Gesellschaft als
lokale Veranstaltung. Die Wolgastdte Kazan und Saratov (1870
1914) (Kln: Bhlau Verlag, 2004).
594 S. (=Beitrge zur Geschichte
Osteuropas; Bd. 35). ISBN: 3-41211403-0;
Guido Hausmann (Hg.), Gesellschaft als lokale Veranstaltung. Selbstverwaltung, Assoziierung und Geselligkeit in den Stdten des ausgehenden Zarenreiches (Gttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).
485 S. (=Brgertum. Beitrge zur
europischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte; Bd. 22). ISBN: 3-52535687-0.
. ,
419
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
not just builders. The two capitals
dominated the provinces in terms of
public art, that is, museums, although the Hermitage was not
opened to common viewers until
1840. The provincial cities also rarely found themselves on canvases, in
sharp distinction from Moscow and
especially the extremely photogenic
St. Petersburg. But the residents, the
local nobility and merchants, sat eagerly for portrait painters, leaving
behind a visual history. Stites argues
that G. A. Krylovs Portrait of a
Rzhevsk Merchant (1830s) captured this groups increasingly ambivalent self-image (P. 360), mercantile in beard and haircut, but
with his elbow resting beside two
expensively bound books. The
search for a cultural identity in the
years leading up to the debacle in
the Crimea, when Russians finally
felt themselves equal to other Europeans because of their defeat of Napoleon, was profound.
Like many of Stitess previous
monographs, Serfdom, Society, and
the Arts in Imperial Russia promises to become a standard reference.
Its stature as a reference book also
has the unhappy attribute of being
the volumes biggest problem. The
degree of detail is wonderful for the
specialist, and even the highly interested casual reader, but it increases
the number of pages and the price,
restricting the book from classroom
use. Nonetheless, the volume offers
Lutz Hfner, Gesellschaft als
lokale Veranstaltung. Die Wolgastdte Kazan und Saratov (1870
1914) (Kln: Bhlau Verlag, 2004).
594 S. (=Beitrge zur Geschichte
Osteuropas; Bd. 35). ISBN: 3-41211403-0;
Guido Hausmann (Hg.), Gesellschaft als lokale Veranstaltung. Selbstverwaltung, Assoziierung und Geselligkeit in den Stdten des ausgehenden Zarenreiches (Gttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).
485 S. (=Brgertum. Beitrge zur
europischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte; Bd. 22). ISBN: 3-52535687-0.
. ,
419
/Reviews
,
,
.
,
. ,
, , ,
.
, , .1
.
(ffentlichkeit),
,
.2
:
1
., , : M. Hildermeier. Brgertum und Stadt in Ruland 17601870: Rechtliche Lage und soziale
Struktur. Kln, 1986; E. Clowes, S. Kassow, and J. West (Eds.). Between Tsar and
People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia.
Princeton, 1991; H. D. Balzer (Ed.). Russias Missing Middle Class: The Professions in
Russian History. London, 1996.
.: S. McCaffrey, M. Melancon (Eds.). Russia
in the European Context, 17891914:A Member of the Family. London, 2005. C.
.
2
,
.: J. Bradley. Subjects into Citizens:
Societies, Civil Society, and Autocracy in Tsarist Russia // American Historical Review.
2002. Vol. 107. Pp. 1094-1123; M. Hildermeier, J. Kocka, C. Conrad (Hrsg.). Europische
Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und West: Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen. Frankfurt/Main, 2000.
. : . Civil Society, Brgertum : // Ab Imperio. 3. 2002. Pp. 161-208.
420
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
,
XVIII .3
,
, , ,
. ,
,
,
, ,
,
,
.
.
, .
,
,
, ,
(Hfner.
S. 7). .
,
. ,
, ,
,
. , , ,
,
, .
,
.
421
/Reviews
.
. ,
.
, , , - ,
,
.
,
300-
1891 .,
.
, , , , 300- ,
.
,
422
. ,
, , .
,
,
.
,
,
,
,
.
, .
,
, , ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , ,
.
,
. ,
.
, , ..
.
,
. ,
, ,
,
. ,
,
,
( )
, -
,
. 1917 .
, . , , ,
(S.
495),
.
,
,
.
,
. , ,
,
,
1,5%
(S. 13). ,
,
.
98,5% , 423
/Reviews
, . ,
. .
1905 .,
, ,
, ,
.
,
. 1914 .,
1917 .,
,
.
,
,
. 424
.
.
,
. ,
,
.
.
,
.
,
, ,
(Hausmann, S. 57).
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. 1997 .
,
. ,
,
.
:
,
.
,
,
.
, . . ()
, 1880- . ,
.
1905 .
. . . , ,
,
,
-
. . .
,
XIXXX .
. . .
.
(Oliver Reisner)
18901897 . ,
-
XIX .
. , ,
,
.
, ,
425
/Reviews
. ,
,
,
. , . .
.
,
,
, (Hubertus Jahn)
-
,
XVIII XIX . . .
- 18601914 .
, , ,
426
,
,
, .
,
(Klaus Gestwa)
,
, .
. XIX
., ,
.
(, ,
),
,
.
,
,
.
,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.
,
.
-.
, ,
,
.
, ,
. ,
. 160- ,
,
, ,
, , ,
.
.
, , .
,
,
. ,
, ,
,
,
.
,
427
/Reviews
, . ,
,
.
, ,
,
.
Charles HALPERIN
. . .
(-
XIV
XV .). : , 2006. 160 . , , , , , . ISBN:
5-9273-1017-6.
The Mongol conquest of and rule
over the Rus principalities and city428
/Reviews
, . ,
,
.
, ,
,
.
Charles HALPERIN
. . .
(-
XIV
XV .). : , 2006. 160 . , , , , , . ISBN:
5-9273-1017-6.
The Mongol conquest of and rule
over the Rus principalities and city428
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
tives, and expressing his preference.
He productively draws upon his numerous previous articles, but in his
Bibliography modestly lists only six
of the more than forty to his credit.
(Not even all these six are readily
accessible in the United States.) In
general he pays the most attention
to recent secondary works in Russian. When appropriate he draws
upon recent scholarship in archeology, numismatics, and geography,
and even the Idigu (Edigei) Turkic
epic.
Seleznev begins by repeating his
observations on the place of the Russian principalities in the system of
Horde administration and on the integration of Rus princes into the
social and political hierarchy of the
Horde. The general principles articulated here infuse the narrative
which follows. One of the strengths
of the monograph is precisely
Seleznevs expertise on the Horde
and sensitivity to its point of view.
In the narrative core of the volume Seleznev pays scrupulous attention to the interaction of the Rus
with their Horde overlords, tracing
the ebb and flow of political relations through chronicles and princely treaties and testaments. He focuses on all the north-eastern Russian
principalities, not just Moscow,
which facilitates his perspective on
events. He emphasizes that there was
no precedent for Tokhtamysh to have
kept the heirs to the thrones of Mos-
/Reviews
fighting Timur in the battle on the
Kunchurga (Kondurcha) river,
which could have been clearer.
Seleznev appreciates the social
and political structure of the Horde,
for example, that Edigei was not a
khan and could never have aspired
to become one, since he was not a
Chingissid. However, Seleznevs
understanding of the place of Rus
princes in the Horde hierarchy, itself an original contribution to the
modus vivendi between Rus and
Tatars, leads him to the somewhat
formalistic observation that Vasilii I,
as a Grand Prince, was hierarchically equal to Edigei, a senior or great
emir (Seleznev does not call Edigei
a bekliaribek, an office or status often attributed to him by historians
although there is no direct source evidence) as if this explains Vasilii Is
disrespectful policy toward Edigeis
puppet khans. Surely power politics
determined policy, although both
sides were very sensitive to questions of status in ceremonial.
In explaining why Timur (Tamerlane) did not attack Moscow in 1395
after taking Elets, Seleznev makes
good use of his analysis of the organization of the Horde to argue that
Elets was part of the Hordes core,
Rus was not formally part of the
Juchid ulus, so attacking Moscow
would not have been part of Timurs
strategy. Seleznev examines the
anomalous position of Chervlennyi
Iar, part of the Horde administrative430
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
gle of Rus for independence and liberation from the Tatar Yoke, this is
the only invocation of the anachronistic and value-laden term Tatar
Yoke in the study. Similarly,
Seleznev refers throughout to the
Horde, eschewing the anachronistic term the Golden Horde by replacing it with the term most often
found in the medieval chronicles.
Of courses many sources are subject to differing interpretations. The
passage in the epic Zadonshchina
that the fleeing Tatars will no longer
collect tribute (vykhod) from the
Rus refers, I think, not to termination of the tribute in principle but to
the imminent death of Mamais Tatars. I have become skeptical that it
is permissible to cite the reconstructed Trinity Chronicle as if it
were a text, i.e. an actual source.
Seleznevs conclusion that the
Rus princes conducted censuses in
the fourteenth, fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries is of wider import. It strikes me as a dubious inference from paragraphs in the
princely wills and treaties which refer to a written allocation of Tatar
tribute. There is no other evidence
that the Muscovite princes had the
administrative expertise to conduct
censuses or that the Rus ever referred to anything other than the
original thirteenth-century Mongol
Empire census. The referenced written source may have been no more
than a tax allocation table. While
431
/Reviews
:
, ,
Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, Aleksandr Nevskij: Heiliger, Frst, Nationalheld; eine Erinnerungsfigur im
russischen kulturellen Gedchtnis
(12632000) (Kln: Bhlau Verlag,
2004). 548, [32] S. Ill. (=Beitraege
zur Geschichte Osteuropas; Bd. 36)
Quellen- und Literaturverz. ISBN:
3-412-06904-3.
.
, ( )
.
,
(S. 14-26)
Les lieux
mmoire.1
,
1
- , ,
.
Erinnerungsort ( ),
. . : , (S. 17).
,
,
Gedchtnisort,
,
, ,
. , - , ,
, , //
//
, , , .
,
-
432
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
.
, , ,
,
:
.
, ,
,
.
,
,
(S. 17).
.
,
732.
, ,
, .
, ,
, ,
.
. :
. :
(S. 13).
, ,
,
.
, , ,
.
,
.
, . , ,
, ,
,
. , , , 433
/Reviews
. . .
, : ,
, , ,
,
(?!).2 ,
.
.
? ,
, . ,
, ;
, . . , . .
. . .
, ,
.
- ,
(S. 35-55),
:
2
. ,
.
,
.
, , ,
XIII XV. . ,
(S. 71-82),
-
.
, , ,
, .
IX ,
434
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
II
(S. 479-485). ,
,
, ,
. :
,
. , .
. :
(XV XVII.) (XVIII.) ( ),
XIX. (1917
1937 .) (1937 .).
, ,
(1939 1945.)
(1945 1985.)
(1985
2000.).
, ,
, .
, ,
, (S. 454469). .
XV XVII.
.
, (S. 88-108), , ,
(.
108). .
,
.
,
.
XVIII
.
435
/Reviews
I (S. 125-142).
, ,
,
.
,
, XIX XX. , .
, , 1937.
(S. 270-282).
, , ,
( . . ),
.
, ,
,
,
(S.
288-373). ,
436
.
, , , ,
.
- (S.
350-354).
,
,
,
-,
,
, , . , -,
, . ,
, .
,
:
,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
,
,
- .
VERSUS .
, .
, , () ,
- ( 1569
).
- (
)
, ,
.
, :
(
),
, .
-
*
Ab Imperio ,
, , . . : Ab Imperio. 2004. 4. . 694-699.
437
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
,
,
- .
VERSUS .
, .
, , () ,
- ( 1569
).
- (
)
, ,
.
, :
(
),
, .
-
*
Ab Imperio ,
, , . . : Ab Imperio. 2004. 4. . 694-699.
437
/Reviews
, 1 ,
,
.
,
,
, 15 .
. ,
, ,
,
, , , ,
-
,
, , . , ,
,
, ,
-
, , ,
.
, .
,
,
1
,
(. .-. :
American Historical Review. 2004. Vol. 109. No. 1. P. 280);
, , ,
(c., , : http://snyder.litvin.org/simau.html, 26 2006 .).
, .. , .: http://
www.yale.edu/history/faculty/materials/snyder-reconstruction.html,
26 2006 .
438
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
,
.
, ,
,
,
, , .
,
. , , ,
, ,
,
.
, (
) (). , ,
, ,
?
,
( ),
,
,
, ,
, ,
.
, -
, .2
:
. . ? // : i. . . 2005. 4
(90). .: http://krytyka.kiev.ua/articles/s5_4_2005.html (
29 2006 .) : . .
? // . .: http://krytyka.kiev.ua/articles/s6_4_2005b.html
( 29 2006 . ); . . , ,
// : : i. . . 2005. 5 (91). .: http:/
/krytyka.kiev.ua/articles/2005.html ( 29 2006 .).
2
439
/Reviews
.-. ,3
,
x
-
.4
,
,
,
(, ,
1943 .). ,
,
, , .
:
( ),
(P. 3)
, ,
, VI
;
,
, ,
; ( ) . , , , (moving) - , .
,
, (genocide
. J.-P. Himka. War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the
Ukrainian Diaspora // Spaces of Identity. 2005. Vol. 9. Pp. 9-24. . : http://www.univie.ac.at/spacesofidentity/_Vol_5_1/_HTML/Himka.html ( 29 2006 .)
4
. Berkhoff, M. Carynnyk. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude
towards Germans and Jews: Jaroslav Stetskos 1941 Zhyttiepys // Harvard Ukrainian
Studies. 1999. Vol. XXIII. No. 3-4. Pp. 149-184.
3
440
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
studies),5
.
,
. ,
:
,
, ( ) , .6
.,7 ,
()
-
.
,
()
( .), ,
.
, ,
, ,
(ethnic cleansing) 8
,
.
genocide studies
.
,
, , ;
19141916 .;
(., : S. Totten, W. Parsons, I. Charny (Eds.). Century of Genocide.
New York, 2004).
6
B. Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London, 1983.
7
. . . , 2004.
8
, :
, , , , , , , ; ,
(N. Naimark. Fires of Hatred:
Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-century Europe. Cambridge, MA, 2002. Pp. 3-14).
5
441
/Reviews
,
( )
, . ,
(
) , , .
, .
, , , ,
, .
,
,
- 1385 .
,
, ,
, 442
,
.
,
,
. ,
,
II (1772 .),
(1774 .)
(1795 .) ,
-, ,
, , ,
, (
,
, ) (Pp. 25-27).
, ,
, .
-
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , ,
,
,
.
, , -
(?!),
,
-
(
)
,
. ,
, , , , (,
, ),
(,
) ,
. ,
?
,
?
, , ,
, .
,
,
.
,
. ,
, , ,
.
(
)
443
/Reviews
.
,
.
,
,
,
. ,
,
,
I - ,
(Pp.
49-51);
,
(Pp. 120-121).
, ,
,
( ) ,
,
, 444
(P.
210).
,
, (
)
, . ,
, ,
, , .
, ,
, , ,
, , , , .
, - . -, -
-
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
:
, , ,
.
,
, ,
,
(P. 124).
,
,
. ,
,
IIIIV ,
VVI : -
, .
,
, (P. 125).
, ,
,
,
(P. 112).
,
- . ,
,
.
1648 ,
445
/Reviews
. :
,
-
?
,
, , :
, ? ,
, , ?
, ( , ),
446
, ,
? ,
, ,
,
. ,
(- ) ,
,
- , !
:
?
,
,
,
, ,
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
.
,
, .9
,
.
,
, ,
, (1569 .).
, ,
988 ,
(P. 106).
-
:
- ,
.
.
,
-
. :
, ,
, , , (Pp. 110-111).
, ,
,
- -
:
, ? , , , , ?
9
447
/Reviews
,
.
VII
, ,
( ), . , ,
,
, ,
.
(
), (
); ,
(.
116). , ,
.
10
- ,
,
() ()
,
, . :
, (P. 117).
,
,
( 17 ). , ,
1920 . (, ,
) 10 ( 19321933 ., , ), ,
,
( ) .
,
, , -
, , .
448
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, , (
),
( ) (P.
143). , ,
,
,
:
,
- ,
.
- ,
,
. ,
1920 1930- , .
,
,
, .
, ,
.
,
- 1939
,
, , .
:
,
, -
, ,
(P. 203). , ,
, ,
, ,
. , 449
/Reviews
(1939 .) ,
.
1941
,
, , (p.
155-156). :
, .
, ,
,
, (P. 175).
,
,
. ,
, 98,5
,
450
, , .
,
,
. ,
, ,
1930- , ,
.
1943 . ,
, , , .
,
.
, 16 ,
8
1943
. 1943 ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
:
, ,
, ,
. ,
,
1942 .
,
,
,
,
.
, ,
.
, ,
. , ,
, ,
. ,
1945 -
,
,
, . 8
1945 208 . , , , -
, , ,
. ,
,
.
,
,
1943 .
-
. , ,
,
,
, , ,
1943 1944
.
451
/Reviews
- ,
, (P. 204).
,
,
,
, .
, (
) .
,
, ( , ) . , ,
, ,
,
452
: ?,
? , ,
. , , ,
. , ,
:
,
;
(
); ,
,
.
, ,
, , , , .
,
(?) (P. 210),
,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
;
,
(. ) (. ).
,
,
,
, ,
, . ,
,
,
,
. , ,
, ,
,
, -
() ,
.
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey
(Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005). 278 pp. Index. ISBN: 0-19-516550-1.
- (.
1923 .) ,
,
.
(1884 1968),
,
, 1
-
1
. . , .:
: , , :
1921-1972 / . . . . Boston, 1973; / . .
. . . , 1998. . 249.
453
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
;
,
(. ) (. ).
,
,
,
, ,
, . ,
,
,
,
. , ,
, ,
,
, -
() ,
.
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities: A Historical Survey
(Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005). 278 pp. Index. ISBN: 0-19-516550-1.
- (.
1923 .) ,
,
.
(1884 1968),
,
, 1
-
1
. . , .:
: , , :
1921-1972 / . . . . Boston, 1973; / . .
. . . , 1998. . 249.
453
/Reviews
, , .
, ,
.
. ,
, ,
(American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies).
() 250 .
,
40 ,
.2
, . ,
I ,3 , ,
.4 ,
, , , . .
, ,
. , , . , , , , , ..,
. ,
.
,
, ,
454
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
,
,
. :
, . ,
() . , ,
,
, , , . . ,
,5
.
.
-,
. -,
, , , . ,
, , . , .
, .
(; ; ; ;
; XVIII .
;
I; I
, I II; (19171991); ). ,
,
,
, .
12 35 ,
, , ,
. . . //
. . . , -, 1999. . 2. .
5
455
/Reviews
.
, , ,
. ,
,
, .
. . ,
,
.6 ,
?
,
, ,
. , -
, ,
, ,
, .. ,
,7 ,
.
1 (), ,
. ,
. ?
,
, . ,
, . . . ,
6
E. Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, 1983; B. Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, 1983.
7
H. Gans. Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Comparison of
Ethnic and Religious Acculturation // Ethnic and Racial Studies.1994. Vol. 17. No. 4.
Pp. 577-592.
456
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
2, ,
,
, . ,
,
.
, , , ,
, , (. 31),
.
, par
excellence. ,
,
, ( , Great
Russians), ,
(P. 21).
, -
,
, .. ,
, ,
.
, (
), , , .
(. 27). ,
,
. ,
-
.
, , , .
,
. . ,
. 457
/Reviews
, -, , ,
(P. 29). : ,
.
,
(, );
,
, ,
.
.
, ,
( , , )
( 2).
, ,
( ,
) (. 33).
, 458
:
,
; ;
;
.
,
. . ,
. ,
, .
( ,
, ). , ,
(P. 50).
: , , , . ,
, ,
.
, , .
, ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
. ,
. , ,
, . , - .
,
I ( 4),
,
.
,
.
, . , ,
. , ,
, . . , I,
: : , ;
. .
,
XVIII . , ,
.
,
XVIII .,
,
II, ,
.
. , I
II , ,
459
/Reviews
,
.
,
XVIII . , (. 89). , ,
, ,
,
; ,
.
I,
II. -.
I,
( ,
.). ,
(. 125).
7
460
I . . ,
,
, .
, (P. 134).
:
(
),
, ,
.. , ,
, ,
. ,
, ,
, :
, .
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
, ,
,
,
(.
155). , ,
, ,
.
, , ,
.
8 I II , , , .
. ,
, ,
.
,
:
. ,
.
, ,
. II,
(. 172),
,
,
, . , , : :
, , .
,
,
. 461
/Reviews
, ( , , ). ,
, ,
.
. ,
II, .
,
, ,
(P. 209). ,
, :
? ,
, () (),
(P. 210) .. ,
. ,
462
,
, ,
XX .
, 1917
1991 .,
. ,
, , ,
,
. / ,
.
, , . ,
(, ,
), ,
-
.
, ;
,
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , ,
, ,
,
(. 223).
(-
,
, ).
, , . ,
, . ,
:
, , . ,
, ,
. ,
. -
,
. .
,
,
. . (
)
,
,
( ) . ,
, ,
, , ..
, ,
. ,
. ,
8
. , ,
.
463
/Reviews
.
,
,
,
.
Natalie BAYER
Susan P. McCaffray, Michael
Melancon (Eds.), Russia in The European Context, 17891914: A
Member of the Family (New York
and Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 256 pp. Index. ISBN: 14039-6855-1.
The private papers of MarieDaniel Bourree, Chevalier de Corberon, secretary to the French minister at St. Petersburg during 1775
1777, charg daffaires in 1777
1780, and author of the diaries Journal Intime,1 contain a document entitled La Russie.2 The undated and
1
unsigned eighteenth-century document represents a contemporary figurative description of eighteenthcentury Russia as a Giant, imposing in the distance by enormity of
its mass, but in proximity rather
shapeless by report of its dimensions. Throughout the eighteenth
century, the Colosse dform was in
the process of a gradual rise to power. But no matter how powerful the
country became through the hewing of the civilizing process, for
the majority of the outside observers
the Giant remained a rude, barbarous, and outlandish creation.
Many spears were broken in attempts to prove either that Russia
was indeed a country of European
rank (whatever this means), or that
in every respect it could not stand
equal to major European players.
The question of how to perceive
Russia is still high on the agenda of
many Western and Russian intellectuals. They have been wrestling with
the attempts to fit Russia into the
universal pattern of progressive history, which has been transforming
from a primitive to an advanced
society since the eighteenth centu-
464
/Reviews
.
,
,
,
.
Natalie BAYER
Susan P. McCaffray, Michael
Melancon (Eds.), Russia in The European Context, 17891914: A
Member of the Family (New York
and Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 256 pp. Index. ISBN: 14039-6855-1.
The private papers of MarieDaniel Bourree, Chevalier de Corberon, secretary to the French minister at St. Petersburg during 1775
1777, charg daffaires in 1777
1780, and author of the diaries Journal Intime,1 contain a document entitled La Russie.2 The undated and
1
unsigned eighteenth-century document represents a contemporary figurative description of eighteenthcentury Russia as a Giant, imposing in the distance by enormity of
its mass, but in proximity rather
shapeless by report of its dimensions. Throughout the eighteenth
century, the Colosse dform was in
the process of a gradual rise to power. But no matter how powerful the
country became through the hewing of the civilizing process, for
the majority of the outside observers
the Giant remained a rude, barbarous, and outlandish creation.
Many spears were broken in attempts to prove either that Russia
was indeed a country of European
rank (whatever this means), or that
in every respect it could not stand
equal to major European players.
The question of how to perceive
Russia is still high on the agenda of
many Western and Russian intellectuals. They have been wrestling with
the attempts to fit Russia into the
universal pattern of progressive history, which has been transforming
from a primitive to an advanced
society since the eighteenth centu-
464
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
ry, the time of Russias Europeanization (Westernization or modernization) from above. At first the
Russian elite, following Catherine
the Great,3 decisively proclaimed
that Russia was indeed European.
Later, when Slavophilism flourished, they were not so sure they
wanted to belong to Europe.
Europeans, for their part, have
been struggling with this problem for
self-serving reasons. The majority of
early travelers accounts insisted that
Russia was not European, while
many eighteenth-century philosophes wholeheartedly embraced the
Europeanizing projects of Peter the
Great and Catherine the Great. The
Napoleonic wars and the era of revolutions returned the image of
backward Russia to the forefront.
It seemed that because socially, economically, and politically Russia
developed along lines different from
those of Western Europe, the country was and still is often viewed as
an outsider trying to enter the European mainstream.4 In this process of
defining the polarity between Russia and Europe, Europe was understood not as a place but a civiliza-
3
Paul Dukes (Ed.). Catherine the Greats Instruction (Nakaz) to the Legislative
Commission, 1767. Newtonville, MA, 1977.
4
The process to which Martin Malia fittingly refers as entering European cultural
escalator (Martin Malia. Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to
the Lenin Mausoleum. Cambridge, MA, 1999. P. 32).
5
Malia. P. 18. Dennis Hay. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. Edinburgh, 1968; Jacques
Le Goff. La vieille Europe et la ntre. Paris, 1994.
6
See, f.i.: Manfred Hildermeier. Rossiiskii dolgii XIX vek: Osobyi put evropeiskoi
modernizatsii? // Ab Imperio. 2002. No. 1. Pp. 85-101.
465
/Reviews
least during 17891914. This position is not a revelation in any sense,
but their thought-provoking approach is a timely return to the theme.
In their introduction, the editors
Susan McCaffray and Michael
Melancon extensively criticize the
Western axiom concerning Russia,
according to which the economic
backwardness, slowness of development, primitiveness of social institutions and overall cultural stiffness
were considered the fundamental
and most stable features of Russian
history. It is true that throughout the
long nineteenth century Russias
economy grew, but not fast enough;
its government policies both promoted industrial development and
blocked it; and some Russians embraced the possibilities of private
property, free markets, and individualism, while others rejected them.
But, according to McCaffray and
Melancon, this does not mean that
nineteenth-century Russia was the
model of perversity (P. 3). Instead,
they claim that if we consider Russia as a member of the European
family, we can achieve a more nuanced understanding of Russias individuality. Shifting attention back
and forth from an analysis that generalizes to an analysis that identifies
particulars can shed light on intellectual trends and assess specific
national features.
7
For the recent debates, see: Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Jrgen Kocka. Kontsept
nemetskogo osobogo puti: Istoriia, potentsial, granitsy primenimosti // Ab Imperio.
466
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
tics of Russia in a European framework requires a more extensive discussion of what European could
mean in the context of the project.
But instead of asking whether the
concepts of Europe or the West
are, in fact, clumsy artifacts or historical facts, the editors simply
broaden the scope of the constructs
to include Russia in it.
Another problematic issue in the
introductory article is McCaffray
and Melancons treatment of the
term Eastern Europe. The editors
mention it, but see its development
and validity only in the context of
the twentieth century. They specifically pinpoint the period after the
Second World War as the point of
geographical and mental demarcation between the good and the
bad Europe (Pp. 1-10). However, following Larry Wolffs line of
reasoning in his Inventing Eastern
Europe,8 it is possible to argue that
the concept of Eastern Europe was
invented in the imagination of Enlightenment intellectuals as a part of
the construction of the modern West.
Without explicitly defining the dif-
2002. No. 1. Pp. 65-84; Boris Ananich, Peter Gatrell. Natsionalnye i vnenatsionalnye
izmereniia ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Rossii, XIX XX vv. // Idem. 2002. No. 4. Pp.
67-91.
8
Larry Wolff. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enlightenment. Stanford, 1994.
9
Boris Gorshkov. Towards a Comprehensive Law: Tsarist Factory Labor Legislation in
European Context, 18301914 // Susan P. McCaffray, Michael Melancon (Eds.). Russia
in The European Context, 17891914. P. 65.
10
Frank Wcislo. Rereading Old Texts: Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia // Ibid. Pp. 71-83.
467
/Reviews
ment,11 and at least a few visionary
entrepreneurs.12
The volumes second part, Envisioning a Society, contains analyses of the formation of a Russian
national identity that did not separate Russia from the West;13 Esther
Kingston-Manns article that unambiguously places the beginning of
Russian social science, and particularly statistics, in a European context;14 a consideration of various associations in provincial Russia;15 a
research into the peculiarities of the
punishment system;16 a case-study
on the insurance law in 1912;17 and
finally Michael Melancons study
into the interconnections between
the government and society in
19101914 through the eyes of the
press.18
11
Susan McCaffray. Capital, Industriousness and Private Banks in the Economic Imagination of a Nineteenth-Century Statesman // Ibid. Pp. 33-48.
12
Boris V. Ananich. Religious and Nationalist Aspects of Entrepreneurialism in Russia // Ibid. Pp. 85-93.
13
Susanna Rabow-Edling. The Role of Europe in Russian Nationalism: Reinterpreting
the Relationship between Russia and the West in Slavophile Thought // Ibid. Pp. 97-112.
14
Esther Kingston-Mann. Statistics, Social Science and Social Justice: The Zemstvo
Statisticians of Pre-Revolutionary Russia // Ibid. Pp. 113-139.
15
Lutz Haefner. The Temple of Idleness? Associations and the Public Sphere in Provincial Russia // Ibid. Pp. 141-160. While the notion of public sphere plays an important
role in the chapter, Haefner does not use of refer to the seminal work on the topic: Jrgen
Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA, 1989.
16
Jonathan Daly. Russian Punishments in the European Mirror // Susan P. McCaffray,
Michael Melancon (Eds.). Russia in The European Context, 17891914. Pp. 161-188.
17
Alice Pate, St. Petersburg Workers and Implementation of the Social Insurance Law
of 1912 // Ibid. Pp. 189-201.
18
Michael Melancon. Russias Outlooks on the Present and Future, 19101914: What
the Press Tells Us // Ibid. Pp. 203-226.
19
Susan McCaffray, Michael Melancon. Introduction: A Member of the Family: Russias Place in Europe, 17891914 // Ibid. Pp. 9.
20
Lee Farrow. The Ties that Bind: The Role of the Russian Clan in Inheritance and
Property Law // Ibid. P. 28.
468
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
who does not follow the course proposed by the editors. Jonathan Daly
emphasizes that Russia lagged
behind some, but not all, Western
European counterparts,21 and refers
to Russias economic and social
backwardness when trying to explain comparative leniency in late
imperial Russia. 22 In light of the
project, this rhetoric simply cannot
be considered as an occasional slip
into the conventional and convenient methodological framework.
Even if the contributors of the programmatic volume cannot help but
rely on the concept of backwardness as a tool, can it be the sign
that the tool itself is more useful
than the editors allow themselves to
admit?
Nevertheless, as the editors of the
volume agree, the debate on Russias
place in Europe is an infinite one (P.
3). There are no definite answers,
correct positions, or incontestable
approaches in the confrontation between the Enlightenment rhetoric of
unity and the modern episteme of
difference. What the participants in
the discussion can hope for, however, is to present a consistent argument. And the editors and the contributors to the Russia in the European Context have attempted to accomplish this with their praise-worthy effort.
Daly. Russian Punishments in the
European Mirror. P. 161.
22
Ibid. Pp. 161, 176.
21
Marina PEUNOVA
. . 19972002 . : , 2004 (=:
). 816 c. . ISBN: 5-86793-300-8.
In the words of the illustrious Sovietologist Alec Nove, Soviet sociologists were, despite the ideological
constraints imposed upon them by the
principles of Marxism-Leninism,
constructive dissidents who went
against the grain and anticipated social change.1 This progressive tradition pre-empted perestroika,2 and
continued through a multitude of
homegrown sociological works that
have complemented Western studies
on post-Soviet transformation.3
1
Alec Nove is cited in: E. Weinberg. Sociology in the Soviet Union and Beyond:
Social Enquiry and Social Change. Burlington, 2004. P. 137.
2
For an overview of Soviet sociology during perestroika and sociologists contribution to the reform process see: D. Shalin.
Sociology for the Glasnost Era: Institutional and Substantive Changes in Recent
Soviet Sociology // Social Forces. 1990.
Vol. 68. Pp. 1-21.
3
For interdisciplinary discussion of postSoviet transformation see: T. I. Zaslavskaia. Sovremennoe rossiiskoe obschestvo:
Sotsialnyi mekhanizm transformatsii.
Moscow, 2004; A. G. Zdravomyslov. Sotsiologiia rossiiskogo krizisa. Moscow,
1999; Yu. A. Levada. Ot mnenii k ponimaniiu: Sotsiologicheskie ocherki, 1993
2000. Moscow, 2000.
469
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
who does not follow the course proposed by the editors. Jonathan Daly
emphasizes that Russia lagged
behind some, but not all, Western
European counterparts,21 and refers
to Russias economic and social
backwardness when trying to explain comparative leniency in late
imperial Russia. 22 In light of the
project, this rhetoric simply cannot
be considered as an occasional slip
into the conventional and convenient methodological framework.
Even if the contributors of the programmatic volume cannot help but
rely on the concept of backwardness as a tool, can it be the sign
that the tool itself is more useful
than the editors allow themselves to
admit?
Nevertheless, as the editors of the
volume agree, the debate on Russias
place in Europe is an infinite one (P.
3). There are no definite answers,
correct positions, or incontestable
approaches in the confrontation between the Enlightenment rhetoric of
unity and the modern episteme of
difference. What the participants in
the discussion can hope for, however, is to present a consistent argument. And the editors and the contributors to the Russia in the European Context have attempted to accomplish this with their praise-worthy effort.
Daly. Russian Punishments in the
European Mirror. P. 161.
22
Ibid. Pp. 161, 176.
21
Marina PEUNOVA
. . 19972002 . : , 2004 (=:
). 816 c. . ISBN: 5-86793-300-8.
In the words of the illustrious Sovietologist Alec Nove, Soviet sociologists were, despite the ideological
constraints imposed upon them by the
principles of Marxism-Leninism,
constructive dissidents who went
against the grain and anticipated social change.1 This progressive tradition pre-empted perestroika,2 and
continued through a multitude of
homegrown sociological works that
have complemented Western studies
on post-Soviet transformation.3
1
Alec Nove is cited in: E. Weinberg. Sociology in the Soviet Union and Beyond:
Social Enquiry and Social Change. Burlington, 2004. P. 137.
2
For an overview of Soviet sociology during perestroika and sociologists contribution to the reform process see: D. Shalin.
Sociology for the Glasnost Era: Institutional and Substantive Changes in Recent
Soviet Sociology // Social Forces. 1990.
Vol. 68. Pp. 1-21.
3
For interdisciplinary discussion of postSoviet transformation see: T. I. Zaslavskaia. Sovremennoe rossiiskoe obschestvo:
Sotsialnyi mekhanizm transformatsii.
Moscow, 2004; A. G. Zdravomyslov. Sotsiologiia rossiiskogo krizisa. Moscow,
1999; Yu. A. Levada. Ot mnenii k ponimaniiu: Sotsiologicheskie ocherki, 1993
2000. Moscow, 2000.
469
/Reviews
Ranging from descriptive analyses based on opinion polls to theoretically grounded works,4 these inquiries provide a rich source of
knowledge on post-Soviet society.
To their polyphony of voices, and in
continuation of the tradition of intellectual dissent, Lev Gudkovs
Negative Identity is a welcome contribution. In this collection of articles written in 19972002, Gudkov,
a former student of Yurii Levada
himself a constructive dissident
during the Soviet era presents a
full-frontal exposure of post-Soviet
malaise. Using results of opinion
polls conducted with collaborators
at the All-Russian Centre for the
Study of Social Opinion as part of
the project entitled The Soviet Ordinary Person, as well as his exhaustive knowledge of Western sociological theory, Gudkov subjects
post-perestroika society to an uncompromising scrutiny.5 Although
these works were written within the
span of five very different and eventful years in Russian contemporary
history, they present a uniform, if
somewhat redundant, set of arguments that cover such interconnected topics as Russian national
identity, the rise of nationalism and
4
For the former, see, f.i.: VTSIOM predstavliaet. Kak my dumali v 2004 godu: Rossiia
na perepute. Moscow, 2005. For the latter: T. I. Zaslavskaia. O nekotorykh metodologicheskikh voprosakh issledovaniia sovremennogo rosskiiskogo obschestva // Kuda idet
Rossiia?.. Krizis institutsionalnykh sistem: Vek, desiatiletie, god. Moscow, 1999.
5
The Center was founded in 1988. It was renamed the Analytical Center of Yurii
Levada in 2004, the year in which this volume was published.
470
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
It is during wars and other extreme
situations that the Russian nation
shows its true identity (Pp. 122-146).
Furthermore, he paints a grim portrait of people who, in their fear,
have relied heavily on the protective
power of the state throughout history, and are unwilling and unable to
resist circumstances or foster change.
Unsatisfied with overused clichs
rooted in Russian Slavophile
thought, and critical of the recurrent
search for the recipes of the Russian
national idea and ideology (P. 131),
Gudkov turns to the Soviet past in
search of explanations. He argues
that it is the years of living under
Soviet rule that have indebted postSoviet society with a collective
memory of deprivation, injustice and
humiliation.6 It is this collective
memory that continues to plague todays Russians and to define their
6
For an original account of the role of history in the formation of Russian national
identity see: B. Iu. Kagarlitskii. Periferiinaia imperiia: Rossiia i mikrosistema. Moscow,
2003.
7
For an overview of a transitology approach see: J. Linz, A. Stepan. Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and PostCommunist Europe. Baltimore, 1996; G. ODonnell, Ph. Schmitter, L. Whitehead (Eds.).
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore, 1986. Vols. 1-4; a significant work by a
Russian political scientist is: A. Iu. Melvil. Demokraticheskie tranzity: Teoretiko-metodologicheskie i prikladnye aspekty. Moscow, 1999. For criticism of transitology approach see: S. Cohen. Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist
Russia. New York, 2000. For the modernization approach, see, for instance: N. F. Naumova. Retsidiviruiuschaia modernizatsiia v Rossii: Beda, vina ili resurs chelovechestva. Moscow, 1999. Naumova examines post-Soviet transformation by using a concept
of belated modernization and using examples from third world countries.
8
An American developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst, Erik Erikson explored
the antisocial, marginal, and rebellious behavior of patients who acted in defiance of the
commonly accepted and expected norms imposed by family and society. See: E. Erikson.
Identity Crisis in Perspective // Idem. Life History and the Historical Moment. New
York, 1975. Pp. 20-21.
471
/Reviews
that is unacceptable to the members
of the group or a community, in a
word, in the quality of an antipode
(P. 271; emphasis mine). He further
extrapolates the notion of negative
identity onto an entire post-Soviet
society by pointing out that the society in focus is glued together by a
common response to this negative
(prohibited and feared) entity; in
short, by its relation to what represents a taboo for the society (P. 272).
The author concludes that such a
society is based not on positive but
on negative civic solidarity; in other words, on unity in dependence,
fear, resistance to any initiatives and
stimuli that would lead to a higher
productivity and intensiveness of
achievements, to openness, goodheartedness, to an increased quality
and value of actions. This is a solidarity that leads to a collective identity of baseness (P. 283).
As clearly stated in the preface
to this volume, social asthenia, apathy, and indifference, a lack of if
idealistic hope for a better future,
and of aspirations of self-perfection
(P. 10) rules in Russia. As well as
the present, Russian history is a subject of pessimistic, negative thinking. As follows from the Victory in
the War: To the Sociology of a Certain National Symbol (1997), Russian citizens prefer sacralization of
victory to rationalization of history and identify as the most important events of the 20th century wars
472
and other catastrophes: the 1945 victory in the Great Patriotic War is
considered by the majority of Russians as the defining moment of their
national history, followed by the
October Revolution, the Chernobyl
tragedy, the dissolution of the USSR,
and Stalinist repressions (Pp. 21-29).
Russians therefore view their past as
a chronic of fatal, natural disasters,
and of their surmounting (P. 22).
According to Gudkov, this catastrophic mindset is the corner stone
of Russian mentality.
For Gudkov, the deficit in positive attitude multiplied by the hollowness of the intellectual space of
recent years are products of the Soviet totalitarian past, as the disintegration of a repressive society brings
about no sense of release from the
constraint of poverty, no feeling of
being finally freed from eternal captivity. Neither is it accompanied by
any particular enthusiasm, idealism
or new-found universal love. Quite
the opposite, post-totalitarianism
presents a deadly cocktail of collective depression and aggression: in
Russia communism gave way not to
a new Silver Age, but to a futile era
of imitation, postmodernism, universal piss-taking, xenophobia and
Kremlin-led sobornost.
To support these claims and to
complement the data received from
opinion polls, Gudkov resorts to the
debatable concept of totalitarianism.
In Totalitarianism as a Theoreti-
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
cal Framework: Attempts at Revision of a Controversial Concept
(2001), the author affirms that totalitarianism is an appropriate notion
to be applied to the Soviet era. The
author attributes the current Russian
condition to residual totalitarian societal structures that influence the
formation of mass consciousness (P.
419). The main argument running as
a red thread through this volume is
that contemporary Russian society
is best understood as a post-totalitarian one, and that it is the lingering culture of homo sovieticus that
impedes positive change. The narrative reaches its culmination when
the author concludes that his is a
society that is empty from within
(Pp. 287-293), and then proceeds to
ask whether an entire society can
qualify as an immoral one.
As a totalitarian empire, the Soviet Union existed in the regime of
chronic mobilization that made its
citizens feel as if they were living in
a constant state of emergency in an
occupied fortress (P. 132). In the
The Ideologeme of an Enemy
(2001), Gudkov argues that the vestiges of totalitarianism such as hypocritical doublethink and moral relativism are complemented by a
combination of the official cult of
heroism, self-sacrifice and hostagetaking (P. 553), which still constitute part of the mind-set of the average Russian. Gudkov depicts the
post-Soviet man as being overcome
/Reviews
perceive to be their enemies (P.
200).
Linked to, and symptomatic of,
negative identity are both xenophobia of the masses and ideational
nationalism of the educated elites.
Both are largely inspired by compensatory defense mechanisms (P. 205).
The author ponders the disappearing
gap between the intelligentsia and
the average person, as the intelligentsia can no longer stand as a consciousness of the nation nor carry
enlightenment and humanism to the
masses (P. 206). Members of the
intelligentsia have freed themselves
from a sense of responsibility that
was one of their definitional characteristics in the past. What is more,
the level of intolerance rises in those
with higher education, and is higher
in Moscow than in the rest of the
country (P. 209). Finally, it is among
the youngest and the oldest generations that one finds the most alarming levels of xenophobia. While the
opinions of fathers and sons might
differ, grandfathers and sons share
their beliefs (P. 188). Gudkov concludes that xenophobia is the price
of centralization and strengthening
state control.
Xenophobic and nationalistic
beliefs often coincide with a neotraditionalist worldview, as ethnic phobias are part of neotraditionalist and
quasi-traditionalist mechanisms of
social regulation (Pp. 177-182). Social particularism and the rejection
474
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
processes and for heavily overusing
the Western concepts of social
stratification, middle class, social elite, representative system,
presidential republic, as well as the
ethic of entrepreneurship and the
division of powers and civil society; and claims these can be used
but with reservation in the Russian
case (P. 6). Yet at the same time,
Gudkov resorts to definitely Western
theoretical notions of negative identity and totalitarianism to prove his
case.
Heavily indebted to the works of
Western maitres, the author falls
prey to the post-Soviet vogue of applying identity and personality theories to the study of society.9 Additionally, Gudkov does it in a rather
repetitive manner: at times the reader
is faced with the same account of the
negative identity of post-Soviet society (with some paragraphs and arguments appearing copied verbatim
twice or more throughout the book).
It is therefore not difficult to imagine that these numerous articles
present a better reading as separate
pieces than as a collection.
It is with these reservations regarding the theoretical contribution
of the author that one should approach this book. If done so, this
compilation of articles can be of
great interest to those looking for
See, for instance: D. Rancour-Laferriere. Russian Nationalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective: Imagining Russia. Lewiston, 2000; also, by the same author: The
Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering. New York, 1995.
9
475
/Reviews
Alexander OGDEN
/ ., ., , .
. . . . -: -, 2003. 396 . ISBN: 5-94380024-7.
The spoken word, stories retained
only in memory, and the oral transmission of narratives, both historical and fictional, have a crucial place
both in the underground survival of
culture during times of repression
and also in any subsequent public
confrontation with those times of
repression. In such periods, when
oppression and censorship make official documents suspect and unofficial writings dangerous, oral sources provide a valuable corrective. As
a team of glasnost-era Russian oral
historians wrote, quoting a prevailing sentiment, for us the documents
are subjective, and the only things
which might be objective are the
memories.1 Hallmarks of the Stalin period include Akhmatovas entrusting her Requiem to the memory
1
Daria Khubova, Andrei Ivankiev, and Tonia Sharova. After Glasnost: Oral History in
the Soviet Union // Luisa Passerini (Ed.). Memory and Totalitarianism. International
Yearbook of Oral History and Life Stories. Vol. 1. Oxford, 1992. P. 96.
2
Lydia Chukovskaya. The Akhmatova Journals / Trans. Milena Michalski et al. New
York, 1994. Vol. 1. P. 6. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The Gulag Archipelago, 19181956:
An Experiment in Literary Investigation / Trans. Harry Willetts. New York, 1992. Vol.
3. P. 526.
3
On the movements, see Khubova et al. Op. Cit. On reclaiming the past, see Irina
Sherbakova. The Gulag in Memory // Passerini (Ed.). Op. Cit. Pp. 105-106.
476
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
to acquaint the Russian reader with
an extraordinarily varied and dynamic trend in the social sciences,
which has received the name of oral
history. As such, the collection provides a succinct overview of how the
field developed in the West.
In a quite detailed introduction,
Loskutova, of the European University in St. Petersburg, surveys the
development of oral history as an
academic discipline in Western Europe and the United States. She first
notes the tendency in treatments by
Western scholars to stress both the
ancient roots and the novelty of oral
history as an approach and then turns
to the unique development of the
field in various nations, at the same
time raising many of the theoretical
and institutional issues that have
shaped that development. While in
the United States, in the work of
Allan Nevins and others, oral history began as an approach to the lives
of great men in politics and industry and only later took on an interest in history from below (as reflected, for example, in the work of
Studs Terkel and Alex Haley), in
Great Britain it emerged from the beginning from social history, ethnography, and studies of the working
class experience. Turning to Italy,
Loskutova notes the tendency there
to combine research and social activism and also points out the importance of less formal working groups
and circles. Germany and France
came late to oral history, for reasons
of both academic proclivities and
institutional culture. Loskutova also
traces the impact of the linguistic
turn in the social sciences on oral
history, leading to a shift from an
emphasis on science and objectivity
to a focus on individual realities,
narrative theory, and the nature of
memory and its social construction.
The introduction covers material
found in previous English-language
surveys of the topic, but Loskutovas
treatment also makes good use of a
range of more specialized sources
and provides a satisfying synthesis
of the fields evolution.4
Many of the eleven works anthologized here are classics of oral
history study, and the authors include
some of the most widely published
and highly regarded in the field:
Alessandro Portelli (2 articles),
Michael Frisch, Jan Vansina, Paul
Thompson, Tamara Hareven,
Alistair Thomson, Luisa Passerini,
Ronald Grele, Gabriele Rosenthal,
and Patrick H. Hutton. Originally
written between 1972 and 1993, the
articles and excerpts have all appeared in English, including three
General studies and anthologies drawn on include the following: Paul Thompson. The
Voice of the Past. Oxford, 1988; David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum (Eds.). Oral
History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Walnut Creek, 1996; and Robert Perks and
Alistair Thomson. The Oral History Reader. London and New York, 1998.
4
477
/Reviews
that had their first publications in
Italian. Categorizing her selections
into six sections, Loskutova first offers discussions of the nature and
tasks of oral history (sections Oral
History: Approaches and Problems
and Oral History and Oral Tradition), then moves to applications of
oral history methods and case studies (sections Oral History and Social-Demographic and Economic
History, Oral History and the Political History of the Twentieth Century, and Practical Aspects of the
Researchers Work: Conducting the
Interview and Interpreting It), and
ends with one selection marking the
trend toward relating oral history
studies to issues of tradition and collective memory (the section History and Memory).
In addition to a good selection of
articles, the volume makes the material easily accessible, with intelligent excerpting and editing, informative editors footnotes, biographies of all the contributors, and an
annotated index. Published by the
European University in St. Petersburg and funded by the Open Society Institute (Soros Fund) and the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, it is attractively presented in a paper cover with a photo
collage and intriguing jacket quotations from Washington Irving and
5
The Oral History Reader, for example, comprises 39 articles and more thoroughly
covers the practical concerns and applications of oral history not included by Loskutova.
478
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
tle Memory and Totalitarianism.6
Western scholars, meanwhile including Paul Thompson, whom
Loskutova calls the British founder
of oral history took advantage of
new access to informants to conduct
extensive oral history interviews in
Russia, leading to numerous articles
and books based on oral sources.7 A
vital connection between oral history and Russian Studies in the West
began much earlier: the first systematic in-depth interviews with Soviet
migrs in the early 1950s coincided
with the dawn of modern oral history and continued with subsequent
projects that together augmented
6
Passerini (Ed.). Op. Cit. See in particular Khubova et al. After Glasnost. Pp. 89-101;
Irina Sherbakova. The Gulag in Memory. Pp. 103-115; Sherbakova. Voices from the
Choir: Reflections on the Development of Oral History in Russia // Ibid. Pp. 188-191;
and the review article by Daniel Bertaux of: Alain Brossat et al. A lEst la mmoire
retrouve // Ibid. Pp. 206-207.
7
On work by Thompson and his colleagues in Russia, see: Ray Pahl, Paul Thompson.
Meanings, Myths and Mystifications: The Social Construction of Life Stories in Russia //
C. M. Hann (Ed.). When History Accelerates. London, 1994. Pp. 130-160; Daniel Bertaux. Transmission in Extreme Situations: Russian Families Expropriated by the October Revolution // Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson (Eds.). Pathways to Social Class.
Oxford, 1997. Pp. 230-258; Daniel Bertaux, Anna Rotkirch, and Paul Thompson. Living
Through Soviet Russia (Memory and Narrative). London and New York, 2003. For
Thompsons own oral history interview on his work in Russia, see: Paul Thompson.
Life Story Interview with Karen Worcman / Interviews dated June 1996 [with subsequent annotations]. Pp. 67-70. Available at http://www.esds.ac.uk/qualidata/online/data/
edwardians/biography/PaulThompsonLifeStoryInterview1996.pdf. Last time consulted
November 23, 2006. See also: Robert Perks. By Train to Samarkand: A View of Oral
History in the Soviet Union // Oral History. 1991. Vol. 19. No. 1-2. Pp. 64-67.
8
On the Harvard Emigre Interview Project, 19511953, see http://
daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/research_portal/emigre.html. The most extensive subsequent
project (2750 informants) was the Soviet Interview Project, 1979-85, sponsored by the
U.S. National Council for Soviet and East European Research. See http://
webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/08694.xml. Last time consulted November 23, 2006. Se also: E. V. Kodin. Garvardskii proekt. Moscow, 2003. Kodins
book was reviewed by Irina Roldugina in Ab Imperio, see: Ab Imperio. 2006. No. 2.
Pp.419-425.
479
/Reviews
given the frequent calls for a more
nuanced understanding of oral history interviews as collective
creation[s] and joint activities, organized and informed by the historical perspectives of both participants in other words, as dialogue.9
Oral history is burgeoning in
Russia and other former republics.10
It has received institutional support,
with oral history centers at the European University of St. Petersburg
and the Russian State Humanities
University in Moscow, as well as
regional centers in Petrozavodsk,
Perm, and elsewhere. As it often has
elsewhere, oral history also offers
important alternative voices to the
countrys official historical narrative: recent publications include ones
focusing on the voices and perspectives of camp survivors, Muslims in
Dagestan, and Armenian women
who witnessed events from the 1915
genocide to violence in Nagorno-
9
Ronald J. Grele. Movement Without Aim: Methodological and Theoretical Problems
in Oral History // Perks and Thomson. The Oral History Reader. Pp. 42, 44.
10
For a discussion of recent developments, see P. V. Krylov. Obretenie istoricheskogo
slukha: Paradigmy izucheniia neofitsialnoi pamiati // NLO. 2005. No. 74. See http://
magazines.russ.ru/nlo/2005/74/kry27.html. Last time consulted November 23, 2006.
11
I. L. Shcherbakova. Pamiat GULAGa. Opyt issledovaniia memuaristiki i ustnykh
svidetelstv byvshikh uznikov // Vek pamiati, pamiat veka. Opyt obrashcheniia s proshlym v XX stoletii. Cheliabinsk, 2004. T. Sivertseva. Kulturnaia transformatsiia i smena
identichnostei (Dagestan, Tsumaninskii raion) // Identichnost i konflikt v postsovetskikh
gosudarstvakh. M, 1997. Pp. 168-183; H.Gevorgyan. Iskusstvo byt: Ritmy dvadtsatogo
stoletiia. Erevan, 2003.
12
Thus all the methodological references in Gevorgyan, for example, are to Western
sources. Meanwhile a complete Russian translation of Paul Thompsons fundamental
study The Voice of the Past has appeared as: Golos proshlogo: Ustnaia istoriia. Moscow,
2003.
480
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
Richard Kieckhefer, Theology in
Stone: Church Architecture From
Byzantium to Berkeley (Oxford &
New York: Oxford University Press,
2004). 372 pp., ill. Index. ISBN:
0-19-515466-5.
, .
: , .
:
,
.
,
, . , ,
,
. -
, , ,
.
,
: ; , ;
; , .
.
,
.
( ),
(
).
5-7.
8
,
. ,
, .
481
/Reviews
1
.
,
. () ,
,
.
,
. ,
( )
,
.
,
,
,
,
.
, ,
,
482
.
2 ,
.
, ,
. ,
, .
,
,
.
,
,
.
,
,
,
. (
, )
,
.
, -
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
,
. ,
,
, ,
, .
,
. .
,
: ; ; .
. ,
, , . ,
-
.
,
,
, , .
.
3
.
( ),
.
,
. ( )
, .
. , ( , )
. ,
483
/Reviews
. .
.
,
, , .
4 , (..
). , ,
.
(, .)
.
,
. ,
. .
,
484
, , . , ,
. , , , .
, , ,
, .
,
, , ,
, . ,
, ,
.
5 ( )
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. .
VIII .
,
. , 16 , ,
.
, , . , ,
, , ,
,
,
.
,
.
,
,
,
,
,
.
6
( ,
).
,
,
, , .
,
,
, . XIX
. .
,
, , .
, . ,
,
,
.
485
/Reviews
.
, .
.
XIX .
,
. ,
. , .
. , ,
.
( , ,
). ,
(. 227) ,
,
.
486
,
,
:
(mediation) , (intercession) , (proclamation)
.
7
(1897 1961).
., ()
. .
,
, ,
.
,
.
,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
,
. , ,
.
, ,
. , ,
,
.
8
()
.
. .
(
!),
.
1960- . ,
.
, , .
, :
?
,
,
. , , ,
,
.
,
, ,
. .
III .
-
,
.
487
/Reviews
, ,
:
, .
, ,
,
,
.
.
, , ,
, ,
.
, , ,
. , . -
(. 115),
,
(Evagr. Hist. Eccl. 4.31),
.
(. 116),
.
, (.
156),
, ,
.
,
.
,
,
(, .
58).
: .1
, ,
,
. ., , : P. Bradshaw (Ed.). The New SCM Dictionary of Liturgy and Worship. London, 2002; idem.
1
488
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
: , ,
. ,
.2 , ,
, ,
, .
.
, -
The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship. London, 1992; G. J. Cumming. A
History of Anglican Liturgy. Toronto, 1969; C. Jones, G. Wainwright, E. Yarnold. The
Study of Liturgy. London, 1978; D. Withey. Catholic Worship: An Introduction to Liturgy.
London, 1990; G. Dix. The Shape of the Liturgy New York, 1978; J. Danielou. The
Bible and the Liturgy. Notre Dame, Ind., 1956.
: . . . . -,
2000; . . . ii ii: i i i.
i, 2002; . ii . i, 2001. ., , : R. Krautheimer. Early Christian and Byzantine Architecture. New Haven, 1986;
R. Ousterhaut. Master Builders of Byzantium. Princeton, 1999; A. Grabar. Martyrium:
recherches sur le culte de reliques et lart chretien antique. Paris, 1946; S. Ristow.
Frhchristlische Baptisterien // Jahrbuch fr Antike und Christentum, Ergnzungsband.
27. Mnster, 1998; P. Donceel-Vote. Les pavements des glises byzantines de Syrie et
du Liban. Dcor, archologie et liturgie. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1988 .
2
, , - . ., , ,
: . - - . . 1. , . -, 1995. : . . . . , 2002; . . , . . , . . . :
// . 2005. 1. C. 72-80; . . . - (
-) // ,
, -. , 2002. . 71-75. , ,
, , . , :
(-, ). , , . , 1992
( : -, 1899). . 1-2; ( ). ,
, 1994 ( : -, 1856).
489
/Reviews
. 3
,
, ,
.
terra
incognita, . ,
,
,
,
,
, ,
, ,
.
3
( )
(
. :
.
, 2004; . . ( VI .). 2. ,
2005. . 680-1025). , ,
!
490
ii.
i i. -: , 2003.
243 . ISBN: 5-94716-032-3.
, XIX .
, . 1891 .
,1
. . .
,
.
.2
. , , ()
? // ARCHE. 2003. 3. . 5.
2
, : . . . . ,
2003. . 1; 2005. . 2. .
. , 2003, :
. . . . 1996, . , . . . . 1993.
1
/Reviews
. 3
,
, ,
.
terra
incognita, . ,
,
,
,
,
, ,
, ,
.
3
( )
(
. :
.
, 2004; . . ( VI .). 2. ,
2005. . 680-1025). , ,
!
490
ii.
i i. -: , 2003.
243 . ISBN: 5-94716-032-3.
, XIX .
, . 1891 .
,1
. . .
,
.
.2
. , , ()
? // ARCHE. 2003. 3. . 5.
2
, : . . . . ,
2003. . 1; 2005. . 2. .
. , 2003, :
. . . . 1996, . , . . . . 1993.
1
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , , . ,
., ,
, ,
.
,
.
. ,
(
1863 . . ).
,
,
.
, , , .
, .
.
() .
, .
, , . , XVIII .,
.
, 1772 .,
.
XVIII .
. .
XIX . (1863 1864 .)
,
,
.3
. . . ( XVIII XIX .) /
... , 2003. . 16.
3
491
/Reviews
,
.
( 70%) (. 16) , . . .
.
,
,
. , (.. )
(. 17).
., , -
, ..
-
XIX .4 -
.5
.
. :
,
,
.
, -
, ,
1895 . ,
(. 17).
,6
1905 .
.7
,
.
i. 1910. 38. . 8.
. 48. . 1-16.
6
. 1910. 50. . 3-6.
7
1905 1907 // . . . 2001. . 227, 228.
4
5
492
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. , , . .
, ,
(C. 23).
;
,
- . ,
, -.
() , ,8 80%
,
.
,
.
,
, ,
(
, ). 9
,
.
(,
),
, ,10
,
,11 -
. . //
-Albaruthenica: . 2. . 1993. . 269; . . // . . 278.
9
.
10
// . . 2002. . 6. . 199-203.
11
. .. . - (1914 1917 .) // : . i, 2003. . 2. . 137.
8
493
/Reviews
.
(. 25),
.
.
, - -
.
1918 . .
.
,
.
-
.
,
. 12
,
. ,
.
1918 . () , . . . , -, , ,
,
.12 1918 .
.
,
, .
,
. ,
-
. . . . . 2006. . 34.
494
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .
, ..
,
, , ,
. ,
, .
,
,
.
1 1919 . (), , ..
.
, ,
. ,
-
, , ,
(. 40). , ,
,
,
. ,
, .
,
.
(), ..
,
.
1919 . ,
. (. 43).
,
495
/Reviews
.
.
. ,
.
,
. . .
. , . , , . ,
( ) .
,
,
(. 60).
.
496
.
, .
,
.
, ..
,
.
,
1930- .
:
, ,
.
,
1920- . (. 63-66).
, ,
,
,
. , ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. ,
. ,
,
,
. ,
80% .13 : , ,
.
.
, ,
.
, .
, ,
13
, .
.
,
, , ,
.
, .
-
,
, ..
(
-
). .
, -
497
/Reviews
,
. (.
82), .. , . ,
:
XIV . ,
,
.
,
, , .
; ,
, .
, , . , ,
,
(. 98). ,
498
.
,
, . ,
, ,
,
.
,
.
, .
,
(C. 108),
-
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
(.
107).
. , ,
. -
,
.
.
, , 1920- .,
.
,
.
,
. , .. -
(. 117-118).
, 1940 . (. 119). -
,
. , ,
,
. ,
- ,
.
.
,
.
.
,
- (C.
124). ,
. 499
/Reviews
,
,
, ,
.. .
, ,
(. 133),
,
.14
- - . , , .
,
, 19
31
1941 .15 ,
,
. -
, , , (. 134),
.
,
. , . , , , ,
. 1942 .
(. 140),
, , ,
.
, ,
. ,
.
.
, , -
. . . - (1941-1944 .) / ...
... , 2005. . 10.
15
. . 1995. . 2. . 520.
14
500
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
60%
1943 .,16
20% (. 150). ,
,
. ,
- 80% , 20%, , .
,
.
,
, ,
, (C. 159).
1980- . . , (,
),
. , 16
, ,
.
.
, , .
, ,
.
,
. , (i
i, )
. , , , ,
,
. . 290.
501
/Reviews
.
(. 177), ,
. ,
. , . (.
175-176), . ,
(. 197).
,
, ,
[sic!]
.
(C. 184).
,
,
502
.
. , ,
( ,
,
.), ,
. , ,
1991 . , ,
(. 197).
, (
,
).
.
, -
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
. ,
.
, , .,
, .
. ,
,
.
, ,
,
,
.. ,
. , , ,
.
, ,
, .
, , . , , ,
,
.
Caroline Milow, Die Ukrainische
Frage 19171923 im Spannungsfeld
der europischen Diplomatie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002)
(=Veroffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts Mnchen. Reihe: Geschichte; Bd. 68). 572 S. ISBN: 3447-04482-9.
,
,
. ,
503
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
,
. ,
.
, , .,
, .
. ,
,
.
, ,
,
,
.. ,
. , , ,
.
, ,
, .
, , . , , ,
,
.
Caroline Milow, Die Ukrainische
Frage 19171923 im Spannungsfeld
der europischen Diplomatie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002)
(=Veroffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Instituts Mnchen. Reihe: Geschichte; Bd. 68). 572 S. ISBN: 3447-04482-9.
,
,
. ,
503
/Reviews
.
,
.1 1945 .
,
.
2002 ,
1917 1923 .
( 500 ) , 1998 .
,
.
,
,
,
.
-
1920-
. .
.
,
.
.
XIX , ,
,
, , . 1914 . , ,
. .: P. Borowsky. Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Brcksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen. Lbeck, 1970; P. Fedenko. Der nazionale und soziale Befraiungskampf der Ukraine. Berlin, 1923; F. Heyer. Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine
von 1917 bis 1945. Mnchen, 1953.
1
504
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
(S. 11).
,
, (S. 17). ,
, ,
.2
, ,
, (S. 18).
, ,3 -
.
, ,
:
,
, .
(1998 .) (2002 .) ,
.4
.: . . . . , 2003; . . . , 1991; . .
, , // . 1999. 3. . 16-19; . .
. . , 2004.
3
, . . . .: . . ,
: - // . 2003. 8. . 25-50; . . -
// . . . 73106; . . 18601870- : , , , // . . 107-126.
4
, .
., , :
. . . //
i . 2006. 3. . 84-88; . . . - 19001920 . // . 2005.
2
505
/Reviews
1917 .5 ,
1917 (S. 21-36),
,
, 1917 .
:
, ,
,
. ,
, (S. 36-47), (S. 4756)
. , ,
,
,
, . ,
,
, .
. ,
, , ,
. ,
. , ,
:
,
, . ,
2. . 162-167; M. . .
1918 . // . 1998. 5. . 40-52; . . .
(18431914) //
. 2006. 1. . 43-60.
5
. :
19171920. - . , 2001.
506
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ,
. . -, ,
,
:
( , ).
-, ,
,
,
.
,
,
.
,
, ,
, , . ,
. ,
.
( ,
)
, .
,
, . ,
, ,
, .
.
,
.6
6
, - , . .: . .
. , 1928; . . . , 1968; . . . , 2004; . .
. , 2002.
507
/Reviews
, ,
,
, . ,
: , , , ?
, ,
,
(
) ?
. -, :
-
. , ,
,
508
1917 1923 .
, , . -,
, ,
. (, Lukasevy,
Lotockyj ..)
. -,
,
, 1917 1923
. -,
(
80 ),
, ,
.
-
. .
,
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
, .
.
. , ,
,
, .7
, , .
, ,
.
.
:
,
.
. . , ( : : : / .
. . . ; . .
. . ; . . . . . : , 2005) // Ab
Imperio. 2006. 1. . 475.
7
, . : ,
?
. . . . - /
1968 . -: -
, , 2004. 252 c., . , ,
. ISBN: 5-98187-042-7.
2006 ,
-,
,
.
.1
. . .
(18471928): .
. . , 2000;
1
509
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
, .
.
. , ,
,
, .7
, , .
, ,
.
.
:
,
.
. . , ( : : : / .
. . . ; . .
. . ; . . . . . : , 2005) // Ab
Imperio. 2006. 1. . 475.
7
, . : ,
?
. . . . - /
1968 . -: -
, , 2004. 252 c., . , ,
. ISBN: 5-98187-042-7.
2006 ,
-,
,
.
.1
. . .
(18471928): .
. . , 2000;
1
509
/Reviews
,
-,
.
13 , ,
, .
,
,
.
,
, .
,
.
,
. . ( ).
, ,
.
(80 )
,
(15
),
. , . . ,
:
, ,
,
,
19
1928 .
,
, . .
, . ,
,
. . ,
,
1968 .
-
. . . . II.
, 2004; / . . . .
, 2005; . . : ,
. , 2001; C. Hall. Little Mother of Russia: A
Biography of Empress Marie Feodorovna (1847 1928). New York, 2001.
510
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
, , .
.
, .
,
, ,
, 1921
2004 .
,
,
.
, ,
, -
. ,
,
, , .
, II
.
I
.
. ,
.
: C
, , ,
, , (. 62). (
, ,
)
.
, , ,
. 22
.
.
, , , ,
. .
.
. ,
511
/Reviews
: ,
. ; , -,
.
, ,
-
(. 35).
,
- 1904 .
II
, ,
,
.
- .
-,
-. 1914 .
,
II
-; 512
.
1914 ,
.
, II
. 1915 .
- II,
.
,
1916 . .
. ,
.
,
. .
, - .
,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
.
13 ,
, .
,
. ,
,
.
, .
,
,
, ,
.
,
,
.
II .
,
. , , - (. . ) ,
. II
:
, ,
, , , .2
:
....3
,
.
. . . .
. . 1920
.
.4
. ,
.
. . . . 180.
. . 209.
4
. . . , 2000. . 232-256.
2
3
513
/Reviews
.
,
.
,
. , .
, ,
.
,
, . ,
, 1919 ., ,
.
.
.
5
. . . 209.
514
.
1922
(
).
.
, .
. ,
,
. . .
19 1928 .5
- .
, ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
,
(. 100).
. , , .
,
,
,
.
1940
Berlingske Tudende , , , , 13 ,
,
. 12 25 1941 .
1946 .
, 1968 .
.
: -
, .
.
, ,
,
(. 100).
, ,
,
. .
,
.
.
, - .
.
. . . , ,
18- (. 6).
.
515
/Reviews
21-22 .
, 22
.
(.
77) ,
. (. 114) , .
. 6
. , .
,
. ,
, . . . ,
. M. .
.
.
. . . . 187; C. Hall. p. 330331.
6
516
Rebecca Kay, Men in Contemporary Russia: The Fallen Heroes of
Post-Soviet Change? (Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate, 2006). 246 pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 0-75464485-5.
,
,
,
.1
,
10 , , , ,
R. Kay. Russian Women and their Organizations: Gender, Discrimination and
Grassroots Womens Organisations, 1991
1996, Basingtoke, 2000; eadem. Images of
an Ideal Woman: Perceptions of Russian
Womanhood through the Media, Education and Womens Own Eyes // M. Buckley (Ed.). Post-Soviet Women: From the
Baltic to Central Asia. Cambridge, 1997.
Pp. 77-98.
1
/Reviews
21-22 .
, 22
.
(.
77) ,
. (. 114) , .
. 6
. , .
,
. ,
, . . . ,
. M. .
.
.
. . . . 187; C. Hall. p. 330331.
6
516
Rebecca Kay, Men in Contemporary Russia: The Fallen Heroes of
Post-Soviet Change? (Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate, 2006). 246 pp. Bibliography, Index. ISBN: 0-75464485-5.
,
,
,
.1
,
10 , , , ,
R. Kay. Russian Women and their Organizations: Gender, Discrimination and
Grassroots Womens Organisations, 1991
1996, Basingtoke, 2000; eadem. Images of
an Ideal Woman: Perceptions of Russian
Womanhood through the Media, Education and Womens Own Eyes // M. Buckley (Ed.). Post-Soviet Women: From the
Baltic to Central Asia. Cambridge, 1997.
Pp. 77-98.
1
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
(
, .).
,
,2
.
.
.
:
?
, ,
.
,
, ,
.
-,
.
.
, ,
, ,
,
517
/Reviews
.
, ,
, .
,
. .
, ,
. , 1990- .,
,
.
.
,
, 518
,
. , ,
, ,
. . , ,
. ,
. ,
,
.
.
: .
,
,
. ( , , ) -
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, ( , , ) ...
. ,
( , ,
)
,
.
. , ,
(,
..), ( ,
, ). ,
, , . ,
. , -, -,
(), -
( ).
, , , , ,
, .
. , . , ,
(), (), (,
) ,
(
) (, , ).
.
.
,
. 519
/Reviews
,
(, , ),
,
.
, . , ,
,
. , , ,
.
-,
,
.
,
, . -,
,
520
.
.
,
, ,
,
. , .
,
,
, ,
,
. ,
, , ,
, ,
,
.
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
. , , ,
,
,
. , , ,
,
.
,
.
,
, .
.
,
. : , ,
,
,
,
, , .
, ,
- ,
.
, , ,
-
.
, :
.
,
.
, , , ,
521
/Reviews
. ,
, .
.
,
, .
,
, ,
, ,
.
, ,
, , -
.
,
, . ,
,
.
,
, ,
.
, , , ,
, ,
,
.
, , , ,3
3
., , : : C /
522
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
.
-
,
, . ,
- 2006 . ,
,
.
,
. - , , ,
,
.
, , , .
.
,
. , , ,
,
, ,
,
,
.
: . / . . . 2004. .
1; .
523
/Reviews
Richard Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya:
From Past to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005). 300 pp. ISBN: 184331-165-8.
- ,
.
. .1 2
,
.
.3 ,
-
, , -, ,
, .., ,
.
- . ,
,
.
,
.
,
, .
, , :
,4 -
1
T. German. Russias Chechen War. London, 2003. . : Ab
Imperio. 2005. 4. . 417-425.
2
/ C. . . , . . . , 2002.
3
Terra incognita. // . 2002.
1(21), - . http://www.nz-online.ru/index.phtml?aid=55011598.
30 2006 . . : http://www.nz-online.ru/
index.phtml?aid=55011599. 30 2006 . . . : (20022004 ) // .
2004. 6(38). .: http://www.nz-online.ru/index.phtml?aid=25011267.
30 2006 .
4
: . , 1999. .: http://www.sakharovcenter.ru/chs/. 30 2006 .
524
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1999 ., de facto.
. , ,
.
.
, , . ( ).
, .
5
,
,
. , . -
,
.
,
6
, , 2000 .
. 7 (
). ,
.
.8 .
,9
. , Frankfurter Rundschau
5
: ( ) / .
. . . . . , 2001.
6
.: http://www.chechnyafree.ru/index.php?lng=rus§ion=historyrus&row=14.
30 2006 .
7
. . ( ).
, 2002.
8
.: http://www.chechenfund.ru/publ.htm. 30
2006 .
9
F. Hassel (Hrsg.). Der Krieg im Schatten: Russland und Tschetschenien. Frankfurt/
Main, 2003.
525
/Reviews
,
:
10 . , , ,
.
, ,
, .
. - , ,
, ..
.
,
,
.
-
.
1. . ,
.
2. -
.
3.
(2003)
(. . )
.
4. ,
.
( , , )
:
. , .
(
), 1
2,
( 3),
,
,
.
:
B. Fowkes (Ed.). Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis. Essays on RussoChechen Relation. Basingstoke, 1998.
10
526
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
1 , ; 2,
, ; 3 4. ,
.
, ,
(), ( ) .
: , ? : ,
. , ,
.
,
!!!
(Pp. 36-39),
,
(Pp. 292-293). ,
, , , - ,
,
(P. 41).
, (P. 179). ,
,
11 ,12
.13
?
,
. ,
-
.: http://www.chechenpress.info. 30 2006 .
.: http://www.daymokh.info. 30 2006 .
13
, http://www.chechnyafree.ru http://www.kavkaz.strana.ru.
30 2006 .
11
12
527
/Reviews
? ,
.
,
,
1990- (P. 7).
. ,
2005
, , , . , ,
() . ,
14 . , . - .
. , . -
,
,
,
,
,
. ,
? !
, - ,
( )
.
13 .
( ,
. , )
.
: . , . . (Robert Bruce
Ware), . (Peter
Shearman), . (Matthew
Sussex), . (Mike Bowker),
. (John Russel), . (James Huges) .
, . , , . , . , ,
14
.: http://radikaly.ru/download.php?f_id=12. 30 2006 .
528
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
. (Tom de Waal)
.
,
, , .
, . ,
.
, , .
?
. , . (Michael Hetcher) ,
, .
(Henry E. Hale) , , , .
,
. . (Daniel
Treisman) ,
. , , -
, (P. 2). ,
. . (David Latin) ,
,
,
.
. , (P. 3).
,
,
, .
, , , , ,
,
(. 4).
,
:
529
/Reviews
1) - , ,
2)
(constricted state
building) (. 4).
, , ,
,
.
, ,
.
,
(. 9). C . (Anatol Lieven):
,
... , (P. 9). , ,
,
, .
19961999 , ,
530
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, (. 20).
, ,
.
,
, ,
, ( ).
,
. , . , , , ,
1997
, , (. 29). ( 2003 .)
(, 2003 ., ,
2004 .),
, , ,
(. 37).
,
, ,
(
)
,
.
. ,
, ,
. ,
.
,
.
, . 1989 .
65,7%,
24,8% ,
,
.
48,5% 43,3% ,
.
, .
94% , 40-50%
,
. ,
531
/Reviews
,
. 1994 .
92%
. ,
. 1990-1991 .,
11% (18% 3% ) .
.
,
.
,
.
.
. ,
1999 ., .
:
.
532
, , ,
. , ,
. , (P.
80) (.
: 1994
(P. 67)),
(P.
87),
(P. 96),
(P. 98).
, , .
, :
,
- . 1999 . ,
(P. 88). ,
,
, ,
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, .. (ibid.). ,
(
, . ), -
21 2004 .,
( ), ,
(P. 101).
, ,
(. 90-96). ,
.
9 1999 . ,
,
.
. .
. . 25
, , ,
, ..
. 30-40 ,
610 ,
4 .15
:
.
,
50
, .
, ,
2001 .,
..
. - ,
, , , -
:
http://www.memo.ru. 30 2006 .
15
533
/Reviews
,
- .. ,
, .
- , c- . -,
,
, , ,
-
.. ( (P. 161),
..) , , ,
(Pp. 175-180),
, -, ,
, .
. . . .
, -,
. 534
.
. . ,
11 . .
. , , - .
, :
, 12 1997
. , ,
.
, ,
, .
,
, , , , .
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , ,
, -, -, . maronoff@rci.rutgers.edu
, , , , , . bayer@rice.edu
, ..., ,
XX , , , .
biktashi@mail.ru
, Ph.D., , , , , , . chalperi@indiana.edu
, ,
, , . bennogam@gmx.de
, , ,
, , . ivangololobov@mail.ru
, . . ., , , , .
agronskij@yandex.ru
, , , , , .
ernest_gyidel@yahoo.com
, ..., , , -, . dolbilov@icmail.ru
, , .
, - , , . kamenskii@list.ru
535
, Ph.D., , , ,
, . j.kennedy@ed.ac.uk
, ..., , , , , . maksymkyrczaniw@rambler.ru
, . . , , , , . kuksin@sbcglobal.net
, , , , -, , .
maiorova@umich.edu
, , ,
, , . louisem@email.unc.edu
, ..., , , . . . , , . novikova_l@gmx.net
, ..., , ,
. nosen@cityline.ru
, , , , , , , . ogdenj@gwm.sc.edu
, , , , . Peunova3@hei.unige.ch
, Ph.D., ,
, , ,
. liliana.riga@strath.ac.uk
, , ,
, . sahlins@socrates.berkeley.edu
, . . , ,
, . . . , , . gekata2000@mail.ru
, , , , .
trubina@uralmail.com
536
Ab Imperio, 4/2006
, , . . . , , . khrapunovn@mail.ru
, , ,
, , . ntsimbaev@mtu-net.ru
-, , , , , .
R.Chamberlain-Creanga@lse.ac.uk
, . . ., ,
, -, . sofia@eu.spb.ru
, , . , - , , . uho@ukma.kiev.ua
537